Update OpenSSL version

24 files changed, 682 insertions, 391 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 04aa2310..2e4250fc 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -587,29 +587,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+		return s->max_cert_list;
+	return max_len;
+	}
 
 static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	pitem *item = NULL;
 	int i = -1, is_complete;
 	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
 
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
 		goto err;
 
-	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
-	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
-	 */
-	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
-		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
-	else
-		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
-		goto err;
+	if (frag_len == 0)
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 	/* Try to find item in queue */
 	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
@@ -639,7 +642,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+	 * does not need to be freed.
 	 */
 	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
 		{
@@ -659,7 +663,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
-	if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+		i=-1;
+	if (i<=0)
 		goto err;
 
 	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -676,10 +682,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 	if (item == NULL)
 		{
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if (item == NULL)
 			{
@@ -687,21 +689,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			goto err;
 			}
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+		 * would never have reached this branch. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 {
 	int i=-1;
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -721,7 +727,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
 	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
 	 */
-	if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		item = NULL;
 
 	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -746,9 +752,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
 
+		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+			goto err;
+
 		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
 		if ( frag == NULL)
 			goto err;
@@ -760,26 +769,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+				i = -1;
+			if (i<=0)
 				goto err;
 			}
 
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if ( item == NULL)
 			goto err;
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+		 * been discarded. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
@@ -1180,6 +1194,8 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
 	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
 
 	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+	if (!frag)
+		return 0;
 
 	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
 
@@ -1476,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	/* Read type and payload length first */
 	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
 		return 0; /* silently discard */
+	if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
 	hbtype = *p++;
 	n2s(p, payload);
 	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 5ee8f58e..37dd5483 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -882,12 +882,18 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		/* TLS extensions*/
+		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			goto err;
 			}
-#endif		
+#endif
 
 		l=(p-d);
 		d=buf;
@@ -996,6 +1002,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1186,6 +1199,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			{
 			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
 				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1245,6 +1265,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
 			int field_size = 0;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			/* Did we send out the client's
 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
@@ -1709,5 +1736,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
-
-
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index ab9c4192..535539ba 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
-			       SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
-	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
-	p=srtp_known_profiles;
-	while(p->name)
-		{
-		if(p->id == profile_num)
-			{
-			*pptr=p;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		p++;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
 static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
 		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
 					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
 			{
+			if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+				sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+				return 1;
+				}
+
 			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
 			return 1;
 			}
 
@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
 
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
 	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
         int ct;
         int mki_len;
-	int i,j;
-	int id;
-	int ret;
+	int i, srtp_pref;
+	unsigned int id;
 
          /* Length value + the MKI length */
         if(len < 3)
@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}
 
+	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+	/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+	srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
         
-	clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
-
 	while(ct)
 		{
 		n2s(d,id);
 		ct-=2;
                 len-=2;
 
-		if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+		/*
+		 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+		 * current match.
+		 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+		 * does nothing.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
 			{
-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			; /* Ignore */
+			sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+			if (sprof->id == id)
+				{
+				s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+				srtp_pref = i;
+				break;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
 		return 1;
 		}
 
-	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
-	/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
-	 configured then the outer loop doesn't run 
-	 (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
-	 and so we just return without doing anything */
-	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
-		{
-		sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
-
-		for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
-			{
-			cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
-            
-			if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
-				{
-				s->srtp_profile=sprof;
-				*al=0;
-				ret=0;
-				goto done;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	ret=0;
-    
-done:
-	if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
-
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
 int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index c181db6d..03b20a27 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -598,10 +598,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
 				}
 			else {
-				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
-				 * have not asked for it :-) */
-				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+					{
+					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+					if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+					}
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -980,6 +981,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 467adfea..f02c275c 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_client_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_client_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		{
 		/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 		if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
 			{
@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
 			s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
 			}
-		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+		else
+#endif
+		if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
 			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
 			{
 			s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
index 3bf72831..f3c29d1d 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
 	long l;
 
 	/* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
+	/* but no ECC ciphers */
+	if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr ||
+		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe ||
+		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH ||
+		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH ||
+		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA)
+		return 0;
 	if (p != NULL)
 		{
 		l=c->id;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 82d6867b..93ca7d53 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_server_method());
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_server_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
@@ -348,23 +350,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
 			 * to read more records to find out.
 			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
-			 * attacks. */
+			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
 			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
 				{
-#if 0
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
 				goto err;
-#else
-				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
 				}
 			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
 			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
 			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
 			 * this....
 			 */
-			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 				v[1]=0xff;
 			else
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -447,14 +445,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
 		v[1] = p[4];
 
