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Diffstat (limited to 'files/conf/ssl_defaults.inc')
| -rw-r--r-- | files/conf/ssl_defaults.inc | 140 |
1 files changed, 140 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/files/conf/ssl_defaults.inc b/files/conf/ssl_defaults.inc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..302b701 --- /dev/null +++ b/files/conf/ssl_defaults.inc @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +# Use separate log files for the SSL virtual host; note that LogLevel +# is not inherited from httpd.conf. +ErrorLog logs/ssl_error_log +#TransferLog logs/ssl_access_log +LogLevel warn + +# SSL Engine Switch: +# Enable/Disable SSL for this virtual host. +SSLEngine on + +# SSL Protocol support: +# List the enable protocol levels with which clients will be able to +# connect. Disable SSLv2 access by default: +SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 + +# SSL Cipher Suite: +# List the ciphers that the client is permitted to negotiate. +# See the mod_ssl documentation for a complete list. +SSLCipherSuite ALL:!ADH:!EXPORT:!SSLv2:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW + +# Server Certificate: +# Point SSLCertificateFile at a PEM encoded certificate. If +# the certificate is encrypted, then you will be prompted for a +# pass phrase. Note that a kill -HUP will prompt again. A new +# certificate can be generated using the genkey(1) command. +#SSLCertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/static.swissflirt.ch.crt + +# Server Private Key: +# If the key is not combined with the certificate, use this +# directive to point at the key file. Keep in mind that if +# you've both a RSA and a DSA private key you can configure +# both in parallel (to also allow the use of DSA ciphers, etc.) +#SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/pki/tls/private/static.swissflirt.ch.key + +# Server Certificate Chain: +# Point SSLCertificateChainFile at a file containing the +# concatenation of PEM encoded CA certificates which form the +# certificate chain for the server certificate. Alternatively +# the referenced file can be the same as SSLCertificateFile +# when the CA certificates are directly appended to the server +# certificate for convinience. +#SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/server-chain.crt + +# Certificate Authority (CA): +# Set the CA certificate verification path where to find CA +# certificates for client authentication or alternatively one +# huge file containing all of them (file must be PEM encoded) +#SSLCACertificateFile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt + +# Client Authentication (Type): +# Client certificate verification type and depth. Types are +# none, optional, require and optional_no_ca. Depth is a +# number which specifies how deeply to verify the certificate +# issuer chain before deciding the certificate is not valid. +#SSLVerifyClient require +#SSLVerifyDepth 10 + +# Access Control: +# With SSLRequire you can do per-directory access control based +# on arbitrary complex boolean expressions containing server +# variable checks and other lookup directives. The syntax is a +# mixture between C and Perl. See the mod_ssl documentation +# for more details. +#<Location /> +#SSLRequire ( %{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/ \ +# and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \ +# and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"} \ +# and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5 \ +# and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 20 ) \ +# or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/ +#</Location> + +# SSL Engine Options: +# Set various options for the SSL engine. +# o FakeBasicAuth: +# Translate the client X.509 into a Basic Authorisation. This means that +# the standard Auth/DBMAuth methods can be used for access control. The +# user name is the `one line' version of the client's X.509 certificate. +# Note that no password is obtained from the user. Every entry in the user +# file needs this password: `xxj31ZMTZzkVA'. +# o ExportCertData: +# This exports two additional environment variables: SSL_CLIENT_CERT and +# SSL_SERVER_CERT. These contain the PEM-encoded certificates of the +# server (always existing) and the client (only existing when client +# authentication is used). This can be used to import the certificates +# into CGI scripts. +# o StdEnvVars: +# This exports the standard SSL/TLS related `SSL_*' environment variables. +# Per default this exportation is switched off for performance reasons, +# because the extraction step is an expensive operation and is usually +# useless for serving static content. So one usually enables the +# exportation for CGI and SSI requests only. +# o StrictRequire: +# This denies access when "SSLRequireSSL" or "SSLRequire" applied even +# under a "Satisfy any" situation, i.e. when it applies access is denied +# and no other module can change it. +# o OptRenegotiate: +# This enables optimized SSL connection renegotiation handling when SSL +# directives are used in per-directory context. +#SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth +ExportCertData +StrictRequire +<Files ~ "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php3?)$"> + SSLOptions +StdEnvVars +</Files> +<Directory "/var/www/cgi-bin"> + SSLOptions +StdEnvVars +</Directory> + +# SSL Protocol Adjustments: +# The safe and default but still SSL/TLS standard compliant shutdown +# approach is that mod_ssl sends the close notify alert but doesn't wait for +# the close notify alert from client. When you need a different shutdown +# approach you can use one of the following variables: +# o ssl-unclean-shutdown: +# This forces an unclean shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. no +# SSL close notify alert is send or allowed to received. This violates +# the SSL/TLS standard but is needed for some brain-dead browsers. Use +# this when you receive I/O errors because of the standard approach where +# mod_ssl sends the close notify alert. +# o ssl-accurate-shutdown: +# This forces an accurate shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. a +# SSL close notify alert is send and mod_ssl waits for the close notify +# alert of the client. This is 100% SSL/TLS standard compliant, but in +# practice often causes hanging connections with brain-dead browsers. Use +# this only for browsers where you know that their SSL implementation +# works correctly. +# Notice: Most problems of broken clients are also related to the HTTP +# keep-alive facility, so you usually additionally want to disable +# keep-alive for those clients, too. Use variable "nokeepalive" for this. +# Similarly, one has to force some clients to use HTTP/1.0 to workaround +# their broken HTTP/1.1 implementation. Use variables "downgrade-1.0" and +# "force-response-1.0" for this. +SetEnvIf User-Agent ".*MSIE.*" \ + nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \ + downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0 + +# Per-Server Logging: +# The home of a custom SSL log file. Use this when you want a +# compact non-error SSL logfile on a virtual host basis. +CustomLog logs/ssl_request_log \ + "%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b" |