diff options
author | Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> | 2014-11-14 09:52:32 +0100 |
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committer | Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> | 2014-11-14 09:52:32 +0100 |
commit | b28828796ad6d65ac463b41bba153f74e4531a6b (patch) | |
tree | 154b9f7436ae575e324f3374a5145e451bf649a8 /main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | |
parent | e7a6c1a987ebee1ddb2f908ca028d613a5c52490 (diff) |
Update OpenSSL version
Diffstat (limited to 'main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c')
-rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 150 |
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c index af4d24a5..c3633319 100644 --- a/main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ b/main/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ * an equivalent notion. */ +#include "constant_time_locl.h" #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) #include <stdio.h> @@ -95,92 +96,117 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { - int i, dblen, mlen = -1; - const unsigned char *maskeddb; - int lzero; - unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - unsigned char *padded_from; - int bad = 0; - - if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) - /* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the - * particular ciphertext. */ - goto decoding_err; + int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; + unsigned int good, found_one_byte; + const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; + /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: + * em = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */ + unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], + phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - lzero = num - flen; - if (lzero < 0) - { - /* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow - * for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge - * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal - * Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001), - * so we use a 'bad' flag */ - bad = 1; - lzero = 0; - flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */ - } + if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) + return -1; - dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; - db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen + num); - if (db == NULL) + /* + * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the + * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by + * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, + * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus + * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. + * This does not leak any side-channel information. + */ + if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2) + goto decoding_err; + + dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1; + db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); + em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; + goto cleanup; } - /* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0) - * to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero. */ - padded_from = db + dblen; - memset(padded_from, 0, lzero); - memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen); + /* + * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid + * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel + * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access + * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. + * + * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. + */ + memset(em, 0, num); + memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); - maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + /* + * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is + * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA + * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). + */ + good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); + + maskedseed = em + 1; + maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen)) - return -1; + goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) - seed[i] ^= padded_from[i]; - + seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; + if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - return -1; + goto cleanup; for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) - return -1; + goto cleanup; + + good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad) + found_one_byte = 0; + for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) + { + /* Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */ + unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); + unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); + one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, + i, one_index); + found_one_byte |= equals1; + good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); + } + + good &= found_one_byte; + + /* + * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, + * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a + * concern. + */ + if (!good) goto decoding_err; + + msg_index = one_index + 1; + mlen = dblen - msg_index; + + if (tlen < mlen) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); + mlen = -1; + } else { - for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) - if (db[i] != 0x00) - break; - if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01) - goto decoding_err; - else - { - /* everything looks OK */ - - mlen = dblen - ++i; - if (tlen < mlen) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); - mlen = -1; - } - else - memcpy(to, db + i, mlen); - } + memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); + goto cleanup; } - OPENSSL_free(db); - return mlen; decoding_err: - /* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal - * which kind of decoding error happened */ + /* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal + * which kind of decoding error happened. */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); +cleanup: if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db); - return -1; + if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em); + return mlen; } int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, |