6 files changed, 3932 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_connections b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_connections
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..c1d0a928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_connections
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+# Munin plugin to monitor Tor
+#
+# Author: Ge van Geldorp <ge@gse.nl>
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+#
+# 	host       - Change which host to graph (default localhost)
+# 	port       - Change which port to connect to (default 9051)
+#	password   - Plain-text control channel password (see torrc
+#	             HashedControlPassword parameter)
+#	cookiefile - Name of the file containing the control channel cookie
+#	             (see torrc CookieAuthentication parameter)
+#
+# Using HashedControlPassword authentication has the problem that you must
+# include the plain-text password in the munin config file. To have any
+# effect, that file shouldn't be world-readable.
+# If you're using CookieAuthentication, you should run this plugin as a user
+# which has read access to the tor datafiles. Also note that bugs in versions
+# upto and including 0.1.1.20 prevent CookieAuthentication from working.
+#
+# Usage: place in /etc/munin/node.d/ (or link it there using ln -s)
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+# 	config   (required)
+# 	autoconf (optional - used by munin-config)
+#
+#
+# Magic markers - optional - used by installation scripts and
+# munin-config:
+#
+#%# family=contrib
+#%# capabilities=autoconf
+
+use strict;
+use IO::Socket::INET;
+
+# Config
+our $address = $ENV{host}  || "localhost";	# Default: localhost
+our $port    = $ENV{port}  || 9051;		# Default: 9051
+
+# Don't edit below this line
+
+sub Authenticate
+{
+	my ($socket) = @_;
+	my $authline = "AUTHENTICATE";
+	if (defined($ENV{cookiefile})) {
+		if (open(COOKIE, "<$ENV{cookiefile}")) {
+			binmode COOKIE;
+			my $cookie;
+			$authline .= " ";
+			while (read(COOKIE, $cookie, 32)) {
+				foreach my $byte (unpack "C*", $cookie) {
+					$authline .= sprintf "%02x", $byte;
+				}
+			}
+			close COOKIE;
+		}
+	} elsif (defined($ENV{password})) {
+		$authline .= ' "' . $ENV{password} . '"';
+	}
+	print $socket "$authline\r\n";
+	my $replyline = <$socket>;
+	if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+		$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+		return "Failed to authenticate: $replyline";
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "autoconf") {
+	# Try to connect to the daemon
+	my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+		or my $failed = 1;
+
+	if ($failed) {
+		print "no (failed to connect to $address port $port)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+	if (defined($msg)) {
+		print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+		close($socket);
+		print "no ($msg)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	print "yes\n";
+	exit 0;
+}
+
+my %connections = ("new",       0,
+                   "launched",  0,
+                   "connected", 0,
+                   "failed",    0,
+                   "closed",    0);
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "config") {
+	print "graph_title Connections\n";
+	print "graph_args -l 0 --base 1000\n";
+	print "graph_vlabel connections\n";
+	print "graph_category Tor\n";
+	print "graph_period second\n";
+	print "graph_info This graph shows the number of Tor OR connections.\n";
+
+	foreach my $status (keys %connections) {
+		print "$status.label $status\n";
+		print "$status.type GAUGE\n";
+		print "$status.max 50000\n";
+		print "$status.min 0\n";
+	}
+	
+        exit 0;
+}
+
+my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+	or die("Couldn't connect to $address port $port: $!");
+
+my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+if (defined($msg)) {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	die "$msg\n";
+}
+
+print $socket "GETINFO orconn-status\r\n";
+my $replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to get orconn-status info: $replyline\n";
+}
+
+while (! (($replyline = <$socket>) =~ /^\.\s*$/)) {
+	my @reply = split(/\s+/, $replyline);
+	$connections{lc($reply[1])}++;
+}
+$replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to authenticate: $replyline\n";
+}
+
+print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+close($socket);
+
+while (my ($status, $count) = each(%connections)) {
+	print "$status.value $count\n";
+}
+
+exit 0;
+
+# vim:syntax=perl
diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_routers b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_routers
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..b977f9aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_routers
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+# Munin plugin to monitor Tor routers
+#
+# Author: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>, based on a plugin by Ge van Geldorp <ge@gse.nl>
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+#
+# 	host       - Change which host to graph (default localhost)
+# 	port       - Change which port to connect to (default 9051)
+#	password   - Plain-text control channel password (see torrc
+#	             HashedControlPassword parameter)
+#	cookiefile - Name of the file containing the control channel cookie
+#	             (see torrc CookieAuthentication parameter)
+#
+# Using HashedControlPassword authentication has the problem that you must
+# include the plain-text password in the munin config file. To have any
+# effect, that file shouldn't be world-readable.
+# If you're using CookieAuthentication, you should run this plugin as a user
+# which has read access to the tor datafiles. Also note that bugs in versions
+# upto and including 0.1.1.20 prevent CookieAuthentication from working.
+#
+# Usage: place in /etc/munin/node.d/ (or link it there using ln -s)
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+# 	config   (required)
+# 	autoconf (optional - used by munin-config)
+#
+#
+# Magic markers - optional - used by installation scripts and
+# munin-config:
+#
+#%# family=contrib
+#%# capabilities=autoconf
+
+use strict;
+use IO::Socket::INET;
+
+# Config
+our $address = $ENV{host}  || "localhost";	# Default: localhost
+our $port    = $ENV{port}  || 9051;		# Default: 9051
+
+# Don't edit below this line
+
+sub Authenticate
+{
+	my ($socket) = @_;
+	my $authline = "AUTHENTICATE";
+	if (defined($ENV{cookiefile})) {
+		if (open(COOKIE, "<$ENV{cookiefile}")) {
+			binmode COOKIE;
+			my $cookie;
+			$authline .= " ";
+			while (read(COOKIE, $cookie, 32)) {
+				foreach my $byte (unpack "C*", $cookie) {
+					$authline .= sprintf "%02x", $byte;
+				}
+			}
+			close COOKIE;
+		}
+	} elsif (defined($ENV{password})) {
+		$authline .= ' "' . $ENV{password} . '"';
+	}
+	print $socket "$authline\r\n";
+	my $replyline = <$socket>;
+	if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+		$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+		return "Failed to authenticate: $replyline";
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "autoconf") {
+	# Try to connect to the daemon
+	my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+		or my $failed = 1;
+
+	if ($failed) {
+		print "no (failed to connect to $address port $port)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+	if (defined($msg)) {
+		print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+		close($socket);
+		print "no ($msg)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	print "yes\n";
+	exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "config") {
+	print "graph_title Routers\n";
+	print "graph_args -l 0\n";
+	print "graph_vlabel routers\n";
+	print "graph_category Tor\n";
+	print "graph_info This graph shows the number of known Tor ORs.\n";
+
+    print "ors.label routers\n";
+    print "ors.type GAUGE\n";
+    print "ors.info The number of known Tor ORs (onion routers)\n";
+
+    exit 0;
+}
+
+my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+	or die("Couldn't connect to $address port $port: $!");
+
+my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+if (defined($msg)) {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	die "$msg\n";
+}
+
+print $socket "GETINFO ns/all\r\n";
