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authorArne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>2015-02-12 22:22:25 +0100
committerArne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>2015-02-12 22:22:25 +0100
commit9f0928c6593f937a17b7974b04051c57e3874b20 (patch)
tree1aaffa07a5c177fef2c1386f1850a688045bec2e /main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
parent68d26e1b1b5b411adce714c88532fc8889289f34 (diff)
Update OpenSSL to AOSP -master
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r--main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c142
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index a42fc9e3..ac3d213d 100644
--- a/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
@@ -183,6 +184,12 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
return(NULL);
}
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
@@ -209,11 +216,6 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
}
#endif
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_get_server_method)
-
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
@@ -288,6 +290,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
@@ -302,6 +305,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@@ -448,20 +454,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- /* clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange */
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
- /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
- * even when forbidden by protocol specs
- * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
- * be able to handle this) */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
@@ -475,7 +472,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ if (0
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if either:
* - PSK identity hint is provided, or
* - the key exchange is kEECDH.
@@ -676,8 +673,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+ * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+ * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+ * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -708,6 +711,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
+ * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
@@ -730,7 +746,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
+ * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -1047,7 +1074,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
else
{
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
- if (i == 1)
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
@@ -1148,14 +1184,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
id=s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers),
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id)
{
@@ -2330,6 +2367,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+ size_t j;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
@@ -2368,8 +2406,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
{
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
else
p-=2;
@@ -2378,6 +2417,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n=i;
}
+ /*
+ * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+ * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+ * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+ * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+ * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ */
+ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
* of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
* RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
@@ -2425,19 +2478,23 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* to remain non-zero (0xff). */
decrypt_good &= version_good;
- /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. */
- for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+ /*
+ * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+ * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+ * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++)
{
- p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
- rand_premaster_secret[i]);
+ p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
- p,i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+ p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
@@ -2577,10 +2634,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
&kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
@@ -2594,10 +2651,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
@@ -3042,7 +3099,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ if (peer != NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -3446,6 +3503,11 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
}
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ if (!l)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;