TOR(1)

From f0826bceeb5817ddf18ae1b3aed3a94f36c308f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: varac Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 17:34:53 +0200 Subject: git subrepo clone https://leap.se/git/puppet_tor puppet/modules/tor subrepo: subdir: "puppet/modules/tor" merged: "9981a70" upstream: origin: "https://leap.se/git/puppet_tor" branch: "master" commit: "9981a70" git-subrepo: version: "0.3.0" origin: "https://github.com/ingydotnet/git-subrepo.git" commit: "cb2995b" --- puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html | 3157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 3157 insertions(+) create mode 100644 puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html (limited to 'puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html') diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html b/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..484545b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html @@ -0,0 +1,3157 @@ + + + + + +TOR(1) + + + + +

SYNOPSIS

tor [OPTION value]…

DESCRIPTION

tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication +service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and +negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node +knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down +the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals +the downstream node.

Basically tor provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). +Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the +routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have +difficulty tracking the source of the stream.

OPTIONS

+-h, -help +: +
+ Display a short help message and exit. +
+
+-f FILE +: +
+ FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: /etc/tor/torrc) +
+
+--hash-password +: +
+ Generates a hashed password for control port access. +
+
+--list-fingerprint +: +
+ Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. +
+
+--verify-config +: +
+ Verify the configuration file is valid. +
+
+--nt-service +: +
+ --service [install|remove|start|stop] Manage the Tor Windows + NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at + https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService +
+
+--list-torrc-options +: +
+ List all valid options. +
+
+--version +: +
+ Display Tor version and exit. +
+
+--quiet +: +
+ Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so. + (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to + the console, until it has parsed its configuration.) +
+

Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option + value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value"). + Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside + quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over + options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To + split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before + the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but + they must start at the beginning of a line.

+BandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to + the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing + bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the + public network, this needs to be at the very least 20 KB (that is, + 20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) +
+
+BandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given + number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) +
+
+MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our + BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients + who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to + advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server + without impacting network performance. +
+
+RelayBandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth + usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes + per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. + Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory + requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) +
+
+RelayBandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for + _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. + (Default: 0) +
+
+PerConnBWRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. + You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is + published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) +
+
+PerConnBWBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. + You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is + published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) +
+
+ConnLimit NUM +: +
+ The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor + process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file + descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n"). + If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.
+
+ You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows + since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) +
+
+ConstrainedSockets 0|1 +: +
+ If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all + sockets to the size specified in ConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for + virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may + be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error + creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are + likely experiencing this problem.
+
+ The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for + the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; + this configuration option is a second-resort.
+
+ The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The + cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates + the problem.
+
+ You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer + space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for + the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip + time on long paths. (Default: 0.) +
+
+ConstrainedSockSize N bytes|KB +: +
+ When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for + all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and + 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. +
+
+ControlPort PORT|auto +: +
+ If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those + connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol + (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one or + more of HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, + setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local + host to control it. (Setting both authentication methods means either + method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This + option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. + Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0). +
+
+ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind + to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly + recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing, + since giving attackers access to your control listener is really + dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple + times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +
+
+ControlSocket Path +: +
+ Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP + socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) +
+
+ControlSocketsGroupWritable 0|1 +: +
+ If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read and + write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make + the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0) +
+
+HashedControlPassword hashed_password +: +
+ Allow connections on the control port if they present + the password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You + can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password + password". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more + than one HashedControlPassword line. +
+
+CookieAuthentication 0|1 +: +
+ If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port + when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named + "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This + authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem + security. (Default: 0) +
+
+CookieAuthFile Path +: +
+ If set, this option overrides the default location and file name + for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) +
+
+CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1|Groupname +: +
+ If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the + cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by + the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet + implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). +
+
+ControlPortWriteToFile Path +: +
+ If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to + this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port + when ControlPort is set to "auto". +
+
+ControlPortFileGroupReadable 0|1 +: +
+ If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the + control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port + file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0). +
+
+DataDirectory DIR +: +
+ Store working data in DIR (Default: /var/lib/tor) +
+
+DirServer [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +: +
+ Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address + and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated + many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are + separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory + is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style + directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is + provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) + directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will + use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" + flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is not set. + Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the + "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=port" is given, Tor will use the + given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a + flag "v3ident=fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority + whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint fp.
+
+ If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default directory + servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor + network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be + distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same + authorities they do. +
+

AlternateDirAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint

AlternateHSAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint

+AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +: +
+ As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using + AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but + leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. + Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service + authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. +
+
+DisableAllSwap 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages, + so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently + not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux + distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This + option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the + User option to properly reduce Tor’s privileges. (Default: 0) +
+
+FetchDirInfoEarly 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other + directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching + early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) +
+
+FetchDirInfoExtraEarly 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory + caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the + start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off. + (Default: 0) +
+
+FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the + rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor + controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) +
+
+FetchServerDescriptors 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server + descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. + (Default: 1) +
+
+FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the + authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless + descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is + useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor + nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) +
+
+HTTPProxy host[:port] +: +
+ Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 + if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory + servers. +
+
+HTTPProxyAuthenticator username:password +: +
+ If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. +
+
+HTTPSProxy host[:port] +: +
+ Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or + host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting + directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to restrict + the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only + allows connecting to certain ports. +
+
+HTTPSProxyAuthenticator username:password +: +
+ If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. +
+
+Socks4Proxy host[:port] +: +
+ Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port + (or host:1080 if port is not specified). +
+
+Socks5Proxy host[:port] +: +
+ Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port + (or host:1080 if port is not specified). +
+

Socks5ProxyUsername username

+Socks5ProxyPassword password +: +
+ If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password + in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and + 255 characters. +
+
+KeepalivePeriod NUM +: +
+ To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell + every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection + has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of + idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) +
+
+Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] stderr|stdout|syslog +: +
+ Send all messages between minSeverity and maxSeverity to the standard + output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The + "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are + debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases, + since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an + attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all + messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination. +
+
+Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME +: +
+ As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The + "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. + Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity + level. +
+

Log [domain,…]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] … file FILENAME

+Log [domain,…]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] … stderr|stdout|syslog +: +
+ As above, but select messages by range of log severity and by a + set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to an area of + functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges + for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated + list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with ~ to indicate + negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity + range without a list of domains, it matches all domains.
+
+ This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two + of Tor’s subsystems at a time.
+
+ The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs, + protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge, + acct, hist, and handshake. Domain names are case-insensitive.
+
+ For example, "Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout" sends + to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher + messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all + messages of severity notice or higher. +
+
+LogMessageDomains 0|1 +: +
+ If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log + message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly + one. This doesn’t affect controller log messages. (Default: 0) +
+
+OutboundBindAddress IP +: +
+ Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This + is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all + of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be + ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). +
+
+PidFile FILE +: +
+ On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove + FILE. +
+
+ProtocolWarnings 0|1 +: +
+ If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not + following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity + 'info'. (Default: 0) +
+
+RunAsDaemon 0|1 +: +
+ If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect + on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. + (Default: 0) +
+
+SafeLogging 0|1|relay +: +
+ Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. + addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can + still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying + information about what sites a user might have visited.
+
+ If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is + set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to + relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but + all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1) +
+
+User UID +: +
+ On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. +
+
+HardwareAccel 0|1 +: +
+ If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when + available. (Default: 0) +
+
+AccelName NAME +: +
+ When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic + engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine. + Names can be verified with the openssl engine command. +
+
+AccelDir DIR +: +
+ Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine + implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default. +
+
+AvoidDiskWrites 0|1 +: +
+ If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. + This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support + only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) +
+
+TunnelDirConns 0|1 +: +
+ If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build + a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. + (Default: 1) +
+
+PreferTunneledDirConns 0|1 +: +
+ If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled + directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) +
+
+CircuitPriorityHalflife NUM1 +: +
+ If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which + circuit’s cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we + round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one + cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering + cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where + cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied + CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at + all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus + networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn’t have + to mess with it. (Default: not set.) +
+

CLIENT OPTIONS

The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if +SocksPort is non-zero):

+AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|… +: +
+ If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory + authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not + recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You + can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is + "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. +
+
+ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1 +: +
+ This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with + the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set + to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at + higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally + included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, + so using these relays might make your client stand out. + (Default: 1) +
+
+Bridge IP:ORPort [fingerprint] +: +
+ When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at + "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" + is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that + the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use + fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if + it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. +
+
+LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0|1 +: +
+ If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1) +
+
+CircuitBuildTimeout NUM +: +
+ Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn’t + open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this + value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If + LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used. + (Default: 60 seconds.) +
+
+CircuitIdleTimeout NUM +: +
+ If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then + close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all + of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up + making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re + receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 + hour.) +
+
+CircuitStreamTimeout NUM +: +
+ If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how + many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. + If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a + number like 60. (Default: 0) +
+
+ClientOnly 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve + directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is + configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at + figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a + useful server.) (Default: 0) +
+
+ExcludeNodes node,node,… +: +
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. + (Example: + ExcludeNodes SlowServer, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
+
+ By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed + to override in order to keep working. + For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, + but you have excluded all of the hidden service’s introduction points, + Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this + behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below).
+
+ Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection + options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. + Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers + can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
+
+ExcludeExitNodes node,node,… +: +
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any + node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this + list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. +
+
+ExitNodes node,node,… +: +
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.
+
+ Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit + nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, + if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won’t + be able to browse the web.
+
+ Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of + the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those + used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, + those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end + at a non-exit node. To + keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes.
+
+ The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
+
+ The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides + this option. +
+
+EntryNodes node,node,… +: +
+ A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes + to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and + address patterns are not yet supported.) Normal circuits include all + circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge + option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and + UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.
+
+ The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
+
+StrictNodes 0|1 +: +
+ If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a + requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so + will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will + still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the + side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells + Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is necessary to + perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to + a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit + request, upload directory information, or download directory information. + (Default: 0) +
+
+FascistFirewall 0|1 +: +
+ If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports + that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see FirewallPorts). + This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with + restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such + a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use + ReachableAddresses instead. +
+
+FirewallPorts PORTS +: +
+ A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when + FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses + instead. (Default: 80, 443) +
+
+HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie [service-name] +: +
+ Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 + characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 + characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal + purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times + for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and + this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden + services can be configured to require authorization using the + HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option. +
+
+ReachableAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +: +
+ A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows + you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except + that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For + example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept + *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net + 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port + 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) +
+
+ReachableDirAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +: +
+ Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP + GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of + ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these + connections will go through that proxy. +
+
+ReachableORAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +: +
+ Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not + set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If + HTTPSProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
+
+ The separation between ReachableORAddresses and + ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting + through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit + TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, + and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory + information) to port 80. +
+
+LongLivedPorts PORTS +: +
+ A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections + (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these + ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node + will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, + 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) +
+
+MapAddress address newaddress +: +
+ When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress + before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to + www.indymedia.org to exit via torserver (where torserver is the + nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org + www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". +
+
+NewCircuitPeriod NUM +: +
+ Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 + seconds) +
+
+MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM +: +
+ Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, + but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 + minutes) +
+
+NodeFamily node,node,… +: +
+ The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, + constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use + any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed + when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option + can be used multiple times. +
+
+EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1 +: +
+ If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on + the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in + the same /16 range. (Default: 1) +
+
+SocksPort PORT|auto +: +
+ Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application + connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for + you. (Default: 9050) +
+
+SocksListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. + 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind + to multiple addresses/ports. +
+
+SocksPolicy policy,policy,… +: +
+ Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit + policies below. +
+
+SocksTimeout NUM +: +
+ Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds + unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: + 2 minutes.) +
+
+TrackHostExits host,.domain,… +: +
+ For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent + connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same + exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as + matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means + match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites + that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if + your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage + of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single + user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it + through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. +
+
+TrackHostExitsExpire NUM +: +
+ Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the + association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is + 1800 seconds (30 minutes). +
+
+UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 0|1 +: +
+ When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors + from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to + a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) +
+
+UseBridges 0|1 +: +
+ When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" + config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory + guards. (Default: 0) +
+
+UseEntryGuards 0|1 +: +
+ If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try + to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers + increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a + fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) +
+
+NumEntryGuards NUM +: +
+ If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers + as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) +
+
+SafeSocks 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that + use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP + address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. + Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. + (Defaults to 0.) +
+
+TestSocks 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for + each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a + safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This + helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking + DNS requests. (Default: 0) +
+
+WarnUnsafeSocks 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is + received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing + applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and + can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1) +
+
+VirtualAddrNetwork Address/bits +: +
+ When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS + command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor + picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: + 127.192.0.0/10)
+
+ When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool + like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or + "172.16.0.0/12". The default VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a + properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For + local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. +
+
+AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal + characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be + resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. + (Default: 0) +
+
+AllowDotExit 0|1 +: +
+ If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the + SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from + the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit + relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0) +
+
+FastFirstHopPK 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first + hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have + already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure + keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.
+
+ Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s + operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it + doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) +
+
+TransPort PORT|auto +: +
+ If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on PORT (by convention, + 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or + Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for + a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the + default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for + the network you’d like to proxy. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a + port for you. (Default: 0). +
+
+TransListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: + 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an + entire network. +
+
+NATDPort PORT|auto +: +
+ Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) + to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is + only for people who cannot use TransPort. Set it to "auto" to have Tor + pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
+
+NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +
+
+AutomapHostsOnResolve 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address + that ends with one of the suffixes in AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an + unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. + This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that + resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). +
+
+AutomapHostsSuffixes SUFFIX,SUFFIX,… +: +
+ A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with AutomapHostsOnResolve. + The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). +
+
+DNSPort PORT|auto +: +
+ If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves + them anonymously. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for + you. (Default: 0). +
+
+DNSListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). +
+
+ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0|1 +: +
+ If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that + tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or + 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t + turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1). +
+
+ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0|1 +: +
+ If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal + address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit node is + specifically requested (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a + controller request). (Default: 1). +
+
+DownloadExtraInfo 0|1 +: +
+ If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents + contain information about servers other than the information in their + regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything + itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). +
+
+FallbackNetworkstatusFile FILENAME +: +
+ If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this + one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to + learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the + authorities. (Default: None). +
+
+WarnPlaintextPorts port,port,… +: +
+ Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous + connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users + to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: + 23,109,110,143). +
+
+RejectPlaintextPorts port,port,… +: +
+ Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor + will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). +
+
+AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays + that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build + one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0) +
+