+		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+		 * record. It's format is:
+		 * Byte  Content
+		 * 0-1   msg_length
+		 * 2     msg_type
+		 * 3-4   version
+		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+		 * 7-8   session_id_length
+		 * 9-10  challenge_length
+		 * ...   ...
+		 */
 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
 		if (n > (1024*4))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		if (n < 9)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+		 * packet bytes. */
 		if (j <= 0) return(j);
 
 		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
@@ -584,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+		if (s->method == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
 
@@ -611,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
 			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
 			}
-		if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
-		else
-			s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
 #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
 		s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index b9624b95..c63be305 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	0,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
 	if (p != NULL)
 		{
 		l=c->id;
-		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
 		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
 		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
 		p[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 443a31e7..11f13adb 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -67,37 +68,6 @@
  * supported by TLS.) */
 #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
 
-/* Some utility functions are needed:
- *
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
-
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	a -= b;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
-	}
-
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
-	{
-	unsigned c = a ^ b;
-	c--;
-	return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
-	}
-
 /* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
  * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
  *
@@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
-}
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+	}
 
 /* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
  * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
@@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
 		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
 		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
@@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
 		}
 
 	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
-	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
-	 * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
-	 * bits. */
-	good &= good >> 4;
-	good &= good >> 2;
-	good &= good >> 1;
-	good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
-	good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
-
+	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+	 */
+	good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
 	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
 	rec->length -= padding_length;
 	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
 
-	return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
 	}
 
 /* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
@@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
 	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
 	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
 		{
-		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
-		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
 		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
 		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
 		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
@@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 				b = data[k-header_length];
 			k++;
 
-			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
-			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
 			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
 			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
-			b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+                        b =  constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
 			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
 			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
 			 * just write zero. */
@@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
 			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
 				{
 				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
-				b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+				b = constant_time_select_8(
+					is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
 				}
 			block[j] = b;
 			}
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 486f538b..8a81793e 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				break;
 				}
 #endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
 			/* or non-RSA PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
 			    !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
 			      !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
 				{
@@ -530,6 +530,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
 				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
 			/* clear flags */
@@ -975,6 +976,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 			{
 			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
 				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+	    		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@@ -1032,6 +1034,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 
 	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -1346,8 +1357,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 	unsigned char *param,*p;
-	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
-	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+	int al,j,ok;
+	long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1425,19 +1436,29 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
 		}
 
+	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
 	param_len=0;
+
 	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 
+	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 	if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
 		{
 		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
 
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		param_len = 2;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
 		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
 			{
 			OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
@@ -1451,17 +1472,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
 			if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
 				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 					SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 				goto f_err;
 				}
-			if (param_len > n)
+			if (i > n - param_len)
 				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 					SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
 				goto f_err;
 				}
+			param_len += i;
+
 			/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
 			 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
 			 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
@@ -1471,6 +1494,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
 			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
 				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto f_err;
 				}
@@ -1484,14 +1508,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
 		{
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1499,14 +1531,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1514,15 +1556,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+
+		if (1 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 1;
+
 		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
 		p++;
-		param_len+=i+1;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1530,14 +1582,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1546,6 +1607,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		p+=i;
 		n-=param_len;
 
+		if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
@@ -1568,14 +1635,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1583,14 +1659,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1619,14 +1704,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
+
+		param_len = 2;
 		if (param_len > n)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		n2s(p,i);
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
+			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1634,14 +1728,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1649,14 +1752,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 		p+=i;
 
+		if (2 > n - param_len)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		param_len += 2;
+
 		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len+=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
+
+		if (i > n - param_len)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += i;
+
 		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1708,12 +1820,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		 */
 
 		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
-		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
+		 * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
 		 */
-		param_len=3;
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
-		    (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
-		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) 
+		param_len=4;
+		if (param_len > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
+		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1755,15 +1874,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
 		p+=1;
-		param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
-		if ((param_len > n) ||
+
+		if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
 		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
 			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
+		param_len += encoded_pt_len;
 
 		n-=param_len;
 		p+=encoded_pt_len;
@@ -1806,7 +1925,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		{
 		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
-			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			int sigalg;
+			if (2 > n)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
 			/* Should never happen */
 			if (sigalg == -1)
 				{
@@ -1824,7 +1951,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			if (md == NULL)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				goto f_err;
 				}
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
@@ -1835,15 +1961,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 			}
 		else
 			md = EVP_sha1();
-			
+
+		if (2 > n)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
 		n2s(p,i);
 		n-=2;
 		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
 
+		/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
 		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
 			{
 			/* wrong packet length */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -1852,6 +1984,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 			{
 			int num;
+			unsigned int size;
 
 			j=0;
 			q=md_buf;
@@ -1864,9 +1997,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
-				q+=i;
-				j+=i;
+				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
+				q+=size;
+				j+=size;
 				}
 			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
 								pkey->pkey.rsa);
@@ -1902,7 +2035,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) &&
+		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
 			/* Among PSK ciphers only RSA_PSK needs a public key */
 			!((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
 			{
@@ -1912,7 +2045,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 		/* still data left over */
 		if (n != 0)
 			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
 			goto f_err;
 			}
@@ -2338,7 +2470,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
 		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
 			{
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+			/* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
+			 * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
+			 * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
+			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
 			size_t identity_len;
 			unsigned char *t = NULL;
 			unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
@@ -2355,7 +2490,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 			memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
 			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
+				identity, sizeof(identity - 1), psk, sizeof(psk));
 			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -2368,14 +2503,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
 				goto psk_err;
 				}
-			identity_len = strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
+			identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+			identity_len = strlen(identity);
 			if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 				goto psk_err;
 				}
-
 			if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
 				{
 				/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
@@ -2407,7 +2542,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				}
 			psk_err = 0;
 		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
 			if (psk_err != 0)
 				{
@@ -2424,6 +2559,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
@@ -2820,7 +2962,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
 			if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
 				{
-				pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n;
+				pre_ms_len = 2+n+2+psk_len;
 				pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
 				if (pre_ms == NULL)
 					{
@@ -2830,11 +2972,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					}
 				memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
 				t = pre_ms;
-				s2n(psk_len, t);
-				memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-				t += psk_len;
 				s2n(n, t);
 				memcpy(t, p, n);
+				t += n;
+				s2n(psk_len, t);
+				memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
 				s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
 					-> generate_master_secret(s,
 						s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
@@ -3341,7 +3483,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 
 	/* we don't have a certificate */
-	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
+	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
 		return(1);
 
 	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 3595cff4..bcb65d48 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -641,10 +641,18 @@ int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
 int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, 
 	     const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
 	{
-	int ret;
+	int ret, sha1len;
 	ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
+	if(ret == 0)
+		return 0;
+
 	p+=ret;
-	ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+
+	sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+	if(sha1len == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret+=sha1len;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index dca9858d..c378dd60 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_SSLV3,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2382,7 +2382,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2426,13 +2426,13 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2464,7 +2464,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_TLSV1,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	168,
+	112,
 	168,
 	},
 
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -3952,10 +3952,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
 		emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-		emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+		if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
+			{
+			mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+			mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+			}
 #endif
-			
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 /*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index df436cf7..4a2f5d6c 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 	return(n);
 	}
 
+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
 /* Call this to get a new input record.
  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
  * or non-blocking IO.
@@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	short version;
 	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
 	size_t extra;
+	unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n");
 	s->packet_length=0;
 
 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
-	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+	if (rr->length == 0)
+		{
+		empty_record_count++;
+		if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		goto again;
+		}
 
 #if 0
 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
@@ -979,7 +996,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 			return(-1);
 
-	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
 	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index f83c9366..a42fc9e3 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -414,11 +415,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
 			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
 			/* non-RSA PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
 				/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */
 				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK &&
-					 !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA))
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+					 !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
 				{
 				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -524,7 +524,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
 				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
 				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+				/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
 				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
 				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
 				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -1905,7 +1907,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			n+=2+nr[i];
 			}
 
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)
+		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
 			/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */
 			&& !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
 			{
@@ -2325,6 +2327,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
 		{
+		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+		int decrypt_len;
+		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+
 		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
 		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
 			{
@@ -2372,54 +2378,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				n=i;
 			}
 
-		i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
-		al = -1;
-		
-		if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
-			}
+		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+		 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+		 * case that the decrypt fails. See
+		 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
 
