clean up use of h1 headings.

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/app/views/pages/technology/critiques/en.haml b/app/views/pages/technology/critiques/en.haml
index 8eb6019..06fccdd 100644
--- a/app/views/pages/technology/critiques/en.haml
+++ b/app/views/pages/technology/critiques/en.haml
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-:textile
-  Here is a collection of some of the critiques we have heard or anticipate.
+%h1.first Anticipated Critiques
 
-  h3. Isn't LEAP too ambitious?
+:textile
+  h2. Isn't LEAP too ambitious?
 
   Yes. However, someone needs to be working on a long term plan to add real security and usability to federated messaging architectures. It will not be easy, but we think it is possible.
 
-  h3. Isn't LEAP just like FreedomBox?
+  h2. Isn't LEAP just like FreedomBox?
 
   LEAP and FreedomBox share a similar goal of ensuring that everyone has the right to communicate securely and without censorship. However, the projects use different strategies for achieving this goal.
 
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
   In the long run, FreedomBox has a lot of potential. But for the foreseeable future, we think it is important to also pursue the LEAP strategy.
 
-  h3. We should not encourage users to store any data in the cloud, encrypted or not
+  h2. We should not encourage users to store any data in the cloud, encrypted or not
 
   Even the best encryption is no guarantee of confidentiality; data in the cloud always has the potential to be decrypted by a determined attacker.
 
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 
   There are many tools and projects out there to help a user do this. LEAP is designed for a different audience, one not adequately addressed by existing technology: people who want high security but don't have the capacity to become highly skilled in self-managing their encryption. There is room--and need--for both approaches, and it is likely that the amount of people who want high security but do not have the time or skills to adequately self-manage their own environment is already large and increasingly rapidly.
 
-  h3. If you make your system architecture public, then you have given adversaries a blueprint to attack you
+  h2. If you make your system architecture public, then you have given adversaries a blueprint to attack you
 
   This is, of course, similar to the arguments about the security of FLOSS. Openness can indeed lead to attacks, but more eyes leads to better security.
 
@@ -36,17 +36,17 @@
 
   Monoculture and openness are both interesting issues that could pose problems for the future. We can only be diligent in assessing LEAP once it is deployed by a variety of organizations. With enough flexibility in configuration, it may be that each LEAP deployment is sufficiently distinct from the others to mitigate these concerns.
 
-  h3. Users will not be willing to download a custom client
+  h2. Users will not be willing to download a custom client
 
   This will indeed be the case for a large number of potential users. Because meaningful levels of security cannot be achieved using current technology without a custom client, our hope is that a critical mass of users can be induced to use one. There are two parts to this inducement: increasing awareness as to why an extra step to ensure security is worthwhile, and decreasing the difficulty in actually taking this step. With sufficient education and an improved user experience, many users should be willing to install a custom client.
 
   On the other hand, rapid developments in Javascript and web browser technology have raised the possibility of running advanced client applications within the browser itself. In this case, a user would not have to install any additional software. However, in-browser crypto is still an area of active research but is currently not safe for deployment, with some areas still to be worked out (like sufficient entropy). LEAP does not depend upon the presence of cryptography in the browser, but would benefit from this should it become viable. The lead W3C employee who began the standardization of Javascript Cryptography is on the board of LEAP, and he will liaise tightly with LEAP as the work matures.
 
-  h3. Users who need security often don't have their own device or access to the internet
+  h2. Users who need security often don't have their own device or access to the internet
 
   This is absolutely true. The digital divide is alive and well, and LEAP does nothing to bridge the gap between the technological haves and have-nots. However, in the long run, IP-based communication--dependent upon advanced devices such as smart phones--is likely to replace most other forms of communication. The cost of such IP-based communication devices and their connectivity is declining rapidly. It behooves us to lay the groundwork now for a secure IP-based communication infrastructure, both for the people who currently rely on the internet and for the next billion who will gain access to the internet in the near future.
 
-  h3. Client encryption is excessive for most people
+  h2. Client encryption is excessive for most people
 
   The argument against client encryption is something like this: a secure connection is good enough, so long as the service provider is located in a country with adequate legal protection and without repressive laws.