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authorParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-11-04 20:45:42 +0100
committerParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-11-04 20:45:42 +0100
commit5304543ebd60778ad46123cd63142e27627fa150 (patch)
treeb07723b530e20b23ae83de822387f6551ea7f9f4 /ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
parent713c3a98f53a6bd1ad94e90f28d3e37d20abfab9 (diff)
Update ics-openvpn to rev 906.
Diffstat (limited to 'ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c')
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c1568
1 files changed, 1568 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..df436cf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1568 @@
+/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment);
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
+ {
+ /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+ * packet by another n bytes.
+ * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
+ * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
+ * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
+ * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+ */
+ int i,len,left;
+ long align=0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n <= 0) return n;
+
+ rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+ if (!extend)
+ {
+ /* start with empty packet ... */
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* check if next packet length is large
+ * enough to justify payload alignment... */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
+ {
+ /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
+ * and its length field is insane, we can
+ * only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not.
+ * Header values has no effect on memmove
+ * arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered. */
+ memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
+ }
+ s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+ }
+
+ /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
+ * because the read operation returns the whole packet
+ * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+ if (left >= n)
+ {
+ s->packet_length+=n;
+ rb->left=left-n;
+ rb->offset+=n;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+ /* else we need to read more data */
+
+ len = s->packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf+align;
+ /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
+ * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
+ * 'left' extra ones at the end */
+ if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
+ {
+ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
+ s->packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
+
+ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->read_ahead)
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else
+ {
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+ }
+
+ while (left < n)
+ {
+ /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
+ * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
+ * len+max if possible) */
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (len+left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ return(i);
+ }
+ left+=i;
+ /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
+ * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
+ * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ s->packet_length += n;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+/* Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
+ int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ short version;
+ unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
+ size_t extra;
+
+ rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ sess=s->session;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ else
+ extra=0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+ {
+ /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr->type= *(p++);
+ ssl_major= *(p++);
+ ssl_minor= *(p++);
+ version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
+ n2s(p,rr->length);
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet)
+ {
+ if (version != s->version)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i=rr->length;
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /* now n == rr->length,
+ * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
+ }
+
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
+ * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
+ * need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression
+ * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
+ * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
+
+ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+ * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data=rr->input;
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+ /* enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid */
+ if (enc_err == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
+{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
+ {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+ orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+ /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+ * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ orig_len < mac_size+1))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ {
+ /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+ * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+ * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+ * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+ * */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+ * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+ * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0)
+ {
+ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off=0;
+ /* So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length=0;
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+ return(1);
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+ rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ rr->length=i;
+ rr->data=rr->comp;
+#endif
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+ wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+ wr->input,(int)wr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ wr->length=i;
+
+ wr->input=wr->data;
+#endif
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
+ * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
+ unsigned int n,nw;
+ int i,tot;
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
+ tot=s->s3->wnum;
+ s->s3->wnum=0;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
+ * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
+ * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
+ * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
+ * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
+ * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
+ * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
+ * will notice
+ */
+ if (len < tot)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+
+ n=(len-tot);
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put
+ * into a record. */
+ unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
+ /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte
+ * in its own record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */
+ int fragment = 0;
+
+ if (n > 1 &&
+ s->s3->need_record_splitting &&
+ type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ !s->s3->record_split_done)
+ {
+ fragment = 1;
+ /* record_split_done records that the splitting has
+ * been done in case we hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition.