-		if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
-			{
-			/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
-			 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
-			 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
-			 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
-			 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
-			 * protocol version.
-			 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
-			if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-				(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
-
-				/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-				 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-				 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
-				 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
-				 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
-				 * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
-				 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
-				}
+		/* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+				      sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+		ERR_clear_error();
+
+		/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+		 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
+		decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+		/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+		 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
+		 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+		 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+		 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+		 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+		 * decryption error. */
+		version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
+		version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
+
+		/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+		 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+		 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+		 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+		 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+		 * support the requested protocol version. If
+		 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
+			{
+			unsigned char workaround_good;
+			workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
+			workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
+			version_good |= workaround_good;
+			}
+
+		/* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
+		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
+		decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
+		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+			{
+			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
 			}
 
-		if (al != -1)
-			{
-			/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
-			 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
-			 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-			p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
-			p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
-			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-				goto err;
-			}
-	
 		s->session->master_key_length=
 			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
 				s->session->master_key,
@@ -2837,7 +2850,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
 	    if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
 			{
-			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+i;
+			pre_ms_len = 2+i+2+psk_len;
 			pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
 			if (pre_ms == NULL)
 				{
@@ -2847,11 +2860,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				}
 			memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
 			t = pre_ms;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-			t += psk_len;
 			s2n(i, t);
 			memcpy(t, p, i);
+			t += i;
+			s2n(psk_len, t);
+			memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
 			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
 				-> generate_master_secret(s,
 					s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
@@ -3009,7 +3022,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
 		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
 		-1,
-		516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
+		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
 		&ok);
 
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index c0cf33ef..24f23309 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
 #define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
 int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
 
+#endif
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index a89ab237..7a1fce89 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST94	"aGOST94"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST  "aGOST"
+#define SSL_TXT_aSRP            "aSRP"
 
 #define	SSL_TXT_DSS		"DSS"
 #define SSL_TXT_DH		"DH"
@@ -664,11 +665,15 @@ struct ssl_session_st
  */
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
 #define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
 
 /* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
  * and Finished.  This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
  * one RTT. */
-#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000080L
+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000200L
 
 /* When set, TLS 1.0 and SSLv3, multi-byte, CBC records will be split in two:
  * the first record will contain a single byte and the second will contain the
@@ -676,11 +681,6 @@ struct ssl_session_st
  * attacks. */
 #define SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING 0x00000100L
 
-/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
-#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000200L
-
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
  * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
 
@@ -2199,6 +2199,10 @@ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secre
 void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
 int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
+#endif
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -2467,6 +2471,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH				 348
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH				 349
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH				 350
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS			 371
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH				 351
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE			 352
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST		 353
@@ -2527,7 +2532,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
-#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK			 380
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK			 373
 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index e8794d4b..cd9f1082 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0,    0,SSL_aSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0,     SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
@@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		break;
 		}
 
-	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
 		*enc=NULL;
 	else
 		{
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		i= -1;
 		break;
 		}
-	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
+	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
 	{
 		*md=NULL; 
 		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
@@ -925,7 +926,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 		int rule, int strength_bits,
 		CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
 	{
-	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *curr2, *last;
+	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
 	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
 	int reverse = 0;
 
@@ -942,21 +943,25 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 
 	if (reverse)
 		{
-		curr = tail;
+		next = tail;
 		last = head;
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		curr = head;
+		next = head;
 		last = tail;
 		}
 
-	curr2 = curr;
+	curr = NULL;
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		if ((curr == NULL) || (curr == last)) break;
-		curr = curr2;
-		curr2 = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+		if (curr == last) break;
+
+		curr = next;
+
+		if (curr == NULL) break;
+
+		next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
 
 		cp = curr->cipher;
 
@@ -1598,6 +1603,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_kSRP:
 		kx="SRP";
 		break;
+	case SSL_kGOST:
+		kx="GOST";
+		break;
 	default:
 		kx="unknown";
 		}
@@ -1628,6 +1636,15 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_aPSK:
 		au="PSK";
 		break;
+	case SSL_aSRP:
+		au="SRP";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aGOST94:
+		au="GOST94";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aGOST01:
+		au="GOST01";
+		break;
 	default:
 		au="unknown";
 		break;
@@ -1675,6 +1692,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_SEED:
 		enc="SEED(128)";
 		break;
+	case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+		enc="GOST89(256)";
+		break;
 	default:
 		enc="unknown";
 		break;
@@ -1697,6 +1717,12 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_AEAD:
 		mac="AEAD";
 		break;
+	case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+		mac="GOST89";
+		break;
+	case SSL_GOST94:
+		mac="GOST94";
+		break;
 	default:
 		mac="unknown";
 		break;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 816f6eef..0e92ccb0 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp b length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp g length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp n length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS)    ,"bad srp parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp s length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE)    ,"bad srtp mki value"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index ec0ec2e5..eb1ae782 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1462,6 +1462,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
 			continue;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 		j = put_cb(c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
@@ -1492,6 +1497,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 			p+=j;
 			}
  		}
+
 	return(p-q);
 	}
 