+my $replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to get orconn-status info: $replyline\n";
+}
+
+my $count;
+while (! (($replyline = <$socket>) =~ /^\.\s*$/)) {
+	my @reply = split(/\s+/, $replyline);
+    $count++ if $reply[0] eq 'r';
+}
+$replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to authenticate: $replyline\n";
+}
+
+print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+close($socket);
+
+print "ors.value $count\n";
+
+exit 0;
+
+# vim:syntax=perl
diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_traffic b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_traffic
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..a72e7d7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/munin/tor_traffic
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+# Munin plugin to monitor Tor traffic
+#
+# Author: Ge van Geldorp <ge@gse.nl>
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+#
+# 	host       - Change which host to graph (default localhost)
+# 	port       - Change which port to connect to (default 9051)
+#	password   - Plain-text control channel password (see torrc
+#	             HashedControlPassword parameter)
+#	cookiefile - Name of the file containing the control channel cookie
+#	             (see torrc CookieAuthentication parameter)
+#
+# Using HashedControlPassword authentication has the problem that you must
+# include the plain-text password in the munin config file. To have any
+# effect, that file shouldn't be world-readable.
+# If you're using CookieAuthentication, you should run this plugin as a user
+# which has read access to the tor datafiles. Also note that bugs in versions
+# upto and including 0.1.1.20 prevent CookieAuthentication from working.
+#
+# Usage: place in /etc/munin/node.d/ (or link it there using ln -s)
+#
+# Parameters understood:
+# 	config   (required)
+# 	autoconf (optional - used by munin-config)
+#
+#
+# Magic markers - optional - used by installation scripts and
+# munin-config:
+#
+#%# family=contrib
+#%# capabilities=autoconf
+
+use strict;
+use IO::Socket::INET;
+
+# Config
+our $address = $ENV{host}  || "localhost";	# Default: localhost
+our $port    = $ENV{port}  || 9051;		# Default: 9051
+
+# Don't edit below this line
+
+sub Authenticate
+{
+	my ($socket) = @_;
+	my $authline = "AUTHENTICATE";
+	if (defined($ENV{cookiefile})) {
+		if (open(COOKIE, "<$ENV{cookiefile}")) {
+			binmode COOKIE;
+			my $cookie;
+			$authline .= " ";
+			while (read(COOKIE, $cookie, 32)) {
+				foreach my $byte (unpack "C*", $cookie) {
+					$authline .= sprintf "%02x", $byte;
+				}
+			}
+			close COOKIE;
+		}
+	} elsif (defined($ENV{password})) {
+		$authline .= ' "' . $ENV{password} . '"';
+	}
+	print $socket "$authline\r\n";
+	my $replyline = <$socket>;
+	if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+		$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+		return "Failed to authenticate: $replyline";
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "autoconf") {
+	# Try to connect to the daemon
+	my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+		or my $failed = 1;
+
+	if ($failed) {
+		print "no (failed to connect to $address port $port)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+	if (defined($msg)) {
+		print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+		close($socket);
+		print "no ($msg)\n";
+		exit 1;
+	}
+
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	print "yes\n";
+	exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($ARGV[0] and $ARGV[0] eq "config") {
+	print "graph_title Traffic\n";
+	print "graph_vlabel bytes per \${graph_period} read (-) / written (+)\n";
+	print "graph_category Tor\n";
+	print "graph_info This graph shows the bandwidth used by Tor.\n";
+
+	print "read.label byte/s\n";
+	print "read.type GAUGE\n";
+	print "read.graph no\n";
+	print "read.max 10000000\n";
+	print "write.label byte/s\n";
+	print "write.type GAUGE\n";
+	print "write.negative read\n";
+	print "write.max 10000000\n";
+	
+        exit 0;
+}
+
+my $socket = IO::Socket::INET->new("$address:$port")
+	or die("Couldn't connect to $address port $port: $!");
+
+my $msg = Authenticate($socket);
+if (defined($msg)) {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	die "$msg\n";
+}
+
+print $socket "SETEVENTS bw\r\n";
+my $replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '2') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to get orconn-status info: $replyline\n";
+}
+
+$replyline = <$socket>;
+if (substr($replyline, 0, 1) != '6') {
+	print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+	close($socket);
+	$replyline =~ s/\s*$//;
+	die "Failed to get bw: $replyline\n";
+}
+my @reply = split(/\s+/, $replyline);
+
+print $socket "SETEVENTS\r\n";
+$replyline = <$socket>;
+print $socket "QUIT\r\n";
+close($socket);
+
+print "read.value $reply[2]\n";
+print "write.value $reply[3]\n";
+
+exit 0;
+
+# vim:syntax=perl
diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/polipo/polipo.conf b/puppet/modules/tor/files/polipo/polipo.conf
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..12b10c41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/polipo/polipo.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# Polipo Configuration from https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torbrowser/trunk/build-scripts/config/polipo.conf
+# Managed by puppet.
+
+### Basic configuration
+### *******************
+
+# Uncomment one of these if you want to allow remote clients to
+# connect:
+
+# proxyAddress = "::0"        # both IPv4 and IPv6
+# proxyAddress = "0.0.0.0"    # IPv4 only
+
+proxyAddress = "127.0.0.1"
+proxyPort = 8118
+
+# If you do that, you'll want to restrict the set of hosts allowed to
+# connect:
+
+# allowedClients = "127.0.0.1, 134.157.168.57"
+# allowedClients = "127.0.0.1, 134.157.168.0/24"
+
+allowedClients = 127.0.0.1
+allowedPorts = 1-65535
+
+# Uncomment this if you want your Polipo to identify itself by
+# something else than the host name:
+
+proxyName = "localhost"
+
+# Uncomment this if there's only one user using this instance of Polipo:
+
+cacheIsShared = false
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to use a parent proxy:
+
+# parentProxy = "squid.example.org:3128"
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to use a parent SOCKS proxy:
+
+socksParentProxy = "localhost:9050"
+socksProxyType = socks5
+
+
+### Memory
+### ******
+
+# Uncomment this if you want Polipo to use a ridiculously small amount
+# of memory (a hundred C-64 worth or so):
+
+# chunkHighMark = 819200
+# objectHighMark = 128
+
+# Uncomment this if you've got plenty of memory:
+
+# chunkHighMark = 50331648
+# objectHighMark = 16384
+
+chunkHighMark = 67108864
+
+### On-disk data
+### ************
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to disable the on-disk cache:
+
+diskCacheRoot = ""
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to put the on-disk cache in a
+# non-standard location:
+
+# diskCacheRoot = "~/.polipo-cache/"
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to disable the local web server:
+
+localDocumentRoot = ""
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to enable the pages under /polipo/index?
+# and /polipo/servers?.  This is a serious privacy leak if your proxy
+# is shared.
+
+# disableIndexing = false
+# disableServersList = false
+
+disableLocalInterface = true
+disableConfiguration = true
+
+### Domain Name System
+### ******************
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to contact IPv4 hosts only (and make DNS
+# queries somewhat faster):
+#
+# dnsQueryIPv6 = no
+
+# Uncomment this if you want Polipo to prefer IPv4 to IPv6 for
+# double-stack hosts:
+#
+# dnsQueryIPv6 = reluctantly
+
+# Uncomment this to disable Polipo's DNS resolver and use the system's
+# default resolver instead.  If you do that, Polipo will freeze during
+# every DNS query:
+
+dnsUseGethostbyname = yes
+
+
+### HTTP
+### ****
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to enable detection of proxy loops.
+# This will cause your hostname (or whatever you put into proxyName
+# above) to be included in every request:
+
+disableVia = true
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to slightly reduce the amount of
+# information that you leak about yourself:
+
+# censoredHeaders = from, accept-language
+# censorReferer = maybe
+
+censoredHeaders = from,accept-language,x-pad,link
+censorReferer = maybe
+
+# Uncomment this if you're paranoid.  This will break a lot of sites,
+# though:
+
+# censoredHeaders = set-cookie, cookie, cookie2, from, accept-language
+# censorReferer = true
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to use Poor Man's Multiplexing; increase
+# the sizes if you're on a fast line.  They should each amount to a few
+# seconds' worth of transfer; if pmmSize is small, you'll want
+# pmmFirstSize to be larger.
+
+# Note that PMM is somewhat unreliable.
+
+# pmmFirstSize = 16384
+# pmmSize = 8192
+
+# Uncomment this if your user-agent does something reasonable with
+# Warning headers (most don't):
+
+# relaxTransparency = maybe
+
+# Uncomment this if you never want to revalidate instances for which
+# data is available (this is not a good idea):
+
+# relaxTransparency = yes
+
+# Uncomment this if you have no network:
+
+# proxyOffline = yes
+
+# Uncomment this if you want to avoid revalidating instances with a
+# Vary header (this is not a good idea):
+
+# mindlesslyCacheVary = true
+
+# Suggestions from Incognito configuration
+maxConnectionAge = 5m
+maxConnectionRequests = 120
+serverMaxSlots = 8
+serverSlots = 2
+tunnelAllowedPorts = 1-65535
diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor-exit-notice.html b/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor-exit-notice.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..de3be174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor-exit-notice.html
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN"
+    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" />
+<title>This is a Tor Exit Router</title>
+
+<!--
+
+This notice is intended to be placed on a virtual host for a domain that
+your Tor exit node IP reverse resolves to so that people who may be about
+to file an abuse complaint would check it first before bothering you or
+your ISP. Ex:
+http://tor-exit.yourdomain.org or http://tor-readme.yourdomain.org.
+
+This type of setup has proven very effective at reducing abuse complaints
+for exit node operators.
+
+There are a few places in this document that you may want to customize.
+They are marked with FIXME.
+
+-->
+
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<p style="text-align:center; font-size:xx-large; font-weight:bold">This is a
+Tor Exit Router</p>
+
+<p>
+Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with
+the traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor Anonymity Network</a>, which is
+dedicated to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">providing
+privacy</a> to people who need it most: average computer users. This
+router IP should be generating no other traffic, unless it has been
+compromised.</p>
+
+
+<!-- FIXME: you should probably grab your own copy of how_tor_works_thumb.png
+     and serve it locally -->
+
+<p style="text-align:center">
+<a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">
+<img src="https://www.torproject.org/images/how_tor_works_thumb.png" alt="How Tor works" style="border-style:none"/>
+</a></p>
+
+<p>
+Tor sees use by <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers">many
+important segments of the population</a>, including whistle blowers,
+journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and oppressive
+censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and law
+enforcement, just to name a few.  While Tor is not designed for malicious
+computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends.
+In reality however, the actual amount of <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">abuse</a> is quite low. This
+is largely because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to
+privacy and anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals
+can and do <a
+href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_tools.html">build,
+sell, and trade</a> far larger and <a
+href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_distributing_your.html">more
+powerful networks</a> than Tor on a daily basis. Thus, in the mind of this
+operator, the social need for easily accessible censorship-resistant private,
+anonymous communication trumps the risk of unskilled bad actors, who are
+almost always more easily uncovered by traditional police work than by
+extensive monitoring and surveillance anyway.</p>
+
+<p>
+In terms of applicable law, the best way to understand Tor is to consider it a
+network of routers operating as common carriers, much like the Internet
+backbone. However, unlike the Internet backbone routers, Tor routers
+explicitly do not contain identifiable routing information about the source of
+a packet, and no single Tor node can determine both the origin and destination
+of a given transmission.</p>
+
+<p>
+As such, there is little the operator of this router can do to help you track
+the connection further. This router maintains no logs of any of the Tor
+traffic, so there is little that can be done to trace either legitimate or
+illegitimate traffic (or to filter one from the other).  Attempts to
+seize this router will accomplish nothing.</p>
+
+<!-- FIXME: US-Only section. Remove if you are a non-US operator -->
+
+<p>
+Furthermore, this machine also serves as a carrier of email, which means that
+its contents are further protected under the ECPA. <a
+href="http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002707----000-.html">18
+USC 2707</a> explicitly allows for civil remedies ($1000/account
+<i><b>plus</b></i>  legal fees)
+in the event of a seizure executed without good faith or probable cause (it
+should be clear at this point that traffic with an originating IP address of
+FIXME_DNS_NAME should not constitute probable cause to seize the
+machine). Similar considerations exist for 1st amendment content on this
+machine.</p>
+
+<!-- FIXME: May or may not be US-only. Some non-US tor nodes have in
+     fact reported DMCA harassment... -->
+
+<p>
+If you are a representative of a company who feels that this router is being
+used to violate the DMCA, please be aware that this machine does not host or
+contain any illegal content. Also be aware that network infrastructure
+maintainers are not liable for the type of content that passes over their
+equipment, in accordance with <a
+href="http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode17/usc_sec_17_00000512----000-.html">DMCA
+"safe harbor" provisions</a>. In other words, you will have just as much luck
+sending a takedown notice to the Internet backbone providers. Please consult
+<a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response">EFF's prepared
+response</a> for more information on this matter.</p>
+
+<p>For more information, please consult the following documentation:</p>
+
+<ol>
+<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">Tor Overview</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">Tor Abuse FAQ</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq">Tor Legal FAQ</a></li>
+</ol>
+
+<p>
+That being said, if you still have a complaint about the router,  you may
+email the <a href="mailto:FIXME_YOUR_EMAIL_ADDRESS">maintainer</a>. If
+complaints are related to a particular service that is being abused, I will
+consider removing that service from my exit policy, which would prevent my
+router from allowing that traffic to exit through it. I can only do this on an
+IP+destination port basis, however. Common P2P ports are
+already blocked.</p>
+
+<p>
+You also have the option of blocking this IP address and others on
+the Tor network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a <a
+href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">web service</a>
+to fetch a list of all IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a
+specified IP:port combination, and an official <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/tordnsel/dist/">DNSRBL</a> is also available to
+determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit server. Please
+be considerate
+when using these options. It would be unfortunate to deny all Tor users access
+to your site indefinitely simply because of a few bad apples.</p>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html b/puppet/modules/tor/files/tor.html
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+<body>

+<div id="header">

+<h1>

+TOR(1) Manual Page

+</h1>

+<h2>NAME</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<p>tor -

+   The second-generation onion router

+</p>

+</div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]&#8230;</p></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication

+service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and

+negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node

+knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down

+the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals

+the downstream node.<br /></p></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").

+Users bounce their TCP streams&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;around the

+routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have

+difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Display a short help message and exit.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: /etc/tor/torrc)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--hash-password</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Generates a hashed password for control port access.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--list-fingerprint</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--verify-config</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Verify the configuration file is valid.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--nt-service</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows

+    NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at

+    <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a>

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--list-torrc-options</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    List all valid options.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--version</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Display Tor version and exit.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>--quiet</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.

+    (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to

+    the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option

+    value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").

+    Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside

+    quoted values.   Options on the command line take precedence over

+    options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise.  To

+    split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before

+    the end of the line.  Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but

+    they must start at the beginning of a line.</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to

+    the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing

+    bandwidth usage to that same value.  If you want to run a relay in the

+    public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is,

+    20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given

+    number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our

+    BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients

+    who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to

+    advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server

+    without impacting network performance.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth

+    usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes

+    per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.

+    Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory

+    requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for

+    _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PerConnBWRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.

+    You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is

+    published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PerConnBWBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.

+    You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is

+    published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor

+    process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file

+    descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").

+    If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br />

+<br />

+    You probably don&#8217;t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows

+    since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all

+    sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for

+    virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may

+    be limited. If you&#8217;re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error

+    creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are

+    likely experiencing this problem.<br />

+<br />

+    The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for

+    the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;

+    this configuration option is a second-resort.<br />

+<br />

+    The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The

+    cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates

+    the problem.<br />

+<br />

+    You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer

+    space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for

+    the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip

+    time on long paths. (Default: 0.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for

+    all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and

+    262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those

+    connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol

+    (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one or

+    more of <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>,

+    setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local

+    host to control it. (Setting both authentication methods means either

+    method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This

+    option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.

+    Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind

+    to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly

+    recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you&#8217;re doing,

+    since giving attackers access to your control listener is really

+    dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple

+    times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP

+    socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlSocketsGroupWritable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is set to 0, don&#8217;t allow the filesystem group to read and

+    write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make

+    the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Allow connections on the control port if they present

+    the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You

+    can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password

+    <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more

+    than one HashedControlPassword line.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port

+    when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named

+    "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This

+    authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem

+    security. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, this option overrides the default location and file name

+    for Tor&#8217;s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is set to 0, don&#8217;t allow the filesystem group to read the

+    cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by

+    the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet

+    implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlPortWriteToFile</strong> <em>Path</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to

+    this address.  Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port

+    when ControlPort is set to "auto".

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ControlPortFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is set to 0, don&#8217;t allow the filesystem group to read the

+    control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port

+    file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Store working data in DIR (Default: /var/lib/tor)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address

+    and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated

+    many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are

+    separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory

+    is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style

+    directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is

+    provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)

+    directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will

+    use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"

+    flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set.

+    Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the

+    "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the

+    given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a

+    flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority

+    whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br />

+<br />

+    If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory

+    servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor

+    network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be

+    distinguishable from other users, because you won&#8217;t believe the same

+    authorities they do.

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using

+    AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but

+    leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.

+    Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service

+    authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DisableAllSwap</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,

+    so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently

+    not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux

+    distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This

+    option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the

+    <strong>User</strong> option to properly reduce Tor&#8217;s privileges. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other

+    directory caches, even if you don&#8217;t meet the normal criteria for fetching

+    early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchDirInfoExtraEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory

+    caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the

+    start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the

+    rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you&#8217;re using a Tor

+    controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server

+    descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if

+    you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the

+    authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless

+    descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is

+    useful if you&#8217;re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor

+    nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80

+    if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory

+    servers.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy

+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP

+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you

+    want it to support others.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or

+    host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting

+    directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict

+    the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only

+    allows connecting to certain ports.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy

+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS

+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you

+    want it to support others.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Socks4Proxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port

+    (or host:1080 if port is not specified).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Socks5Proxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port

+    (or host:1080 if port is not specified).

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>Socks5ProxyUsername</strong> <em>username</em><br /></p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Socks5ProxyPassword</strong> <em>password</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password

+    in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and

+    255 characters.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell

+    every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection

+    has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of

+    idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard

+    output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The

+    "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are

+    debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,

+    since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an

+    attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all

+    messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The

+    "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.

+    Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity

+    level.

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>Log</strong> <strong>[</strong><em>domain</em>,&#8230;<strong>]</strong><em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] &#8230; <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em><br /></p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Log</strong> <strong>[</strong><em>domain</em>,&#8230;<strong>]</strong><em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] &#8230; <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    As above, but select messages by range of log severity <em>and</em> by a

+    set of "logging domains".  Each logging domain corresponds to an area of

+    functionality inside Tor.  You can specify any number of severity ranges

+    for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated

+    list of logging domains.  You can prefix a domain with ~ to indicate

+    negation, and use * to indicate "all domains".  If you specify a severity

+    range without a list of domains, it matches all domains.<br />

+<br />

+    This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two

+    of Tor&#8217;s subsystems at a time.<br />

+<br />

+    The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,

+    protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,

+    acct, hist, and handshake.  Domain names are case-insensitive.<br />

+<br />

+    For example, "<tt>Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout</tt>" sends

+    to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher

+    messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all

+    messages of severity notice or higher.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>LogMessageDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message.  Every log

+    message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly

+    one.  This doesn&#8217;t affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This

+    is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all

+    of Tor&#8217;s outgoing connections to use a single one.  This setting will be

+    ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove

+    FILE.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not

+    following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity

+    'info'. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect

+    on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>relay</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.

+    addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can

+    still be useful, but they don&#8217;t leave behind personally identifying

+    information about what sites a user might have visited.<br />

+<br />

+    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is

+    set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to

+    relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but

+    all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when

+    available. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AccelName</strong> <em>NAME</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic

+    engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.

+    Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AccelDir</strong> <em>DIR</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine

+    implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.

+    This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support

+    only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build

+    a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don&#8217;t support tunneled

+    directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CircuitPriorityHalflife</strong> <em>NUM1</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which

+    circuit&#8217;s cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we

+    round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one

+    cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering

+    cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where

+    cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied

+    CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at

+    all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus

+    networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn&#8217;t have

+    to mess with it. (Default: not set.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if

+<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>&#8230;</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory

+    authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it&#8217;s not

+    recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You

+    can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is

+    "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with

+    the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set

+    to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at

+    higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally

+    included.  Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,

+    so using these relays might make your client stand out.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at

+    "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"

+    is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that

+    the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use

+    fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if

+    it&#8217;s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>LearnCircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn&#8217;t

+    open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this

+    value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If

+    LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.

+    (Default: 60 seconds.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then

+    close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all

+    of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up

+    making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we&#8217;re

+    receiving, it won&#8217;t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1

+    hour.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CircuitStreamTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how

+    many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.

+    If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a

+    number like 60. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve

+    directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is

+    configured. (Usually, you don&#8217;t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at

+    figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a

+    useful server.) (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

+    patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.

+    (Example:

+    ExcludeNodes SlowServer, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)<br />

+<br />

+    By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed

+    to override in order to keep working.

+    For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,

+    but you have excluded all of the hidden service&#8217;s introduction points,

+    Tor will connect to one of them anyway.  If you do not want this

+    behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). <br />

+<br />

+    Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection

+    options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.

