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authorArne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>2014-04-23 09:56:37 +0200
committerArne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>2014-04-23 09:56:37 +0200
commite436c963f0976b885a7db04681344779e26dd3b5 (patch)
tree240663106f32e02e1c34080656f4ef21a2e1776e /main/openssl/patches/npn.patch
parent6a99715a9b072fa249e79c98cd9f03991f0f1219 (diff)
Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1g and statically link OpenVPN with it
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/patches/npn.patch')
-rw-r--r--main/openssl/patches/npn.patch1293
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1293 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch b/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 46b7a7df..00000000
--- a/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1293 +0,0 @@
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.c 2010-11-11 14:42:19.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -3012,3 +3012,46 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int
- int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int siz)
- { return write(fileno(stdout),buf,siz); }
- #endif
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
-+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
-+ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
-+ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
-+ *
-+ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
-+ */
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
-+ {
-+ size_t len;
-+ unsigned char *out;
-+ size_t i, start = 0;
-+
-+ len = strlen(in);
-+ if (len >= 65535)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
-+ if (!out)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i)
-+ {
-+ if (i == len || in[i] == ',')
-+ {
-+ if (i - start > 255)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(out);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+ out[start] = i - start;
-+ start = i + 1;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ out[i+1] = in[i];
-+ }
-+
-+ *outlen = len + 1;
-+ return out;
-+ }
-+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.h 2009-10-31 13:34:19.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -358,3 +358,7 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *,int);
- #define TM_STOP 1
- double app_tminterval (int stop,int usertime);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in);
-+#endif
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
-+# endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
- #endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-@@ -367,6 +370,40 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb
-
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+ unsigned char *data;
-+ unsigned short len;
-+ int status;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
-+ {
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
-+
-+ if (!c_quiet)
-+ {
-+ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
-+ unsigned i;
-+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
-+ for (i = 0; i < inlen; )
-+ {
-+ if (i)
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
-+ i += in[i] + 1;
-+ }
-+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
-+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+ }
-+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
- #endif
-
- enum
-@@ -431,6 +468,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- char *servername = NULL;
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp =
- {NULL,0};
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-+# endif
- #endif
- char *sess_in = NULL;
- char *sess_out = NULL;
-@@ -658,6 +698,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
- { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+ {
-+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0)
- cutthrough=1;
-@@ -766,6 +813,21 @@ bad:
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ next_proto.status = -1;
-+ if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+ {
-+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
-+ if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+ {
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
-+ goto end;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ next_proto.data = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
- if (ssl_client_engine_id)
-@@ -896,6 +958,11 @@ bad:
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode);
- }
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (next_proto.data)
-+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+#endif
-+
- if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
- if (cipher != NULL)
- if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
-@@ -1755,6 +1822,18 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s
- BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n",
- expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
- #endif
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (next_proto.status != -1) {
-+ const unsigned char *proto;
-+ unsigned int proto_len;
-+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
-+ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
-+ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
-+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
- BIO_printf(bio,"---\n");
- if (peer != NULL)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_server.c 2010-06-15 17:25:02.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_server.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000
-@@ -492,6 +492,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
-+# endif
- #endif
- }
-
-@@ -826,6 +829,24 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- goto done;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+ unsigned char *data;
-+ unsigned int len;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg)
-+ {
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
-+
-+ *data = next_proto->data;
-+ *len = next_proto->len;
-+
-+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+ }
-+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN */
- #endif
-
- int MAIN(int, char **);
-@@ -867,6 +888,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-+ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-+# endif
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */
-@@ -1191,7 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
- s_key_file2= *(++argv);
- }
--
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+ {
-+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
- else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0)
-@@ -1476,6 +1507,11 @@ bad:
- if (vpm)
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm);
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (next_proto.data)
-+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-@@ -1617,6 +1653,21 @@ bad:
- goto end;
- }
- }
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+ {
-+ unsigned short len;
-+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len,
-+ next_proto_neg_in);
-+ if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+ goto end;
-+ next_proto.len = len;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ next_proto.data = NULL;
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
- RSA_free(rsa);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n");
-@@ -2159,6 +2210,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- X509 *peer;
- long verify_error;
- MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
-+ unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
-+#endif
-
- if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0)
- {
-@@ -2198,6 +2253,15 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf);
- str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)");
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
-+ if (next_proto_neg)
-+ {
-+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is ");
-+ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
-+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
-+ }
-+#endif
- if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n");
- if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) &
- TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
- /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
- int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
-+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-+
-+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen,
-+ void *arg);
-+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C
- #endif
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-+ const unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned int *outlen,
-+ void *arg), void *arg);
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
-+ void *arg);
-+
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
-+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-+ unsigned *len);
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
-+
-+#endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
-@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st
- void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
-
- SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-+ * extensions.
-+ *
-+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-+ * before the Finished message. */
-+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+#endif
-+
- #define session_ctx initial_ctx
- #else
- #define session_ctx ctx
-@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
-+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
-@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
- #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
- #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347
- #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
- #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
- #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- void *server_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-+ our peer. */
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-+
- struct {
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* read from server */
-@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- /* write to client */
-@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
- #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
- #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
-+#endif
- #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
-
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Temporary extension type */
- #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
-+#endif
-+
- /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
- #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
- /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
-+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ const char *sender;
-+ int slen;
-+
-+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+ {
-+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
-+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
-+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
-+ }
-+
-+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- int al,i,ok;
- long n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* the mac has already been generated when we received the
- * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
- */
-+#endif
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- a,
-@@ -521,6 +546,15 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, i
- s->init_num += i;
- n -= i;
- }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
-+ * Finished verification. */
-+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
-+#endif
-+
-+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -435,7 +435,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
-+
- s->init_num=0;
-
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-@@ -463,6 +472,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-
- break;
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
-+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-@@ -3060,6 +3078,32 @@ err:
- */
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
-+ unsigned char *d;
-+
-+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
-+ {
-+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-+ d[4] = len;
-+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
-+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
-+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
-+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
-+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
-+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
-+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
-+ s->init_off = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-+ }
-+# endif
-+
- int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -2230,6 +2230,15 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
- s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-+
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
-+ }
-+#endif
- }
-
- long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -1394,8 +1394,10 @@ err:
- int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- {
- int i;
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- const char *sender;
- int slen;
-+#endif
-
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
-@@ -1418,6 +1420,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
- return(0);
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* we have to record the message digest at
- * this point so we can get it before we read
- * the finished message */
-@@ -1434,6 +1437,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
-
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-+#endif
-
- return(1);
- }
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -538,7 +538,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- * the client uses its key from the certificate
- * for key exchange.
