Merge branch 'feature/implement-gradle-build-system-#4676' into develop

1 files changed, 3242 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/app/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b169ba93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3242 @@
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
+ *  \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+#  include <assert.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
+	/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
+	(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+	ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+	0,	/* finish_mac_length */
+	(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+	NULL,	/* client_finished_label */
+	0,	/* client_finished_label_len */
+	NULL,	/* server_finished_label */
+	0,	/* server_finished_label_len */
+	(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
+	};
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+	{
+
+	if (s->method == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+		return(0);
+		}
+
+	if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
+		{
+		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+		s->session=NULL;
+		}
+
+	s->error=0;
+	s->hit=0;
+	s->shutdown=0;
+
+#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+       * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
+	/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+	 * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
+	if (s->new_session) return(1);
+#else
+	if (s->new_session)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return 0;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	s->type=0;
+
+	s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+
+	s->version=s->method->version;
+	s->client_version=s->version;
+	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
+	s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+		{
+		BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+		s->init_buf=NULL;
+		}
+
+	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+	s->first_packet=0;
+
+#if 1
+	/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
+	 * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
+	if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
+		{
+		s->method->ssl_free(s);
+		s->method=s->ctx->method;
+		if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+			return(0);
+		}
+	else
+#endif
+		s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+	ctx->method=meth;
+
+	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
+		&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	SSL *s;
+
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	if (ctx->method == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+
+	s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+	if (s == NULL) goto err;
+	memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+	s->options=ctx->options;
+	s->mode=ctx->mode;
+	s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+	if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+		{
+		/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
+		 * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
+		 * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
+		 * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
+		 * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
+		 * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+		 * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
+		 * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
+		 * duplicated it once. */
+
+		s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+		if (s->cert == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+	s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
+	s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
+	s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+	s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
+	s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+	s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+	memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+	s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+	s->session_creation_enabled=1;
+	s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+	s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+	if (!s->param)
+		goto err;
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
+	s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+	s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+	s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+	s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	s->ctx=ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+	s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+	s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+	s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+	s->method=ctx->method;
+
+	if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+		goto err;
+
+	s->references=1;
+	s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
+
+	SSL_clear(s);
+
+	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
+	s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+	return(s);
+err:
+	if (s != NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->cert != NULL)
+			ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+		if (s->ctx != NULL)
+			SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+				   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+    {
+    if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+	return 0;
+	}
+    ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+    {
+    if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+	return 0;
+	}
+    ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+	{
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+	{
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+	ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+				unsigned int id_len)
+	{
+	/* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+	 * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+	 * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+	 * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
+	 * use by this SSL. */
+	SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+	if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+		return 0;
+
+	r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+	r.session_id_length = id_len;
+	memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+	/* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+	 * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+	 * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+	 * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
+	if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+			(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+		{
+		memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
+			SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+		r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+		}
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	return (p != NULL);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+	}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if(s == NULL)
+	    return;
+
+	i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+	REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
+#endif
+	if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+	if (i < 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+		abort(); /* ok */
+		}
+#endif
+
+	if (s->param)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+	if (s->bbio != NULL)
+		{
+		/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+			{
+			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+			}
+		BIO_free(s->bbio);
+		s->bbio=NULL;
+		}
+	if (s->rbio != NULL)
+		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+	if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+	/* add extra stuff */
+	if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+	/* Make the next call work :-) */
+	if (s->session != NULL)
+		{
+		ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+		}
+
+	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+	if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+	/* Free up if allocated */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+	if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+	if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+		sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+						X509_EXTENSION_free);
+	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+		sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+#endif
+
+	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+
+	if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+	if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+		kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+#endif
+
+	OPENSSL_free(s);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
+	{
+	/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+	 */
+	if (s->bbio != NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
+			{
+			s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
+			s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+	s->rbio=rbio;
+	s->wbio=wbio;
+	}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+	{ return(s->rbio); }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+	{ return(s->wbio); }
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret= -1;
+	BIO *b,*r;
+
+	b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+	if (r != NULL)
+		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret= -1;
+	BIO *b,*r;
+
+	b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+	if (r != NULL)
+		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
+	{
+	int ret=0;
+	BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+	bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+	if (bio == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+	SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
+	ret=1;
+err:
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+	{
+	int ret=0;
+	BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+	if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
+		{
+		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+		if (bio == NULL)
+			{ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
+		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
+		}
+	else
+		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
+	ret=1;
+err:
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+	{
+	int ret=0;
+	BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+	if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
+		{
+		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+		if (bio == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+		SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
+		}
+	else
+		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
+	ret=1;
+err:
+	return(ret);
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+	{
+	size_t ret = 0;
+	
+	if (s->s3 != NULL)
+		{
+		ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+		if (count > ret)
+			count = ret;
+		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+	{
+	size_t ret = 0;
+	
+	if (s->s3 != NULL)
+		{
+		ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+		if (count > ret)
+			count = ret;
+		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->verify_mode);
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+	}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+	{
+	return(s->verify_callback);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return(ctx->verify_mode);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+	}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+	{
+	return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
+		    int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+	{
+	s->verify_mode=mode;
+	if (callback != NULL)
+		s->verify_callback=callback;
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
+	{
+	s->read_ahead=yes;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->read_ahead);
+	}
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	/* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+	 * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
+	 * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
+	 * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
+	 * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
+	 * so we'd better not return -1.)