+    Clients can still build circuits through you to any node.  Controllers

+    can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

+    patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a

+    node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.   Note that any

+    node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this

+    list too.  See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

+    patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a

+    node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.<br />

+<br />

+    Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit

+    nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality.  For example,

+    if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won&#8217;t

+    be able to browse the web.<br />

+<br />

+    Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of

+    the Tor network.  It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those

+    used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,

+    those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end

+    at a non-exit node.  To

+    keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes.<br />

+<br />

+    The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both

+    ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.<br />

+<br />

+    The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides

+    this option.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes

+    to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.  (Country codes and

+    address patterns are not yet supported.)  Normal circuits include all

+    circuits except for direct connections to directory servers.  The Bridge

+    option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and

+    UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.<br />

+<br />

+    The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both

+    EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>StrictNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a

+    requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so

+    will break functionality for you.  If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will

+    still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the

+    side of avoiding unexpected errors.  Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells

+    Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is <strong>necessary</strong> to

+    perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to

+    a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit

+    request, upload directory information, or download directory information.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports

+    that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>).

+    This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with

+    restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such

+    a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use

+    ReachableAddresses instead.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when

+    <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses

+    instead. (Default: 80, 443)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16

+    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22

+    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal

+    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times

+    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and

+    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden

+    services can be configured to require authorization using the

+    <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows

+    you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except

+    that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For

+    example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept

+    *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net

+    99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port

+    80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey

+    these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP

+    GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of

+    <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these

+    connections will go through that proxy.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey

+    these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not

+    set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If

+    <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br />

+<br />

+    The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and

+    <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting

+    through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit

+    TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,

+    and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory

+    information) to port 80.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections

+    (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these

+    ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node

+    will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,

+    5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress

+    before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to

+    www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the

+    nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org

+    www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30

+    seconds)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,

+    but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10

+    minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,

+    constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use

+    any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed

+    when a server doesn&#8217;t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option

+    can be used multiple times.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on

+    the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in

+    the same /16 range. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking

+    applications. Set this to 0 if you don&#8217;t want to allow application

+    connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for

+    you. (Default: 9050)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking

+    applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.

+    192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind

+    to multiple addresses/ports.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the

+    SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit

+    policies below.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds

+    unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:

+    2 minutes.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent

+    connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same

+    exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as

+    matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means

+    match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites

+    that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if

+    your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage

+    of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single

+    user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it

+    through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the

+    association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is

+    1800 seconds (30 minutes).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors

+    from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to

+    a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"

+    config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory

+    guards. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try

+    to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers

+    increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a

+    fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers

+    as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that

+    use unsafe variants of the socks protocol&#8201;&#8212;&#8201;ones that only provide an IP

+    address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.

+    Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.

+    (Defaults to 0.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for

+    each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a

+    safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This

+    helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking

+    DNS requests. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>WarnUnsafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is

+    received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing

+    applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and

+    can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS

+    command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor

+    picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:

+    127.192.0.0/10)<br />

+<br />

+    When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool

+    like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or

+    "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a

+    properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For

+    local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal

+    characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be

+    resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AllowDotExit</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the

+    SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from

+    the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit

+    relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first

+    hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have

+    already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure

+    keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br />

+<br />

+    Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it&#8217;s

+    operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it

+    doesn&#8217;t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention,

+    9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or

+    Linux&#8217;s IPTables. If you&#8217;re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for

+    a network, you&#8217;ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the

+    default setting. You&#8217;ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for

+    the network you&#8217;d like to proxy.  Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a

+    port for you.  (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:

+    127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an

+    entire network.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)

+    to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is

+    only for people who cannot use TransPort.  Set it to "auto" to have Tor

+    pick a port for you. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address

+    that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an

+    unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.

+    This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that

+    resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>.

+    The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves

+    them anonymously.  Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for

+    you. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that

+    tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or

+    192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don&#8217;t

+    turn it off unless you know what you&#8217;re doing. (Default: 1).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ClientRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal

+    address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) <em>unless a exit node is

+    specifically requested</em> (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a

+    controller request).  (Default: 1).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DownloadExtraInfo</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents

+    contain information about servers other than the information in their

+    regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything

+    itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FallbackNetworkstatusFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If Tor doesn&#8217;t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this

+    one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to

+    learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn&#8217;t need to put load on the

+    authorities. (Default: None).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>WarnPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous

+    connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users

+    to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:

+    23,109,110,143).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RejectPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor

+    will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AllowSingleHopCircuits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays

+    that have the <strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> option turned on to build

+    one-hop Tor connections.  (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort

+is non-zero):</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Address</strong> <em>address</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.

+    moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP

+    address.  This IP address is the one used to tell clients and other

+    servers where to find your Tor server; it doesn&#8217;t affect the IP that your

+    Tor client binds to.  To bind to a different address, use the

+    *ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop

+    proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is

+    the only hop in the circuit.  Note that most clients will refuse to use

+    servers that set this option, since most clients have

+    ExcludeSingleHopRelays set.  (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AssumeReachable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,

+    don&#8217;t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor

+    immediately. If <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> is also set, this option

+    instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list

+    all connected servers as running.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BridgeRelay</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections

+    from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a

+    server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay

+    descriptor to the public directory authorities.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ContactInfo</strong> <em>email_address</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked

+    up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it&#8217;s an

+    email address.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExitPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form

+    "<strong>accept</strong>|<strong>reject</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]". If /<em>MASK</em> is

+    omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving

+    a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).

+    <em>PORT</em> can be a single port number, an interval of ports

+    "<em>FROM_PORT</em>-<em>TO_PORT</em>", or "*". If <em>PORT</em> is omitted, that means

+    "*".<br />

+<br />

+    For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would

+    reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept

+    anything else.<br />

+<br />

+    To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,

+    169.254.0.0/16,    127.0.0.0/8,    192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and

+    172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.