SERVER OPTIONS

The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort +is non-zero):

+Address address +

+ The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. + moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP + address. This IP address is the one used to tell clients and other + servers where to find your Tor server; it doesn’t affect the IP that your + Tor client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the + *ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options. +

+AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 +

+ This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop + proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is + the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use + servers that set this option, since most clients have + ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0) +

+AssumeReachable 0|1 +

+ This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, + don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor + immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set, this option + instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list + all connected servers as running. +

+BridgeRelay 0|1 +

+ Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections + from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a + server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay + descriptor to the public directory authorities. +

+ContactInfo email_address +

+ Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked + up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an + email address. +

+ExitPolicy policy,policy,… +

+ Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form + "accept|reject ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /MASK is + omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving + a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). + PORT can be a single port number, an interval of ports + "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If PORT is omitted, that means + "*".
+
+ For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would + reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept + anything else.
+
+ To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, + 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and + 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. + These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit + policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the + ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done + that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to + internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that + may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its + public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details + about internal and reserved IP address space.
+
+ This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it + all on one line.
+
+ Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you + want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with + either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ + (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
+

reject *:25
+reject *:119
+reject *:135-139
+reject *:445
+reject *:563
+reject *:1214
+reject *:4661-4666
+reject *:6346-6429
+reject *:6699
+reject *:6881-6999
+accept *:*

+ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1 +

+ Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, + at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. + (Default: 1) +

+MaxOnionsPending NUM +

+ If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject + new ones. (Default: 100) +

+MyFamily node,node,… +

+ Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or + organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by + their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare + that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the + same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its + family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) +

+Nickname name +

+ Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 + characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. +

+NumCPUs num +

+ How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) +

+ORPort PORT|auto +

+ Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and + servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. + Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0). +

+ORListenAddress IP[:PORT] +

+ Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and + servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one + specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified + multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +

+PublishServerDescriptor 0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge,… +

+ This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as + a relay. You can + choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
+ If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its + descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing + out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory + publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all + type(s) specified. The default is "1", + which means "if running as a server, publish the + appropriate descriptors to the authorities". +

+ShutdownWaitLength NUM +

+ When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down: + we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After NUM + seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- + ately. (Default: 30 seconds) +

+AccountingMax N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB +

+ Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting + period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with + AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB + and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 + GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new + connections and circuits. When the number of bytes + is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some + time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at + the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period + before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation + is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a + collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more + useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". +

