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authorParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-06-11 11:56:59 +0200
committerParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-06-11 19:50:54 +0200
commit3e121542d8b7ab5201c47bbd3ba5611a23c54759 (patch)
treea6035639e7baa88dd122d0d4e85791726606389a /app/openssl/crypto/rsa
parentac69881af1b7bfcdd185989f3e434556b1d62fed (diff)
Correctly connects to millipede.
Location keyword on android.cfg isn't supported, EIP corresponding code has been commented out. I think we should support it in ics-openvpn, so that we can show the location instead of the server name. I've updated all opensssl, openvpn, etc. subprojects from rev 813 of ics-openvpn, and jni too.
Diffstat (limited to 'app/openssl/crypto/rsa')
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h81
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c351
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c10
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c6
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c257
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c86
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c21
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c15
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c172
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c8
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c156
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c81
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c33
13 files changed, 1041 insertions, 236 deletions
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index cf743436..5f269e57 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -222,12 +222,22 @@ struct rsa_st
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, \
pad, NULL)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, ppad) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, ppad)
+
#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, len) \
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
len, NULL)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, plen) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY), \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, \
+ 0, plen)
+
#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) \
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL)
@@ -236,11 +246,24 @@ struct rsa_st
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5)
+
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
@@ -257,7 +280,7 @@ struct rsa_st
RSA * RSA_new(void);
RSA * RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
-int RSA_size(const RSA *);
+int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
/* Deprecated version */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
@@ -300,6 +323,16 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
+typedef struct rsa_pss_params_st
+ {
+ X509_ALGOR *hashAlgorithm;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskGenAlgorithm;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *saltLength;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *trailerField;
+ } RSA_PSS_PARAMS;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r,int offset);
#endif
@@ -380,6 +413,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
const unsigned char *mHash,
const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen);
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ const unsigned char *EM, int sLen);
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+ const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen);
+
int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r,int idx,void *arg);
@@ -388,6 +429,25 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx);
RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(RSA *rsa);
+/* If this flag is set the RSA method is FIPS compliant and can be used
+ * in FIPS mode. This is set in the validated module method. If an
+ * application sets this flag in its own methods it is its responsibility
+ * to ensure the result is compliant.
+ */
+
+#define RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD 0x0400
+
+/* If this flag is set the operations normally disabled in FIPS mode are
+ * permitted it is then the applications responsibility to ensure that the
+ * usage is compliant.
+ */
+
+#define RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x0400
+/* Application has decided PRNG is good enough to generate a key: don't
+ * check.
+ */
+#define RSA_FLAG_CHECKED 0x0800
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -405,6 +465,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL 143
#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR 144
#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 142
+#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY 154
#define RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER 141
#define RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN 129
#define RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY 123
@@ -413,6 +474,8 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 103
#define RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 104
#define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY 105
+#define RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 155
+#define RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY 156
#define RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK 130
#define RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD 106
#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL 124
@@ -424,6 +487,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 148
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2 109
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23 110
@@ -436,8 +500,12 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931 128
#define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT 115
#define RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP 116
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 150
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT 151
#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE 137
#define RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE 138
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT 152
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 153
#define RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE 139
#define RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING 136
#define RSA_F_RSA_SIGN 117
@@ -445,6 +513,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY 119
#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 120
#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS 126
+#define RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 149
/* Reason codes. */
#define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100
@@ -470,19 +539,24 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
#define RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS 145
#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD 156
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING 138
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE 141
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS 149
#define RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN 146
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH 150
#define RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER 139
#define RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST 142
#define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126
#define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120
#define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 134
#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 105
+#define RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD 157
#define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 140
#define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113
#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
+#define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 158
#define RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 148
#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
@@ -493,7 +567,12 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK 115
#define RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 116
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 117
+#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST 151
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 118
+#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST 152
+#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM 153
+#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER 154
+#define RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE 155
#define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING 147
#define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 119
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
index 8c320988..5a2062f9 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
@@ -265,6 +265,147 @@ static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
}
+static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+ X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int plen;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+
+ *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+ if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ return NULL;
+ p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
+
+ if (!pss)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ {
+ ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
+ && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ {
+ p = param->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = param->value.sequence->length;
+ *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pss;
+ }
+
+static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
+ {
+ int rv = 0;
+ if (!pss)
+ {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm)
+ {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (maskHash)
+ {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->saltLength)
+ {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->trailerField)
+ {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return rv;
+
+ }
+
+static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig,
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+ {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss)
+ {
+ int rv;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+ rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (sig)
+ return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+ return 1;
+ }
static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
{
@@ -310,6 +451,211 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
}
+/* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called
+ * when a signature is encountered requiring special handling. We
+ * currently only handle PSS.
