Update OpenSSL to 1.0.1g and statically link OpenVPN with it

1 files changed, 658 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/main/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4a3d13ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+/* crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c */
+/* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with 
+ * the precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) 
+ * for the EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "srp_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/srp.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+
+#define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
+#define MAX_LEN 2500
+
+static char b64table[] =
+  "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./";
+
+/* the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from Stanford */ 
+
+/*
+ * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
+ */
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src)
+	{
+	char *loc;
+	int i, j;
+	int size;
+
+	while(*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
+		++src;
+	size = strlen(src);
+	i = 0;
+	while(i < size)
+		{
+		loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
+		if(loc == (char *) 0) break;
+		else a[i] = loc - b64table;
+		++i;
+		}
+	size = i;
+	i = size - 1;
+	j = size;
+	while(1)
+		{
+		a[j] = a[i];
+		if(--i < 0) break;
+		a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6;
+		--j;
+		a[j] = (unsigned char) ((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2);
+		if(--i < 0) break;
+		a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4;
+		--j;
+		a[j] = (unsigned char) ((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4);
+		if(--i < 0) break;
+		a[j] |= (a[i] << 2);
+
+		a[--j] = 0;
+		if(--i < 0) break;
+		}
+	while(a[j] == 0 && j <= size) ++j;
+	i = 0;
+	while (j <= size) a[i++] = a[j++];
+	return i;
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
+ */
+static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
+	{
+	int c, pos = size % 3;
+	unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0;
+	char *olddst = dst;
+
+	switch(pos)
+		{
+	case 1:
+		b2 = src[0];
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		b1 = src[0];
+		b2 = src[1];
+		break;
+		}
+
+	while(1)
+		{
+		c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2;
+		if(notleading || c != 0)
+			{
+			*dst++ = b64table[c];
+			notleading = 1;
+			}
+		c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4);
+		if(notleading || c != 0)
+			{
+			*dst++ = b64table[c];
+			notleading = 1;
+			}
+		c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6);
+		if(notleading || c != 0)
+			{
+			*dst++ = b64table[c];
+			notleading = 1;
+			}
+		c = b2 & 0x3f;
+		if(notleading || c != 0)
+			{
+			*dst++ = b64table[c];
+			notleading = 1;
+			}
+		if(pos >= size) break;
+		else
+			{
+			b0 = src[pos++];
+			b1 = src[pos++];
+			b2 = src[pos++];
+			}
+		}
+
+	*dst++ = '\0';
+	return olddst;
+	}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
+	{
+	if (user_pwd == NULL) 
+		return;
+	BN_free(user_pwd->s);
+	BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
+	OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
+	OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
+	OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
+	}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new()
+	{
+	SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_user_pwd));
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return NULL;								
+	ret->N = NULL;
+	ret->g = NULL;	
+	ret->s = NULL;
+	ret->v = NULL;
+	ret->id = NULL ;
+	ret->info = NULL;
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
+				const BIGNUM *N)
+	{
+	vinfo->N = N;
+	vinfo->g = g;	
+	}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
+				const char *info)
+	{
+	if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = BUF_strdup(id)))
+		return 0;
+	return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = BUF_strdup(info))) ;
+	}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
+			       const char *v)
+	{
+	unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+	int len;
+
+	if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN) 
+		return 0; 
+	len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
+	if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) )
+		return 0;
+	len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
+	return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL) ;
+	}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
+	{
+	vinfo->v = v;
+	vinfo->s = s;
+	return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL) ;
+	}
+
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
+	{
+	SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
+
+	if (vb == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!(vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) ||
+		!(vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(vb);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	vb->default_g = NULL;
+	vb->default_N = NULL;
+	vb->seed_key = NULL;
+	if ((seed_key != NULL) && 
+		(vb->seed_key = BUF_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL)
+		{
+		sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
+		sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+		OPENSSL_free(vb);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	return vb;
+	}
+
+
+int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
+	{
+	sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd,SRP_user_pwd_free);
+	sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+	OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
+	OPENSSL_free(vb);
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+
+static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
+	{
+	unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+	int len;
+
+	SRP_gN_cache *newgN = (SRP_gN_cache *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN_cache));
+	if (newgN == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	len = t_fromb64(tmp, ch);
+	if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+		return newgN;
+
+	OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
+err:
+	OPENSSL_free(newgN);
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+
+static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
+	{
+	if (gN_cache == NULL)
+		return;
+	OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
+	BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
+	OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
+	}
+
+static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	SRP_gN *gN;
+	if (gN_tab != NULL) 
+	for(i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++)
+		{
+		gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
+		if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id,id)==0))
+			return gN;
+		}
+	
+	return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
+	}
+
+static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
+	{
+	int i;
+	if (gN_cache == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* search if we have already one... */
+	for(i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++)
+		{
+		SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
+		if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn,ch)==0)
+			return cache->bn;
+		}
+		{		/* it is the first time that we find it */
+		SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
+		if (newgN)
+			{
+			if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache,newgN,0)>0)
+				return newgN->bn;
+			SRP_gN_free(newgN);
+			}
+		}
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+/* this function parses verifier file. Format is:
+ * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
+ * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
+ */
+
+
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
+	{
+	int error_code ;
+	STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
+	char *last_index = NULL;
+	int i;
+	char **pp;
+
+	SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
+	SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL ;
+
+	TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+	BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+	error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+
+	if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in,verifier_file) <= 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
+
+	if ((tmpdb =TXT_DB_read(in,DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+
+
+	if (vb->seed_key)
+		{
+		last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
+		}
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++)
+		{
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data,i);
+		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX)
+			{
+			/*we add this couple in the internal Stack */
+
+			if ((gN = (SRP_gN *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL) 
+ 				goto err;
+
+			if  (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
+	                ||  !(gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache,pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+			||  !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache,pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+			||  sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab,gN,0) == 0)
+				goto err;
+
+			gN = NULL;
+
+			if (vb->seed_key != NULL)
+				{
+				last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
+				}
+			}
+		else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID)
+			{
+			/* it is a user .... */
+			SRP_gN *lgN;
+			if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN],SRP_gN_tab))!=NULL)
+				{
+				error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+				if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
+					goto err;
+				
+				SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd,lgN->g,lgN->N);
+				if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid],pp[DB_srpinfo]))
+					goto err;
+				
+				error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+				if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt],pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+					goto err;
+
+				if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
+					goto err;
+				user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	
+	if (last_index != NULL)
+		{
+		/* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
+
+		if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index,SRP_gN_tab))==NULL))
+			{
+			error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		vb->default_g = gN->g ;
+		vb->default_N = gN->N ;
+		gN = NULL ;
+		}
+	error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
+
+ err:
+	/* there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application terminates most likely */
+
+	if (gN != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
+		OPENSSL_free(gN);
+		}
+
+	SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
+
+	if (tmpdb) TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+	if (in) BIO_free_all(in);
+
+	sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
+
+	return error_code;
+
+	}
+
+
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+	{
+	int i;
+	SRP_user_pwd *user;
+	unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
+
+	if (vb == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	for(i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++)
+		{
+		user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
+		if (strcmp(user->id,username)==0)
+			return user;
+		}
+	if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
+		(vb->default_g == NULL) ||
+		(vb->default_N == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
+
+	if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
+		return NULL;
+
+	SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user,vb->default_g,vb->default_N);
+				
+	if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user,username,NULL))
+		goto err;
+		
+	RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, username, strlen(username));
+	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digs, NULL);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
+	if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user, BN_bin2bn(digs,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,NULL), BN_bin2bn(digv,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL))) 
+		return user;
+
+err:    SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+
+/*
+   create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
+*/
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
+			  char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
+	{
+	int len;
+	char * result=NULL;
+	char *vf;
+	BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
+	unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+	unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+	char * defgNid = NULL;
+
+	if ((user == NULL)||
+		(pass == NULL)||
+		(salt == NULL)||
+		(verifier == NULL))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (N)
+		{
+		if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N))) goto err;
+		N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+		if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g))) goto err;
+		g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+		defgNid = "*";
+		}
+	else
+		{ 
+		SRP_gN * gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL) ;
+		if (gN == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		N_bn = gN->N;
+		g_bn = gN->g;
+		defgNid = gN->id;
+		}
+
+	if (*salt == NULL)
+		{
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+
+		s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, *salt)))
+			goto err;
+		s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
+		}
+
+
+	if(!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn)) goto err;
+
+	BN_bn2bin(v,tmp);
+	if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v)*2)) == NULL))
+		goto err;
+	t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
+
+	*verifier = vf;
+	if (*salt == NULL)
+		{
+		char *tmp_salt;
+
+		if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(vf);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+		*salt = tmp_salt;
+		}
+
+	result=defgNid;
+
+err:
+	if(N)
+		{
+		BN_free(N_bn);
+		BN_free(g_bn);
+		}
+	return result;
+	}
+
+/*
+   create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
+*/
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
+	{
+	int result=0;
+	BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+
+	if ((user == NULL)||
+		(pass == NULL)||
+		(salt == NULL)||
+		(verifier == NULL)||
+		(N == NULL)||
+		(g == NULL)||
+		(bn_ctx == NULL))
+		goto err;
+
+	srp_bn_print(N);
+	srp_bn_print(g);
+
+	if (*salt == NULL)
+		{
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+
+		*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2,SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN,NULL);
+		}
+
+	x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt,user,pass);
+
+	*verifier = BN_new();
+	if(*verifier == NULL) goto err;
+
+	if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier,g,x,N,bn_ctx))
+		{
+		BN_clear_free(*verifier);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	srp_bn_print(*verifier);
+
+	result=1;
+
+err:
+
+	BN_clear_free(x);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	return result;
+	}
+
+
+
+#endif