Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1g and statically link OpenVPN with it

48 files changed, 8504 insertions, 2274 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/Android.mk b/main/openssl/ssl/Android.mk
deleted file mode 100644
index 1319d5e1..00000000
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/Android.mk
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)
-
-local_c_includes := \
-	openssl \
-	openssl/include \
-	openssl/crypto
-
-local_src_files:= \
-	s2_meth.c \
-	s2_srvr.c \
-	s2_clnt.c \
-	s2_lib.c \
-	s2_enc.c \
-	s2_pkt.c \
-	s3_meth.c \
-	s3_srvr.c \
-	s3_clnt.c \
-	s3_lib.c \
-	s3_enc.c \
-	s3_pkt.c \
-	s3_both.c \
-	s23_meth.c \
-	s23_srvr.c \
-	s23_clnt.c \
-	s23_lib.c \
-	s23_pkt.c \
-	t1_meth.c \
-	t1_srvr.c \
-	t1_clnt.c \
-	t1_lib.c \
-	t1_enc.c \
-	t1_reneg.c \
-	ssl_lib.c \
-	ssl_err2.c \
-	ssl_cert.c \
-	ssl_sess.c \
-	ssl_ciph.c \
-	ssl_stat.c \
-	ssl_rsa.c \
-	ssl_asn1.c \
-	ssl_txt.c \
-	ssl_algs.c \
-	bio_ssl.c \
-	ssl_err.c \
-	kssl.c
-
-#######################################
-# target static library
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-include $(LOCAL_PATH)/../android-config.mk
-
-ifneq ($(TARGET_ARCH),x86)
-LOCAL_NDK_VERSION := 5
-LOCAL_SDK_VERSION := 9
-endif
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES += $(local_src_files)
-LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(local_c_includes)
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE:= libssl_static
-include $(BUILD_STATIC_LIBRARY)
-
-#######################################
-# target shared library
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-include $(LOCAL_PATH)/../android-config.mk
-
-ifneq ($(TARGET_ARCH),x86)
-LOCAL_NDK_VERSION := 5
-LOCAL_SDK_VERSION := 9
-endif
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES += $(local_src_files)
-LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(local_c_includes)
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcrypto
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE:= libssl
-include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
-
-
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/Makefile b/main/openssl/ssl/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b275faf..00000000
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,975 +0,0 @@
-#
-# OpenSSL/ssl/Makefile
-#
-
-DIR=	ssl
-TOP=	..
-CC=	cc
-INCLUDES= -I../crypto -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
-CFLAG=-g
-MAKEFILE=	Makefile
-AR=		ar r
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-
-CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
-
-GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c
-APPS=
-
-LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
-SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
-LIBSRC=	\
-	s2_meth.c   s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c  s2_lib.c  s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \
-	s3_meth.c   s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c \
-	s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c          s23_pkt.c \
-	t1_meth.c   t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c  t1_lib.c  t1_enc.c \
-	d1_meth.c   d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c  d1_lib.c  d1_pkt.c \
-	d1_both.c d1_enc.c \
-	ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
-	ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
-	ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
-	bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c t1_reneg.c
-LIBOBJ= \
-	s2_meth.o  s2_srvr.o  s2_clnt.o  s2_lib.o  s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
-	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \
-	s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o          s23_pkt.o \
-	t1_meth.o   t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o  t1_lib.o  t1_enc.o \
-	d1_meth.o   d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o  d1_lib.o  d1_pkt.o \
-	d1_both.o d1_enc.o \
-	ssl_lib.o ssl_err2.o ssl_cert.o ssl_sess.o \
-	ssl_ciph.o ssl_stat.o ssl_rsa.o \
-	ssl_asn1.o ssl_txt.o ssl_algs.o \
-	bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o t1_reneg.o
-
-SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-EXHEADER= ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h
-HEADER=	$(EXHEADER) ssl_locl.h kssl_lcl.h
-
-ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-top:
-	(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all)
-
-all:	shared
-
-lib:	$(LIBOBJ)
-	$(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
-	$(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
-	@touch lib
-
-shared: lib
-	if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
-		(cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \
-	fi
-
-files:
-	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
-
-links:
-	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
-	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST)
-	@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS)
-
-install:
-	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
-	@headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
-	do  \
-	(cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
-	chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
-	done;
-
-tags:
-	ctags $(SRC)
-
-tests:
-
-lint:
-	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-
-depend:
-	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
-	    $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
-	else \
-	    $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC); \
-	fi
-
-dclean:
-	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
-	mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
-
-clean:
-	rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
-
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bio_ssl.c
-d1_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_both.c
-d1_both.o: ssl_locl.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_clnt.c kssl_lcl.h ssl_locl.h
-d1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_enc.c ssl_locl.h
-d1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_lib.c ssl_locl.h
-d1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_meth.c ssl_locl.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_pkt.c
-d1_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl.c kssl_lcl.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
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-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_lib.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_meth.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
-s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_algs.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_asn1.c
-ssl_asn1.o: ssl_locl.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../crypto/o_dir.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-ssl_cert.o: ssl_cert.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_ciph.c
-ssl_ciph.o: ssl_locl.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err.c
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err2.c
-ssl_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h kssl_lcl.h ssl_lib.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h ssl_rsa.c
-ssl_sess.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h ssl_sess.c
-ssl_stat.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h ssl_stat.c
-ssl_txt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h ssl_txt.c
-t1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_clnt.o: t1_clnt.c
-t1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_enc.o: t1_enc.c
-t1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_lib.o: t1_lib.c
-t1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_meth.c
-t1_reneg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_reneg.c
-t1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_srvr.o: t1_srvr.c
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
index eedac8a3..e9552cae 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ err:
 
 BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
 	BIO *ret=NULL,*con=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
 
 	if ((con=BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
@@ -549,6 +550,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	return(ret);
 err:
 	if (con != NULL) BIO_free(con);
+#endif
 	return(NULL);
 	}
 
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 2180c6d4..7a5596a6 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
@@ -215,6 +214,12 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
 static void
 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	{
+
+	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
+		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+		}
 	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
 	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
@@ -228,14 +233,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
 		s->d1->mtu = 
 			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 
 		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
 		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = 0;
 			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
@@ -264,11 +269,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			return ret;
 		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
 		}
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0);  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
 #endif
 
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
+
 	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
 			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
@@ -315,9 +319,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-				/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
-				if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)  
-					len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+					len = curr_mtu;
+				else
+					len = s->init_num;
 				}
 
 			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
@@ -795,7 +800,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 		*ok = 0;
 		return i;
 		}
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	/* parse the message fragment header */
 	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -867,7 +878,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
 	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
 	 * handshake to fail */
-	OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+	if (i != (int)frag_len)
+		{
+		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 
 	*ok = 1;
 
@@ -1075,7 +1091,11 @@ int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
 		return code;
 		}
 
-	if ( ! SSL_in_init(s))  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+#else
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s))  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+#endif
 		{
 		BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
 		return code;
@@ -1367,7 +1387,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return p;
 	}
 
-static unsigned int 
+unsigned int 
 dtls1_min_mtu(void)
 	{
 	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
@@ -1408,3 +1428,171 @@ dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
 
 	ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
 	}
+
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+	    !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
+		{
+		ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+		if (ret < 0) return -1;
+
+		if (ret == 0)
+			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
+		}
+#endif
+	ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int
+dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+	unsigned short hbtype;
+	unsigned int payload;
+	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	pl = p;
+
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+		{
+		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+		int r;
+
+		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+		 * payload, plus padding
+		 */
+		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+		bp = buffer;
+
+		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+		s2n(payload, bp);
+		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+		bp += payload;
+		/* Random padding */
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+
+		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		}
+	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
+		{
+		unsigned int seq;
+
+		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
+		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
+		 * sequence number */
+		n2s(pl, seq);
+
+		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
+			{
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+int
+dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf, *p;
+	int ret;
+	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
+	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+	 * some random stuff.
+	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
+	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+	 *  - Padding
+	 */
+	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+	p = buf;
+	/* Message Type */
+	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+	s2n(payload, p);
+	/* Sequence number */
+	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+	/* 16 random bytes */
+	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+	p += 16;
+	/* Random padding */
+	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+	ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		{
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		dtls1_start_timer(s);
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 57766717..4fc4e1b9 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -150,7 +150,11 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
 	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+	int new_state,state,skip=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+	char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+#endif
 
 	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -164,6 +168,27 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 	s->in_handshake++;
 	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
+	 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
+	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+	 */
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		state=s->state;
@@ -171,7 +196,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		switch(s->state)
 			{
 		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->new_session=1;
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
 			/* break */
@@ -226,6 +251,42 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			s->hit = 0;
 			break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK:
+
+			if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+			{
+				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+
+			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+			break;
+
+		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK:
+			/* read app data until dry event */
+
+			ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+			if (ret < 0) goto end;
+
+			if (ret == 0)
+			{
+				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+
+			s->state=s->d1->next_state;
+			break;
+#endif
+
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
 
@@ -248,9 +309,17 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 
 			s->init_num=0;
 
-			/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
-			if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
-				s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* Disable buffering for SCTP */
+			if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+				{
+#endif
+				/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+				if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+					s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				}
+#endif
 
 			break;
 
@@ -260,9 +329,25 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			else
 				{
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				if (s->hit)
+					{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+					/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
+					 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+					 */
+					snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+					         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+					SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+					                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+					                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+
+					BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+							 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+					}
 				else
 					s->state=DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
 				}
@@ -354,12 +439,20 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
 			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP			
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+			    state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK;
+			else
+#endif			
+			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
 			break;
 
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
@@ -378,6 +471,22 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
+			 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+			 */
+			snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+			         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+			SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+			                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+			                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+
+			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+					 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
 			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
 			 * sent back */
 			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
@@ -388,7 +497,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+					s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+				else
+#endif
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 				}
 
@@ -400,7 +517,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+			{
+				s->d1->next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+			}
+			else
+#endif
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
 			break;
@@ -412,6 +537,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
 				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -438,6 +564,16 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				goto end;
 				}
 			
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (s->hit)
+					{
+					/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+					 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+					 */
+					BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+					}
+#endif
+
 			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
 			break;
 
@@ -457,15 +593,36 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (s->hit)
 				{
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+						s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+						s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+#endif
 				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
 					{
 					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+					if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+						{
+							s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+							s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+						}
+#endif
 					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
 					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
 					}
 				}
 			else
 				{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+				 */
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 				/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
 				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
@@ -508,6 +665,16 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
 			else
 				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+				state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+				{
+				s->d1->next_state=s->state;
+				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+				}
+#endif
+
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
@@ -515,6 +682,13 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
 			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
 				{
+				/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
+				if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
+					{
+					s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+					s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+					}
+				
 				ret= -1;
 				goto end;
 				}
@@ -541,6 +715,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->renegotiate=0;
 			s->new_session=0;
 
 			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
@@ -587,6 +762,15 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		}
 end:
 	s->in_handshake--;
+	
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake
+	 * mode and allow stream identifier other
+	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+	 */
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
 	if (buf != NULL)
 		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
 	if (cb != NULL)
@@ -599,7 +783,7 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	unsigned int i,j;
-	unsigned long Time,l;
+	unsigned long l;
 	SSL_COMP *comp;
 
 	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@@ -630,13 +814,11 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
 		/* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
 		 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
-		for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
+		for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++)
+			;
 		if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
-			{
-			Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);	/* Time */
-			l2n(Time,p);
-			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
-			}
+			ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+					      sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
 
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
index becbab91..712c4647 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,20 +126,28 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			if (mac_size < 0)
 				return -1;
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -164,9 +172,8 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			if (n < 0)
-				return -1;
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return -1;
+				return 0;
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -246,43 +253,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-				 */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-
-			rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-			rec->input += bs;
-			rec->length -= bs;
-			}
+			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 48e8b6ff..106939f2 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={
 	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	tls1_alert_code,
+	tls1_export_keying_material,
 	};
 
 long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
 	pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 
 	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+	s->d1 = NULL;
 	}
 
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
@@ -204,7 +206,8 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
     pqueue buffered_messages;
 	pqueue sent_messages;
 	pqueue buffered_app_data;
-	
+	unsigned int mtu;
+
 	if (s->d1)
 		{
 		unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q;
@@ -212,6 +215,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 		buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
 		sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
 		buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
+		mtu = s->d1->mtu;
 
 		dtls1_clear_queues(s);
 
@@ -222,6 +226,11 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 			s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
 			}
 
+		if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
+			{
+			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
+			}
+
 		s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
 		s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
 		s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
@@ -284,6 +293,15 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
 
 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
 	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Disable timer for SCTP */
+	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+		{
+		memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+		return;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
 	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
 		{
@@ -374,6 +392,7 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	{
 	/* Reset everything */
+	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
 	memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
 	s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
 	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
@@ -381,10 +400,28 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 	}
 
-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
 	{
-	DTLS1_STATE *state;
+	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
+
+	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
+		}
+
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+		{
+		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		return -1;
+		}
 
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+	{
 	/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
 	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
 		{
@@ -392,20 +429,23 @@ int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	dtls1_double_timeout(s);
-	state = s->d1;
-	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
-		{
-		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+
+	if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
 		return -1;
+
+	s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+	if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+		{
+		s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
 		}
 
-	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
 		{
-		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
 		}
+#endif
 
 	dtls1_start_timer(s);
 	return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 91562f35..5b84e97c 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
 	unsigned char *priority);
 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			  unsigned int len);
 
 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
 static int
@@ -232,6 +233,14 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 
 	item->data = rdata;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+	    (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
+		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
 	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
 		{
@@ -369,14 +378,12 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
 	int i,al;
-	int clear=0;
 	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess = s->session;
 
@@ -407,14 +414,15 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-		if (enc_err < 0)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			}
+		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
 		goto err;
 		}
 
@@ -425,46 +433,67 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(s->read_hash == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		int t;
-		t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-		mac_size=t;
-
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
-			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			goto err;
-#endif			
-			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length < mac_size)
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			goto err;
-#endif
 			}
-		rr->length-=mac_size;
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
-			goto err;
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		}
+
+	if (enc_err < 0)
+		{
+		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
 		}
 
 	/* r->length is now just compressed */
@@ -604,24 +633,6 @@ again:
 			goto again;
 			}
 
-		/* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-		 * allocate some memory for it.
-		 */
-		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			unsigned char *pp;
-			unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-			s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp;
-			s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen;
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			}
-
 		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 		}
 
@@ -656,20 +667,28 @@ again:
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
-	 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
-	 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
-	 * since they arrive from different connections and
-	 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
-	 */
-	if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-		!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
-		{
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
-		goto again;     /* get another record */
-		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+	if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+  		{
+#endif
+		/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
+		 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
+		 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
+		 * since they arrive from different connections and
+		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
+		 */
+		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
+			{
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
+			goto again;     /* get another record */
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+  		}
+#endif
 
 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
 	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
@@ -697,7 +716,6 @@ again:
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	dtls1_clear_timeouts(s);  /* done waiting */
 	return(1);
 
 	}
@@ -755,7 +773,17 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 
 	/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
+	 * app data with SCTP.
+	 */
+	if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
+	    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+	     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
+	     s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
+#else
 	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+#endif
 		{
 		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
@@ -786,6 +814,15 @@ start:
 		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 		if (item)
 			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+				{
+				DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+				}
+#endif
+
 			dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
 
 			OPENSSL_free(item->data);
@@ -812,6 +849,12 @@ start:
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		{
+		rr->length = 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 
 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@@ -868,6 +911,31 @@ start:
 				rr->off=0;
 				}
 			}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
+			 * belated application data first, so retry.
+			 */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+			    rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+			    (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
+				{
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				}
+
+			/* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
+			 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
+			 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
+			 */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+			    s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+				{
+				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+				return(0);
+				}
+#endif			
 		return(n);
 		}
 
@@ -895,6 +963,19 @@ start:
 			dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
 			dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
+			{
+			dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#endif
 		/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
 		else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
 			{
@@ -978,6 +1059,8 @@ start:
 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
 			{
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+			s->new_session = 1;
 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
 				{
@@ -1039,6 +1122,21 @@ start:
 			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
 			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
 				{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				/* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
+				 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
+				 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
+				 */
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+					BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
+					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					return -1;
+					}
+#endif
 				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
 				return(0);
 				}
@@ -1145,6 +1243,15 @@ start:
 		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		/* Remember that a CCS has been received,
+		 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
+		 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
+		 * if no SCTP is used
+		 */
+		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
+#endif
+
 		goto start;
 		}
 
@@ -1167,6 +1274,9 @@ start:
 		 */
 		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
 			{
+			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+				return -1;
+
 			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
 			rr->length = 0;
 			goto start;
@@ -1184,6 +1294,7 @@ start:
 #else
 			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
 #endif
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			s->new_session=1;
 			}
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
@@ -1280,7 +1391,16 @@ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 	{
 	int i;
 
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		/* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
+		 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
+		 */
+		if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
+		    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+		     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
+#else
+		if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+#endif
 		{
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
 		if (i < 0) return(i);
@@ -1345,11 +1465,12 @@ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
 
 	OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
+	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
 	return i;
 	}
 
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			  unsigned int len)
 	{
 	unsigned char *p,*pseq;
 	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
@@ -1358,7 +1479,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	int bs;
-	unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
 
 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
@@ -1368,16 +1488,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 		}
 
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead)
-		{
-		if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-		s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead;
-		}
-
 	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 		{
@@ -1387,7 +1497,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 		}
 
-	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+	if (len == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
@@ -1408,37 +1518,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 			goto err;
 		}
 
-	/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
-#if 0
-	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
-	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
-	    && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
-		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-		 */
-
-		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
-			{
-			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
-			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
-			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
-			 * together with the actual payload) */
-			prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
-			if (prefix_len <= 0)
-				goto err;
-
-			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
-				{
-				/* insufficient space */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		
-		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
-		}
-#endif
 	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
 
 	/* write the header */
@@ -1544,14 +1623,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 
 	ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
 
-	if (create_empty_fragment)
-		{
-		/* we are in a recursive call;
-		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
-		 */
-		return wr->length;
-		}
-
 	/* now let's set up wb */
 	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
 	wb->offset = 0;
@@ -1648,7 +1719,7 @@ int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
 		}
 #endif
 