+	 */
+	return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+	}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	X509 *r;
+	
+	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+		r=NULL;
+	else
+		r=s->session->peer;
+
+	if (r == NULL) return(r);
+
+	CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+	return(r);
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+	
+	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+		r=NULL;
+	else
+		r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+	/* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
+	 * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
+	
+	return(r);
+	}
+
+/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
+	{
+	CERT *tmp;
+
+	/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+	SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
+
+	/* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
+	 * vice-versa */
+	if (t->method != f->method)
+		{
+		t->method->ssl_free(t);	/* cleanup current */
+		t->method=f->method;	/* change method */
+		t->method->ssl_new(t);	/* setup new */
+		}
+
+	tmp=t->cert;
+	if (f->cert != NULL)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+		t->cert=f->cert;
+		}
+	else
+		t->cert=NULL;
+	if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+	SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
+	}
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	if (	(ctx == NULL) ||
+		(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
+		(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if 	(ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+	}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+	{
+	if (ssl == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+		ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+	}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		/* Not properly initialized yet */
+		SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+
+	return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+	}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		/* Not properly initialized yet */
+		SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+
+	return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+	}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->method->get_timeout());
+	}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+	{
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+		{
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
+	}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+	{
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+		{
+		return(0);
+		}
+	return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
+	}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
+	{
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
+		{
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+	return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
+	}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+	{
+	/* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+	 * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
+	 * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
+	 * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
+	 */
+
+	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
+		return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
+	else
+		return(1);
+	}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->new_session == 0)
+		{
+		s->new_session=1;
+		}
+	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+	}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+	{
+	/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
+	 * false again once a handshake has finished */
+	return (s->new_session != 0);
+	}
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+	{
+	long l;
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+		return(s->read_ahead);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+		l=s->read_ahead;
+		s->read_ahead=larg;
+		return(l);
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+		s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+		return 1;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+		return(s->options|=larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+		return(s->options&=~larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+		return(s->mode|=larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+		return(s->mode &=~larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+		return(s->max_cert_list);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+		l=s->max_cert_list;
+		s->max_cert_list=larg;
+		return(l);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			{
+			s->d1->mtu = larg;
+			return larg;
+			}
+		return 0;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+		s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+		return 1;
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+		if (s->s3)
+			return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+		else return 0;
+	default:
+		return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
+		}
+	}
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+	{
+	switch(cmd)
+		{
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+		s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+		return 1;
+		
+	default:
+		return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
+		}
+	}
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->sessions;
+	}
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+	{
+	long l;
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+		return(ctx->read_ahead);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+		l=ctx->read_ahead;
+		ctx->read_ahead=larg;
+		return(l);
+		
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+		ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+		return 1;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+		return(ctx->max_cert_list);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+		l=ctx->max_cert_list;
+		ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
+		return(l);
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+		l=ctx->session_cache_size;
+		ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
+		return(l);
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+		return(ctx->session_cache_size);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+		l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
+		ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
+		return(l);
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+		return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+		return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+		return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+		return(ctx->options|=larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+		return(ctx->options&=~larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+		return(ctx->mode|=larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+		return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
+		}
+	}
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+	{
+	switch(cmd)
+		{
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+		ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+		return 1;
+
+	default:
+		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
+		}
+	}