+    These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit

+    policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the

+    ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you&#8217;ve done

+    that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to

+    internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that

+    may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its

+    public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details

+    about internal and reserved IP address space.<br />

+<br />

+    This directive can be specified multiple times so you don&#8217;t have to put it

+    all on one line.<br />

+<br />

+    Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you

+    want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with

+    either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you&#8217;re _augmenting_

+    (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:<br />

+</p>

+<div class="literalblock">

+<div class="content">

+<pre><tt>reject *:25

+reject *:119

+reject *:135-139

+reject *:445

+reject *:563

+reject *:1214

+reject *:4661-4666

+reject *:6346-6429

+reject *:6699

+reject *:6881-6999

+accept *:*</tt></pre>

+</div></div>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExitPolicyRejectPrivate</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,

+    at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MaxOnionsPending</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject

+    new ones. (Default: 100)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MyFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or

+    organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by

+    their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare

+    that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the

+    same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its

+    family; it doesn&#8217;t need to list itself, but it won&#8217;t hurt.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>Nickname</strong> <em>name</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Set the server&#8217;s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19

+    characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NumCPUs</strong> <em>num</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ORPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and

+    servers.  This option is required to be a Tor server.

+    Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ORListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and

+    servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one

+    specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified

+    multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PublishServerDescriptor</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>v1</strong>|<strong>v2</strong>|<strong>v3</strong>|<strong>bridge</strong>,<strong>&#8230;</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as

+    a relay. You can

+    choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.

+<br />

+    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its

+    descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you&#8217;re testing

+    out your server, or if you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles directory

+    publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all

+    type(s) specified. The default is "1",

+    which means "if running as a server, publish the

+    appropriate descriptors to the authorities".

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ShutdownWaitLength</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When we get a SIGINT and we&#8217;re a server, we begin shutting down:

+    we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After <strong>NUM</strong>

+    seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-

+    ately. (Default: 30 seconds)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AccountingMax</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>|<strong>TB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting

+    period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with

+    AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB

+    and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1

+    GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new

+    connections and circuits.  When the number of bytes

+    is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some

+    time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at

+    the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period

+    before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation

+    is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a

+    collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more

+    useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AccountingStart</strong> <strong>day</strong>|<strong>week</strong>|<strong>month</strong> [<em>day</em>] <em>HH:MM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Specify how long accounting periods last. If <strong>month</strong> is given, each

+    accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> on the <em>dayth</em> day of one

+    month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and

+    28.) If <strong>week</strong> is given, each accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em>

+    of the <em>dayth</em> day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,

+    with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If <strong>day</strong> is given, each

+    accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> each day to the same time on

+    the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to

+    "month 1 0:00".)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RefuseUnknownExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Prevent nodes that don&#8217;t appear in the consensus from exiting using this

+    relay.  If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such

+    nodes; if it&#8217;s 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do

+    whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus. (Defaults to auto.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSResolvConfFile</strong> <em>filename</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in

+    <em>filename</em>. The file format is the same as the standard Unix

+    "<strong>resolv.conf</strong>" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,

+    only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.

+    (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems

+    parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.

+    Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until

+    it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSSearchDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.

+    For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in

+    "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be

+    connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that

+    your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSDetectHijacking</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine

+    whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS

+    requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to

+    correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does

+    on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSTestAddresses</strong> <em>address</em>,<em>address</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When we&#8217;re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these <em>valid</em> addresses

+    aren&#8217;t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,

+    and we&#8217;ll reset our exit policy to "reject <strong>:</strong>". This option only affects

+    name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to

+    "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames

+    containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an

+    exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve

+    URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does

+    on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BridgeRecordUsageByCountry</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have

+    GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client

+    addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess

+    which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ServerDNSRandomizeCase</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in

+    outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.

+    This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.

+    For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through

+    0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server

+    does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>GeoIPFile</strong> <em>filename</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>CellStatistics</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that

+    cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirReqStatistics</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and

+    response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>EntryStatistics</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of

+    directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExitPortStatistics</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed

+    bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ExtraInfoStatistics</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in

+    its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.

+    (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,

+if DirPort is non-zero):</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory

+    server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of

+    good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients

+    already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want

+    to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at

+    <a href="mailto:tor-ops@torproject.org">tor-ops@torproject.org</a> if you think you should be a directory.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirPortFrontPage</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on

+    the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing

+    to set up a separate webserver. There&#8217;s a sample disclaimer in

+    contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V1AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor

+    generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy

+    Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V2AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor

+    generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as

+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running

+    0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor

+    generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as

+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at

+    least 0.2.0.x).

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of

+    Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each

+    version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2

+    authorities provide this service optionally. See <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>,

+    <strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong>, and <strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong>.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has

+    opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these

+    opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with

+    the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint

+    has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to

+    accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See

+    <strong>approved-routers</strong> in the <strong>FILES</strong> section below.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor also

+    accepts and serves v0 hidden service descriptors,

+    which are produced and used by Tor 0.2.1.x and older. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HidServDirectoryV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service

+    descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients

+    connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BridgeAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor

+    accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main

+    networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by

+    authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>|<strong>auto</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.

+    Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you.  (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to

+    this port rather than the one specified in DirPort.  (Default: 0.0.0.0)

+    This directive can be specified multiple times  to bind to multiple

+    addresses/ports.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the

+    directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>FetchV2Networkstatus</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, we try to fetch the (obsolete, unused) version 2 network status

+    consensus documents from the directory authorities. No currently

+    supported Tor version uses them.  (Default: 0.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be

+    safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the

+    directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear

+    multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When

+    this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should be set too.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be

+    safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2

+    directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>

+    is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should

+    be set too.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be

+    safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2

+    directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>

+    is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should

+    be set too.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>ConsensusParams</strong> <em>STRING</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include

+    in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>DirAllowPrivateAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"

+    elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP

+    address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirBadDir</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that

+    will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this

+    authority publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> is set.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirBadExit</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that

+    will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority

+    publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> is set.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirInvalid</strong> <em>AddressPattern&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that

+    will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this

+    authority publishes.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirReject</strong> <em>AddressPattern</em>&#8230;

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that

+    will never be listed at all in any network status document that this

+    authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor

+    submitted for publication by this authority.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some

+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set

+    this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;

+    otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor  of every declared

+    directory.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some

+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to

+    1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are

+    effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirRejectUnlisted</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects

+    all uploaded server descriptors that aren&#8217;t explicitly listed in the

+    fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil

+    attack. (Default: 0)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will

+    list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".