+ */
+
+
+static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ int rv = -1;
+ int saltlen;
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Decode PSS parameters */
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+
+ if (pss == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!maskHash)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm)
+ {
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->saltLength)
+ {
+ saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
+
+ /* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main
+ * RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
+ */
+ if (saltlen < 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ saltlen = 20;
+
+ /* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1)
+ * and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+ */
+ if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have all parameters now set up context */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Carry on */
+ rv = 2;
+
+ err:
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
+ {
+ int pad_mode;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return 2;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+ int saltlen, rv = 0;
+ sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen == -1)
+ saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
+ else if (saltlen == -2)
+ {
+ saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+ if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
+ saltlen--;
+ }
+ pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
+ if (!pss)
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen != 20)
+ {
+ pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (!pss->saltLength)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1)
+ {
+ pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->hashAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd);
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1)
+ {
+ ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+ /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
+ mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md);
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+ &stmp))
+ goto err;
+ pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm,
+ OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
+ }
+ /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1))
+ goto err;
+ if (alg2)
+ {
+ os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
+ if (!os2)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+ os1 = os2 = NULL;
+ rv = 3;
+ err:
+ if (mgf1alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (os1)
+ ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
+ return rv;
+
+ }
+ return 2;
+ }
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] =
{
@@ -335,10 +681,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] =
0,0,0,0,0,0,
+ rsa_sig_print,
int_rsa_free,
rsa_pkey_ctrl,
old_rsa_priv_decode,
- old_rsa_priv_encode
+ old_rsa_priv_encode,
+ rsa_item_verify,
+ rsa_item_sign
},
{
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
index 4efca8cd..6ed5de3d 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
/* Override the default free and new methods */
@@ -96,6 +97,15 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) = {
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
+
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPrivateKey, RSAPrivateKey)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(RSA, RSAPublicKey, RSAPublicKey)
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 9d848db8..cc30e771 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
BN_CTX *ctx;
int r;
int ret=1;
+
+ if (!key->p || !key->q || !key->n || !key->e || !key->d)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
i = BN_new();
j = BN_new();
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d3e44785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
+ {
+ return(BN_num_bytes(r->n));
+ }
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+ }
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+ }
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+ }
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
+ RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
+ }
+
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
+ {
+ return((r == NULL)?0:r->meth->flags);
+ }
+
+void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
+ rsa->blinding=NULL;
+ }
+ rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+ }
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+ if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
+ RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
+
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+ rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
+
+ if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one())) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one())) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM local_n;
+ BIGNUM *e,*n;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (in_ctx == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ctx = in_ctx;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (e == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->e == NULL)
+ {
+ e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
+ if (e == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ e = rsa->e;
+
+
+ if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
+ {
+ /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
+ * exponent as unpredictable seed */
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ n = &local_n;
+ BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ n = rsa->n;
+
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
+ rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret));
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ if (in_ctx == NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if(rsa->e == NULL)
+ BN_free(e);
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7c941885..88ee2cb5 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -314,51 +314,56 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
return ret;
}
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if (unblind == NULL)
+ /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * in BN_BLINDING. */
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
else
{
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (local)
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
+ /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
+ * outside BN_BLINDING. */
int ret;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
return ret;
}
-}
+ }
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
+ * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
+ * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
+ * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
+ * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
+ * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
+ */
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
+ }
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -406,8 +411,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
+ }
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
@@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
@@ -480,18 +492,21 @@ err:
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
+ /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+ * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
+ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
@@ -529,8 +544,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ {
+ if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
+ }
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
@@ -564,7 +586,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
}
if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
goto err;
p=buf;
@@ -825,12 +847,12 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index cf9f1106..46e0bf99 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "PKEY_RSA_SIGN"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
@@ -86,6 +87,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY), "RSA_generate_key"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX), "RSA_generate_key_ex"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "RSA_ITEM_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK), "RSA_memory_lock"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"},
@@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
