From a5d46a4e38985be540b9127ddcd3d8e21bbecb9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kali Kaneko Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2015 16:46:11 -0400 Subject: Imported Upstream version 2.0.2 --- PKG-INFO | 12 +- .../Complete-Guide-to-Publishing-OpenPGP-in-DNS.md | 832 ---- docs/DETAILS | 1225 ----- docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org | 21 - docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-3.1-audit.html | 946 ---- docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-3.1-audit.org | 232 - docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-development.org | 59 - docs/NOTES-python-openpgp-implementations.txt | 31 - docs/OpenPGP-keys-in-DNS.md | 133 - docs/_build/doctrees/environment.pickle | Bin 1439404 -> 0 bytes docs/_build/doctrees/gnupg.doctree | Bin 582816 -> 0 bytes docs/_build/doctrees/index.doctree | Bin 11034 -> 0 bytes docs/_build/html/.buildinfo | 4 - docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg.html | 148 - docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_meta.html | 981 ---- docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_parsers.html | 1486 ------ docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_util.html | 718 --- docs/_build/html/_modules/index.html | 104 - 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docs/upstream-python-gnupg-POC-exploit.py | 120 - examples/make-8192-bit-key.py | 214 + gnupg/_meta.py | 250 +- gnupg/_parsers.py | 276 +- gnupg/_trust.py | 8 +- gnupg/_util.py | 270 +- gnupg/_version.py | 4 +- gnupg/gnupg.py | 139 +- setup.py | 27 +- 71 files changed, 974 insertions(+), 26982 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/Complete-Guide-to-Publishing-OpenPGP-in-DNS.md delete mode 100644 docs/DETAILS delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-isec-audit.org delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-3.1-audit.html delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-3.1-audit.org delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-python-gnupg-development.org delete mode 100644 docs/NOTES-python-openpgp-implementations.txt delete mode 100644 docs/OpenPGP-keys-in-DNS.md delete mode 100644 docs/_build/doctrees/environment.pickle delete mode 100644 docs/_build/doctrees/gnupg.doctree delete mode 100644 docs/_build/doctrees/index.doctree delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/.buildinfo delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_meta.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_parsers.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_modules/gnupg/_util.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_modules/index.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_sources/gnupg.txt delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_sources/index.txt delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/DETAILS.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/agogo.css delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/ajax-loader.gif delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/basic.css delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/bgfooter.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/bgtop.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/comment-bright.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/comment-close.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/comment.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/doctools.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/down-pressed.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/down.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/file.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/jquery.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/minus.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/pgp-subkeys.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/plus.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/pygments.css delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/searchtools.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/underscore.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/up-pressed.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/up.png delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/_static/websupport.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/genindex.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/gnupg.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/index.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/objects.inv delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/py-modindex.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/search.html delete mode 100644 docs/_build/html/searchindex.js delete mode 100644 docs/_build/python-gnupg-docs.zip delete mode 100644 docs/_static/DETAILS.html delete mode 100644 docs/_static/agogo.css delete mode 100644 docs/_static/pgp-subkeys.html delete mode 100644 docs/_static/pygments.css delete mode 100644 docs/change-license-emails.txt delete mode 100644 docs/change-license-emails.txt~ delete mode 100644 docs/gpg-migrate.txt delete mode 100644 docs/pip-install.log delete mode 100644 docs/smartcard-idea.txt delete mode 100644 docs/the-internals-of-a-gpgpgp-key delete mode 100644 docs/to-monkeysphere-list delete mode 100644 docs/upstream-python-gnupg-POC-exploit.py create mode 100755 examples/make-8192-bit-key.py diff --git a/PKG-INFO b/PKG-INFO index 63c5f9b..2bdc4b2 100644 --- a/PKG-INFO +++ b/PKG-INFO @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ Metadata-Version: 1.1 Name: gnupg -Version: 1.3.1 +Version: 2.0.2 Summary: A Python wrapper for GnuPG Home-page: https://github.com/isislovecruft/python-gnupg Author: Isis Agora Lovecruft Author-email: isis@patternsinthevoid.net License: GPLv3+ Download-URL: https://github.com/isislovecruft/python-gnupg/archive/master.zip -Description: This module allows easy access to GnuPG's key management, encryption and signature functionality from Python programs, by interacting with GnuPG through file descriptors. Input arguments are strictly checked and sanitised, and therefore this module should be safe to use in networked applications requiring direct user input. It is intended for use with Python 2.6 or greater. +Description: This module allows easy access to GnuPG's key management, encryption and signature functionality from Python programs, by interacting with GnuPG through file descriptors. Input arguments are strictly checked and sanitised, and therefore this module should be safe to use in networked applications requiring direct user input. It is intended for use on Windows, MacOS X, BSD, or Linux, with Python 2.6, Python 2.7, Python 3.3, Python 3.4, or PyPy. Platform: Linux Platform: BSD @@ -15,7 +15,13 @@ Platform: OSX Platform: Windows Classifier: Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers +Classifier: Intended Audience :: System Administrators Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: GNU General Public License v3 or later (GPLv3+) +Classifier: Operating System :: Android +Classifier: Operating System :: MacOS :: MacOS X +Classifier: Operating System :: Microsoft :: Windows +Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX :: BSD +Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux Classifier: Programming Language :: Python Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2 Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3 @@ -23,6 +29,8 @@ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2.6 Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2.7 Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.3 Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.4 +Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: CPython +Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: PyPy Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules Classifier: Topic :: Utilities diff --git a/docs/Complete-Guide-to-Publishing-OpenPGP-in-DNS.md b/docs/Complete-Guide-to-Publishing-OpenPGP-in-DNS.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5112c97..0000000 --- a/docs/Complete-Guide-to-Publishing-OpenPGP-in-DNS.