From 3c3421afd8f74a3aa8d1011de07a8c18f9549210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Parm=C3=A9nides=20GV?= Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 12:04:17 +0200 Subject: Rename app->bitmask_android This way, gradle commands generate apks correctly named. --- bitmask_android/openvpn/.gitignore | 56 + bitmask_android/openvpn/.mailmap | 1 + bitmask_android/openvpn/.svncommitters | 1 + bitmask_android/openvpn/AUTHORS | 1 + bitmask_android/openvpn/Android.mk | 93 + bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYING | 217 + bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYRIGHT.GPL | 339 + bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog | 4071 ++++++++++++ bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog.IPv6 | 440 ++ bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL | 369 ++ bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL-win32.txt | 48 + bitmask_android/openvpn/Makefile.am | 101 + bitmask_android/openvpn/NEWS | 0 bitmask_android/openvpn/PORTS | 94 + bitmask_android/openvpn/README | 75 + bitmask_android/openvpn/README.IPv6 | 97 + bitmask_android/openvpn/README.polarssl | 28 + 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create mode 100755 bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_lpback.sh create mode 100644 bitmask_android/openvpn/version.m4 create mode 100644 bitmask_android/openvpn/version.sh.in (limited to 'bitmask_android/openvpn') diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/.gitignore b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a04afff7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +*.[oa] +*.l[oa] +*.dll +*.exe +*.exe.* +*.obj +*.pyc +*.so +*~ +*.idb +*.suo +*.ncb +*.vcproj.* +*.vcxproj.user +*.sln.cache +*.log +Release +Debug +Win32-Output +.deps +.libs +Makefile +Makefile.in +aclocal.m4 +autodefs.h +autom4te.cache +config.guess +config.h +config.h.in +config.log +config.status +config.sub +configure +configure.h +depcomp +stamp-h1 +install-sh +missing +ltmain.sh +libtool +m4/libtool.m4 +m4/ltoptions.m4 +m4/ltsugar.m4 +m4/ltversion.m4 +m4/lt~obsolete.m4 + +version.sh +msvc-env-local.bat +config-msvc-local.h +config-msvc-version.h +doc/openvpn.8.html +distro/rpm/openvpn.spec +tests/t_client.sh +tests/t_client-*-20??????-??????/ +src/openvpn/openvpn +config-version.h diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/.mailmap b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.mailmap new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91ff5537 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.mailmap @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +James Yonan james diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/.svncommitters b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.svncommitters new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0772102d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/.svncommitters @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +james = James Yonan diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/AUTHORS b/bitmask_android/openvpn/AUTHORS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f90aa2a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/AUTHORS @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +James Yonan diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/Android.mk b/bitmask_android/openvpn/Android.mk new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a949451 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/Android.mk @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)/ + +include $(CLEAR_VARS) + +LOCAL_LDLIBS := -lz +LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := openssl/include lzo/include openssl/crypto openssl openvpn/src/compat openvpn/src/openvpn openvpn/include + +LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libssl libcrypto +#LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libssl_static libcrypto_static liblzo-static + +LOCAL_CFLAGS= -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -DTARGET_ABI=\"${TARGET_ABI}\" +LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := liblzo-static + +LOCAL_MODULE = openvpn + +LOCAL_SRC_FILES:= \ + src/compat/compat-basename.c \ + src/compat/compat-daemon.c \ + src/compat/compat-dirname.c \ + src/compat/compat-gettimeofday.c \ + src/compat/compat-inet_ntop.c \ + src/compat/compat-inet_pton.c \ + src/compat/compat-rsa_generate_key.c \ + src/openvpn/base64.c \ + src/openvpn/buffer.c \ + src/openvpn/clinat.c \ + src/openvpn/console.c \ + src/openvpn/crypto.c \ + src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c \ + src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c \ + src/openvpn/dhcp.c \ + src/openvpn/error.c \ + src/openvpn/event.c \ + src/openvpn/fdmisc.c \ + src/openvpn/forward.c \ + src/openvpn/fragment.c \ + src/openvpn/gremlin.c \ + src/openvpn/helper.c \ + src/openvpn/httpdigest.c \ + src/openvpn/init.c \ + src/openvpn/interval.c \ + src/openvpn/list.c \ + src/openvpn/lladdr.c \ + src/openvpn/lzo.c \ + src/openvpn/manage.c \ + src/openvpn/mbuf.c \ + src/openvpn/misc.c \ + src/openvpn/mroute.c \ + src/openvpn/mss.c \ + src/openvpn/mstats.c \ + src/openvpn/mtcp.c \ + src/openvpn/mtu.c \ + src/openvpn/mudp.c \ + src/openvpn/multi.c \ + src/openvpn/ntlm.c \ + src/openvpn/occ.c \ + src/openvpn/openvpn.c \ + src/openvpn/options.c \ + src/openvpn/otime.c \ + src/openvpn/packet_id.c \ + src/openvpn/perf.c \ + src/openvpn/pf.c \ + src/openvpn/ping.c \ + src/openvpn/pkcs11.c \ + src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c \ + src/openvpn/platform.c \ + src/openvpn/plugin.c \ + src/openvpn/pool.c \ + src/openvpn/proto.c \ + src/openvpn/proxy.c \ + src/openvpn/ps.c \ + src/openvpn/push.c \ + src/openvpn/reliable.c \ + src/openvpn/route.c \ + src/openvpn/schedule.c \ + src/openvpn/session_id.c \ + src/openvpn/shaper.c \ + src/openvpn/sig.c \ + src/openvpn/socket.c \ + src/openvpn/socks.c \ + src/openvpn/ssl.c \ + src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c \ + src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c \ + src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c \ + src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c \ + src/openvpn/status.c \ + src/openvpn/tun.c + +include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY) +#include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE) + + + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYING b/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYING new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6e5c431 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYING @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +OpenVPN (TM) -- An Open Source VPN daemon + +Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + +This distribution contains multiple components, some +of which fall under different licenses. By using OpenVPN +or any of the bundled components enumerated below, you +agree to be bound by the conditions of the license for +each respective component. + +OpenVPN trademark +----------------- + + "OpenVPN" is a trademark of OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + + +OpenVPN license: +---------------- + + OpenVPN is distributed under the GPL license version 2 (see Below). + + Special exception for linking OpenVPN with OpenSSL: + + In addition, as a special exception, OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. gives + permission to link the code of this program with the OpenSSL + library (or with modified versions of OpenSSL that use the same + license as OpenSSL), and distribute linked combinations including + the two. You must obey the GNU General Public License in all + respects for all of the code used other than OpenSSL. If you modify + this file, you may extend this exception to your version of the + file, but you are not obligated to do so. If you do not wish to + do so, delete this exception statement from your version. + +LZO license: +------------ + + LZO is Copyright (C) Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer, + and is licensed under the GPL. + + Special exception for linking OpenVPN with both OpenSSL and LZO: + + Hereby I grant a special exception to the OpenVPN project + (http://openvpn.net/) to link the LZO library with + the OpenSSL library (http://www.openssl.org). + + Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer + +TAP-Win32/TAP-Win64 Driver license: +----------------------------------- + + This device driver was inspired by the CIPE-Win32 driver by + Damion K. Wilson. + + The source and object code of the TAP-Win32/TAP-Win64 driver + is Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc., and is released under + the GPL version 2. + +Windows DDK Samples: +-------------------- + + The Windows binary distribution includes devcon.exe, a + Microsoft DDK sample which is redistributed under the terms + of the DDK EULA. + +NSIS License: +------------- + + Copyright (C) 2002-2003 Joost Verburg + + This software is provided 'as-is', without any express or implied + warranty. In no event will the authors be held liable for any damages + arising from the use of this software. + + Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose, + including commercial applications, and to alter it and redistribute + it freely, subject to the following restrictions: + + 1. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented; + you must not claim that you wrote the original software. + If you use this software in a product, an acknowledgment in the + product documentation would be appreciated but is not required. + 2. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, + and must not be misrepresented as being the original software. + 3. This notice may not be removed or altered from any distribution. + +OpenSSL License: +---------------- + + The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a dual license, i.e. both the conditions of + the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit. + See below for the actual license texts. Actually both licenses are BSD-style + Open Source licenses. In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL + please contact openssl-core@openssl.org. + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + + Original SSLeay License + ----------------------- + +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +GNU Public License (GPL) +------------------------ + + OpenVPN, LZO, and the TAP-Win32 distributions are + licensed under the GPL version 2 (see COPYRIGHT.GPL). + + In the Windows binary distribution of OpenVPN, the + GPL is reproduced below. + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYRIGHT.GPL b/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYRIGHT.GPL new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff8a7f00 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/COPYRIGHT.GPL @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE + Version 2, June 1991 + + Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies + of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. + + Preamble + + The licenses for most software are designed to take away your +freedom to share and change it. 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See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + + +Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. + +If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this +when it starts in an interactive mode: + + Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author + Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. + This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it + under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. + +The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate +parts of the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may +be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be +mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program. + +You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your +school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if +necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names: + + Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program + `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker. + + , 1 April 1989 + Ty Coon, President of Vice + +This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into +proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may +consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the +library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Library General +Public License instead of this License. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog b/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7b945c80 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,4071 @@ +OpenVPN Change Log +Copyright (C) 2002-2012 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + +2012.09.12 -- Version 2.3_beta1 +Arne Schwabe (7): + Fixes error: --key fails with EXTERNAL_PRIVATE_KEY: No such file or directory if --management-external-key is used + Merge almost identical create_socket_tcp and create_socket_tcp6 + Document the inlining of files in openvpn and document key-direction + Merge getaddr_multi and getaddr6 into one function + Document --management-client and --management-signal a bit better + Document that keep alive will double the second value in server mode and give a short explanation why the value is chosen. + Add checks for external-key-managements + +David Sommerseth (1): + Fix reconnect issues when --push and UDP is used on the server + +Gert Doering (4): + Reduce --version string detail about IPv6 to just "[IPv6]". + Put actual OpenVPN command line on top of corresponding log file. + Keep pre-existing tun/tap devices around on *BSD + make "ipv6 ifconfig" on linux compatible with busybox ifconfig + +Heiko Hund (6): + fix regression with --http-proxy[-*] options + add x_msg_va() log function + add API for plug-ins to write to openvpn log + remove stale _openssl_get_subject() prototype + remove unused flag SSLF_NO_NAME_REMAPPING + Add --compat-names option + +2012.07.20 -- Version 2.3_alpha3 +Arne Schwabe (1): + Fix compiling with --disable-management + +Gert Doering (1): + Repair "tap server" mode brokenness caused by fallout + +Heiko Hund (4): + make non-blocking connect work on Windows + don't treat socket related errors special anymore + remove unused show_connection_list debug function + add option --management-query-proxy + +2012.06.29 -- Version 2.3_alpha2 +Adriaan de Jong (11): + Fixed off-by-one in serial length calculation + Migrated x509_get_subject to use of the garbage collector + Migrated x509_get_serial to use the garbage collector + Migrated x509_get_sha1_hash to use the garbage collector + Ensure sys/un.h autoconf detection includes sys/socket.h + Added support for new PolarSSL 1.1 RNG + Added a configuration option to enable prediction resistance in the PolarSSL random number generator. + Use POLARSSL_CFLAGS instead of POLARSSL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS in configure.ac + Removed support for PolarSSL < 1.1 + Updated README.polarssl with build system changes. + Removed stray "Fox-IT hardening" string. + +Alon Bar-Lev (94): + build: version should not contain '-' + package: rpm: strip should be handled by package management + cleanup: options.c: remove redundant include + cleanup: remove C++ warnings + cleanup: win32.c: wrong printf format + cleanup: remove redundant ';' + cleanup: crypto_openssl.c: remove support for pre-openssl-0.9.6 + cleanup: tun.c: fix incorrect option in message (ip-win32) + cleanup: memcmp.c: remove unused source + fixup: init.c: add missing conditional for ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + build: correct place to alter WINVER is at build system + Update .gitignore + build: handle printf style format in mingw + build: rename plugin directory to plugins + build: plugins: properly use CC, CFLAGS and LDFLAGS + build: we need the sample.ovpn in future + Remove install-win32 + Remove easy-rsa + Remove tap-win32 + cleanup: rename tap-windows function from win32 to win + build: remove windows specific build system + build: split acinclude.m4 into m4/* + build: m4/ax_varargs.m4: cleanup + build: m4/ax_emptyarray.m4: cleanup + build: m4/ax_socklen_t.m4: cleanup + build: autotools: first pass of trivial autotools changes + build: autoconf: remove OPENVPN_ADD_LIBS useless macro + build: remove awk and non-standard autoconf output processing + build: standard directory layout + build: add libtool + windows resources for executables + build: autoconf: commands as environment + build: libdl usage + build: properly detect and use socket libs + build: autoconf: minor cleanups + build: proper selinux detection and usage + build: distribute pkg.m4 + build: proper pkcs11-helper detection and usage + build: properly process lzo-stub + build: proper lzo detection and usage + build: proper crypto detection and usage + build: autoconf: update defaults for options + build: win-msvc: msbuild format + build: move out config.h include from syshead + build: split out compat + build: move gettimeofday() emulation to compat + build: move daemon() emulation into compat + build: move inet_ntop(), inet_pton() emulation into compat + cleanup: move console related function into its own module + build: move wrappers into platform module + build: windows: install version.sh to allow installer read version + build: distribute samples in windows + build: use tap-windows.h as external dependency + build: ax_varargs.m4: fixups + build: autoconf: misc sockets fixups + build: enable lzo by default + build: windows: set vendor to openvpn project + cleanups + build: assume dlfcn is available on all supported platforms + build: openbsd: detect netinet/ip.h correctly + build: tap: search for tap header + build: msvc: upgrade to Visual Studio 2010 + fixups + Enable pedantic in windows compilation + cleanup: flags should not be bool + cleanup: avoid using ~0 - generic + cleanup: avoid using ~0 - ipv6 + cleanup: avoid using ~0 - netmask + cleanup: avoid using ~0 - windows + cleanup: gc usage + build: fix some statement left from conversion + build: properly detect netinet/ip.h structs + build: properly detect TUNSETPERSIST + cleanup: plugin: support C++ plugin + cleanup: remove C++ comments + cleanup: add .gitattributes to control eol style explicitly + crash: packet_id_debug_print: sl may be null + build: use stdbool.h if available + build: fix typo in --enable-save-password + build: windows: convert resources to UTF-8 + build: check minimum polarssl version + cleanup: update .gitignore + cleanup: spec: make space/tab consistent + build: spec: we support openssl >= 0.9.7 + build: insall README* document using build system + build: detect sys/wait.h required for *bsd + build: add git revision to --version output if build from git repository + build: cleanup: yet another forgotten brackets + build: update INSTALL to recent changes + build: support platforms that does not need explicit tun headers + build: do not support authenticated in verify_user_pass + Moved gc_new and gc_free to begin end of function + Fixed a bug in the return value of ssl_verify when pre_verify failed + Unified verification function return values: + Removed a stray Fox-IT tag + Fixed a typo: print the subject instead of the serial for verification errors + Made SSL_CIPHER const in print_details, to fix warning + Moved to PolarSSL 1.0.0: + Added missing #ifdef to allow --disable-managent to work again + Fixed disabling crypto and SSL + Got rid of a few magic numbers in ntlm.c + Removed obsolete des_cblock and des_keyschedule + Further removal of des_old.h based calls + Fixed missing comma in plugin.h + Moved prng_uninit out of crypto_uninit_lib + Moved CryptoAPI header include to the ssl_openssl.c + Reordered functions to ensure warning-free Windows build + Added options to switch between OpenSSL and PolarSSL and PKCS11... + Moved from strsep to strtok, for Windows compatibility + Minor cleanup to enable warning-free Windows build: + Fixed a typo when initialising cryptoapi certs + Minor code cleanup: cleaned up error handling in verify_cert. + Moved out of memory prototype to error.h, as the definition is in error.c + Removed support for calling gc_malloc with a NULL gc_arena struct + + (The follwing patches from Adriaan was mistakenly merged with + the wrong commit author in the git tree) + Doxygen: Added data channel crypto docs + Added control channel crypto docs + Added compression docs + Added reliability layer documentation + Added memory management documentation + Added data channel fragmentation docs + Added main/control docs + Moved doxygen-specific files to a separate directory + +Byron Ellacott (1): + autoconf fixes for building on OSX + +David Sommerseth (50): + Provide 'dev_type' environment variable to plug-ins and script hooks + Define the new openvpn_plugin_{open,func}_v3() API + Implement the core v3 plug-in function calls. + Extend the v3 plug-in API to send over X509 certificates + Added a simple plug-in demonstrating the v3 plug-in API. + Separate the general plug-in version constant and v3 plug-in structs version + Use a version-less version identifier on the master branch + Fix the --client-cert-not-required feature + Change the default --tmp-dir path to a more suitable path + Improve the mysprintf() issue in openvpnserv.c + Add a simple comment regarding openvpn_snprintf() is duplicated + Merge branch 'feat_ipv6_transport' + Merge branch 'feat_ipv6_payload' + Merge branch 'svn-branch-2.1' into merge + Solved hidden merge conflicts between master and svn-branch-2.1 + Fix const declarations in plug-in v3 structs + Merge remote-tracking branch 'cron2/feat_ipv6_payload_2.3' + Don't define ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO if SSL is not available + Fix compiling issues with pkcs11 when --disable-management is configured + Remove support for Linux 2.2 configuration fallback + Revert "Add new openssl.cnf to easy-rsa/Windows" + Merge remote branch SVN 2.1 into the git tree + Merge branch 'svn-merger' + Fix Microsoft Visual Studio incompatibility in plugin.c + Fixed compile issues on FreeBSD and Solaris + Fix PolarSSL and --pkcs12 option issues + Fix FreeBSD/OpenBSD/NetBSD compiler warnings in get_default_gateway() + Make '--win-sys env' default + Do some file/directory tests before really starting openvpn + Fix bug after removing Linux 2.2 support + Don't look for 'stdin' file when using --auth-user-pass + Fix compiling with --disable-crypto and/or --disable-ssl + Fix a couple of issues in openvpn_execve() + Move away from openvpn_basename() over to platform provided basename() + Enable access() when building in Visual Studio + New Windows build fixes + Fix compilation errors on Linux platforms without SO_MARK + autotools ./configure don't like compat.h + Fix pool logging when IPv6 is not enabled + Don't check for file presence on inline files + Add --route-pre-down/OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_PREDOWN script/plug-in hook + Enhance the error handling in _openssl_get_subject() + Fix assert() situations where gc_malloc() is called without a gc_arena object + Fix compile issues when plug-ins are disabled. + Remove --show-gateway if debug info is not enabled (--disable-debug) + Fix compile issues with status.c + Connection entry {tun,link}_mtu_defined not set correctly + Makefile.am referenced a now non-existing config-win32.h + Makefile.am was missing ssl_common.h + Revamp check_file_access() checks in stdin scenarios + +Davide Guerri (1): + New feauture: Add --stale-routes-check + +Frank de Brabander (1): + Fixed wrong return type of cipher_kt_mode + +Frederic Crozat (1): + Add support to forward console query to systemd + +Gert Doering (45): + Add more detailed explanation regarding the function of "--rdns-internal" + Enable IPv6 Payload in OpenVPN p2mp tun server mode. 20100104-1 release. + remove NOTES file from commit - private scribbling + NetBSD fixes - on 4.0 and up, use multi-af mode. + new feature: "ifconfig-ipv6-push" (from ccd/ config) + add some TODOs to TODO.IPv6 + undo accidential duplication of existing "--iroute" line in the help text + basic documentation of IPv6 related options and their syntax + Enable IPv6 Payload in OpenVPN p2mp tun server mode. + remove NOTES file from commit - private scribbling + env_block(): if PATH is not set, add standard PATH setting to env + add IPv6 route add / route delete code for windows (using "netsh") + - Win32 IPv6 ifconfig support, using "netsh" calls + drop "book ipv6" from open_tun() and tuncfg() prototypes + document recent changes and open TODOs, adapt --version info, tag release + Win32: set next-hop for IPv6 routes according to TUN/TAP mode + when deleting a route on win32, also add gateway address + WIN32: if IPv6 requested in TUN mode, check if TUN/TAP driver < 9.7 + revert unconditionally-enabling of setenv_es() logging + implement IPv6 ifconfig + route setup/deletion on OpenBSD + full "VPN client connect" test framework for OpenVPN t_client.rc-sample + renamed t_client.sh to t_client.sh.in + 2.2-beta3 has a signed TAP driver with the IPv6 code - test for 9.8 + correct URL for "more information about IPv6 patch is *here*" + bugfix for linux/iproute2: IPv6 ifconfig code block was not called for "dev tun"+"topology subnet" + bump IPv6 version number (openvpn --version) to 20100922-1 + Implement "ipv6 ifconfig" for TAP interfaces on Solaris interfaces + rebased to 2.2RC2 (beta 2.2 branch) + Windows IPv6 cleanup - properly remove IPv6 routes and interface config + For all accesses to "struct route_list * rl", check first that rl is non-NULL + Replace 32-bit-based add_in6_addr() implementation by an 8-bit based one + Platform cleanup for NetBSD + Move block for "stale-routes-check" config inside #ifdef P2MP_SERVER block + add missing break between "case IPv4" and "case IPv6" + bump tap driver version from 9.8 to 9.9 + log error message and exit for "win32, tun mode, tap driver version 9.8" + work around inet_ntop/inet_pton problems for MSVC builds on WinXP + Fix build-up of duplicate IPv6 routes on reconnect. + Fix list-overrun checks in copy_route_[ipv6_]option_list() + add "print test titles" and "use sudo" functionality to t_client.rc + Platform cleanup for FreeBSD + Implement IPv6 interface config with non-/64 prefix lengths. + Fix RUN_SUDO functionality for t_client.sh + Document IPv6-related environment variables. + Platform cleanup for OpenBSD + +Gisle Vanem (1): + Avoid re-defining uint32_t when using mingw compiler + +Gustavo Zacarias (1): + Fix compile issues when using --enable-small and --disable-ssl/--disable-crypto + +Heiko Hund (16): + add .gitignore to official repository + remove function is_proto_tcp() + remove legacy code to query IE proxy information + lowercase include header name in syshead.h + define IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL macro for WIN32 + add --mark option to set SO_MARK sockopt + Windows UTF-8 input/output + UTF-8 X.509 distinguished names + set Windows environment variables as UCS-2 + handle Windows unicode paths + replace check for TARGET_WIN32 with WIN32 + do not use mode_t on Windows + use the underscore version of stat on Windows + make MSVC link against shell32 as well + move variable declaration to top of function + define access mode flag X_OK as 0 on Windows + +Igor Novgorodov (1): + The code blocks enabled by ENABLE_CLIENT_CR depends on management + +James Yonan (57): + Added "management-external-key" option. + Minor addition of logging info before and after execution of Windows net commands. + Misc fixes to r6708. + Added --x509-track option. + * added --management-up-down option to allow management interface to be notified of tunnel up/down events. + Fixed minor compile issue triggered on builds where MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH is not enabled. + Implemented get_default_gateway_mac_addr for Mac OS X + Fixes to r6925. + Properly handle certificate serial numbers > 32 bits. + Added "client-nat" option for stateless, one-to-one NAT on the client side. + Renamed branch to reflect that it is no longer beta. + env_filter_match now includes the serial number of all certs + Fixed issue where a client might receive multiple push replies from a server + Fixed bug introduced in r7031 that might cause this error message: + Extended "client-kill" management interface command (server-side) + Client will now try to reconnect if no push reply received within handshake-window seconds. + Version 2.1.3n + Fixed compiling issues when using --disable-crypto + Added "management-external-key" option. + Misc fixes to r6708. + win/sign.py now accepts an optional tap-dir argument. + Added "auth-token" client directive + Added ./configure --enable-osxipconfig option for Mac OS X + Added more packet ID debug info at debug level 3 for debugging false positive packet replays. + Fixed bug that incorrectly placed stricter TCP packet replay rules on UDP sessions + Fixed bug in port-share that could cause port share process to crash + For Mac OSX, when DARWIN_USE_IPCONFIG is defined, retry ipconfig command on failure + Version 2.1.3t + Revert r7092 and r7151, i.e. remove --enable-osxipconfig configure option. + Added 'dir' flag to "crl-verify" (see man page for info). + Added new "extra-certs" and "verify-hash" options + Fixed compile issues on Windows. + Added --enable-lzo-stub configure option to build an OpenVPN client without LZO + Added optional journal directory argument to "port-share" directive + Reduce log verbosity at level 3, with a focus on removing excessive log verbosity generated by port-share activity. + env_filter_match now includes the serial number of all certs in chain + Added support for static challenge/response protocol. + r7316 fixes. + Added redirect-gateway block-local flag, with support for Linux, Mac OS X + Extended x509-track to allow SHA1 certificate hash to be extracted + Added "management-query-remote" directive (client) to allow the management interface to override the "remote" directive. + Version 2.1.5. + Fixed MSVC compile error related to r7408. + Redact "echo" directive strings from log, since these strings (going forward) could conceivably contain security-sensitive data. + Modified sanitize_control_message to remove redacted data from control string rather than blotting it out with "_" chars. + Changed CC_PRINT character class to allow UTF-8 chars. + Increased the --verb threshold for "PID_ERR replay" messages to 4 from 3. + Fixed issue where redirect-gateway block-local code was not correctly calculating... + CC_PRINT character class now allows any 8-bit character value >= 32. + "status" management interface command (version >= 2) will now include the username for each connected user. + Minor fix to CC_PRINT char class + Fixed management interface bug where >FATAL notifications were not being output properly + Raised D_PID_DEBUG_LOW from level 3 to 4 to reduce replay error verbosity at level 3. + Added "memstats" option to maintain real-time operating stats in a memory-mapped file. + Fixed client issues with DHCP Router option extraction/deletion when using layer 2 with DHCP proxy: + Allow "tap-win32 dynamic " to be used in topology subnet mode. + Added support for "on-link" routes on Linux client + +Jan Just Keijser (1): + Made some options connection-entry specific + +Joe Patterson (1): + common_name passing in auth_pam plugin + +JuanJo Ciarlante (40): + * rebased openvpn-2.1_rc1b.jjo.20061206.d.patch + * created getaddr6(), use it from resolve_remote() + * migrated all getaddrinfo() to getaddr6 + * socket.c: use USE_PF_INET6 in switch constructs to actually toss them out, + * support --disable-ipv6 build properly: + * important fix for tcp6 reconnection was incorrectly creating a PF_INET socket + * added README.ipv6.txt + * fixed win32 non-ipv6 build + * ipv6 on win32 "milestone": 1st snapshot that passes all unittests + * document ipv6 milestone status + * doc update w/unittests results + * make possible to x-compile openvpn/win32 in Linux + * correctly setup hints.ai_socktype for getaddrinfo(), althought sorta hacky, see TODO.ipv6. + * renamed README.ipv6{.txt,} + * updated {README,TODO}.ipv6 from feedback at openvpn-devel mlist + * init.c: document the ENABLE_MANAGEMENT place to work on + * init.c: small in-doc tweaks + * fix multi-tcp crash (corrected assertion) + * TODO.ipv6 update + * socket.c: better buf logic in print_sockaddr_ex + * fixed segfault for undef address family in print_sockaddr_ex (thanks Marcel!) + * doc updates + * openbsd: no IFF_MULTICAST, #ifdef around it + * no new funcionality, just small cleanups + * (prototype) fix for supporting "redirect-gateway" for tunneled ipv4 over ipv6 endpoints + * polished redirect-gateway (ipv4 on ipv6 endpoints) support + * updated doc + * fix --disable-ipv6 build + * doc updates + * rebased to v2.1.1 release + * undo mroute.c changes related to ipv6 payload + * fix --multihome for ipv4 + * fix --multihome for ipv6 + * ipv6-0.4.14: fix xinetd usage + * ipv6-0.4.15: add --multihome support to xBSD + * ipv6-0.4.15b: rebase over openvpn-testing-master + * ipv6-0.4.16: fix mingw32 build + * make ipv6_payload compile under windowze + USE_PF_INET6 by default for v2.3 + fix ipv6 compilation under macosx >= 1070 - v3 + +Markus Koetter (1): + Add extv3 X509 field support to --x509-username-field + +Matthew L. Creech (1): + Fix 2.2.0 build failure when management interface disabled + +Matthias Andree (1): + Skip rather than fail test in addressless FreeBSD jails. + +Robert Fischer (8): + Update man page with info about --capath + Update man page with info about --connect-timeout + Added info about --show-proxy-settings + Documented --x509-username-field option + Documented --errors-to-stderr option + Documented --push-peer-info option + Update man page with info about --remote-random-hostname + Added man page entry for --management-client + +Samuli Seppänen (19): + Add man page entry for --redirect-private + Change all CRLF linefeeds to LF linefeeds + Fix a bug in devcon source code handling + Removed Win2k from supported platforms list in INSTALL and win/openvpn.nsi + Fixed copying of tapinstall.exe to dist/bin when using prebuilt TAP-drivers + Fixed a bug with GUI icon deletion on upgrade from 2.2-RC or earlier + Fix a build-ca issue on Windows + Add new openssl.cnf to easy-rsa/Windows + Updated "easy-rsa" for OpenSSL 1.0.0 + Made domake-win builds to use easy-rsa/2.0/openssl-1.0.0.cnf + Fixes to easy-rsa/2.0 + Merged TODO.IPv6 with TODO.ipv6 and README.IPv6 with README.ipv6 + Fixed a number of fatal build errors on Visual Studio 2008 + Fix a Visual Studio 2008 build issue in socket.c + Additional Visual Studio 2008 build fixes to tun.c + Fixed a typo in win32.h that prevented building with Visual Studio + Fixed a regression causing VS2008/Python build failure + Fix a Visual Studio 2008 build error in tun.c + Fix a Visual Studio 2008 build error in options.c + +Simon Matter (1): + Fix issues with some older GCC compilers + +Stefan Hellermann (2): + plugin.h: update prototype of plugin_call dummy in !ENABLE_PLUGIN case + Fixed typo in plugin.h + +chantra (1): + Clarify --tmp-dir option + +smos (1): + Change the netsh.exe command from "add" to "set". + +2011.12.25 -- Version 2.x-master +James Yonan (1): + Added support for "on-link" routes on Linux client -- these are + routes where the gateway is specified as an interface rather than + an address. This allows redirect-gateway to work on Linux clients + whose connection to the internet is via a point-to-point link + such as PPP. + + Note that at the moment, this capability is incompatible with + the "redirect-gateway block-local" directive -- this is because + the block-local directive blocks all traffic from the local LAN + except for the local and gateway addresses. Since a PPP link + is essentially a subnet of two addresses, local and remote (i.e. + gateway), the set of addresses that would be blocked by block-local + is empty. Therefore, the "redirect-gateway block-local" directive + will be ignored on PPP links. + + To view the OpenVPN client's current determination of the default + gateway, use this command: + + ./openvpn --show-gateway + +2011.03.24 -- Version 2.2-RC2 +Alon Bar-Lev (1): + Windows cross-compile cleanup + +David Sommerseth (2): + Open log files as text files on Windows + Clarify default value for the --inactive option. + +Gert Doering (1): + Implement IPv6 in TUN mode for Windows TAP driver. + +Samuli Seppänen (6): + Added support for prebuilt TAP-drivers. Automated embedding manifests. + Fixes to win/openvpn.nsi + Replaced config-win32.h with win/config.h.in + Updated INSTALL-win32.txt + Fixes to Makefile.am + Clarified --client-config-dir section on the man-page. + +Ville Skyttä (1): + Fix line continuation in chkconfig init script description. + +2011.02.28 -- Version 2.2-RC +David Sommerseth (3): + Make the --x509-username-field feature an opt-in feature + Fix compiler warning when compiling against OpenSSL 1.0.0 + Fix packaging of config-win32.h and service-win32/msvc.mak + +James Yonan (1): + Minor addition of logging info before and after execution of Windows net commands. + +Matthias Andree (1): + Change variadic macros to C99 style. + +Samuli Seppänen (15): + Added ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE to config-win32.h + Added a nmake makefile for openvpnserv.exe building + Moved TAP-driver version info to version.m4. Cleaned up win/settings.in. + Added helper functionality to win/wb.py + Added support for viewing config-win32.h paramters to win/show.py + Added comments and made small modifications to win/msvc.mak.in + Added command-line switch to win/build_all.py to skip TAP driver building + Added configure.h and version.m4 variable parsing to win/config.py + Added openvpnserv.exe building to win/build.py + Added comments to win/build_ddk.py + Several modifications to win/make_dist.py to allow building the NSI installer + Copied install-win32/setpath.nsi to win/setpath.nsi + Added first version of NSI installer script to win/openvpn.nsi + Changes to buildsystem patchset + Temporary snprintf-related fix to service-win32/openvpnserv.c + +2010.11.25 -- Version 2.2-beta5 + +Samuli Seppänen (1): + Fixed an issue causing a build failure with MS Visual Studio 2008. + +2010.11.18 -- Version 2.2-beta4 + +David Sommerseth (10): + Clarified --explicit-exit-notify man page entry + Clean-up: Remove pthread and mutex locking code + Clean-up: Remove more dead and inactive code paths + Clean-up: Removing useless code - hash related functions + Use stricter snprintf() formatting in socks_username_password_auth() (v3) + Fix compiler warnings about not used dummy() functions + Fixed potential misinterpretation of boolean logic + Only add some functions when really needed + Removed functions not being used anywhere + Merged add_bypass_address() and add_host_route_if_nonlocal() + +Gert Doering (3): + Integrate support for TAP mode on Solaris, written by Kazuyoshi Aizawa . + Make "topology subnet" work on Solaris + Improved man page entry for script_type + +James Yonan (5): + Fixed initialization bug in route_list_add_default_gateway (Gert Doering). + Implement challenge/response authentication support in client mode + Make base64.h have the same conditional compilation expression as base64.c. + Fixed compiling issues when using --disable-crypto + In verify_callback, the subject var should be freed by OPENSSL_free, not free + +Jesse Young (1): + Remove hardcoded path to resolvconf + +Lars Hupel (1): + Add HTTP/1.1 Host header + +Pierre Bourdon (1): + Adding support for SOCKS plain text authentication + +Samuli Seppänen (2): + Added check for variable CONFIGURE_DEFINES into options.c + Added command-line option parser and an unsigned build option to build_all.py + +2010.08.21 -- Version 2.2-beta3 + +* Attempt to fix issue where domake-win build system was not properly + signing drivers and .exe files. + + Added win/tap_span.py for building multiple versions of the TAP driver + and tapinstall binaries using different DDK versions to span from Win2K + to Win7 and beyond. + +* Community patches + David Sommerseth (2): + Test framework improvment - Do not FAIL if t_client.rc is missing + More t_client.sh updates - exit with SKIP when we want to skip + + Gert Doering (4): + Fix compile problems on NetBSD and OpenBSD + Fix compile time problems on OpenBSD for good + full "VPN client connect" test framework for OpenVPN + Build t_client.sh by configure at run-time. + + chantra (1): + Fixes openssl-1.0.0 compilation warning + +2010.08.16 -- Version 2.2-beta2 + +* Windows security issue: + Fixed potential local privilege escalation vulnerability in + Windows service. The Windows service did not properly quote the + executable filename passed to CreateService. A local attacker + with write access to the root directory C:\ could create an + executable that would be run with the same privilege level as + the OpenVPN Windows service. However, since non-Administrative + users normally lack write permission on C:\, this vulnerability + is generally not exploitable except on older versions of Windows + (such as Win2K) where the default permissions on C:\ would allow + any user to create files there. + Credit: Scott Laurie, MWR InfoSecurity + +* Added Python-based based alternative build system for Windows using + Visual Studio 2008 (in win directory). + +* When aborting in a non-graceful way, try to execute do_close_tun in + init.c prior to daemon exit to ensure that the tun/tap interface is + closed and any added routes are deleted. + +* Fixed an issue where AUTH_FAILED was not being properly delivered + to the client when a bad password is given for mid-session reauth, + causing the connection to fail without an error indication. + +* Don't advance to the next connection profile on AUTH_FAILED errors. + +* Fixed an issue in the Management Interface that could cause + a process hang with 100% CPU utilization in --management-client + mode if the management interface client disconnected at the + point where credentials are queried. + +* Fixed an issue where if reneg-sec was set to 0 on the client, + so that the server-side value would take precedence, + the auth_deferred_expire_window function would incorrectly + return a window period of 0 seconds. In this case, the + correct window period should be the handshake window + period. + +* Modified ">PASSWORD:Verification Failed" management interface + notification to include a client reason string: + + >PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'AUTH_TYPE' ['REASON_STRING'] + +* Enable exponential backoff in reliability layer + retransmits. + +* Set socket buffers (SO_SNDBUF and SO_RCVBUF) immediately after + socket is created rather than waiting until after connect/listen. + +* Management interface performance optimizations: + + 1. Added env-filter MI command to perform filtering on env vars + passed through as a part of --management-client-auth + + 2. man_write will now try to aggregate output into larger blocks + (up to 1024 bytes) for more efficient i/o + +* Fixed minor issue in Windows TAP driver DEBUG builds + where non-null-terminated unicode strings were being + printed incorrectly. + +* Fixed issue on Windows with MSVC compiler, where TCP_NODELAY support + was not being compiled in. + +* Proxy improvements: + + Improved the ability of http-auth "auto" flag to dynamically detect + the auth method required by the proxy. + + Added http-auth "auto-nct" flag to reject weak proxy auth methods. + + Added HTTP proxy digest authentication method. + + Removed extraneous openvpn_sleep calls from proxy.c. + +* Implemented http-proxy-override and http-proxy-fallback directives to make it + easier for OpenVPN client UIs to start a pre-existing client config file with + proxy options, or to adaptively fall back to a proxy connection if a direct + connection fails. + +* Implemented a key/value auth channel from client to server. + +* Fixed issue where bad creds provided by the management interface + for HTTP Proxy Basic Authentication would go into an infinite + retry-fail loop instead of requerying the management interface for + new creds. + +* Added support for MSVC debugging of openvpn.exe in settings.in: + + # Build debugging version of openvpn.exe + !define PRODUCT_OPENVPN_DEBUG + +* Implemented multi-address DNS expansion on the network field of route + commands. + + When only a single IP address is desired from a multi-address DNS + expansion, use the first address rather than a random selection. + +* Added --register-dns option for Windows. + + Fixed some issues on Windows with --log, subprocess creation + for command execution, and stdout/stderr redirection. + +* Fixed an issue where application payload transmissions on the + TLS control channel (such as AUTH_FAILED) that occur during + or immediately after a TLS renegotiation might be dropped. + +* Added warning about tls-remote option in man page. + +2009.12.11 -- Version 2.1.1 + +* Fixed some breakage in openvpn.spec (which is required to build an + RPM distribution) where it was referencing a non-existent + subdirectory in the tarball, causing it to fail (patch from + David Sommerseth). + +2009.12.11 -- Version 2.1.0 + +* Fixed a couple issues in sample plugins auth-pam.c and down-root.c. + (1) Fail gracefully rather than segfault if calloc returns NULL. + (2) The openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 function can potentially be called + with handle == NULL. Add code to detect this case, and if so, avoid + dereferencing pointers derived from handle (Thanks to David + Sommerseth for finding this bug). + +* Documented "multihome" option in the man page. + +2009.11.20 -- Version 2.1_rc22 + +* Fixed a client-side bug on Windows that occurred when the + "dhcp-pre-release" or "dhcp-renew" options were combined with + "route-gateway dhcp". The release/renew would not occur + because the Windows DHCP renew function is blocking and + therefore must be called from another process or thread + so as not to stall the tunnel. + +* Added a hard failure when peer provides a certificate chain + with depth > 16. Previously, a warning was issued. + +2009.11.12 -- Version 2.1_rc21 + +* Rebuilt OpenVPN Windows installer with OpenSSL 0.9.8l to address + CVE-2009-3555. Note that OpenVPN has never relied on the session + renegotiation capabilities that are built into the SSL/TLS protocol, + therefore the fix in OpenSSL 0.9.8l (disable SSL/TLS renegotiation + completely) will not adversely affect OpenVPN mid-session SSL/TLS + renegotation or any other OpenVPN capabilities. + +* Added additional session renegotiation hardening. OpenVPN has always + required that mid-session renegotiations build up a new SSL/TLS + session from scratch. While the client certificate common name is + already locked against changes in mid-session TLS renegotiations, we + now extend this locking to the auth-user-pass username as well as all + certificate content in the full client certificate chain. + +2009.10.01 -- Version 2.1_rc20 + +* Fixed a bug introduced in 2.1_rc17 (svn r4436) where using the + redirect-gateway option by itself, without any extra parameters, + would cause the option to be ignored. + +* Fixed build problem when ./configure --disable-server is used. + +* Fixed ifconfig command for "topology subnet" on FreeBSD (Stefan Bethke). + +* Added --remote-random-hostname option. + +* Added "load-stats" management interface command to get global server + load statistics. + +* Added new ./configure flags: + + --disable-def-auth Disable deferred authentication + --disable-pf Disable internal packet filter + +* Added "setcon" directive for interoperability with SELinux (Sebastien + Raveau). + +* Optimized PUSH_REQUEST handshake sequence to shave several seconds + off of a typical client connection initiation. + +* The maximum number of "route" directives (specified in the config + file or pulled from a server) can now be configured via the new + "max-routes" directive. + +* Eliminated the limitation on the number of options that can be pushed + to clients, including routes. Previously, all pushed options needed + to fit within a 1024 byte options string. + +* Added --server-poll-timeout option : when polling possible remote + servers to connect to in a round-robin fashion, spend no more than + n seconds waiting for a response before trying the next server. + +* Added the ability for the server to provide a custom reason string + when an AUTH_FAILED message is returned to the client. This + string can be set by the server-side managment interface and read + by the client-side management interface. + +* client-kill management interface command, when issued on server, will + now send a RESTART message to client. + This feature is intended to make UDP clients respond the same as TCP + clients in the case where the server issues a RESTART message in + order to force the client to reconnect and pull a new options/route + list. + +2009.07.16 -- Version 2.1_rc19 + +* In Windows TAP driver, refactor DHCP/ARP packet injection code to + use a DPC (deferred procedure call) to defer packet injection until + IRQL < DISPATCH_LEVEL, rather than calling NdisMEthIndicateReceive + in the context of AdapterTransmit. This is an attempt to reduce kernel + stack usage, and prevent EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT BSODs that have been + observed on Vista. Updated TAP driver version number to 9.6. + +* In configure.ac, use datadir instead of datarootdir for compatibility + with CLIENT:ESTABLISHED" notification. + +* Build fixes: + + 1. Fixed some issues with C++ style comments that leaked into the code. + + 2. Updated configure.ac to work on MinGW64. + + 3. Updated common.h types for _WIN64. + + 4. Fixed issue involving an #ifdef in a macro reference that breaks early gcc + compilers. + + 5. In cryptoapi.c, renamed CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey to + OpenVPNCryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey to work around + a symbol conflict in MinGW-5.1.4. + +2008.11.19 -- Version 2.1_rc15 + +* Fixed issue introduced in 2.1_rc14 that may cause a + segfault when a --plugin module is used. + +* Added server-side --opt-verify option: clients that connect + with options that are incompatible with those of the server + will be disconnected (without this option, incompatible + clients would trigger a warning message in the server log + but would not be disconnected). + +* Added --tcp-nodelay option: Macro that sets TCP_NODELAY socket + flag on the server as well as pushes it to connecting clients. + +* Minor options check fix: --no-name-remapping is a + server-only option and should therefore generate an + error when used on the client. + +* Added --prng option to control PRNG (pseudo-random + number generator) parameters. In previous OpenVPN + versions, the PRNG was hardcoded to use the SHA1 + hash. Now any OpenSSL hash may be used. This is + part of an effort to remove hardcoded references to + a specific cipher or cryptographic hash algorithm. + +* Cleaned up man page synopsis. + +2008.11.16 -- Version 2.1_rc14 + +* Added AC_GNU_SOURCE to configure.ac to enable struct ucred, + with the goal of fixing a build issue on Fedora 9 that was + introduced in 2.1_rc13. + +* Added additional method parameter to --script-security to preserve + backward compatibility with system() call semantics used in OpenVPN + 2.1_rc8 and earlier. To preserve backward compatibility use: + + script-security 3 system + +* Added additional warning messages about --script-security 2 + or higher being required to execute user-defined scripts or + executables. + +* Windows build system changes: + + Modified Windows domake-win build system to write all openvpn.nsi + input files to gen, so that gen can be disconnected from + the rest of the source tree and makensis openvpn.nsi will + still function correctly. + + Added additional SAMPCONF_(CA|CRT|KEY) macros to settings.in + (commented out by default). + + Added optional files SAMPCONF_CONF2 (second sample configuration + file) and SAMPCONF_DH (Diffie-Helman parameters) to Windows + build system, and may be defined in settings.in. + +* Extended Management Interface "bytecount" command + to work when OpenVPN is running as a server. + Documented Management Interface "bytecount" command in + management/management-notes.txt. + +* Fixed informational message in ssl.c to properly indicate + deferred authentication. + +* Added server-side --auth-user-pass-optional directive, to allow + connections by clients that do not specify a username/password, when a + user-defined authentication script/module is in place (via + --auth-user-pass-verify, --management-client-auth, or a plugin module). + +* Changes to easy-rsa/2.0/pkitool and related openssl.cnf: + + Calling scripts can set the KEY_NAME environmental variable to set + the "name" X509 subject field in generated certificates. + + Modified pkitool to allow flexibility in separating the Common Name + convention from the cert/key filename convention. + + For example: + + KEY_CN="James's Laptop" KEY_NAME="james" ./pkitool james + + will create a client certificate/key pair of james.crt/james.key + having a Common Name of "James's Laptop" and a Name of "james". + +* Added --no-name-remapping option to allow Common Name, X509 Subject, + and username strings to include any printable character including + space, but excluding control characters such as tab, newline, and + carriage-return (this is important for compatibility with external + authentication systems). + + As a related change, added --status-version 3 format (and "status 3" + in the management interface) which uses the version 2 format except + that tabs are used as delimiters instead of commas so that there + is no ambiguity when parsing a Common Name that contains a comma. + + Also, save X509 Subject fields to environment, using the naming + convention: + + X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value} + + This is to avoid ambiguities when parsing out the X509 subject string + since "/" characters could potentially be used in the common name. + +* Fixed some ifconfig-pool issues that precluded it from being combined + with --server directive. + + Now, for example, we can configure thusly: + + server 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 nopool + ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.99 255.255.255.0 + + to have ifconfig-pool manage only a subset + of the VPN subnet. + +* Added config file option "setenv FORWARD_COMPATIBLE 1" to relax + config file syntax checking to allow directives for future OpenVPN + versions to be ignored. + +2008.10.07 -- Version 2.1_rc13 + +* Bundled OpenSSL 0.9.8i with Windows installer. + +* Management interface can now listen on a unix + domain socket, for example: + + management /tmp/openvpn unix + + Also added management-client-user and management-client-group + directives to control which processes are allowed to connect + to the socket. + +* Copyright change to OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + +2008.09.23 -- Version 2.1_rc12 + +* Patched Makefile.am so that the new t_cltsrv-down.sh script becomes + part of the tarball (Matthias Andree). + +* Fixed --lladdr bug introduced in 2.1-rc9 where input validation code + was incorrectly expecting the lladdr parameter to be an IP address + when it is actually a MAC address (HoverHell). + +2008.09.14 -- Version 2.1_rc11 + +* Fixed a bug that can cause SSL/TLS negotiations in UDP mode + to fail if UDP packets are dropped. + +2008.09.10 -- Version 2.1_rc10 + +* Added "--server-bridge" (without parameters) to enable + DHCP proxy mode: Configure server mode for ethernet + bridging using a DHCP-proxy, where clients talk to the + OpenVPN server-side DHCP server to receive their IP address + allocation and DNS server addresses. + +* Added "--route-gateway dhcp", to enable the extraction + of the gateway address from a DHCP negotiation with the + OpenVPN server-side LAN. + +* Fixed minor issue with --redirect-gateway bypass-dhcp or bypass-dns + on Windows. If the bypass IP address is 0.0.0.0 or 255.255.255.255, + ignore it. + +* Warn when ethernet bridging that the IP address of the bridge adapter + is probably not the same address that the LAN adapter was set to + previously. + +* When running as a server, warn if the LAN network address is + the all-popular 192.168.