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Diffstat (limited to 'pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.html.haml')
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diff --git a/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.html.haml b/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.html.haml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14f0ec4 --- /dev/null +++ b/pages/about-us/news/2014/repository-key-refresh.html.haml @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +- @title = "Repository Key Refresh" +- @author = 'Elijah' +- @posted_at = "2014-01-14" +- @more = true +- @preview = "We screwed up and let our debian repository key expire. The responsible parties have been punished (no more free back rubs). You have three options to fix it..." + +%p We screwed up and let our debian repository key expire. The responsible parties have been punished (no more free back rubs). You have three options to fix: + +%h3 option 1 - blindly upgrade + +%p You can just ignore the warnings about the packages being unauthenticated. This will upgrade your leap-keyring package, which includes the updated key. This is potentially dangerious and should be avoided. + +%pre + apt-get update --allow-unauthenticated + apt-get upgrade --allow-unauthenticated + +%h3 option 2 - re-add key without checking fingerprint + +%p You can simply re-import the key to your apt keyring. This method is less dangerious, but requires you to trust the certificate authority system (which never a good idea). + +%pre + curl https://dl.bitmask.net/apt.key | apt-key add - + +%h3 option 3 - update the key from keyserver + +%p With this method, we update the key by pulling it from a keyserver and then importing to apt-key. This method is the most secure (so long as you follow all the steps and actually verify the fingerprint). + +%p Find the long key-id of the current LEAP archive signing key: + +%pre + apt-key adv --list-keys --keyid-format 0xLONG + +%p You should see this among the output: + +%pre + pub 4096R/0x1E34A1828E207901 2013-02-06 [expired: 2014-02-06] + uid LEAP archive signing key <sysdev@leap.se> + +%p Now, grab that specific key-id from a keyserver, and verify the fingerprint: + +%pre + gpg --recv-key 0x1E34A1828E207901 + gpg --fingerprint 0x1E34A1828E207901 + +%p You should see this as output: + +:plain + <pre> + pub 4096R/8E207901 2013-02-06 [expires: 2015-02-07] + Key fingerprint = 1E45 3B2C E87B EE2F 7DFE 9966 1E34 A182 8E20 7901 + uid LEAP archive signing key <sysdev@leap.se> + </pre> + +%p Make sure that the fingerprint in this output matches the long key-id you listed with <code>apt-key</code>. Without this step, it would be very easy for an attacker to feed you a bogus key. + +%p Finally, import the key into apt-key: + +%pre + gpg --armor --export 0x1E34A1828E207901 | sudo apt-key add - |