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,832 +0,0 @@ - - -# The complete guide to publishing PGP keys in DNS - -## Introduction - -Publishing PGP keys is a pain. There are many disjoint keyservers, three or -four _networks_ of which, which do (or don't) share information with each -other. Some are corporate, some are private. And it's a crapshoot as to -whose key is going to be on which, or worse, which will have the latest copy -of a person's key. - -For a long time, GPG has had a way to publish keys in DNS, but it hasn't been -well documented. This document hopes to change that. - -After reading this, you should: - -* Know the three ways to publish a key - -* Have at least a couple tools to do so - -* Have learned a bit more about DNS - -The target audience for this guide is a technical one. It's expected you -understand what DNS is, and what an RFC and a resource record is. - -There are three ways to publish a PGP key in DNS. Most modern versions of GPG -can retrieve from all three, although it's not enabled by default. There are -no compile-time options you need to enable it, and it's simple to turn on. Of -the three key-publishing methods, there are two that you probably shouldn't -use at the same time, and there are advantages and disadvantages to each, -which I hope to outline below, both in general and for each method. - -### Advantages to DNS publishing of your keys - -* It's universal. Your DNS is your own, and you don't have to worry about - which network of vastly-disconnectedkeyservers is caching your key. - -* Using DNS does not stop you from publishing via other means. - -* If you run an organization, you can easily publish all your employee-keys - via this method, and in the same step,define a signing-policy, such that a - person need only assign trust to your organization's "keysigning key" (or - theCEO's key, or the CTO's), without the trouble of running a keyserver. - -* DNSSEC can be (somewhat) used as an additional trust-path vector. More on - this in the notes at the bottom. - -* You do not have to be searching DNS for keys in order to publish. On the - same note, you do not have to be publishing in this manner to search - forothers there. - -### Disadvantages to DNS publishing - -* If you don't control your own DNS (or have a good relationship with your DNS - admin), this isn't going to beas easy or even possible. Ideally, you want - to be running BIND. - -* With two of the three methods listed here, you're going to need to be able - to put a CERT record into your DNS. Mostweb-enabled DNS tools probably will - not give you this ability. The third uses TXT records, which SPF has caused - to befairly universal in web-interfaces. However, it's also the least - standards-defined of the three. - -* Using at least some of these methods, it's not always a "set it and forget - it" procedure. You may need toperiodically re-export your key and - re-publish it, especially if you gain new signatures. - -* Using some of these methods, you're going to be putting some pretty large, - pretty unwiedly lines in your DNS zones. Not everyone will easily be able - to retrieve them, but again, you can still publish other ways. - -* Using some of these methods, DNS is just a means to an end: you still need - to publish your key elsewhere, like a webpage,and the DNS records just point - at it. - -* Initial verifications of most of these seem to imply that only DSA keys are - supported, although I welcome feedback. Itseems the community is trying to - get RSA keys to make a comeback. They're the only type supported by the - gpg2.0 card, andthey are the default keytype. There was a while where they - weren't, though. Since writing this document, I've discoveredthat "new" RSA - keys work, but ancient RSA keys with no subkeys tend to misbehave. - -### Turning on key-fetching via DNS - -Inside your GPG "options" file, find the "auto-key-locate" line, and add -"cert" and/or "pka" to the options. - - auto-key-locate cert pka (as well as other methods, like keyserver URLs) - - -Don't be surprised if a lot of people don't use this method. - -Note that you can also turn on two options during signature verification. -They are specified in a "verify-options" clause in your config file, or on the -command line, and they are (right from the GPG manpage): - - pka-lookups - - Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that - PKA is based on DNS, and so enabling this option may dis- - close information on when and what signatures are veri- - fied or to whom data is encrypted. This is similar to the - "web bug" described for the auto-key-retrieve feature. - -And: - - pka-trust-increase - - Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature - passes PKA validation. This option is only meaningful if - pka-lookups is set. - - -You can also use the same options on the command line (as you'll see in this -document). - -## Types of PGP Key Records - -### DNS PKA Records - -Relevant RFCs: None that I can find. - -Other Docs: The GPG source and mailing lists. - -#### Advantages - -* It's a TXT record. Easy to put in a zonefile with most management software. -* No special tools required to generate, just three simple pieces of data. -* Since it uses a special subzone, you can manage the _pka namespace in a - separate zonefile. -* GPG has an option, when verifying a signature, to look up these records - (--verify-options pka-lookups), so it's doubly useful, both from a - distribution and a verification point. - -#### Disadvantages - -* As with IPGP certs, you're at the mercy of the URL. This doesn't put your - key in DNS, just the location of it, and the fingerprint. Some clients may - not be able to support https or http 1.1. -* Not RFC standard. - -#### Howto - -1. Figure out which key you want to export: - - %gpg --list-keys danm@prime.gushi.org - Warning: using insecure memory! - pub 1024D/624BB249 2000-10-02 <-- I'm going to use this one. - uid Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - uid Daniel Mahoney (Secondary Email) <gushi@gushi.org> - sub 2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 - pub 1024R/309C17C5 1997-05-08 - uid Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - -2. Export the key to a file (I use keyid.pub.asc, but it can be anything) - - %gpg --export --armor 624BB249 > 624BB249.pub.asc - Warning: using insecure memory! - % - -3. Get the fingerprint for your key: - - %gpg --list-keys --fingerprint 624BB249 - gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory! - gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/faq.html for more information - pub 1024D/624BB249 2000-10-02 - Key fingerprint = C206 3054 5492 95F3 3490 37FF FBBE 5A30 624B B249 <-- That bit is your fingerprint. - uid Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - uid Daniel Mahoney (Secondary Email) <gushi@gushi.org> - sub 2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 - -4. Copy the file somewhere, like your webspace. It need not live on the same - server. It needs to be accessable by the url you create in the next step. - - %cp 624BB249.pub.asc public_html/danm.pubkey.txt - -5. Make up your text record. The format is: - - danm._pka.prime.gushi.org. TXT "v=pka1;fpr=C2063054549295F3349037FFFBBE5A30624BB249;uri=http://prime.gushi.org/danm.pubkey.txt" - - -We'll take this in several parts. The record label is simply the email -address with "._pka." replacing the "@". danm@prime.gushi.org becomes -danm._pka.prime.gushi.org. Don't forget the trailing dot, if you're using the -fully qualified name. I recommend sticking with fully-qualified, for -simplicity. - -The body of the record is also simple. The v portion is just a version. -There's only one version as far as I can tell, 'pka1'. The fpr is the -fingerprint, with all whitespace stripped, and in uppercase. The uri is the -location a key can be retrieved from. All the "names" are lowercase, -separated by semicolons. - -6. Publish the above record in your DNS. Bump your serial number and reload - your nameserver. If you're using DNSSEC, re-sign your zone. - -#### Testing - -Most of the tests we're going to do for these are essentially the same -activity. See if our DNS server is handing out an answer, and then see if GPG -can retrieve it. - -1. A simple dig: - - %dig +short danm._pka.prime.gushi.org. TXT - "v=pka1\;fpr=C2063054549295F3349037FFFBBE5A30624BB249\;uri=http://prime.gushi.org/danm.pubkey.txt" - -(The backslashes before the semicolons are normal). Other than that, it seems -to make sense and match what I put in.) - -2. Test it with GPG. Rather than messing around with, and adding-from and - deleting from live keyrings, you can do: - - %echo "foo" | gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring /tmp/gpg-$$ --encrypt --armor --auto-key-locate pka -r you@you.com - - -(where you@you.com is the address of your primary key.) The /tmp/gpg-$$ -creates a random file named after your PID. What you should see, and what I -see, is something like this: - - gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory! - gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/faq.html for more information - gpg: keyring `/tmp/gpg-39996' created - gpg: requesting key 624BB249 from http server prime.gushi.org - gpg: key 624BB249: public key "Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>" imported - gpg: public key of ultimately trusted key CF45887D not found - gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model - gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u - gpg: Total number processed: 1 - gpg: imported: 1 - gpg: automatically retrieved `danm@prime.gushi.org' via PKA - gpg: DE20C529: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user - pub 2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - Primary key fingerprint: C206 3054 5492 95F3 3490 37FF FBBE 5A30 624B B249 - Subkey fingerprint: CE40 B786 81E2 5CB9 F7D3 1318 9488 EB58 DE20 C529 - It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named - in the user ID. If you *really* know what you are doing, - you may answer the next question with yes. - Use this key anyway? (y/N) y - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- - Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (FreeBSD) - hQIOA5SI61jeIMUpEAf/UotgWP8VQC9VTY36HaZeXO1CTFk90x0qlPrAhJk9YaoA - 2eHNKZSoHKqaLjzTbaWnWHnNZu0IllIS+qrAwNeIAhswfzDoc8Q9+/4sGSR3LmxA - 8SEwrJIvLmGVbqJEtnH8TTHIEao/lpL/d+ul4nLfbXRn0NW+MsaCAi8UsjbLlJeV - n4p0GQlpDoZCE55DTwMzfWMT84YVwuXTesuN+i7sSyJn2hT1rXuK1BCVcsgTcKdy - QhIo3EfKBlfFp74yiU7QCmlAujD6U6a93mmxezPIHVx/WGXgPExVRGgEzfT/tUcI - IQ2xMDUv4BF05hgm04GPGCbBY431j4UkdWWI6bvMLwgA2i01NmflH/6Z8+ss6J1M - e3RWnR7TPl5lDkXFBtLGAzO+HrsC5A32SbkTw+WsljCQLifJ2EalfoJ1QGY4Sp3v - H2YunwZLVPTc+D2JnrXfqNmi5zYZio8by3c8L0CgWdMwZ7PPxZpTOLN77/MIjBkJ - EBb8Z6SZCgzTIhN5z56ZgWFvmSKf1vKkeUcrgxMs+DnA+XqBMJ9w520JwoTLjJza - syrlYVhd+ktY21DYB9OJ5MZx2HMAtkUDRAzW1zoLcehk1kdZNzhpjU5hqSjT8/GN - trKFeqkmKemrq2GvMNyJyrEOB8e7KgbmXa95YKH0Wh2D4SWpXukegyCspmY4tDE+ - uckaFSao+48g8D6vs1irGSxBRjyhD/jPDblrgpo= - =NbgW - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- - -The "insecure memory" warning is a silly warning that the only way to turn off is to run GPG setuid root. -You can see in the output that the key comes from PKA. - -The "it is NOT certain" warning has nothing to do with the fact that it came -from DNS. You will get that warning every time you use that key (or any gpg -key) until you have edited it and assigned ownertrust to it, or until the key -is signed with a trusted signature, either from your personal web of trust, or -from a signing service like the pgp.com directory. - -3. Ask other people to run it for you and send you the resulting blob. You should be able to decrypt it with your private key. - -### PGP CERT Records - -Also known as: The "big" CERT record. - -Relevant RFCs: [RFC 2538](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2538.html), -[RFC 4398](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc4398.html), specifically sections 2.1 -and 3.3 - -#### Advantages - -* DNS is all you need. You don't have to host the key elsewhere. As a DNS - nerd, this strikes me as very cool. - -* Suprisingly easy to verify with dig, if you have a base64 converter handy - (openssl includes one) - -#### Disadvantages - -* These records can get big. Really big. Especially if you have photo-ids on your keys. You can play with export-options to shrink it somewhat. Big dns packets may require EDNS, or dns-over-tcp, which not everyone supports, but support is becoming more widespread as a result of DNSSEC awareness. - -* Requires the make-dns-cert tool, which isn't built by default. - -* Requires you to have some control over your actual zonefile. Most control panels won't cut it. - -* Make-dns-cert currently generates a very ugly record for this. - - #### How to - -1. As before, the first step is to figure out which key we want. - - %gpg --list-keys danm@prime.gushi.org - Warning: using insecure memory! - pub 1024D/624BB249 2000-10-02 <-- I'm going to use this one. - uid Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - uid Daniel Mahoney (Secondary Email) <gushi@gushi.org> - sub 2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 - pub 1024R/309C17C5 1997-05-08 - uid Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org> - -2. We export the key, but this time, it needs to be binary. - - %gpg --export 624BB249 > 624BB249.pub.bin - Warning: using insecure memory! - -3. We run make-dns-cert on it. make-dns-cert comes with no manual or docs, - but running with -h gives you all the clue you need. - - make-dns-cert - -f fingerprint - -u URL - -k key file - -n DNS name - -So then, - - make-dns-cert -n danm.prime.gushi.org. -k 624BB249.pub.bin - 
`%make-dns-cert -n danm.prime.gushi.org. -k 624BB249.pub.bin
-         danm.prime.gushi.org.   TYPE37  \# 1298 0003 0000 00 9901A20439D8DAF1110400F770EC6AA006076334BEC6DB6FBB237DC194BC0AB8
-         302C8953F04C28FC2085235D4F10EFA027234FBD63D142CCADD5213AD2B79A22C89ED9B4138370D8220D0F987F993A5364A4A7AC3D42F3765C384
-         71DDD0FF3372E4AE6F7BEE1E18EF464A0BEB5BBE860A08238891455EBE7CB53D567E981F78ADBD263206B0493ADCB74DD00A0FF0E9A1CD245415E
-         CEF59435162AFCE4CDD14BC70400EA38FF501256E773DEA299404854D99F4EDB2757AA911A9C77C68AB8D6622E517A556C43D21F0523C568F016C
-         D0DB89EF435F0D53B4E07434213F899E6578955DC2C147931E7B6901C9FD8A02705417D69A879B3CC196D2AC2EAEF311192EE89ABAF5A60942167
-         B4625735FCBDFB5DE0E3AC1236A53FA4D7CDD7D75F5DE85AF50400867D9546B28B79AF10541053CF4AB06A6171BFD21458BFD12AF1AE2B2401CAD
-         8851661F8AF6602F80EDAC99C79616BE1F910F4156242003779C68D7A079A8B18F89DD293E1B247E7420471300A4A0730AA61DE281CCC211FC405
-         A0A8A79877999FF9042AD892AB927DA371E8883BBB370AB7A97841408C3486BB18598CF2559BB42844616E69656C20502E204D61686F6E6579203
-         C64616E6D407072696D652E67757368692E6F72673E884E04101102000E050239D8DAF1040B030102021901000A0910FBBE5A30624BB249FA2E00
-         9B057503ED498695AE5ED73CA1B98EBAEE13F717E500A0921E0D92724459100266FEBBC29E911C8B0F530BB43244616E69656C204D61686F6E657
-         920285365636F6E6461727920456D61696C29203C67757368694067757368692E6F72673E8860041311020020050245D49FD7021B23060B090807
-         030204150208030416020301021E01021780000A0910FBBE5A30624BB249158400A082C8AF43DA8B85F740D6B1A6E9FF0B4490520B8C00A08F77D
-         21FBF86C842963E8090DC0646D1DD7F95C9B9020D0439D8DAF4100800F64257B7087F081772A2BAD6A942F305E8F95311394FB6F16EB94B3820DA
-         01A756A314E98F4055F3D007C6CB43A994ADF74C648649F80C83BD65E917D4A1D350F8F5595FDC76524F3D3D8DDBCE99E1579259CDFDB8AE744FC
-         5FC76BC83C5473061CE7CC966FF15F9BBFD915EC701AAD35B9E8DA0A5723AD41AF0BF4600582BE5F488FD584E49DBCD20B49DE49107366B336C38
-         0D451D0F7C88B31C7C5B2D8EF6F3C923C043F0A55B188D8EBB558CB85D38D334FD7C175743A31D186CDE33212CB52AFF3CE1B1294018118D7C84A
-         70A72D686C40319C807297ACA950CD9969FABD00A509B0246D3083D66A45D419F9C7CBD894B221926BAABA25EC355E9320B3B00020207FF5E1A3C
-         C5DA00E1E94EC8EF6C7FE9B49D944C71D8BBC817DD8E64A7344B9E48392E0B833B3B1DB7E6D5A38BE2826DEF0060F78C6417871EAF1CFBCBC47D2
-         7E93718D975E0A3A36D868C021D6B771740CE2918307D69D614BBF0632DC31932EA31397A7F3B04618C9A76C2F38265C7037E303EDD8AEF03D069
-         208E3FE9C4EA77D83E6311ED36C013D58C54E914B263A459E22D463A0288510C4752B99C163EEA0A55686979691AB0D9F9AA0C06C834446D7A723
-         EC534D819301382621ACF8930C74E9FD28C8797718AEC2C30CF601E24194B799234104A3D6239657B1D4AD545BDAA637F61541435CB51B4D138FB
-         F55E1A9FD2EED860E4459D6795B6FCCA23155A8846041811020006050239D8DAF4000A0910FBBE5A30624BB249415A009E37BCFDC64E76CBF6A86
-         82B85EA161BD1DFB793DF00A0C471BC7B9723535CD855D8FF1EB93F01E251B698
-         %
-                                                                                                                                                              
-The program prints that all on **one line**.
-
-Immediately, we notice a few things.
-
-*   The record type isn't "CERT", it's "TYPE37".  This confused me for a while until I discovered    [RFC3597](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3597.html) Basically, it's a way that a DNS server can handle a resource    record it doesn't know about, by giving it some special fields like the "#", as well as a length (which is the 1298 you    see there).
-
-*   The rest of the record is on one line.  I wrapped it for the purposes of brevity.  If I were using this in a zonefile,    I would need to be careful that I wrapped it on a byte-boundary (every two characters is a byte).  If I miss the    boundary, named will refuse to load it, dnssec-signzone won't touch it, etc.
-
-4.  So the thing is ugly and you don't want to touch it.  The easiest way to work with it is to drop all that into a file:
-
-        %make-dns-cert -n danm.prime.gushi.org. -k 624BB249.pub.bin > 624BB249.big.cert
-
-
-5.  And then either read it into your editor, or tack it on like this:
-
-        %cat 624BB249.big.cert >> your.zonefile
-
-Be sure to make a backup first.  Either way, you never have to copy/paste the raw hex and worry about newlines being    inserted where you don't want them.
-
-6.  Before you reload your zone, you might want to use named-checkzone on it first:
-
-        prime# named-checkzone gushi.org gushi.org.hosts
-        zone gushi.org/IN: loaded serial 2009102909
-        OK
-        prime#
-
-7.  Voice of experience: You may want to dial the TTL (which controls how long servers will cache your data) way down on the    record above.  It's not hard, just put a number before the TYPE37, with a space, i.e:
-
-         danm.prime.gushi.org. 30 TYPE37
-
-This way if it all goes terribly wrong, or you need to make changes, it won't be cached for very long.
-
-8.  If it looks okay, bump your serial number and reload.
-
-#### Testing
-
-1.  As above, you can dig, but you won't be able to easily read the results:
-
-         prime# dig +short danm.prime.gushi.org CERT
-         ;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode.
-
-
-PGP 0 0 
-mQGiBDnY2vERBAD3cOxqoAYHYzS+xttvuyN9wZS8CrgwLIlT8Ewo/CCF
-I11PEO+gJyNPvWPRQsyt1SE60reaIsie2bQTg3DYIg0PmH+ZOlNkpKes
-PULzdlw4Rx3dD/M3Lkrm977h4Y70ZKC+tbvoYKCCOIkUVevny1PVZ+mB
-94rb0mMgawSTrct03QCg/w6aHNJFQV7O9ZQ1Fir85M3RS8cEAOo4/1AS
-Vudz3qKZQEhU2Z9O2ydXqpEanHfGirjWYi5RelVsQ9IfBSPFaPAWzQ24
-nvQ18NU7TgdDQhP4meZXiVXcLBR5Mee2kByf2KAnBUF9aah5s8wZbSrC
-6u8xEZLuiauvWmCUIWe0Ylc1/L37XeDjrBI2pT+k183X119d6Fr1BACG
-fZVGsot5rxBUEFPPSrBqYXG/0hRYv9Eq8a4rJAHK2IUWYfivZgL4DtrJ
-nHlha+H5EPQVYkIAN3nGjXoHmosY+J3Sk+GyR+dCBHEwCkoHMKph3igc
-zCEfxAWgqKeYd5mf+QQq2JKrkn2jceiIO7s3CrepeEFAjDSGuxhZjPJV
-m7QoRGFuaWVsIFAuIE1haG9uZXkgPGRhbm1AcHJpbWUuZ3VzaGkub3Jn
-PohOBBARAgAOBQI52NrxBAsDAQICGQEACgkQ+75aMGJLskn6LgCbBXUD
-7UmGla5e1zyhuY667hP3F+UAoJIeDZJyRFkQAmb+u8KekRyLD1MLtDJE
-YW5pZWwgTWFob25leSAoU2Vjb25kYXJ5IEVtYWlsKSA8Z3VzaGlAZ3Vz
-aGkub3JnPohgBBMRAgAgBQJF1J/XAhsjBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYCAwEC
-HgECF4AACgkQ+75aMGJLskkVhACggsivQ9qLhfdA1rGm6f8LRJBSC4wA
-oI930h+/hshClj6AkNwGRtHdf5XJuQINBDnY2vQQCAD2Qle3CH8IF3Ki
-utapQvMF6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSG
-SfgMg71l6RfUodNQ+PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPF
-RzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarTW56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvN
-ILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjT
-NP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM
-2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpMgs7AAICB/9e
-GjzF2gDh6U7I72x/6bSdlExx2LvIF92OZKc0S55IOS4Lgzs7Hbfm1aOL
-4oJt7wBg94xkF4cerxz7y8R9J+k3GNl14KOjbYaMAh1rdxdAzikYMH1p
-1hS78GMtwxky6jE5en87BGGMmnbC84JlxwN+MD7diu8D0Gkgjj/pxOp3
-2D5jEe02wBPVjFTpFLJjpFniLUY6AohRDEdSuZwWPuoKVWhpeWkasNn5
-qgwGyDREbXpyPsU02BkwE4JiGs+JMMdOn9KMh5dxiuwsMM9gHiQZS3mS
-NBBKPWI5ZXsdStVFvapjf2FUFDXLUbTROPv1Xhqf0u7YYORFnWeVtvzK
-IxVaiEYEGBECAAYFAjnY2vQACgkQ+75aMGJLsklBWgCeN7z9xk52y/ao
-aCuF6hYb0d+3k98AoMRxvHuXI1Nc2FXY/x65PwHiUbaY
-
-
-It's still ugly, but it's not AS ugly because it's base64, which includes
-spaces, at least, and is easier to search for a pattern.  Base64 can also be
-easily wrapped on any boundary, which is nice.