@@ -109,8 +113,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_private_decrypt"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_private_encrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "RSA_PRIV_DECODE"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "RSA_PRIV_ENCODE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_public_decrypt"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_public_encrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "RSA_PUB_DECODE"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
@@ -118,6 +126,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING), "RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
{0,NULL}
};
@@ -146,19 +155,24 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER) ,"invalid header"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS) ,"invalid keybits"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),"invalid message length"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD) ,"invalid mgf1 md"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING) ,"invalid padding"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE) ,"invalid padding mode"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS),"invalid pss parameters"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN) ,"invalid pss saltlen"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH) ,"invalid salt length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER) ,"invalid trailer"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST) ,"invalid x931 digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL) ,"key size too small"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID) ,"last octet invalid"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) ,"modulus too large"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD) ,"non fips rsa method"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT) ,"no public exponent"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"operation not allowed in fips mode"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
@@ -169,7 +183,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK) ,"sslv3 rollback attack"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),"the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE),"unknown algorithm type"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST) ,"unknown mask digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE) ,"unknown padding type"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST) ,"unknown pss digest"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),"unsupported mask algorithm"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),"unsupported mask parameter"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),"unsupported signature type"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING) ,"value missing"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
{0,NULL}
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 767f7ab6..42290cce 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb);
@@ -77,8 +80,20 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
* now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. */
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
if(rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+#endif
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
}
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
index de45088d..c95ceafc 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
const char RSA_version[]="RSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth=NULL;
@@ -87,12 +91,15 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
{
if (default_RSA_meth == NULL)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_rsa_pkcs1_ssleay();
+ else
+ return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+#else
#ifdef RSA_NULL
default_RSA_meth=RSA_null_method();
#else
-#if 0 /* was: #ifdef RSAref */
- default_RSA_meth=RSA_PKCS1_RSAref();
-#else
default_RSA_meth=RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
#endif
#endif
@@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
ret->blinding=NULL;
ret->mt_blinding=NULL;
ret->bignum_data=NULL;
- ret->flags=ret->meth->flags;
+ ret->flags=ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data))
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -280,163 +287,6 @@ void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data,idx));
}
-int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
- {
- return(BN_num_bytes(r->n));
- }
-
-int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
-
-int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
-
-int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
-
-int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
- RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- return(rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
- }
-
-int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
- {
- return((r == NULL)?0:r->meth->flags);
- }
-
-void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
- {
- BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blinding);
- rsa->blinding=NULL;
- }
- rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
- }
-
-int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int ret=0;
-
- if (rsa->blinding != NULL)
- RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
-
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
- rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
- ret=1;
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
-
-static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *q, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *ret = NULL, *r0, *r1, *r2;
-
- if (d == NULL || p == NULL || q == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (r2 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one())) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) goto err;
-
- ret = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, d, r0, ctx);
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM local_n;
- BIGNUM *e,*n;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-
- if (in_ctx == NULL)
- {
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0;
- }
- else
- ctx = in_ctx;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (e == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->e == NULL)
- {
- e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx);
- if (e == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- e = rsa->e;
-
-
- if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
- {
- /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
- * exponent as unpredictable seed */
- RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
- n = &local_n;
- BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- n = rsa->n;
-
- ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
- rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret));
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (in_ctx == NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if(rsa->e == NULL)
- BN_free(e);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
int RSA_memory_lock(RSA *r)
{
int i,j,k,off;
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 18d307ea..af4d24a5 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
seed = to + 1;
db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
- EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ return 0;
memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
@@ -145,9 +146,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
- EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ return -1;
- if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
goto decoding_err;
else
{
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index c6892ecd..157aa5c4 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -63,6 +63,12 @@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
#include "evp_locl.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
@@ -79,6 +85,8 @@ typedef struct
int pad_mode;
/* message digest */
const EVP_MD *md;
+ /* message digest for MGF1 */
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
/* PSS/OAEP salt length */
int saltlen;
/* Temp buffer */
@@ -95,6 +103,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
rctx->md = NULL;
+ rctx->mgf1md = NULL;
rctx->tbuf = NULL;
rctx->saltlen = -2;
@@ -147,6 +156,31 @@ static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
OPENSSL_free(rctx);
}
}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+/* FIP checker. Return value indicates status of context parameters:
+ * 1 : redirect to FIPS.