-	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
+	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
 	if (i <= 0)
 		{
 		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
@@ -1791,10 +1862,3 @@ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
 
 	memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
 	}
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
-	{
-	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
-	}
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab9c4192
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/*
+  DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
+
+  Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc.
+  Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
+*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
+#include "srtp.h"
+
+
+static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[]=
+    {
+    {
+    "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80",
+    SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80,
+    },
+    {
+    "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32",
+    SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32,
+    },
+#if 0
+    {
+    "SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80",
+    SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80,
+    },
+    {
+    "SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32",
+    SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32,
+    },
+#endif
+    {0}
+    };
+
+static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
+				SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr,unsigned len)
+	{
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+
+	p=srtp_known_profiles;
+	while(p->name)
+		{
+		if((len == strlen(p->name)) && !strncmp(p->name,profile_name,
+							len))
+			{
+			*pptr=p;
+			return 0;
+			}
+
+		p++;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
+			       SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
+	{
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+
+	p=srtp_known_profiles;
+	while(p->name)
+		{
+		if(p->id == profile_num)
+			{
+			*pptr=p;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		p++;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+
+	char *col;
+	char *ptr=(char *)profiles_string;
+    
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+
+	if(!(profiles=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null()))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
+		return 1;
+		}
+    
+	do
+		{
+		col=strchr(ptr,':');
+
+		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
+					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
+			{
+			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+			return 1;
+			}
+
+		if(col) ptr=col+1;
+		} while (col);
+
+	*out=profiles;
+    
+	return 0;
+	}
+    
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx,const char *profiles)
+	{
+	return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles,&ctx->srtp_profiles);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *s,const char *profiles)
+	{
+	return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles,&s->srtp_profiles);
+	}
+
+
+STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if(s != NULL)
+		{
+		if(s->srtp_profiles != NULL)
+			{
+			return s->srtp_profiles;
+			}
+		else if((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+			(s->ctx->srtp_profiles != NULL))
+			{
+			return s->ctx->srtp_profiles;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return s->srtp_profile;
+	}
+
+/* Note: this function returns 0 length if there are no 
+   profiles specified */
+int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+	{
+	int ct=0;
+	int i;
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0;
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+    
+	clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);    
+	ct=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); /* -1 if clnt == 0 */
+
+	if(p)
+		{
+		if(ct==0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+			return 1;
+			}
+
+		if((2 + ct*2 + 1) > maxlen)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
+			return 1;
+			}
+
+                /* Add the length */
+                s2n(ct * 2, p);
+		for(i=0;i<ct;i++)
+			{
+			prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i);
+			s2n(prof->id,p);
+			}
+
+                /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+                *p++ = 0;
+		}
+
+	*len=2 + ct*2 + 1;
+    
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+	{
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+        int ct;
+        int mki_len;
+	int i,j;
+	int id;
+	int ret;
+
+         /* Length value + the MKI length */
+        if(len < 3)
+		{            
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+                }
+
+        /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list */
+        n2s(d, ct);
+        len -= 2;
+        
+        /* Check that it is even */
+	if(ct%2)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+        
+        /* Check that lengths are consistent */
+	if(len < (ct + 1)) 
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+        
+	clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
+
+	while(ct)
+		{
+		n2s(d,id);
+		ct-=2;
+                len-=2;
+
+		if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+			{
+			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			; /* Ignore */
+			}
+		}
+
+        /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
+        mki_len = *d;
+        d++; len--;
+
+        if (mki_len != len)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+
+	/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
+	 configured then the outer loop doesn't run 
+	 (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
+	 and so we just return without doing anything */
+	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
+		{
+		sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
+
+		for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
+			{
+			cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
+            
+			if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
+				{
+				s->srtp_profile=sprof;
+				*al=0;
+				ret=0;
+				goto done;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	ret=0;
+    
+done:
+	if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+	{
+	if(p)
+		{
+		if(maxlen < 5)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
+			return 1;
+			}
+
+		if(s->srtp_profile==0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED);
+			return 1;
+			}
+                s2n(2, p);
+		s2n(s->srtp_profile->id,p);
+                *p++ = 0;
+		}
+	*len=5;
+    
+	return 0;
+	}
+    
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+	{
+	unsigned id;
+	int i;
+        int ct;
+
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+
+	if(len!=5)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+        n2s(d, ct);
+	if(ct!=2)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	n2s(d,id);
+        if (*d)  /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+		*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+
+	/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
+	if (clnt == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
+		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		return 1;
+		}
+    
+	/* Check to see if the server gave us something we support
+	   (and presumably offered)
+	*/
+	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);i++)
+		{
+		prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i);
+	    
+		if(prof->id == id)
+			{
+			s->srtp_profile=prof;
+			*al=0;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+	*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+
+#endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index a6a4c87e..9975e208 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -151,6 +151,10 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 	int ret= -1;
 	int new_state,state,skip=0;
 	int listen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+	char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+#endif
 
 	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
 	ERR_clear_error();
@@ -168,6 +172,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
 
 	s->d1->listen = listen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
+	 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
+	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+	 */
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
 
 	if (s->cert == NULL)
 		{
@@ -175,6 +186,19 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		return(-1);
 		}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		state=s->state;
@@ -182,7 +206,7 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		switch (s->state)
 			{
 		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->new_session=1;
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
 
 		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
@@ -227,8 +251,12 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				{
 				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
 				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+				 * ...but not with SCTP :-)
 				 */
-				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+#endif
+					if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
 
 				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
@@ -248,10 +276,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
 
 			s->shutdown=0;
+			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -313,25 +342,75 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
 			break;
 			
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
+			
+			if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))		
+				{
+				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+			
+		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
+			ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+			if (ret < 0) goto end;
+			
+			if (ret == 0)
+				{
+				if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK)
+					{
+					s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					ret = -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				}
+
+			s->state=s->d1->next_state;
+			break;
+#endif
+
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			s->new_session = 2;
+			s->renegotiate = 2;
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 			if (s->hit)
 				{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
+				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+				 */
+				snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+				         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+				SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+				                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+				                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+				
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+                         sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 				else
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-				}
 #else
-			if (s->hit)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 #endif
+				}
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -441,6 +520,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				skip=1;
 				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+					s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+#endif
 				}
 			else
 				{
@@ -450,9 +536,23 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+					s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+#endif
 #else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+#endif
 #endif
 				s->init_num=0;
 				}
@@ -472,6 +572,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
 			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
 				{
+				/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
+				if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
+					{
+					s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+					s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+					}
+				
 				ret= -1;
 				goto end;
 				}
@@ -485,15 +592,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0)
 				goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+				}
 			else {
 				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
 				 * have not asked for it :-) */
 				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -503,7 +611,21 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
+			 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+			 */
+			snprintf((char *) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+			         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+			SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+			                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+			                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
+
+			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+			         sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -540,9 +662,13 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+			    state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
+			else
+#endif			
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
@@ -594,6 +720,17 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
 
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			if (!s->hit)
+				{
+				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+				 */
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+				}
+#endif
+
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -616,9 +753,27 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			if (s->hit)
+				{
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
+				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
+				 */
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+				}
 			else
+				{
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+					}
+#endif
+				}
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
@@ -636,11 +791,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 
 			s->init_num=0;
 
-			if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
 				{
-				/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
-				 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
-				
+				s->renegotiate=0;
 				s->new_session=0;
 				
 				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
@@ -692,6 +845,14 @@ end:
 	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
 
 	s->in_handshake--;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake
+		 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
+		 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+		 */
+		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
 	if (cb != NULL)
 		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
 	return(ret);
@@ -764,15 +925,13 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int i;
 	unsigned int sl;
-	unsigned long l,Time;
+	unsigned long l;
 
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
 		{
 		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 		p=s->s3->server_random;
-		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
-		l2n(Time,p);
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+		ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 
@@ -1147,7 +1306,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
 			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
-			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
 				== NULL)
 				{
 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -1271,7 +1430,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
 				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
 					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
 					{
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
index 2900d1d8..e65d5011 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@
  *
  */
 
-#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H 
-#define HEADER_DTLS1_H 
+#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H
+#define HEADER_DTLS1_H
 
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
@@ -72,8 +72,12 @@
 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
 #include <sys/timeval.h>
 #else
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+#include <sys/times.h>
+#else
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #endif
+#endif
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
@@ -105,6 +109,11 @@ extern "C" {
 #define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH                   2
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL	"EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
+#endif
 
 typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
 	{
@@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 
 	struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout;
 
-	/* Indicates when the last handshake msg sent will timeout */
+	/* Indicates when the last handshake msg or heartbeat sent will timeout */
 	struct timeval next_timeout;
 
 	/* Timeout duration */
@@ -243,6 +252,13 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
 	unsigned int retransmitting;
 	unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* used when SSL_ST_XX_FLUSH is entered */
+	int next_state;
+
+	int shutdown_received;
+#endif
+
 	} DTLS1_STATE;
 
 typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
@@ -251,8 +267,12 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
 	unsigned int   packet_length;
 	SSL3_BUFFER    rbuf;
 	SSL3_RECORD    rrec;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo;
+#endif
 	} DTLS1_RECORD_DATA;
 
+#endif
 
 /* Timeout multipliers (timeout slice is defined in apps/timeouts.h */
 #define DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT                      2
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
index b820e374..fd7c67bb 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -2194,6 +2194,22 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_build_principal_2(
 	return ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx)
+	{
+	s->kssl_ctx = kctx;
+	} 
+
+KSSL_CTX * SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return s->kssl_ctx;
+	}
+
+char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx)
+	{
+	if (kctx)
+		return kctx->client_princ;
+	return NULL;
+	}
 
 #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
index a3d20e1c..8242fd5e 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
 			            krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
 unsigned char	*kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
 
+void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx);
+KSSL_CTX * SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s);
+char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx);
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index f41fe3ab..fefcd167 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
 		return(SSLv3_client_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_client_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_2_client_method());
 	else
 		return(NULL);
 	}
@@ -265,12 +269,35 @@ static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
 	return 1;
 	}
 
+/* Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0
+ * on failure, 1 on success. */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
+	{
+	int send_time = 0;
+
+	if (len < 4)
+		return 0;
+	if (server)
+		send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+	else
+		send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+	if (send_time)
+		{
+		unsigned long Time = time(NULL);
+		unsigned char *p = result;
+		l2n(Time, p);
+		return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
+		}
+	else
+		return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
+	}
+
 static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int i,ch_len;
-	unsigned long Time,l;
+	unsigned long l;
 	int ssl2_compat;
 	int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -278,24 +305,51 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	SSL_COMP *comp;
 #endif
 	int ret;
+	unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
 
-	ssl2_compat = (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
+	ssl2_compat = (options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
 
 	if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
 		ssl2_compat = 0;
 
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-		{
+	/*
+	 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
+	 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
+	 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
+	 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
+	 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
+	 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+	 */
+	mask =	SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+		|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+		|(ssl2_compat?SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2:0)
+#endif
+		;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
+	version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && (options & mask) != mask)
+		version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#else
+	version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
 		version = TLS1_VERSION;
-		}
-	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-		{
+	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
 		version = SSL3_VERSION;
-		}
-	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-		{
+	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & mask) != mask)
 		version = SSL2_VERSION;
-		}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (version != SSL2_VERSION)
 		{
@@ -324,16 +378,32 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 		p=s->s3->client_random;
-		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);		/* Time */
-		l2n(Time,p);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
 			return -1;
 
-		if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+		if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
+			version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
+			}
+		else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+			{
+			version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+			version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
+			}
+		else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
 			version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
 			}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		else if(FIPS_mode())
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+			return -1;
+			}
+#endif
 		else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
 			{
 			version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
@@ -417,7 +487,10 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			{
 			/* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
 
-			/* do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4 bytes) last */
+			/* do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message
+			 * header (4 bytes) last. Note: the code to add the
+			 * padding extension in t1_lib.c depends on the size of
+			 * this prefix. */
 			d = p = &(buf[9]);
 			
 			*(p++) = version_major;
@@ -437,6 +510,15 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
 				return -1;
 				}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
+			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
+			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
 			s2n(i,p);
 			p+=i;
 
@@ -491,8 +573,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			d=buf;
 			*(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
 			*(d++) = version_major;
-			*(d++) = version_minor; /* arguably we should send the *lowest* suported version here
-			                         * (indicating, e.g., TLS 1.0 in "SSL 3.0 format") */
+			/* Some servers hang if we use long client hellos
+			 * and a record number > TLS 1.0.
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+				*(d++) = 1;
+			else
+				*(d++) = version_minor;
 			s2n((int)l,d);
 
 			/* number of bytes to write */
@@ -608,7 +695,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 		}
 	else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
-	         (p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR || p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+	         p[2] <= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
 	         ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
 	          (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2)))
 		{
@@ -617,6 +704,14 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
 			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+			if(FIPS_mode())
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+#endif
 			s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
 			s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
 			}
@@ -626,6 +721,18 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
 			s->method=TLSv1_client_method();
 			}
+		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+			{
+			s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+			s->method=TLSv1_1_client_method();
+			}
+		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+			{
+			s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+			s->method=TLSv1_2_client_method();
+			}
 		else
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
index c6099efc..40eae0f0 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_method(int ver)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
 	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_1_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_2_method());
 	else
 #endif
 		return(NULL);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index e22879c8..48778490 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -128,6 +131,10 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
 		return(SSLv3_server_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_server_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
+	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
 	else
 		return(NULL);
 	}
@@ -283,7 +290,20 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 				/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
 				if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
 					{
-					if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+					if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+						{
+						s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+						}
+					else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+						{
+						s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
+						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+						}
+					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
 						{
 						s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
 						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
@@ -350,7 +370,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
 			if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
 				{
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+				if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+					{
+					s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+					type=3;
+					}
+				else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+					{
+					s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+					type=3;
+					}
+				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
 					{
 					s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
 					type=3;
@@ -393,6 +425,15 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
@@ -403,13 +444,8 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
 		v[1] = p[4];
 
-/* The SSL2 protocol allows n to be larger, just pick
- * a reasonable buffer size. */
-#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE < 1024*4 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
-#error "SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE is too small."
-#endif
 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
-		if (n > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - 2)
+		if (n > (1024*4))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
 			goto err;
@@ -572,8 +608,11 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
 			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
 			}
-
-		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+		if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+			s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+		else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
 			s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
 		else
 			s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 00ac158f..03b6cf96 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -359,12 +359,14 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 					SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
 			return(-1);
 			}
-#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
-		/* The Rhapsody 5.5 (a.k.a. MacOS X) compiler bug
-		 * workaround. <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
-		s->hit=(i=*(p++))?1:0;
-#else
+#if 0
 		s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
+		/* Some [PPC?] compilers fail to increment p in above
+		   statement, e.g. one provided with Rhapsody 5.5, but
+		   most recent example XL C 11.1 for AIX, even without
+		   optimization flag... */
+#else
+		s->hit=(*p)?1:0; p++;
 #endif
 		s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
 		n2s(p,i);
@@ -937,7 +939,7 @@ static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
 	p += 1;
 
-	if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
 		{
 		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index ac963b2d..8bb6ab8b 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
 			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
 			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
-			if (	(memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
-				(unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
+			if (	(CRYPTO_memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) ||
 				(s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
index bc885e8e..2cba426b 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -1059,10 +1059,12 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 
 		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
-				 s->s2->key_material_length);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL)
+		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
+					 s->s2->key_material_length)
+		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,
+					 SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
+			goto msg_end;
 
 		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
 		buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
@@ -1073,7 +1075,11 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p2=buf2;
 		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
-		EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i);
+		if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i))
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(buf2);
+			goto msg_end;
+			}
 		OPENSSL_free(buf2);
 
 		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
index 508e3902..d9e18a31 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
 
 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
 			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+		if (i == 0)
+			return 0;
 		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
 		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
 		p+=i;
@@ -208,7 +210,11 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
 	{
 	const char *sender;
 	int slen;
-
+	/* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
+	 * set the appropriate error.
+	 */
+	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+		return;
 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 		{
 		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
@@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
-	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
+	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md.
 	 */ 
 #endif
 
@@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
-	if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
 		{
 		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
@@ -555,7 +561,8 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 #endif
 
 	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+	if (*(unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data != SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)
+		ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 	*ok=1;
@@ -756,20 +763,13 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
 
 	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
 		{
-		if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
-			{
-			len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
-			}
-  		else
+		len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+			+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+			+ headerlen + align;
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
 			{
-			len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-				+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
-				+ headerlen + align;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-				{
-				s->s3->init_extra = 1;
-				len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-				}
+			s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
@@ -805,15 +805,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
 
 	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
 		{
-		if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
-			{
-			len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
-			}
-  		else
-			{
-			len = s->max_send_fragment;
-			}
-		len += 0
+		len = s->max_send_fragment
 			+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
 			+ headerlen + align;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -823,6 +815,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
 		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
 			len += headerlen + align
 				+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+
 		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
 			goto err;
 		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
@@ -865,3 +858,4 @@ int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
 		}
 	return 1;
 	}
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..443a31e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/* Some utility functions are needed:
+ *
+ * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
+ * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
+#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
+
+/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	a -= b;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
+	}
+
+/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	a -= b;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
+	}
+
+/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
+static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+	{
+	unsigned c = a ^ b;
+	c--;
+	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size)
+	{
+	unsigned padding_length, good;
+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+	 * time. */
+	if (overhead > rec->length)
+		return 0;
+
+	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
+	/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+	good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
+	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+	rec->length -= padding_length;
+	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
+	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+}
+
+/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ *   1: if the padding was valid
+ *  -1: otherwise. */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size)
+	{
+	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		{
+		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
+		 * non-constant time.
+		 */
+		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+			return 0;
+		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+		rec->data += block_size;
+		rec->input += block_size;
+		rec->length -= block_size;
+		}
+	else if (overhead > rec->length)
+		return 0;
+
+	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
+
+	/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
+	 * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
+	 * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
+	 * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
+	 */
+	if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand)
+		{
+		/* First packet is even in size, so check */
+		if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) &&
+		    !(padding_length & 1))
+			{
+			s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+			}
+		if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) &&
+		    padding_length > 0)
+			{
+			padding_length--;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+		{
+		/* padding is already verified */
+		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length);
+	/* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+	 * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+	 * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+	 * bytes of padding.
+	 *
+	 * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+	 * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+	 * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+	 * public information so we can use it.) */
+	to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
+	if (to_check > rec->length-1)
+		to_check = rec->length-1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
+		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+		good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
+		}
+
+	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
+	 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
+	 * bits. */
+	good &= good >> 4;
+	good &= good >> 2;
+	good &= good >> 1;
+	good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
+	good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
+
+	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
+	rec->length -= padding_length;
+	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
+
+	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
+	{
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+	unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+	/* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
+	unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+	unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+	/* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+	 * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+	unsigned scan_start = 0;
+	unsigned i, j;
+	unsigned div_spoiler;
+	unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
+#endif
+
+	/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+	if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+		scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+	/* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
+	 * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
+	 * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
+	 *
+	 * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
+	 * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
+	 * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
+	div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
+	div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8;
+	rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+
+	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
+		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
+		}
+
+	/* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+		{
+		/* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+		((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
+		out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+		}
+#else
+	memset(out, 0, md_size);
+	rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+	rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
+		{
+		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+			out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+		rotate_offset++;
+		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+	(*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+ * typically does. */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+	u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+	u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+	}
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+	l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+	l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+	}
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		{
+		l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+		}
+	}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+	{
+	SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		{
+		l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+		}
+	}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+#endif
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+		case NID_sha1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+		case NID_sha224:
+		case NID_sha256:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+		case NID_sha384:
+		case NID_sha512:
+#endif
+			return 1;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. ) */
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+	unsigned char* md_out,
+	size_t* md_out_size,
+	const unsigned char header[13],
+	const unsigned char *data,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+	unsigned mac_secret_length,
+	char is_sslv3)
+	{
+	union {	double align;
+		unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
+	void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+	void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+	unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+	unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+		 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+		 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+	unsigned int bits;	/* at most 18 bits */
+	unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+	/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+	unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+	/* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+	* the hash. */
+	unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+	char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+
+	/* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+	 * many possible overflows later in this function. */
+	OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
+
+	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
+			md_size = 16;
+			sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+			length_is_big_endian = 0;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha1:
+			SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
+			md_size = 20;
+			break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+		case NID_sha224:
+			SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+			md_size = 224/8;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
+			md_size = 32;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+		case NID_sha384:
+			SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+			md_size = 384/8;
+			md_block_size = 128;
+			md_length_size = 16;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
+			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
+			md_size = 64;
+			md_block_size = 128;
+			md_length_size = 16;
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
+			 * called first to check that the hash function is
+			 * supported. */
+			OPENSSL_assert(0);
+			if (md_out_size)
+				*md_out_size = -1;
+			return;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+	header_length = 13;
+	if (is_sslv3)
+		{
+		header_length =
+			mac_secret_length +
+			sslv3_pad_length +
+			8 /* sequence number */ +
+			1 /* record type */ +
+			2 /* record length */;
+		}
+
+	/* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+	 * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+	 * padding value.
+	 *
+	 * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
+	 * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
+	 * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
+	 * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
+	 * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+	 *
+	 * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+	 * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+	 * can vary based on the padding.
+	 *
+	 * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
+	 * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
+	variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+	/* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+	 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+	 * (SSLv3) */
+	len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+	/* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+	* |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
+	max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+	/* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+	num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+	/* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+	 * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+	 * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
+	 * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+	 * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+	 * they are plaintext. */
+	num_starting_blocks = 0;
+	/* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+	 * we start processing. */
+	k = 0;
+	/* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+	 * MACed. */
+	mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+	/* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+	 * contains application data. */
+	c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+	/* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+	 * value. */
+	index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+	/* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+	 * length, in bits. */
+	index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+	/* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+	 * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
+	 * SSLv3. */
+
+	/* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
+	 * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
+	if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
+		{
+		num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+		k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
+		}
+
+	bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
+	if (!is_sslv3)
+		{
+		/* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
+		 * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
+		 * than a single block. */
+		bits += 8*md_block_size;
+		memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+		memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+		md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+		}
+
+	if (length_is_big_endian)
+		{
+		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
+		length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+		}
+
+	if (k > 0)
+		{
+		if (is_sslv3)
+			{
+			/* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
+			 * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
+			 * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
+			 * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
+			unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
+			md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+			memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+			memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
+			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
+				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+			memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+			memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
+			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
+				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
+			}
+		}
+
+	memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+	/* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+	 * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+	 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+	 * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
+	for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+		unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+		for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
+			{
+			unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+			if (k < header_length)
+				b = header[k];
+			else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+				b = data[k-header_length];
+			k++;
+
+			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
+			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
+			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
+			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
+			b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
+			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+			 * just write zero. */
+			b = b&~is_past_cp1;
+			/* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+			 * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+			 * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+			 * add an extra block of zeros. */
+			b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+			/* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+			 * length. */
+			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
+				{
+				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+				b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+				}
+			block[j] = b;
+			}
+
+		md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+		md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+		/* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+			mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
+		}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
+	if (is_sslv3)
+		{
+		/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+		memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+		}
+	EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+	if (md_out_size)
+		*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases
+ * by digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+	{
+	size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+		return;
+	block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+	/* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+	 * digests and TLS to deal with.
+	 * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+	 * otherwise.
+	 * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+	 * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+	 * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+	 * So we have:
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+	 * equivalently:
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+	 * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+	 * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+	 * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+	 * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+	 * otherwise.
+	 */
+	digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+	blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+	blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
+	/* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original
+	 * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a
+	 * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to
+	 * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum
+	 * length TLS buffer. 
+	 */
+	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+				(blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+	}
+#endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 42bcd629..efbd666b 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
@@ -199,19 +202,37 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 	
 	s->in_handshake++;
 	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-#if 0	/* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
-	 * (only one site so far) closes the socket.
-	 * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
-	 * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
-	 * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
 	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+		}
+#endif
+
+// BEGIN android-added
+#if 0
+/* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
+ * (only one site so far) closes the socket. http://b/2511073
+ * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
+ * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
+ * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
+ */
+// END android-added
 	if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
 		{
 		/* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
 		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
 		}
-#endif
 