-
-You can run your existing exported key through a base64 converter, like the
-one built into the openssl binary, if you want to compare:
-
-     %cat 624BB249.pub.bin | openssl enc -base64
-     mQGiBDnY2vERBAD3cOxqoAYHYzS+xttvuyN9wZS8CrgwLIlT8Ewo/CCFI11PEO+g
-     JyNPvWPRQsyt1SE60reaIsie2bQTg3DYIg0PmH+ZOlNkpKesPULzdlw4Rx3dD/M3
-     Lkrm977h4Y70ZKC+tbvoYKCCOIkUVevny1PVZ+mB94rb0mMgawSTrct03QCg/w6a
-     (...etc...)
-     OPv1Xhqf0u7YYORFnWeVtvzKIxVaiEYEGBECAAYFAjnY2vQACgkQ+75aMGJLsklB
-     WgCeN7z9xk52y/aoaCuF6hYb0d+3k98AoMRxvHuXI1Nc2FXY/x65PwHiUbaY
-
-
-Now, while you could compare things byte-by-byte here, what I've done as a
-"casual check" is just pick random strings in the text and see if they match
-up.  For example, you can see that "reaIsie2" is present in both.  They both
-start with and end with similar strings on every line.  The real test, of
-course, is to see if GPG recognizes it as a valid key.
-
-By the way, since I use DNSSEC, dnssec-signzone rewrites this record into the
-proper "presentation format" for me, which is base64.  If you want a similar
-function, you can use named-compilezone to get some of the same effects, or
-you can use the shell script I provide later in this document, with which you
-don't even need make-dns-cert.
-
-2.  Testing with gpg
-
-As above, the command to test this is remarkably simple:
-
-     %rm /tmp/gpg-*
-     %echo "foo" | gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring /tmp/gpg-$$ --encrypt --armor --auto-key-locate cert -r danm@prime.gushi.org
-     gpg: keyring `/tmp/gpg-39996' created
-     gpg: key 624BB249: public key "Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>" imported
-     gpg: Total number processed: 1
-     gpg:               imported: 1
-     gpg: automatically retrieved `danm@prime.gushi.org' via DNS CERT
-     gpg: DE20C529: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
-     pub  2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-     Primary key fingerprint: C206 3054 5492 95F3 3490  37FF FBBE 5A30 624B B249
-     Subkey fingerprint: CE40 B786 81E2 5CB9 F7D3  1318 9488 EB58 DE20 C529
-     It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named
-     in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,
-     you may answer the next question with yes.
-     Use this key anyway? (y/N) y
-     -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
-     Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (FreeBSD)
-     hQIOA5SI61jeIMUpEAf/Sx7MKWm+e9EpUTSrDaBp4nJfDcBeqbYJulPRbDZz7eVW
-     2+ol6sG0jWjuirbG1YppZccEr9mgqaQujdSXb/bleD8POS0TEWuf3aPswFQvHf90
-     NLEzHt6BnfLoeobXXxyCflNaGX8zW+XgJtwZqAc2+jietuz8MOUhrf5m17CsW/wZ
-     IuEqwaek+K1irJp+w3rhaE08Jzb/S4CCifeW9J3mK57chQoPOu7Nz3rY666YKp/3
-     9T9StOgmFiNpvtFPNy4N7hHMHvbQwRsKlnkl+a7n0Aq2+OF4d1+/k2EE4uSGgcz0
-     oHvee8DnuOx3P92mO4Jz5/0O0lwBD7I51iOjzUurTAgAiIM5sHV8/QFCVzH9Ule+
-     gd8Wo5momcphkU/AXpce5Xgi/Vm4oGQ0x0queii8afUrzkpeN5SuwgQfAdOPiXW5
-     2bo527jBllxOxjeBasfky82XheTnLzbAQNvQNTEM9zE7zCl1LQJUZEJ1hVzcOevI
-     s+cm/AaGII9VkrAtSt3aLSRZuRJHFmhGvYd2Hz5WzcV1YFjXXP1eLwfetDBlaeB9
-     /K5v4hZBkIZPbHX0DcLVrP96mCIT4wCBYSJw+I6n0E6Fz3IfybQG2HMfqWp966/c
-     00ijx/aRDh42Dr/fTropuzzFzQr7weYDa1JnN3Zoftv6Zb/n+NcrmMiDCH8jJV6E
-     uMkaeeB5Mv7ssDQ9kPhO989CHFcznrE1lgOxjX8=
-     =NTLY
-     -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
-                                                                                                                                                              
-Okay, as above, try to decrypt that with your private key.
-
-### IPGP CERT Records
-
-Also known as: The "little" or "short" CERT record. (These terms are purely my
-own).
-
-Relevant RFCs: [RFC 2538](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2538.html),
-[RFC 4398](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc4398.html), specifically sections 2.1
-and 3.3
-
-IPGP certs are interesting.  It's basically the same pieces of infomation that
-are in the PKA record, as above, except that it's supported by an RFC.
-Despite the RFC compliance, I am not sure if any non-gpg client knows to look
-for them.  However, because it's a DNS cert, make-dns-cert encodes the
-information in binary, and your DNS server will see it in base64.  So
-verifying it visually is harder than verifying either of the above.
-
-#### Advantages
-
-*   Small, easy-to-transmit records.
-*   Can use the same uri as the PKA record.
-
-#### Disadvantages
-
-* Relies on the URI scheme.  I haven't yet been able to get a definitive list
-  of what uri schemes are supported, although I've seen http and finger.  I've
-  also seen reports that unless gpg is compiled against curl, http 1.1 is not
-  supported (what this actually means is that any host that supports SSL will
-  probably work, because of some of the nuances of SSL).
-* With PGP certs and IPGP certs, GPG will only parse the first key it gets, so
-  if you publish both, and one doesn't work, there's no failover.  I've argued
-  that this should be fixed.
-* Requires make-dns-cert, which is not built in GPG by default.  (But see "A
-  Better Way" below)
-* Requires publication in your main DNS zone.
-* Despite being RFC compliant, GPG has additional trust vectors for PKA but
-  not this, despite the fact that they share basically the same information.
-* Harder to verify with dig.
-
-#### Howto
-
-1. Note that some of these steps are redundant.  If you're already doing a PKA
-   key, skip to step 5.
-
-2. Dig:
-
-         %gpg --list-keys danm@prime.gushi.org
-         Warning: using insecure memory!
-         pub   1024D/624BB249 2000-10-02  <-- I'm going to use this one.