+ * 0 : don't redirect to FIPS.
+ * -1 : illegal operation in FIPS mode.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ int rv = -1;
+ if (!FIPS_mode())
+ return 0;
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ rv = 0;
+ if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv)
+ return -1;
+ if (rctx->md && !(rctx->md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+ return rv;
+ if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS))
+ return rv;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
@@ -155,6 +189,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (rctx->md)
{
if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
@@ -163,7 +206,36 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (ret > 0)
+ {
+ unsigned int slen;
+ ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md,
+ rctx->pad_mode,
+ rctx->saltlen,
+ rctx->mgf1md,
+ sig, &slen);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ *siglen = slen;
+ else
+ *siglen = 0;
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2)
+ {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
+ tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ }
+ else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
@@ -186,8 +258,10 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
- if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs,
- rctx->md, rctx->saltlen))
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
+ rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->saltlen))
return -1;
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
@@ -269,8 +343,30 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
size_t rslen;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ int rv;
+ rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
if (rctx->md)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (rv > 0)
+ {
+ return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa,
+ tbs, tbslen,
+ rctx->md,
+ rctx->pad_mode,
+ rctx->saltlen,
+ rctx->mgf1md,
+ sig, siglen);
+
+ }
+#endif
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
sig, siglen, rsa);
@@ -289,7 +385,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
- ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, tbs, rctx->md,
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
@@ -403,15 +500,25 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
- if (p1 < -2)
- return -2;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return -2;
}
- rctx->saltlen = p1;
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+ else
+ {
+ if (p1 < -2)
+ return -2;
+ rctx->saltlen = p1;
+ }
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
@@ -435,16 +542,45 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD)
+ {
+ if (rctx->mgf1md)
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+ else
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ }
+ else
+ rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+ {
+ X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *encalg = NULL;
+ if (p2)
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(p2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ if (alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_get0(&encalg, NULL, NULL, alg);
+ if (encalg && OBJ_obj2nid(encalg) == NID_rsaesOaep)
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
-#endif
return 1;
+#endif
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
@@ -475,6 +611,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index ac211e2f..5f9f533d 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ static const unsigned char zeroes[] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
{
+ return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
+ }
+
+int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
+ const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
+ {
int i;
int ret = 0;
int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
@@ -80,6 +87,10 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
unsigned char *DB = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+ mgf1Hash = Hash;
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
if (hLen < 0)
@@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2;
else if (sLen < -2)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -102,7 +113,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits))
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
goto err;
}
if (MSBits == 0)
@@ -112,12 +123,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
}
if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2)) /* sLen can be small negative */
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
goto err;
}
maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
@@ -125,10 +136,10 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
if (!DB)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash) < 0)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
DB[i] ^= EM[i];
@@ -137,25 +148,28 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen-1); i++) ;
if (DB[i++] != 0x1)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
+ goto err;
if (maskedDBLen - i)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, H_, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ {
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H_, NULL))
+ goto err;
if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen))
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0;
}
else
@@ -164,6 +178,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
err:
if (DB)
OPENSSL_free(DB);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ret;
@@ -173,12 +188,22 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
const unsigned char *mHash,
const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
{
+ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
+ }
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+ const unsigned char *mHash,
+ const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash, int sLen)
+ {
int i;
int ret = 0;
int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+ mgf1Hash = Hash;
+
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
if (hLen < 0)
goto err;
@@ -192,7 +217,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
else if (sLen == -2) sLen = -2;
else if (sLen < -2)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -209,8 +234,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
}
else if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2))
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
goto err;
}
if (sLen > 0)
@@ -218,8 +242,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
if (!salt)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
@@ -228,16 +251,18 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
H = EM + maskedDBLen;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen);
- if (sLen)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, H, NULL);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen))
+ goto err;
+ if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H, NULL))
+ goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
/* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
- if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash))
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
goto err;
p = EM;
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 0be4ec7f..b6f6037a 100644
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
const unsigned char *s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign)
{
return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len,
@@ -153,6 +161,15 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
unsigned char *s;
X509_SIG *sig=NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa))
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
@@ -182,6 +199,22 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0) goto err;
+ /* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
+ * check for correct tag and length octets.
+ */
+ if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10)
+ {
+ if (rm)
+ {
+ memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
+ *prm_len = 16;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
/* Special case: SSL signature */
if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {