diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c')
| m--------- | main/openssl | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c | 1586 |
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 1586 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl b/main/openssl new file mode 160000 +Subproject 4d377a9ce111930d8a8f06dc0e94a892a7f6c51 diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c deleted file mode 100644 index c2ae93bc..00000000 --- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1586 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <limits.h> -#include <errno.h> -#define USE_SOCKETS -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> - -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment); -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); - -int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) - { - /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase - * packet by another n bytes. - * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified - * by s->packet and s->packet_length. - * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf - * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) - */ - int i,len,left; - long align=0; - unsigned char *pkt; - SSL3_BUFFER *rb; - - if (n <= 0) return n; - - rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); - if (rb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - left = rb->left; -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); -#endif - - if (!extend) - { - /* start with empty packet ... */ - if (left == 0) - rb->offset = align; - else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - /* check if next packet length is large - * enough to justify payload alignment... */ - pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; - if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA - && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) - { - /* Note that even if packet is corrupted - * and its length field is insane, we can - * only be led to wrong decision about - * whether memmove will occur or not. - * Header values has no effect on memmove - * arguments and therefore no buffer - * overrun can be triggered. */ - memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); - rb->offset = align; - } - } - s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; - s->packet_length = 0; - /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ - } - - /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets - * because the read operation returns the whole packet - * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - if (left == 0 && extend) - return 0; - if (left > 0 && n > left) - n = left; - } - - /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ - if (left >= n) - { - s->packet_length+=n; - rb->left=left-n; - rb->offset+=n; - return(n); - } - - /* else we need to read more data */ - - len = s->packet_length; - pkt = rb->buf+align; - /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: - * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', - * 'left' extra ones at the end */ - if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ - { - memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); - s->packet = pkt; - rb->offset = len + align; - } - - if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if (!s->read_ahead) - /* ignore max parameter */ - max = n; - else - { - if (max < n) - max = n; - if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) - max = rb->len - rb->offset; - } - - while (left < n) - { - /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf - * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to - * len+max if possible) */ - - clear_sys_error(); - if (s->rbio != NULL) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); - i = -1; - } - - if (i <= 0) - { - rb->left = left; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - if (len+left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - return(i); - } - left+=i; - /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because - * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed - * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - if (n > left) - n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ - } - } - - /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ - rb->offset += n; - rb->left = left - n; - s->packet_length += n; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(n); - } - -/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will - * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker - * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause - * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ -#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 - -/* Call this to get a new input record. - * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error - * or non-blocking IO. - * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in - * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data - * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes - */ -/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ -static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) - { - int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; - int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - short version; - unsigned mac_size, orig_len; - size_t extra; - unsigned empty_record_count = 0; - - rr= &(s->s3->rrec); - sess=s->session; - - if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) - extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; - else - extra=0; - if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) - { - /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER - * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - -again: - /* check if we have the header */ - if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) - { - n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); - if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; - - p=s->packet; - - /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ - rr->type= *(p++); - ssl_major= *(p++); - ssl_minor= *(p++); - version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; - n2s(p,rr->length); -#if 0 -fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); -#endif - - /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->first_packet) - { - if (version != s->version) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) - /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ - s->version = (unsigned short)version; - al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } - - if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto err; - } - - if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } - - /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ - - if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) - { - /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i=rr->length; - n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); - if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ - /* now n == rr->length, - * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ - } - - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ - - /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, - * and we have that many bytes in s->packet - */ - rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - - /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' - * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which - * need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression - * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, - * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ - - /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] - * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ - - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data=rr->input; - - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); - /* enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid */ - if (enc_err == 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG -printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); -{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } -printf("\n"); -#endif - - /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && - (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) - { - /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ - unsigned char *mac = NULL; - unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - - /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ - orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); - - /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was - * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, - * therefore we can safely process the record in a different - * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. - */ - if (orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ - (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - orig_len < mac_size+1)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - { - /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes - * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract - * the MAC in constant time from within the record, - * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. - * */ - mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); - rr->length -= mac_size; - } - else - { - /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| - * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's - * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } - - i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) - enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) - enc_err = -1; - } - - if (enc_err < 0) - { - /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, - * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption - * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, - * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this - * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ - al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); - goto f_err; - } - - /* r->length is now just compressed */ - if (s->expand != NULL) - { - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) - { - al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - rr->off=0; - /* So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ - - /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - s->packet_length=0; - - /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) - { - empty_record_count++; - if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; - } - goto again; - } - -#if 0 -fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); -#endif - - return(1); - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(ret); - } - -int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int i; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - - rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); - i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); - if (i < 0) - return(0); - else - rr->length=i; - rr->data=rr->comp; -#endif - return(1); - } - -int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) - { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int i; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - - wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); - i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, - wr->input,(int)wr->length); - if (i < 