+// BEGIN android-added
+#endif
+// END android-added
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		state=s->state;
@@ -219,7 +240,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		switch(s->state)
 			{
 		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->new_session=1;
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
 			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
 			/* break */
@@ -292,7 +313,16 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
 			if (s->hit)
+				{
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					{
+					/* receive renewed session ticket */
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+					}
+#endif
+				}
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -370,6 +400,17 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
+				{
+				if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					goto end;
+					}
+				}
+#endif
 			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
 			else
@@ -436,15 +477,15 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-			if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+# endif
 #endif
-
 			s->init_num=0;
 
 			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
@@ -477,6 +518,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
 			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 			break;
 #endif
@@ -611,6 +664,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->renegotiate=0;
 			s->new_session=0;
 
 			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
@@ -667,7 +721,7 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int i;
-	unsigned long Time,l;
+	unsigned long l;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 	int j;
 	SSL_COMP *comp;
@@ -698,17 +752,52 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
 
 		p=s->s3->client_random;
-		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
-		l2n(Time,p);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+
+		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
+		/* Do the message type and length last.
+		 * Note: the code to add the padding extension in t1_lib.c
+		 * depends on the size of this prefix. */
 		d=p= &(buf[4]);
 
+		/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+		 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+		 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+		 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+		 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+		 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+		 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+		 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+		 * 1.0.
+		 *
+		 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+		 * 	1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+		 * 	2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+		 *	3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+		 * 	4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+		 *	5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+		 *	6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+		 *	   know that is maximum server supports.
+		 *	7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+		 *	   containing version 1.0.
+		 *
+		 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+		 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+		 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+		 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+		 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+		 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+		 * the negotiated version.
+		 */
+#if 0
 		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
 		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 		s->client_version=s->version;
+#else
+		*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
+		*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
+#endif
 
 		/* Random stuff */
 		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -738,6 +827,15 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
+			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
+			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
 		s2n(i,p);
 		p+=i;
 
@@ -924,6 +1022,14 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+	/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
+	if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
+		(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
 	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 
 	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -955,9 +1061,14 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}
 	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+	/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
+	 * client authentication.
+	 */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+		{
+		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto f_err;
-
+		}
 	/* lets get the compression algorithm */
 	/* COMPRESSION */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -1030,7 +1141,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		/* wrong packet length */
 		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-		goto err;
+		goto f_err;
 		}
 
 	return(1);
@@ -1236,6 +1347,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
 	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	RSA *rsa=NULL;
 #endif
@@ -1359,6 +1471,86 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		}
 	else
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+		{
+		n2s(p,i);
+		param_len=i+2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p+=i;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		param_len+=i+2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p+=i;
+
+		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
+		p++;
+		param_len+=i+1;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p+=i;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		param_len+=i+2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p+=i;
+		n-=param_len;
+
+/* We must check if there is a certificate */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#else
+		if (0)
+			;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
+#endif
+		}
+	else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
@@ -1606,6 +1798,38 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	/* if it was signed, check the signature */
 	if (pkey != NULL)
 		{
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			/* Should never happen */
+			if (sigalg == -1)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+			if (md == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+			p += 2;
+			n -= 2;
+			}
+		else
+			md = EVP_sha1();
+			
 		n2s(p,i);
 		n-=2;
 		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
@@ -1619,7 +1843,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			int num;
 
@@ -1627,6 +1851,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			q=md_buf;
 			for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
 				{
+				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+					EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 				EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
 					?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -1654,11 +1880,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		else
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
 			{
-			/* lets do DSS */
-			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
@@ -1670,30 +1893,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				goto f_err;
 				}
 			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-			{
-			/* let's do ECDSA */
-			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
-				{
-				/* bad signature */
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -1740,7 +1939,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ok,ret=0;
 	unsigned long n,nc,l;
-	unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
+	unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
 	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p,*q;
 	unsigned char *d;
@@ -1760,6 +1959,14 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+		/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
+		 * as we wont be doing client auth.
+		 */
+		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+			{
+			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+				goto err;
+			}
 		return(1);
 		}
 
@@ -1796,6 +2003,27 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
 	for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
 		s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
 	p+=ctype_num;
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		n2s(p, llen);
+		/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
+		 * following length value.
+		 */
+		if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
+			{
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (llen & 1)
+			{
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen);
+		p += llen;
+		}
 
 	/* get the CA RDNs */
 	n2s(p,llen);
@@ -1808,7 +2036,7 @@ fclose(out);
 }
 #endif
 
-	if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
+	if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
 		{
 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
@@ -1914,7 +2142,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	if (n < 6)
 		{
 		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-		al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
@@ -1925,7 +2153,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
 	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
 	if (ticklen + 6 != n)
 		{
-		al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
@@ -2630,6 +2858,39 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
 
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
+				{
+				/* send off the data */
+				n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+				s2n(n,p);
+				BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
+				n+=2;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
 			{
@@ -2749,12 +3010,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
 	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
 	unsigned u=0;
-#endif
 	unsigned long n;
 	int j;
 
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
 		{
 		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
@@ -2765,7 +3027,8 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
 		EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
 		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
 			{
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+			if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
 						NID_sha1,
 						&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
 			}
@@ -2773,6 +3036,62 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
 			{
 			ERR_clear_error();
 			}
+		/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
+		 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
+		 */
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			long hdatalen = 0;
+			void *hdata;
+			const EVP_MD *md;
+			switch (ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey))
+				{
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+				md = s->s3->digest_rsa;
+				break;
+			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+				md = s->s3->digest_dsa;
+				break;
+			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+				md = s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
+				break;
+			default:
+				md = NULL;
+				}
+			if (!md)
+				/* Unlike with the SignatureAlgorithm extension (sent by clients),
+				 * there are no default algorithms for the CertificateRequest message
+				 * (sent by servers). However, now that we've sent a certificate
+				 * for which we don't really know what hash to use for signing, the
+				 * best we can do is try a default algorithm. */
+				md = EVP_sha1();
+			hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
+								&hdata);
+			if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+						ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			p += 2;
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+			fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
+							EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+			if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+				|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+				|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+						ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			s2n(u,p);
+			n = u + 4;
+			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
 			{
@@ -2855,9 +3174,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
 		s->init_num=(int)n+4;
 		s->init_off=0;
 		}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
 	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 err:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
 	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
 	return(-1);
 	}
@@ -2981,7 +3302,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
 		{
 		if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
-		    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0) 
+		    						s) == 0) 
 			{ /* check failed */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
 			goto f_err;
@@ -3077,13 +3398,8 @@ err:
 	return(0);
 	}
 
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned int len, padding_len;
@@ -3106,9 +3422,124 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+# endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *d;
+	int ret = -1, public_key_len;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+	size_t sig_len;
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+	unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
+
+	if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
+		return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+	d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+	l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
+	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
+	s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+	public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
+	if (public_key_len <= 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	// i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
+	// P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
+	// field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers.
+	if (public_key_len != 65)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
+	if (!public_key)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	derp = public_key;
+	i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
+
+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
+			       s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+	if (!der_sig)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	derp = der_sig;
+	sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**)&derp, sig_len);
+	if (sig == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	// The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key.
+	memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
+	d += 64;
+	memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+	d += 32;
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+	d += 32;
+
+	s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
+	s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
+	s->init_off = 0;
+
+	ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+err:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	if (public_key)
+		OPENSSL_free(public_key);
+	if (der_sig)
+		OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
+	if (sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+	return ret;
 	}
-# endif
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
+ * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
+ * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
+ */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ok;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index b1459707..90fbb180 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
 #endif
 	k=0;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
 	for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
 		{
@@ -427,27 +428,26 @@ int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
 
 	ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s,p,num);
 
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+	/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+	 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
 		{
-		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
-		 */
-		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+		s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
 
 		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
 			{
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-			
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 #endif
 			}
 		}
 
 	return ret;
-		
+
 err:
 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	return(0);
@@ -465,12 +465,21 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
 	}
 
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occured.
+ */
 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i;
+	int bs,i,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
@@ -521,32 +530,16 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
-			/* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
-			 * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */
-			if (i > bs)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			/* now i <= bs <= rec->length */
-			rec->length-=i;
-			}
+			return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -571,12 +564,12 @@ void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
 	OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
 	s->s3->handshake_dgst=NULL;
 	}	
-		
+
 
 
 void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
 	{
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) 
 		{
 		BIO_write (s->s3->handshake_buffer,(void *)buf,len);
 		} 
@@ -613,9 +606,16 @@ int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
 	/* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
 	for (i=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(i,&mask,&md); i++) 
 		{
-		if ((mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2) && md) 
+		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) 
 			{
 			s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+			if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5)
+				{
+				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
+						EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+				}
+#endif
 			EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],md,NULL);
 			EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],hdata,hdatalen);
 			} 
@@ -624,9 +624,12 @@ int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=NULL;
 			}
 		}
-	/* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
-	BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-	s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+	if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE))
+		{
+		/* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
+		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+		}
 
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -672,6 +675,7 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
 		return 0;
 	}	
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
 	n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
 	if (n < 0)
@@ -704,7 +708,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 	const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
 	unsigned char *p,rec_char;
-	unsigned int md_size;
+	size_t md_size, orig_len;
 	int npad;
 	int t;
 
@@ -729,28 +733,72 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	md_size=t;
 	npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
 
-	/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
-	rec_char=rec->type;
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
-	p=md;
-	s2n(rec->length,p);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	/* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+
+		/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+		 *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+		 *
+		 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+		 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+		 * total size. */
+		unsigned char header[75];
+		unsigned j = 0;
+		memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
+		j += md_size;
+		memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+		j += npad;
+		memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
+		j += 8;
+		header[j++] = rec->type;
+		header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+		header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			hash,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+			mac_sec, md_size,
+			1 /* is SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		unsigned int md_size_u;
+		/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
+		rec_char=rec->type;
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
+		p=md;
+		s2n(rec->length,p);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
+		md_size = md_size_u;
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	}
 
 	ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
 	return(md_size);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 28ee4746..f7a5c6f0 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,103 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	256,
 	},
 
+	/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+	/* Cipher 3B */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+	SSL_kRSA,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_eNULL,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	0,
+	0,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 3C */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kRSA,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 3D */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kRSA,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 3E */
+	{
+	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHd,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 3F */
+	{
+	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 40 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
 	/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */
 
@@ -1287,6 +1384,122 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	128,
 	},
 #endif
+
+	/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+	/* Cipher 67 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 68 */
+	{
+	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHd,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 69 */
+	{
+	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 6A */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 6B */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 6C */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 6D */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* GOST Ciphersuites */
+
 	{
 	1,
 	"GOST94-GOST89-GOST89",
@@ -1470,7 +1683,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1486,7 +1699,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -1502,7 +1715,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
@@ -1610,6 +1823,200 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
 
+	/* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+
+	/* Cipher 9C */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kRSA,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 9D */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kRSA,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 9E */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher 9F */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A0 */
+	{
+	0,
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A1 */
+	{
+	0,
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kDHr,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A2 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A3 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A4 */
+	{
+	0,
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kDHd,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A5 */
+	{
+	0,
+	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kDHd,
+	SSL_aDH,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A6 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher A7 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEDH,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 	/* Cipher C001 */
 	{
@@ -1621,7 +2028,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
 	0,
@@ -1653,7 +2060,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1669,7 +2076,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -1685,7 +2092,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
@@ -1701,7 +2108,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
 	0,
@@ -1733,7 +2140,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1749,7 +2156,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -1765,7 +2172,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
@@ -1781,7 +2188,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
 	0,
@@ -1813,7 +2220,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1829,7 +2236,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -1845,7 +2252,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
@@ -1861,7 +2268,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
 	0,
@@ -1893,7 +2300,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1909,7 +2316,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -1925,7 +2332,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
@@ -1941,7 +2348,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
 	0,
@@ -1973,7 +2380,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	168,
 	168,
@@ -1989,7 +2396,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
 	128,
@@ -2005,13 +2412,423 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
 	256,
 	},
 #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	/* Cipher C01A */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_3DES,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	168,
+	168,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C01B */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_3DES,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	168,
+	168,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C01C */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_3DES,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	168,
+	168,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C01D */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C01E */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C01F */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C020 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C021 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C022 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	SSL_kSRP,
+	SSL_aDSS,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA1,
+	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+
+	/* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+	/* Cipher C023 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aECDSA,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C024 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aECDSA,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA384,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C025 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C026 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA384,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C027 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C028 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA384,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C029 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES128,
+	SSL_SHA256,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C02A */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES256,
+	SSL_SHA384,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+	/* Cipher C02B */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aECDSA,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C02C */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aECDSA,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C02D */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C02E */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kECDHe,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C02F */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C030 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kEECDH,
+	SSL_aRSA,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C031 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES128GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+	128,
+	128,
+	},
+
+	/* Cipher C032 */
+	{
+	1,
+	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	SSL_kECDHr,
+	SSL_aECDH,
+	SSL_AES256GCM,
+	SSL_AEAD,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
+	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+	256,
+	256,
+	},
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+
 #ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
 /* Cipher FF00 */
 	{
@@ -2087,6 +2904,9 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={
 	SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST,4,
 	SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST,4,
 	ssl3_alert_code,
+	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+		 size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+		 int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
 	};
 
 long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
@@ -2128,6 +2948,14 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
 
 	s->s3=s3;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+	s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup(s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+#endif
 	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
 	return(1);
 err:
@@ -2168,6 +2996,14 @@ void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
 		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
 	}
 	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
+#endif
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3,sizeof *s->s3);
 	OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
 	s->s3=NULL;
@@ -2177,6 +3013,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned char *rp,*wp;
 	size_t rlen, wlen;
+	int init_extra;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
@@ -2210,11 +3047,17 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
 		}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
 	rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
 	wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
 	rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
  	wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+	init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
 	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
 		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
 		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
@@ -2222,11 +3065,20 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) {
 		ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
 	}	
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
 	memset(s->s3,0,sizeof *s->s3);
 	s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
 	s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
 	s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
  	s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+	s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
 
 	ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
@@ -2245,8 +3097,19 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 		s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
 		}
 #endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+	s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+#endif
 	}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static char * MS_CALLBACK srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+	{
+	return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info) ;
+	}
+#endif
+
 long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 	{
 	int ret=0;
@@ -2492,6 +3355,56 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		ret = 1;
 		break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	case SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT:
+		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s);
+		else
+			ret = tls1_heartbeat(s);
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING:
+		ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS:
+		if (larg)
+			s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+		else
+			s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
+		if (!s->server)
+			break;
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		if (s->server)
+			break;
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+			break;
+			}
+		if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = (EVP_PKEY*) parg;
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		if (!s->server)
+			break;
+		if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+			break;
+		memcpy(parg, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, larg < 64 ? larg : 64);
+		return 64;
+
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -2712,6 +3625,12 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 			}
 		return 1;
 		}
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
+		/* must be called on a server */
+		if (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled=1;
+		return 1;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
@@ -2724,6 +3643,38 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		return 1;
 		break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
+		if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
+		ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+		if (parg == NULL)
+			break;
+		if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
+			return 0;
+			} 
+		if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback=srp_password_from_info_cb;
+		ctx->srp_ctx.info=parg;
+		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
+		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg=parg;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.strength=larg;
+		break;
+#endif
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
 	/* A Thawte special :-) */
@@ -2736,6 +3687,30 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs,(X509 *)parg);
 		break;
 
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+		*(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg =  ctx->extra_certs;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+		if (ctx->extra_certs)
+			{
+			sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
+			ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
+			}
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+			break;
+			}
+		if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = (EVP_PKEY*) parg;
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		return(0);
 		}
@@ -2793,6 +3768,20 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
 						HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
 		break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
+		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
+		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
+		ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
+		break;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
+		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
+		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback=(char *(*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
+		break;
+#endif
 #endif
 	default:
 		return(0);
@@ -2811,6 +3800,9 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
 	id=0x03000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[1];
 	c.id=id;
 	cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
+if (cp == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
+#endif
 	if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
 		return NULL;
 	else
@@ -2888,11 +3880,20 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		{
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
 
+		/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
+		if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
+			(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+			continue;
+
 		ssl_set_cert_masks(cert,c);
 		mask_k = cert->mask_k;
 		mask_a = cert->mask_a;
 		emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
 		emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+		emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+#endif
 			
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 /*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
@@ -3089,6 +4090,13 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
 		if (ii >= 0)
 			{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+			if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
+				{
+				if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
+				continue;
+				}
+#endif
 			ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
 			break;
 			}
@@ -3354,4 +4362,15 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
 		}
 	return(ret);
 	}
-
+/* If we are using TLS v1.2 or later and default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch
+ * to new SHA256 PRF and handshake macs
+ */
+long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+	{
+	long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
+	if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+	    alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
+		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+	return alg2;
+	}
+		
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 0d3874ae..d88f4dbb 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -115,9 +115,10 @@
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
+			 unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment);
 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
 
 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
@@ -289,16 +290,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	short version;
-	int mac_size;
-	int clear=0;
+	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 	size_t extra;
-	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-	long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD;
-#else
-	long align=0;
-#endif
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -307,8 +300,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
 	else
 		extra=0;
-	if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) &&
-		extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+	if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
 		{
 		/* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
 		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
@@ -343,7 +335,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 			if (version != s->version)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
                                 	/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
 					s->version = (unsigned short)version;
 				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
@@ -357,21 +349,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 			goto err;
 			}
 
-		/* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-		 * allocate some memory for it.
-		 */
-		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align)
-			{
-			if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
-			s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align;
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			}
-
 		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
@@ -423,17 +400,15 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		if (enc_err == 0)
-			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
-			goto err;
-
-		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
-		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
-		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
-		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
-		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+		goto f_err;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -443,53 +418,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif			
 			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-			rr->length = 0;
-#endif
-			}
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-			{
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
 		}
 
-	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+	if (enc_err < 0)
 		{
 		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
 		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
@@ -598,7 +582,6 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
 	unsigned int tot,n,nw;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int max_plain_length;
 
 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 	tot=s->s3->wnum;
@@ -618,17 +601,34 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 	n=(len-tot);
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS))
-			max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-		else
-			max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment;
+		/* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put
+		 * into a record. */
+		unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
+		/* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte
+		 * in its own record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */
+		int fragment = 0;
+
+		if (n > 1 &&
+		    s->s3->need_record_splitting &&
+		    type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+		    !s->s3->record_split_done)
+			{
+			fragment = 1;
+			/* The first byte will be in its own record, so we
+			 * can write an extra byte. */
+			max++;
+			/* record_split_done records that the splitting has
+			 * been done in case we hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition.
+			 * In that case, we don't need to do the split again. */
+			s->s3->record_split_done = 1;
+			}
 
