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+++ b/ta3m/slides.haml
@@ -1,6 +1,42 @@
-%section
+:css
+ .reveal h1 {
+ margin-bottom: 30px;
+ }
+ .reveal h3 li {
+ margin-bottom: 10px;
+ }
+ .reveal h1, .reveal h3, .reveal p, .reveal li, .reveal .p {
+ text-shadow: 0px 0px 10px rgba(0, 0, 0, 1)
+ }
+ .left-column {
+ display: block;
+ width: 50%;
+ float: left;
+ }
+ .right-column {
+ width: 50%;
+ float: left;
+ }
+ .row {
+ display: table;
+ width: 100%;
+ }
+ ul.plain {
+ list-style-type: none;
+ }
+ .reveal p, .reveal .p, ul.plain li {
+ margin-top: 15px;
+ margin-bottom: 15px;
+ }
+ .reveal li {
+ margin-top: 10px;
+ margin-bottom: 10px;
+ }
+%section(data-background="images/kid-jumping.svg" data-background-size="50%")
%h1 LEAP Encryption Access Project
- Elijah Sparrow     Sean Leonard
+ .p.row
+ .left-column Elijah Sparrow<br>elijah@leap.se<br>@ecsparrow
+ .right-column Sean Leonard<br>MeanderingCode@leap.se<br>@MeanderingCode
%section
%h1 What is the goal?
@@ -14,18 +50,25 @@
%section
%h1 What is the strategy?
- %h3 Federated service providers using open protocols
+ %h3 Federated service providers<br>using open protocols
%p (Not peer-to-peer, not centralized)
%section
%h1 What is the strategy?
- %p Bitmask: client application
- %p LEAP Platform: service provider automation
+ .row
+ .left-column
+ %h3 Bitmask
+ %p Cross platform client application
+ .right-column
+ %h3 LEAP Platform
+ %p Service provider automation
-%section
+%section(data-background="")
+ %p
+ %img{src: "images/bitmask-icon.png", style:"height: 200px; width 200px; float: left;"}
%h1 Bitmask
- %p With Bitmask App, you choose among any LEAP-powered service provider.
+ %p With Bitmask App, you choose among any<br>LEAP-powered service provider.
%p Currently, we support VPN and Email.
%section
@@ -35,6 +78,8 @@
%li Auto-configuring
%li Single click VPN
%li Email via a local IMAP and SMTP services.
+ %p
+ %img{src: "images/bitmask-main-window.jpg" }
%section
%h1 LEAP Platform
@@ -59,6 +104,9 @@
%li Heavily customizable: override node behavior with tags & environments. Easy to fork.
%li Includes a testing and monitoring framework.
%li Includes a webapp with user management, help tickets and billing.
+ %p
+ See
+ %a(href="https://leap.se/platform") leap.se/platform
%section
%h3 How to make something easy and secure?
@@ -67,7 +115,8 @@
%section
%h1 A better UI
- %p image of android app on/off dashboard
+ %p
+ %img(src="images/bitmask-android.png")
%section
%h1 A better UI
@@ -94,29 +143,49 @@
%section
%h1 Data availability
- %p issue 1: can't use normal hashed passwords.
- %p solution: use Secure Remote Password, two pass authentication scheme built on a zero knowledge proof such that the server never has access to the password.
+ %ul.plain
+ %li
+ %b Issue 1:
+ can't use normal hashed passwords.
+ %li
+ %b Solution:
+ use Secure Remote Password, two pass authentication scheme built on a zero knowledge proof such that the server never has access to the password.
%section
%h1 Data availability
- %p issue 2: when stored locally, we need the data in a database.
- %p solution: stored local in sqlcipher (encrypted sqlite db)
+ %ul.plain
+ %li
+ %b Issue 2:
+ when stored locally, we need the data in a database.
+ %li
+ %b Solution:
+ stored local in sqlcipher (encrypted sqlite db)
%section
%h1 Data availability
- %p issue 3: don't trust the provider
- %p
- solution: client's individually encrypt each document record before synchronizing with distributed cloud database.
- %a(href="https://leap.se/soledad") leap.se/soledad
+ %ul.plain
+ %li
+ %b Issue 3:
+ don't trust the provider
+ %li
+ %b Solution:
+ clients individually encrypt each document record before synchronizing with distributed cloud database.
+ %a(href="https://leap.se/soledad") leap.se/soledad
%section
%h1 Secure identity
- %p Bedrock precondition for secure communication between to people: all other security properties flow from it.
+ %p Bedrock precondition for secure communication between two people.
+ %p All other security properties flow from it.
%section
%h1 Secure identity
- %p Zooko's triangle: identifers may be globally unique, easy to remember, or decentralized: pick two.
- %p The binding problem: how to strongly bind a human name to a long random cryptographic key.
+ %ul.plain
+ %li
+ %b Zooko's triangle:
+ identifers may be globally unique, easy to remember, or decentralized: pick two.
+ %li
+ %b The binding problem:
+ how to strongly bind a human name to a long random cryptographic key.
%section
%h1 Secure identity
@@ -126,11 +195,22 @@
%section
%h1 Secure identity
%p What we are trying:
- %ul
- %li TOFU - trust on first use.
- %li Provider endorsement - providers sign & revoke user public keys.
- %li Network perspective - audit providers to keep them honest.
- %P Gradual, backward compatible, ramp up.
+ %ol
+ %li
+ %b TOFU:
+ Trust On First Use.
+ %li
+ %b Provider endorsement:
+ providers sign & revoke user public keys.
+ %li
+ %b Network perspective:
+ audit providers to keep them honest.
+ %p
+ %p Goals: gradual adoption, backward compatible, ramp up.
+ %p
+ See
+ %a(href="https://leap.se/nicknym") leap.se/nicknym
+
%section
%h1 Meta-data problem
@@ -166,10 +246,14 @@
%section
%h1 Why not p2p?
%ul
- %li The "natural" network: many to many networks don't look like networks found in nature, which follow a power law ("scale free") distribution.
- %li The Internet: internet infrastructure is actually very polycentric rather than decentralized (more akin to a tree than a spider's web).
- %li Traffic Analysis: p2p message routing schemes are more vulnerable to traffic analysis.
- %li Sybil Attacks: By their nature, peer-to-peer networks are highly vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where an attacker creates fake participants in order to reveal secrets or hijack network.
- %li Mobile: Peer-to-peer networks are resource intensive, typically with every node in the network responsible for continually relaying traffic and keeping the network healthy.
- %li Identifiers: There are no good schemes for secure p2p identity. Everyone uses fingerprints, but this makes user identifiers impossible to remember.
- %li Data Availability: p2p has very poor data availability.
+ %li <b>The "natural" network:</b> many to many networks don't look like networks found in nature, which follow a power law ("scale free") distribution.
+ %li <b>The Internet:</b> internet infrastructure is actually very polycentric rather than decentralized (more akin to a tree than a spider's web).
+ %li <b>Traffic Analysis:</b> p2p message routing schemes are more vulnerable to traffic analysis.
+ %li <b>Sybil Attacks:</b> By their nature, peer-to-peer networks are highly vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where an attacker creates fake participants in order to reveal secrets or hijack network.
+
+%section
+ %h1 Why not p2p?
+ %ul
+ %li <b>Mobile:</b> Peer-to-peer networks are resource intensive, typically with every node in the network responsible for continually relaying traffic and keeping the network healthy.
+ %li <b>Identifiers:</b> There are no good schemes for secure p2p identity. Everyone uses fingerprints, but this makes user identifiers impossible to remember.
+ %li <b>Data Availability:</b> p2p has very poor data availability.