- */
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- else
-@@ -581,10 +588,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
-+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+ s->init_num = 0;
-+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-@@ -655,7 +679,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit)
-+ {
-+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#else
-+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+ else
-+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+#endif
-+ }
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num=0;
-@@ -3196,4 +3229,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
-+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
-+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+ {
-+ int ok;
-+ unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
-+ long n;
-+ const unsigned char *p;
-+
-+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-+ * extension in their ClientHello */
-+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-+ 514, /* See the payload format below */
-+ &ok);
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return((int)n);
-+
-+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (n < 2)
-+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-+
-+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-+
-+ /* The payload looks like:
-+ * uint8 proto_len;
-+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
-+ * uint8 padding_len;
-+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
-+ */
-+ proto_len = p[0];
-+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
-+ return 0;
-+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
-+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-+
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+# endif
- #endif
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
- /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
- int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
-+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-+
-+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen,
-+ void *arg);
-+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C
- #endif
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-+ const unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned int *outlen,
-+ void *arg), void *arg);
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
-+ unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in,
-+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
-+ void *arg);
-+
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
-+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-+ unsigned *len);
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
-+
-+#endif
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
-@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st
- void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
-
- SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-+ * extensions.
-+ *
-+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-+ * before the Finished message. */
-+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+#endif
-+
- #define session_ctx initial_ctx
- #else
- #define session_ctx ctx
-@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
-+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
-@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
- #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
- #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347
- #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
- #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
- #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- void *server_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-+ our peer. */
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-+
- struct {
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* read from server */
-@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#endif
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- /* write to client */
-@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
- #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
- #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
-+#endif
- #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
-
-
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
-+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
-@@ -355,6 +356,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->initial_ctx=ctx;
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
- #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+#endif
-+
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
-
-@@ -1503,6 +1511,124 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s
- return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- return -1;
- }
-+
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
-+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
-+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
-+ *
-+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
-+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
-+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
-+ *
-+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
-+ *
-+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
-+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
-+ * or have a default application level protocol.
-+ *
-+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
-+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
-+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
-+ *
-+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
-+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
-+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
-+ * a client should use.
-+ *
-+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
-+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
-+ *
-+ * It returns either
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
-+ */
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int i, j;
-+ const unsigned char *result;
-+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-+
-+ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-+ for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
-+ {
-+ for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-+ {
-+ if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-+ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* We found a match */
-+ result = &server[i];
-+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-+ goto found;
-+ }
-+ j += client[j];
-+ j++;
-+ }
-+ i += server[i];
-+ i++;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-+ result = client;
-+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+
-+ found:
-+ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-+ *outlen = result[0];
-+ return status;
-+ }
-+
-+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
-+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
-+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
-+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
-+ * provided by the callback.
-+ */
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
-+ {
-+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-+ if (!*data) {
-+ *len = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
-+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
-+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
-+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
-+ * it.
-+ *
-+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
-+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+ {
-+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-+ }
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
-+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
-+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
-+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
-+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
-+ *
-+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
-+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
-+ */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+ {
-+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-+ }
-+
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
-@@ -1667,6 +1793,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
- ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
- ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
-
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
-+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
-+# endif
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -968,6 +968,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
-+# endif
- #endif
-
- int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
-@@ -986,6 +989,9 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
-+#endif
-
- int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
- int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-16 13:26:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -494,6 +494,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
-+ {
-+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
-+ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
-+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+ s2n(0,ret);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
-
-@@ -505,6 +517,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+#endif
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-@@ -618,6 +633,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
-
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
-+ {
-+ const unsigned char *npa;
-+ unsigned int npalen;
-+ int r;
-+
-+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
-+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+ {
-+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
-+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+ s2n(npalen,ret);
-+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
-+ ret += npalen;
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
-
-@@ -982,6 +1019,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- else
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
-+ * renegotiation.
-+ *
-+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
-+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
-+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
-+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
-+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
-+ * anything like that, but this might change).
-+
-+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
-+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
-+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
-+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
-+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */
-+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
- data+=size;
-@@ -1005,6 +1064,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- return 1;
- }
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
-+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
-+ * the length of the block. */
-+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
-+ {
-+ unsigned int off = 0;
-+
-+ while (off < len)
-+ {
-+ if (d[off] == 0)
-+ return 0;
-+ off += d[off];
-+ off++;
-+ }
-+
-+ return off == len;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
- {
- unsigned short length;
-@@ -1139,6 +1218,39 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
-+ {
-+ unsigned char *selected;
-+ unsigned char selected_len;
-+
-+ /* We must have requested it. */
-+ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* The data must be valid */
-+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
-+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+ {
-+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
-+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
-+ }
-+#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000
-+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000
-@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Temporary extension type */
- #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
-+#endif
-+
- /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
- #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
- /* status request value from RFC 3546 */