-		if (n > max_plain_length)
-			nw = max_plain_length;
+		if (n > max)
+			nw=max;
 		else
 			nw=n;
 
-		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
+		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0);
 		if (i <= 0)
 			{
 			s->s3->wnum=tot;
@@ -639,10 +639,10 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
 			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
 			{
-			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
-			 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
-			s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
-			
+			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended,
+			 * one-byte fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
+			 * weakness. */
+			s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
 			return tot+i;
 			}
 
@@ -651,12 +651,18 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 		}
 	}
 
+/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1
+ * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest
+ * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then
+ * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that
+ * one byte fragment. */
 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+			 unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment)
 	{
 	unsigned char *p,*plen;
-	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+	int i,mac_size;
 	int prefix_len=0;
+	int eivlen;
 	long align=0;
 	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
@@ -680,7 +686,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 		}
 
-	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+	if (len == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
@@ -689,10 +695,9 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
 		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
 		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (clear)
+		{
 		mac_size=0;
+		}
 	else
 		{
 		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
@@ -700,54 +705,33 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 			goto err;
 		}
 
-	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
-	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
+	if (fragment)
 		{
 		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
 		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+		prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */,
+					   0 /* fragment */,
+					   1 /* is_fragment */);
+		if (prefix_len <= 0)
+			goto err;
 
-		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
-			{
-			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
-			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
-			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
-			 * together with the actual payload) */
-			prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
-			if (prefix_len <= 0)
-				goto err;
-
-			if (prefix_len >
-		(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
-				{
-				/* insufficient space */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		
-		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
-		}
-
-	/* resize if necessary to hold the data. */
-	if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len)
-		{
-		if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL)
+		if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
+				  SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
 			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			/* insufficient space */
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		wb->buf = p;
-		wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
 		}
 
-	if (create_empty_fragment)
+	if (is_fragment)
 		{
 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-		/* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
-		 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
-		 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
-		 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
-		align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		/* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and
+		 * that will be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we
+		 * want to align the real payload, we can just pretend that we
+		 * have two headers and a byte. */
+		align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
 		align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 #endif
 		p = wb->buf + align;
@@ -773,16 +757,42 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	wr->type=type;
 
 	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
-	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+	/* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
+	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
+	 */
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+				&& !s->renegotiate
+				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+		*(p++) = 0x1;
+	else
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 
 	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
-	plen=p; 
+	plen=p;
 	p+=2;
+	/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
+	if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		{
+		int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+		if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+			{
+			eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+			if (eivlen <= 1)
+				eivlen = 0;
+			}
+		/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+		else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+			eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+		else
+			eivlen = 0;
+		}
+	else 
+		eivlen = 0;
 
 	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
-	wr->data=p;
-	wr->length=(int)len;
-	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
+	wr->data=p + eivlen;
+	wr->length=(int)(len - (fragment != 0));
+	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf + (fragment != 0);
 
 	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
 	 * wr->data */
@@ -808,11 +818,19 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 
 	if (mac_size != 0)
 		{
-		if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
+		if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
 			goto err;
 		wr->length+=mac_size;
-		wr->input=p;
-		wr->data=p;
+		}
+
+	wr->input=p;
+	wr->data=p;
+
+	if (eivlen)
+		{
+	/*	if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
+			goto err; */
+		wr->length += eivlen;
 		}
 
 	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
@@ -827,11 +845,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
 	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-	if (create_empty_fragment)
+	if (is_fragment)
 		{
-		/* we are in a recursive call;
-		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
-		 */
+		/* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't
+		 * write out anything. */
 		return wr->length;
 		}
 
@@ -1081,6 +1098,19 @@ start:
 			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
 			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
+			{
+			tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#endif
 
 		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
 			{
@@ -1224,6 +1254,10 @@ start:
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
 				goto f_err;
 				}
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+				return(0);
+#endif
 			}
 		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
 			{
@@ -1302,6 +1336,7 @@ start:
 #else
 			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
 #endif
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			s->new_session=1;
 			}
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
@@ -1335,8 +1370,10 @@ start:
 		{
 	default:
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
-		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
-		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+		/* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
+		 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
+		 */
+		if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
 			{
 			rr->length = 0;
 			goto start;
@@ -1396,10 +1433,8 @@ err:
 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int i;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	const char *sender;
 	int slen;
-#endif
 
 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
@@ -1422,7 +1457,6 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
 	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
 		return(0);
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	/* we have to record the message digest at
 	 * this point so we can get it before we read
 	 * the finished message */
@@ -1437,9 +1471,14 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
 		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
 		}
 
-	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+	i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
 		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-#endif
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
 
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -1471,7 +1510,7 @@ int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
 
 	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
-	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
+	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0);
 	if (i <= 0)
 		{
 		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 60591622..19158850 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -157,8 +157,11 @@
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -179,6 +182,32 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
 		return(NULL);
 	}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+	*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+	if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+	    (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
+		{
+		if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
+			{
+			/* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 
+			   we do so if There is no srp login name */
+			ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+			*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
+			}
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
 			ssl3_accept,
 			ssl_undefined_function,
@@ -211,6 +240,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		return(-1);
 		}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		state=s->state;
@@ -218,7 +259,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		switch (s->state)
 			{
 		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->new_session=1;
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
 
 		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
@@ -258,6 +299,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				}
 
 			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
 			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
 				{
@@ -313,10 +355,35 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
 
 			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+			{
+				ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			{
+			int al;
+			if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al))  < 0)
+					{
+					/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
+					s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+					goto end;
+					}
+			if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);	
+				/* This is not really an error but the only means to
+                                   for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
+ 				   if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 	
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);			
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;			
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;	
+				}
+			}
+#endif		
 			
-			s->new_session = 2;
+			s->renegotiate = 2;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
@@ -345,7 +412,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
-			/* normal PSK or KRB5 */
+			/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
 			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
 				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
 				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
@@ -410,6 +477,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			    /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+			    || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
 			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
 			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
 			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
@@ -456,6 +527,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				skip=1;
 				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+						return -1;
 				}
 			else
 				{
@@ -538,15 +612,26 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
 				 * for key exchange.
 				 */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
 				s->init_num = 0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
+				}
+			else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
+				if (!s->session->peer)
+					break;
+				/* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
+				 * at this point and digest cached records.
+				 */
+				if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					return -1;
+					}
+				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+				if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+					return -1;
 				}
 			else
 				{
@@ -588,16 +673,28 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {
+			char next_proto_neg = 0;
+			char channel_id = 0;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+			next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+			channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+#endif
+
+			if (next_proto_neg)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+			else if (channel_id)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
+		}
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
@@ -605,6 +702,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->init_num = 0;
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num = 0;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			break;
 #endif
@@ -614,14 +724,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-			else if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#else
 			if (s->hit)
 				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 #endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
@@ -679,16 +786,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			if (s->hit)
-				{
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-				else
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
-				}
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
 			else
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -706,11 +804,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 			s->init_num=0;
 
-			if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
 				{
-				/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
-				 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
-				
+				s->renegotiate=0;
 				s->new_session=0;
 				
 				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
@@ -800,6 +896,13 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
 		{
+		/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+		 * negotiation. */
+		if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
 		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
@@ -816,6 +919,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
 			}
 #endif
+		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 		return 2;
 		}
 	return 1;
@@ -840,7 +944,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
 	 * TLSv1.
 	 */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
+		)
 		{
 		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
 		}
@@ -865,7 +970,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 
+			!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
 			{
 			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
 			s->version = s->client_version;
@@ -897,13 +1003,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	j= *(p++);
 
 	s->hit=0;
-	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
-	 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
-	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
-	 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
-	 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
-	 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
-	 * an earlier library version)
+	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
+	 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
+	 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+	 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
+	 * won't even compile against older library versions).
+	 *
+	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
+	 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
+	 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+	 * setting will be ignored.
 	 */
 	if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
 		{
@@ -1099,7 +1208,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 		}
-		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
 			goto err;
 		}
@@ -1109,12 +1218,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
 	 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
 	{
-		unsigned long Time;
 		unsigned char *pos;
-		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
 		pos=s->s3->server_random;
-		l2n(Time,pos);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			goto f_err;
@@ -1304,8 +1410,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
 		}
 
-	if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-		goto f_err;
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
+		{
+		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
 	
 	/* we now have the following setup. 
 	 * client_random
@@ -1318,6 +1430,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
 	 */
 
+	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+		{
+		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
 	if (ret < 0) ret=1;
 	if (0)
 		{
@@ -1335,19 +1457,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int i,sl;
 	unsigned long l;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	unsigned long Time;
-#endif
 
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
 		{
 		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 		p=s->s3->server_random;
-		/* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
-		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
-		l2n(Time,p);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
 			return -1;
 #endif
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
@@ -1360,20 +1476,20 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
-		/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
-		 * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the
-		 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
-		 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
-		 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
-		 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
-		 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
-		 *
-		 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
-		 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
-		 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
-		 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
-		 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
-		 * is unaffected.
+		/* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+		 * back in the server hello:
+		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+		 *   we send back the old session ID.
+		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+		 *   session ID.
+		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+		 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+		 * to send back.
 		 */
 		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
 			&& !s->hit)
@@ -1474,6 +1590,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
 #endif
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 	unsigned char *p,*d;
 	int al,i;
 	unsigned long type;
@@ -1714,21 +1831,44 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (type & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
+				(s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
+			r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
+			r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
+			r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
 			{
 			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+				n+=1+nr[i];
+			else
+#endif
 			n+=2+nr[i];
 			}
 
 		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
 			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
 			{
-			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
 				== NULL)
 				{
 				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -1750,8 +1890,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 		p= &(d[4]);
 
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
 			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+			if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+				{
+				*p = nr[i];
+				p++;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
 			s2n(nr[i],p);
 			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
 			p+=nr[i];
@@ -1799,12 +1947,15 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
 			 * and p points to the space at the end. */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+					&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 				{
 				q=md_buf;
 				j=0;
 				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
 					{
+					EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+						EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
 					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
 						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
 					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -1826,44 +1977,41 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
-				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+			if (md)
 				{
-				/* lets do DSS */
-				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
-				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
-					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+				/* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
+				 * algorithm */
+				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
-					goto err;
+					if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+						{
+						/* Should never happen */
+						al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+						SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+						goto f_err;
+						}
+					p+=2;
 					}
-				s2n(i,p);
-				n+=i+2;
-				}
-			else
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+				fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
+							EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
-				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-				{
-				/* let's do ECDSA */
-				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
 				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
 					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
 					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
 					goto err;
 					}
 				s2n(i,p);
 				n+=i+2;
+				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+					n+= 2;
 				}
 			else
-#endif
 				{
 				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
 				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -1916,6 +2064,14 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
 		p+=n;
 		n++;
 
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+			s2n(nl, p);
+			p += nl + 2;
+			n += nl + 2;
+			}
+
 		off=n;
 		p+=2;
 		n+=2;
@@ -2175,6 +2331,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		if (i <= 0)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+			BN_clear_free(pub);
 			goto err;
 			}
 
@@ -2634,6 +2791,44 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			int param_len;
+
+			n2s(p,i);
+			param_len=i+2;
+			if (param_len > n)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			p+=i;
+			}
+		else
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 		if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
 			{
 			int ret = 0;
@@ -2717,7 +2912,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 	return(1);
 f_err:
 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
 err:
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
@@ -2738,12 +2933,15 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 	long n;
 	int type=0,i,j;
 	X509 *peer;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
 
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
 		-1,
-		514, /* 514? */
+		516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
 		&ok);
 
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
@@ -2763,7 +2961,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -2806,6 +3004,36 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 		} 
 	else 
 		{	
+		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			/* Should never happen */
+			if (sigalg == -1)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+			if (md == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+			p += 2;
+			n -= 2;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
 		n-=2;
 		if (i > n)
@@ -2823,6 +3051,37 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		long hdatalen = 0;
+		void *hdata;
+		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+		if (hdatalen <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+		fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+							EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+			|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
 	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
 		{
@@ -2913,6 +3172,13 @@ f_err:
 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 		}
 end:
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+		{
+		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+		s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+		}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	return(ret);
 	}
@@ -3025,6 +3291,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -3101,13 +3373,17 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 	{
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
 		{
 		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
-		int len, slen;
+		const unsigned char *const_p;
+		int len, slen_full, slen;
+		SSL_SESSION *sess;
 		unsigned int hlen;
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
 		HMAC_CTX hctx;
@@ -3116,12 +3392,38 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 		unsigned char key_name[16];
 
 		/* get session encoding length */
-		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+		slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
 		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
  		 * too long
  		 */
-		if (slen > 0xFF00)
+		if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+			return -1;
+		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+		if (!senc)
+			return -1;
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+		/* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
+		const_p = senc;
+		sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+		if (sess == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(senc);
 			return -1;
+			}
+		sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+		if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(senc);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
 		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
  		 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
  		 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
@@ -3133,11 +3435,6 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 			26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
 			EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
 			return -1;
-		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
-		if (!senc)
-			return -1;
-		p = senc;
-		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
 
 		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 		/* do the header */
@@ -3168,7 +3465,13 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
 					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
 			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
 			}
-		l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+
+		/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
+		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
+		 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
+		 * as their sessions. */
+		l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
 		/* Skip ticket length for now */
 		p += 2;
 		/* Output key name */
@@ -3244,13 +3547,13 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
 
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
  * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ok;
-	unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
+	int proto_len, padding_len;
 	long n;
 	const unsigned char *p;
 
@@ -3311,4 +3614,140 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
 	return 1;
 	}
 # endif
+
+/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = -1, ok;
+	long n;
+	const unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;
+	EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
+	EC_KEY* key = NULL;
+	EC_POINT* point = NULL;
+	ECDSA_SIG sig;
+	BIGNUM x, y;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)
+		{
+		/* The first time that we're called we take the current
+		 * handshake hash and store it. */
+		EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+		unsigned int len;
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+		if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
+			return -1;
+		len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);
+		EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+		}
+
+	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
+		SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+		2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return((int)n);
+
+	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+
+	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	/* The payload looks like:
+	 *   uint16 extension_type
+	 *   uint16 extension_len;
+	 *   uint8 x[32];
+	 *   uint8 y[32];
+	 *   uint8 r[32];
+	 *   uint8 s[32];
+	 */
+	n2s(p, extension_type);
+	n2s(p, extension_len);
+
+	if (extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
+	    extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+	if (!p256)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	BN_init(&x);
+	BN_init(&y);
+	sig.r = BN_new();
+	sig.s = BN_new();
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(p +  0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
+	if (!point ||
+	    !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
+		goto err;
+
+	key = EC_KEY_new();
+	if (!key ||
+	    !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
+	    !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
+		goto err;
+
+	/* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
+	 * that we were called. */
+	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {
+	case 1:
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
+		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+		goto err;
+	default:
+		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+	BN_free(&x);
+	BN_free(&y);
+	BN_free(sig.r);
+	BN_free(sig.s);
+	if (key)
+		EC_KEY_free(key);
+	if (point)
+		EC_POINT_free(point);
+	if (p256)
+		EC_GROUP_free(p256);
+	return ret;
+	}
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c0cf33ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/*
+  DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
+
+  Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc.
+  Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
+*/
+
+#ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
+#define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+     
+#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 0x0001
+#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 0x0002
+#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_80 0x0003
+#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_32 0x0004
+#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
+#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
+int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
+SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+
+STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
+SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index 9cb2bf93..4c38f6ed 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_kEECDH		"kEECDH"
 #define SSL_TXT_kPSK            "kPSK"
 #define SSL_TXT_kGOST		"kGOST"
+#define SSL_TXT_kSRP		"kSRP"
 
 #define	SSL_TXT_aRSA		"aRSA"
 #define	SSL_TXT_aDSS		"aDSS"
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_ECDSA		"ECDSA"
 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5      	"KRB5"
 #define SSL_TXT_PSK             "PSK"
+#define SSL_TXT_SRP		"SRP"
 
 #define SSL_TXT_DES		"DES"
 #define SSL_TXT_3DES		"3DES"
@@ -285,6 +287,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_AES128		"AES128"
 #define SSL_TXT_AES256		"AES256"
 #define SSL_TXT_AES		"AES"
+#define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM		"AESGCM"
 #define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128	"CAMELLIA128"
 #define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256	"CAMELLIA256"
 #define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA	"CAMELLIA"
@@ -294,10 +297,14 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_SHA		"SHA" /* same as "SHA1" */
 #define SSL_TXT_GOST94		"GOST94" 
 #define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC		"GOST89MAC" 
+#define SSL_TXT_SHA256		"SHA256"
+#define SSL_TXT_SHA384		"SHA384"
 
 #define SSL_TXT_SSLV2		"SSLv2"
 #define SSL_TXT_SSLV3		"SSLv3"
 #define SSL_TXT_TLSV1		"TLSv1"
+#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1		"TLSv1.1"
+#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2		"TLSv1.2"
 
 #define SSL_TXT_EXP		"EXP"
 #define SSL_TXT_EXPORT		"EXPORT"
@@ -356,9 +363,29 @@ extern "C" {
  * in SSL_CTX. */
 typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
 typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
+typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
+typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER;
+typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+
+/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
+typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st
+       {
+       const char *name;
+       unsigned long id;
+       } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
+
+typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn)(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
+typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
 
 /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
-typedef struct ssl_cipher_st
+struct ssl_cipher_st
 	{
 	int valid;
 	const char *name;		/* text name */
@@ -375,15 +402,11 @@ typedef struct ssl_cipher_st
 	unsigned long algorithm2;	/* Extra flags */
 	int strength_bits;		/* Number of bits really used */
 	int alg_bits;			/* Number of bits for algorithm */
-	} SSL_CIPHER;
+	};
 
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
-
-typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn)(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
-typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
 
 /* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */
-typedef struct ssl_method_st
+struct ssl_method_st
 	{
 	int version;
 	int (*ssl_new)(SSL *s);
@@ -416,7 +439,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_method_st
 	int (*ssl_version)(void);
 	long (*ssl_callback_ctrl)(SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
 	long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
-	} SSL_METHOD;
+	};
 
 /* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
  * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -433,14 +456,17 @@ typedef struct ssl_method_st
  *	Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- the Session ID context
  *	Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER,   -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
  *	HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension 
- *	ECPointFormatList [ 7 ] OCTET STRING,     -- optional EC point format list from TLS extension
- *	PSK_identity_hint [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
- *	PSK_identity [ 9 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional PSK identity
+ *	PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
+ *	PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,  -- optional PSK identity
+ *	Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
+ *	Ticket [10]             EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
+ *	Compression_meth [11]   EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
+ *	SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
  *	}
  * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
  * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
  */
-typedef struct ssl_session_st
+struct ssl_session_st
 	{
 	int ssl_version;	/* what ssl version session info is
 				 * being kept in here? */
@@ -467,6 +493,9 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 	char *psk_identity_hint;
 	char *psk_identity;
 #endif
+	/* Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed.
+	 * Applications can also set this bit for a new session via
+	 * not_resumable_session_cb to disable session caching and tickets. */
 	int not_resumable;
 
 	/* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
@@ -509,11 +538,15 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 	/* RFC4507 info */
 	unsigned char *tlsext_tick;	/* Session ticket */
-	size_t	tlsext_ticklen;		/* Session ticket length */	
+	size_t tlsext_ticklen;		/* Session ticket length */
 	long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;	/* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
 #endif
-	} SSL_SESSION;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	char *srp_username;
+#endif
+	};
 
+#endif
 
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG			0x00000001L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG			0x00000002L
@@ -522,21 +555,28 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L
 #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x00000010L
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER		0x00000020L
-#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING			0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
+#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG			0x00000040L
 #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG			0x00000080L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG				0x00000100L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG			0x00000200L
 
-/* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
- * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.  Usually (depending on the application protocol)
- * the workaround is not needed.  Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
- * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include
- * it in SSL_OP_ALL. */
+/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
+#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING			0x0
+
+/* SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS is vestigial. Previously it disabled the
+ * insertion of empty records in CBC mode, but the empty records were commonly
+ * misinterpreted as EOF by other TLS stacks and so this was disabled by
+ * SSL_OP_ALL.
+ *
+ * This has been replaced by 1/n-1 record splitting, which is enabled by
+ * SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING in SSL_set_mode. This involves sending a
+ * one-byte record rather than an empty record and has much better
+ * compatibility. */
 #define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS              0x00000800L /* added in 0.9.6e */
 