+AccountingStart day|week|month [day] HH:MM +

+ Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each + accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day of one + month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and + 28.) If week is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM + of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, + with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each + accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on + the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to + "month 1 0:00".) +

+RefuseUnknownExits 0|1|auto +

+ Prevent nodes that don’t appear in the consensus from exiting using this + relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such + nodes; if it’s 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do + whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus. (Defaults to auto.) +

+ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename +

+ Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in + filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix + "resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, + only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. + (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) +

+ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 0|1 +

+ If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems + parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. + Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until + it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) +

+ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1 +

+ If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. + For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in + "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be + connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that + your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) +

+ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1 +

+ When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine + whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS + requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to + correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) +

+ServerDNSTestAddresses address,address,… +

+ When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses + aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, + and we’ll reset our exit policy to "reject :". This option only affects + name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to + "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) +

+ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1 +

+ When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames + containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an + exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve + URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) +

+BridgeRecordUsageByCountry 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have + GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client + addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess + which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) +

+ServerDNSRandomizeCase 0|1 +

+ When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in + outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. + This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. + For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through + 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server + does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) +

+GeoIPFile filename +

+ A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. +

+CellStatistics 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that + cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) +

+DirReqStatistics 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and + response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. + (Default: 0) +

+EntryStatistics 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of + directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) +

+ExitPortStatistics 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed + bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) +

+ExtraInfoStatistics 0|1 +

+ When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in + its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. + (Default: 0) +

DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS

The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, +if DirPort is non-zero):

+AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory + server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of + good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients + already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want + to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at + tor-ops@torproject.org if you think you should be a directory. +
+
+DirPortFrontPage FILENAME +: +
+ When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on + the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing + to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in + contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. +
+
+V1AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy + Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). +
+
+V2AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running + 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). +
+
+V3AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at + least 0.2.0.x). +
+
+VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of + Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each + version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 + authorities provide this service optionally. See RecommendedVersions, + RecommendedClientVersions, and RecommendedServerVersions. +
+
+NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has + opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these + opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with + the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint + has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to + accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See + approved-routers in the FILES section below. +
+
+HSAuthoritativeDir 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also + accepts and serves v0 hidden service descriptors, + which are produced and used by Tor 0.2.1.x and older. (Default: 0) +
+
+HidServDirectoryV2 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service + descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients + connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) +
+
+BridgeAuthoritativeDir 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main + networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) +
+
+MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +: +
+ Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by + authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours) +
+
+DirPort PORT|auto +: +
+ If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port. + Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0) +
+
+DirListenAddress IP[:PORT] +: +
+ Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to + this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) + This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple + addresses/ports. +
+
+DirPolicy policy,policy,… +: +
+ Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. +
+
+FetchV2Networkstatus 0|1 +: +
+ If set, we try to fetch the (obsolete, unused) version 2 network status + consensus documents from the directory authorities. No currently + supported Tor version uses them. (Default: 0.) +
+

DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS

+RecommendedVersions STRING +: +
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the + directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear + multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When + this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. +
+
+RecommendedClientVersions STRING +: +
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions + is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should + be set too. +
+
+RecommendedServerVersions STRING +: +
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions + is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should + be set too. +
+
+ConsensusParams STRING +: +
+ STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include + in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote. +
+
+DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" + elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP + address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. +
+
+AuthDirBadDir AddressPattern… +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this + authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set. +
+
+AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern… +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority + publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set. +
+
+AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern… +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this + authority publishes. +
+
+AuthDirReject AddressPattern… +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed at all in any network status document that this + authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor + submitted for publication by this authority. +
+
+AuthDirListBadDirs 0|1 +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set + this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; + otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared + directory.) +
+
+AuthDirListBadExits 0|1 +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to + 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are + effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) +
+
+AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1 +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects + all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the + fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil + attack. (Default: 0) +
+
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr NUM +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will + list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". + (Default: 2) +
+
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr NUM +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies + to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) +
+
+AuthDirFastGuarantee N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the + Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or + more. (Default: 20 KB) +
+
+AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee N bytes|KB|MB|GB +: +
+ Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity + or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement + for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB) +
+
+BridgePassword Password +: +
+ If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to + serve all requested bridge information. Used for debugging. (Default: + not set.) +
+
+V3AuthVotingInterval N minutes|hours +: +
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting + interval. Note that voting will actually happen at an interval chosen + by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time + SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) +
+
+V3AuthVoteDelay N minutes|hours +: +
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the + other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s + preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) +
+
+V3AuthDistDelay N minutes|hours +: +
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the + signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used + is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. + (Default: 5 minutes.) +
+
+V3AuthNIntervalsValid NUM +: +
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals + for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers + increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases + directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the + server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at + least 2. (Default: 3.) +
+
+V3BandwidthsFile FILENAME +: +
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the + bandiwdth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured + bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset.) +
+
+V3AuthUseLegacyKey 0|1 +: +
+ If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its + own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a + different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority + keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0.) +
+
+RephistTrackTime N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +: +
+ Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, + that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn’t + changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) +
+
+VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 0|1 +: +
+ When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories. + (Default: 1) +
+

HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS

The following options are used to configure a hidden service.

+HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORY +: +
+ Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service + must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to + specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an existing directory. +
+
+HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET] +: +
+ Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this + option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most + recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to + the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or + both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have + multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that + VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. +
+
+PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1 +: +
+ If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t + advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. + (Default: 1) +
+
+HiddenServiceVersion version,version,… +: +
+ A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden + service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) +
+
+HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,… +: +
+ If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients + only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose + authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also + hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are + listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names + are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no + spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for + clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be + found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in + their configuration file using HidServAuth. +
+
+RendPostPeriod N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +: +
+ Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous + service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also + uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour) +
+

TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS

The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.

+TestingTorNetwork 0|1 +

+ If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, + so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if + non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. + (Default: 0)
+

ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
+DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
+EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
+AssumeReachable 1
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
+AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
+ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
+ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
+ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
+V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
+V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
+V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
+MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
+TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
+TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
+TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
+TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
+TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes

+TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval N minutes|hours +

+ Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first + consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +

+TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay N minutes|hours +

+ Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +

+TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay N minutes|hours +

+ Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +

+TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability N minutes|hours +

+ After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers + are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires + that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) +

+TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime N minutes|hours +

+ Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this + time. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: + 10 minutes) +

SIGNALS

Tor catches the following signals:

+SIGTERM +: +
+ Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit. +
+
+SIGINT +: +
+ Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled + slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting. + (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.) +
+
+SIGHUP +: +
+ The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and + reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable. +
+
+SIGUSR1 +: +
+ Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput. +
+
+SIGUSR2 +: +
+ Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by + sending a SIGHUP. +
+
+SIGCHLD +: +
+ Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it + can clean up. +
+
+SIGPIPE +: +
+ Tor catches this signal and ignores it. +
+
+SIGXFSZ +: +
+ If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it. +
+

FILES

+/etc/tor/torrc +

+ The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs. +

+/var/lib/tor/ +

+ The tor process stores keys and other data here. +

+DataDirectory/cached-status/ +

+ The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. + Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal + identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. +

+DataDirectory/cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new +

+ These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more + than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines + beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about + a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets + too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file. +

+DataDirectory/cached-routers and cached-routers.new +

+ Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When + Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead. +

+DataDirectory/state +

+ A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in + the file. These include: +

+
+The current entry guards and their status. +
+
+
+The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see + below). +
+
+
+When the file was last written +
+
+
+What version of Tor generated the state file +
+
+
+A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router + descriptors. +
+

+DataDirectory/bw_accounting +

+ Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts + and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file + is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only + used when bandwidth accounting is enabled. +

+DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie +

+ Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be + overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See + control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is + enabled. +

+DataDirectory/keys/* +

+ Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys. +

+DataDirectory/fingerprint +

+ Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key. +

+DataDirectory/approved-routers +

+ Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see + NamingAuthoritativeDirectory). This file lists nickname to identity + bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by + whitespace. See your fingerprint file in the DataDirectory for an + example line. If the nickname is !reject then descriptors from the + given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is + !invalid then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as + not valid, that is, not recommended. +

+DataDirectory/router-stability +

+ Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for + router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of + how to set their Stable flags. +

+HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname +

+ The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. + If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file + also contains authorization data for all clients. +

+HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key +

+ The private key for this hidden service. +

+HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys +

+ Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by + authorized clients. +

BUGS

Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.

AUTHORS

Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].

+ + + -- cgit v1.2.3

+TOR(1) Manual Page +

NAME