From e436c963f0976b885a7db04681344779e26dd3b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arne Schwabe Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 09:56:37 +0200 Subject: Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1g and statically link OpenVPN with it --- main/openssl/patches/npn.patch | 1293 ---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1293 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 main/openssl/patches/npn.patch (limited to 'main/openssl/patches/npn.patch') diff --git a/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch b/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 46b7a7df..00000000 --- a/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1293 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.c 2010-11-11 14:42:19.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -3012,3 +3012,46 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int - int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int siz) - { return write(fileno(stdout),buf,siz); } - #endif -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string -+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. -+ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. -+ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi" -+ * -+ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure. -+ */ -+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in) -+ { -+ size_t len; -+ unsigned char *out; -+ size_t i, start = 0; -+ -+ len = strlen(in); -+ if (len >= 65535) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); -+ if (!out) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) -+ { -+ if (i == len || in[i] == ',') -+ { -+ if (i - start > 255) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(out); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ out[start] = i - start; -+ start = i + 1; -+ } -+ else -+ out[i+1] = in[i]; -+ } -+ -+ *outlen = len + 1; -+ return out; -+ } -+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.h 2009-10-31 13:34:19.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -358,3 +358,7 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *,int); - #define TM_STOP 1 - double app_tminterval (int stop,int usertime); - #endif -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in); -+#endif ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void) - BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); -+# endif - BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); - #endif - BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); -@@ -367,6 +370,40 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb - - return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ -+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { -+ unsigned char *data; -+ unsigned short len; -+ int status; -+} tlsextnextprotoctx; -+ -+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; -+ -+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) -+ { -+ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; -+ -+ if (!c_quiet) -+ { -+ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ -+ unsigned i; -+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); -+ for (i = 0; i < inlen; ) -+ { -+ if (i) -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); -+ i += in[i] + 1; -+ } -+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); -+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -+ } -+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ - #endif - - enum -@@ -431,6 +468,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - char *servername = NULL; - tlsextctx tlsextcbp = - {NULL,0}; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; -+# endif - #endif - char *sess_in = NULL; - char *sess_out = NULL; -@@ -658,6 +698,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) - { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) -+ { -+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; -+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); -+ } -+# endif - #endif - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0) - cutthrough=1; -@@ -766,6 +813,21 @@ bad: - OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); - SSL_load_error_strings(); - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ next_proto.status = -1; -+ if (next_proto_neg_in) -+ { -+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); -+ if (next_proto.data == NULL) -+ { -+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); -+ goto end; -+ } -+ } -+ else -+ next_proto.data = NULL; -+#endif -+ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); - if (ssl_client_engine_id) -@@ -896,6 +958,11 @@ bad: - SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode); - } - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (next_proto.data) -+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); -+#endif -+ - if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); - if (cipher != NULL) - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) { -@@ -1755,6 +1822,18 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s - BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n", - expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); - #endif -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (next_proto.status != -1) { -+ const unsigned char *proto; -+ unsigned int proto_len; -+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); -+ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); -+ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); -+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); -+ } -+#endif -+ - SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s)); - BIO_printf(bio,"---\n"); - if (peer != NULL) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_server.c 2010-06-15 17:25:02.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_server.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 -@@ -492,6 +492,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void) - BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); - BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); -+# endif - #endif - } - -@@ -826,6 +829,24 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received % - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - goto done; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ -+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { -+ unsigned char *data; -+ unsigned int len; -+} tlsextnextprotoctx; -+ -+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) -+ { -+ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; -+ -+ *data = next_proto->data; -+ *len = next_proto->len; -+ -+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -+ } -+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN */ - #endif - - int MAIN(int, char **); -@@ -867,6 +888,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; -+ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; -+# endif - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ -@@ -1191,7 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) - if (--argc < 1) goto bad; - s_key_file2= *(++argv); - } -- -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) -+ { -+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; -+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); -+ } -+# endif - #endif - #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) - else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0) -@@ -1476,6 +1507,11 @@ bad: - if (vpm) - SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm); - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (next_proto.data) -+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -@@ -1617,6 +1653,21 @@ bad: - goto end; - } - } -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (next_proto_neg_in) -+ { -+ unsigned short len; -+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, -+ next_proto_neg_in); -+ if (next_proto.data == NULL) -+ goto end; -+ next_proto.len = len; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ next_proto.data = NULL; -+ } -+# endif - #endif - RSA_free(rsa); - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n"); -@@ -2159,6 +2210,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) - X509 *peer; - long verify_error; - MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ]; -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; -+ unsigned next_proto_neg_len; -+#endif - - if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0) - { -@@ -2198,6 +2253,15 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf); - str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); - BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)"); -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); -+ if (next_proto_neg) -+ { -+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is "); -+ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); -+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); -+ } -+#endif - if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n"); - if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) & - TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st - /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ - int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); - void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ -+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ -+ -+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of -+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ -+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, -+ unsigned int *len, void *arg); -+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; -+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the -+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ -+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, -+ void *arg); -+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK -@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C - #endif - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, -+ const unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned int *outlen, -+ void *arg), void *arg); -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), -+ void *arg); -+ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, -+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, -+ unsigned *len); -+ -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 -+ -+#endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the -@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st - void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; - - SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that -+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello -+ * extensions. -+ * -+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from -+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, -+ * before the Finished message. */ -+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; -+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; -+#endif -+ - #define session_ctx initial_ctx - #else - #define session_ctx ctx -@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 -+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 -@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 - #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 - #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 - #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 - #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 - #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - void *server_opaque_prf_input; - size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from -+ our peer. */ -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif -+ - struct { - /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ - unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; -@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - /* read from server */ -@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - /* write to client */ -@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 - #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 - #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 -+#endif - #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 - - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { - /* Temporary extension type */ - #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ -+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 -+#endif -+ - /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ - #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 - /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ -+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) -+ { -+ const char *sender; -+ int slen; -+ -+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+ { -+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; -+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; -+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; -+ } -+ -+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, -+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); -+ } -+#endif -+ - int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) - { - int al,i,ok; - long n; - unsigned char *p; - -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* the mac has already been generated when we received the - * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md - */ -+#endif - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - a, -@@ -521,6 +546,15 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, i - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; - } -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for -+ * Finished verification. */ -+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) -+ ssl3_take_mac(s); -+#endif -+ -+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -435,7 +435,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+#endif -+ - s->init_num=0; - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; -@@ -463,6 +472,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) - - break; - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: -+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: -+ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); -+ if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; -+ break; -+#endif -+ - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, -@@ -3060,6 +3078,32 @@ err: - */ - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) -+ { -+ unsigned int len, padding_len; -+ unsigned char *d; -+ -+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) -+ { -+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; -+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); -+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; -+ d[4] = len; -+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); -+ d[5 + len] = padding_len; -+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); -+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; -+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); -+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; -+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; -+ s->init_off = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); -+ } -+# endif -+ - int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) - { - int ok; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -2230,6 +2230,15 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) - s->s3->num_renegotiations=0; - s->s3->in_read_app_data=0; - s->version=SSL3_VERSION; -+ -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; -+ } -+#endif - } - - long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -1394,8 +1394,10 @@ err: - int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - { - int i; -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - const char *sender; - int slen; -+#endif - - if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; -@@ -1418,6 +1420,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) - return(0); - -+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* we have to record the message digest at - * this point so we can get it before we read - * the finished message */ -@@ -1434,6 +1437,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); -+#endif - - return(1); - } ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -538,7 +538,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - * the client uses its key from the certificate - * for key exchange. - */ -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif - s->init_num = 0; - } - else -@@ -581,10 +588,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: -+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: -+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); -+ if (ret <= 0) goto end; -+ s->init_num = 0; -+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+ break; -+#endif -+ - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, -@@ -655,7 +679,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (s->hit) -+ { -+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#else -+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; -+ else -+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -+#endif -+ } - else - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num=0; -@@ -3196,4 +3229,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN -+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It -+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ -+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) -+ { -+ int ok; -+ unsigned proto_len, padding_len; -+ long n; -+ const unsigned char *p; -+ -+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the -+ * extension in their ClientHello */ -+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, -+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, -+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, -+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, -+ 514, /* See the payload format below */ -+ &ok); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return((int)n); -+ -+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received -+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset -+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */ -+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (n < 2) -+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ -+ -+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; -+ -+ /* The payload looks like: -+ * uint8 proto_len; -+ * uint8 proto[proto_len]; -+ * uint8 padding_len; -+ * uint8 padding[padding_len]; -+ */ -+ proto_len = p[0]; -+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) -+ return 0; -+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; -+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) -+ return 0; -+ -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); -+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; -+ -+ return 1; -+ } -+# endif - #endif ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st - /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ - int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); - void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ -+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ -+ -+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of -+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ -+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, -+ unsigned int *len, void *arg); -+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; -+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the -+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ -+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, -+ void *arg); -+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; -+# endif - #endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK -@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C - #endif - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); - void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, -+ const unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned int *outlen, -+ void *arg), void *arg); -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, -+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, -+ unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, -+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), -+ void *arg); -+ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, -+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, -+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, -+ unsigned *len); -+ -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 -+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 -+ -+#endif - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the -@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st - void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; - - SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ -+ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that -+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello -+ * extensions. -+ * -+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from -+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, -+ * before the Finished message. */ -+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; -+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; -+#endif -+ - #define session_ctx initial_ctx - #else - #define session_ctx ctx -@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 -+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 - #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 -@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); - #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 - #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 - #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 -+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 - #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 - #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 - #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - void *server_opaque_prf_input; - size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from -+ our peer. */ -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif -+ - struct { - /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ - unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; -@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) - /* read from server */ -@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) -+#endif - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - /* write to client */ -@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st - #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 - #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 - #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 -+#endif - #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 - - ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, -+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"}, - {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"}, -@@ -355,6 +356,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"}, -+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"}, -+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, - {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - s->initial_ctx=ctx; -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -+# endif - #endif - - s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; -@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) - kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); - #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - -+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) -+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); -+#endif -+ - OPENSSL_free(s); - } - -@@ -1503,6 +1511,124 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s - return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - return -1; - } -+ -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is -+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by -+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. -+ * -+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte -+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte -+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. -+ * -+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: -+ * -+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the -+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection -+ * or have a default application level protocol. -+ * -+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the -+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the -+ * API that this fallback case was enacted. -+ * -+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list -+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's -+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol -+ * a client should use. -+ * -+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised -+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. -+ * -+ * It returns either -+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or -+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. -+ */ -+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) -+ { -+ unsigned int i, j; -+ const unsigned char *result; -+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; -+ -+ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ -+ for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) -+ { -+ for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) -+ { -+ if (server[i] == client[j] && -+ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) -+ { -+ /* We found a match */ -+ result = &server[i]; -+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; -+ goto found; -+ } -+ j += client[j]; -+ j++; -+ } -+ i += server[i]; -+ i++; -+ } -+ -+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ -+ result = client; -+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; -+ -+ found: -+ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; -+ *outlen = result[0]; -+ return status; -+ } -+ -+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's -+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't -+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. -+ * -+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned -+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols -+ * provided by the callback. -+ */ -+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) -+ { -+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; -+ if (!*data) { -+ *len = 0; -+ } else { -+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; -+ } -+} -+ -+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a -+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol -+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned -+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will -+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to -+ * it. -+ * -+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no -+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) -+ { -+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; -+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; -+ } -+ -+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a -+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| -+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). -+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's -+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can -+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. -+ * -+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this -+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. -+ */ -+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) -+ { -+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; -+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; -+ } -+ -+# endif - #endif - - static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) -@@ -1667,6 +1793,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m - ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; - ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; - -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; -+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; -+# endif - #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -968,6 +968,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); - int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); -+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); -+# endif - #endif - - int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); -@@ -986,6 +989,9 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); - int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); -+#endif - - int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); - int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-16 13:26:24.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -494,6 +494,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) -+ { -+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its -+ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ -+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) -+ return NULL; -+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); -+ s2n(0,ret); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - -@@ -505,6 +517,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ int next_proto_neg_seen; -+#endif - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) -@@ -618,6 +633,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex - - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) -+ { -+ const unsigned char *npa; -+ unsigned int npalen; -+ int r; -+ -+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); -+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) -+ { -+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; -+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); -+ s2n(npalen,ret); -+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); -+ ret += npalen; -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - -@@ -982,6 +1019,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && -+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) -+ { -+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a -+ * renegotiation. -+ * -+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we -+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on -+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when -+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an -+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing -+ * anything like that, but this might change). -+ -+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake -+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > -+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen -+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new -+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */ -+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; -+ } -+#endif - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ - data+=size; -@@ -1005,6 +1064,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, - return 1; - } - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No -+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill -+ * the length of the block. */ -+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) -+ { -+ unsigned int off = 0; -+ -+ while (off < len) -+ { -+ if (d[off] == 0) -+ return 0; -+ off += d[off]; -+ off++; -+ } -+ -+ return off == len; -+ } -+#endif -+ - int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short length; -@@ -1139,6 +1218,39 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) -+ { -+ unsigned char *selected; -+ unsigned char selected_len; -+ -+ /* We must have requested it. */ -+ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* The data must be valid */ -+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); -+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) -+ { -+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); -+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; -+ } -+#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) ---- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 -+++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 -@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { - /* Temporary extension type */ - #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 - -+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ -+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 -+#endif -+ - /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ - #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 - /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ -- cgit v1.2.3