 /* SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless.
  *             This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */
-#define SSL_OP_ALL					0x80000FFFL
+#define SSL_OP_ALL					0x80000BFFL
 
 /* DTLS options */
 #define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU                 0x00001000L
@@ -572,11 +612,17 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2					0x01000000L
 #define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3					0x02000000L
 #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1					0x04000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2				0x08000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1				0x10000000L
 
+/* These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay
+ * zap so we have some more flags.
+ */
 /* The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check
  * for the PKCS#1 attack */
-#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1				0x08000000L
-#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2				0x10000000L
+#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1				0x0
+#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2				0x0
+
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG			0x20000000L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x40000000L
 /* Make server add server-hello extension from early version of
@@ -602,13 +648,21 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
  * TLS only.)  "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
  * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
 #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
-/* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for
- * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */
-#define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L
+/* Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
+ * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
+ * that require it.
+ */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
 /* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
  * and Finished.  This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
  * one RTT. */
-#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000040L
+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000080L
+/* When set, TLS 1.0 and SSLv3, multi-byte, CBC records will be split in two:
+ * the first record will contain a single byte and the second will contain the
+ * rest of the bytes. This effectively randomises the IV and prevents BEAST
+ * attacks. */
+#define SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING 0x00000100L
 
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
  * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -644,12 +698,53 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
 	SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL)
+#endif
+
 void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
 void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
 #define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
 #define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+typedef struct srp_ctx_st
+	{
+	/* param for all the callbacks */
+	void *SRP_cb_arg;
+	/* set client Hello login callback */
+	int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *);
+	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+	int (*SRP_verify_param_callback)(SSL *, void *);
+	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
+	char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback)(SSL *, void *);
+
+	char *login;
+	BIGNUM *N,*g,*s,*B,*A;
+	BIGNUM *a,*b,*v;
+	char *info;
+	int strength;
+
+	unsigned long srp_Mask;
+	} SRP_CTX;
+
+#endif
+
+/* see tls_srp.c */
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
+int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key);
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
+int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key);
 
+#endif
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
 #define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */
@@ -675,7 +770,11 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int con
 typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
 				unsigned int *id_len);
 
-typedef struct ssl_comp_st
+typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+struct ssl_comp_st
 	{
 	int id;
 	const char *name;
@@ -684,7 +783,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_comp_st
 #else
 	char *method;
 #endif
-	} SSL_COMP;
+	};
 
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
 DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
@@ -857,6 +956,28 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 	/* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
 	int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
 	void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	char *psk_identity_hint;
+	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+		unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+		unsigned int max_psk_len);
+	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+#define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
+	unsigned int freelist_max_len;
+	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
+	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	/* Next protocol negotiation information */
@@ -876,24 +997,43 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 				    void *arg);
 	void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
 # endif
-#endif
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	char *psk_identity_hint;
-	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
-		unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-		unsigned int max_psk_len);
-	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
+	/* ALPN information
+	 * (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.) */
+
+	/* For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
+	 * server to select the protocol for the connection.
+	 *   out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
+	 *        name (without the length prefix).
+	 *   outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|.
+	 *   in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
+	 *       wire-format.
+	 *   inlen: the length of |in|. */
+	int (*alpn_select_cb)(SSL *s,
+			      const unsigned char **out,
+			      unsigned char *outlen,
+			      const unsigned char* in,
+			      unsigned int inlen,
+			      void *arg);
+	void *alpn_select_cb_arg;
+
+	/* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+	 * format. */
+	unsigned char* alpn_client_proto_list;
+	unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+
+        /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
+        STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;  
+
+	/* If true, a client will advertise the Channel ID extension and a
+	 * server will echo it. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
+	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
 #endif
+	};
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-#define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
-	unsigned int freelist_max_len;
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
 #endif
-	};
 
 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF			0x0000
 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT			0x0001
@@ -931,6 +1071,10 @@ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
+/* SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
+ * IDs from clients. Returns 1 on success. */
+#define SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(ctx) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
 
 void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess));
 int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
@@ -952,26 +1096,43 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
 					   int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
 						      const unsigned char **out,
 						      unsigned int *outlen,
-						      void *arg), void *arg);
+						      void *arg),
+					   void *arg);
 void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-				      int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
+				      int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+						 unsigned char **out,
 						 unsigned char *outlen,
 						 const unsigned char *in,
-						 unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
+						 unsigned int inlen,
+						 void *arg),
 				      void *arg);
 
 int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
 			  const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
 			  const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
-				    unsigned *len);
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s,
+				    const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len);
 
 #define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED	0
 #define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED	1
 #define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP	2
-
 #endif
 
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
+			    unsigned protos_len);
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
+			unsigned protos_len);
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
+				int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+					   const unsigned char **out,
+					   unsigned char *outlen,
+					   const unsigned char *in,
+					   unsigned int inlen,
+					   void *arg),
+				void *arg);
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+			    unsigned *len);
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 /* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
  * resulting identity/psk */
@@ -1011,6 +1172,8 @@ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
 #define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
 #define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
 struct ssl_st
 	{
 	/* protocol version
@@ -1055,9 +1218,7 @@ struct ssl_st
 
 	int server;	/* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear*/
 
-	int new_session;/* 1 if we are to use a new session.
-	                 * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
-	                 *   (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
+	int new_session;/* Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
 	                 * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
 	                 * cached session or even the previous session unless
 	                 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
@@ -1244,11 +1405,44 @@ struct ssl_st
 #endif
 
 #define session_ctx initial_ctx
+
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;  /* What we'll do */
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;            /* What's been chosen */
+
+	unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat;  /* Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated?
+	                                   0: disabled
+	                                   1: enabled
+	                                   2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests
+	                                 */
+	unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
+	unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;     /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
+
+	/* Copied from the SSL_CTX. For a server, means that we'll accept
+	 * Channel IDs from clients. For a client, means that we'll advertise
+	 * support. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
+	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
+
+	/* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+	 * format. */
+	unsigned char* alpn_client_proto_list;
+	unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
 #else
 #define session_ctx ctx
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+	int renegotiate;/* 1 if we are renegotiating.
+	                 * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
+	                 * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+#endif
 	};
 
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
@@ -1258,6 +1452,7 @@ struct ssl_st
 #include <openssl/tls1.h> /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
 #include <openssl/dtls1.h> /* Datagram TLS */
 #include <openssl/ssl23.h>
+#include <openssl/srtp.h>  /* Support for the use_srtp extension */
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
@@ -1304,7 +1499,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_get_state(a)		SSL_state(a)
 #define SSL_is_init_finished(a)		(SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
 #define SSL_in_init(a)			((SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) && \
-                                  !SSL_cutthrough_complete(a))
+					!SSL_cutthrough_complete(a))
 #define SSL_in_before(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
 #define SSL_in_connect_init(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL_in_accept_init(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
@@ -1476,6 +1671,23 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP	71
 
 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB	72
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB	75
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB		76
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB		77
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG		78
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME		79
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH		80
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD		81
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT				85
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING		86
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS	87
+#endif
+#define SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID			88
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID			89
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID			90
 #endif
 
 #define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT		73
@@ -1486,6 +1698,9 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS			77
 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE			78
 
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS		82
+#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83
+
 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
 #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -1520,8 +1735,31 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
 
+/* SSL_enable_tls_channel_id configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
+ * IDs from clients. Returns 1 on success. */
+#define SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(ctx) \
+	SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
+/* SSL_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID to
+ * compatible servers. private_key must be a P-256 EVP_PKEY*. Returns 1 on
+ * success. */
+#define SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(s, private_key) \
+	SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
+#define SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(ctx, private_key) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
+/* SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server SSL*
+ * and copies up to the first |channel_id_len| bytes into |channel_id|. The
+ * Channel ID consists of the client's P-256 public key as an (x,y) pair where
+ * each is a 32-byte, big-endian field element. Returns 0 if the client didn't
+ * offer a Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise. */
+#define SSL_get_tls_channel_id(ctx, channel_id, channel_id_len) \
+	SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID,channel_id_len,(void*)channel_id)
+
 #define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
+#define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
 BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
@@ -1549,7 +1787,8 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
 int	SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits);
 char *	SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
 const char *	SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-const char *	SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+unsigned long 	SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher);
 
 int	SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
 int	SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
@@ -1619,11 +1858,15 @@ long	SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
 long	SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
 long	SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
 void	SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const SSL *from);
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
 
 SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
 const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
 					unsigned int *len);
 const char *	SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 int	SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
 #endif
@@ -1687,6 +1930,30 @@ int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
 int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
 int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *name);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *password);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+					char *(*cb)(SSL *,void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+					  int (*cb)(SSL *,void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+				      int (*cb)(SSL *,int *,void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+			     BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
+				const char *grp);
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
+char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
 void	SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
 int 	SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
 int 	SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
@@ -1722,6 +1989,15 @@ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */
 
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.1 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.1 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.1 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);		/* TLSv1.2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.2 */
+
+
 const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void);		/* DTLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void);	/* DTLSv1.0 */
 const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void);	/* DTLSv1.0 */
@@ -1730,6 +2006,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
 
 int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
 int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
 int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
 int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
 
@@ -1781,6 +2058,7 @@ void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
 			   void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val));
 void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
 int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state);
 
 void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long v);
 long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
@@ -1881,6 +2159,9 @@ int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
 /* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
 int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg);
 
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -1900,6 +2181,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT				 246
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF			 295
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD			 247
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM			 316
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO			 248
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT				 249
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC					 250
@@ -1908,6 +2190,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT		 253
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD				 254
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT			 297
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT				 305
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN			 255
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT			 288
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE		 256
@@ -1957,6 +2240,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL			 233
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE			 129
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM		 130
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO			 304
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO				 131
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT				 132
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL					 213
@@ -1968,6 +2252,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 135
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS			 289
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY			 136
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID			 317
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 137
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO			 138
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 139
@@ -1975,7 +2260,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE			 141
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE				 142
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET		 283
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO			 304
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO			 306
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD				 143
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE		 144
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE			 145
@@ -1987,6 +2272,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES				 148
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N				 149
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 150
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID			 318
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 151
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 152
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY			 153
@@ -2000,10 +2286,12 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING			 159
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 298
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 277
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT		 307
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK	 215
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK	 216
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 299
 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 278
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT		 308
 #define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD				 160
 #define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST			 161
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP				 221
@@ -2020,6 +2308,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST			 166
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL					 232
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY			 168
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES			 309
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW				 169
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST			 269
 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE		 290
@@ -2042,14 +2331,17 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION			 181
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION			 217
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT			 182
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY			 317
 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY				 183
 #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER			 184
 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE			 185
 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW					 186
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 300
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 302
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT	 310
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 301
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 303
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT	 311
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK					 270
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 281
 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 282
@@ -2058,6 +2350,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT			 188
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW				 189
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP			 190
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT		 312
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW				 225
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT				 191
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST			 271
@@ -2071,6 +2364,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST				 228
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD				 196
 #define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN				 224
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT				 313
 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION		 243
 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION			 197
 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION		 244
@@ -2091,6 +2385,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE			 209
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 274
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC					 210
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL		 314
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT				 315
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 275
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 276
 #define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF					 284
@@ -2130,6 +2426,13 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH			 121
 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE				 122
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE				 123
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH				 347
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH				 348
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH				 349
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH				 350
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH				 351
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE			 352
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST		 353
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE				 124
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH			 125
 #define SSL_R_BAD_STATE					 126
@@ -2137,12 +2440,15 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET				 128
 #define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG			 129
 #define SSL_R_BN_LIB					 130
+#define SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY		 376
 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 131
 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG				 132
 #define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY			 133
 #define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED			 134
 #define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 135
 #define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT			 136
+#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256			 375
+#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID		 371
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH			 137
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE		 138
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR			 139
@@ -2155,6 +2461,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT		 143
 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET			 144
 #define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH				 308
+#define SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG				 379
 #define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED		 145
 #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
 #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
@@ -2168,14 +2475,18 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE	 322
 #define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE	 323
 #define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER		 310
+#define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST	 354
 #define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 150
 #define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY		 282
 #define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST		 151
+#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED		 377
+#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED			 378
 #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE			 152
 #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE			 153
 #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS			 154
-#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS		 346
-#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION		 347
+#define SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS		 372
+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS		 355
+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION		 356
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
@@ -2183,7 +2494,9 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 341
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE				 374
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE				 278
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME			 357
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE			 328
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH		 325
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST				 279
@@ -2213,11 +2526,13 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE			 168
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT		 169
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT			 170
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM				 358
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY			 171
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY			 311
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY			 172
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY			 173
 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE			 174
+#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS			 346
 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET			 175
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED			 176
 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED			 177
@@ -2234,6 +2549,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED			 187
 #define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER		 330
 #define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED			 188
+#define SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT				 373
 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY				 189
 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED			 190
 #define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE			 191
@@ -2241,6 +2557,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION				 339
 #define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST			 324
 #define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER				 193
+#define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES				 359
 #define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK			 194
 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX				 195
 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED			 196
@@ -2285,7 +2602,12 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED		 277
 #define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED		 2000
 #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ				 219
+#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR		 360
 #define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE	 220
+#define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC				 361
+#define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES		 362
+#define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG	 363
+#define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE		 364
 #define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE		 221
 #define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG		 299
 #define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT		 321
@@ -2330,6 +2652,9 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME			 1112
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION		 1110
 #define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER	 232
+#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT		 365
+#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING			 366
+#define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL		 367
 #define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST		 157
 #define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
 #define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG	 234
@@ -2351,6 +2676,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE			 247
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED			 248
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE			 249
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST				 368
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE			 250
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE				 251
 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL				 252
@@ -2365,12 +2691,14 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL			 258
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION			 259
 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE			 329
+#define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED			 369
 #define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET				 260
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED			 261
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE			 262
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS			 263
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH			 264
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE			 265
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE			 370
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION				 266
 #define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER			 267
 #define SSL_R_X509_LIB					 268
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
index 99a52ea0..eb25dcb0 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #define  CERT		char
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
 typedef struct ssl2_state_st
 	{
 	int three_byte_header;
@@ -219,6 +221,8 @@ typedef struct ssl2_state_st
 		} tmp;
 	} SSL2_STATE;
 
+#endif
+
 /* SSLv2 */
 /* client */
 #define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A		(0x10|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
index f9268c57..9086db42 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -280,9 +280,6 @@ extern "C" {
 
 #define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA			(16384)
 
-/* Default buffer length used for writen records.  Thus a generated record
- * will contain plaintext no larger than this value. */
-#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH	2048
 /* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
 #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH		16384
 /* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
@@ -314,13 +311,6 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE		\
 		(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 
-/* Extra space for empty fragment, headers, MAC, and padding. */
-#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD  256
-#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE     4096 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
-#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE
-#error "Insufficient space allocated for write buffers."
-#endif
-
 #define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST	"\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
 #define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST	"\x53\x52\x56\x52"
 
@@ -332,6 +322,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_RT_ALERT			21
 #define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE		22
 #define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA	23
+#define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT		24
 
 #define SSL3_AL_WARNING			1
 #define SSL3_AL_FATAL			2
@@ -349,6 +340,11 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN	46
 #define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER	47	/* fatal */
 
+#define TLS1_HB_REQUEST		1
+#define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE	2
+	
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
 typedef struct ssl3_record_st
 	{
 /*r */	int type;               /* type of record */
@@ -370,6 +366,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 	int left;               /* how many bytes left */
 	} SSL3_BUFFER;
 
+#endif
+
 #define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN			1
 #define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN			2
 #define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH			3
@@ -389,6 +387,20 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER			0x0004
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
+#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
+ 
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE		0x0040
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
 
 typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	{
@@ -406,8 +418,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
 
 	/* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
-	int need_empty_fragments;
-	int empty_fragment_done;
+	int need_record_splitting;
+	int record_split_done;
 
 	/* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
 	int init_extra;
@@ -465,12 +477,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	void *server_opaque_prf_input;
 	size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-	   our peer. */
-	int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-
 	struct	{
 		/* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
 		unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
@@ -480,7 +486,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 		int finish_md_len;
 		unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
 		int peer_finish_md_len;
-		
+
 		unsigned long message_size;
 		int message_type;
 
@@ -528,14 +534,64 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
         unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
         int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
+	int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+	 * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
+	 * on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
+	char is_probably_safari;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+	/* In a client, this means that the server supported Channel ID and that
+	 * a Channel ID was sent. In a server it means that we echoed support
+	 * for Channel IDs and that tlsext_channel_id will be valid after the
+	 * handshake. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+	/* For a server:
+	 *     If |tlsext_channel_id_valid| is true, then this contains the
+	 *     verified Channel ID from the client: a P256 point, (x,y), where
+	 *     each are big-endian values. */
+	unsigned char tlsext_channel_id[64];
+
+	/* ALPN information
+	 * (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.) */
+
+	/* In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+	 * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the
+	 * protocol that the server selected once the ServerHello has been
+	 * processed. */
+	unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+	unsigned alpn_selected_len;
+
+	/* These point to the digest function to use for signatures made with
+	 * each type of public key. A NULL value indicates that the default
+	 * digest should be used, which is SHA1 as of TLS 1.2.
+	 *
+	 * (These should be in the tmp member, but we have to put them here to
+	 * ensure binary compatibility with earlier OpenSSL 1.0.* releases.) */
+	const EVP_MD *digest_rsa;
+	const EVP_MD *digest_dsa;
+	const EVP_MD *digest_ecdsa;
 	} SSL3_STATE;
 
+#endif
 
 /* SSLv3 */
 /*client */
 /* extra state */
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH		(0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE	(0x101|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK			(0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK			(0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#endif	
 /* write to server */
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A		(0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B		(0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
@@ -567,6 +623,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #endif
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 /* read from server */
@@ -582,6 +640,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 /* server */
 /* extra state */
 #define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH		(0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK			(0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK			(0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#endif	
 /* read from client */
 /* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A		(0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
@@ -612,10 +674,13 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT	(0x1BF|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #endif
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x220|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x221|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 /* write to client */
@@ -643,6 +708,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO			67
 #endif
+#define SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS		203
 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
 
 
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
index 0967b2df..9c34d197 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))
+	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
+#endif
 #endif  
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
@@ -85,6 +88,13 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
+	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
+	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
+	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
+#endif
+
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
 	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index d7f4c608..38540be1 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 	} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
 
 int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
@@ -130,6 +133,9 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 	unsigned char cbuf;
 	int v11=0;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	int v12=0;
+#endif
 	long l;
 	SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
 	M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
@@ -267,6 +273,14 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 		a.psk_identity.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (in->srp_username)
+		{
+		a.srp_username.length=strlen(in->srp_username);
+		a.srp_username.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+		a.srp_username.data=(unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 
 	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version),		i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
 	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version),	i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
@@ -307,6 +321,10 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 	if (in->psk_identity)
         	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (in->srp_username)
+        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12,v12);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 
 	M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
 
@@ -351,6 +369,10 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 	if (in->compress_meth)
         	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11,v11);
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (in->srp_username)
+		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12,v12);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 	M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
 	}
 
@@ -549,6 +571,19 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 		}
 	else
 		ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+
+	os.length=0;
+	os.data=NULL;
+	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8);
+	if (os.data)
+		{
+		ret->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+		os.data = NULL;
+		os.length = 0;
+		}
+	else
+		ret->psk_identity=NULL;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -588,5 +623,20 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 		}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	os.length=0;
+	os.data=NULL;
+	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12);
+	if (os.data)
+		{
+		ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+		os.data = NULL;
+		os.length = 0;
+		}
+	else
+		ret->srp_username=NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
 	M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
 	}
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 27256eea..bc4150b0 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
 
 	ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
 	ret->references=1;
-
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index e523a8f2..e8794d4b 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -162,11 +162,13 @@
 #define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX	9
 #define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX	10
 #define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX    	11
-#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX		12
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX	12
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX	13
+#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX		14
 
 
 static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]={
-	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,
+	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
 	};
 
 #define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX	0
@@ -179,28 +181,32 @@ static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods=NULL;
 #define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX	1
 #define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
 #define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
+#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
+#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
 /*Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be 
  * defined in the
  * ssl_locl.h */
 #define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX	SSL_MAX_DIGEST 
 static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
+	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
 	};
 /* PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because
  * implementation is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if
  * corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is found 
  */
 static int  ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,NID_undef
+	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,NID_undef,
+	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC
 	};
 
 static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	0,0,0,0
+	0,0,0,0,0,0
 	};
 
 static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5,SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94,0
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384
 	};
 
 #define CIPHER_ADD	1
@@ -247,6 +253,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_ECDH,0,    SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
         {0,SSL_TXT_kPSK,0,    SSL_kPSK,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kSRP,0,    SSL_kSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_kGOST,0, SSL_kGOST,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* server authentication aliases */
@@ -273,6 +280,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_ADH,0,     SSL_kEDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_AECDH,0,   SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
         {0,SSL_TXT_PSK,0,     SSL_kPSK,SSL_aPSK,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SRP,0,     SSL_kSRP,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
 
 	/* symmetric encryption aliases */
@@ -283,9 +291,10 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_IDEA,0,    0,0,SSL_IDEA,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SEED,0,    0,0,SSL_SEED,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_eNULL,0,   0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES128,0,  0,0,SSL_AES128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES256,0,  0,0,SSL_AES256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES,0,     0,0,SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES128,0,  0,0,SSL_AES128|SSL_AES128GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES256,0,  0,0,SSL_AES256|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES,0,     0,0,SSL_AES,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES_GCM,0, 0,0,SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA   ,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
@@ -296,11 +305,14 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA,0,     0,0,0,SSL_SHA1,  0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST94,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST94,  0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST89MAC,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA256,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA256,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA384,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA384,  0,0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* protocol version aliases */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV2,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV2, 0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV3,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV3, 0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1, 0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1_2, 0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* export flag */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
@@ -379,6 +391,11 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
 	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX]=
 	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
 
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm);
+
 	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
 		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
 	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
@@ -404,6 +421,14 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
 			ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=32;
 		}		
 
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]);
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]);
 	}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 
@@ -446,6 +471,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
 						sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
 						}
 					}
+					sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
 				}
 			MemCheck_on();
 			}
@@ -525,6 +551,12 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 	case SSL_SEED:
 		i=SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
 		break;
+	case SSL_AES128GCM:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256GCM:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX;
+		break;
 	default:
 		i= -1;
 		break;
@@ -548,6 +580,12 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 	case SSL_SHA1:
 		i=SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
 		break;
+	case SSL_SHA256:
+		i=SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA384:
+		i=SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX;
+		break;
 	case SSL_GOST94:
 		i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
 		break;
@@ -563,17 +601,45 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		*md=NULL; 
 		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
 		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0;
-
+		if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+			mac_pkey_type = NULL;
 	}
 	else
 	{
 		*md=ssl_digest_methods[i];
 		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
 		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
-	}	
+	}
+
+	if ((*enc != NULL) &&
+	    (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) &&
+	    (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
+		{
+		const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
+		if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
+		    s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+			return 1;
 
-	if ((*enc != NULL) && (*md != NULL) && (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			return 1;
+#endif
+
+		if	(c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
 		return(1);
+		}
 	else
 		return(0);
 	}
@@ -584,9 +650,11 @@ int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md)
 		{
 		return 0;
 		}
-	if (ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx]==0) return 0;
 	*mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
-	*md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+	if (*mask)
+		*md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+	else
+		*md = NULL;
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -661,6 +729,9 @@ static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, un
 	*mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
 	*auth |= SSL_aPSK;
 #endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	*mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
+#endif
 	/* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
 	 * do not present, disable  appropriate auth and key exchange */
 	if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
@@ -686,6 +757,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, un
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA:0;
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128:0;
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM:0;
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128:0;
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256:0;
 	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:0;
@@ -693,6 +766,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, un
 
 	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 :0;
 	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384:0;
 	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94:0;
 	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]==NID_undef)? SSL_GOST89MAC:0;
 
@@ -723,6 +798,9 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 		c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
 		/* drop those that use any of that is not available */
 		if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		    (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) &&
+#endif
 		    !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
 		    !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
 		    !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
@@ -1073,9 +1151,9 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 			while (	((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
 				((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
 				((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
-				 (ch == '-'))
+				 (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #else
-			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-'))
+			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
 #endif
 				 {
 				 ch = *(++l);
@@ -1422,7 +1500,11 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 	 */
 	for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next)
 		{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (curr->active && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
+#else
 		if (curr->active)
+#endif
 			{
 			sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
@@ -1479,6 +1561,8 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 		ver="SSLv2";
 	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
 		ver="SSLv3";
+	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2)
+		ver="TLSv1.2";
 	else
 		ver="unknown";
 
@@ -1511,6 +1595,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_kPSK:
 		kx="PSK";
 		break;
+	case SSL_kSRP:
+		kx="SRP";
+		break;
 	default:
 		kx="unknown";
 		}
@@ -1573,6 +1660,12 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_AES256:
 		enc="AES(256)";
 		break;
+	case SSL_AES128GCM:
+		enc="AESGCM(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256GCM:
+		enc="AESGCM(256)";
+		break;
 	case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
 		enc="Camellia(128)";
 		break;
@@ -1595,6 +1688,15 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_SHA1:
 		mac="SHA1";
 		break;
+	case SSL_SHA256:
+		mac="SHA256";
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA384:
+		mac="SHA384";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AEAD:
+		mac="AEAD";
+		break;
 	default:
 		mac="unknown";
 		break;
@@ -1652,6 +1754,11 @@ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+	{
+	return c->id;
+	}
+
 /* return string version of key exchange algorithm */
 const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher)
 	{
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 8bff5905..c40c7187 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* ssl/ssl_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT),	"DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF),	"DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD),	"DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM),	"DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO),	"DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT),	"DTLS1_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC),	"DTLS1_ENC"},
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT),	"DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD),	"DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT),	"DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT),	"DTLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN),	"DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT),	"DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),	"DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
@@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL),	"SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),	"SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),	"SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT),	"SSL3_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL),	"SSL3_CTRL"},
@@ -148,6 +151,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
@@ -167,6 +171,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES),	"SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N),	"SSL3_READ_N"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
@@ -180,10 +185,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING),	"SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),	"SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),	"SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD),	"SSL_BAD_METHOD"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP),	"SSL_CERT_DUP"},
@@ -200,6 +207,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL),	"SSL_ctrl"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY),	"SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES),	"SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW),	"SSL_CTX_new"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE),	"SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
@@ -222,14 +230,17 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER),	"SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE),	"SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW),	"SSL_new"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK),	"SSL_peek"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
@@ -238,6 +249,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW),	"SSL_SESSION_new"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP),	"SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW),	"SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT),	"SSL_SET_CERT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_set_cipher_list"},
@@ -251,6 +263,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST),	"SSL_set_trust"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD),	"SSL_set_wfd"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN),	"SSL_shutdown"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT),	"SSL_SRP_CTX_init"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION"},
@@ -270,6 +283,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),	"TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC),	"TLS1_ENC"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL),	"TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT),	"SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF),	"tls1_prf"},
@@ -312,6 +327,13 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH),"bad rsa modulus length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE)     ,"bad rsa signature"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE)         ,"bad signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp a length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp b length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp g length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp n length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp s length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE)    ,"bad srtp mki value"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE)      ,"bad ssl filetype"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),"bad ssl session id length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_STATE)             ,"bad state"},
@@ -319,12 +341,15 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET)           ,"bio not set"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),"block cipher pad is wrong"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB)                ,"bn lib"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY),"cannot serialize public key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"ca dn length mismatch"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG)        ,"ca dn too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY)    ,"ccs received early"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),"certificate verify failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH)  ,"cert length mismatch"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT),"challenge is different"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256)   ,"channel id not p256"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID),"Channel ID signature invalid"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),"cipher code wrong length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),"cipher or hash unavailable"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"},
@@ -337,6 +362,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"connection id is different"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET),"connection type not set"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH)       ,"cookie mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG)         ,"d2i ecdsa sig"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),"data between ccs and finished"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
@@ -350,12 +376,16 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have rsa signature"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have sha1 signature"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),"ecgroup too large for cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"empty srtp protection profile list"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"encrypted length too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),"error generating tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),"error in received cipher list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED),"evp digestsignfinal failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED),"evp digestsigninit failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got Channel ID before a ccs"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
@@ -365,7 +395,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"invalid compression algorithm"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE)       ,"invalid message"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE)       ,"invalid purpose"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME)  ,"invalid srp username"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),"invalid ticket keys length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST)         ,"invalid trust"},
@@ -395,11 +427,13 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE),"missing rsa certificate"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),"missing rsa encrypting cert"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing rsa signing cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM)     ,"can't find SRP server param"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY)    ,"missing tmp dh key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY)  ,"missing tmp ecdh key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY)   ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY)  ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
@@ -416,6 +450,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED),"no compression specified"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED)   ,"no method specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT)       ,"no p256 support"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY)         ,"no privatekey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"},
@@ -423,6 +458,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION)      ,"no renegotiation"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST)    ,"digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER)      ,"no shared cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES)      ,"no srtp profiles"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK)    ,"no verify callback"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX)          ,"null ssl ctx"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
@@ -467,7 +503,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED),"session may not be created"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ)            ,"short read"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),"signature algorithms error"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC)            ,"error with the srp params"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),"srtp could not allocate profiles"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),"srtp protection profile list too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),"srtp unknown protection profile"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl2 connection id too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT),"ssl3 ext invalid ecpointformat"},
@@ -512,6 +553,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),"tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),"tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbearts"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING) ,"heartbeat request already pending"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),"tls illegal exporter label"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),"tls peer did not respond with certificate list"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"},
@@ -533,6 +577,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"unknown certificate type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED),"unknown cipher returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE)   ,"unknown cipher type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST)        ,"unknown digest"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),"unknown key exchange type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE)     ,"unknown pkey type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)      ,"unknown protocol"},
@@ -547,12 +592,14 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL)  ,"unsupported protocol"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION),"unsupported ssl version"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),"unsupported status type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED),"use srtp not negotiated"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET)     ,"write bio not set"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED) ,"wrong cipher returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE)    ,"wrong message type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS),"wrong number of key bits"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE)  ,"wrong signature size"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE)  ,"wrong signature type"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION)     ,"wrong ssl version"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)  ,"wrong version number"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB)              ,"x509 lib"},
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index b169ba93..74523862 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -176,7 +176,10 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
 	0,	/* client_finished_label_len */
 	NULL,	/* server_finished_label */
 	0,	/* server_finished_label_len */
-	(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
+	(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+		 size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+		 int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
 	};
 
 int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
@@ -202,9 +205,9 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
        * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
 	/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
 	 * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
-	if (s->new_session) return(1);
+	if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
 #else
-	if (s->new_session)
+	if (s->renegotiate)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return 0;
@@ -357,6 +360,17 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
 # endif
+
+	if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		{
+		s->alpn_client_proto_list =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+		if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
+		       s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+		s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+		}
 #endif
 
 	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
@@ -576,6 +590,10 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 		sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
 	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
 #endif
 
 	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
@@ -595,6 +613,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        if (s->srtp_profiles)
+            sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
 	OPENSSL_free(s);
 	}
 
@@ -1017,10 +1040,21 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
 
 int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
 	{
-	if (s->new_session == 0)
-		{
-		s->new_session=1;
-		}
+	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+		s->renegotiate=1;
+
+	s->new_session=1;
+
+	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+	}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+		s->renegotiate=1;
+
+	s->new_session=0;
+
 	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
 	}
 
@@ -1028,7 +1062,7 @@ int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
 	{
 	/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
 	 * false again once a handshake has finished */
-	return (s->new_session != 0);
+	return (s->renegotiate != 0);
 	}
 
 long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
@@ -1063,6 +1097,11 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+			return 0;
+#endif
+
 		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
@@ -1390,6 +1429,10 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
 		{
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+		/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
+		if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
+			(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+			continue;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
 		    nokrb5)
@@ -1407,7 +1450,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 	/* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
 	 * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
 	 */
-	if (p != q && !s->new_session)
+	if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
 		{
 		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
 			{
@@ -1454,7 +1497,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
 			{
 			/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
-			if (s->new_session)
+			if (s->renegotiate)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
 				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
@@ -1627,10 +1670,93 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned
 	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
 	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
 	}
-
 # endif
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success. */
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
+			    unsigned protos_len)
+	{
+	if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+	if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		return 1;
+	memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success. */
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
+			unsigned protos_len)
+	{
+	if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+	if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+		return 1;
+	memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called
+ * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the
+ * client's list of offered protocols. */
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
+				int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+					   const unsigned char **out,
+					   unsigned char *outlen,
+					   const unsigned char *in,
+					   unsigned int inlen,
+					   void *arg),
+				void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+	ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
+ * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not
+ * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with
+ * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+			    unsigned *len)
+	{
+	*data = NULL;
+	if (ssl->s3)
+		*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
+	if (*data == NULL)
+		*len = 0;
+	else
+		*len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+	}
 #endif
 
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+	int use_context)
+	{
+	if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
+		return -1;
+
+	return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
+							   llen, p, plen,
+							   use_context);
+	}
+
 static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
 	{
 	unsigned long l;
@@ -1674,6 +1800,14 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 		return(NULL);
 		}
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))	
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+
 	if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
@@ -1777,7 +1911,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
 
 	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
-	ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+	/* No compression for DTLS */
+	if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
 	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
 
@@ -1803,6 +1939,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 	ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
 	ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
 	ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
 	ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
@@ -1931,10 +2070,18 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 	a->comp_methods = NULL;
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        if (a->srtp_profiles)
+                sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
 		OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	if (a->client_cert_engine)
 		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
@@ -1947,6 +2094,13 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+	if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
+#endif
+
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	}
 
@@ -2188,12 +2342,13 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	int keysize = 0;
 	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+	const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
 
 	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
@@ -2223,7 +2378,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
 			return 0;
 			}
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
+		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
 			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
@@ -2232,7 +2387,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 				return 0;
 				}
 			}
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be RSA */
 
@@ -2259,7 +2414,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 #endif
 
 /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
@@ -2314,15 +2469,23 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
 		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
 	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
 		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
-	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
 
-	return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+	return c->pkeys + i;
+	}
+
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+	cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+	if (!cpk)
+		return NULL;
+	return cpk->x509;
 	}
 
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
 	{
 	unsigned long alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
@@ -2330,26 +2493,37 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 	alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
 	c=s->cert;
 
+	/* SHA1 is the default for all signature algorithms up to TLS 1.2,
+	 * except RSA which is handled specially in s3_srvr.c */
+	if (pmd)
+		*pmd = EVP_sha1();
+
 	if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
-		(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
-		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+	    (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+		{
+		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_dsa)
+			*pmd = s->s3->digest_dsa;
+		return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey;
+		}
 	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
 		{
+		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_rsa)
+			*pmd = s->s3->digest_rsa;
 		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
-			return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
-		else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
-			return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
-		else
-			return(NULL);
+			return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey;
+		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+			return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
 		}
 	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
 	         (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
-		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
-	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
 		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return(NULL);
+		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_ecdsa)
+			*pmd = s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
+		return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey;
 		}
+
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+	return(NULL);
 	}
 
 void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
@@ -2574,7 +2748,11 @@ SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
 
 static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
 	{
-	if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return("TLSv1.2");
+	else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return("TLSv1.1");
+	else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return("TLSv1");
 	else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return("SSLv3");
@@ -2602,12 +2780,8 @@ const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
 		{
 	case SSL2_VERSION:
 		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
-	case SSL3_VERSION:
-	case TLS1_VERSION:
-	case DTLS1_VERSION:
-		return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
 	default:
-		return "UNKNOWN";
+		return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2695,6 +2869,7 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
 	ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
 	ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
 	ret->server = s->server;
+	ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
 	ret->new_session = s->new_session;
 	ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
 	ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
@@ -2960,6 +3135,11 @@ int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
 	return(ssl->state);
 	}
 
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
+	{
+	ssl->state = state;
+	}
+
 void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
 	{
 	ssl->verify_result=arg;
@@ -3231,6 +3411,16 @@ void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
 	*hash=NULL;
 }
 
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
+	{
+	s->debug = debug;
+	}
+
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
+	{
+	return s->hit;
+	}
+
 #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
 #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
 #endif
@@ -3239,4 +3429,3 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
 				    ssl_cipher_id);
-
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 25f8e16c..f79ab009 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
 # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
 #endif
 
-#define PKCS1_CHECK
+#undef PKCS1_CHECK
 
 #define c2l(c,l)	(l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))     , \
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
@@ -215,6 +215,15 @@
 			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
 			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
 
+#define l2n8(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
+
 #define n2l6(c,l)	(l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
 			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
 			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
@@ -289,6 +298,7 @@
 #define SSL_kEECDH		0x00000080L /* ephemeral ECDH */
 #define SSL_kPSK		0x00000100L /* PSK */
 #define SSL_kGOST       0x00000200L /* GOST key exchange */
+#define SSL_kSRP        0x00000400L /* SRP */
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
 #define SSL_aRSA		0x00000001L /* RSA auth */
@@ -316,21 +326,29 @@
 #define SSL_CAMELLIA256		0x00000200L
 #define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT	0x00000400L
 #define SSL_SEED		0x00000800L
+#define SSL_AES128GCM		0x00001000L
+#define SSL_AES256GCM		0x00002000L
 
-#define SSL_AES        		(SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256)
+#define SSL_AES        		(SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM)
 #define SSL_CAMELLIA		(SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
 
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
+
 #define SSL_MD5			0x00000001L
 #define SSL_SHA1		0x00000002L
 #define SSL_GOST94      0x00000004L
 #define SSL_GOST89MAC   0x00000008L
+#define SSL_SHA256		0x00000010L
+#define SSL_SHA384		0x00000020L
+/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
+#define SSL_AEAD		0x00000040L
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
 #define SSL_SSLV2		0x00000001L
 #define SSL_SSLV3		0x00000002L
 #define SSL_TLSV1		SSL_SSLV3	/* for now */
+#define SSL_TLSV1_2		0x00000004L
 
 
 /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
@@ -338,15 +356,21 @@
 #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10
 #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20
 #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100
 #define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA)
 
 /* When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX
  * make sure to update this constant too */
-#define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 4
+#define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6
+
+#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK	(0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
 
-#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8
+#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10
 #define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
 #define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+#define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+#define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
 #define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
 #define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1)
 
@@ -354,6 +378,7 @@
  * (currently this also goes into algorithm2) */
 #define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
 
+#define TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE 128
 
 
 /*
@@ -555,6 +580,10 @@ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method
 	const char *server_finished_label;
 	int server_finished_label_len;
 	int (*alert_value)(int);
+	int (*export_keying_material)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
+				      const char *, size_t,
+				      const unsigned char *, size_t,
+				      int use_context);
 	} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -592,11 +621,14 @@ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
 extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
 extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
 
-#define IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+#define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
+				s_get_meth) \
 const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 	{ \
 	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-		TLS1_VERSION, \
+		version, \
 		tls1_new, \
 		tls1_clear, \
 		tls1_free, \
@@ -670,7 +702,7 @@ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 	{ \
 	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-	TLS1_VERSION, \
+	TLS1_2_VERSION, \
 	tls1_new, \
 	tls1_clear, \
 	tls1_free, \
@@ -753,7 +785,7 @@ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 		ssl3_read, \
 		ssl3_peek, \
 		ssl3_write, \
-		ssl3_shutdown, \
+		dtls1_shutdown, \
 		ssl3_renegotiate, \
 		ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
 		dtls1_get_message, \
@@ -809,13 +841,15 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
 int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
 int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
 int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *);
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *,const SSL_CIPHER *);
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
 int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
 void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
 
 int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
 int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
@@ -944,6 +978,7 @@ void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
 long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
 struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft);
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
 const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
@@ -951,6 +986,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 
 /* some client-only functions */
 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -970,6 +1006,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s);
 # endif
 #endif
 
@@ -992,6 +1029,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
 #endif
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s);
 
 int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1019,11 +1057,10 @@ int	dtls1_connect(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
 long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
 