-         uid                  Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-         uid                  Daniel Mahoney (Secondary Email) <gushi@gushi.org>
-         sub   2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02
-         pub   1024R/309C17C5 1997-05-08
-         uid                  Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-
-3. Export the key to a file (I use keyid.pub.asc, but it can be anything)
-
-         %gpg --export --armor 624BB249 > 624BB249.pub.asc
-         Warning: using insecure memory!
-         %
-
-4. Get the fingerprint for your key:
-
-         %gpg --list-keys --fingerprint 624BB249
-         gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory!
-         gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/faq.html for more information
-         pub   1024D/624BB249 2000-10-02
-         Key fingerprint = C206 3054 5492 95F3 3490  37FF FBBE 5A30 624B B249 <-- That bit is your fingerprint.
-         uid                  Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-         uid                  Daniel Mahoney (Secondary Email) <gushi@gushi.org>
-         sub   2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02
-
-5. As above, run make-dns-cert.  This time we use the -n, -f, and -u options:
-
-         %make-dns-cert -n danm.prime.gushi.org. -f C2063054549295F3349037FFFBBE5A30624BB249 -u http://prime.gushi.org/danm.pubkey.txt
-         danm.prime.gushi.org.   TYPE37  \# 64 0006 0000 00 14 C2063054549295F3349037FFFBBE5A30624BB249    687474703A2F2F7072696D652E67757368692E6F72672F64616E6D2E7075626B65792E747874
-         %
-
-
-6. Put the above in DNS.  All on one line.  Optionally add a TTL.
-
-7. IMPORTANT: make sure you don't have any other CERT records with the same
-   label (i.e. a "big" cert, as above).  While it won't break things, you have
-   no control over which (of multiple) people will get.
-
-8. Reload your zone, and test.  Testing will probably look VERY MUCH like the
-   above, but here are the steps anyway:
-
-#### Testing
-
-1.  Dig:
-
-         %dig +short danm.prime.gushi.org CERT
-         6 0 0 FMIGMFRUkpXzNJA3//u+WjBiS7JJaHR0cDovL3ByaW1lLmd1c2hpLm9y Zy9kYW5tLnB1YmtleS50eHQ=
-
-Sadly, I haven't come across an easy way to decipher it yet, but there's
-always gpg.
-
-2.  GPG:
-
-Since we're fetching the same kind of record, the command is exactly the same
-as before:
-
-     %echo "foo" | gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring /tmp/gpg-$$ --encrypt --armor --auto-key-locate cert -r  danm@prime.gushi.org
-     gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory!
-     gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/faq.html for more information
-     gpg: keyring `/tmp/gpg-39996' created
-     gpg: requesting key 624BB249 from http server prime.gushi.org
-     gpg: key 624BB249: public key "Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>" imported
-     gpg: public key of ultimately trusted key CF45887D not found
-     gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model
-     gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   0  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
-     gpg: Total number processed: 1
-     gpg:               imported: 1
-     gpg: automatically retrieved `danm@prime.gushi.org' via DNS CERT
-     gpg: DE20C529: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
-     pub  2048g/DE20C529 2000-10-02 Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-     Primary key fingerprint: C206 3054 5492 95F3 3490  37FF FBBE 5A30 624B B249
-     Subkey fingerprint: CE40 B786 81E2 5CB9 F7D3  1318 9488 EB58 DE20 C529
-     It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named
-     in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,
-     you may answer the next question with yes.
-     Use this key anyway? (y/N) y
-     -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
-     Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (FreeBSD)
-     hQIOA5SI61jeIMUpEAgApZurJi3hZmDaUFjB2j93eX/lTl96xq6T//sz6nT6jcTx
-     IPnq1RN8IrIQPjDBByHdqOZBT5hhblr9xi7NKIIv3W4q4L0z0fJx7NERPZNvn/H0
-     DkTwfDgAvCRxcKjenpLSwKZFwLjyfS7wjlDr3HFX7Tila0hbzplHslvgTE0QMcd7
-     7oNmEyOL3z+yZr/afQGp2wpzDv4YB9zOiNHcHcenqX0yrtiqKozZ9VAldi53rb/q
-     f38lwInbveyAcEQkE2iFwhRsbMR4VLcsBoxY6D9brsBprt23ey8Rnv+bQ9IAR0VN
-     /WYzU4zUUqb8HmpNFXQLEgH8A2BENw+bxkVYHjSfWQf/cBSGAzfBQQVJ7qp4tN0Z
-     FRVe51dokbU4NM9tGBdCzFHWARVkQX/Ulekd4F3sxBR/sum1UOT2xl2THVBz7/Pq
-     UCrTRPA0uH4dIbL5JpfGZhqsJ079+wmUWUtJIiO2wXi7ePEA/DrBC6p7jlmjyYN/
-     AeSKcPoTeLX+zryV5bECx4RO6S56EEcy0Ns0pASGMsgUnKL6Adrv3Y6ea3ZAOQMn
-     H9Uo28BKTKNUvUaBpN8cV8jIbKYPPW9i04kvEQRqs5rdamERCY1vVTqYTrcLsNqz
-     fF3KopX+V82X1oE2QuGdFfd8mK57ZXJL3VRUrfohQjhfYNKzougiP46rQQv79MYT
-     j8kazWyJUuufm6NVco1/35Zdp1UhHu8qTgXxrjo=
-     =zY9G
-     -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
-     %
-
-Strangely, the output doesn't say what PKA does (a PKA retrieval has a line
-about fetching via HTTP), however, by checking my webserver logs, I can see it
-retrieved it from there:
-
-     %tail -200 /usr/local/apache/logs/prime.gushi.org.log | grep pubkey | tail -1
-     prime.gushi.org 72.9.101.130 - - [28/Oct/2009:23:50:43 -0400] "GET /danm.pubkey.txt HTTP/1.1" 200 4337 "-" "-"
-     %
-
-As usual, test decryption, etc.  You're done.
-
-## Further Steps
-
-* Figure out which of these are useful to you, and use them.* When someone
-  asks for your public key, tell them to run the above command instead of
-  mailing them your key or sending them a keyserver URL.
-
-* Consider using the pka-related verify-options.
-
-* Look into embracing DNSSEC.  With a signed root, there's a good trust-path
-  vector here.  Who knows, maybe some day GPG will be dnssec-aware so it will
-  give more credit to a secure DNS transaction.  Without a signed root, there
-  are still ways to have those who care about security use it, through
-  services such as [ISC's DLV registry](http://dlv.isc.org).
-
-* On DNSSEC: At present, GPG cannot see the difference between an insecure
-  response (one from an unsigned zone) and a correctly validated one from a
-  signed zone.  (In a signed zone, an unsigned or malformed will simply get a
-  SERVFAIL dns response).  Look into sponsoring development of GPG to make it
-  as an application more aware of this.
-
-## A better way to generate records
-
-In reading over a lot of these commands, I've come across a few problems with
-the tools involved.  They either require you to assemble large records by
-hand, or manipulate huge files.
-
-DNS has also come a long way since these tools were written, and RFCs have
-solidified that have determined the "presentation format" (i.e. the "master
-file format") of what CERT records should look like.