@@ -1542,7 +1548,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 			}
 
 		/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
-		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+		if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
 			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
 			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
 			{
@@ -1551,7 +1557,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 			if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+				if (s->s3)
+					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
 				goto err;
 				}
 			continue;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 6b7731a4..ca399078 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
 #define SSL_aPSK                0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST94				0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST01 			0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+#define SSL_aSRP 		0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
 
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
@@ -809,6 +810,16 @@ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
 	return &func_name##_data; \
 	}
 
+struct openssl_ssl_test_functions
+	{
+	int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer)(SSL *s, int push);
+	int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers)(SSL *s);
+	int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+	int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+	};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
 void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
 int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
 CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
@@ -1096,8 +1107,8 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit); 
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
@@ -1179,4 +1190,14 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(
 	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
 	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
 
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
+#else
+
+#define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
+#define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
+#define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
+#define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
+
+#endif
 #endif
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
index 144b81e5..c5a15ce5 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify A"; break;
 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify B"; break;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 /* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
 /* client */
 case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello A"; break;
@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello B"; break;
 /* server */
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello A"; break;
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break;
-#endif
 
 /* DTLS */
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break;
@@ -366,7 +364,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:			str="3RCV_A"; break;
 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:			str="3RCV_B"; break;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 /* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
 /* client */
 case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23WCHA"; break;
@@ -376,7 +373,7 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:			str="23RSHA"; break;
 /* server */
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23RCHA"; break;
 case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="23RCHB"; break;
-#endif
+
 /* DTLS */
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break;
 case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index b8d497ec..455992ad 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	int rv;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 122a25f5..d0b893b5 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -352,15 +352,16 @@ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	return (int)slen;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
+	unsigned char *orig = buf;
+	unsigned char *ret = buf;
 
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
 					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return p;
+		return orig;
 
 	ret+=2;
 
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
               return NULL;
               }
 
-          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
           
           s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
           s2n(el,ret);
@@ -452,8 +453,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -472,8 +472,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
 		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
 		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -669,13 +668,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
 
                 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                 
-                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 
                 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                 s2n(el,ret);
@@ -718,24 +717,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			}
 		}
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
+		return orig;
 
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
+	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
+	unsigned char *orig = buf;
+	unsigned char *ret = buf;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
 
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return p;
+		return orig;
 	
 	ret+=2;
 	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
               return NULL;
               }
 
-          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
           
           s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
           s2n(el,ret);
@@ -773,8 +773,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -832,13 +831,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if(s->srtp_profile)
+	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
                 {
                 int el;
 
                 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                 
-                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
 
                 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                 s2n(el,ret);
@@ -937,10 +936,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret += len;
 		}
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
+		return orig;
 
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
+	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
 	return ret;
 	}
 
@@ -1288,8 +1287,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1323,8 +1321,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
 			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -1600,7 +1597,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+			 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
 			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -1706,8 +1704,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1718,15 +1715,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-			if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-			if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+			if (!s->hit)
 				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+					{
+					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
-			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 #if 0
 			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
 			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
 			{
                         if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
 							      al))
@@ -2561,7 +2561,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 		return 2;
+		}
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -2574,7 +2577,11 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		}
 	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
 	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+		OPENSSL_free(sdec);
 		return 2;
+		}
 	slen += mlen;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	p = sdec;
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 2315a7c0..e7368a8f 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -408,16 +408,46 @@ err:
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
 	{
-	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
+	/* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
+	 * by checking B != 0 since B < N
+	 */
+	if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
+		|| BN_is_zero(srp->B))
+		{
+		*al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
-		return -1;
+	if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && 
-		!SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
-		return -1 ;
+	if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
+		{
+		if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
+			{
+			*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+	
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
 	RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
@@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
 	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
 		return -1;
 
-	/* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) 
-		return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
-
 	return 1;
 	}