 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-	unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
 
@@ -1039,12 +1076,15 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
 int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
 	unsigned char *p, int len);
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	const char *label, size_t llen,
+	const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context);
 int tls1_alert_code(int code);
 int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
 int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs);
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
 #endif
 
 SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
@@ -1061,9 +1101,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d,
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
 #define tlsext_tick_md	EVP_sha1
 #else
@@ -1071,7 +1119,15 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #endif
 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 				const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret);
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+				const EVP_MD *md);
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
+
+int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, SSL *s);
 #endif
+
 EVP_MD_CTX* ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) ;
 void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
 int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
@@ -1082,4 +1138,42 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
 					int maxlen);
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
 					  int *al);
+long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
+void tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+
+int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
+int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
+
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
+		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size);
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
+			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+			    unsigned block_size,
+			    unsigned mac_size);
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+	unsigned char* md_out,
+	size_t* md_out_size,
+	const unsigned char header[13],
+	const unsigned char *data,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+	unsigned mac_secret_length,
+	char is_sslv3);
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index c43f3e2a..e98e862d 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -714,6 +714,8 @@ int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
 		return(0);
 		}
+	if (ssl->cert->key->cert_chain != NULL)
+		sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->cert->key->cert_chain, X509_free);
 	ssl->cert->key->cert_chain = cert_chain;
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -746,7 +748,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 
 	ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
 
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+	in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
 	if (in == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
@@ -759,14 +761,16 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 		goto end;
 		}
 
-	x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+	x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+				ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
 	if (x == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
 		goto end;
 		}
 
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+	ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+
 	if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
 		ret = 0;  /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
 	if (ret)
@@ -778,13 +782,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
 		int r;
 		unsigned long err;
 		
-		if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) 
+		if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
 			{
 			sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
 			ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
 			}
 
-		while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
+		while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
+					ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+					ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
 			!= NULL)
 			{
 			r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 93954e48..920b763e 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
 	ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
 	ss->psk_identity=NULL;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	ss->srp_username=NULL;
+#endif
 	return(ss);
 	}
 
@@ -228,6 +231,11 @@ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
 	return s->session_id;
 	}
 
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+	{
+	return s->compress_meth;
+	}
+
 /* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
  * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
  * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
@@ -307,6 +315,16 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
 			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
 			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
 			}
+		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+			{
+			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+			}
+		else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+			{
+			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+			}
 		else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
 			ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
@@ -430,6 +448,25 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
 	return(1);
 	}
 
+/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ *       extension, if any.
+ *   len: the length of the session ID.
+ *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: error
+ *    0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ *     existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ *   - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ *     if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ */
 int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 			const unsigned char *limit)
 	{
@@ -437,27 +474,39 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 
 	SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL;
 	int fatal = 0;
+	int try_session_cache = 1;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	int r;
 #endif
 
 	if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
 		goto err;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		try_session_cache = 0;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
-	if (r == -1)
+	r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+	switch (r)
 		{
+	case -1: /* Error during processing */
 		fatal = 1;
 		goto err;
+	case 0: /* No ticket found */
+	case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
+		break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+	case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+	case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+		try_session_cache = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		abort();
 		}
-	else if (r == 0 || (!ret && !len))
-		goto err;
-	else if (!ret && !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
-#else
-	if (len == 0)
-		goto err;
-	if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
 #endif
+
+	if (try_session_cache &&
+	    ret == NULL &&
+	    !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
 		{
 		SSL_SESSION data;
 		data.ssl_version=s->version;
@@ -468,20 +517,22 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 		ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data);
 		if (ret != NULL)
-		    /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
-		    CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+			{
+			/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+			CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+			}
 		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+		if (ret == NULL)
+			s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
 		}
 
-	if (ret == NULL)
+	if (try_session_cache &&
+	    ret == NULL &&
+	    s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL)
 		{
 		int copy=1;
 	
-		s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
-		ret=NULL;
-		if (s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
-		    && (ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy))
-		       != NULL)
+		if ((ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy)))
 			{
 			s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
 
@@ -500,23 +551,18 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 				 * things are very strange */
 				SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
 			}
-		if (ret == NULL)
-			goto err;
 		}
 
-	/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
 
 	if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
 	    || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
 		{
-		/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
+		/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't
 		 * want to use it in this context. */
-
-#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
-       * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
-
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-#endif
 		goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
 		}
 	
@@ -553,39 +599,38 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 			goto err;
 		}
 
-
-#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
-
-	/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
-	 * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
-	 * be in trouble.  So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
-	 * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
-	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-#endif
-
 	if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
 		{
 		s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
-		/* remove it from the cache */
-		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
+		if (try_session_cache)
+			{
+			/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
+			}
 		goto err;
 		}
 
 	s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
 
-	/* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
-	/* again, just leave the session 
-	 * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
-	 * then decremented the reference count :-) */
 	if (s->session != NULL)
 		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
 	s->session=ret;
 	s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
-	return(1);
+	return 1;
 
  err:
 	if (ret != NULL)
+		{
 		SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if (!try_session_cache)
+			{
+			/* The session was from a ticket, so we should
+			 * issue a ticket for the new session */
+			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+			}
+#endif
+		}
 	if (fatal)
 		return -1;
 	else
@@ -736,6 +781,10 @@ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
 	if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
 		OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
+#endif
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
 	OPENSSL_free(ss);
 	}
@@ -760,10 +809,6 @@ int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
 			{
 			if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
 				return(0);
-			if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
-				session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
-			else
-				session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
@@ -831,6 +876,25 @@ long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
 	return(t);
 	}
 
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
+	{
+	return s->peer;
+	}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+	{
+	if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	s->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+	memcpy(s->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
 long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
 	{
 	long l;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
index 3122440e..6479d52c 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
 		s="SSLv2";
 	else if (x->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION)
 		s="SSLv3";
+	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		s="TLSv1.2";
+	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		s="TLSv1.1";
 	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION)
 		s="TLSv1";
 	else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -187,6 +191,10 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
 	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    PSK identity hint: ") <= 0) goto err;
 	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0) goto err;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    SRP username: ") <= 0) goto err;
+	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0) goto err;
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)
 		{
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
index f6a2c79d..28fa223f 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+#include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
 #define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED	1 /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly
@@ -246,6 +249,49 @@ static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned
 	unsigned int max_psk_len);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* SRP client */
+/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_client_arg_st
+	{
+	char *srppassin;
+	char *srplogin;
+	} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
+
+#define PWD_STRLEN 1024
+
+static char * MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+	{
+	SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
+	return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
+	}
+
+/* SRP server */
+/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_server_arg_st
+	{
+	char *expected_user;
+	char *pass;
+	} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+	{
+	SRP_SERVER_ARG * p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *) arg;
+
+	if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
+		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+		}
+	if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s,p->expected_user,p->pass,"1024")<0)
+		{
+		*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+		}
+	return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+	}
+#endif
+
 static BIO *bio_err=NULL;
 static BIO *bio_stdout=NULL;
 
@@ -268,6 +314,9 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	{
 	fprintf(stderr,"usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
 	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	fprintf(stderr,"-F             - run test in FIPS mode\n");
+#endif
 	fprintf(stderr," -server_auth  - check server certificate\n");
 	fprintf(stderr," -client_auth  - do client authentication\n");
 	fprintf(stderr," -proxy        - allow proxy certificates\n");
@@ -289,6 +338,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	fprintf(stderr," -psk arg      - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	fprintf(stderr," -srpuser user  - SRP username to use\n");
+	fprintf(stderr," -srppass arg   - password for 'user'\n");
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 	fprintf(stderr," -ssl2         - use SSLv2\n");
 #endif
@@ -316,8 +369,6 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	               "                 (default is sect163r2).\n");
 #endif
 	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
 	fprintf(stderr," -cutthrough      - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
 	}
 
@@ -447,10 +498,6 @@ int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
 	return arg->ret;
 	}
 #endif
-	int ssl_mode = 0;
-	int c_small_records=0;
-	int s_small_records=0;
-	int cutthrough = 0;
 
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
@@ -483,6 +530,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	/* client */
+	SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = {NULL,NULL};
+	/* server */
+	SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = {NULL,NULL};
+#endif
 	int no_dhe = 0;
 	int no_ecdhe = 0;
 	int no_psk = 0;
@@ -491,9 +544,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	int comp = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 	COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
-#endif
 	STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
 	int test_cipherlist = 0;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	int fips_mode=0;
+#endif
+	int cutthrough = 0;
 
 	verbose = 0;
 	debug = 0;
@@ -525,7 +582,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	while (argc >= 1)
 		{
-		if	(strcmp(*argv,"-server_auth") == 0)
+		if(!strcmp(*argv,"-F"))
+			{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+			fips_mode=1;
+#else
+			fprintf(stderr,"not compiled with FIPS support, so exitting without running.\n");
+			EXIT(0);
+#endif
+			}
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-server_auth") == 0)
 			server_auth=1;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-client_auth") == 0)
 			client_auth=1;
@@ -579,6 +645,20 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			no_psk=1;
 #endif
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-srpuser") == 0)
+			{
+			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+			srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin= *(++argv);
+			tls1=1;
+			}
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-srppass") == 0)
+			{
+			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+			srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin= *(++argv);
+			tls1=1;
+			}
+#endif
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
 			ssl2=1;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
@@ -687,14 +767,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			{
 			test_cipherlist = 1;
 			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_small_records") == 0)
-			{
-			c_small_records = 1;
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_small_records") == 0)
-			{
-			s_small_records = 1;
-			}
 		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cutthrough") == 0)
 			{
 			cutthrough = 1;
@@ -733,6 +805,20 @@ bad:
 		EXIT(1);
 		}
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if(fips_mode)
+		{
+		if(!FIPS_mode_set(1))
+			{
+			ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+			ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE));
+			EXIT(1);
+			}
+		else
+			fprintf(stderr,"*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n");
+		}
+#endif
+
 	if (print_time)
 		{
 		if (!bio_pair)
@@ -801,7 +887,13 @@ bad:
 		meth=SSLv23_method();
 #else
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	meth=SSLv3_method();
+	if (tls1)
+		meth=TLSv1_method();
+	else
+	if (ssl3)
+		meth=SSLv3_method();
+	else
+		meth=SSLv23_method();
 #else
 	meth=SSLv2_method();
 #endif
@@ -820,26 +912,10 @@ bad:
 		SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx,cipher);
 		SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx,cipher);
 		}
-
-	ssl_mode = 0;
-	if (c_small_records)
-		{
-		ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
-		ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
-		SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
-		}
-	ssl_mode = 0;
-	if (s_small_records)
-		{
-		ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(s_ctx);
-		ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
-		SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode);
-		}
-	ssl_mode = 0;
 	if (cutthrough)
 		{
-		ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
-		ssl_mode = SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
+		int ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
+		ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
 		SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
 		}
 
@@ -878,7 +954,11 @@ bad:
 				}
 			}
 		else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+			nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+#else
 			nid = NID_sect163r2;
+#endif
 
 		ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
 		if (ecdh == NULL)
@@ -981,6 +1061,26 @@ bad:
 			}
 #endif
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if (srp_client_arg.srplogin)
+		{
+		if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(bio_err,"Unable to set SRP username\n");
+			goto end;
+			}
+		SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx,&srp_client_arg);
+		SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
+		/*SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);*/
+		}
+
+	if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL)
+		{
+		SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,SSL_VERIFY_NONE,verify_callback);
+		SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
+		SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+		}
+#endif
 
 	c_ssl=SSL_new(c_ctx);
 	s_ssl=SSL_new(s_ctx);
@@ -2205,15 +2305,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-		FIPS_allow_md5(1);
-# endif
 	ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-		FIPS_allow_md5(0);
-# endif
 #endif
 
 	if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
index c87af177..578617ed 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
@@ -66,13 +66,26 @@
 static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver);
 static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver)
 	{
+	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_2_client_method();
+	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_1_client_method();
 	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
+		return TLSv1_client_method();
+	return NULL;
 	}
 
-IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_client_method,
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_client_method,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl3_connect,
+			tls1_get_client_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_client_method,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl3_connect,
+			tls1_get_client_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_client_method,
 			ssl_undefined_function,
 			ssl3_connect,
 			tls1_get_client_method)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 793ea43e..07cb62bd 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
@@ -158,68 +159,75 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 			unsigned char *out, int olen)
 	{
 	int chunk;
-	unsigned int j;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+	size_t j;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
 	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned int A1_len;
+	size_t A1_len;
 	int ret = 0;
 	
 	chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
 	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
 
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-	if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+	if (!mac_key)
 		goto err;
-	if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+		goto err;
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 		goto err;
 
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+		/* Reinit mac contexts */
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
 			goto err;
 
 		if (olen > chunk)
 			{
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
 				goto err;
 			out+=j;
 			olen-=j;
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+			/* calc the next A1 value */
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
 				goto err;
 			}
 		else	/* last one */
 			{
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 				goto err;
 			memcpy(out,A1,olen);
 			break;
@@ -227,8 +235,9 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 		}
 	ret = 1;
 err:
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
 	return ret;
 	}
@@ -256,6 +265,8 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
 		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
 	}	
 	len=slen/count;
+	if (count == 1)
+		slen = 0;
 	S1=sec;
 	memset(out1,0,olen);
 	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
 	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
 	{
 	int ret;
-	ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
 		 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 		 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -350,7 +361,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -358,7 +369,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 		{
 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-			else
+		else
 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
 
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
@@ -403,15 +414,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
 			else
 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
 		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+			{
+			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+			if (!mac_ctx)
+				goto err;
+			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+			}
+		else
+			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 		if (s->compress != NULL)
 			{
@@ -445,7 +461,11 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
 	               cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
 	/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-	k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+	/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+	else
+		k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
 	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
 		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
 		{
@@ -474,10 +494,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 		}
 
 	memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-			mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-	EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+
+	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+		{
+		mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+				mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+		}
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -487,7 +511,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
 		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
 		 */
-		if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+		if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 				exp_label,exp_label_len,
 				s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 				s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -498,7 +522,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 
 		if (k > 0)
 			{
-			if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+			if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 					TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
 					s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 					s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -524,7 +548,19 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		{
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+		}
+	else	
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+				*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -606,21 +642,22 @@ printf("\nkey block\n");
 { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
 
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+	if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION &&
+	    (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
 		{
 		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
 		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 		 */
-		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+		s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
 
 		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
 			{
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 			
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 #endif
 			}
 		}
@@ -635,19 +672,28 @@ err:
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -655,13 +701,34 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
 			enc=NULL;
 		else
+			{
+			int ivlen;
 			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+			else
+				ivlen = 0;
+			if (ivlen > 1)
+				{
+				if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+					/* we can't write into the input stream:
+					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+					 */
+					fprintf(stderr,
+						"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+						__FILE__, __LINE__);
+				else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+					return -1;
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	else
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
@@ -676,18 +743,54 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
 		{
 		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
 		rec->input=rec->data;
+		ret = 1;
 		}
 	else
 		{
 		l=rec->length;
 		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
-		if ((bs != 1) && send)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+			{
+			unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				{
+				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+				s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+				memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+				memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+				for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
+					{
+					++seq[i];
+					if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
+					}
+				}
+
+			buf[8]=rec->type;
+			buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+			buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+			buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+			buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+			pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+			if (send)
+				{
+				l+=pad;
+				rec->length+=pad;
+				}
+			}
+		else if ((bs != 1) && send)
 			{
 			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
 
@@ -708,13 +811,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long ui;
+		unsigned long ui;
 		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+			ds->cipher->iv_len);
 		printf("\t\tIV: ");
 		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
 		printf("\n");
@@ -727,68 +830,41 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+						?(i<0)
+						:(i==0))
+			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+			{
+			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+		unsigned long i;
+		printf("\trec->data=");
 		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+		ret = 1;
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-			 * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-			 * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-			 * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-			 * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-			 * [steve]
-			 */
-			if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				&& !s->expand)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-			}
+			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+		if (pad && !send)
+			rec->length -= pad;
 		}
-	return(1);
+	return ret;
 	}
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 	{
 	unsigned int ret;
@@ -841,26 +917,27 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
 
 	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
 		{
-		if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
 			{
 			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-			if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
 				{
 				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
 				err = 1;
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
-				if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
+					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
 					err = 1;
-				q+=i;
+				q+=hashsize;
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		
-	if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 			str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
 			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
 			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
@@ -878,10 +955,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	unsigned char *seq;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size;
+	size_t md_size, orig_len;
 	int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char buf[5]; 
+	unsigned char header[13];
 	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
 	int t;
 
@@ -902,12 +979,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
 	md_size=t;
 
-	buf[0]=rec->type;
-	buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-	buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
 	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
 	if (stream_mac) 
 		{
@@ -926,17 +997,55 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
 		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 		}
 	else
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	rec->type &= 0xff;
 
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+	header[8]=rec->type;
+	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			mac_ctx,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+			tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+					mac_ctx, rec->input,
+					rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+		}
 		
-	if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+	if (!stream_mac)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
@@ -970,6 +1079,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 	const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
 	int col = 0, sol = 0;
 
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -986,7 +1096,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 		}
 #endif
 
-	tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
 		s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 		co, col,
@@ -994,6 +1104,16 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 		so, sol,
 		p,len,
 		s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
@@ -1001,6 +1121,95 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
 	}
 
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buff;
+	unsigned char *val = NULL;
+	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+	int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+	/* construct PRF arguments
+	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+	 * does not create a prohibited label.
+	 */
+	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+		}
+
+	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+	currentvalpos = 0;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+	currentvalpos += llen;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+			{
+			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* disallow prohibited labels
+	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+		      val, vallen,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+		      out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+	goto ret;
+err1:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+	rv = 0;
+	goto ret;
+err2:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	rv = 0;
+ret:
+	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+	return(rv);
+	}
+
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	{
 	switch (code)
@@ -1042,4 +1251,3 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	default:			return(-1);
 		}
 	}
-
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index bbab4675..eba732f1 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
 	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	tls1_alert_code,
+	tls1_export_keying_material,
 	};
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -166,10 +168,11 @@ void tls1_free(SSL *s)
 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+	s->version = s->method->version;
 	}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
 static int nid_list[] =
 	{
 		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -198,7 +201,36 @@ static int nid_list[] =
 		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
 		NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
 	};
-	
+
+static int pref_list[] =
+	{
+		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+		NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+	};
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -270,6 +302,56 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+#endif
+
+#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+
+static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#endif
+};
+
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+	{
+	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+	if (p)
+		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
+	return (int)slen;
+	}
+
 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
@@ -317,7 +399,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 
         /* Add RI if renegotiating */
-        if (s->new_session)
+        if (s->renegotiate)
           {
           int el;
           
@@ -341,6 +423,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
           ret += el;
         }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	/* Add SRP username if there is one */
+	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+		{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
+
+		int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);	
+		if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			} 
+
+		/* check for enough space.
+		   4 for the srp type type and entension length
+		   1 for the srp user identity
+		   + srp user identity length 
+		*/
+		if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 
+
+		/* fill in the extension */
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
+		s2n(login_len+1,ret);
+		(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
+		memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
+		ret+=login_len;
+		}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
 	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -426,6 +536,17 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 		skip_ext:
 