[0|1].x, since this condition commonly + leads to subnet conflicts down the road. + +* Primarily on the client, check for subnet conflicts between + the local LAN and the VPN subnet. + +* Added a 'netmask' parameter to get_default_gateway, to return + the netmask of the adapter containing the default gateway. + Only implemented on Windows so far. Other platforms will + return 255.255.255.0. Currently the netmask information is + only used to warn about subnet conflicts. + +* Minor fix to cryptoapi.c to not compile itself unless USE_CRYPTO + and USE_SSL flags are enabled (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Updated openvpn/t_cltsrv.sh (used by "make check") to conform to new + --script-security rules. Also adds retrying if the addresses are in + use (Matthias Andree). + +* Fixed build issue with ./configure --disable-socks --disable-http. + +* Fixed separate compile errors in options.c and ntlm.c that occur + on strict C compilers (such as old versions of gcc) that require + that C variable declarations occur at the start of a {} block, + not in the middle. + +* Workaround bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8, which + the new implementation of extract_x509_field_ssl depends on. + +* LZO compression buffer overflow errors will now invalidate + the packet rather than trigger a fatal assertion. + +* Fixed minor compile issue in ntlm.c (mid-block declaration). + +* Added --allow-pull-fqdn option which allows client to pull DNS names + from server (rather than only IP address) for --ifconfig, --route, and + --route-gateway. OpenVPN versions 2.1_rc7 and earlier allowed DNS names + for these options to be pulled and translated to IP addresses by default. + Now --allow-pull-fqdn will be explicitly required on the client to enable + DNS-name-to-IP-address translation of pulled options. + +* 2.1_rc8 and earlier did implicit shell expansion on script + arguments since all scripts were called by system(). + The security hardening changes made to 2.1_rc9 no longer + use system(), but rather use the safer execve or CreateProcess + system calls. The security hardening also introduced a + backward incompatibility with 2.1_rc8 and earlier in that + script parameters were no longer shell-expanded, so + for example: + + client-connect "docc CLIENT-CONNECT" + + would fail to work because execve would try to execute + a script called "docc CLIENT-CONNECT" instead of "docc" + with "CLIENT-CONNECT" as the first argument. + + This patch fixes the issue, bringing the script argument + semantics back to pre 2.1_rc9 behavior in order to preserve + backward compatibility while still using execve or CreateProcess + to execute the script/executable. + +* Modified ip_or_dns_addr_safe, which validates pulled DNS names, + to more closely conform to RFC 3696: + + (1) DNS name length must not exceed 255 characters + + (2) DNS name characters must be limited to alphanumeric, + dash ('-'), and dot ('.') + +* Fixed bug in intra-session TLS key rollover that was introduced with + deferred authentication features in 2.1_rc8. + +2008.07.31 -- Version 2.1_rc9 + +* Security Fix -- affects non-Windows OpenVPN clients running + OpenVPN 2.1-beta14 through 2.1-rc8 (OpenVPN 2.0.x clients are NOT + vulnerable nor are any versions of the OpenVPN server vulnerable). + An OpenVPN client connecting to a malicious or compromised + server could potentially receive an "lladdr" or "iproute" configuration + directive from the server which could cause arbitrary code execution on + the client. A successful attack requires that (a) the client has agreed + to allow the server to push configuration directives to it by including + "pull" or the macro "client" in its configuration file, (b) the client + successfully authenticates the server, (c) the server is malicious or has + been compromised and is under the control of the attacker, and (d) the + client is running a non-Windows OS. Credit: David Wagner. + CVE-2008-3459 + +* Miscellaneous defensive programming changes to multiple + areas of the code. In particular, use of the system() call + for calling executables such as ifconfig, route, and + user-defined scripts has been completely revamped in favor + of execve() on unix and CreateProcess() on Windows. + +* In Windows build, package a statically linked openssl.exe to work around + observed instabilities in the dynamic build since the migration to + OpenSSL 0.9.8h. + +2008.06.11 -- Version 2.1_rc8 + +* Added client authentication and packet filtering capability + to management interface. In addition, allow OpenVPN plugins + to take advantage of deferred authentication and packet + filtering capability. + +* Added support for client-side connection profiles. + +* Fixed unbounded memory growth bug in environmental variable + code that could have caused long-running OpenVPN sessions + with many TLS renegotiations to incrementally + increase memory usage over time. + +* Windows release now packages openssl-0.9.8h. + +* Build system changes -- allow building on Windows using + autoconf/automake scripts (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Changes to Windows build system to make it easier to do + partial builds, with a reduced set of prerequisites, + where only a subset of OpenVPN installer + components are built. See ./domake-win comments. + +* Cleanup IP address for persistence interfaces for tap and also + using ifconfig, gentoo#209055 (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Fall back to old version of extract_x509_field for OpenSSL 0.9.6. + +* Clarified tcp-queue-limit man page entry (Matti Linnanvuori). + +* Added new OpenVPN icon and installer graphic. + +* Minor pkitool changes. + +* Added --pkcs11-id-management option, which will cause OpenVPN to + query the management interface via the new NEED-STR asynchronous + notification query to get additional PKCS#11 options (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Added NEED-STR management interface asynchronous query and + "needstr" management interface command to respond to the query + (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Added Dragonfly BSD support (Francis-Gudin). + +* Quote device names before passing to up/down script (Josh Cepek). + +* Bracketed struct openvpn_pktinfo with #pragma pack(1) to + prevent structure padding from causing an incorrect length + to be returned by sizeof (struct openvpn_pktinfo) on 64-bit + platforms. + +* On systems that support res_init, always call it + before calling gethostbyname to ensure that + resolver configuration state is current. + +* Added NTLMv2 proxy support (Miroslav Zajic). + +* Fixed an issue in extract_x509_field_ssl where the extraction + would fail on the first field of the subject name, such as + the common name in: /CN=foo/emailAddress=foo@bar.com + +* Made "Linux ip addr del failed" error nonfatal. + +* Amplified --client-cert-not-required warning. + +* Added #pragma pack to proto.h. + +2008.01.29 -- Version 2.1_rc7 + +* Added a few extra files that exist in the svn repo but were + not being copied into the tarball by make dist. + +* Fixup null interface on close, don't use ip addr flush (Alon Bar-Lev). + +2008.01.24 -- Version 2.1_rc6 + +* Fixed options checking bug introduced in rc5 where legitimate configuration + files might elicit the error: "Options error: Parameter pkcs11_private_mode + can only be specified in TLS-mode, i.e. where --tls-server or --tls-client + is also specified." + +2008.01.23 -- Version 2.1_rc5 + +* Fixed Win2K TAP driver bug that was introduced by Vista fixes, + incremented driver version to 9.4. + +* Windows build system changes: + + Incremented included OpenSSL version to openssl-0.9.7m. + + Updated openssl.patch for openssl-0.9.7m and added some + brief usage comments to the head of the patch. + + Added build-pkcs11-helper.sh for building the pkcs11-helper + library. + + Integrated inclusion of pkcs11-helper into Windows build + system. + + Upgraded TAP build scripts to use WDK 6001.17121 + (Windows 2008 Server pre-RTM). + +* Windows installer changes: + + Clean up the start menu folder. + + Allow for a site-specific sample configuration file and keys + to be included in a custom installer (see SAMPCONF macros + in settings.in). + + New icon (temporary). + +* Added "forget-passwords" command to the management interface + (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Added --management-signal option to signal SIGUSR1 when the + management interface disconnects (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Modified command line and config file parser to allow + quoted strings using single quotes ('') (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Use pkcs11-helper as external library, can be downloaded from + https://www.opensc-project.org/pkcs11-helper (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Fixed interim memory growth issue in TCP connect loop where + "TCP: connect to %s failed, will try again in %d seconds: %s" + is output. + +* Fixed bug in epoll driver in event.c, where the lack of a + handler for EPOLLHUP could cause 99% CPU usage. + +* Defined ALLOW_NON_CBC_CIPHERS for people who don't + want to use a CBC cipher for OpenVPN's data channel. + +* Added PLUGIN_LIBDIR preprocessor string to prepend a default + plugin directory to the dlopen search list when the user + specifies the basename of the plugin only (Marius Tomaschewski). + +* Rewrote extract_x509_field and modified COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS + to allow forward slash characters ("/") in the X509 common name + (Pavel Shramov). + +* Allow OpenVPN to run completely unprivileged under Linux + by allowing openvpn --mktun to be used with --user and --group + to set the UID/GID of the tun device node. Also added --iproute + option to allow an alternative command to be executed in place + of the default iproute2 command (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Fixed --disable-iproute2 in ./configure to actually disable + iproute2 usage (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Added --management-forget-disconnect option -- forget + passwords when management session disconnects (Alon Bar-Lev). + +2007.04.25 -- Version 2.1_rc4 + +* Worked out remaining issues with TAP driver signing + on Vista x64. OpenVPN will now run on Vista x64 + with driver signing enforcement enabled. + +* Fixed 64-bit portability bug in time_string function + (Thomas Habets). + +2007.04.22 -- Version 2.1_rc3 + +* Additional fixes to TAP driver for Windows x64. Driver + now runs successfully on Vista x64 if driver signing + enforcement is disabled. + +* The Windows Installer and TAP driver are now signed by + OpenVPN Solutions LLC (in addition to the usual GnuPG + signatures). + +* Added OpenVPN GUI (Mathias Sundman version) as install + option in Windows installer. + +* Clean up configure on FreeBSD for recent autotool versions + that require that all .h files have to be compiled. + Also, FreeBSD install does not support GNU long options + which the Makefile in easy-rsa/2.0 uses (not checked the + others as we don't install those on Gentoo) (Roy Marples). + +* Added additional scripts to easy-rsa/Windows for working + with password-protected keys; also add -extensions server + option when generating server cert via + build-key-server-pass.bat (Daniel Zauft). + +2007.02.27 -- Version 2.1_rc2 + +* auth-pam change: link with -lpam rather + than dlopen (Roy Marples). + +* Prevent SIGUSR1 or SIGHUP from causing program + exit from initial management hold. + +* SO_REUSEADDR should not be set on Windows TCP sockets + because it will cause bind to succeed on port conflicts. + +* Added time_ascii, time_duration, and time_unix + environmental variables for plugins and callback + scripts. + +* Fixed issue where OpenVPN does not apply the --txqueuelen option + to persistent interfaces made with --mktun (Roy Marples). + +* Attempt at rational signal handling when in the + management hold state. During management hold, ignore + SIGUSR1/SIGHUP signals thrown with the "signal" command. + Also, "signal" command will now apply remapping as + specified with the --remap-usr1 option. + When a signal entered using the "signal" command from a management + hold is ignored, output: >HOLD:Waiting for hold release + +* Fixed issue where struct env_set methods that + change the value of an existing name=value pair + would delay the freeing of the memory held by + the previous name=value pair until the underlying + client instance object is closed. + This could cause a server that handles long-term + client connections, resulting in many periodic calls + to verify_callback, to needlessly grow the env_set + memory allocation until the underlying client instance + object is closed. + +* Renamed TAP-Win32 driver from tap0801.sys to tap0901.sys + to reflect the fact that Vista has blacklisted the tap0801.sys + file name due to previous compatibility issues which have now + been resolved. TAP-Win32 major/minor version number is now 9/1. + +* Windows installer will delete a previously installed + tap0801.sys TAP driver before installing tap0901.sys. + +* Added code to Windows installer to fail gracefully on 64 bit + installs until 64-bit TAP driver issues can be resolved. + +* Added code to Windows installer to fail gracefully on + versions of Windows which are not explicitly supported. + +* The Windows version will now use a default route-delay + of 5 seconds to deal with an apparent routing table race + condition on Vista. + +* Worked around an incompatibility in the Windows Vista + version of CreateIpForwardEntry as described in + http://www.nynaeve.net/?p=59 + This issue would cause route additions using the + IP Helper API to fail on Vista. + +* On Windows, revert to "ip-win32 dynamic" as the default. + +2006.10.31 -- Version 2.1_rc1 + +* Support recovery (return to hold) from signal at + management password prompt. + +* Added workaround for OpenSC PKCS#11 bug#108 + (Alon Bar-Lev). + +2006.10.01 -- Version 2.1-beta16 + +* Windows installer updated with OpenSSL 0.9.7l DLLs to fix + published vulnerabilities. + +* Fixed TAP-Win32 bug that caused BSOD on Windows Vista + (Henry Nestler). + +* Autodetect 32/64 bit Windows in installer and install + appropriate TAP driver (Mathias Sundman, Hypherion). + +* Fixed bug in loopback self-test introduced + in 2.1-beta15 where self test as invoked by + "make check" would not properly exit after + 2 minutes (Paul Howarth). + +2006.09.12 -- Version 2.1-beta15 + +* Windows installer updated with OpenSSL 0.9.7k DLLs to fix + RSA Signature Forgery (CVE-2006-4339). + +* Fixed bug introduced with the --port-share directive + (back in 2.1-beta9 which causes TLS soft resets + (1 per hour by default) in TCP server mode to force + a blockage of tunnel packets and later time-out and + restart the connection. + +* easy-rsa update (Alon Bar-Lev) + Makefile (install) is now available so that + distribs will be able to install it safely. + +* PKCS#11 changes: (Alon Bar-Lev) + - Modified ssl.c to not FATAL and return to init.c + so auth-retry will work. + - Modifed pkcs11-helper.c to fix some problem with + multiple providers. + - Added retry counter to PKCS#11 PIN hook. + - Modified PKCS#11 PIN retry loop to return correct error + code when PIN is incorrect. + - Fix handling (ignoring) zero sized attributes. + - Fix gcc-2 issues. + - Fix openssl 0.9.6 (first version) issues. + +* Minor fixes of lladdr (Alon Bar-Lev) + Updated makefile.w32-vc to include lladdr.*, updated + linkage libraries. + Modified lladdr.c to be compiled under visual C. + +* Added two new management states: + OPENVPN_STATE_RESOLVE -- DNS lookup + OPENVPN_STATE_TCP_CONNECT -- Connecting to TCP server + +* Echo management state change to log. + +* Minor syshead.h change for NetBSD to allow + TCP_NODELAY flag to work. + +* Modified --port-share code to remove the assumption that + CMSG_SPACE always evaluates to a constant, to enable + compilation on NetBSD and possibly other BSDs as well. + +* Eliminated gcc 3.3.3 warnings on NetBSD + when ./configure --enable-strict is used. + +* Added optional minimum-number-of-bytes parameter + to --inactive directive. + +2006.04.13 -- Version 2.1-beta14 + +* Fixed Windows server bug in time backtrack handling code which + could cause TLS negotiation failures on legitimate clients. + +* Rewrote gettimeofday function for Windows to be + simpler and more efficient. + +* Merged PKCS#11 extensions to easy-rsa/2.0 (Alon Bar-Lev). + +* Added --route-metric option to set a default route metric + for --route (Roy Marples). + +* Added --lladdr option to specify the link layer (MAC) address + for the tap interface on non-Windows platforms (Roy Marples). + +2006.04.12 -- Version 2.1-beta13 + +* Code added in 2.1-beta7 and 2.0.6-rc1 to extend byte counters + to 64 bits caused a bug in the Windows version which has now + been fixed. The bug could cause intermittent crashes. + +2006.04.05 -- Version 2.1-beta12 + +* Security Vulnerability -- An OpenVPN client connecting to a + malicious or compromised server could potentially receive + "setenv" configuration directives from the server which could + cause arbitrary code execution on the client via a LD_PRELOAD + attack. A successful attack appears to require that (a) the + client has agreed to allow the server to push configuration + directives to it by including "pull" or the macro "client" in + its configuration file, (b) the client configuration file uses + a scripting directive such as "up" or "down", (c) the client + succesfully authenticates the server, (d) the server is + malicious or has been compromised and is under the control of + the attacker, and (e) the attacker has at least some level of + pre-existing control over files on the client (this might be + accomplished by having the server respond to a client web request + with a specially crafted file). Credit: Hendrik Weimer. + CVE-2006-1629. + + The fix is to disallow "setenv" to be pushed to clients from + the server, and to add a new directive "setenv-safe" which is + pushable from the server, but which appends "OPENVPN_" to the + name of each remotely set environmental variable. + +* "topology subnet" fix for FreeBSD (Benoit Bourdin). + +* PKCS11 fixes (Alon Bar-Lev). For full description: + svn log -r990 http://svn.openvpn.net/projects/openvpn/branches/BETA21 + +* When deleting routes under Linux, use the route metric + as a differentiator to ensure that the route teardown + process only deletes the identical route which was originally + added via the "route" directive (Roy Marples). + +* Fix the t_cltsrv.sh file in FreeBSD 4 jails + (Matthias Andree, Dirk Meyer, Vasil Dimov). + +* Extended tun device configure code to support ethernet + bridging on NetBSD (Emmanuel Kasper). + +2006.02.19 -- Version 2.1-beta11 + +* Fixed --port-share bug that caused premature closing + of proxied sessions. + +2006.02.17 -- Version 2.1-beta10 + +* Fixed --port-share breakage introduced in 2.1-beta9. + +2006.02.16 -- Version 2.1-beta9 + +* Added --port-share option for allowing OpenVPN and HTTPS + server to share the same port number. +* Added --management-client option to connect as a client + to management GUI app rather than be connected to as a + server. +* Added "bytecount" command to management interface. +* --remote-cert-tls fixes (Alon Bar-Lev). + +2006.01.03 -- Version 2.1-beta8 + +* --remap-usr1 will now also remap signals thrown during + initialization. +* Added --connect-timeout option to control the timeout + on TCP client connection attempts (doesn't work on all + OSes). This patch also makes OpenVPN signalable during + TCP connection attempts. +* Fixed bug in acinclude.m4 where capability of compiler + to handle zero-length arrays in structs is tested + (David Stipp). +* Fixed typo in manage.c where inline function declaration + was declared without the "static" keyword (David Stipp). +* Patch to support --topology subnet on Mac OS X (Mathias Sundman). +* Added --auto-proxy directive to auto-detect HTTP or SOCKS + proxy settings (currently Windows only). +* Removed redundant base64 code. +* Better sanity checking of --server and --server-bridge + IP pool ranges, so as not to hit the assertion at + pool.c:119 (2.0.5). +* Fixed bug where --daemon and --management-query-passwords + used together would cause OpenVPN to block prior to + daemonization. +* Fixed client/server race condition which could occur + when --auth-retry interact is set and the initially + provided auth-user-pass credentials are incorrect, + forcing a username/password re-query. +* Fixed bug where if --daemon and --management-hold are + used together, --user or --group options would be ignored. +* --ip-win32 adaptive is now the default. +* --ip-win32 netsh (or --ip-win32 adaptive when in netsh + mode) can now set DNS/WINS addresses on the TAP-Win32 + adapter. +* Added new option --route-method adaptive (Win32) + which tries IP helper API first, then falls back to + route.exe. +* Made --route-method adaptive the default. + +2005.11.12 -- Version 2.1-beta7 + +* Allow blank passwords to be passed via the management + interface. +* Fixed bug where "make check" inside a FreeBSD "jail" + would never complete (Matthias Andree). +* Fixed bug where --server directive in --dev tap mode + claimed that it would support subnets of /30 or less + but actually would only accept /29 or less. +* Extend byte counters to 64 bits (M. van Cuijk). +* Fixed bug in Linux get_default_gateway function + introduced in 2.0.4, which would cause redirect-gateway + on Linux clients to fail. +* Moved easy-rsa 2.0 scripts to easy-rsa/2.0 to + be compatible with 2.0.x distribution. +* Documented --route-nopull. +* Documented --ip-win32 adaptive. +* Windows build now linked with LZO2. +* Allow ca, cert, key, and dh files to be specified + inline via XML-like syntax without needing to + reference an explicit file. + For example: + + data here... + +* Allow plugin and push directives to have multi-line + parameter lists such as: + + my-plugin.so + parm1 + parm2 + +* Added connect-retry-max option (Alon Bar-Lev). +* Fixed problems where signals thrown during initialization + were not returning to a management-hold state. +* Added a backtrack-hardened system time algorithm. +* Added --remote-cert-ku, --remote-cert-eku, and + --remote-cert-tls options for verifying certificate + attributes (Alon Bar-Lev). +* For Windows, reverted --ip-win32 default back to "dynamic". + To use new adaptive mode, set explicitly. + +2005.11.01 -- Version 2.1-beta6 + +* Security fix (merged from 2.0.4) -- Affects non-Windows + OpenVPN clients of version 2.0 or higher which connect to + a malicious or compromised server. A format string + vulnerability in the foreign_option function in options.c + could potentially allow a malicious or compromised server + to execute arbitrary code on the client. Only + non-Windows clients are affected. The vulnerability + only exists if (a) the client's TLS negotiation with + the server succeeds, (b) the server is malicious or + has been compromised such that it is configured to + push a maliciously crafted options string to the client, + and (c) the client indicates its willingness to accept + pushed options from the server by having "pull" or + "client" in its configuration file (Credit: Vade79). + CVE-2005-3393 +* Security fix -- (merged from 2.0.4) Potential DoS + vulnerability on the server in TCP mode. If the TCP + server accept() call returns an error status, the resulting + exception handler may attempt to indirect through a NULL + pointer, causing a segfault. Affects all OpenVPN 2.0 versions. + CVE-2005-3409 +* Fix attempt of assertion at multi.c:1586 (note that + this precise line number will vary across different + versions of OpenVPN). +* Windows reliability changes: + (a) Added code to make sure that the local PATH environmental + variable points to the Windows system32 directory. + (b) Added new --ip-win32 adaptive mode which tries 'dynamic' + and then fails over to 'netsh' if the DHCP negotiation fails. + (c) Made --ip-win32 adaptive the default. +* More PKCS#11 additions/changes (Alon Bar-Lev). +* Added ".PHONY: plugin" to Makefile.am to work around + "make dist" issue. +* Fixed double fork issue that occurs when --management-hold + is used. +* Moved TUN/TAP read/write log messages from --verb 8 to 6. +* Warn when multiple clients having the same common name or + username usurp each other when --duplicate-cn is not used. +* Modified Windows and Linux versions of get_default_gateway + to return the route with the smallest metric + if multiple 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0 entries are present. +* Added ">NEED-OK" alert and "needok" command to management + interface to provide a general interface for sending + alerts to the end-user. Used by the PKCS#11 code + to send Token Insertion Requests to the user. +* Added actual remote address used to the ">STATE" alert + in the management interface (Rolf Fokkens). + +2005.10.17 -- Version 2.1-beta4 + +* Fixed bug introduced in 2.1-beta3 where management + socket bind would fail. +* --capath fix in ssl.c (Zhuang Yuyao). +* Added ".PHONY: plugin" to Makefile.am, reverted + location of "plugin" directory (thanks to + Matthias Andree for figuring this out). + +2005.10.16 -- Version 2.1-beta3 + +* Added PKCS#11 support (Alon Bar-Lev). +* Enable the use of --ca together with --pkcs12. If --ca is + used at the same time as --pkcs12, the CA certificate is loaded + from the file specified by --ca regardless if the pkcs12 file + contains a CA cert or not (Mathias Sundman). +* Merged --capath patch (Thomas Noel). +* Merged --multihome patch. +* Added --bind option for TCP client connections (Ewan Bhamrah + Harley). +* Moved "plugin" directory to "plugins" to deal with strange + automake problem that ended up being also fixable with + ".PHONY: plugin" in Makefile.am. + +2005.10.13 -- Version 2.1-beta2 + +* Made --sndbuf and --rcvbuf pushable. + +2005.10.01 -- Version 2.1-beta1 + +* Made LZO setting pushable. +* Renamed sample-keys/tmp-ca.crt to ca.crt. +* Fixed bug where remove_iroutes_from_push_route_list + was missing routes if those routes had + an implied netmask (by omission) of 255.255.255.255. +* Merged with 2.0.3-rc1 +* easy-rsa/2.0 moved to easy-rsa +* old easy-rsa moved to easy-rsa/1.0 + +2005.09.23 -- Version 2.0.2-TO4 + +* Added feature to TAP-Win32 adapter to allow it to be + opened from non-administrator mode. This feature + is enabled by default, and can be enabled/disabled + in the adapter advanced properties dialog. +* Added --allow-nonadmin standalone option for Windows to + set TAP adapter to allow non-admin access. This + is a user-mode version of the code, and duplicates + the same feature as the above entry. +* Added fix that attempts to solve corner case of tunnel not + forwarding packets when system clock is reset to an earlier time. +* Added --redirect-gateway bypass-dns option. (Developers: + To add bypass-dhcp or bypass-dns support to other OSes, + add a get_bypass_addresses function to route.c for + your OS.) +* Added OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2 plugin callback, which + allows a client-connect plugin to return configuration text + in memory, rather than via a file. +* Fixed a bug where --mode server --proto tcp-server --cipher none + operation could cause tunnel packet truncation. +* openvpn --version will show [LZO1] or [LZO2], depending on + version that was linked. + +2005.09.07 -- Version 2.0.2-TO1 + +* Added --topology directive. See man page. +* Added --redirect-gateway bypass-dhcp option to add a route + allowing DHCP packets to bypass the tunnel, when the + DHCP server is non-local. Currently only implemented + on Windows clients. +* Modified OpenVPN Service on Windows to declare the DHCP + client service as a dependency. +* Extended the plugin interface to allow plugins to declare + per-client constructor and destructor functions, to make + it simpler for plugins to maintain per-client state. + +2005.09.25 -- Version 2.0.3-rc1 + +* openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 function wasn't being properly + registered on Windows. +* Fixed a bug where --mode server --proto tcp-server --cipher none + operation could cause tunnel packet truncation. + +2005.08.25 -- Version 2.0.2 + +* No change from 2.0.2-rc1. + +2005.08.24 -- Version 2.0.2-rc1 + +* Fixed regression bug in Win32 installer, introduced in 2.0.1, + which incorrectly set OpenVPN service to autostart. +* Don't package source code zip file in Windows installer + in order to reduce the size of the installer. The source + zip file can always be downloaded separately if needed. +* Fixed bug in route.c in FreeBSD, Darwin, OpenBSD and NetBSD + version of get_default_gateway. Allocated socket for route + manipulation is never freed so number of mbufs continuously + grow and exhaust system resources after a while (Jaroslav Klaus). +* Fixed bug where "--proto tcp-server --mode p2p --management + host port" would cause the management port to not respond until + the OpenVPN peer connects. +* Modified pkitool script to be /bin/sh compatible (Johnny Lam). + +2005.08.16 -- Version 2.0.1 + +* Security Fix -- DoS attack against server when run with "verb 0" and + without "tls-auth". If a client connection to the server fails + certificate verification, the OpenSSL error queue is not properly + flushed, which can result in another unrelated client instance on the + server seeing the error and responding to it, resulting in disconnection + of the unrelated client (CAN-2005-2531). +* Security Fix -- DoS attack against server by authenticated client. + This bug presents a potential DoS attack vector against the server + which can only be initiated by a connected and authenticated client. + If the client sends a packet which fails to decrypt on the server, + the OpenSSL error queue is not properly flushed, which can result in + another unrelated client instance on the server seeing the error and + responding to it, resulting in disconnection of the unrelated client + (CAN-2005-2532). Credit: Mike Ireton. +* Security Fix -- DoS attack against server by authenticated client. + A malicious client in "dev tap" ethernet bridging mode could + theoretically flood the server with packets appearing to come from + hundreds of thousands of different MAC addresses, causing the OpenVPN + process to deplete system virtual memory as it expands its internal + routing table. A --max-routes-per-client directive has been added + (default=256) to limit the maximum number of routes