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authorelijah <elijah@riseup.net>2014-02-13 02:55:54 -0800
committerelijah <elijah@riseup.net>2014-02-13 02:55:54 -0800
commitbe51da074872d958145735144ce666a91fd7b349 (patch)
tree9064c45f5d68d1701407d1551ac34e6e34e1ba5a
parent1cc912a8d2c483220b1d714d2ec569777ced2b66 (diff)
updated key refresh post
-rw-r--r--pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.haml22
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.haml b/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.haml
index db624da..6032351 100644
--- a/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.haml
+++ b/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.haml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
%h3 option 1 - blindly upgrade
-%p You can just ignore the warnings about the packages being unauthenticated. This will upgrade your leap-keyring package, which includes the updated key.
+%p You can just ignore the warnings about the packages being unauthenticated. This will upgrade your leap-keyring package, which includes the updated key. This is potentially dangerious and should be avoided.
%pre
apt-get update --allow-unauthenticated
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@
%h3 option 2 - re-add key without checking fingerprint
-%p You can simply re-import the key to your apt keyring:
+%p You can simply re-import the key to your apt keyring. This method is less dangerious, but requires you to trust the certificate authority system (which never a good idea).
%pre
curl https://dl.bitmask.net/apt.key | apt-key add -
%h3 option 3 - update the key from keyserver
-%p With this method, we update the key by pulling it from a keyserver and then importing to apt-key. We use the long key-id to ensure that we grab a key with exactly the same fingerprint (the short key-id is easily forged, but the long key id is very hard to replicate).
+%p With this method, we update the key by pulling it from a keyserver and then importing to apt-key. This method is the most secure (so long as you follow all the steps and actually verify the fingerprint).
%p Find the long key-id of the current LEAP archive signing key:
@@ -36,8 +36,22 @@
pub 4096R/0x1E34A1828E207901 2013-02-06 [expired: 2014-02-06]
uid LEAP archive signing key <sysdev@leap.se>
-%P Now, grab that specific key-id from a keyserver, and import it into apt-key:
+%p Now, grab that specific key-id from a keyserver, and verify the fingerprint:
%pre
gpg --recv-key 0x1E34A1828E207901
+ gpg --fingerprint 0x1E34A1828E207901
+
+%p You should see this as output:
+
+%pre
+ pub 4096R/8E207901 2013-02-06 [expires: 2015-02-07]
+ Key fingerprint = 1E45 3B2C E87B EE2F 7DFE 9966 1E34 A182 8E20 7901
+ uid LEAP archive signing key <sysdev@leap.se>
+
+%p Make sure that the fingerprint in this output matches the long key-id you listed with <code>apt-key</code>. Without this step, it would be very easy for an attacker to feed you a bogus key.
+
+%p Finally, import the key into apt-key:
+
+%pre
gpg --armor --export 0x1E34A1828E207901 | sudo apt-key add -