From c206a91d320995f37f8abb33188bfd384249da3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Parm=C3=A9nides=20GV?= Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 20:43:34 +0200 Subject: Next step: compile jni sources correctly. --- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 893 ------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 893 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c (limited to 'openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c') diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7c941885..00000000 --- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,893 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef RSA_NULL - -static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); -static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); -static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); -static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); -static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); -static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); -static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); -static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ - "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", - RSA_eay_public_encrypt, - RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ - RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ - RSA_eay_private_decrypt, - RSA_eay_mod_exp, - BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ - RSA_eay_init, - RSA_eay_finish, - 0, /* flags */ - NULL, - 0, /* rsa_sign */ - 0, /* rsa_verify */ - NULL /* rsa_keygen */ - }; - -const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) - { - return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); - } - -static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f,*ret; - int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) - { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - - /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the - * length of the modulus */ - j=BN_num_bytes(ret); - i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j])); - for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) - to[k]=0; - - r=num; -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } - -static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BN_BLINDING *ret; - int got_write_lock = 0; - CRYPTO_THREADID cur; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - - ret = rsa->blinding; - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; - - CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); - if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) - { - /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ - - *local = 1; - } - else - { - /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ - - *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() - * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses - * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be - * stored outside the BN_BLINDING - */ - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) - { - if (!got_write_lock) - { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - got_write_lock = 1; - } - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) - rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - ret = rsa->mt_blinding; - } - - err: - if (got_write_lock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - return ret; -} - -static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) - return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else - { - int ret; - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } -} - -static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else - { - int ret; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } -} - -/* signing */ -static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res; - int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) - { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) - goto err; - - if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && - (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && - (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) - { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - BN_init(&local_d); - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d= rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) - { - BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); - if (BN_cmp(ret, f)) - res = f; - else - res = ret; - } - else - res = ret; - - /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the - * length of the modulus */ - j=BN_num_bytes(res); - i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j])); - for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) - to[k]=0; - - r=num; -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } - -static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br; - int j,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ - if (flen > num) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) - { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* do the decrypt */ - if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && - (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && - (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) - { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d = rsa->d; - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) - goto err; - - p=buf; - j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); - break; -#endif - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } - -/* signature verification */ -static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) - { - BIGNUM *f,*ret; - int i,num=0,r= -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf=NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) - { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if(!f || !ret || !buf) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things - * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ - if (flen > num) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - - if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) - if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; - - p=buf; - i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); - - switch (padding) - { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - -err: - if (ctx != NULL) - { - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - } - if (buf != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - } - return(r); - } - -static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) - { - BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1; - BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1; - int ret=0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM local_p, local_q; - BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; - - /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) - */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - BN_init(&local_p); - p = &local_p; - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - BN_init(&local_q); - q = &local_q; - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - { - p = rsa->p; - q = rsa->q; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) - { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) - goto err; - } - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - c = &local_c; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - } - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; - - if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err; - /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does - * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; - - /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - pr1 = &local_r1; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - pr1 = r1; - if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - - /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of - * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still - * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following - * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. - * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because - * they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) - { - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation - * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of - * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check - * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) - { - /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) - * mod_exp and return that instead. */ - - BIGNUM local_d; - BIGNUM *d = NULL; - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) - { - d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - else - d = rsa->d; - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; - } - } - ret=1; -err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - return(ret); - } - -static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) - { - rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; - return(1); - } - -static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) - { - if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return(1); - } - -#endif -- cgit v1.2.3