-
-On top of everything, the make-dns-cert tool is not built by default, and is
-not present in most binary distributions (RPM's, deb packages, FreeBSD's
-ports).
-
-Thus, I took it upon myself to rewrite make-dns-cert as a shell script.
-
-### Advantages
-
-* Extracts your key for you (takes a keyid as the argument).
-* Formats all three record types for you, you can pipe it right into your zone
-  file.
-* Takes email address as an argument, generates record label.
-* No compiling needed.
-* Should work with most systems.  Requires openssl and sed, a few other
-  standard utilities.
-* Generates base64-ified CERT records, split into easy, manageable pieces.
-* Generates DNS-friendly comments, so repeating tasks are easy to reference.
-* (Eventually) available as a tarball, or as a paste-and-go script.
-* Arguments are in logical DNS record order `emailaddress keyid [url]`.
-* Will generate an IPGP CERT record without a URI (this is legal per RFC4398).
-
-You can see sample output
-[here](http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/sample-output.txt), and you can view
-the script itself
-[here](http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/make-dns-cert.sh.txt).  Depending on
-your MIME settings, you can probably get a download link if you go
-[here](http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/make-dns-cert.sh).  If you see the
-script rather than getting a download prompt, you can just save-as.
-
-README, Changelog, TODO coming soon.
-
-## Other notes
-
-I'm not 100 percent sure (mainly because I haven't tried), but with IPGP cert,
-and PKA, I believe I could in theory point at a keyserver directly, for
-example, specify a uri of
-[http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB0307039309C17C5](http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB0307039309C17C5).
-I'm a bit dubious about the question marks and equals-signs, or if I might
-have to uri-encode things.  It's something to be tried.
-
-I'm trying to convince the GPG people that this would be much better adopted
-if the make-dns-cert tool was built/included by default, or if its function
-were included in gpg rather than a third-party tool.  This is analagous as to
-how dnssec-keygen is used to generate SSHFP DNS records.
-
-It doesn't do any actual cryptography, just some binary conversion, so in
-theory it could be rewritten in pure-perl, so there's nothing to compile.
-
-I've made the argument to the GPG developers that if multiple CERT records are
-available, all should be tried if one fails.  So far, if multiple exist, only
-the first received is parsed, and of course, DNS round-robins the answers by
-default.
-
-It took me quite a lot of trial and error to realize that there's a difference
-between "modern" RSA keys, like this:
-
-    %gpg --list-keys --fingerprint gushi@prime.gushi.org
-    pub   2048R/CF45887D 2009-10-29
-    Key fingerprint = FCB0 485E 050D DDFA 83C6  76E3 E722 3C05 CF45 887D
-    uid                  Gushi Test <gushi@prime.gushi.org>
-    sub   2048R/C9761244 2009-10-29
-
-and ancient RSA keys like this pgp2.6.2 monster:
-
-    %gpg --list-keys --fingerprint danm@prime.gushi.org
-    pub   1024R/309C17C5 1997-05-08
-    Key fingerprint = 04 4B 1A 2E C4 62 95 73  73 A4 EA D0 08 A4 45 76
-    uid                  Daniel P. Mahoney <danm@prime.gushi.org>
-
-Note the lack of a subkey there.  Note the weird fingerprint.  I have not been
-able to get this key to properly export with gpg.  If someone knows the Deep
-Magic, let me know.
-
-## References
-
-### Blog posts and list threads
-
-While researching this I came across little more than a few blog posts, and a
-few short discussions on the gpg-devel mailing list.
-
-* [A blog entry](http://www.df7cb.de/blog/2007/openpgp-dns.html) that seems to
-  have things mostly right.
-
-* [GPG Mailing List Discussion](http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2006-April/028314.html)
-  which seems to date towhen these features were first added.
-
-* [My own thread](http://www.mail-archive.com/gnupg-users@gnupg.org/msg12336.html)
-  on the gnupg-users mailing list that led upto this doc.
-
-* [A slideshow of a talk given on PKA](ftp://ftp.g10code.com/people/werner/talks/pka-intro.ps.gz)
-  (really the only doc I couldfind with regard to PKA).  Note that this is a
-  postscript doc, for reasons I cannot fathom.
-
-### RFCs
-
-* [RFC 3597](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3597.html) defines the odd format of
-  the records that make-dns-cert generates, if itconfuses you.
-
-* [RFC 2538](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2538.html), which was superseded by
-  [RFC4398](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc4398.html), defines the format for a
-  CERT record.
-
-## Todo
-
-* At least one GPG enthusiast has suggested to me that any tools I write to
-  handle keys should simply be able to insert themusing nsupdate.  I don't
-  disagree, but there's a complicated metric there as some of these require
-  manipulation of a site'smain zone, or at the very least, many subzones.  In
-  doing this I'd also like to find out a bit about how to do nsupdate
-  withsig(0) and KEY records, which with the right policies would mean I could
-  do this without touching named.conf.  That may be the subject of a whole
-  other howto.
-
-* (Done) I need to get the shell script cleaned up a bit more, and generate
-  proper docs, and start tracking it with version control.
-
-* I should probably get the gumption up to formally license all this stuff.
-  For right now, I declare it under the
-  [ISCLicense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_license).
-
-* I'd like to track down the full list of supported URI types for PKA/IPGP
-  CERT records.  There doesn't seem to be a defined standard for it.
-
-## Epilogue
-
-### About the author
-
-Dan Mahoney is a Systems Admin in the Bay Area, California.  In his spare time
-he enjoys thinking for those brief fleeting moments what he would do if he had
-more free time.  Keyid 624BB249, or email address danm@prime.gushi.org.
-
-### About this Document
-
-This document was written in [gnu nano](http://nano-editor.org), and HTML was
-generated using [Markdown](http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown).
-
-Markdown rocks.
-
-Originally published on my livejournal at
-[http://gushi.livejournal.com/524199.html](http://gushi.livejournal.com/524199.html),
-its main home is at
-[http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/HOWTO.html](http://www.gushi.org/make-dns-cert/HOWTO.html),
-which is where later versions will be published.
-
-Free to use, comments to the above email address are welcome.
diff --git a/docs/DETAILS b/docs/DETAILS
deleted file mode 100644
index d5c5cea..0000000
--- a/docs/DETAILS
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1225 +0,0 @@
-# doc/DETAILS                                                -*- org -*-
-#+TITLE: GnuPG Details
-# Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
-#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
-#
-
-# Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
-# text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
-# enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
-# colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
-# equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
-# *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
-
-This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
-parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
-
-* Format of the colon listings
-  The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
-  with a tag string and extends to the end of the line.  Here is an
-  example:
-#+begin_example
-$ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
-      --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
-pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
-fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
-uid:f::::::::Werner Koch :
-uid:f::::::::Werner Koch :
-sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
-fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
-sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
-fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
-#+end_example
-
-The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
-too.  Old versions of gpg used a lighly different format and required
-the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to format
-described here.
-
-** Description of the fields
-*** Field 1 - Type of record
-
-    - pub :: Public key
-    - crt :: X.509 certificate
-    - crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
-    - sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
-    - sec :: Secret key
-    - ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
-    - uid :: User id (only field 10 is used).