in OpenVPN's + internal routing table which can be associated with a given client + (CAN-2005-2533). +* Security Fix -- DoS attack against server by authenticated client. + If two or more client machines try to connect to the server at the + same time via TCP, using the same client certificate, and when + --duplicate-cn is not enabled on the server, a race condition can + crash the server with "Assertion failed at mtcp.c:411" + (CAN-2005-2534). +* Fixed server bug where under certain circumstances, the client instance + object deletion function would try to delete iroutes which had never been + added in the first place, triggering "Assertion failed at mroute.c:349". +* Added --auth-retry option to prevent auth errors from being fatal + on the client side, and to permit username/password requeries in case + of error. Also controllable via new "auth-retry" management interface + command. See man page for more info. +* Added easy-rsa 2.0 scripts to the tarball in easy-rsa/2.0 +* Fixed bug in openvpn.spec where rpmbuild --define 'without_pam 1' + would fail to build. +* Implement "make check" to perform loopback tests (Matthias Andree). + +2005.07.21 -- Version 2.0.1-rc7 + +* Support LZO 2.01 which renamed its library to lzo2 (Matthias Andree). +* Include linux/types.h before checking for linux/errqueue.h (Matthias + Andree). + +2005.07.15 -- Version 2.0.1-rc6 + +* Commented out "user nobody" and "group nobody" in sample + client/server config files. +* Allow '@' character to be used in --client-config-dir + file names. + +2005.07.04 -- Version 2.0.1-rc5 + +* Windows version will log a for-further-info URL when + initialization sequence is completed with errors. +* Added DLOPEN_PAM parameter to plugin/auth-pam/Makefile + to control whether auth-pam plugin links to PAM via + dlopen or -lpam. By default, DLOPEN_PAM=1 so pre-existing + behavior should be preserved. DLOPEN_PAM=0 is the preferred + setting to link via -lpam, but DLOPEN_PAM=1 works around + a bug in SuSE 9.1 (and possibly other distros as well) + where the PAM modules are not linked with -lpam. See + thread on openvpn-devel for more discussion about this + patch (Simon Perreault). + +2005.06.15 -- Version 2.0.1-rc4 + +* Support LZO 2.00, including changes to configure script to + autodetect LZO version. + +2005.06.12 -- Version 2.0.1-rc3 + +* Fixed a bug which caused standard file handles to not be closed + after daemonization when --plugin and --daemon are used together, + and if the plugin initialization function forks (as does auth-pam + and down-root) (Simon Perreault). +* Added client-side up/down scripts in contrib/pull-resolv-conf + for accepting server-pushed "dhcp-option DOMAIN" and "dhcp-option DNS" + on Linux/Unix systems (Jesse Adelman). +* Fixed bug where if client-connect scripts/plugins were cascaded, + and one (but not all) of them returned an error status, there might + be cases where for an individual script/plugin, client-connect was + called but not client-disconnect. The goal of this fix is to + ensure that if client-connect is called on a given client instance, + then client-disconnect will definitely be called. A potential + complication of this fix is that when client-connect functions are + cascaded, it's possible that the client-disconnect function would + be called in cases where the related client-connect function returned + an error status. This fix should not alter OpenVPN behavior when + scripts/plugins are not cascaded. +* Changed the hard-to-reproduce "Assertion failed at fragment.c:312" + fatal error to a warning: "FRAG: outgoing buffer is not empty". + Need more info on how to reproduce this one. +* When --duplicate-cn is used, the --ifconfig-pool allocation + algorithm will now allocate the first available IP address. +* When --daemon and --management-hold are used together, + OpenVPN will daemonize before it enters the management hold state. + +2005.05.16 -- Version 2.0.1-rc2 + +* Modified vendor test in openvpn.spec file to match against + "Mandrakesoft" in addition to "MandrakeSoft". +* Using --iroute in a --client-config-dir file while in --dev tap + mode is not currently supported and will produce a warning + message. Fixed bug where in certain cases, in addition to + generating a warning message, this combination of options + would also produce a fatal assertion in mroute.c. +* Pass --auth-user-pass username to server-side plugin without + performing any string remapping (plugins, unlike scripts, + don't get any security benefit from string remapping). + This is intended to fix an issue with openvpn-auth-pam/pam_winbind + where backslash characters in a username ('\') were being remapped + to underscore ('_'). +* Updated OpenSSL DLLs in Windows build to 0.9.7g. +* Documented --explicit-exit-notify in man page. +* --explicit-exit-notify seconds parameter defaults to 1 if + unspecified. + +2005.04.30 -- Version 2.0.1-rc1 + +* Fixed bug where certain kinds of fatal errors after + initialization (such as port in use) would leave plugin + processes (such as openvpn-auth-pam) still running. +* Added optional openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 plugin function for + closing initialized plugin objects in the event of a fatal + error by main OpenVPN process. +* When the --remote list is > 1, and --resolv-retry is not + specified (meaning that it defaults to "infinite"), apply the + infinite timeout to the --remote list as a whole, but try each + list item only once before moving on to the next item. +* Added new --syslog directive which redirects output + to syslog without requiring the use of the --daemon or --inetd + directives. +* Added openvpn.spec option to allow RPM to be built with support + for passwords read from a file: + rpmbuild -tb [openvpn.x.tar.gz] --define 'with_password_save 1' + +2005.04.17 -- Version 2.0 + +* Fixed minor options string typo in options.c. + +2005.04.10 -- Version 2.0-rc21 + +* Change license description from "GPL Version 2 or (at your + option) any later version" to just "GPL Version 2". + +2005.04.04 -- Version 2.0-rc20 + +* Dag Wieers has put together an OpenVPN/LZO binary RPM set with + excellent distro/version coverage for RH/EL/Fedora, though + using his own SPEC. I modified openvpn.spec to follow some of + the same conventions such as putting sample scripts and doc + files in %doc rather than /usr/share/openvpn. +* Minor change to init scripts to run the user-defined script + /etc/openvpn/openvpn-startup (if it exists) before any OpenVPN + configs are started, and to run /etc/openvpn/openvpn-shutdown + after all OpenVPN configs have been stopped. The + openvpn-startup script can be used for stuff like + insmod tun.o, setting up firewall rules, or starting + ethernet bridges. + +2005.03.29 -- Version 2.0-rc19 + +* Omit additions of routes where the network and + gateway are equal and the netmask is 255.255.255.255. + This can come up if you are using both + server/ifconfig-pool and client-config-dir with + ifconfig-push static addresses for some subset of clients + which directly reference the server IP address as the + remote endpoint. + +2005.03.28 -- Version 2.0-rc18 + +* Packaged Windows installer with OpenSSL 0.9.7f. +* Built Windows installer with NSIS 2.06. + +2005.03.12 -- Version 2.0-rc17 + +* "MANAGEMENT: CMD" log file output will now only occur + at --verb 7 or greater. +* Added an optional name/value configuration list to + the openvpn-auth-pam plugin module argument list. See + plugin/auth-pam/README for documentation. This is necessary + in order for openvpn-auth-pam to work with queries generated + by arbitrary PAM modules. +* In both auth-pam and down-root plugins, in the forked process, + a read error on the parent process socket is no longer fatal. +* MandrakeSoft liblzo1 RPM only Provides for a 'liblzo1'. + A conditional test of the vendor has been added to + Require the appropriately named 'lzo' (liblzo1 / lzo). + (Tom Walsh - http://openhardware.net) + + +2005.02.20 -- Version 2.0-rc16 + +* Fixed bug introduced in rc13 where Windows service wrapper + would be installed with a startup type of Automatic. + This fix restores the previous behavior of installing + with a startup type of Manual. + +2005.02.19 -- Version 2.0-rc15 + +* Added warning when --keepalive is not used in a server + configuration. +* Don't include OpenSSL md4.h file if we are not building + NTLM proxy support (Waldemar Brodkorb). +* Added easy-rsa/build-key-pkcs12 and + easy-rsa/Windows/build-key-pkcs12.bat scripts + (Mathias Sundman). + +2005.02.16 -- Version 2.0-rc14 + +* Fixed small memory leak that occurs when --crl-verify + is used. +* Upgraded Windows installer and .nsi script to NSIS 2.05 + (Mathias Sundman). +* Changed #include backslash usage in cryptoapi.c to use + forward slashes instead (Gisle Vanem). +* Created easy-rsa/revoke-full to handle revocations in + a single step: (a) revoke crt, (b) regenerate CRL, and + (c) verify that revocation succeeded. +* Renamed easy-rsa/Windows/revoke-key to revoke-full so + that both *nix and Windows scripts are equivalent. + +2005.02.11 -- Version 2.0-rc13 + +* Improve human-readability of local/remote options + diff, when inconsistencies are present. +* For Windows easy-rsa, distribute vars.bat.sample and + openssl.cnf.sample, then copy them to their normal + filenames (without the .sample) when init-config.bat + is run. This is to prevent OpenVPN upgrades from + wiping out vars.bat and openssl.cnf edits. +* Modified service wrapper (Windows) to use a + case-insensitive search when scanning for .ovpn files + in \Program Files\OpenVPN\config. Prior versions + required an all-lower-case .ovpn file extension. +* Miscellaneous service wrapper code cleanup. +* If --user/--group is used on Windows, treat it + as a no-op with a warning (this makes it easier to + distribute the same client config file to Windows + and *nix users). +* Warn if --ifconfig-pool-persist is used with + --duplicate-cn. + +2005.02.05 -- Version 2.0-rc12 + +* Removed some debugging code inadvertently included + in rc11 which would print the --auth-user-pass + username/password provided by clients in the server + logfile. +* Client code for cycling through --remote list will + retry the last address which successfully authenticated + before moving on through the list. +* Windows installer will now install sample configuration + files in \Program Files\OpenVPN\sample-configs as well + as generate a start menu shortcut to this directory. +* Minor type change in buffer.[ch] to work around char-type + ambiguity bug. Caused management interface lock-ups on + ARM when building with armv4b-hardhat-linux-gcc 2.95.3. + +2005.02.03 -- Version 2.0-rc11 + +* Windows installer will now install easy-rsa directory + in \Program Files\OpenVPN +* Allow syslog facility to be controlled at compile time, + e.g. -DLOG_OPENVPN=LOG_LOCAL6 (P Kern). +* Changed certain shell scripts in distribution to use + #!/bin/sh rather than #!/bin/bash for better portability. +* If --ifconfig-pool-persist seconds parameter is 0, treat + persist file as an allocation of fixed IP addresses + (previous versions took IP-to-common-name associations + from this list as hints, not mandatory static allocations). +* Fixed bug on *nix where if --auth-user-pass and --log + were used together, the username prompt would be sent to + the log file rather than /dev/tty. +* Spurious text in openvpn.8 detected by doclifter + (Eric S. Raymond). +* Call closelog later on daemon kill so that process + exit message is written to syslog. + +2005.01.27 -- Version 2.0-rc10 + +* When ./configure is run with plugins enabled (the default), + check whether or not dlopen exists in libc before testing + for libdl. This is to fix an issue on FreeBSD and possibly + other OSes which bundle libdl functions in libc. +* On Windows, filter initial WSAEINVAL warning which occurs + on the initial read attempt of an unbound socket. +* The easy-rsa scripts build-key, build-key-pass, and + build-key-server will now chmod the .key file + to 0600. This is in addition to the fact the generated + keys directory has always been similarly protected + (Pete Harlan). + +2005.01.23 -- Version 2.0-rc9 + +* Fixed error "ROUTE: route addition failed using + CreateIpForwardEntry ..." on Windows when --redirect-gateway + is used over a RRAS internet link. +* When using --route-method exe on Windows, include the + gateway parameter on route delete commands (Mathias Sundman). +* Try not to do a hard reset (i.e. SIGHUP) when two + SIGUSR1 signals are received in close succession. +* If the push list tries to grow beyond its buffer capacity, + the resulting error will be non-fatal. +* To increase the push list capacity (must be done on both + client and server), increase TLS_CHANNEL_BUF_SIZE in + common.h (default=1024). + +2005.01.15 -- Version 2.0-rc8 + +* Fixed bug introduced in rc7 where options error + "--auth-user-pass requires --pull" might occur even + if --pull was correctly specified. +* Changed management interface code to bind once + to TCP socket, rather than rebinding after every + client disconnect. +* Added "disable" directive for client-config-dir + files. +* Windows binary install is now distributed with + OpenSSL 0.9.7e. +* Query the management interface for --http-proxy + username/password if authfile is set to "stdin". +* Added current OpenVPN version number to "Unrecognized + option or missing parameter" error message. +* Added "-extensions server" to "openssl req" command + in easy-rsa/build-key-server (Nir Yeffet). + +2005.01.10 -- Version 2.0-rc7 + +* Fixed bug in management interface which could cause + 100% CPU utilization in --proto tcp-server mode + on all *nix OSes except for Linux 2.6. +* --ifconfig-push now accepts DNS names as well as + IP addresses. +* Added sanity check errors when --pull or + --auth-user-pass is used in an incorrect mode. +* Updated man page entries for --client-connect and + --ifconfig-push. +* Added "String Types and Remapping" section to man + page to consisely document the way which OpenVPN + may convert certain types of characters in strings + to ('_'). +* Modified bridging description in HOWTO to emphasize + the fact that bridging allows Windows file and print + sharing without a WINS server (Charles Duffy). + +2004.12.20 -- Version 2.0-rc6 + +* Improved checking for epoll support in ./configure + to fix false positive on RH9 (Jan Just Keijser). +* Made the "MULTI TCP: I/O wait required blocking in + multi_tcp_action, action=7" error nonfatal and replaced + with "MULTI: Outgoing TUN queue full, dropped packet". + So far the issue only seems to occur on Linux 2.2 + in --mode server --proto tcp mode. It occurs when + the TUN/TAP driver locks up and refuses to accept + new packet writes for a second or more. +* Fixed bug where if a --client-config-dir file tried + to include another file using "config", and if that + include failed, OpenVPN would abort with a fatal + error. Now such inclusion failures will be logged + but are no longer fatal. +* Global changes to the way that packet buffer alignment + is handled. Previously we didn't care about alignment + and took care, when handling 16 and 32 bit words + in buffers, to always use alignment-safe transfers. + This approach appears to be inadequate on some + architectures such as alpha. The new approach is + to initialize packet buffers in a way that anticipates + how component structures will be allocated within + them, to maintain correct alignment. +* Added --dhcp-option DISABLE-NBT to disable NetBIOS + over TCP (Jan Just Keijser). +* Added --http-proxy-option directive for controlling + miscellaneous HTTP proxy options. +* Management state will no longer transition to "WAIT" + during TLS renegotiations. + +2004.12.16 -- Version 2.0-rc5 + +* The --client-config-dir option will now try to open + a default file called "DEFAULT" if no file matching + the common name of the incoming client was found. +* The --client-connect script/plugin can now veto client + authentication by returning a failure code. +* The --learn-address script/plugin can now prevent a + client-instance/address association from being learned + by returning a failure code. +* Changed RPM group in .spec file to Applications/Internet. + +2004.12.14 -- Version 2.0-rc4 + +* SuSE only -- Fixed interaction between openvpn.spec and + suse/openvpn.init where the .spec file was writing the + OpenVPN binary to a different location than where the + .init script was referencing it (Stefan Engel). +* Solaris only -- Split Solaris ifconfig command into two + parts (Jan Just Keijser). +* Some cleanup in add_option(). +* Better error checking on input dotted quad IP addresses. +* Verify that --push argument is quoted, if there is + more than one. +* More miscellaneous option sanity checks. + +2004.12.13 -- Version 2.0-rc3 + +* On Windows, when --log or --log-append is used, + save the original stderr for username and password + prompts. +* Fixed a bug introduced in the late 2.0 betas where + if a "verb" parameter >= 16 was used, it would be + ignored and the actual verb level would remain at 1. +* Fixed a bug mostly seen on OS X where --management-hold + or --management-query-passwords would cause the management + interface to be unresponsive to incoming client connections. +* Trigger an options error if one of the management-modifying + options is used without "management" itself. + +2004.12.12 -- Version 2.0-rc2 + +* Amplified warnings in documentation about possible + man-in-the-middle attack when clients do not properly + verify server certificate. Changes to easy-rsa README, + FAQ, HOWTO, man page, and sample client config file. +* Added a warning message if --tls-client or --client + is used without also specifying one of either + --ns-cert-type, --tls-remote, or --tls-verify. +* status_open() fixes for MSVC builds (Blaine Fleming). +* Fix attempt of "ntlm.c:55: error: `des_cblock' undeclared" + compiler error which has been reported on some platforms. +* The openvpn.spec file for rpmbuild has several + new build-time options. See comments in the file. +* Plugins are now built and packaged in the RPM and + will be saved in /usr/share/openvpn/plugin/lib. +* Added --management-hold directive to start OpenVPN + in a hibernating state until released by the + management interface. Also added "hold" command + to the management interface. + +2004.12.07 -- Version 2.0-rc1 + +* openvpn.spec workaround for SuSE confusion regarding + /etc/init.d vs. /etc/rc.d/init.d (Stefan Engel). + +2004.12.05 -- Version 2.0-beta20 + +* The ability to read --askpass and --auth-user-pass + passwords from a file has been disabled by default. + To re-enable, use ./configure --enable-password-save. +* Added additional pre-connected states to management + interface. See management/management-notes.txt + for more info. +* State history is now recorded by the management + interface, and the "state" command now works like + the log or echo commands. +* State history and real-time state change notifications + are now prepended with an integer unix timestamp. +* Added --http-proxy-timeout option, previously + the timeout was hardcoded to 5 seconds. + +2004.12.02 -- Version 2.0-beta19 + +* Fixed bug in management interface line termination + where output lines incorrectly contained a \00 char + after the customary \0d \0a. +* Fixed bug introduced in beta18 where Windows version + would segfault on options errors. +* Fixed bug in management interface where an empty + quoted string ("") entered as a parameter would cause + a segfault. +* Fixed bug where --resolv-retry was not working + properly with multiple --remote hosts. +* Added additional ./configure options to reduce + executable size for embedded applications. + See ./configure --help. + +2004.11.28 -- Version 2.0-beta18 + +* Added management interface. See new --management-* + options or the full management interface documentation + in management/management-notes.txt in the tarball. + Management interface inclusion can be disabled by + ./configure --disable-management. +* Added two new plugin modules: auth-pam and down-root. + Auth-pam supports pam-based authentication using a + split privilege execution model, while down-root enables + a down script to be executed with root privileges, even + when --user/--group is used to drop root privileges. + See the plugin directory in the tarball for READMEs, + source code, and Makefiles. +* Plugin developers should note that some changes were + made to the plugin interface since beta17. See + openvpn-plugin.h for details. + Plugin interface inclusion can be disabled with + ./configure --disable-plugins +* Added easy-rsa/build-key-server script which will + build a certificate with with nsCertType=server. +* Added --ns-cert-type option for verification + of nsCertType field in peer certificate. +* If --fragment n is specified and --mssfix is specified + without a parameter, default --mssfix to n. This restores + the 1.6 behavior when using --mssfix without a parameter. +* Fixed SSL context initialization bug introduced in beta14 + where this error might occur on restarts: "Cannot load + certificate chain ... PEM_read_bio:no start line". + +2004.11.11 -- Version 2.0-beta17 + +* Changed default port number to 1194 per IANA official + port number assignment. +* Added --plugin directive which allows compiled + modules to intercept script callbacks. See + plugin folder in tarball for more info. +* Fixed bug introduced in beta12 where --key-method 1 + authentications which should have succeeded would fail. +* Ignore SIGUSR1 during DNS resolution. +* Added SuSE support to openvpn.spec (Umberto Nicoletti). +* Fixed --cryptoapicert SUBJ: parsing bug (Peter 'Luna' + Runestig). + +2004.11.07 -- Version 2.0-beta16 + +* Modified sample-scripts/auth-pam.pl to get username + and password from OpenVPN via a file rather than + via environmental variables. +* Added bytes_sent and bytes_received environmental + variables to be set prior to client-disconnect script. +* Changed client virtual IP derivation precedence: + (1) use --ifconfig-push directive from --client-connect + script, (2) use --ifconfig-push directive from + --client-config-dir, and (3) use --ifconfig-pool + address. +* If a --client-config-dir file specifies --ifconfig-push, + it will be visible to the --client-connect-script in + the ifconfig_pool_remote_ip environmental variable. +* For tun-style tunnels, the ifconfig_pool_local_ip + environmental variable will be set, while for + tap-style tunnels, the ifconfig_pool_netmask variable + will be set. +* Added intelligence to autoconf script to test + compiler for the accepted form of zero-length arrays. +* Fixed a bug introduced in beta12 where --ip-win32 + netsh would fail if --dev-node was not explicitly + specified. +* --ip-win32 netsh will now work on hidden adapters. +* Fix attempt of "Assertion failed at crypto.c:149". + This assertion has also been reported on 1.x with a + slightly different line number. The fix is twofold: + (1) In previous releases, --mtu-test may trigger this + assertion -- this bug has been fixed. (2) If something + else causes the assertion to be thrown, don't panic, + just output a nonfatal warning to the log and drop + the packet which generated the error. +* Support TAP interfaces on Mac OS X (Waldemar Brodkorb). +* Added --echo directive. +* Added --auth-nocache directive. + +2004.10.28 -- Version 2.0-beta15 + +* Changed environmental variable character classes + so that names must consist of alphanumeric or + underbar chars and values must consist of printable + characters. Illegal chars will be deleted. + Versions prior to 2.0-beta12 were more restrictive + and would map spaces to '.'. +* On Windows, when the TAP adapter fails to + initialize with the correct IP address, output + "Initialization Sequence Completed with Errors" + to the console or log file. +* Added a warning when user/group/chroot is used + without persist-tun and persist-key. +* Added cryptoapi.[ch] to tarball and source zip. +* --tls-remote option now works with common name + prefixes as well as with the full X509 subject + string. This is a useful alternative to using + a CRL on the client. +* common names associated with a static + --ifconfig-push setting will no longer leave + any state in the --ifconfig-pool-persist file. +* Hard TLS errors (TLS handshake failed) will now + trigger either a SIGUSR1 signal by default + or SIGTERM (if --tls-exit is specified). In TCP + mode, all TLS errors are considered to be hard. + In server mode, the signal will be local to the + client instance. +* Added method parameter to --auth-user-pass-verify + directive to select whether username/password + is passed to script via environment or a temporary + file. +* Added --status-version option to control format + of --status file. The --mode server + --status-version 2 format now includes a line + type token, the virtual IP address is shown + in the client list (even in --dev tap mode), + and the integer time_t value is shown anywhere + an ascii-formatted time/date is also shown. +* Added --remap-usr1 directive which can be used + to control whether internally or externally + generated SIGUSR1 signals are remapped to + SIGHUP (restart without persisting state) or + SIGTERM (exit). +* When running as a Windows service (using + --service option), check the exit event before + and after reading one line of input from + stdin, when reading username/password info. +* For developers: Extended the --gremlin function + to better stress-test the new 2.0 features, + added Valgrind support on Linux and Dmalloc + support on Windows. + +2004.10.19 -- Version 2.0-beta14 + +* Fixed a bug introduced in Beta12 that would occur + if you use a --client-connect script without also + defining --tmp-dir. +* Fixed a bug introduced in Beta12 where a learn-address + script might segfault on the delete method. +* Added Crypto API support in Windows version via + the --cryptoapicert option (Peter 'Luna' Runestig). + +2004.10.18 -- Version 2.0-beta13 + +* Fixed an issue introduced in Beta12 where the private + key password would not be prompted for unless --askpass + was explicitly specified in the config. + +2004.10.17 -- Version 2.0-beta12 + +* Added support for username/password-based authentication. + Clients can now authentication themselves with the server + using either a certificate, a username/password, or both. + New directives: --auth-user-pass, --auth-user-pass-verify, + --client-cert-not-required, and --username-as-common-name. +* Added NTLM proxy patch (William Preston). +* Added --ifconfig-pool-linear server flag to allocate + individual tun addresses for clients rather than /30 + subnets (won't work with Windows clients). +* Modified --http-proxy code to cache username/password + across restarts. +* Modified --http-proxy code to read username/password + from the console when the auth file is given as "stdin". +* Modified --askpass to take an optional filename argument. +* --persist-tun and --persist-key now work in client mode + and can be pushed to clients as well. +* Added --ifconfig-pool-persist directive, to maintain + ifconfig-pool info in a file which is persistent across + daemon instantiations. +* --user and --group privilege downgrades as well as + --chroot now also work in client mode (the + dowgrade/chroot will be delayed until the initialization + sequence is completed). +* Added --show-engines standalone directive to show + available OpenSSL crypto accelerator engine support. +* --engine directive now accepts an optional engine-ID + parameter to control which engine is used. +* "Connection reset, restarting" log message now shows + which client is being reset. +* Added --dhcp-pre-release directive in Windows version. +* Second parm to --ip-win32 can be "default", e.g. + --ip-win32 dynamic default 60. +* Fixed documentation bug regarding environmental + variable settings for --ifconfig-pool IP addresses. + The correct environmental variable names are: + ifconfig_pool_local_ip and ifconfig_pool_remote_ip. +* ifconfig_pool_local_ip and ifconfig_pool_remote_ip + environmental variables are now passed to the + client-disconnect script. +* In server mode, environmental variables are now scoped + according to the client they are associated with, + to solve the problem of "crosstalk" between different + client's environmental variable sets. +* Added --down-pre flag to cause --down script to be + called before TUN/TAP close (rather than after). +* Added --tls-exit flag which will cause OpenVPN + to exit on any TLS errors. +* Don't push a route to a client if it exactly + matches an iroute (this lets you push routes to + all clients, and OpenVPN will automatically remove + the route from the route push list only for that client + which the route actually belongs to). +* Made '--resolv-retry infinite' the default. + --resolv-retry can be disabled by using a parameter of 0. +* For clients which plan to pull config info from server, + set an initial default ping-restart of 60 seconds. +* Optimized