diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/patches/npn.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/patches/npn.patch | 1293 |
1 files changed, 1293 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch b/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46b7a7df --- /dev/null +++ b/main/openssl/patches/npn.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1293 @@ +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.c 2010-11-11 14:42:19.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 +@@ -3012,3 +3012,46 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int + int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf,int siz) + { return write(fileno(stdout),buf,siz); } + #endif ++ ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string ++ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. ++ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. ++ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi" ++ * ++ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure. ++ */ ++unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in) ++ { ++ size_t len; ++ unsigned char *out; ++ size_t i, start = 0; ++ ++ len = strlen(in); ++ if (len >= 65535) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1); ++ if (!out) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) ++ { ++ if (i == len || in[i] == ',') ++ { ++ if (i - start > 255) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(out); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ out[start] = i - start; ++ start = i + 1; ++ } ++ else ++ out[i+1] = in[i]; ++ } ++ ++ *outlen = len + 1; ++ return out; ++ } ++#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/apps.h 2009-10-31 13:34:19.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/apps.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 +@@ -358,3 +358,7 @@ int raw_write_stdout(const void *,int); + #define TM_STOP 1 + double app_tminterval (int stop,int usertime); + #endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in); ++#endif +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_client.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 +@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void) + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n"); ++# endif + BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n"); + #endif + BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); +@@ -367,6 +370,40 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ ++typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { ++ unsigned char *data; ++ unsigned short len; ++ int status; ++} tlsextnextprotoctx; ++ ++static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; ++ ++static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) ++ { ++ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; ++ ++ if (!c_quiet) ++ { ++ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ ++ unsigned i; ++ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); ++ for (i = 0; i < inlen; ) ++ { ++ if (i) ++ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); ++ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); ++ i += in[i] + 1; ++ } ++ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); ++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; ++ } ++# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ + #endif + + enum +@@ -431,6 +468,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + char *servername = NULL; + tlsextctx tlsextcbp = + {NULL,0}; ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; ++# endif + #endif + char *sess_in = NULL; + char *sess_out = NULL; +@@ -658,6 +698,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0) + { off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; } ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) ++ { ++ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ++ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); ++ } ++# endif + #endif + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0) + cutthrough=1; +@@ -766,6 +813,21 @@ bad: + OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ next_proto.status = -1; ++ if (next_proto_neg_in) ++ { ++ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); ++ if (next_proto.data == NULL) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); ++ goto end; ++ } ++ } ++ else ++ next_proto.data = NULL; ++#endif ++ + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1); + if (ssl_client_engine_id) +@@ -896,6 +958,11 @@ bad: + SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode); + } + ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ if (next_proto.data) ++ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); ++#endif ++ + if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback); + if (cipher != NULL) + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) { +@@ -1755,6 +1822,18 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s + BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n", + expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); + #endif ++ ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ if (next_proto.status != -1) { ++ const unsigned char *proto; ++ unsigned int proto_len; ++ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); ++ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); ++ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); ++ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); ++ } ++#endif ++ + SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s)); + BIO_printf(bio,"---\n"); + if (peer != NULL) +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/apps/s_server.c 2010-06-15 17:25:02.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/apps/s_server.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.902465346 +0000 +@@ -492,6 +492,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void) + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n"); ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n"); ++# endif + #endif + } + +@@ -826,6 +829,24 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received % + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + goto done; + } ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ ++typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { ++ unsigned char *data; ++ unsigned int len; ++} tlsextnextprotoctx; ++ ++static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) ++ { ++ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; ++ ++ *data = next_proto->data; ++ *len = next_proto->len; ++ ++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; ++ } ++# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN */ + #endif + + int MAIN(int, char **); +@@ -867,6 +888,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) + #endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING}; ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; ++ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; ++# endif + #endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ +@@ -1191,7 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[]) + if (--argc < 1) goto bad; + s_key_file2= *(++argv); + } +- ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0) ++ { ++ if (--argc < 1) goto bad; ++ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv); ++ } ++# endif + #endif + #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK) + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0) +@@ -1476,6 +1507,11 @@ bad: + if (vpm) + SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm); + } ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ if (next_proto.data) ++ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); ++# endif + #endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +@@ -1617,6 +1653,21 @@ bad: + goto end; + } + } ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ if (next_proto_neg_in) ++ { ++ unsigned short len; ++ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, ++ next_proto_neg_in); ++ if (next_proto.data == NULL) ++ goto end; ++ next_proto.len = len; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ next_proto.data = NULL; ++ } ++# endif + #endif + RSA_free(rsa); + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"\n"); +@@ -2159,6 +2210,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) + X509 *peer; + long verify_error; + MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ]; ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; ++ unsigned next_proto_neg_len; ++#endif + + if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0) + { +@@ -2198,6 +2253,15 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf); + str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); + BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)"); ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); ++ if (next_proto_neg) ++ { ++ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is "); ++ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); ++ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); ++ } ++#endif + if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n"); + if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) & + TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st + /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ + int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); + void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ ++ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ ++ ++ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of ++ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ ++ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, ++ unsigned int *len, void *arg); ++ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; ++ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the ++ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ ++ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, ++ unsigned int inlen, ++ void *arg); ++ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; ++# endif + #endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C + #endif + void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); + void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, ++ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, ++ const unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned int *outlen, ++ void *arg), void *arg); ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, ++ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, ++ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), ++ void *arg); ++ ++int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, ++ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); ++void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, ++ unsigned *len); ++ ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 ++ ++#endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the +@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st + void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; + + SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that ++ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello ++ * extensions. ++ * ++ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from ++ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, ++ * before the Finished message. */ ++ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; ++ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; ++#endif ++ + #define session_ctx initial_ctx + #else + #define session_ctx ctx +@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 ++#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 +@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 + #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 + #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 ++#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 ++#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 + #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 + #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 + #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + void *server_opaque_prf_input; + size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from ++ our peer. */ ++ int next_proto_neg_seen; ++#endif ++ + struct { + /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ + unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; +@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#endif + #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + /* read from server */ +@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#endif + #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + /* write to client */ +@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 + #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 + #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 ++#endif + #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 + + +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/include/openssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/include/openssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { + /* Temporary extension type */ + #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ ++#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 ++#endif ++ + /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ + #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 + /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_both.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -202,15 +202,40 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, in + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */ ++static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) ++ { ++ const char *sender; ++ int slen; ++ ++ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++ { ++ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; ++ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; ++ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; ++ } ++ ++ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, ++ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); ++ } ++#endif ++ + int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) + { + int al,i,ok; + long n; + unsigned char *p; + ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* the mac has already been generated when we received the + * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md + */ ++#endif + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + a, +@@ -521,6 +546,15 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, i + s->init_num += i; + n -= i; + } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for ++ * Finished verification. */ ++ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ++ ssl3_take_mac(s); ++#endif ++ ++ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ + ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -435,7 +435,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; ++ ++#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; ++#else ++ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; ++ else ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; ++#endif ++ + s->init_num=0; + + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; +@@ -463,6 +472,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + + break; + ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: ++ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: ++ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); ++ if (ret <= 0) goto end; ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; ++ break; ++#endif ++ + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, +@@ -3060,6 +3078,32 @@ err: + */ + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) ++ { ++ unsigned int len, padding_len; ++ unsigned char *d; ++ ++ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) ++ { ++ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; ++ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); ++ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; ++ d[4] = len; ++ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); ++ d[5 + len] = padding_len; ++ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); ++ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; ++ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); ++ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; ++ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; ++ s->init_off = 0; ++ } ++ ++ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); ++ } ++# endif ++ + int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) + { + int ok; +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -2230,6 +2230,15 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) + s->s3->num_renegotiations=0; + s->s3->in_read_app_data=0; + s->version=SSL3_VERSION; ++ ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); ++ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; ++ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; ++ } ++#endif + } + + long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -1394,8 +1394,10 @@ err: + int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) + { + int i; ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + const char *sender; + int slen; ++#endif + + if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; +@@ -1418,6 +1420,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) + return(0); + ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* we have to record the message digest at + * this point so we can get it before we read + * the finished message */ +@@ -1434,6 +1437,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) + + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); ++#endif + + return(1); + } +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -538,7 +538,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + * the client uses its key from the certificate + * for key exchange. + */ ++#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#else ++ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; ++ else ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#endif + s->init_num = 0; + } + else +@@ -581,10 +588,27 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + ++#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#else ++ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; ++ else ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#endif + s->init_num=0; + break; + ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: ++ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: ++ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); ++ if (ret <= 0) goto end; ++ s->init_num = 0; ++ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++ break; ++#endif ++ + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, +@@ -655,7 +679,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + if (s->hit) ++ { ++#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#else ++ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) ++ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; ++ else ++ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; ++#endif ++ } + else + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; + s->init_num=0; +@@ -3196,4 +3229,72 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN ++/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It ++ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ ++int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) ++ { ++ int ok; ++ unsigned proto_len, padding_len; ++ long n; ++ const unsigned char *p; ++ ++ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the ++ * extension in their ClientHello */ ++ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, ++ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, ++ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, ++ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, ++ 514, /* See the payload format below */ ++ &ok); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return((int)n); ++ ++ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received ++ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset ++ * by ssl3_get_finished). */ ++ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (n < 2) ++ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ ++ ++ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; ++ ++ /* The payload looks like: ++ * uint8 proto_len; ++ * uint8 proto[proto_len]; ++ * uint8 padding_len; ++ * uint8 padding[padding_len]; ++ */ ++ proto_len = p[0]; ++ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) ++ return 0; ++ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; ++ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) ++ return 0; ++ ++ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); ++ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); ++ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; ++ ++ return 1; ++ } ++# endif + #endif +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -857,6 +857,25 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st + /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */ + int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); + void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg; ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Next protocol negotiation information */ ++ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */ ++ ++ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of ++ * advertised protocols can be provided. */ ++ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf, ++ unsigned int *len, void *arg); ++ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg; ++ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the ++ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */ ++ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, ++ unsigned int inlen, ++ void *arg); ++ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; ++# endif + #endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +@@ -928,6 +947,30 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_C + #endif + void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); + void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, ++ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, ++ const unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned int *outlen, ++ void *arg), void *arg); ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, ++ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, ++ unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, ++ unsigned int inlen, void *arg), ++ void *arg); ++ ++int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, ++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, ++ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len); ++void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, ++ unsigned *len); ++ ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0 ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1 ++#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2 ++ ++#endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the +@@ -1187,6 +1230,19 @@ struct ssl_st + void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; + + SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that ++ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello ++ * extensions. ++ * ++ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from ++ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, ++ * before the Finished message. */ ++ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; ++ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; ++#endif ++ + #define session_ctx initial_ctx + #else + #define session_ctx ctx +@@ -1919,6 +1975,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 ++#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 + #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 +@@ -2117,6 +2174,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 + #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 + #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 ++#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346 ++#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347 + #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 + #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 + #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.832465351 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl3.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -465,6 +465,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + void *server_opaque_prf_input; + size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len; + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from ++ our peer. */ ++ int next_proto_neg_seen; ++#endif ++ + struct { + /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */ + unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; +@@ -557,6 +563,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT) ++#endif + #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT) + /* read from server */ +@@ -602,6 +612,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) ++#endif + #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) + /* write to client */ +@@ -626,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st + #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 + #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20 + #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67 ++#endif + #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 + + +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]= + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"}, ++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"}, + {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"}, +@@ -355,6 +356,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"}, ++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"}, ++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s->initial_ctx=ctx; ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; ++# endif + #endif + + s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; +@@ -587,6 +590,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) + kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); + #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + ++#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) ++ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) ++ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); ++#endif ++ + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + +@@ -1503,6 +1511,124 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s + return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + return -1; + } ++ ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is ++ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by ++ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. ++ * ++ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte ++ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte ++ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated. ++ * ++ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is: ++ * ++ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the ++ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection ++ * or have a default application level protocol. ++ * ++ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the ++ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the ++ * API that this fallback case was enacted. ++ * ++ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list ++ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's ++ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol ++ * a client should use. ++ * ++ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised ++ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2. ++ * ++ * It returns either ++ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or ++ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. ++ */ ++int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) ++ { ++ unsigned int i, j; ++ const unsigned char *result; ++ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; ++ ++ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ ++ for (i = 0; i < server_len; ) ++ { ++ for (j = 0; j < client_len; ) ++ { ++ if (server[i] == client[j] && ++ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0) ++ { ++ /* We found a match */ ++ result = &server[i]; ++ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; ++ goto found; ++ } ++ j += client[j]; ++ j++; ++ } ++ i += server[i]; ++ i++; ++ } ++ ++ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ ++ result = client; ++ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; ++ ++ found: ++ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1; ++ *outlen = result[0]; ++ return status; ++ } ++ ++/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's ++ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't ++ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. ++ * ++ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned ++ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols ++ * provided by the callback. ++ */ ++void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) ++ { ++ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; ++ if (!*data) { ++ *len = 0; ++ } else { ++ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; ++ } ++} ++ ++/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a ++ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol ++ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned ++ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will ++ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to ++ * it. ++ * ++ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no ++ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */ ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) ++ { ++ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ++ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; ++ } ++ ++/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a ++ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| ++ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). ++ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's ++ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can ++ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid. ++ * ++ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this ++ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. ++ */ ++void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) ++ { ++ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ++ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; ++ } ++ ++# endif + #endif + + static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) +@@ -1667,6 +1793,10 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m + ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; + ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; + ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; ++ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; ++# endif + #endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL; +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.846517045 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -968,6 +968,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); + int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s); ++# endif + #endif + + int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s); +@@ -986,6 +989,9 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); + int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); + int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); + int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s); ++#endif + + int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s); + int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s); +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-16 13:26:24.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -494,6 +494,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex + i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); + } + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ++ { ++ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its ++ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ ++ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) ++ return NULL; ++ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); ++ s2n(0,ret); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) + return p; + +@@ -505,6 +517,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex + { + int extdatalen=0; + unsigned char *ret = p; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ int next_proto_neg_seen; ++#endif + + /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) +@@ -618,6 +633,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex + + } + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; ++ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; ++ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) ++ { ++ const unsigned char *npa; ++ unsigned int npalen; ++ int r; ++ ++ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); ++ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) ++ { ++ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; ++ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); ++ s2n(npalen,ret); ++ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); ++ ret += npalen; ++ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) + return p; + +@@ -982,6 +1019,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, + else + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && ++ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) ++ { ++ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a ++ * renegotiation. ++ * ++ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we ++ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on ++ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when ++ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an ++ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing ++ * anything like that, but this might change). ++ ++ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake ++ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > ++ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen ++ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new ++ * Finished message could have been computed.) */ ++ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; ++ } ++#endif + + /* session ticket processed earlier */ + data+=size; +@@ -1005,6 +1064,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, + return 1; + } + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No ++ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill ++ * the length of the block. */ ++static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) ++ { ++ unsigned int off = 0; ++ ++ while (off < len) ++ { ++ if (d[off] == 0) ++ return 0; ++ off += d[off]; ++ off++; ++ } ++ ++ return off == len; ++ } ++#endif ++ + int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) + { + unsigned short length; +@@ -1139,6 +1218,39 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + } ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ++ { ++ unsigned char *selected; ++ unsigned char selected_len; ++ ++ /* We must have requested it. */ ++ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)) ++ { ++ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* The data must be valid */ ++ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) ++ { ++ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) ++ { ++ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); ++ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) ++ { ++ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; ++ return 0; ++ } ++ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); ++ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; ++ } ++#endif + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + { + if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) +--- openssl-1.0.0b.orig/ssl/tls1.h 2009-11-11 14:51:29.000000000 +0000 ++++ openssl-1.0.0b/ssl/tls1.h 2010-11-29 19:56:04.965928855 +0000 +@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ extern "C" { + /* Temporary extension type */ + #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01 + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ++/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */ ++#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172 ++#endif ++ + /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */ + #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0 + /* status request value from RFC 3546 */ |