+	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+			return NULL; 
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
+		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
+		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
+		memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
+		ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		}
+
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
 	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -494,6 +615,20 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
 		}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* Add Heartbeat extension */
+	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+	s2n(1,ret);
+	/* Set mode:
+	 * 1: peer may send requests
+	 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+	 */
+	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+	else
+		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
 		{
@@ -506,6 +641,74 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
+		{
+		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
+		 * support for Channel ID. */
+		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
+		s2n(0,ret);
+		}
+
+	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+		{
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+		s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+		s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+		memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+		       s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+		ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+                ret += el;
+                }
+#endif
+
+	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02 */
+	{
+	int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+	 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+	 * not. */
+	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+		hlen -= 5;
+	if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+		{
+		hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+		if (hlen >= 4)
+			hlen -= 4;
+		else
+			hlen = 0;
+
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+		s2n(hlen, ret);
+		memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+		ret += hlen;
+		}
+	}
+
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -618,6 +821,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret += sol;
 		}
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+        if(s->srtp_profile)
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+                ret+=el;
+                }
+#endif
+
 	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
 		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
 		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
@@ -633,6 +858,24 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
 		}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
+		{
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+		s2n(1,ret);
+		/* Set mode:
+		 * 1: peer may send requests
+		 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+		 */
+		if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+		else
+			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+		}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
 	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
@@ -655,6 +898,31 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	/* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
+	 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
+	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+		{
+		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
+		s2n(0,ret);
+		}
+
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+		unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+		s2n(3 + len,ret);
+		s2n(1 + len,ret);
+		*ret++ = len;
+		memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+		ret += len;
+		}
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -662,6 +930,159 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	return ret;
 	}
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+	unsigned short type, size;
+	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+	};
+
+	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+	};
+
+	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+		return;
+	data += 2;
+
+	if (data > (d+n-4))
+		return;
+	n2s(data,type);
+	n2s(data,size);
+
+	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+		return;
+
+	if (data+size > d+n)
+		return;
+	data += size;
+
+	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+
+	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello.
+ *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
+ *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
+ *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
+ *       return.
+ *
+ *   returns: 0 on success. */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+					 unsigned data_len, int *al)
+	{
+	unsigned i;
+	unsigned proto_len;
+	const unsigned char *selected;
+	unsigned char selected_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (data_len < 2)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+	 * length-prefixed strings. */
+	i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
+	    ((unsigned) data[1]);
+	data_len -= 2;
+	data += 2;
+	if (data_len != i)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	if (data_len < 2)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
+		{
+		proto_len = data[i];
+		i++;
+
+		if (proto_len == 0)
+			goto parse_error;
+
+		if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+			goto parse_error;
+
+		i += proto_len;
+		}
+
+	r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+				   s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+	if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+		if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+		if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+			{
+			*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			return -1;
+			}
+		memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	return -1;
+	}
+
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
 	{
 	unsigned short type;
@@ -669,10 +1090,37 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+	int sigalg_seen = 0;
 
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 
+	/* Reset TLS 1.2 digest functions to defaults because they don't carry
+	 * over to a renegotiation. */
+	s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL;
+	s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL;
+	s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -799,6 +1247,31 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+			{
+			if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+				return -1;
+			memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+			s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
+  
+			if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
@@ -843,7 +1316,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
 			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -919,6 +1393,24 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				return 0;
 			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+			{
+			int dsize;
+			if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			sigalg_seen = 1;
+			n2s(data,dsize);
+			size -= 2;
+			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize);
+			}
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
 		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 			{
@@ -1008,6 +1500,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				sdata = data;
 				if (dsize > 0)
 					{
+					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+						{
+						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
+						}
+
 					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
 						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
 							&sdata, dsize);
@@ -1025,9 +1523,27 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				else
 					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+			{
+			switch(data[0])
+				{
+				case 0x01:	/* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+							break;
+				case 0x02:	/* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+							break;
+				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+							return 0;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                         s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+			 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
 			{
 			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
 			 * renegotiation.
@@ -1048,7 +1564,29 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+			 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+			{
+			if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+				return 0;
+			/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+			}
+
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+			{
+			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+							      al))
+				return 0;
+			}
+#endif
+
 		data+=size;
 		}
 				
@@ -1058,7 +1596,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
 
-	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
 		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -1074,7 +1612,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
  * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
  * the length of the block. */
-static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
 	{
 	unsigned int off = 0;
 
@@ -1099,6 +1637,21 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 
@@ -1138,7 +1691,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1225,13 +1779,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
 			{
 			unsigned char *selected;
 			unsigned char selected_len;
 
 			/* We must have requested it. */
-			if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
 				return 0;
@@ -1255,14 +1810,89 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
 			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
 			}
 #endif
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+			{
+			unsigned len;
+
+			/* We must have requested it. */
+			if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (size < 4)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			/* The extension data consists of:
+			 *   uint16 list_length
+			 *   uint8 proto_length;
+			 *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
+			len = data[0];
+			len <<= 8;
+			len |= data[1];
+			if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			len = data[2];
+			if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+			s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+			if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+			s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+			}
+
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
 			{
 			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
 				return 0;
 			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+			{
+			switch(data[0])
+				{
+				case 0x01:	/* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+							break;
+				case 0x02:	/* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+							break;
+				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+							return 0;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+			{
+                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+							      al))
+                                return 0;
+			}
+#endif
+
 		data+=size;		
 		}
 
@@ -1342,7 +1972,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			break;
 			}
 		}
-	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
+	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
 	if (using_ecc)
 		{
 		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
@@ -1358,16 +1988,19 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 		/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
 		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
+		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
 		if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
 			{
 			s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			return -1;
 			}
-		for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
-				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
-			s2n(i,j);
+		for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
+				sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
+			{
+			int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
+			s2n(id,j);
+			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
@@ -1439,7 +2072,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1458,42 +2091,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed.
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		switch (r)
-			{
-			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* status request response should be sent */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* something bad happened */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
 		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
 		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-		 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+		 * so this has to happen here in
+		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
 		int r = 1;
 	
@@ -1545,8 +2148,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			}
 	}
 
-#endif
  err:
+#endif
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1564,6 +2167,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+	int al;
+
+	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
+ 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		{
+		int r;
+		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+		if (certpkey == NULL)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+		 */
+		s->cert->key = certpkey;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		switch (r)
+			{
+			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* status request response should be sent */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* something bad happened */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+			return -1;
+
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+			return 1; 
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -1676,26 +2344,56 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
- * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
- * session ticket extension at the same time.
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
+ * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ *
+ *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ *       extension, if any.
+ *   len: the length of the session ID.
+ *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
  */
-
 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-				const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+			const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
 	{
 	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
 	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
 	unsigned short i;
 
+	*ret = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
 	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- 	 * to permit stateful resumption.
- 	 */
+	 * to permit stateful resumption.
+	 */
 	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-		return 1;
-
+		return 0;
 	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	if (p >= limit)
 		return -1;
 	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
@@ -1718,7 +2416,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 		return -1;
 	/* Now at start of extensions */
 	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	n2s(p, i);
 	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
 		{
@@ -1726,39 +2424,61 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 		n2s(p, type);
 		n2s(p, size);
 		if (p + size > limit)
-			return 1;
+			return 0;
 		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
 			{
-			/* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
- 			 * trigger a full handshake
- 			 */
-			if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				return 1;
-			/* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
- 			 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
- 			 */
+			int r;
 			if (size == 0)
 				{
+				/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
+				 * currently have one. */
 				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-				return 0;	/* Cache miss */
+				return 1;
 				}
 			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
 				{
-				/* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
-				 * generating the session from ticket now,
-				 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
-				 * external mechanism to calculate the master
-				 * secret later. */
-				return 0;
+				/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
+				 * decrypted rather than generating the session
+				 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
+				 * handshake based on external mechanism to
+				 * calculate the master secret later. */
+				return 2;
+				}
+			r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+			switch (r)
+				{
+				case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+					return 2;
+				case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+					return r;
+				case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+					return 3;
+				default: /* fatal error */
+					return -1;
 				}
-			return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
-									ret);
 			}
 		p += size;
 		}
-	return 1;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
+/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
 				SSL_SESSION **psess)
@@ -1773,7 +2493,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
 	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
 	if (eticklen < 48)
-		goto tickerr;
+		return 2;
 	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
 	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
@@ -1785,7 +2505,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		if (rv < 0)
 			return -1;
 		if (rv == 0)
-			goto tickerr;
+			return 2;
 		if (rv == 2)
 			renew_ticket = 1;
 		}
@@ -1793,15 +2513,15 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		{
 		/* Check key name matches */
 		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-			goto tickerr;
+			return 2;
 		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
 					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
 		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
 				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
 		}
 	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- 	 * integrity checks on ticket.
- 	 */
+	 * integrity checks on ticket.
+	 */
 	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
 	if (mlen < 0)
 		{
@@ -1813,8 +2533,8 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
-		goto tickerr;
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+		return 2;
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -1827,33 +2547,369 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		}
 	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
 	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
-		goto tickerr;
+		return 2;
 	slen += mlen;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	p = sdec;
-		
+
 	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
 	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
 	if (sess)
 		{
-		/* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
- 		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- 		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- 		 * as required by standard.
- 		 */
+		/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
+		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+		 * as required by standard.
+		 */
 		if (sesslen)
 			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
 		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
 		*psess = sess;
-		s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
-		return 1;
+		if (renew_ticket)
+			return 4;
+		else
+			return 3;
 		}
-	/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
- 	 * send a new ticket
- 	 */
-	tickerr:	
-	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+        ERR_clear_error();
+	/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
+	 * ticket. */
+	return 2;
+	}
+
+/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+
+typedef struct 
+	{
+	int nid;
+	int id;
+	} tls12_lookup;
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+	{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+	{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+	{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+	{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+	{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+#endif
+};
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+#endif
+};
+
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+		{
+		if (table[i].nid == nid)
+			return table[i].id;
+		}
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
+	{
+	int sig_id, md_id;
+	if (!md)
+		return 0;
+	md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+				sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+	if (md_id == -1)
+		return 0;
+	sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+	if (sig_id == -1)
+		return 0;
+	p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+	p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* tls12_get_sigid returns the TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm value corresponding
+ * to the given public key, or -1 if not known. */
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+	{
+	return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+	}
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+	{
+	switch(hash_alg)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+		return EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+	case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+		return EVP_sha224();
+
+	case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+		return EVP_sha256();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+	case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+		return EVP_sha384();
+
+	case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+		return EVP_sha512();
+#endif
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+
+		}
+	}
+
+/* tls1_process_sigalgs processes a signature_algorithms extension and sets the
+ * digest functions accordingly for each key type.
+ *
+ * See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1.
+ *
+ * data: points to the content of the extension, not including type and length
+ *     headers.
+ * dsize: the number of bytes of |data|. Must be even.
+ */
+void tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+	{
+	int i;
+	const EVP_MD *md, **digest_ptr;
+	/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL;
+	s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL;
+	s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
+		{
+		unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
+
+		switch(sig_alg)
+			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_rsa;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_dsa;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
+			break;
+#endif
+			default:
+			continue;
+			}
+
+		if (*digest_ptr == NULL)
+			{
+			md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
+			if (md)
+				*digest_ptr = md;
+			}
+
+		}
+	}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int
+tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+	unsigned short hbtype;
+	unsigned int payload;
+	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+	/* Read type and payload length first */
+	hbtype = *p++;
+	n2s(p, payload);
+	pl = p;
+
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+		{
+		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+		int r;
+
+		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
+		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+		 * payload, plus padding
+		 */
+		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+		bp = buffer;
+		
+		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+		s2n(payload, bp);
+		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+		bp += payload;
+		/* Random padding */
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+		r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+
+		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		}
+	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
+		{
+		unsigned int seq;
+		
+		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
+		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
+		 * sequence number */
+		n2s(pl, seq);
+		
+		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+			}
+		}
+
 	return 0;
 	}
 
+int
+tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf, *p;
+	int ret;
+	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+		return -1;
+		}
+		
+	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+		
+	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
+	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+	 * some random stuff.
+	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
+	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+	 *  - Padding
+	 */
+	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+	p = buf;
+	/* Message Type */
+	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+	s2n(payload, p);
+	/* Sequence number */
+	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+	/* 16 random bytes */
+	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+	p += 16;
+	/* Random padding */
+	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+	ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		{
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+		}
+		
+	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
+ * SSL connection and writes it to |md|.
+ */
+int
+tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
+	{
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned temp_digest_len;
+	int i;
+	static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			return 0;
+
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
+		{
+		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
+		}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+	return 1;
+	}
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
index 6ce7c0bb..53c807de 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
@@ -60,16 +60,28 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_method(int ver);
 static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_method(int ver)
 	{
+	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_2_method();
+	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_1_method();
 	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
+		return TLSv1_method();
+	return NULL;
 	}
 
-IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_method,
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl3_connect,
+			tls1_get_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl3_connect,
+			tls1_get_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_method,
 			ssl3_accept,
 			ssl3_connect,
 			tls1_get_method)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
index 42525e9e..f1d15657 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
@@ -67,13 +67,26 @@
 static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver);
 static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver)
 	{
+	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_2_server_method();
+	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		return TLSv1_1_server_method();
 	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
+		return TLSv1_server_method();
+	return NULL;
 	}
 
-IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_server_method,
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_server_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			tls1_get_server_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_server_method,
+			ssl3_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			tls1_get_server_method)
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_server_method,
 			ssl3_accept,
 			ssl_undefined_function,
 			tls1_get_server_method)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
index 76f368ac..6f031a44 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -159,10 +159,24 @@ extern "C" {
 
 #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES	0
 
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION			0x0303
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03
+
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION			0x0302
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR		0x02
+
 #define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
 #define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
 #define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
 
+#define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+		((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+
+#define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \
+		((s->client_version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->client_version : 0)
+
 #define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED	21
 #define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW		22
 #define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA		48	/* fatal */
@@ -183,17 +197,45 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
 #define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY	115	/* fatal */
 
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 */
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name			0
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length		1
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url	2
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys		3
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac		4
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request		5
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping		6
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz		7
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz		8
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type		9
+
 /* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves		10
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats		11
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp				12
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms	13
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp	14
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat	15
+
+/* ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket		35
+
 /* ExtensionType value from draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt */
 #if 0 /* will have to be provided externally for now ,
        * i.e. build with -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=38183
@@ -209,6 +251,13 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg		13172
 #endif
 
+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id			30031
+
+/* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+ * Number not yet IANA assigned. */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding			35655
+
 /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
 #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
 /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
@@ -221,12 +270,37 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2	2
 #define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last			2
 
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
+
+#define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous			0
+#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa				1
+#define TLSEXT_signature_dsa				2
+#define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa				3
+
+#define TLSEXT_hash_none				0
+#define TLSEXT_hash_md5					1
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha1				2
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha224				3
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha256				4
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha384				5
+#define TLSEXT_hash_sha512				6
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 
 #define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
 
-const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) ;
-int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) ;
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type);
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
+/* SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret,
+ * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and
+ * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context|
+ * flag controls whether a context is included.)
+ *
+ * It returns 1 on success and zero otherwise.
+ */
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+	int use_context);
 
 #define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
 SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
@@ -290,6 +364,16 @@ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG, 0, arg)
 #define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
 SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED				0x01
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS	0x02
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS	0x04
+
+#define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
+        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL)
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
@@ -327,6 +411,14 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA		0x03000039
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA			0x0300003A
 
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256			0x0300003B
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256			0x0300003C
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256			0x0300003D
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x0300003E
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x0300003F
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x03000040
+
 /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		0x03000041
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000042
@@ -335,6 +427,16 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000045
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		0x03000046
 
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x03000067
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x03000068
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x03000069
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x0300006A
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x0300006B
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256			0x0300006C
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256			0x0300006D
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA		0x03000084
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000085
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000086
@@ -350,6 +452,20 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                   0x0300009A
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                	0x0300009B
 
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x0300009C
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x0300009D
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x0300009E
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x0300009F
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A0
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A1
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A2
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A3
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A4
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A5
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A6
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A7
+
 /* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with changes soon to be in draft 13 */
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                0x0300C001
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             0x0300C002
@@ -381,6 +497,38 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C018
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C019
 
+/* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA		0x0300C01A
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01B
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01C
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		0x0300C01D
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01E
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01F
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		0x0300C020
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	0x0300C021
+#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	0x0300C022
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256         0x0300C023
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384         0x0300C024
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256          0x0300C025
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384          0x0300C026
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256           0x0300C027
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384           0x0300C028
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256            0x0300C029
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384            0x0300C02A
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	0x0300C02B
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	0x0300C02C
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      0x0300C02D
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      0x0300C02E
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       0x0300C02F
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       0x0300C030
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        0x0300C031
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        0x0300C032
+
 /* XXX
  * Inconsistency alert:
  * The OpenSSL names of ciphers with ephemeral DH here include the string
@@ -448,6 +596,17 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		"PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		"PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
 
+/* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA		"SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		"SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		"SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+
 /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		"CAMELLIA128-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	"DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
@@ -471,6 +630,55 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "ADH-SEED-SHA"
 
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256			"NULL-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"AES256-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"ADH-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"ADH-AES256-SHA256"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	"DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	"DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	"DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	"DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
 
 #define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN			1
 #define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN			2
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2315a7c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+/* ssl/tls_srp.c */
+/* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with 
+ * the precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) 
+ * for the EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/srp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
+	{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b);
+	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v);
+	ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s)
+	{
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+	s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+	s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s)
+	{
+	SSL_CTX *ctx;
+
+	if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL))
+		return 0;
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg;
+	/* set client Hello login callback */
+	s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback;
+	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback;
+	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
+	s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback;
+
+	s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+	s->srp_ctx.info = ctx->srp_ctx.info;
+	s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength;
+
+	if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) ||
+		((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) &&
+		 ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL)))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) && 
+		((s->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+
+	return (1);
+err:
+	OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
+	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
+	{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
+	/* set client Hello login callback */
+	ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
+	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
+	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
+	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
+
+	ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
+	ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* server side */
+int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
+	{
+	unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	int al;
+
+	*ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+	if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback !=NULL) &&
+		((al = s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))!=SSL_ERROR_NONE))
+			return al;
+
+	*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+		(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+		(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
+		(s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
+		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
+		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+	s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b,sizeof(b),NULL);
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(b,sizeof(b));
+
+	/* Calculate:  B = (kv + g^b) % N  */
+
+	return ((s->srp_ctx.B = SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.v)) != NULL)?
+			SSL_ERROR_NONE:SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+	}
+
+/* If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the fly */
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp)
+	{
+	SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp);
+	if(GN == NULL) return -1;
+	s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N);
+	s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g);
+	if(s->srp_ctx.v != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+		s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+		}
+	if(s->srp_ctx.s != NULL)
+		{
+		BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+		s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+		}
+	if(!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, GN->N, GN->g)) return -1;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+			     BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info)
+	{
+	if (N!= NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
+			{
+			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N,N))
+				{
+				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
+				s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N);
+		}
+	if (g!= NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
+			{
+			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g,g))
+				{
+				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
+				s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g);
+		}
+	if (sa!= NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL)
+			{
+			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s,sa))
+				{
+				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
+				s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa);
+		}
+	if (v!= NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL)
+			{
+			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v,v))
+				{
+				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
+				s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v);
+		}
+	s->srp_ctx.info = info;
+
+	if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) ||
+		!(s->srp_ctx.g) ||
+		!(s->srp_ctx.s) ||
+		!(s->srp_ctx.v))
+		return -1;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL;
+	int ret = -1, tmp_len;
+	unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+
+	if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.N))
+		goto err;
+	if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N)))
+		goto err;
+	if (!(K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N)))
+		goto err;
+
+	tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
+	if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
+	ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,master_key,tmp,tmp_len);
+err:
+	if (tmp)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,tmp_len) ;
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+		}
+	BN_clear_free(K);
+	BN_clear_free(u);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/* client side */
+int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL;
+	int ret = -1, tmp_len;
+	char *passwd = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+
+	/* Checks if b % n == 0
+	 */
+	if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N)==0) goto err;
+	if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N))) goto err;
+	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL) goto err;
+	if (!(passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) goto err;
+	if (!(x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s,s->srp_ctx.login,passwd))) goto err;
+	if (!(K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g, x, s->srp_ctx.a, u))) goto err;
+
+	tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
+	if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) goto err;
+	BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
+	ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,master_key,tmp,tmp_len);
+err:
+	if (tmp)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,tmp_len) ;
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+		}
+	BN_clear_free(K);
+	BN_clear_free(x);
+	if (passwd)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(passwd,strlen(passwd)) ;
+		OPENSSL_free(passwd);
+		}
+	BN_clear_free(u);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && 
+		!SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
+		return -1 ;
+
+	RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+
+	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
+		return -1;
+
+	/* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
+	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) 
+		return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
+		return s->srp_ctx.g;
+	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g;
+	}
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
+		return s->srp_ctx.N;
+	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N;
+	}
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+		return s->srp_ctx.login;
+	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login;
+	}
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
+		return s->srp_ctx.info;
+	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info;
+	}
+
+#define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl
+#define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *name)
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME,0,name);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *password)
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD,0,password);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength)
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength,
+			     NULL);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *,void *))
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB,
+				      (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG,0,arg);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+				      int (*cb)(SSL *,int *,void *))
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB,
+				      (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *,void *))
+	{
+	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB,
+				      (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
+
+#endif