mute code to lessen the load on the processor + when messages are being muted at a higher frequency. +* Made route log messages non-mutable. +* Silence the Linux "No buffer space available" message. +* Added miscellaneous additional option sanity checks. +* Added Windows version of easy-rsa scripts in + easy-rsa/Windows directory (Andrew J. Richardson). +* Added NetBSD route patch (Ed Ravin). +* Added OpenBSD patch for TAP + --redirect-gateway + (Waldemar Brodkorb). +* Directives which prompt for a username and/or password + will now work with --daemon (OpenVPN will prompt + before forking). +* Warn if CRL is from a different issuer than the + issuer of the peer certificate (Bernhard Weisshuhn). +* Changed init script chkconfig parameters to start + OpenVPN daemon(s) before NFS. +* Bug fix attempt of "too many I/O wait events" which occurs + on OSes which prefer select() over poll() such as Mac OS X. +* Added --ccd-exclusive flag. This flag will require, as a + condition of authentication, that a connecting client has + a --client-config-dir file. +* TAP-Win32 open code will attempt to open a free adapter + if --dev-node is not specified (Mathias Sundman). +* Resequenced --nice and --chroot ordering so that --nice + occurs first. +* Added --suppress-timestamps flag (Charles Duffy). +* Source code changes to allow compilation by MSVC + (Peter 'Luna' Runestig). +* Added experimental --fast-io flag which optimizes + TUN/TAP/UDP writes on non-Windows systems. + +2004.08.18 -- Version 2.0-beta11 + +* Added --server, --server-bridge, --client, and + --keepalive helper directives. See client.conf + and server.conf in sample-config-files for sample + configurations which use the new directives. +* On Windows, added --route-method to control + whether IP Helper API or route.exe is used + to add/delete routes. +* On Windows, added a second parameter to + --route-delay to control the maximum time period + to wait for the TAP-Win32 adapter to come up + before adding routes. +* Fixed bug in Windows version where configurations + which omit --ifconfig might fail to recognize when + the TAP adapter is up. +* Proxy connection failures will now retry according + to the --connect-retry parameter. +* Fixed --dev null handling on Windows so that TLS + loopback test described in INSTALL file works + correctly on Windows. +* Added "Initialization Sequence Completed" message + after all initialization steps have been completed + and the VPN can be considered "up". +* Better sanity-checking on --ifconfig-pool parameters. +* Added --tcp-queue-limit option to control + TUN/TAP -> TCP socket overflow. +* --ifconfig-nowarn flag will now silence general + warnings about possible --ifconfig address + conflicts, including the warning about --ifconfig + and --remote addresses being in same /24 subnet. +* Fixed case where server mode did not correctly + identify certain types of ethernet multicast packets + (Marcel de Kogel). +* Added --explicit-exit-notify option (experimental). + +2004.08.02 -- Version 2.0-beta10 + +* Fixed possible reference after free of option strings + after a restart, bug was introduced in beta8. +* Fixed segfault at route.c:919 in the beta9 + Windows version that was being caused by indirection + through a NULL pointer. +* Mistakenly built debug version of TAP-Win32 driver + for beta9. Beta10 has correct release build. + +2004.07.30 -- Version 2.0-beta9 + +* Fixed --route issue on Windows that was introduced with + the new beta8 route implementation based on the + IP Helper API. + +2004.07.27 -- Version 2.0-beta8 + +* Added TCP support in server mode. +* Added PKCS #12 support (Mathias Sundman). +* Added patch to make revoke-crt and make-crl work + seamlessly within the easy-rsa environment (Jan Kiszka). +* Modified --mode server ethernet bridge code to forward + special IEEE 802.1d MAC Groups, i.e. 01:80:C2:XX:XX:XX. +* Added --dhcp-renew and --dhcp-release flags to Windows + version. Normally DHCP renewal and release on the TAP + adapter occurs automatically under Windows, however + if you set the TAP-Win32 adapter Media Status property + to "Always Connected", you may need these flags. +* Added --show-net standalone flag to Windows version to + show OpenVPN's view of the system adapter and routing + tables. +* Added --show-net-up flag to Windows version to output + the system routing table and network adapter list to + the log file after the TAP-Win32 adapter has been brought + up and any routes have been added. +* Modified Windows version to add routes using the IP Helper + API rather than by calling route.exe. +* Fixed bug where --route-up script was not being called + if no --route options were specified. +* Added --mute-replay-warnings to suppress packet replay + warnings. This is a common false alarm on WiFi nets. +* Added "def1" flag to --redirect-gateway option to override + the default gateway by using 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1 + rather than 0.0.0.0/0. This has the benefit of overriding + but not wiping out the original default gateway. + (Thanks to Jim Carter for pointing out this idea). +* You can now run OpenVPN with a single config file argument. + For example, you can now say "openvpn config.conf" + rather than "openvpn --config config.conf". +* On Windows, made --route and --route-delay more adaptive + with respect to waiting for interfaces referenced by the + route destination to come up. Routes added by --route + should now be added as soon as the interface comes up, + rather than after an obligatory 10 second delay. The + way this works internally is that --route-delay now + defaults to 0 on Windows. Previous versions would + wait for --route-delay seconds then add the routes. + This version will wait --route-delay seconds and then + test the routing table at one second intervals for the + next 30 seconds and will not add the routes until they + can be added without errors. +* On Windows, don't setsockopt SO_SNDBUF or SO_RCVBUF by + default on TCP/UDP socket in light of reports that this + action can have undesirable global side effects on the + MTU settings of other adapters. These parameters can + still be set, but you need to explicitly specify + --sndbuf and/or --rcvbuf. +* Added --max-clients option to limit the maximum number + of simultaneously connected clients in server mode. +* Added error message to illuminate shell escape gotcha when + single backslashes are used in Windows path names. +* Added optional netmask parm to --ifconfig-pool. +* Fixed bug where http-proxy connect retry attempts were + incorrectly going to the remote OpenVPN server, + not to the HTTP proxy server. + +2004.06.29 -- Version 2.0-beta7 + +* Fixed bug in link_socket_verify_incoming_addr() which + under certain circumstances could have caused --float + behavior even if --float was not specified. +* --tls-auth option now works with --mode server. + All clients and the server should use the same + --tls-auth key when operating in client/server mode. +* Added --engine option to make use of OpenSSL-supported + crypto acceleration hardware. +* Fixed some high verbosity print format size issues + in event.c for 64 bit platforms (Janne Johansson). +* Made failure to open --log or --log-append file + a non-fatal error. + +2004.06.23 -- Version 2.0-beta6 + +* Fixed Windows installer to intelligently put + up a reboot dialog only if tapinstall tells + us that it's really necessary. +* Fixed "Assertion failed at fragment.c:309" + bug when --mode server and --fragment are used + together. +* Ignore HUP, USR1, and USR2 signals during + initialization. Prior versions would abort. +* Fixed bug on OS X: "Assertion failed at event.c:406". +* Added --service option to Windows version, for use + when OpenVPN is being programmatically instantiated + by another process (see man page for info). +* --log and --log-append options now work on Windows. +* Update OpenBSD INSTALL notes (Janne Johansson). +* Enable multicast on tun interface when running on + OpenBSD (Pavlin Radoslavov). +* Fixed recent --test-crypto breakage, where options + such as --cipher were not being parsed correctly. +* Modified options compatibility string by removing + ifconfig substring if it is empty. Incremented + options compatibility string version number to 4. +* Fixed typo in --tls-timeout option parsing + (Mikael Lonnroth). + +2004.06.13 -- Version 2.0-beta5 + +* Fixed rare --mode server crash that could occur + if data was being routed to a client at + high bandwidth at the precise moment that the + client instance object on the server was being + deleted. +* Fixed issue on machines which have epoll.h and + the epoll_create glibc call defined, but which + don't actually implement epoll in the kernel. + OpenVPN will now gracefully fall back to the + poll API in this case. +* Fixed Windows bug which would cause the following + error in a --mode server --dev tap configuration: + "resource limit WSA_MAXIMUM_WAIT_EVENTS has been + exceeded". +* Added CRL (certificate revocation list) management + scripts to easy-rsa directory (Jon Bendtsen). +* Do a better job of getting the ifconfig component + of the options consistency check to work correctly + when --up-delay is used. +* De-inlined some functions which were too complex + to be inlined anyway with gcc. +* If a --dhcp-option option is pushed to a non-windows + client, the option will be saved in the client's + environment before the --up script is called, under + the name "foreign_option_{n}". +* Added --learn-address script (see man page) which + allows for firewall access through the VPN to be + controlled based on the client common name. +* In mode --server mode, when a client connects to + the server, the server will disconnect any + still-active clients which use the same common + name. Use --duplicate-cn flag to revert to + previous behavior of allowing multiple clients + to concurrently connect with the same common name. + +2004.06.08 -- Version 2.0-beta4 + +* Fixed issue with beta3 where Win32 service wrapper + was keying off of old TAP HWID as a dependency. To + ensure that the new service wrapper is correctly + installed, the Windows install script will uninstall + the old wrapper before installing the new one, + causing a reset of service properties. +* Fixed permissions issue on --status output file, + with default access permissions of owner read/write + only (default permissions can be changed of course with + chmod). + +2004.06.05 -- Version 2.0-beta3 + +* More changes to TAP-Win32 driver's INF file which + affects the placement of the driver in the Windows + device namespace. This is done to work around an + apparent bug in Windows when short HWIDs are used, + and will also ease the upgrade from 1.x to 2.0 by + reducing the chances that a reboot will be needed + on upgrade. Like beta2, this upgrade will + delete existing TAP-Win32 interfaces, and reinstall + a single new interface with default properties. +* Major rewrite of I/O event wait layer in the style + of libevent. This is a precursor to TCP support + in --mode server. +* New feature: --status. Outputs a SIGUSR2-like + status summary to a given file, updated once + per n seconds. The status file is comma delimited + for easy machine parsing. +* --ifconfig-pool now remembers common names and + will try to assign a consistent IP to a given + common name. Still to do: persist --ifconfig-pool + memory across restarts by saving state in file. +* Fixed bug in event timer queue which could cause + recurring timer events such as --ping to not + correctly schedule again after firing. This in + turn would cause spurrious ping restarts and possible + connection outages. Thanks to Denis Vlasenko for + tracking this down. +* Possible fix to reported bug where --daemon argument + was not printing to syslog correctly after restart. +* Fixed bug where pulling --route or --dhcp-option + directives from a server would problematically + interact with --persist-tun on the client. +* Updated contrib/multilevel-init.patch (Farkas Levente). +* Added RPM build option to .spec and .spec.in files + to optionally disable LZO inclusion (Ian Pilcher). +* The latest MingW runtime and headers define + 'ssize_t', so a patch is needed (Gisle Vanem). + +2004.05.14 -- Version 2.0-beta2 + +* Fixed signal handling bug in --mode server, where + SIGHUP and SIGUSR1 were treated as SIGTERM. +* Changed the TAP-Win32 HWID from "TAP" to "TAPDEV". + Apparently the larger string may work around + a problem where the TAP adapter is sometimes missing + from the network connections panel, especially under + XP SP2. Also note that installing this upgrade will + uninstall any pre-existing TAP-Win32 adapters, and then + install a single new adapter, meaning that old adapter + properties will be lost. Thanks to Md5Chap for solving + this one. +* For --mode server --dev tap, the options --ifconfig and + --ifconfig-pool are now optional. This allows address + assignment via DHCP or use of a TAP VPN without + IP support, as has always been possible with 1.x. +* Fixed bug where --ifconfig may not work correctly on + Linux 2.2. +* Added 'local' flag to --redirect-gateway for use on + networks where both OpenVPN daemons are connected + to a shared subnet, such as wireless. + +2004.05.09 -- Version 2.0-beta1 + +* Unchanged from test29 except for version number + upgrade. + +2004.05.08 -- Version 2.0-test29 + +* Modified --dev-node on Windows to accept a TAP-Win32 + GUID name. In addition, --show-adapters will now + display the high-level name and GUID of each adapter. + This is an attempt to work around an issue in Windows + where sometimes the TAP-Win32 adapter installs correctly + but has no icon in the network connections control + panel. In such cases, being able to specify + --dev-node {TAP-GUID} can work around the missing icon. + +2004.05.07 -- Version 2.0-test28 + +* Fixed bug which could cause segfault on program + shutdown if --route and --persist-tun are used + together. + +2004.05.06 -- Version 2.0-test27 + +* Fixed bug in close_instance() which might cause + memory to be accessed after it had already been freed. +* Fixed bug in verify_callback() that might have + caused uninitialized data to be referenced. +* --iroute now allows full CIDR subnet routing. +* In "--mode server --dev tun" usage, source addresses + on VPN packets coming from a particular client must + be associated with that client in the OpenVPN internal + routing table. + +2004.04.28 -- Version 2.0-test26 + +* Optimized broadcast path in multi-client mode. +* Added socket buffer size options --rcvbuf & --sndbuf. +* Configure Linux tun/tap driver to use a more sensible + txqueuelen default. Also allow explicit setting + via --txqueuelen option (Harald Roelle). +* The --remote option now allows the port number + to be specified as the second parameter. If + unspecified, the port number defaults to the + --rport value. +* Multiple --remote options on the client can now be + specified for load balancing and failover. The + --remote-random flag can be used to initially randomize + the --remote list for basic load balancing. +* If a remote DNS name resolves to multiple DNS addresses, + one will be chosen by random as a kind of basic + load-balancing feature if --remote-random is used. +* Added --connect-freq option to control maximum + new connection frequency in multi-client mode. +* In multi-client mode, all syslog messages associated + with a specific client now include a client-ID prefix. +* For Windows, use a gettimeofday() function based + on QueryPerformanceCounter (Derek Burdick). +* Fixed bug in interaction between --key-method 2 + and DES ciphers, where dynamic keys would be generated + with bad parity and then be rejected. + +2004.04.17 -- Version 2.0-test24 + +* Reworked multi-client broadcast handling. + +2004.04.13 -- Version 2.0-test23 + +* Fixed bug in --dev tun --client-to-client routing. +* Fixed a potential deadlock in --pull. +* Fixed a problem with select() usage which could + cause a repeating sequence of "select : Invalid + argument (code=22)" + +2004.04.11 -- Version 2.0-test22 + +* Fixed bug where --mode server + --daemon was + prematurely closing syslog connection. +* Added support for --redirect-gateway on Mac OS X + (Jeremy Apple). +* Minor changes to TAP-Win32 driver based on feedback + from the NDISTest tool. + +2004.04.11 -- Version 2.0-test21 + +* Optimizations in multi-client server event loop. + +2004.04.10 -- Version 2.0-test20 + +* --mode server capability now works with either tun + or tap interfaces. When used with tap interfaces, + OpenVPN will internally bridge all client tap + interfaces with the server tap interface. +* Connecting clients can now have a client-specific + configuration on the server, based on the client + common name embedded in the client certificate. + See --client-config-dir and --client-connect. + These options can be used to configure client-specific + routes. +* Added an option --client-to-client that enables + internal client-to-client routing or bridging. + Otherwise, clients will only "see" the server, + not other connected clients. +* Fixed bug in route scheduling which would have caused + --mode server to not work on Windows in test18 + and test19 with the sample config file. +* Man page is up to date with all new options. +* OpenVPN 2.0 release notes on web site updated + with tap-style tunnel examples. + +2004.04.02 -- Version 2.0-test19 + +* Fixed bug where routes pushed from server were + not working correctly on Windows clients. +* Added Mac OS X route patch (Jeremy Apple). + +2004.03.30 -- Version 2.0-test18 + +* Minor fixes + Windows self-install modified + to use OpenSSL 0.9.7d. + +2004.03.29 -- Version 2.0-test17 + +* Fixed some bugs related to instance timeout and deletion. +* Extended --push/--pull option to support additional + option classes. + +2004.03.28 -- Version 2.0-test16 + +* Successful test of --mode udp-server, --push, + --pull, and --ifconfig-pool with server on + Linux 2.4 and clients on Linux and Windows. + +2004.03.25 -- Version 2.0-test15 + +* Implemented hash-table lookup of client instances + based either on remote UDP address/port or remote + ifconfig endpoint. +* Implemented a randomized binary tree based + scheduler for scalably scheduling a large number + of client instance events. Uses the treap + data structure and node rotation algorithm + to keep the tree balanced. +* Initial implementation of ifconfig-pool. +* Made --key-method 2 the default. + +2004.03.20 -- Version 2.0-test14 + +* Implemented --push and --pull. + +2004.03.20 -- Version 2.0-test13 + +* Reduced struct tls_multi and --single-session + memory footprint. +* Modified --single-session flag to be used + in multi-client UDP server client instances. + +2004.03.19 -- Version 2.0-test12 + +* Added the key multi-client UDP server options, + --mode, --push, --pull, and --ifconfig-pool. +* Revamped GC (garbage collection) code to not rely + on any global data. +* Modifications to thread.[ch] to allow a more + flexible thread model. + +2004.03.16 -- Version 2.0-test11 + +* Moved all timer code to interval.h, added new file + interval.c. +* Fixed missing include. + +2004.03.16 -- Version 2.0-test10 + +* More TAP-Win32 fixes. +* Initial debugging and testing of multi.[ch]. + +2004.03.14 -- Version 2.0-test9 + +* Branch merge with 1.6-rc3 +* More point-to-multipoint work in multi.[ch]. +* Major TAP-Win32 driver restructuring to use + NdisMRegisterDevice instead of + IoCreateDevice/IoCreateSymbolicLink. +* Changed TAP-Win32 symbolic links to use \DosDevices\Global\ + pathname prefix. +* In the majority of cases, TAP-Win32 should now be + able to install and uninstall on Win2K without requiring + a reboot. +* TAP-Win32 MAC address can now be explicitly set in the + adapter advanced properties page. + +2004.03.04 -- Version 2.0-test8 + +* Branch merge with 1.6-rc2. + +2004.03.03 -- Version 2.0-test7 + +* Branch merge with 1.6-rc1.2. + +2004.03.02 -- Version 2.0-test6 + +* Branch merge with 1.6-rc1. + +2004.03.02 -- Version 2.0-test5 + +* Move Socks5 UDP header append/remove to socks.c, and is + called from forward.c. +* Moved verify statics from ssl.c into struct tls_session. +* Wrote multi.[ch] to handle top level of point-to-multipoint + mode. +* Wrote some code to allow a struct link_socket in a child context + to be slaved to the parent context. +* Broke up packet read and process functions in forward.c + (from socket or tuntap) into separate functions for read + and process, so that point-to-point and point-to-multipoint can + share the same code. +* Expand TLS control channel to allow the passing of configuration + commands. +* Wrote mroute.[ch] to handle internal packet routing for + point-to-multipoint mode. + +2004.02.22 -- Version 2.0-test3 + +* Initial work on UDP multi-client server. +* Branch merge of 1.6-beta7 + +2004.02.14 -- Version 2.0-test2 + +* Refactorization of openvpn.c into openvpn.[ch] + init.[ch] forward.[ch] forward-inline.h + occ.[ch] occ-inline.h ping.[ch] ping-inline.h + sig.[ch]. Created a master per-tunnel + struct context in openvpn.h. +* Branch merge of 1.6-beta6.2 + +2003.11.06 -- Version 2.0-test1 + +* Initial testbed for 2.0. + +2004.05.09 -- Version 1.6.0 + +* Unchanged from 1.6-rc4 except for version number + upgrade. + +2004.04.01 -- Version 1.6-rc4 + +* Made minor customizations to devcon and + renamed as tapinstall.exe for Windows version. +* Fixed "storage size of `iv' isn't known" build + problem on FreeBSD. +* OpenSSL 0.9.7d bundled with Windows self-install. + +2004.03.13 -- Version 1.6-rc3 + +* Minor Windows fixes for --ip-win32 dynamic, relating to + the way the TAP-Win32 driver responds to a DHCP request + from the Windows DHCP client. +* The net_gateway environmental variable wasn't being + set correctly for called scripts (Paul Zuber). +* Added code to determine the default gateway on FreeBSD, + allowing the --redirect-gateway option to work + (Juan Rodriguez Hervella). + +2004.03.04 -- Version 1.6-rc2 + +* Fixed bug in Windows version where the NetBIOS node-type + DHCP option might have been passed even if it was not + specified. +* Fixed bug in Windows version introduced in 1.6-rc1, where + DHCP timeout would be set to 0 seconds if --ifconfig option + was used and --ip-win32 option was not explicitly specified. +* Added some new --dhcp-option types for Windows version. + +2004.03.02 -- Version 1.6-rc1 + +* For Windows, make "--ip-win32 dynamic" the default. +* For Windows, make "--route-delay 10" the default + unless --ip-win32 dynamic is not used or --route-delay + is explicitly specified. +* L_TLS mutex could have been left in a locked state + for certain kinds of TLS errors. + +2004.02.22 -- Version 1.6-beta7 + +* Allow scheduling priority increase (--nice) together + with UID/GID downgrade (--user/--group). +* Code that causes SIGUSR1 restart on TLS errors in TCP + mode was not activated in pthread builds. +* Save the certificate serial number in an environmental + variable called tls_serial_{n} prior to calling the + --tls-verify script. n is the current cert chain level. +* Added NetBSD IPv6 tunnel capability (also requires + a kernel patch) (Horst Laschinsky). +* Fixed bug in checking the return value of the nice() + function (Ian Pilcher). +* Bug fix in new FreeBSD IPv6 over TUN code which was + originally added in 1.6-beta5 (Nathanael Rensen). +* More Socks5 fixes -- extended the struct frame + infrastructure to accomodate proxy-based encapsulation + overhead. +* Added --dhcp-option to Windows version for setting + adapter properties such as WINS & DNS servers. +* Use a default route-delay of 5 seconds when + --ip-win32 dynamic is specified (only applicable when + --route-delay is not explicitly specified). +* Added "log_append" registry variable to control + whether the OpenVPN service wrapper on Windows + opens log files in append (log_append="1") or + truncate (log_append="0") mode. The default + is truncate. + +2004.02.05 -- Version 1.6-beta6 + +* UDP over Socks5 fix to accomodate Socks5 encapsulation + overhead (Christof Meerwald). +* Minor --ip-win32 dynamic tweaks (use long lease time, + invalidate existing lease with DHCPNAK). + +2004.02.01 -- Version 1.6-beta5 + +* Added Socks5 proxy support (Christof Meerwald). +* IPv6 tun support for FreeBSD (Thomas Glanzmann). +* Special TAP-Win32 debug mode for Windows self-install that was + enabled in beta4 is now turned off. +* Added some new Solaris notes to INSTALL (Koen Maris). +* More work on --ip-win32 dynamic. + +2004.01.27 -- Version 1.6-beta4 + +* For this beta, the Windows self-install is a debug version + and will run slower -- use only for testing. +* Reverted the --ip-win32 default back to 'ipapi' + from 'dynamic'. +* Added the offset parameter to '--ip-win32 dynamic' which + can be used to control the address of the masqueraded + DHCP server which replies to Windows DHCP requests. +* Added a wait/nowait option to --inetd (nowait can only + be used with TCP sockets, TLS authentication, and over + a bridged configuration -- see FAQ for more info) + (Stefan `Sec` Zehl). +* Added a build-time capability where TAP-Win32 driver + debug messages can be output by OpenVPN at --verb 6 + or higher. + +2004.01.20 -- Version 1.6-beta2 + +* Added ./configure --enable-iproute2 flag which + uses iproute2 instead of route + ifconfig -- + this is necessary for the LEAF Linux distro + (Martin Hejl). +* Added renewal-time and rebind-time to set of + DHCP options returned by the TAP-Win32 driver when + "--ip-win32 dynamic" is used. + +2004.01.14 -- Version 1.6-beta1 + +* Fixed --proxy bug that sometimes caused plaintext + control info generated by the proxy prior to http + CONNECT method establishment to be incorrectly + parsed as OpenVPN data. +* For Windows version, implemented the + "--ip-win32 dynamic" method and made it the default. + This method sets the TAP-Win32 adapter IP address + and netmask by replying to the kernel's DHCP queries. + See the man page for more detailed info. +* Added --connect-retry parameter which controls + the time interval (in seconds) between connect() + retries when --proto tcp-client is used. Previously, + this value was hardcoded to 5 seconds, and still + defaults as such. +* --resolv-retry can now be used with a parameter + of "infinite" to retry indefinitely. +* Added SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() to ssl.c + for support of multi-level certificate chains + (Sten Kalenda). +* Fixed --tls-auth incompatibility with 1.4.x and earlier + versions of OpenVPN when the passphrase file is an + OpenVPN static key file (as generated by --genkey). +* Added shell-escape support in config files using + the backslash character ("\") so that (for example) + double quotes can be passed to the shell. +* Added "contrib" subdirectory on tarball, source zip, + and CVS containing user-submitted contributions. +* Added an optional patch to the Redhat init script to + allow the configuration file directory to be a + multi-level directory hierarchy (Farkas Levente). + See contrib/multilevel-init.patch +* Added some scripts and documentation on using + Linux "fwmark" iptables rules to enable + fine-grained routing control over the VPN + (Sean Reifschneider, ). + See contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00 + +2003.11.20 -- Version 1.5.0 + +* Minor documentation changes. + +2003.11.04 -- Version 1.5-beta14 + +* Fixed build problem with ./configure --disable-ssl + that was reported on Debian woody. +* Fixed bug where --redirect-gateway could not be used + together with --resolv-retry. + +2003.11.03 -- Version 1.5-beta13 + +* Added CRL (certificate revocation list) capability using + --crl-verify option (Stefano Bracalenti). +* Added --replay-window option for variable replay-protection + window sizes. +* Fixed --fragment bug which might have caused certain large + packets to be sent unfragmented. +* Modified --secret and --tls-auth to permit different cipher and + HMAC keys to be used for each data flow direction. Also + increased static key file size generated by --genkey from + 1024 to 2048 bits, where 512 bits each are reserved for + send-HMAC, encrypt, receive-HMAC, and decrypt. Key file forward + and backward compatibility is maintained. See --secret option + documentation on the man page for more info. +* Added --tls-remote option (Teemu Kiviniemi). +* Fixed --tls-cipher documention regarding correct delimiter + usage (Teemu Kiviniemi). +* Added --key-method option for selecting alternative data + channel key negotiation methods. Method 1 is the default. + Method 2 has been added (see man page for more info). +* Added French translation of HOWTO to web site + (Guillaume Lehmann). +* Fixed problem caused by late resolver library load on + certain platforms when --resolv-retry and --chroot are + used together (Teemu Kiviniemi). +* In TCP mode, all decryption or TLS errors will abort the current + connection (this is not done in UDP mode because UDP is + "connectionless"). +* Fixed a TCP client reconnect bug that