+    (Default: 2)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies

+    to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirFastGuarantee</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the

+    Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or

+    more. (Default: 20 KB)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity

+    or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement

+    for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>BridgePassword</strong> <em>Password</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to

+    serve all requested bridge information.  Used for debugging.  (Default:

+    not set.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred voting

+    interval. Note that voting will <em>actually</em> happen at an interval chosen

+    by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time

+    SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred delay

+    between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the

+    other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server&#8217;s

+    preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server&#8217;s preferred  delay

+    between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming  it has all the

+    signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used

+    is not the server&#8217;s preferred time,  but the consensus of all preferences.

+    (Default: 5 minutes.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthNIntervalsValid</strong> <em>NUM</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals

+    for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers

+    increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases

+    directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the

+    server&#8217;s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at

+    least 2. (Default: 3.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3BandwidthsFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the

+    bandiwdth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured

+    bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>V3AuthUseLegacyKey</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its

+    own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a

+    different identity.  This feature is used to migrate directory authority

+    keys in the event of a compromise.  (Default: 0.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RephistTrackTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,

+    that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn&#8217;t

+    changed for a given amount of time.  (Default: 24 hours)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor

+    votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HiddenServiceDir</strong> <em>DIRECTORY</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service

+    must have a separate directory. You may use this option  multiple times to

+    specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an existing directory.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HiddenServicePort</strong> <em>VIRTPORT</em> [<em>TARGET</em>]

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this

+    option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most

+    recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to

+    the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or

+    both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have

+    multiple lines with  the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that

+    VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>PublishHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won&#8217;t

+    advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if

+    you&#8217;re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.

+    (Default: 1)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HiddenServiceVersion</strong> <em>version</em>,<em>version</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden

+    service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> <em>auth-type</em> <em>client-name</em>,<em>client-name</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients

+    only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose

+    authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also

+    hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are

+    listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names

+    are 1 to 19 characters  long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no

+    spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for

+    clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be

+    found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in

+    their configuration file using <strong>HidServAuth</strong>.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>RendPostPeriod</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous

+    service descriptors to the directory servers. This information  is also

+    uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,

+    so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if

+    non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.

+    (Default: 0)<br />

+</p>

+<div class="literalblock">

+<div class="content">

+<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1

+DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1

+EnforceDistinctSubnets 0

+AssumeReachable 1

+AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0

+AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0

+ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0

+ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0

+ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0

+V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes

+V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds

+V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds

+MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds

+TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes

+TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds

+TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds

+TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes

+TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre>

+</div></div>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first

+    consensus has been created. Changing this requires that

+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before

+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that

+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before

+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that

+    <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers

+    are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires

+    that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set.  (Default: 30 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this

+    time. Changing this requires that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default:

+    10 minutes)

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>Tor catches the following signals:</p></div>

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGTERM</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGINT</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled

+    slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.

+    (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGHUP</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and

+    reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGUSR1</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGUSR2</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by

+    sending a SIGHUP.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGCHLD</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it

+    can clean up.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGPIPE</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Tor catches this signal and ignores it.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>SIGXFSZ</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="dlist"><dl>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>/etc/tor/torrc</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<strong>/var/lib/tor/</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The tor process stores keys and other data here.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-status/</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.

+    Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal

+    identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-descriptors</strong> and <strong>cached-descriptors.new</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more

+    than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines

+    beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about

+    a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets

+    too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-routers</strong> and <strong>cached-routers.new</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When

+    Tor can&#8217;t find the newer files, it looks here instead.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/state</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in

+    the file. These include:

+</p>

+<div class="ulist"><ul>

+<li>

+<p>

+The current entry guards and their status.

+</p>

+</li>

+<li>

+<p>

+The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see

+            below).

+</p>

+</li>

+<li>

+<p>

+When the file was last written

+</p>

+</li>

+<li>

+<p>

+What version of Tor generated the state file

+</p>

+</li>

+<li>

+<p>

+A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router

+            descriptors.

+</p>

+</li>

+</ul></div>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/bw_accounting</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts

+    and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file

+    is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only

+    used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/control_auth_cookie</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be

+    overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See

+    control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is

+    enabled.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/keys/</strong>*

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/fingerprint</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server&#8217;s identity key.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/approved-routers</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see

+    <strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong>). This file lists nickname to identity

+    bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by

+    whitespace. See your <strong>fingerprint</strong> file in the <em>DataDirectory</em> for an

+    example line. If the nickname is <strong>!reject</strong> then descriptors from the

+    given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is

+    <strong>!invalid</strong> then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as

+    not valid, that is, not recommended.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/router-stability</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for

+    router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of

+    how to set their Stable flags.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/hostname</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The &lt;base32-encoded-fingerprint&gt;.onion domain name for this hidden service.

+    If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file

+    also contains authorization data for all clients.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/private_key</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    The private key for this hidden service.

+</p>

+</dd>

+<dt class="hdlist1">

+<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/client_keys</strong>

+</dt>

+<dd>

+<p>

+    Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by

+    authorized clients.

+</p>

+</dd>

+</dl></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>privoxy</strong>(1), <strong>tsocks</strong>(1), <strong>torify</strong>(1)<br /></p></div>

+<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>https://www.torproject.org/</strong></p></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</p></div>

+</div>

+<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2>

+<div class="sectionbody">

+<div class="paragraph"><p>Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</p></div>

+</div>

+<div id="footer">

+<div id="footer-text">

+Last updated 2011-12-15 11:28:37 EDT

+</div>

+</div>

+</body>

+</html>