+ * In that case, we don't need to do the split again. */
+ s->s3->record_split_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (n > max)
+ nw=max;
+ else
+ nw=n;
+
+ i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->wnum=tot;
+ /* Try to write the fragment next time. */
+ s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if ((i == (int)n) ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
+ {
+ /* next chunk of data should get another prepended,
+ * one-byte fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
+ * weakness. */
+ s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
+ return tot+i;
+ }
+
+ n-=i;
+ tot+=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1
+ * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest
+ * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then
+ * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that
+ * one byte fragment. */
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*plen;
+ int i,mac_size;
+ int prefix_len=0;
+ int eivlen;
+ long align=0;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
+ if (wb->left != 0)
+ return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ {
+ i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return(i);
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (wb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ sess=s->session;
+
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+ {
+ mac_size=0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (fragment)
+ {
+ /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */,
+ 0 /* fragment */,
+ 1 /* is_fragment */);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (is_fragment)
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ /* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and
+ * that will be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we
+ * want to align the real payload, we can just pretend that we
+ * have two headers and a byte. */
+ align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+ else if (prefix_len)
+ {
+ p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+
+ /* write the header */
+
+ *(p++)=type&0xff;
+ wr->type=type;
+
+ *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
+ /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
+ * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+ && !s->renegotiate
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+ *(p++) = 0x1;
+ else
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet length */
+ plen=p;
+ p+=2;
+ /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ {
+ int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ {
+ eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (eivlen <= 1)
+ eivlen = 0;
+ }
+ /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ eivlen = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ eivlen = 0;
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+ wr->data=p + eivlen;
+ wr->length=(int)(len - (fragment != 0));
+ wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf + (fragment != 0);
+
+ /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
+ * wr->data */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
+ wr->input=wr->data;
+ }
+
+ /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
+ * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
+ * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
+
+ if (mac_size != 0)
+ {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ wr->length+=mac_size;
+ }
+
+ wr->input=p;
+ wr->data=p;
+
+ if (eivlen)
+ {
+ /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err; */
+ wr->length += eivlen;
+ }
+
+ /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+
+ /* record length after mac and block padding */
+ s2n(wr->length,plen);
+
+ /* we should now have
+ * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+ * wr->length long */
+ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+ wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (is_fragment)
+ {
+ /* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't
+ * write out anything. */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+
+ /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
+ s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
+ s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
+ s->s3->wpend_type=type;
+ s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
+err:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len)
+ {
+ int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+
+/* XXXX */
+ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
+ || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+ !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+ || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->wbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
+ (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+ (unsigned int)wb->left);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i= -1;
+ }
+ if (i == wb->left)
+ {
+ wb->left=0;
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
+ }
+ else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+ point in using a datagram service */
+ wb->left = 0;
+ }
+ return(i);
+ }
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ wb->left-=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
+ {
+ int al,i,j,ret;
+ unsigned int n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return(-1);
+
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
+ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+start:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
+ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+ * (even in 'peek' mode) */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ rr->length=0;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+ if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+ {
+ /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+ * are doing a handshake for the first time */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
+ if (!peek)
+ {
+ rr->length-=n;
+ rr->off+=n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
+ }
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+
+ /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
+ * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
+ * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+ }
+ else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
+ {
+ tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+ /* Exit and notify application to read again */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0)
+ {
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (rr->length < n)
+ n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ while (n-- > 0)
+ {
+ dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ rr->length--;
+ }
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ !s->s3->renegotiate)
+ {
+ ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
+ * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+ goto start;
+ }
+ /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+ * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ */
+ if (s->server &&
+ SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+ !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+
+ {
+ /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
+ {
+ int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
+
+ s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
+ {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+ {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
+ * a fatal alert because if application tried to
+ * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+ * expects it to succeed.
+ *
+ * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
+ * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+ return(0);
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
+ {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
+ s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ rr->length=0;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+ * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+ if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
+ (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+ {
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+ * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+ * protocol violations): */
+ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
+ ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
+ :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
+ s->renegotiate=1;
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (rr->type)
+ {
+ default:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+ /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
+ * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+#endif
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
+ * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
+ * should not happen when type != rr->type */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
+ * but have application data. If the library was
+ * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
+ * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+ * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
+ * we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ ((
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ ) || (
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* not reached */
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+ else
+ i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
+ return(0);
+
+ /* we have to record the message digest at
+ * this point so we can get it before we read
+ * the finished message */
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+ {
+ /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+ desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+ desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+ if (desc < 0) return -1;
+ /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+ s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
+ s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
+ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
+ * some time in the future */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,j;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
+ * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
+ * we will not worry too much. */
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
+ }
+ }
+ return(i);
+ }