-    - uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
-    - sig :: Signature
-    - rev :: Revocation signature
-    - fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
-    - pkd :: Public key data [*]
-    - grp :: Keygrip
-    - rvk :: Revocation key
-    - tru :: Trust database information [*]
-    - spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
-    - cfg :: Configuration data [*]
-
-    Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
-
-*** Field 2 - Validity
-
-    This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
-    Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
-    information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
-    2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
-
-    - o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
-    - i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
-    - d :: The key has been disabled
-	   (deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
-    - r :: The key has been revoked
-    - e :: The key has expired
-    - - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
-    - q :: Undefined validity.  '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
-           the same value for most purposes
-    - n :: The key is not valid
-    - m :: The key is marginal valid.
-    - f :: The key is fully valid
-    - u :: The key is ultimately valid.  This often means that the
-           secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
-           ultimately valid.
-    - w :: The key has a well known private part.
-    - s :: The key has special validity.  This means that it might be
-           self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED sytem.
-
-    If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
-    describes the validity calculated based on this user ID.  If given
-    for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
-    rated user ID.
-
-    For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
-    certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
-    valid certificates.
-
-*** Field 3 - Key length
-
-    The length of key in bits.
-
-*** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
-
-    The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
-    greather than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
-
-*** Field 5 - KeyID
-
-    This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
-    bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
-
-*** Field 6 - Creation date
-
-    The creation date of the key is given in UTC.  For UID and UAT
-    records, this is used for the self-signature date.  Note that the
-    date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
-    migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500").  This is
-    currently only relevant for X.509.  A simple way to detect the new
-    format is to scan for the 'T'.  Note that old versions of gpg
-    without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
-    format.
-
-*** Field 7 - Expiration date
-
-    Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
-
-*** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
-
-    Used for serial number in crt records.  For UID and UAT records,
-    this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
-    exact user ID.  For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
-    seperated by the trust value by a space.
-
-*** Field 9 -  Ownertrust
-
-    This is only used on primary keys.  This is a single letter, but
-    be prepared that additional information may follow in future
-    versions.  For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
-    the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
-
-*** Field 10 - User-ID
-    The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
-    (the colon is quoted =\x3a=).  For a "pub" record this field is
-    not used on --fixed-list-mode.  A UAT record puts the attribute
-    subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
-    subpacket size.  In gpgsm the issuer name comes here.  A FPR
-    record stores the fingerprint here.  The fingerprint of a
-    revocation key is stored here.
-*** Field 11 - Signature class
-
-    Signature class as per RFC-4880.  This is a 2 digit hexnumber
-    followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
-    the letter 'l' for a local-only signature.  The class byte of an
-    revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same
-    way.  This field if not used for X.509.
-
-*** Field 12 - Key capabilities
-
-    The defined capabilities are:
-
-    - e :: Encrypt
-    - s :: Sign
-    - c :: Certify
-    - a :: Authentication
-    - ? :: Unknown capability
-
-    A key may have any combination of them in any order.  In addition
-    to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
-    letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
-    a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
-
-*** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
-
-    Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
-    the issuer certificate.  This is useful to build the certificate
-    path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
-    only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
-    been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
-    advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
-    been been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
-
-    For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
-    gpg's --edit-key menu does.
-
-    For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that issued
-    the signature.  Note that this is only filled in if the signature
-    verified correctly.  Note also that for various technical reasons,
-    this fingerprint is only available if --no-sig-cache is used.
-
-*** Field 14 - Flag field
-
-    Flag field used in the --edit menu output
-
-*** Field 15 - S/N of a token
-
-    Used in sec/sbb to print the serial number of a token (internal
-    protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
-    protect mode 1001)
-
-*** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
-
-    For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm.  For example:
-    2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
-
-** Special fields
-
-*** PKD - Public key data
-
-    If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
-#+begin_example
-pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
-    !  !   !-- the value
-    !  !------ for information number of bits in the value
-    !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
-#+end_example
-
-*** TRU - Trust database information
-    Example for a "tru" trust base record:
-#+begin_example
-    tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
-#+end_example
-
-    - Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust.  If this field is
-                 empty, then the trustdb is not stale.  This field may
-                 have multiple flags in it:
-
-                 - o :: Trustdb is old
-                 - t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
-                        than the one we are using now.
-
-    - Field 3 :: Trust model
-
-                 - 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
-                 - 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
-                        This is the same as the classic trust model,
-                        except for the addition of trust signatures.
-
-                 GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
-                 by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
-                 model by default.
-
-    - Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
-    - Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
-    - Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
-                 key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
-    - Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
-                 key signer.  (gpg's option --completes-needed)
-
-    - Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
-                 --max-cert-depth)
-
-*** SPK - Signature subpacket records
-
-    - Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
-    - Field 3 :: Flags in hex.  Currently the only two bits assigned
-                 are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
-                 hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
-                 subpacket was marked critical.
-    - Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket.  Note that this is the
-                 length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
-                 5 below.  Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
-                 of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
-    - Field 5 :: The subpacket data.  Printable ASCII is shown as
-                 ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
-                 is the hex value for the byte.
-
-*** CFG - Configuration data
-
-    --list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
-    for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
-    There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
-    rest of the --with-colons output.  The first field is always "cfg"
-    to indicate configuration information.  The second field is one of
-    (with examples):
-
-    - version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
-
-                 : cfg:version:1.3.5
-
-    - pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
-                this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
-                semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified in
-                RFC-4880.  Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
-                interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
-
-                 : cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
-
-    - cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
-                version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
-                The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
-
-                 : cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
-
-    - digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
-                this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
-                semicolons.  The digest numbers are as specified in
-                RFC-4880.
-
-                 : cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
-
-    - compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
-                  this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
-                  semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified
-                  in RFC-4880.
-
-                 : cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
-
-    - group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
-               fourth field contains the values that the group expands
-               to, separated by semicolons.
-
-               For example, a group of:
-                 : group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
-               would result in:
-                 : cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
-
-
-* Format of the --status-fd output
-
-  Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
-  the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
-  (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see more
-  arguments in future versions.
-
-** General status codes
-*** NEWSIG
-    May be issued right before a signature verification starts.  This
-    is useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
-    No arguments are currently defined.
-
-*** GOODSIG    
-    The signature with the keyid is good.  For each signature only one
-    of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
-    ERRSIG will be emitted.  In the past they were used as a marker
-    for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
-    instead.  The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
-    escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
-    it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
-    also be available for OpenPGP.
-
-*** EXPSIG    
-    The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
-    expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
-    escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
-    it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
-    also be available for OpenPGP.
-
-*** EXPKEYSIG   
-    The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
-    by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
-    UTF-8 and %XX escaped.  The fingerprint may be used instead of the
-    long keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and
-    might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
-
-*** REVKEYSIG    
-    The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
-    by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
-    and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
-    keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might
-    eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
-
-*** BADSIG    
-    The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay.  The
-    username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
-    fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
-    available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
-    available for OpenPGP.
-
-*** ERRSIG