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+	{
+	long l;
+
+	l=a->id-b->id;
+	if (l == 0L)
+		return(0);
+	else
+		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
+			const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
+	{
+	long l;
+
+	l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
+	if (l == 0L)
+		return(0);
+	else
+		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+	}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s != NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+			{
+			return(s->cipher_list);
+			}
+		else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+			(s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
+			{
+			return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
+			}
+		}
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s != NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+			{
+			return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+			}
+		else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+			(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
+			{
+			return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+			}
+		}
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
+	{
+	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+	if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
+	sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+		return(NULL);
+	c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
+	if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
+	return(c->name);
+	}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+	
+	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
+		&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+	/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
+	 * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
+	 * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
+	 * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
+	 * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+	 * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
+	 * updated. */
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+	
+	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
+		&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+	/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
+
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+        /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
+	tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
+	if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+	s->cipher_list = sk;
+	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+	s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+	(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+	sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
+	{
+	char *p;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	int i;
+
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
+		(len < 2))
+		return(NULL);
+
+	p=buf;
+	sk=s->session->ciphers;
+	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		int n;
+
+		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+		n=strlen(c->name);
+		if (n+1 > len)
+			{
+			if (p != buf)
+				--p;
+			*p='\0';
+			return buf;
+			}
+		strcpy(p,c->name);
+		p+=n;
+		*(p++)=':';
+		len-=n+1;
+		}
+	p[-1]='\0';
+	return(buf);
+	}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+			     int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
+	{
+	int i,j=0;
+	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	unsigned char *q;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+	q=p;
+
+	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
+		    nokrb5)
+		    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
+		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+			continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+		p+=j;
+		}
+	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+	 */
+	if (p != q && !s->new_session)
+		{
+		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+			{
+			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+			};
+		j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+		p+=j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+		fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+		}
+
+	return(p-q);
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+					       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+	{
+	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+	int i,n;
+	if (s->s3)
+		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+	if ((num%n) != 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+		sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+	else
+		{
+		sk= *skp;
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+		}
+
+	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+		{
+		/* Check for SCSV */
+		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+			{
+			/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+			if (s->new_session)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
+				goto err;
+				}
+			s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+			p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+			fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+			continue;
+			}
+
+		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+		p+=n;
+		if (c != NULL)
+			{
+			if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (skp != NULL)
+		*skp=sk;
+	return(sk);
+err:
+	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+	{
+	if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+		s->session->tlsext_hostname :
+		s->tlsext_hostname;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+		return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
+ *
+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
+ *
+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
+ *
+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
+ * or have a default application level protocol.
+ *
+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
+ *
+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
+ * a client should use.
+ *
+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
+ *
+ * It returns either
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+	{
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	const unsigned char *result;
+	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
+	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
+		{
+		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
+			{
+			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
+				{
+				/* We found a match */
+				result = &server[i];
+				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+				goto found;
+				}
+			j += client[j];
+			j++;
+			}
+		i += server[i];
+		i++;
+		}
+
+	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+	result = client;
+	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+	found:
+	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
+	*outlen = result[0];
+	return status;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
+ *
+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
+	{
+	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+	if (!*data) {
+		*len = 0;
+	} else {
+		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+	}
+}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
+ * it.