0) - return(0); - else - wr->length=i; - - wr->input=wr->data; -#endif - return(1); - } - -/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' - * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. - */ -int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) - { - const unsigned char *buf=buf_; - unsigned int n,nw; - int i,tot; - - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); - tot=s->s3->wnum; - s->s3->wnum=0; - - if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) - { - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - } - - /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write - * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete - * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding - * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as - * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large - * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users - * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user - * will notice - */ - if (len < tot) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); - return(-1); - } - - - n=(len-tot); - for (;;) - { - /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put - * into a record. */ - unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment; - /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte - * in its own record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */ - int fragment = 0; - - if (n > 1 && - s->s3->need_record_splitting && - type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - !s->s3->record_split_done) - { - fragment = 1; - /* record_split_done records that the splitting has - * been done in case we hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition. - * In that case, we don't need to do the split again. */ - s->s3->record_split_done = 1; - } - - if (n > max) - nw=max; - else - nw=n; - - i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->s3->wnum=tot; - /* Try to write the fragment next time. */ - s->s3->record_split_done = 0; - return i; - } - - if ((i == (int)n) || - (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) - { - /* next chunk of data should get another prepended, - * one-byte fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV - * weakness. */ - s->s3->record_split_done = 0; - return tot+i; - } - - n-=i; - tot+=i; - } - } - -/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1 - * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest - * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then - * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that - * one byte fragment. */ -static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment) - { - unsigned char *p,*plen; - int i,mac_size; - int prefix_len=0; - int eivlen; - long align=0; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); - SSL_SESSION *sess; - - - /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written - * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ - if (wb->left != 0) - return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); - - /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) - { - i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - if (i <= 0) - return(i); - /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ - } - - if (wb->buf == NULL) - if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) - return -1; - - if (len == 0) - return 0; - - wr= &(s->s3->wrec); - sess=s->session; - - if ( (sess == NULL) || - (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) - { - mac_size=0; - } - else - { - mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - if (mac_size < 0) - goto err; - } - - if (fragment) - { - /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites - * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ - prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */, - 0 /* fragment */, - 1 /* is_fragment */); - if (prefix_len <= 0) - goto err; - - if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + - SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) - { - /* insufficient space */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (is_fragment) - { -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - /* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and - * that will be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we - * want to align the real payload, we can just pretend that we - * have two headers and a byte. */ - align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); -#endif - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } - else if (prefix_len) - { - p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; - } - else - { -#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 - align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); -#endif - p = wb->buf + align; - wb->offset = align; - } - - /* write the header */ - - *(p++)=type&0xff; - wr->type=type; - - *(p++)=(s->version>>8); - /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 - * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 - */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B - && !s->renegotiate - && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) - *(p++) = 0x1; - else - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; - - /* field where we are to write out packet length */ - plen=p; - p+=2; - /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ - if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) - { - int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - { - eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (eivlen <= 1) - eivlen = 0; - } - /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - else - eivlen = 0; - } - else - eivlen = 0; - - /* lets setup the record stuff. */ - wr->data=p + eivlen; - wr->length=(int)(len - (fragment != 0)); - wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf + (fragment != 0); - - /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into - * wr->data */ - - /* first we compress */ - if (s->compress != NULL) - { - if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - else - { - memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); - wr->input=wr->data; - } - - /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input - * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. - * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ - - if (mac_size != 0) - { - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) - goto err; - wr->length+=mac_size; - } - - wr->input=p; - wr->data=p; - - if (eivlen) - { - /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) - goto err; */ - wr->length += eivlen; - } - - if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1)<1) goto err; - - /* record length after mac and block padding */ - s2n(wr->length,plen); - - /* we should now have - * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is - * wr->length long */ - wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ - wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - - if (is_fragment) - { - /* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't - * write out anything. */ - return wr->length; - } - - /* now let's set up wb */ - wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; - - /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ - s->s3->wpend_tot=len; - s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; - s->s3->wpend_type=type; - s->s3->wpend_ret=len; - - /* we now just need to write the buffer */ - return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); -err: - return -1; - } - -/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ -int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len) - { - int i; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); - -/* XXXX */ - if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) - || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && - !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) - || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); - return(-1); - } - - for (;;) - { - clear_sys_error(); - if (s->wbio != NULL) - { - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - i=BIO_write(s->wbio, - (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), - (unsigned int)wb->left); - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); - i= -1; - } - if (i == wb->left) - { - wb->left=0; - wb->offset+=i; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && - SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(s->s3->wpend_ret); - } - else if (i <= 0) { - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || - s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { - /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole - point in using a datagram service */ - wb->left = 0; - } - return(i); - } - wb->offset+=i; - wb->left-=i; - } - } - -/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. - * 'type' is one of the following: - * - * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) - * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) - * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) - * - * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first - * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). - * - * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as - * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really - * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. - * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store - * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol - * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): - * Change cipher spec protocol - * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored - * Alert protocol - * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) - * Handshake protocol - * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have - * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages - * here, anything else is handled by higher layers - * Application data protocol - * none of our business - */ -int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) - { - int al,i,j,ret; - unsigned int n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ - if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) - return(-1); - - if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || - (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) - /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ - { - unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; - unsigned char *dst = buf; - unsigned int k; - - /* peek == 0 */ - n = 0; - while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) - { - *dst++ = *src++; - len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; - n++; - } - /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ - for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) - s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; - return n; - } - - /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ - - if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) - { - /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } - } -start: - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - - /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * s->s3->rrec.data, - data - * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - - /* get new packet if necessary */ - if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) - { - ret=ssl3_get_record(s); - if (ret <= 0) return(ret); - } - - /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ - - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, - * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ - && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away - * (even in 'peek' mode) */ - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) - { - rr->length=0; - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - return(0); - } - - - if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ - { - /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we - * are doing a handshake for the first time */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (len <= 0) return(len); - - if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) - n = rr->length; - else - n = (unsigned int)len; - - memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); - if (!peek) - { - rr->length-=n; - rr->off+=n; - if (rr->length == 0) - { - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->off=0; - if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) - ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); - } - } - return(n); - } - - - /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake - * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ - - /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, - * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. - */ - { - unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; - unsigned char *dest = NULL; - unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - { - dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; - dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; - dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; - } - else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) - { - dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; - dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; - dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) - { - tls1_process_heartbeat(s); - - /* Exit and notify application to read again */ - rr->length = 0; - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - return(-1); - } -#endif - - if (dest_maxlen > 0) - { - n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ - if (rr->length < n) - n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ - - /* now move 'n' bytes: */ - while (n-- > 0) - { - dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; - rr->length--; - } - - if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) - goto start; /* fragment was too small */ - } - } - - /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ - - /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ - if ((!s->server) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) - { - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - - if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && - !s->s3->renegotiate) - { - ssl3_renegotiate(s); - if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) - { - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) - { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ - { - BIO *bio; - /* In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return(-1); - } - } - } - } - /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, - * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ - goto start; - } - /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't - * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. - * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) - */ - if (s->server && - SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !s->s3->send_connection_binding && - (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && - (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && - !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - - { - /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ - rr->length = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto start; - } - if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) - { - int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; - int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; - - s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - { - j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; - cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); - } - - if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ - { - s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; - if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) - { - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return(0); - } - /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested - * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with - * a fatal alert because if application tried to - * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and - * expects it to succeed. - * - * In future we might have a renegotiation where we - * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. - */ - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) - { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME - else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) - return(0); -#endif - } - else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ - { - char tmp[16]; - - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); - BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); - ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); - s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); - return(0); - } - else - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - goto start; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ - { - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - rr->length=0; - return(0); - } - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) - { - /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know - * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ - if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || - (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; - } - - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - rr->length=0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; - if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) - goto err; - else - goto start; - } - - /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ - if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) - { - if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) - { -#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and - * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting - * protocol violations): */ - s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) - ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT - :SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#else - s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#endif - s->renegotiate=1; - s->new_session=1; - } - i=s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) return(i); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return(-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) - { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ - { - BIO *bio; - /* In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ - s->rwstate=SSL_READING; - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return(-1); - } - } - goto start; - } - - switch (rr->type) - { - default: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS - /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: - * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. - */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) - { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } -#endif - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - case SSL3_RT_ALERT: - case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: - /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception - * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that - * should not happen when type != rr->type */ - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: - /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, - * but have application data. If the library was - * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data - * is set) and it makes sense to read application data - * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), - * we will indulge it. - */ - if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && - (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && - (( - (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) - ) || ( - (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) - ) - )) - { - s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; - return(-1); - } - else - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - } - } - /* not reached */ - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: - return(-1); - } - -int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) - { - int i; - const char *sender; - int slen; - - if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; - else - i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; - - if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) - { - if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) - { - /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - return (0); - } - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); - } - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) - return(0); - - /* we have to record the message digest at - * this point so we can get it before we read - * the finished message */ - if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; - } - else - { - sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; - slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; - } - - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); - if (i == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; - - return(1); - } - -int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) - { - /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ - desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) - desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ - if (desc < 0) return -1; - /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ - if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); - - s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; - s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; - s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; - if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ - return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - /* else data is still being written out, we will get written - * some time in the future */ - return -1; - } - -int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) - { - int i,j; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - - s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; - i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0); - if (i <= 0) - { - s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; - } - else - { - /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. - * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, - * we will not worry too much. */ - if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) - (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - { - j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; - cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); - } - } - return(i); - } |