From a5d46a4e38985be540b9127ddcd3d8e21bbecb9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kali Kaneko Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2015 16:46:11 -0400 Subject: Imported Upstream version 2.0.2 --- docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org | 21 --------------------- 1 file changed, 21 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org (limited to 'docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org') diff --git a/docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org b/docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org deleted file mode 100644 index f1d729d..0000000 --- a/docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ --*- mode: org; -*- - -* python-gnupg - -** what should be done by 1 May 2013: -- [ ] packaging for pypi -- [ ] unittests -- [ ] leap_mx and soledad should be using python-gnupg - -** what the isec folks might want to look at: -*** options - are there any ways to coerce python-gnupg in strange/buggy ways though its - allowed options, or, in general, though the API it presents? -*** daemons - if any of the daemons controlled by, or connected to, leap_mx or soledad - can be leveraged in any way to execute an a attack using python-gnupg. -*** keyID collision / couchDB key database poisoning - is there a way to trick python-gnupg into using an incorrect key? -*** identity leaks - is there a way to analyse the mailserver, leapmx, or soledad, to gain info - about which key is being used at a particular time? -- cgit v1.2.3