+ *
+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
+ *
+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+	{
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	l=(unsigned long)
+		((unsigned int) a->session_id[0]     )|
+		((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
+		((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
+		((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
+	return(l);
+	}
+
+/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+ * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+ * with a matching session ID. */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
+	{
+	if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+		return(1);
+	if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+		return(1);
+	return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
+	}
+
+/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
+ * ssl.h. */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+	{
+	SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
+
+	if (meth == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+
+	if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+	ret->method=meth;
+
+	ret->cert_store=NULL;
+	ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+	ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+	ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
+	ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+
+	/* We take the system default */
+	ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
+
+	ret->new_session_cb=0;
+	ret->remove_session_cb=0;
+	ret->get_session_cb=0;
+	ret->generate_session_id=0;
+
+	memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
+
+	ret->references=1;
+	ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
+
+/*	ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*	ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+	ret->master_key=NULL;
+	ret->key_arg=NULL;
+	ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+
+	ret->info_callback=NULL;
+
+	ret->app_verify_callback=0;
+	ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+
+	ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+	ret->read_ahead=0;
+	ret->msg_callback=0;
+	ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
+	ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
+	ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+	ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
+	ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
+	if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
+	ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
+	ret->client_cert_cb=0;
+	ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
+	ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
+
+	ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+	if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
+	ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
+	if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
+
+	ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+		&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+	if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
+	    || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+		goto err2;
+		}
+
+	ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+	if (!ret->param)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+		goto err2;
+		}
+	if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+		goto err2;
+		}
+	if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+		goto err2;
+		}
+
+	if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
+	ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+	ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+	/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+	if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+		ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+	ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+	ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
+	ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+	ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
+	ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+	ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+	if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+		goto err;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+	if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+	ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+#define eng_strx(x)	#x
+#define eng_str(x)	eng_strx(x)
+	/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+	{
+	ENGINE *eng;
+	eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+	if (!eng)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+		eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+		}
+	if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+		ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+#endif
+#endif
+	/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+	 * deployed might change this.
+	 */
+	ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+	return(ret);
+err:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+	if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+#if 0
+static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
+    { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void
+ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+	{
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+	for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
+		{
+		next = ent->next;
+		OPENSSL_free(ent);
+		}
+	OPENSSL_free(list);
+	}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (a == NULL) return;
+
+	i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+	REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
+#endif
+	if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+	if (i < 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+		abort(); /* ok */
+		}
+#endif
+
+	if (a->param)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+	/*
+	 * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+	 * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+	 * after the sessions were flushed.
+	 * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+	 * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+	 * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+	 * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+	 */
+	if (a->sessions != NULL)
+		SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
+
+	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+	if (a->sessions != NULL)
+		lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+	if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+		X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+	if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+	if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+	if (a->cert != NULL)
+		ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+	if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+	if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
+	if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
+#else
+	a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+		OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+	if (a->client_cert_engine)
+		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+	if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+	if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
+	OPENSSL_free(a);
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+	{
+	ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
+	{
+	ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
+	ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+	{
+	ctx->verify_mode=mode;
+	ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+	}
+
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+	int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
+	int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
+	int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
+	unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
+	int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	int have_ecdh_tmp;
+#endif
+	X509 *x = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+	int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+
+	if (c == NULL) return;
+
+	kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+	rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+		(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+	rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+	dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+		(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+	dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+#endif
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+	rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+	rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+	dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+	dh_rsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
+	dh_dsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+	have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+	mask_k=0;
+	mask_a=0;
+	emask_k=0;
+	emask_a=0;
+
+	
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
+		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
+#endif
+	
+	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+	}
+	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+	}
+
+	if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+		mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+	if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+		emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+
+#if 0
+	/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+	if (	(dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
+		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+	if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+#endif
+
+	if (dh_tmp_export)
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+	if (dh_tmp)
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+	if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+	if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+
+	if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+	if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+
+	if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
+		{
+		mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+		emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_sign)
+		{
+		mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+		emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+		}
+
+	mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+	emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+	mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+	emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+	emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+
+	/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
+	 * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
+	 */
+	if (have_ecc_cert)
+		{
+		/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+		x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
+		X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+		ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+		ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+		ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+		ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
+		    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+		if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+			{
+			signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+			OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (ecdh_ok)
+			{
+
+			if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
+				{
+				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+					{
+					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+					}
+				}
+
+			if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+				{
+				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+					{
+					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+		if (ecdsa_ok)
+			{
+			mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+			emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (have_ecdh_tmp)
+		{
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+		}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+	mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+	emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+	emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+	c->mask_k=mask_k;
+	c->mask_a=mask_a;
+	c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
+	c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
+	c->valid=1;
+	}
+
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+	{
+	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	int keysize = 0;
+	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+
+	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
+		{
+		/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+		pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+		if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
+		keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		if (keysize > 163) return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+	if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+		{
+		signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+		OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+		}
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+		{
+		/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
+			{
+			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			}
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+			{
+			/* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+			if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+		{
+		/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
+	}
+
+#endif
+
+/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
+	CERT *c;
+	int i;
+
+	c=s->cert;
+	ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+	
+	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+	if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+		{
+		/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
+		 * since no certificate is needed for
+		 * anon ECDH and for authenticated
+		 * EECDH, the check for the auth
+		 * algorithm will set i correctly
+		 * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
+		 * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
+		 * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
+		 * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
+		 * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
+		 */
+		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+		}
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+		{
+		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+		}
+	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+		i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+		{
+		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
+			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+		else
+			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+		}
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
+		{
+		/* VRS something else here? */
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 
+		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
+
+	return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+	}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+	{
+	unsigned long alg_a;
+	CERT *c;
+
+	alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	c=s->cert;
+
+	if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+		(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+		{
+		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+			return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+		else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+			return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+		else
+			return(NULL);
+		}
+	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+	         (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	/* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
+	 * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
+	if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
+
+	i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+	if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+		&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+		    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
+		&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
+		{
+		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+		if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
+			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+		}
+
+	/* auto flush every 255 connections */
+	if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
+		((i & mode) == mode))
+		{
+		if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+			?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+			:s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
+			{
+			SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->method);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+	{
+	int conn= -1;
+	int ret=1;
+
+	if (s->method != meth)
+		{
+		if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+			conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+		if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+			s->method=meth;
+		else
+			{
+			s->method->ssl_free(s);
+			s->method=meth;
+			ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
+			}
+
+		if (conn == 1)
+			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
+		else if (conn == 0)
+			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
+		}
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
+	{
+	int reason;
+	unsigned long l;
+	BIO *bio;
+
+	if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+	/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
+	 * etc, where we do encode the error */
+	if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
+		{
+		if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+			return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+		else
+			return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+		}
+
+	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
+		{
+		bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+		if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+		else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+			/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
+			 * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
+			 * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
+			 * should wait for.
+			 * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
+			 * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
+			 * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
+			 * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
+			 * to keep it. */
+			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+			{
+			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+			else
+				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+			}
+		}
+
+	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
+		{
+		bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+		if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+		else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+			/* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
+			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+			{
+			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+			else
+				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+			}
+		}
+	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
+		{
+		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+		}
+
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+			{
+			/* assume it is the socket being closed */
+			return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+				(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+				return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+			}
+		}
+	return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+	}
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret=1;
+
+	if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+
+	s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+	if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+		{
+		ret=s->handshake_func(s);
+		}
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
+ * one of these calls will reset it */
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+	{
+	s->server=1;
+	s->shutdown=0;
+	s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+	/* clear the current cipher */
+	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+	{
+	s->server=0;
+	s->shutdown=0;
+	s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
+	/* clear the current cipher */
+	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+	}
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+	{
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
+	{
+	if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+		return("TLSv1");
+	else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+		return("SSLv3");
+	else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
+		return("SSLv2");
+	else
+		return("unknown");
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+	{
+		return ssl_get_version(s->version);
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+	{
+		return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
+	}
+
+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
+	{
+	if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+		return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
+	switch (ssl->version)
+		{
+	case SSL2_VERSION:
+		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+	case SSL3_VERSION:
+	case TLS1_VERSION:
+	case DTLS1_VERSION:
+		return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+	default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+	X509_NAME *xn;
+	SSL *ret;
+	int i;
+	
+	if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+	    return(NULL);
+
+	ret->version = s->version;
+	ret->type = s->type;
+	ret->method = s->method;
+
+	if (s->session != NULL)
+		{
+		/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+		SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
+		 * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
+		 * they should not both point to the same object,
+		 * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
+
+		ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+		ret->method = s->method;
+		ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+		if (s->cert != NULL)
+			{
+			if (ret->cert != NULL)
+				{
+				ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+				}
+			ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+			if (ret->cert == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			}
+				
+		SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
+			s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+		}
+
+	ret->options=s->options;
+	ret->mode=s->mode;
+	SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+	SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+	ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+	ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+	SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
+		SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+	SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+	ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+	SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+	
+	ret->debug=s->debug;
+
+	/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+	if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+		goto err;
+
+	/* setup rbio, and wbio */
+	if (s->rbio != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
+			goto err;
+		}
+	if (s->wbio != NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
+			{
+			if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
+		}
+	ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+	ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+	ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+	ret->server = s->server;
+	ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+	ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+	ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
+	ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
+	ret->rstate=s->rstate;
+	ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
+	ret->hit=s->hit;
+
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+	/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+		{
+		if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+		if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+			== NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+	/* Dup the client_CA list */
+	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
+		ret->client_CA=sk;
+		for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+			{
+			xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+			if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
+				{
+				X509_NAME_free(xn);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (0)
+		{
+err:
+		if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
+		ret=NULL;
+		}
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+		s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
+		}
+	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+		s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+	if (s->expand != NULL)
+		{
+		COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+		s->expand=NULL;
+		}
+	if (s->compress != NULL)
+		{
+		COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+		s->compress=NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->cert != NULL)
+		return(s->cert->key->x509);
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->cert != NULL)
+		return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+		return(s->session->cipher);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return NULL;
+	}
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return NULL;
+	}
+#else
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->compress != NULL)
+		return(s->compress->meth);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->expand != NULL)
+		return(s->expand->meth);
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
+	{
+	BIO *bbio;
+
+	if (s->bbio == NULL)
+		{
+		bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+		if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
+		s->bbio=bbio;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		bbio=s->bbio;
+		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+		}
+	(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/*	if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+	if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (push)
+		{
+		if (s->wbio != bbio)
+			s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (s->wbio == bbio)
+			s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
+		}
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
+
+	if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+		{
+		/* remove buffering */
+		s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+		assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+	}
+	BIO_free(s->bbio);
+	s->bbio=NULL;
+	}
+	
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
+	{
+	ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+	{
+	s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->quiet_shutdown);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+	{
+	s->shutdown=mode;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->shutdown);
+	}
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->version);
+	}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+	{
+	return(ssl->ctx);
+	}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
+	{
+	if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+		return ssl->ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+	if (ssl->cert != NULL)
+		ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+	ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+	ssl->ctx = ctx;
+	return(ssl->ctx);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+		const char *CApath)
+	{
+	return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
+	}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
+	{
+	ssl->info_callback=cb;
+	}
+
+/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
+   function pointer.  */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
+	{
+	return ssl->info_callback;
+	}
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
+	{
+	return(ssl->state);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
+	{
+	ssl->verify_result=arg;
+	}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+	{
+	return(ssl->verify_result);
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+			 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+	{
+	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
+	{
+	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+	}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
+	{
+	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+			     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+	{
+	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
+	{
+	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+	}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
+	{
+	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+	}
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return(ctx->cert_store);
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
+	{
+	if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+		X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+	ctx->cert_store=store;
+	}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return(s->rwstate);
+	}
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param cb the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+							  int is_export,
+							  int keylength))
+    {
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+    }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+						  int is_export,
+						  int keylength))
+    {
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DOXYGEN
+/*!
+ * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
+ * \param ssl the SSL session.
+ * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
+ * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
+ * of the required key in bits.
+ * \return the temporary RSA key.
+ * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
+ */
+
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
+    {}
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                        int keylength))
+	{
+	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                int keylength))
+	{
+	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                                int keylength))
+	{
+	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                        int keylength))
+	{
+	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+	{
+	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+	if (identity_hint != NULL)
+		{
+		ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+		if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+	{
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (s->session == NULL)
+		return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+	if (identity_hint != NULL)
+		{
+		s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return(s->session->psk_identity);
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+	{
+	s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+	{
+	ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+	}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+	{
+	s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+	}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+	{
+	ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+	}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+	{
+	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+	{
+	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
+
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
+		!s->hit &&                        /* full-handshake */
+		s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
+		s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 &&   /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
+		(SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) &&  /* cutthrough enabled */
+		SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 &&                      /* strong cipher choosen */
+		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 &&                 /* not a renegotiation handshake */
+		(s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A ||                 /* ready to write app-data*/
+			s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
+	}
+
+/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
+ * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
+ * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
+{
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+	*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
+	return *hash;
+}
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
+{
+
+	if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+	*hash=NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+				    ssl_cipher_id);
+