only occurs on the + BSDs, where connect() fails with an invalid argument. This + bug was partially (but not completely) fixed in beta7. +* Added "route_net_gateway" environmental variable which contains + the pre-existing default gateway address from the routing table + (there's no standard API for getting the default gateway, so + right now this feature only works on Windows or Linux). +* Renamed the "route_default_gateway" enviromental variable to + "route_vpn_gateway" -- this is the remote VPN endpoint. +* The special keywords vpn_gateway, net_gateway, and remote_host + can now be used for the network or gateway components of the + --route option. See the man page for more info. +* Added the --redirect-gateway option to configure the VPN + as the default gateway (implemented on Linux and Windows only). +* Added the --http-proxy option with basic authentication + support for use in TCP client mode. Successfully tested + using Squid as the HTTP proxy, with and without authentication. + +2003.10.12 -- Version 1.5-beta12 + +* Fixed Linux-only bug in --mktun and --rmtun which was + introduced around beta8 or so, which would cause + an error such as "I don't recognize device tun0 as a + tun or tap device1". +* Added --ifconfig-nowarn option to disable options + consistency warnings about --ifconfig parameters. +* Don't allow any kind of sequence number backtracking or + message reordering when in TCP mode. +* Changed beta naming convention to use '_' (underscore) + rather than '-' (dash) to pacify rpmbuild. + +2003.10.08 -- Version 1.5-beta11 + +* Modified code in the Windows version which sets the IP address + and netmask of the TAP-Win32 adapter using the IP Helper API. + Most of the changes involve better error recovery when + the IP Helper API returns an error status. See the + manual page entry on --ip-win32 for more info. + +2003.10.08 -- Version 1.5-beta10 + +* Added getpass() function for Windows version so that --askpass + option works correctly (Stefano Bracalenti). +* Added reboot advisory to end of Win32 install script. +* Changed crypto code to use pseudo-random IVs rather than + carrying forward the IV state from the previous packet. + This is in response to item 2 in the following document: + http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt which points + out weaknesses in TLS's use of the same IV carryforward + approach. This change does not break protocol compatibility + with previous versions of OpenVPN. +* Made a change to the crypto replay protection code to also + protect against certain kinds of packet reordering attacks. + This change does not break protocol compatibility with + previous versions of OpenVPN. +* Added --ip-win32 option to provide several choices for + setting the IP address on the TAP-Win32 adapter. +* #ifdefed out non-CBC crypto modes by default. +* Added --up-delay option to delay TUN/TAP open and --up script + execution until after connection establishment. This option + replaces the earlier windows-only option --tap-delay. + +2003.10.01 -- Version 1.5-beta9 + +* Fixed --route-noexec bug where option was not parsed correctly. +* Complain if --dev tun is specified without --ifconfig on Windows. +* Fixed bug where TCP connections on windows would sometimes cause + an assertion failure. +* Added a new flag to TAP-Win32 advanced properties that allows one + to set the adapter to be always "connected" even when an OpenVPN + process doesn't have it open. The default behavior is to report + a media status of connected only when an OpenVPN process has the + adapter open. +* Rebuilt the Windows self-install distribution with OpenSSL 0.9.7c + DLLs in response to an OpenSSL security advisory. + +2003.09.30 -- Version 1.5-beta8 + +* Extended the --ifconfig option to work on tap devices as well + as tun devices. +* Implemented the --ifconfig option for Windows, by calling the + netsh tool. +* By default, do an "arp -d *" on Windows after TAP-Win32 open to + refresh the MAC cache. This behaviour can be disabled with + --no-arp-del. +* On Windows, allow the --dev-node parameter (which specifies + the name of the TAP-Win32 adapter) to be omitted in cases where + there is a single TAP-Win32 adapter on the system which can be + assumed to be the default. +* Modified the diagnostic --verb 5 debugging level to print 'R' + for TCP/UDP read, 'W' for TCP/UDP write, 'r' for TUN/TAP read, + and 'w' for TUN/TAP write. +* Conditionalize OpenBSD read_tun and write_tun based on tun or tap + mode. +* Added IPv6 tun support to OpenBSD (Thomas Glanzmann). +* Make the --enable-mtu-dynamic ./configure option enabled by + default. +* Deprecated the --mtu-dynamic run-time option, in favor of + --fragment. +* DNS names can now be used as --ifconfig parameters. +* Significant work on TAP-Win32 driver to bring up to SMP standards. +* On Windows, fixed dangling IRP problem if TAP-Win32 driver is + unloaded or disabled, while a user-space process has it open. +* On Windows, if --tun-mtu is not specified, it will be read from + the TAP-Win32 driver via ioctl. +* On Windows, added TAP-Win32 driver status info to "F2" keyboard + signal (only when run from a console window). +* Added --mssfix option to control TCP MSS size (YANO Hirokuni). +* Renamed --mtu-dynamic option to --fragment to more accurately + reflect its function. Fragment accepts a single parameter which + is the upper limit on acceptable UDP packet size. +* Changed default --tun-mtu-extra parameter to 32 from 64. +* Eliminated reference to malloc.o in configure.ac. +* Added tun device emulation to the TAP-Win32 driver. +* Added --route and related options. +* Added init script for SuSE Linux (Frank Plohmann). +* Extended option consistency check between peers to function + in all crypto modes, including static-key and cleartext modes. + Previously only TLS mode was supported. Disable with + --disable-occ. +* Overall, increased the amount of configuration option sanity + checking, especially of networking parameters. +* Added --mtu-test option for empirical MTU measurement. +* Added Windows-only option --tap-delay to not set the TAP-Win32 + adapter media state to 'connected' until TCP/UDP connection + establishment with peer. +* Slightly modified --route/--route-delay semantics so that when + --route is given without --route-delay, routes are added + immediately after tun/tap device open. When --route-delay is + specified, routes will be added n seconds after connection + initiation, where n is the --route-delay parameter (which + can be set to 0). +* Made TCP framing error into a non-fatal error that triggers a + connection reset. + +2003.08.28 -- Version 1.5-beta7 + +* Fixed bug that caused OpenVPN not to respond to exit/restart + signals when --resolv-retry is used and a local or remote DNS + name cannot be resolved. +* Exported a series of environmental variables with useful + info for scripts. See man page for more info. Based + on a suggestion by Anthony Ciaravalo. +* Moved TCP/UDP socket bind to a point in the initialization + before the --up script gets called. This is desirable + because (a) a socket bind failure will happen before + daemonization, allowing an error status code to be returned + to the shell and (b) the possibility is eliminated of a + socket bind failure causing the --up script to be run + but not the --down script. This change has a side effect + that --resolv-retry will no longer work with --local. +* Fixed bug where if an OpenVPN TCP server went down and back + up again, Solaris or FreeBSD clients would fail to reconnect + to it. +* Fixed bug that prevented OpenVPN from being run by + inetd/xinetd in TCP mode. +* Added --log and --log-append options for logging messages to + a file. +* On Windows, check that the current user is a member of the + Administrator group before attempting install or uninstall. + +2003.08.16 -- Version 1.5-beta6 + +* Fixed TAP-Win32 driver to properly increment the Rx/Tx count. + +2003.08.14 -- Version 1.5-beta5 + +* Added user-configurability of the TAP-Win32 adapter MTU + through the adapter advanced properties page. +* Added Windows Service support. +* On Windows, added file association and right-clickability + for .ovpn files (OpenVPN config files). + +2003.08.05 -- Version 1.5-beta4 + +* Extra refinements and error checking added to Windows + NSIS install script. + +2003.08.05 -- Version 1.5-beta3 + +* Added md5.h include to crypto.c to fix build problem on + OpenBSD. +* Created a Win32 installer using NSIS. +* Removed DelService command from TAP-Win32 INF file. It appears + to be not necessary and it interfered with the ability to + uninstall and reinstall the driver without needing to reboot. +* On Windows version, added "addtap" and "deltapall" batch + files to add and delete TAP-Win32 adapter instances. + +2003.07.31 -- Version 1.5-beta2 + +* Renamed INSTALL.w32 to INSTALL-win32.txt and reformatted + in Windows ASCII so it's easier to click and view. +* Added postscript and PDF versions of the HOWTO to the web + site (C R Zamana). +* Merged Michael Clarke's stability patch into TAP-Win32 + driver which appears to fix the suspend/resume driver bug + and significantly improve driver stability. +* Added Christof Meerwald's Media Status patch to the + TAP-Win32 driver which shows the TAP adapter to be + disconnected when OpenVPN is not running. +* Moved socket connect and TCP server listen code to a later + point in openvpn() function so that the TCP server listen + state is entered after daemonization. +* Added keyboard shortcuts to simulate signals in the Windows + version, see the window title bar for descriptions. + +2003.07.24 -- Version 1.5-beta1 + +* Added TCP support via the new --proto option. +* Renamed udp-centric options such as --udp-mtu to + --link-mtu (old option names preserved for compatibility). +* Ported to Windows 2000 + XP using mingw and a TAP driver + derived from the Cipe-Win32 project by Damion K. Wilson. +* Added --show-adapters flag for windows version. +* Reworked the SSL/TLS packet acknowledge code to better + handle certain corner cases. +* Turned off the default enabling of IP forwarding in the + sample-scripts/openvpn.init script for Redhat. + Forwarding can be enabled by users in their --up scripts + or firewall config. +* Added --up-restart option based on suggestion from Sean + Reifschneider. +* If --dev tap or --dev-type tap is specified, --tun-mtu + defaults to 1500 and --tun-mtu-extra defaults to 64. +* Enabled --verb 5 debugging mode that prints 'R' and 'W' + for each packet read or write on the TCP/UDP socket. + +2003.08.04 -- Version 1.4.3 + +* Added md5.h include to crypto.c + to fix build problem on OpenBSD. + +2003.07.15 -- Version 1.4.2 + +* Removed adaptive bandwidth from + --mtu-dynamic -- its absence appears + to work better than its existence (1.4.1.2). +* Minor changes to --shaper to fix long + retransmit timeouts at low bandwidth + (1.4.1.2). +* Added LOG_RW flag to openvpn.h for + debugging (1.4.1.2). +* Silenced spurious configure warnings (1.4.1.2). +* Backed out --dev-name patch, modified --dev + to offer equivalent functionality (1.4.1.4). +* Added an optional parameter to --daemon and + --inetd to support the passing of a custom + program name to the system logger (1.4.1.5). +* Add compiled-in options to the program title + (1.4.1.5). +* Coded the beginnings of a WIN32 port (1.4.1.5). +* Succeeded in porting to Win32 Mingw environment + and running loopback tests (1.4.1.6). Still + need a kernel driver for full Win32 + functionality. +* Fixed a bug in error.h where + HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC was misspelled. + This would have caused a significant slowdown + of OpenVPN when built by compilers that + lack ISO C99 vararg macros (1.4.1.6). +* Created an init script for Gentoo Linux + in ./gentoo directory (1.4.1.6). + +2003.05.15 -- Version 1.4.1 + +* Modified the Linux 2.4 TUN/TAP open code to + fall back to the 2.2 TUN/TAP interface if the + open or ioctl fails. +* Fixed bug when --verb is set to 0 and non-fatal + socket errors occur, causing 100% CPU utilization. + Occurs on platorms where + EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY is defined, + such as Linux 2.4. +* Fixed typo in tun.c that was preventing + OpenBSD build. +* Added --enable-mtu-dynamic configure option + to enable --mtu-dynamic experimental option. + +2003.05.07 -- Version 1.4.0 + +* Added --replay-persist feature to allow replay + protection across sessions. +* Fixed bug where --ifconfig could not be used + with --tun-mtu. +* Added --tun-mtu-extra parameter to deal with + the situation where a read on a TUN/TAP device + returns more data than the device's MTU size. +* Fixed bug where some IPv6 support code for + Linux was not being properly ifdefed out for + Linux 2.2, causing compile errors. +* Added OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_x codes to + openvpn.h to control which status value + openvpn returns to its caller (such as + a shell or inetd/xinetd) for various conditions. +* Added OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE flag to + openvpn.h to allow debugging in situations + where stdout, stderr, and syslog cannot be used + for message output, such as when OpenVPN is + instantiated by inetd/xinetd. +* Removed owner-execute permission from file + created by static key generator (Herbert Xu + and Alberto Gonzalez Iniesta). +* Added --passtos option to allow IPv4 TOS bits + to be passed from TUN/TAP input packets to + the outgoing UDP socket (Craig Knox). +* Added code to prevent open socket file descriptors + from being accessible to called scripts. +* Added --dev-name option (Christian Lademann). +* Added --mtu-disc option for manual control + over MTU options. +* Show OS MTU value on UDP socket write failures + (linux only). +* Numerous build system and portability + fixes (Matthias Andree). +* Added better sensing of compiler support for + variable argument macros, including (a) gcc + style, (b) ISO C 1999 style, and (c) no support. +* Removed generated files from CVS. Note INSTALL + file for new CVS build commands. +* Changed certain internal symbol names + for C standards compliance. +* Added TUN/TAP open code to cycle dynamically + through unit numbers until it finds a free + unit (based on code from Thomas Gielfeldt + and VTun). +* Added dynamic MTU and fragmenting infrastructure + (Experimental). Rebuild with FRAGMENT_ENABLE + defined to enable. +* Minor changes to SSL/TLS negotiation, use + exponential backoff on retransmits, and use + a smaller MTU size (note that no protocol + changes have been made which would break + compatibility with 1.3.x). +* Added --enable-strict-options flag + to ./configure. This option will cause + a more strict check for options compatibility + between peers when SSL/TLS negotiation is used, + but should only be used when both OpenVPN peers + are of the same version. +* Reorganization of debugging levels. +* Added a workaround in configure.ac for + default SSL header location on Linux + to fix RH9 build problem. +* Fixed potential deadlock when pthread support + is used on OSes that allocate a small socketpair() + message buffer. +* Fixed openvpn.init to be sh compliant + (Bishop Clark). +* Changed --daemon to wait until all + initialization is finished before becoming a + daemon, for the benefit of initialization + scripts that want a useful return status from + the openvpn command. +* Made openvpn.init script more robust, including + positive indication of initialization errors + in the openvpn daemon and better sanity checks. +* Changed --chroot to wait until initialization + is finished before calling chroot(), and allow + the use of --user and --group with --chroot. +* When syslog logging is enabled (--daemon or + --inetd), set stdin/stdout/stderr to point + to /dev/null. +* For inetd instantiations, dup socket descriptor + to a >2 value. +* Fixed bug in verify-cn script, where test would + incorrectly fail if CN=x was the last component + of the X509 composite string (Anonymous). +* Added Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer's special + license exception to COPYING. + +2002.10.23 -- Version 1.3.2 + +* Added SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list call + to follow the canonical form for TLS initialization + recommended by the OpenSSL docs. This change allows + better support for intermediate CAs and has no impact + on security. +* Added build-inter script to easy-rsa package, to + facilitate the generation of intermediate CAs. +* Ported to NetBSD (Dimitri Goldin). +* Fixed minor bug in easy-rsa/sign-req. It refers to + openssl.cnf file, instead of $KEY_CONFIG, like all + other scripts (Ernesto Baschny). +* Added --days 3650 to the root CA generation command + in the HOWTO to override the woefully small 30 day + default (Dominik 'Aeneas' Schnitzer). +* Fixed bug where --ping-restart would sometimes + not re-resolve remote DNS hostname. +* Added --tun-ipv6 option and related infrastructure + support for IPv6 over tun. +* Added IPv6 over tun support for Linux (Aaron Sethman). +* Added FreeBSD 4.1.1+ TUN/TAP driver notes to + INSTALL (Matthias Andree). +* Added inetd/xinetd support (--inetd) including + documentation in the HOWTO. +* Added "Important Note on the use of commercial certificate + authorities (CAs) with OpenVPN" to HOWTO based on + issues raised on the openvpn-users list. + +2002.07.10 -- Version 1.3.1 + +* Fixed bug in openvpn.spec and openvpn.init + which caused RPM upgrade to fail. + +2002.07.10 -- Version 1.3.0 + +* Added --dev-node option to allow explicit selection of + tun/tap device node. +* Removed mlockall call from child thread, as it doesn't + appear to be necessary (child thread inherits mlockall + state from parent). +* Added --ping-timer-rem which causes timer for --ping-exit + and --ping-restart not to run unless we have a remote IP + address. +* Added condrestart to openvpn.init and openvpn.spec + (Bishop Clark). +* Added --ifconfig case for FreeBSD (Matthias Andree). +* Call openlog with facility=LOG_DAEMON (Matthias Andree). +* Changed LOG_INFO messages to LOG_NOTICE. +* Added warning when key files are group/others accessible. +* Added --single-session flag for TLS mode. +* Fixed bug where --writepid would segfault if used with + an invalid filename. +* Fixed bug where --ipchange status message was formatted + incorrectly. +* Print more concise error message when system() call + fails. +* Added --disable-occ option. +* Added --local, --remote, and --ifconfig options sanity + check. +* Changed default UDP MTU to 1300 and TUN/TAP MTU to + 1300. +* Successfully tested with OpenSSL 0.9.7 Beta 2. +* Broke out debug level definitions to errlevel.h +* Minor documentation and web site changes. +* All changes maintain protocol compatibility + with OpenVPN versions since 1.1.0, however default + MTU changes will require setting the MTU explicitly + by command line option, if you want 1.3.0 to + communicate with previous versions. + +2002.06.12 -- Version 1.2.1 + +* Added --ping-restart option to restart + connection on ping timeout using SIGUSR1 + logic (Matthias Andree). +* Added --persist-tun, --persist-key, + --persist-local-ip, and --persist-remote-ip + options for finer-grained control over SIGUSR1 + and --ping-restart restarts. To + replicate previous SIGUSR1 functionality, + use --persist-remote-ip. +* Changed residual IV fetching code to take + IV from tail of ciphertext. +* Added check to make sure that CFB or OFB + cipher modes are only used with SSL/TLS + authentication mode, and added a caveat + to INSTALL. +* Changed signal handling during initialization + (including re-initialization during restarts) + to exit on SIGTERM or SIGINT and ignore other + signals which would ordinarily be caught. +* Added --resolv-retry option to allow + retries on hostname resolution. +* Expanded the --float option to also + allow dynamic changes in source port number + on incoming datagrams. +* Added --mute option to limit repetitive + logging of similar message types. +* Added --group option to downgrade GID + after initialization. +* Try to set ifconfig path automatically + in configure. +* Added --ifconfig code for Mac OS X + (Christoph Pfisterer). +* Moved "Peer Connection Initiated" message + to --verb level 1. +* Successfully tested with + OpenSSL 0.9.7 Beta 1 and AES cipher. +* Added RPM notes to INSTALL. +* Added ACX_PTHREAD (from the autoconf + macro archive) to configure.ac + to figure out the right pthread + options for a given platform. +* Broke out macro definitions from + configure.ac to acinclude.m4. +* Minor changes to docs and HOWTO. +* All changes maintain protocol compatibility + with OpenVPN versions since 1.1.0. + +2002.05.22 -- Version 1.2.0 + +* Added configuration file support via + the --config option. +* Added pthread support to improve latency. + With pthread support, OpenVPN + will offload CPU-intensive tasks such as RSA + key number crunching to a background thread + to improve tunnel packet forwarding + latency. pthread support can be enabled + with the --enable-pthread configure option. + Pthread support is currently available + only for Linux and Solaris. +* Added --dev-type option so that tun/tap + device names don't need to begin with + "tun" or "tap". +* Added --writepid option to write main + process ID to a file. +* Numerous portability fixes to ease + porting to other OSes including changing + all network types to uint8_t and uint32_t, + and not assuming that time_t is 32 bits. +* Backported to OpenSSL 0.9.5. +* Ported to Solaris. +* Finished OpenBSD port except for + pthread support. +* Added initialization script: + sample-scripts/openvpn.init + (Douglas Keller) +* Ported to Mac OS X (Christoph Pfisterer). +* Improved resilience to DoS attacks when + TLS mode is used without --remote or + --tls-auth, or when --float is used + with --remote. Note however that the best + defense against DoS attacks in TLS mode + is to use --tls-auth. +* Eliminated automake/autoconf dependency + for non-developers. +* Ported configure.in to configure.ac + and autoconf 2.50+. +* SIGHUP signal now causes OpenVPN to restart + and re-read command line and or config file, + in conformance with canonical daemon behaviour. +* SIGUSR1 now does what SIGHUP did in + version 1.1.1 and earlier -- close and reopen + the UDP socket for use when DHCP changes + host's IP address and preserve most recently + authenticated peer address without rereading + config file. +* SIGUSR2 added -- outputs current statistics, + including compression statistics. +* All changes maintain protocol compatibility + with 1.1.1 and 1.1.0. + +2002.04.22 -- Version 1.1.1 + +* Added --ifconfig option to automatically configure + TUN device. +* Added inactivity disconnect (--inactive + and --ping-exit options). +* Added --ping option to keep stateful firewalls + from timing out. +* Added sanity check to command line parser to + err if any TLS options are used in non-TLS mode. +* Fixed build problem with compiler environments that + define printf as a macro. +* Fixed build problem on linux systems that have + an integrated TUN/TAP driver but lack the persistent + tunnel feature (TUNSETPERSIST). Some linux kernels + >= 2.4.0 and < 2.4.7 fall into this category. +* Changed all calls to EVP_CipherInit to use explicit + encrypt/decrypt mode in order to fix problem with + IDEA-CBC and AES-256-CBC ciphers. +* Minor changes to control channel transmit limiter + algorithm to fix problem where TLS control channel + might not renegotiate within the default 60 second window. +* Simplified man page examples by taking advantage + of the new --ifconfig option. +* Minor changes to configure.in to check more + rigourously for OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater. +* Put back openvpn.spec, eliminated + openvpn.spec.in. +* Modified openvpn.spec to reflect new automake-based + build environment (Bishop Clark). +* Other documentation changes. +* Added --test-crypto option for debugging. +* Added "missing" and "mkinstalldirs" automake + support files. + + +2002.04.09 -- Version 1.1.0 + +* Strengthened replay protection and IV handling, + extending it fully to both static key and + TLS dynamic key exchange modes. +* Added --mlock option to disable paging and ensure that key + material and tunnel data is never paged to disk. +* Added optional traffic shaping feature to cap the maximum + data rate of the tunnel. +* Converted to automake (The Platypus Brothers 2002-04-01). +* Ported to OpenBSD by Janne Johansson. +* Added --tun-af-inet option to work around an incompatibility + between Linux and BSD tun drivers. +* Sequence number-based replay protection using the + IPSec sliding window model is now the default, + disable with --no-replay. +* Explicit IV is now the default, disable with --no-iv. +* Disabled all cipher modes except CBC, CFB, and OFB. +* In CBC mode, use explicit IV and carry forward residuals, + using IPSec model. +* In CFB/OFB mode, IV is timestamp, sequence number. +* Eliminated --packet-id, --timestamp, and max-delta parameter to + the --tls-auth option as they are now supplanted by improved + replay code which is enabled by default. +* Eliminated --rand-iv as it is now obsolete with improved + IV code. +* Eliminated --reneg-err option as it increases vulnerability + to DoS attacks. +* Added weak key check for DES ciphers. +* --tls-freq option is no longer specified on the command line, + instead it now inherits its parameter from the + --tls-timeout option. +* Fixed bug that would try to free memory on exit that was + never malloced if --comp-lzo was not specified. +* Errata fixed in the man page examples: "test-ca" should be + "tmp-ca". +* Updated manual page. +* Preliminary work in porting to OpenSSL 0.9.7. +* Changed license to allowing linking with OpenSSL. + +2002.03.29 -- Version 1.0.3 + +* Fixed a problem in configure with library ordering on the + command line. + +2002.03.28 -- Version 1.0.2 + +* Improved the efficiency of the inner event loop. +* Fixed a minor bug with timeout handling. +* Improved the build system to build on RH 6.2 through 7.2. +* Added an openvpn.spec file for RPM builders (Bishop Clark). + +2002.03.23 -- Version 1.0 + +* Added TLS-based authentication and key exchange. +* Added gremlin mode to stress test. +* Wrote man page. + +2001.12.26 -- Version 0.91 + +* Added any choice of cipher or HMAC digest. + +2001.5.13 -- Version 0.90 + +* Initial release. +* IP tunnel over UDP, with blowfish cipher and SHA1 HMAC signature. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog.IPv6 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog.IPv6 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..283fe6e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/ChangeLog.IPv6 @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +Do 31. Dez 15:32:40 CET 2009 Gert Doering + + * Basic IPv6 p2mp functionality implemented + + * new options: + - server-ipv6 + - ifconfig-ipv6 + - ifconfig-ipv6-pool + - route-ipv6 + - iroute-ipv6 + + * modules touched: + - init.c: init & setup IPv6 route list & add/delete IPv6 routes + - tun.c: add "ifconfig" and "route" handling for IPv6 + - multi.c: IPv6 ifconfig-pool assignments + put to route-hash table + push to client + - pool.c: extend pools to handle IPv4+IPv6, and also return IPv6 address + IPv6 address saved to file if ifconfig-pool-persist is set + (but ignored on read due to the way pools work) + - mroute.c: handle reading src/dst addresses from IPv6 packets + (so multi.c can check against route-hash table) + handle printing of IPv6 mroute_addr structure + - helper.c: implement "server-ipv6" macro (->ifconfig-ipv6, pool, ...) + - options.c: implement all the new options + add helper functions for IPv6 address handling + - forward.c: tell do_route() about IPv6 routes + - route.c: handle IPv6 route lists + route option lists + extend add_routes() to do IPv4 + IPv6 route lists + extend delete_routes() to do IPv4 + IPv6 route lists + implement add_route_ipv6(), delete_route_ipv6() to call + system-dependend external program to do the work + - push.c: handle pushing of "ifconfig-ipv6" option + - socket.c: helper function to check & print IPv6 address strings + + * known issues: + - operating system support on all but Linux (ifconfig, route) + - route-ipv6 gateway handling + - iroute-ipv6 not implemented + - TAP support: ifconfig, routing (route needs gateway!) + + * release as patch 20091231-1 + +Thu Dec 31 17:02:08 CET 2009 + + * NetBSD port (NetBSD 3.1 on Sparc64) + + * mroute.c, socket.c: make byte/word access to in6_addr more portable + + * tun.c: fix IPv6 ifconfig arguments on NetBSD + + still doesn't work on NetBSD 3.1, "ifconfig tun0 inet6..." errors with + + ifconfig: SIOCAIFADDR: Address family not supported by protocol family + + (sys/net/if_tun.c, needs to be revision 1.80 or later, NetBSD PR 32944, + included in NetBSD 4.0 and up) + + +Fri Jan 1 14:07:15 CET 2010 + + * FreeBSD port (FreeBSD 6.3-p12 on i386) + + * tun.c: implement IPv6 ifconfig setting for FreeBSD + + * route.c: fix %s/%s argument to IPv6 route add/delete command for *BSD + + * TEST SUCCESS: FreeBSD 6.3-p12, server-ipv6, route-ipv6, ccd/iroute-ipv6 + + * multi.c: implement setting and deleting of iroute-ipv6 + (multi_add_iroutes(), multi_del_iroutes()) + * mroute.c: add mroute_helper_add_iroute6(), mroute_helper_del_iroute6() + * mroute.h: add prototypes, increase MR_HELPER_NET_LEN to 129 (/0.../128) + * multi.c: zeroize host part of IPv6 iroutes in multi_learn_in6_addr() + * mroute.c: implement mroute_addr_mask_host_bits() for IPv6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux 2.6.30 (Gentoo)/iproute2, server-ipv6, ccd/iroute-ipv6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux 2.6.30 (Gentoo)/ifconfig, client-ipv6 + + * TEST FAIL: NetBSD 5.0, IPv6 client + - "ifconfig tun0 .../64" does not create a "connected" route + - adding routes fails + + --> more work to do here. + + * release as patch 20100101-1 + + * TEST FAIL: + FreeBSD 6.3-p12 server "--topology subnet" + Linux/ifconfig client + - BSD sends ICMP6 neighbor solicitations, which are ignored by Linux + - server tun interface is not in p2p mode, client tun interface *is* + + * TEST SUCCESS: non-ipv6 enabled client -> "--server-ipv6" server + (warnings in the log file, but no malfunctions) + + +Sat Jan 2 19:48:35 CET 2010 + + * tun.c: change "ipv6_support()", do not turn off tt->ipv6 unconditionally + if we don't know about OS IPv6 support - just log warning + + * tun.c: implement "ifconfig inet6" setting for MacOS X / Darwin + + * route.c: split *BSD system dependent part of add/delete_route_ipv6() + into FreeBSD/Dragonfly and NetBSD/Darwin/OpenBSD variants + ("2001:db8::/64" vs. "2001:db8:: --prefixlen 64"). + + * tun.c: on MacOS X, NetBSD and OpenBSD, explicitely set on-link route + + * TEST SUCCESS: MacOS X, client-ipv6 with route-ipv6 + + +Sun Jan 3 10:55:31 CET 2010 + + * route.c: NetBSD fails with "-iface tun0", needs gateway address + (assume that the same syntax is needed for OpenBSD) + + * route.h: introduce "remote_endpoint_ipv6" into "struct route_ipv6_list" + + * init.c: pass "ifconfig_ipv6_remote" as gateway to init_route_ipv6_list() + + * route.c: + - init_route_ipv6(): use "remote_endpoint_ipv6" as IPv6 gateway address + if no gateway was specified explicitely + + - init_route_ipv6_list(): fill in "remote_endpoint_ipv6", if parseable + + - get rid of "GATEWAY-LESS ROUTE6" warning + + * route.c, add_route_ipv6() + - explicitely clear host bits of base address, to be able to more + easily set up "connected" /64 routes on NetBSD+Darwin + + - split system-dependent part between Darwin and NetBSD/OpenBSD + (Darwin can use "-iface tun0", NetBSD/OpenBSD get gateway address) + + - change Solaris comments from "known-broken" to "unknown" + + * tun.c: rework NetBSD tunnel initialization and tun_read() / tun_write() + to work the same way OpenBSD and NetBSD do - tunnel is put into + "multi-af" mode, and all packet read/write activity is prepended by + a 32 bit value specifying the address family. + + * TEST SUCCESS: NetBSD 5.0/Sparc64: client-ipv6 with route-ipv6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: MacOS X 10.5: client-ipv6 with route-ipv6 + + * (RE-)TEST SUCCESS: Linux/iproute2: server-ipv6 + Linux/ifconfig: client-ipv6 + FreeBSD 6.3: server-ipv6 + + * release as patch 20100103-1 + + * options.c: document all new options in "--help" + + * tun.c: fix typo in Solaris-specific section + + * socket.h, socket.c: change u_int32_t to uint32_t + (Solaris - and all the rest of the code uses "uintNN" anyway) + +Mon Jan 4 17:46:58 CET 2010 + + * socket.c: rework add_in6_addr() to use 32-bit access to struct in6_addr + (Solaris has no 16-bit values in union, but this is more elegant as well) + + * tun.c: fix "ifconfig inet6" command for Solaris + + * tun.c: make sure "tun0 inet6" is unplumbed first, cleanup leftovers + + * route.c: add routes with "metric 0" on solaris, otherwise they just + don't work (someone who understands Solaris might want to fix this). + + * Solaris "sort of" works now - ifconfig works, route add does not give + errors, "netstat -rn" looks right, but packets are discarded unless + the routes are installed with "metric 0". So we just use "metric 0"... + + * CAVEAT: Solaris "ifconfig ... preferred" interferes with source address + selection. So if there are any active IPv6 interfaces configured with + "preferred", packets leaving out the tunnel will use the wrong source + IPv6 address. Not fixable from within OpenVPN. + + * CAVEAT2: Solaris insists on doing DHCPv6 on tun0 interfaces by default, + so DHCPv6 solicitation packets will be seen. Since the server end has + no idea what to do with them, they are a harmless nuisance. Fixable + on the Solaris side via "ndpd.conf" (see ``man ifconfig''). + + * release as patch 20100104-1 + +Fri Jan 8 10:00:50 CET 2010 + + * import into git repository + + * options.c: add sanity checks for most typical error cases + (--ifconfig-ipv6-pool configured with no --ifconfig-ipv6, etc) + + * options.c: modify get_ipv6_addr() to be more flexible about netbits + (optional now, default to /64) and to return the address-without-netbits + string now (-> for options that want the IPv6 address in printable + form, but without /nn) + + * options.c: modify --ifconfig-ipv6 to optionally accept /netbits, + you can do now "ifconfig-ipv6 2001:df8::1/64 2001:df8::2" or just + "ifconfig-ipv6 2001:df8::5 2001:df8::7", defaulting to /64 + + * options.h: add necessary structure elements for --ifconfig-ipv6-push + + * options.c: implement "parse options" side of --ifconfig-ipv6-push + +Tue Jan 12 22:42:09 CET 2010 + + * tun.c: in TARGET_NETBSD #ifdef, distinguish between "old" code + (IPv4 only, but unmodified read/write) and "new" code (multi-af, + extra 32 bit AF on read/write of the tun interface) - pre-4.0 + NetBSD systems don't have TUNSIFHEAD, no way to have common code. + + * TEST SUCCESS: NetBSD 5.0/Sparc64: client-ipv6 with route-ipv6 (v4+v6) + + * TEST SUCCESS: NetBSD 3.1/Sparc64: client-ipv6 with route-ipv6 (v4-only) + +Thu Jan 14 15:41:50 CET 2010 + + * multi.c: if "--ifconfig-push" is used together with "--ifconfig-ipv6-pool" + and no "--ifconfig-ipv6-push" is seen, issue warning - the current + implementation of pools has IPv6 tied to IPv4, so if v4 does not use + the pool, it breaks for IPv6. Not a *big* problem (since there is + enough v6, just give those users a static v6 address as well), but needs + to be pointed out clearly. + + * release as patch 20100114-1 + +Tue Feb 16 14:43:28 CET 2010 + + * options.c: print "IPv6 payload patch" release date in "--version" + + * tun.c: undo change to init_tun() (moving "bool tun" and call to + "is_tun_p2p()" further up) - it wasn't needed and breaks "make check" + + * git stuff: rebase on David Sommerseth's openvpn-testing git tree + + * release as patch 20100216-1 + +Fri Feb 26 19:59:01 CET 2010 + + * init.c: initialize tuntap->ipv6 in do_init_tun() (to make sure it's + always initialized early-enough, independent of the sequence of + do_ifconfig()/open_tun() [see ifconfig_order() in tun.h]) + + * tun.c, init.c: remove "bool ipv6" argument to tuncfg(), open_tun() + and open_tun_generic() - obsoleted by previous change + + * tun.c: remove ipv6_support() - original purpose was unclear, and all + current platforms (except linux-very-old) fully support IPv6 now :-) + + * tun.c: initial implementation of "netsh" IPv6-ifconfig for Win32 + + * RE-TEST SUCCESS: Linux/i386/ifconfig, client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + +Sun Feb 28 17:05:57 CET 2010 + + * tun.c: NetBSD dependent part: correct destroying/re-creation of tun dev + + * tun.c: move adding of "connected" IPv6 prefix to new helper function, + add_route_connected_v6_net() + + * RE-TEST SUCCESS: NetBSD 5.0/Sparc64, client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * RE-TEST SUCCESS: NetBSD 3.1/Sparc64: client-tun/net30, v4-only + + * RE-TEST SUCCESS: Linux/i386/iproute2: server-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * tun.c: add #ifdef TARGET_DARWIN block for *_tun() functions, to + be able to modify close_tun() for unconfiguring IPv6 + + * tun.c: on close_tun() on MacOS X, need to de-configure "lo0" route for + configured IPv6 address + + * RE-TEST SUCCESS: MacOS X (10.5)/i386: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * route.c: implement ipv6 route adding / deletion via "netsh" for WIN32 + + * TEST FAIL: Windows XP fails, because the tun/tap driver does not + forward IPv6 frames kernel->userland if in "tun" mode + + * options.c: set IPv6 version to 20100228-1 + + * release as patch 20100228-1 + +Sun Mar 7 19:17:33 CET 2010 + + * options.c: set IPv6 version to 20100307-1 + + * TODO.IPv6: add note about OpenBSD TODO (#16) + + * route.c: set (and remove) "magic next hop" fe80::8 for IPv6 routes on + Win32 + + * install-win32/settings.in: bump TAP driver version from 9.6 to 9.7 + and TAP_RELDATE to "07/03/2010" + + * tap-win32/proto.h: add data types and definitions needed for IPv6 + + * tap-win32/types.h: add m_UserToTap_IPv6 ethernet header for IPv6 packets + + * tap-win32/tapdrvr.c: implement support for IPv6 in TUN mode: + - IPv6 packets User->OS need correct ether type + - IPv6 packets OS->User get correctly forwarded + - IPv6 neighbour discovery packets for "fe80::8" (magic address + installed as route-nexthop by OpenVPN.exe) get answered locally + + * TEST SUCCESS: WindowsXP/32bit: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * tun.c: if IPv6 requested in TUN mode, and TUN/TAP driver version + is older than 9.7, log warning and disable IPv6 (won't work anyway). + + * release as patch 20100307-1 + +Sat Jul 10 14:37:52 CEST 2010 + + * TEST SUCCESS: point-to-point tun mode with --ifconfig-ipv6 between + Solaris10/sparc and Linux (Michal Ludvig) + (using the whiteboard tun driver on Solaris, otherwise "no IPv6") + +Sun Aug 8 12:30:44 CEST 2010 + + * route.c: split NetBSD and OpenBSD parts of add_route_ipv6() and + delete_route_ipv6(), implement OpenBSD variant + (needs "-prefixlen nn" while NetBSD uses "/nn") + + * tun.c: implement IPv6 ifconfig for OpenBSD + + * tun.c: destroy tunX interface at tun_close() on OpenBSD (cleanup) + + * TEST SUCCESS: OpenBSD 4.7: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + +Thu Sep 2 21:18:32 CEST 2010 + + * tun.c: the TAP binary in 2.2-beta3 has the IPv6 related changes, but + the version number is 9.8 now -> check for 9.8, not 9.7 + +Wed Sep 22 22:20:37 CEST 2010 + + * tun.c: bugfix for Linux/iproute2/"topology subnet". Works :-) + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/ifconfig: client-tun/net30+subnet, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/iproute2: client-tun/net30+subnet, v4+v6 + + * options.c: tag as 20100922-1 so "allmerged" users can see IPv6 change + +Fri Sep 24 17:57:41 CEST 2010 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/: client-tap, v4+v6, ping6 on connected addr + + * TEST FAIL: Linux/: client-tap, v6, route6 (gateway missing) + +Do 21. Okt 19:36:49 CEST 2010 + + * t_client.sh.in: cherrypick commit f25fe91a40aa3f and 6f1e61b41be52 + (proper exit codes to signal "SKIP" if we do not want to run) + +So 16. Jan 17:25:23 CET 2011 + + * tun.c, route.c: cherrypick 121755c2cb4891f and f0eac1a5979096c67 + (TAP driver and "topology subnet" support for Solaris) + + * tun.c: add IPv6 configuration for TAP interfaces (:1 inet6) + + * tun.c: on close_tun on Solaris, unplumb IPv6 TUN or TAP interfaces + + * TEST SUCCESS: OpenSolaris: client-tun, v4+v6 + TEST SUCCESS: OpenSolaris: client-tap, v4+v6, ping6 on connected addr + TEST FAIL: OpenSolaris: client-tap, v6, route6 (gateway missing) + +So 24. Apr 16:51:45 CEST 2011 + + * rebase to "beta2.2" branch (at 2.2RC2 tag) + + * mroute.c: remove mroute_helper_lock/_unlock() calls for IPv6 + * socket.c: remove locking with L_INET_NTOA mutex + (all the threading stuff got removed by David Sommerseth for 2.2) + + * mroute.c: remove duplicate mroute_helper_add_iroute6() and + mroute_helper_del_iroute6() - "git rebase" artefact + + * ChangeLog.IPv6 and TODO.IPv6: add to commit + + * options.c: tag as 20110424-2 (2.2RC2) + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/ifconfig: client-tun/net30+subnet, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/iproute2: client-tun/net30+subnet, v4+v6 + +Thu Apr 28 19:10:01 CEST 2011 + + * rebase to "origin/release/2.2" branch (at v2.2.0 tag) + +Thu May 19 20:51:12 CEST 2011 + + * include Windows "netsh add" -> "netsh set ... store=active" patch from + Seth Mos, to fix restart problems on Windows due to persistant addresses + + * TEST SUCCESS: Windows XP SP3: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + +Sat May 21 17:03:20 CEST 2011 + + * tun.c: Solaris cleanup (use CLEAR() to zero-out "ifr") + + * tun.c: Windows cleanup: remove route and IPv6 address on disconnect + + * route.c, route.h: remove "static" from delete_route_ipv6(), needed + for ipv6-route cleanup on disconnect + + * TEST SUCCESS: Windows XP SP3: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Windows 7 Home Premium: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + +So 22. Mai 14:46:12 CEST 2011 + + * Tony Lim: removing routes fails on windows if certain bits are set + in the "host part" (others are silently ignored) --> + + * route.c: create print_in6_addr_netbits_only() helper, call from + add_route_ipv6() and delete_route_ipv6() to get only network part + of route-to-be-modified + + * route.c: set 'store=active' on adding routes on WIN32 as well (Tony Lim) + + * options.c: bump IPv6 release to 20110522-1 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Linux/iproute2: client-tun/net30+subnet, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Windows XP SP3: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: Windows 7 Home Premium: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + + * TEST SUCCESS: OpenBSD 4.7: client-tun/net30, v4+v6 + TEST FAIL: OpenBSD 4.7: client-tun/subnet, v4 + (seems to be due to "topology subnet has just not been implemented yet") diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL b/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ca72883 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@ +Installation instructions for OpenVPN, a Secure Tunneling Daemon + +Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. This program is free software; +you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +as published by the Free Software Foundation. + +************************************************************************* + +QUICK START: + + Unix: + ./configure && make && make-install + + Windows MinGW, using MSYS bash shell: + ./domake-win (see comments in the script for more info) + + Windows Visual Studio: + python win\build_all.py + +************************************************************************* + +To download OpenVPN, go to: + + http://openvpn.net/download.html + +For step-by-step installation instructions with real-world +examples see: + + http://openvpn.net/howto.html + +For examples see: + + http://openvpn.net/examples.html + +************************************************************************* + +SUPPORTED PLATFORMS: + (1) Linux 2.2+ + (2) Solaris + (3) OpenBSD 3.0+ (Comes with OpenSSL and TUN devices by default) + (4) Mac OS X Darwin + (5) FreeBSD + (6) NetBSD + (7) Windows (WinXP and higher) + +SUPPORTED PROCESSOR ARCHITECTURES: + In general, OpenVPN is word size and endian independent, so + most processors should be supported. Architectures known to + work include Intel x86, Alpha, Sparc, Amd64, and ARM. + +REQUIRES: + (1) TUN and/or TAP driver to allow user-space programs to control + a virtual point-to-point IP or Ethernet device. See + TUN/TAP Driver Configuration section below for more info. + +OPTIONAL (but recommended): + (1) OpenSSL library, necessary for encryption, version 0.9.5 or higher + required, available from http://www.openssl.org/ + (2) LZO real-time compression library, required for link compression, + available from http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ + OpenBSD users can use ports or packages to install lzo, but remember + to add CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include" LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib" + directives to "configure", since gcc will not find them otherwise. + (3) Pthread library. + +OPTIONAL (for developers only): + (1) Autoconf 2.59 or higher + Automake 1.9 or higher + -- available from http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html + (2) Dmalloc library + -- available from http://dmalloc.com/ + +************************************************************************* + +CHECK OUT SOURCE FROM SOURCE REPOSITORY: + + git clone https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn + + Check out stable version: + + git checkout -b 2.2 remotes/origin/release/2.2 + + Check out master (unstable) branch: + + git checkout master + + +************************************************************************* + +BUILD COMMANDS FROM TARBALL: + + ./configure + make + make install + +************************************************************************* + +BUILD COMMANDS FROM SOURCE REPOSITORY CHECKOUT: + + autoreconf -i -v -f + ./configure + make + make install + +************************************************************************* + +BUILD A TARBALL FROM SOURCE REPOSITORY CHECKOUT: + + autoreconf -i -v -f + ./configure + make dist + +************************************************************************* + +LOOPBACK TESTS (after BUILD): + +make check (Run all tests below) + +Test Crypto: + +./openvpn --genkey --secret key +./openvpn --test-crypto --secret key + +Test SSL/TLS negotiations (runs for 2 minutes): + +./openvpn --config sample/sample-config-files/loopback-client (In one window) +./openvpn --config sample/sample-config-files/loopback-server (Simultaneously in another window) + +************************************************************************* + +OPTIONS for ./configure: + + --disable-lzo disable LZO compression support [default=yes] + --enable-lzo-stub don't compile LZO compression support but still + allow limited interoperability with LZO-enabled + peers [default=no] + --disable-crypto disable crypto support [default=yes] + --disable-ssl disable SSL support for TLS-based key exchange + [default=yes] + --enable-x509-alt-username + enable the --x509-username-field feature + [default=no] + --disable-multi disable client/server support (--mode server + + client mode) [default=yes] + --disable-server disable server support only (but retain client + support) [default=yes] + --disable-plugins disable plug-in support [default=yes] + --disable-eurephia disable support for the eurephia plug-in + [default=yes] + --disable-management disable management server support [default=yes] + --enable-pkcs11 enable pkcs11 support [default=no] + --disable-socks disable Socks support [default=yes] + --disable-http-proxy disable HTTP proxy support [default=yes] + --disable-fragment disable internal fragmentation support (--fragment) + [default=yes] + --disable-multihome disable multi-homed UDP server support (--multihome) + [default=yes] + --disable-port-share disable TCP server port-share support (--port-share) + [default=yes] + --disable-debug disable debugging support (disable gremlin and verb + 7+ messages) [default=yes] + --enable-small enable smaller executable size (disable OCC, usage + message, and verb 4 parm list) [default=yes] + --enable-password-save allow --askpass and --auth-user-pass passwords to be + read from a file [default=yes] + --enable-iproute2 enable support for iproute2 [default=no] + --disable-def-auth disable deferred authentication [default=yes] + --disable-pf disable internal packet filter [default=yes] + --enable-strict enable strict compiler warnings (debugging option) + [default=no] + --enable-pedantic enable pedantic compiler warnings, will not generate + a working executable (debugging option) [default=no] + --enable-strict-options enable strict options check between peers (debugging + option) [default=no] + --enable-selinux enable SELinux support [default=no] + --enable-systemd enable systemd suppport [default=no] + +ENVIRONMENT for ./configure: + + IFCONFIG full path to ipconfig utility + ROUTE full path to route utility + IPROUTE full path to ip utility + NETSTAT path to netstat utility + MAN2HTML path to man2html utility + GIT path to git utility + TAP_CFLAGS C compiler flags for tap + OPENSSL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS + C compiler flags for OPENSSL_CRYPTO, overriding pkg-config + OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBS + linker flags for OPENSSL_CRYPTO, overriding pkg-config + OPENSSL_SSL_CFLAGS + C compiler flags for OPENSSL_SSL, overriding pkg-config + OPENSSL_SSL_LIBS + linker flags for OPENSSL_SSL, overriding pkg-config + POLARSSL_CFLAGS + C compiler flags for polarssl + POLARSSL_LIBS + linker flags for polarssl + LZO_CFLAGS C compiler flags for lzo + LZO_LIBS linker flags for lzo + PKCS11_HELPER_CFLAGS + C compiler flags for PKCS11_HELPER, overriding pkg-config + PKCS11_HELPER_LIBS + linker flags for PKCS11_HELPER, overriding pkg-config + +************************************************************************* + +BUILDING ON LINUX 2.4+ FROM RPM + +You can build a binary RPM directly from the OpenVPN tarball file: + + rpmbuild -tb [tarball] + +This command will build a binary RPM file and place it in the system +RPM directory. You can then install the RPM with the standard RPM +install command: + + rpm -ivh [binary-rpm] + +When you install the binary RPM, it will install +sample-scripts/openvpn.init, which can be used to +automatically start or stop one or more OpenVPN tunnels on system +startup or shutdown, based on OpenVPN .conf files in /etc/openvpn. +See the comments in openvpn.init for more information. + +Installing the RPM will also configure the TUN/TAP device node +for linux 2.4. + +Note that the current openvpn.spec file, which instructs the rpm tool +how to build a package, will build OpenVPN with all options enabled, +including OpenSSL, LZO, and pthread linkage. Therefore all of +these packages will need to be present prior to the RPM build, unless +you edit the openvpn.spec file. + +************************************************************************* + +TUN/TAP Driver Configuration: + +* Linux 2.4 or higher (with integrated TUN/TAP driver): + + (1) make device node: mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200 + (2a) add to /etc/modules.conf: alias char-major-10-200 tun + (2b) load driver: modprobe tun + (3) enable routing: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward + + Note that either of steps (2a) or (2b) is sufficient. While (2a) + only needs to be done once per install, (2b) needs to be done once + per reboot. If you install from RPM (see above) and use the + openvpn.init script, these steps are taken care of for you. + +* Linux 2.2 or Solaris: + + You should obtain + version 1.1 of the TUN/TAP driver from + http://vtun.sourceforge.net/tun/ + and follow the installation instructions. + + If you use OpenVPN on Linux 2.2 or 2.4 or Solaris, you may be + suffering from a bug which causes connections to hang under heavy load. + The symptoms are very similar to the MTU problems discussed frequently + in the OpenVPN mailing lists. But it turns out that this bug is not caused by + MTU problems. It's a bug in the tun/tap driver. A patch is provided here: + + http://openvpn.net/patch/tun-sb.patch + +* Solaris + + For 64 bit, I used the tun-1.1.tar.gz source and compiled it. + + Of course there is a but :) + In the tun-1-1\solaris\Makefile I changed a line so it compiles with 64 bit + + CFLAGS = $(DEFS) -m64 -O2 -Wall -D_KERNEL -I. + + I just added -m64 and it worked. + + The tun driver works fine as said previously, however we noticed there is a + minor problem when creating multiple tunnels on Solaris. + Mr Tycho Fruru changed the code in tun.c file where he locked the tun device + number to -1. This way it is impossible to specify the name of the tun device + but it is still possible to have multiple devices. + The modification will increment automatically meaning starting from tun0 ---> + tunX I know you are not responsible for the tun coding but if you think the + modification can be useful for you feel free to use it. + + http://openvpn.net/solaris/tun.c + +* FreeBSD 4.1.1+: + + FreeBSD ships with the TUN/TAP driver, and the device nodes for tap0, + tap1, tap2, tap3, tun0, tun1, tun2 and tun3 are made by default. + However, only the TUN driver is linked into the GENERIC kernel. + + To load the TAP driver, enter: + + kldload if_tap + + See man rc(8) to find out how you can do this at boot time. + + The easiest way is to install OpenVPN from the FreeBSD ports system, + the port includes a sample script to automatically load the TAP driver + at boot-up time. + +* OpenBSD: + + OpenBSD ships with tun0 and tun1 installed by default on pre-3.5 systems, + while 3.5 and later have dynamically created tun* devices so you only need + to create an empty /etc/hostname.tun0 (tun1, tun2 and so on) for each tun + you plan to use to create the device(s) at boot. + +* Mac OS X: + + 2005.02.13: Angelo Laub has developed a GUI for OS X: + + http://rechenknecht.net/OpenVPN-GUI/ + + 2004.10.26: Mattias Nissler has developed a new TUN/TAP driver for + MAC OS X: + + http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/ + + Christoph Pfisterer's old TUN driver can be obtained at + http://chrisp.de/en/projects/tunnel.html -- note that it + is no longer being maintained. + +* Solaris9 Sparc/64 + + The kernel module for solaris + can be generated by adding the -m64 switch to a modern + gcc compiler (I'm using 3.2) The resulting kernel driver + needs to be manually copied to /kernel/drv/sparcv9/ and then a + reconfiguration reboot. (boot -r). + +* Windows XP/2003/Vista + + See domake-win for building instructions. + See INSTALL-win32.txt for usage info. + + See the man page for more information, usage examples, and + information on firewall configuration. + +************************************************************************* + +CAVEATS & BUGS: + +* I have noticed cases where TCP sessions tunneled over the Linux + TAP driver (kernel 2.4.21 and 2.4.22) stall when lower --mssfix + values are used. The TCP sessions appear to unstall and resume + normally when the remote VPN endpoint is pinged. + +* If run through a firewall using OpenBSDs packet filter PF and the + filter rules include a "scrub" directive, you may get problems talking + to Linux hosts over the tunnel, since the scrubbing will kill packets + sent from Linux hosts if they are fragmented. This is usually seen as + tunnels where small packets and pings get through but large packets + and "regular traffic" don't. To circumvent this, add "no-df" to + the scrub directive so that the packet filter will let fragments with + the "dont fragment"-flag set through anyway. + +* Mixing OFB or CFB cipher modes with static key mode is not recommended, + and is flagged as an error on OpenVPN versions 1.2.1 and greater. + If you use the --cipher option to explicitly select an OFB or CFB + cipher AND you are using static key mode, it is possible that there + could be an IV collision if the OpenVPN daemons on both sides + of the connection are started at exactly the same time, since + OpenVPN uses a timestamp combined with a sequence number as the cipher + IV for OFB and CFB modes. This is not an issue if you are + using CBC cipher mode (the default), or if you are using OFB or CFB + cipher mode with SSL/TLS authentication. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL-win32.txt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL-win32.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ef3869c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/INSTALL-win32.txt @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +UPGRADING FROM 2.3-ALPHA1 AND EARLIER + +OpenVPN Windows installer went through major changes in +2.3-alpha2. To avoid any unexpected behavior, it is strongly +suggested to upgrade as follows. + +First backup configuration files and certificates from your +current installation; by default they're in + + C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\config (32-bit Windows) + C:\Program Files (x86)\OpenVPN\config (64-bit Windows) + +After this, stop the openvpn-gui or the openvpn service +wrapper, if either of them is running and uninstall OpenVPN. +Finally, remove the OpenVPN install directory entirely (e.g. +using Windows Explorer as administrator). + +Finally, install the new version of OpenVPN and copy over +your configuration files and certificates, which now go to + + C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\config + +provided you did not install the 32-bit version on 64-bit +Windows. + +IMPORTANT NOTE FOR WINDOWS VISTA/7 USERS + +Note that on Windows Vista, you will need to run the OpenVPN +GUI with administrator privileges, so that it can add routes +to the routing table that are pulled from the OpenVPN server. +You can do this by right-clicking on the OpenVPN GUI +desktop icon, and selecting "Run as administrator". + +GENERAL QUICKSTART FOR WINDOWS + +The OpenVPN Client requires a configuration file +and key/certificate files. You should obtain +these and save them to OpenVPN's configuration +directory, usually C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\config. + +You can run OpenVPN as a Windows system service or by using +the client GUI. To use the OpenVPN GUI, double click on the +desktop icon or start menu icon. The OpenVPN GUI is a +system-tray applet, so an icon for the GUI will appear in +the lower-right corner of the screen. Right click on the +system tray icon, and a menu should appear showing the names +of your OpenVPN configuration files, and giving you the +option to connect. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5805797 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2010 David Sommerseth +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +# as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this +# distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., +# 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA +# + +# This option prevents autoreconf from overriding our COPYING and +# INSTALL targets: +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign 1.9 +ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4 + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + config.log config.status \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(srcdir)/config.h.in $(srcdir)/config.h.in~ $(srcdir)/configure \ + $(srcdir)/install-sh $(srcdir)/ltmain.sh $(srcdir)/missing \ + $(srcdir)/m4/libtool.m4 $(srcdir)/m4/lt~obsolete.m4 \ + $(srcdir)/m4/ltoptions.m4 $(srcdir)/m4/ltsugar.m4 \ + $(srcdir)/m4/ltversion.m4 \ + $(srcdir)/depcomp $(srcdir)/aclocal.m4 \ + $(srcdir)/config.guess $(srcdir)/config.sub + +CLEANFILES = \ + config-version.h + +EXTRA_DIST = \ + contrib \ + debug + +.PHONY: config-version.h + +if GIT_CHECKOUT +BUILT_SOURCES = \ + config-version.h +endif + +SUBDIRS = build distro include src sample doc tests + +dist_doc_DATA = \ + README \ + README.IPv6 \ + README.polarssl \ + COPYRIGHT.GPL \ + COPYING + +dist_noinst_DATA = \ + .gitignore \ + .gitattributes \ + config-version.h.in \ + PORTS \ + README.IPv6 TODO.IPv6 \ + README.polarssl \ + openvpn.sln \ + msvc-env.bat \ + msvc-dev.bat \ + msvc-build.bat + +if WIN32 +dist_doc_DATA += INSTALL-win32.txt +else +dist_noinst_DATA += INSTALL-win32.txt +endif + +dist_noinst_HEADERS = \ + config-msvc.h \ + config-msvc-version.h.in + +if WIN32 +rootdir=$(prefix) +root_DATA = version.sh +endif + +config-version.h: + @CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION="`GIT_DIR=\"$(top_srcdir)/.git\" $(GIT) rev-parse --symbolic-full-name HEAD`/`GIT_DIR=\"$(top_srcdir)/.git\" $(GIT) rev-parse --short=16 HEAD`"; \ + $(SED) "s#@CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION[@]#$${CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION}#g" "$(srcdir)/config-version.h.in" > config-version.h.tmp + @if ! [ -f config-version.h ] || ! cmp -s config-version.h.tmp config-version.h; then \ + echo "replacing config-version.h"; \ + mv config-version.h.tmp config-version.h; \ + else \ + rm -f config-version.h.tmp; \ + fi diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/NEWS b/bitmask_android/openvpn/NEWS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/PORTS b/bitmask_android/openvpn/PORTS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..735493c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/PORTS @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +OpenVPN +Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + + OpenVPN has been written to try to avoid features + that are not standardized well across different + OSes, so porting OpenVPN itself will probably be + straightforward if a tun or tap driver already exists. + + Where special OS features are used, they are usually + bracketed with #ifdef HAVE_SOME_FUNCTION. + +PLATFORM STATUS: + + * Linux 2.2+ (supported) + * Solaris (supported) + * OpenBSD 3.0 (supported but pthreads are broken) + * Max OS X Darwin + * FreeBSD + * NetBSD + * Windows + * 64 bit platforms -- I have heard reports that + OpenVPN runs on Alpha Linux and FreeBSD. + * ARM -- I have heard of at least one case + where OpenVPN was successfully built and + run on the ARM architecture. + +PORTING NOTES: + + * Make sure that OpenSSL will build on your + platform. + * Make sure that a tun or tap virtual device + driver exists for your platform. See + http://vtun.sourceforge.net/tun/ for examples + of tun and tap drivers that have been written + for Linux, Solaris, and FreeBSD. + * Make sure you have autoconf 2.50+ and + automake 1.6+. + * Edit configure.ac, adding platform specific + config code, and a TARGET_YOUROS define. + * Add platform-specific includes to syshead.h. + * Add an #ifdef TARGET_YOUROS to the do_ifconfig() + function in tun.c to generate a correct "ifconfig" + command for your platform. Note that OpenVPN + determines the ifconfig path at ./configure time. + * Add an ifconfig_order() variant for your OS so + openvpn knows whether to call ifconfig before + or after tun/tap dev open. + * Add an #ifdef TARGET_YOUROS block in tun.c and define + the open_tun, close_tun, read_tun, and write_tun + functions. If your tun/tap virtual device is + sufficiently generic, you may be able to use the + default case. + * Add appropriate code to route.c to handle + the route command on your platform. This + is necessary for the --route option to + work correctly. + * After you successfully build OpenVPN, run + the loopback tests as described in INSTALL. + * For the next test, confirm that the UDP socket + functionality is working independently of the + tun device, by doing something like: + ./openvpn --remote localhost --verb 9 --ping 1 --dev null + * Now try with --remote [a real host] + * Now try with a real tun/tap device, you will + need to figure out the appropriate ifconfig + command to use once openvpn has opened the tun/tap + device. + * Once you have simple tests working on the tun device, + try more complex tests such as using TLS mode. + * Stress test the link by doing ping -f across it. + * Make sure that packet fragmenting is happening + correctly by doing a ping -s 2000 or higher. + * Ensure that OpenVPN on your platform will talk + to OpenVPN on other platforms such as Linux. + Some tun/tap driver implementations will prepend + unnecessary stuff onto the datagram that must be + disabled with an explicit ioctl call if cross-platform + compatibility is to be preserved. You can see some + examples of this in tun.c. + * If your system supports pthreads, try building + with ./configure --enable-pthread and do a stress + test in TLS mode. + * Try the ultimate stress test which is --gremlin + --reneg-sec 10 in TLS mode (preferably with pthreads + enabled), then do a flood ping across the tunnel + (ping -f remote-endpoint) in both directions and let + it run overnight. --gremlin will induce massive + corruption and packet loss, but you win if you + wake up the next morning and both peers are still + running and occasionally even succeeding in their + attempted once-per-10-seconds TLS handshake. + * When it's working, submit your patch to + + and rejoice :) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c5e6f6f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +OpenVPN -- A Secure tunneling daemon + +Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. This program is free software; +you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +as published by the Free Software Foundation. + +************************************************************************* + +For the latest version of OpenVPN, go to: + + http://openvpn.net/ + +To Build and Install, + + ./configure + make + make install + +or see the file INSTALL for more info. + +************************************************************************* + +For detailed information on OpenVPN, including examples, see the man page + http://openvpn.net/man.html + +For a sample VPN configuration, see + http://openvpn.net/howto.html + +For a description of OpenVPN's underlying protocol, + see the file ssl.h included in the source distribution. + +************************************************************************* + +Other Files & Directories: + +* INSTALL-win32.txt -- installation instructions + for Windows + +* configure.ac -- script to rebuild our configure + script and makefile. + +* openvpn.spec -- RPM Spec file + To build an OpenVPN binary RPM, use the command: + + rpmbuild -tb [tarball] + + When you install the binary RPM, it will automatically + install sample-scripts/openvpn.init (see below) + +* sample-scripts/openvpn.init + + A sample init script for OpenVPN. See the file for + comments and additional information. + +* sample-scripts/verify-cn + + A sample perl script which can be used with OpenVPN's + --tls-verify option to provide a customized authentication + test on embedded X509 certificate fields. + +* sample-keys/ + + Sample RSA keys and certificates. DON'T USE THESE FILES + FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN TESTING BECAUSE THEY ARE TOTALLY INSECURE. + +* sample-config-files/ + + A collection of OpenVPN config files and scripts from + the HOWTO at http://openvpn.net/howto.html + +* easy-rsa/ + + A simple guide to RSA key management, scripts included. + Also see http://openvpn.net/easyrsa.html diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.IPv6 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.IPv6 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d504f4ff --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.IPv6 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +IPv6 payload support +-------------------- + +Latest IPv6 payload support code and documentation can be found from here: + + http://www.greenie.net/ipv6/openvpn.html + +For TODO list, see TODO.IPv6. + +Gert Doering, 31.12.2009 + + + +IPv6 transport support +---------------------- + +[ Last updated: 25-Mar-2011. ] + +OpenVPN-2.1 over UDP6/TCP6 README for ipv6-0.4.x patch releases: +( --udp6 and --tcp6-{client,server} ) + +* Availability + Source code under GPLv2 from http://github.com/jjo/openvpn-ipv6 + + Distro ready repos/packages: + o Debian sid official repo, by Alberto Gonzalez Iniesta, + starting from openvpn_2.1~rc20-2 + o Gentoo official portage tree, by Marcel Pennewiss: + - https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=287896 + o Ubuntu package, by Bernhard Schmidt: + - https://launchpad.net/~berni/+archive/ipv6/+packages + o Freetz.org, milestone freetz-1.2 + - http://trac.freetz.org/milestone/freetz-1.2 + +* Status: + o OK: + - upd6,tcp6: GNU/Linux, win32, openbsd-4.7, freebsd-8.1 + - udp4->upd6,tcp4->tcp6 (ipv4/6 mapped): GNU/Linux + (gives a warning on local!=remote proto matching) + o NOT: + - win32: tcp4->tcp6 (ipv4/6 mapped) fails w/connection refused + o NOT tested: + - mgmt console + +* Build setup: + ./configure --enable-ipv6 (by default) + +* Usage: + For IPv6 just specify "-p upd6" an proper IPv6 hostnames, adapting the example + from man page ... + + On may: + openvpn --proto udp6 --remote --dev tun1 \ + --ifconfig 10.4.0.1 10.4.0.2 --verb 5 --secret key + + On june: + openvpn --proto udp6 --remote --dev tun1 \ + --ifconfig 10.4.0.2 10.4.0.1 --verb 5 --secret key + + Same for --proto tcp6-client, tcp6-server. + +* Main code changes summary: + - socket.h: New struct openvpn_sockaddr type that holds sockaddrs and pktinfo, + (here I omitted #ifdef USE_PF_xxxx, see socket.h ) + + struct openvpn_sockaddr { + union { + struct sockaddr sa; + struct sockaddr_in in; + struct sockaddr_in6 in6; + } addr; + }; + + struct link_socket_addr + { + struct openvpn_sockaddr local; + struct openvpn_sockaddr remote; + struct openvpn_sockaddr actual; + }; + + PRO: allows simple type overloading: local.addr.sa, local.addr.in, local.addr.in6 ... etc + (also local.pi.in and local.pi.in6) + + - several function prototypes moved from sockaddr_in to openvpn_sockaddr + - several new sockaddr functions needed to "generalize" AF_xxxx operations: + addr_copy(), addr_zero(), ...etc + proto_is_udp(), proto_is_dgram(), proto_is_net() + +* For TODO list, see TODO.IPv6 + +-- +JuanJo Ciarlante jjo () google () com ............................ +: : +. Linux IP Aliasing author . +. Modular algo (AES et all) support for FreeSWAN/OpenSWAN author . +. OpenVPN over IPv6 support . +:...... plus other scattered free software bits in the wild ...: diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.polarssl b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.polarssl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab7c2d78 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/README.polarssl @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +This version of OpenVPN has PolarSSL support. To enable follow the following +instructions: + +To Build and Install, + + ./configure --with-crypto-library=polarssl + make + make install + +This version depends on at least PolarSSL v1.1. + +************************************************************************* + +Due to limitations in the PolarSSL library, the following features are missing +in the PolarSSL version of OpenVPN: + + * PKCS#12 file support + * --capath support - Loading certificate authorities from a directory + * Windows CryptoAPI support + * Management external key support + * X.509 alternative username fields (must be "CN") + +Plugin/Script features: + + * X.509 Serial number is in hex, not decimal as with OpenSSL + * X.509 subject line has a different format than the OpenSSL subject line + * X.509 certificate export does not work + * X.509 certificate tracking diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/TODO.IPv6 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/TODO.IPv6 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29d75546 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/TODO.IPv6 @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +TODO for IPv6 payload support +----------------------------- + +1.) "--topology subnet" doesn't work together with IPv6 payload on FreeBSD + (verified for FreeBSD server, Linux/ifconfig client, problems + with ICMP6 neighbor solicitations from BSD not being answered by Linux) + + * 2012-01-22 fixed in platform cleanup, commit 62c613d46dc495d74 + +2.) NetBSD IPv6 support doesn't work + ("connected" route is not auto-created, "route-ipv6" adding fails) + + * fixed, 3.1.10 * + +3.) route deletion for IPv6 routes is not yet done + + * fixed for configured routes, 3.1.10 * + * missing for manual-ifconfig-connected (NetBSD, Darwin, Win32) + + * 2012-06-10 - fixed somewhere in 2010 + +4.) do "ifconfig tun0 inet6 unplumb" or "ifconfig tun0 destroy" for + Solaris, *BSD, ... at program termination time, to clean up leftovers + (unless tunnel persistance is desired). + + For Solaris, only the "ipv6 tun0" is affected, for the *BSDs all tun0 + stay around. + + * 2012-06-10 - fixed in individual platform cleanups early-2012 + +4a.) deconfigure IPv6 on tun interface on session termination, otherwise + one could end up with something like this (on NetBSD): + +tun0: flags=8051 mtu 1500 + inet 10.9.0.18 -> 10.9.0.17 netmask 0xffffffff + inet6 fe80::a00:20ff:fece:d299%tun0 -> prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x3 + inet6 2001:608:4:eff::2000:3 -> prefixlen 64 + inet6 2001:608:4:eff::1:3 -> prefixlen 64 + + (pool was changed, previous address still active on tun0, breakage) + + * semi-fixed for NetBSD, 28.2.10, always do tun0 destroy / tun0 create + before actual ifconfig -- tunnel still lingers after OpenVPN quits + + * 2011-09-16 fixed in platform cleanup, commit 8ca19c014c149cf69 + +4b.) verify this - on FreeBSD, tun0 is auto-destroyed if created by + opening /dev/tun (and lingers if created by "ifconfig tun0 create") + + -> use for persistant tunnels on not-linux? + + * 2012-06-10 tun interface behaviour is documented in "man tun(4)" + +5.) add new option "ifconfig-ipv6-push" + (per-client static IPv6 assignment, -> radiusplugin, etc) + + * implemented, 14.1.10 * + +6.) add new option "route-ipv6-gateway" + + * 2012-06-09 - decided there is no current need (but fairly trivial) + +7.) add "full" gateway handling for IPv6 in route.c + (right now, the routes are just sent down the tun interface, if the + operating system in questions supports that, without care for the + gateway address - which does not work for gateways that are supposed + to point elsewhere. Also, it doesn't work for TAP interfaces. + + * 2012-06-09 use "dev tun" for tun devices, "via $gateway" for tap + (and purposely do not support off-link routes) + +8.) full IPv6 support for TAP interfaces + (main issue should be routes+gateway - and testing :-) ) + + test 2010/09/24: TAP itself works on linux/ifconfig+iproute2, but + route-via-tap doesn't work at all (route points to "tap0" which fails) + +17:51:14.075412 fe:ab:6e:c5:53:71 > 33:33:ff:00:00:01, ethertype IPv6 (0x86dd), length 86: 2001:608:4:a053::1:0 > ff02::1:ff00:1: ICMP6, neighbor solicitation, who has 2001:608:4:a001::1, length 32 + + * 2012-06-09 missing gateway support implemented + +8a.) + how is iroute-via-tap supposed to work?? + + * 2012-06-10 - answer: not at all, OpenVPN doesn't do "iroute" in + tap mode - set up "route-ipv6" with gateway address = individual + client's tap0 address to get the per-client routes + + +9.) verify that iroute-ipv6 and route-ipv6 interact in the same way as + documented for iroute/route: + + A's subnet, OpenVPN must push this route to all clients + EXCEPT for A, since the subnet is already owned by A. + OpenVPN accomplishes this by not + not pushing a route to a client + if it matches one of the client's iroutes. + +10.) extend "ifconfig-ipv6" to handle specification of /netbits, pushing + of /netbits, and correctly ifconfig'ing this + (default, if not specified: /64) + + * done * 2012-02-03 + +11.) do not add ipv6-routes if tun-ipv6 is not set - complain instead + + * done * 12.1.10 + +12.) handle incoming [::] and [fe80:...] packets in tun-p2mp MULTI mode + (most likely those are DAD packets) + silently ignore DAD? + Or accept-and-forward iff (multicast && client2client)? + handle NS/NA + +13.) from Martin List-Petersen: + + One thing, and I guess this requires modifications in + network-manager-openvpn: It also works, BUT ignores "push + route-ipv6-gateway" and "push route-ipv6 ...." (obviously routes pushed + from the server) entirely. + +14.) from ##openvpn-discussion: + + new features should be #ifdef'ed + + (check whether this is feasible at all) + +15.) IPv6 related environment variables + + - document all of them in openvpn.8 + - make sure that all existing IPv4 stuff has IPv6 counterparts + +16.) OpenBSD + - implement ifconfig/route for IPv6 + - revert ifconfig/open_tun order to "normal" (separate commit!!!) + (openvpn-devel, Subject: OpenBSD) + - test + + * 2012-02-05 platform cleanup, commit 82d4e12068774b0a6ca + +17.) client-option (Elwood) + - ignore-v6-push-options yes/no + - ignore-v6-route-push ("as for IPv4 routes") + +18.) fail-save? "what if 'ip -6 addr add' fails" -> fail, or fallback to v4? + (-> recomment setting "ignore-v6-push-options yes") + +19.) safety check: if connecting over IPv6 (v6 transport) and the pushed + route-ipv6 network encompasses the server IPv6 address, make sure + we at least log a warning (until we can fiddle with external routing + to make this work correctly). + +20.) show "route add" / "route delete" commands for IPv6 in log file + (we show the "ifconfig" commands, so why not the routes?) + + 2010-08-07: this is a null-feature - it's already there, but with + different debug level (M_INFO vs. D_ROUTE) so user + didn't notice + +21.) enable ipv6-only server operations + - decouple ipv6 pool handling from ipv4 pool + - make sure Rest of OpenVPN doesn't assume "there will always be IPv4" + +22.) implement --learn-address for IPv6 + +23.) FreeBSD 8 seems to require explicit setting of the "ifconfig" IPv6 + route, while FreeBSD 6+7 don't --> more testing, and code fix + + workaround for the time being: just add + + server-ipv6 2001:608:4:a051::/64 + route-ipv6 2001:608:4:a051::/64 + + to the config + + (problem + workaround applies both to tun and tap style devices) + + * 2012-06-09 - this got fixed in one of the platform cleanups + + + + +TODO for IPv6 transport support +------------------------------- + +[ Last updated: 10-Jun-2012. ] + +* All platforms: + o mgmt console: as currently passes straight in_addr_t bits around + + o make possible to get AF from getaddrinfo() answer, ie allow openvpn to + use ipv4/6 if DNS returns A/AAAA without specifying protocol. + Hard: requires deep changes in initialization/calling logic + + o use AI_PASSIVE + + o the getaddr()/getaddr6() interface is not prepared for handling socktype + "tagging", currently I abuse the sockflags bits for getting the ai_socktype + downstream. + + o implement comparison for mapped addesses: server in dual stack + listening IPv6 must permit incoming streams from allowed IPv4 peer, + currently you need to pass eg: --remote ffff::1.2.3.4 + + +* win32: + o find out about mapped addresses, as I can't make it work + with bound at ::1 and connect to 127.0.0.1 + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/compat.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/compat.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c132544 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/compat.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +dnl OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +dnl over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +dnl session authentication and key exchange, +dnl packet encryption, packet authentication, and +dnl packet compression. +dnl +dnl Copyright (C) 2008-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +dnl +dnl This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +dnl it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +dnl the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +dnl (at your option) any later version. +dnl +dnl This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +dnl but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +dnl MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +dnl GNU General Public License for more details. +dnl +dnl You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +dnl along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this +dnl distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., +dnl 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + +dnl Compatibility layer for + +#define CONFIGURE_DEFINES "N/A" + +#define ENABLE_DEF_AUTH 1 +#define ENABLE_PF 1 +#define ENABLE_CLIENT_SERVER 1 +#define ENABLE_CRYPTO 1 +#define ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL 1 +#define ENABLE_DEBUG 1 +#define ENABLE_EUREPHIA 1 +#define ENABLE_FRAGMENT 1 +#define ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY 1 +#define ENABLE_LZO 1 +#define ENABLE_MANAGEMENT 1 +#define ENABLE_MULTIHOME 1 +#define ENABLE_PKCS11 1 +#define ENABLE_PLUGIN 1 +#define ENABLE_PORT_SHARE 1 +#define ENABLE_SOCKS 1 +#define ENABLE_SSL 1 + +#define HAVE_ERRNO_H 1 +#define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1 +#define HAVE_CTYPE_H 1 +#define HAVE_STDARG_H 1 +#define HAVE_STDIO_H 1 +#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 +#define HAVE_STRDUP 1 +#define HAVE_STRERROR 1 +#define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1 +#define HAVE_STRING_H 1 +#define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1 +#define HAVE_SYSTEM 1 +#define HAVE_TIME 1 +#define HAVE_TIME_H 1 +#define HAVE_UNLINK 1 +#define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1 +#define HAVE_WINDOWS_H 1 +#define HAVE_WINSOCK2_H 1 +#define HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H 1 +#define HAVE_IO_H 1 +#define HAVE_DIRECT_H 1 +#define HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1 +#define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1 +#define HAVE_LZO_LZO1X_H 1 +#define HAVE_LZO_LZOUTIL_H 1 + +#define HAVE_ACCESS 1 +#define HAVE_CHDIR 1 +#define HAVE_CHSIZE 1 +#define HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO 1 +#define HAVE_CTIME 1 +#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH 1 +#define HAVE_IN_PKTINFO 1 +#define HAVE_MEMSET 1 +#define HAVE_PUTENV 1 +#define HAVE_STAT 1 + +#define HAVE_SOCKET 1 +#define HAVE_RECV 1 +#define HAVE_RECVFROM 1 +#define HAVE_SEND 1 +#define HAVE_SENDTO 1 +#define HAVE_LISTEN 1 +#define HAVE_ACCEPT 1 +#define HAVE_CONNECT 1 +#define HAVE_BIND 1 +#define HAVE_SELECT 1 +#define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME 1 +#define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1 +#define HAVE_SETSOCKOPT 1 +#define HAVE_GETSOCKOPT 1 +#define HAVE_GETSOCKNAME 1 +#define HAVE_POLL 1 + +#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1 + +#ifndef __cplusplus +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#define EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE 0 +#define TARGET_WIN32 1 +#define TARGET_ALIAS "Windows-MSVC" + +#define HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK 0 + +#define strncasecmp strnicmp +#define strcasecmp _stricmp +#define snprintf _snprintf +#define strtoull strtoul + +#define in_addr_t uint32_t +#define ssize_t SSIZE_T + +#define S_IRUSR 0 +#define S_IWUSR 0 +#define R_OK 4 +#define W_OK 2 +#define X_OK 1 +#define F_OK 0 + +#define SIGHUP 1 +#define SIGINT 2 +#define SIGUSR1 10 +#define SIGUSR2 12 +#define SIGTERM 15 + +typedef unsigned __int64 uint64_t; +typedef unsigned __int32 uint32_t; +typedef unsigned __int16 uint16_t; +typedef unsigned __int8 uint8_t; +typedef __int64 int64_t; +typedef __int32 int32_t; +typedef __int16 int16_t; +typedef __int8 int8_t; + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_MSVC_LOCAL_H +#include +#endif + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/config-version.h.in b/bitmask_android/openvpn/config-version.h.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27ee36af --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/config-version.h.in @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +#define CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION "@CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION@" diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/configure.ac b/bitmask_android/openvpn/configure.ac new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f780b7a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/configure.ac @@ -0,0 +1,1069 @@ +dnl OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +dnl over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +dnl session authentication and key exchange, +dnl packet encryption, packet authentication, and +dnl packet compression. +dnl +dnl Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +dnl Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +dnl +dnl This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +dnl it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +dnl the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +dnl (at your option) any later version. +dnl +dnl This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +dnl but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +dnl MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +dnl GNU General Public License for more details. +dnl +dnl You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +dnl along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this +dnl distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., +dnl 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + +dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script. + +AC_PREREQ(2.59) + +m4_include(version.m4) +AC_INIT([PRODUCT_NAME], [PRODUCT_VERSION], [PRODUCT_BUGREPORT], [PRODUCT_TARNAME]) +m4_include(compat.m4) +AC_DEFINE([OPENVPN_VERSION_RESOURCE], [PRODUCT_VERSION_RESOURCE], [Version in windows resource format]) + +AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([.]) +AM_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) +AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/openvpn/syshead.h]) +AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE +AC_CANONICAL_HOST +AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [lzo], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-lzo], [disable LZO compression support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_lzo="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [lzo-stub], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-lzo-stub], [don't compile LZO compression support but still allow limited interoperability with LZO-enabled peers @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_lzo_stub="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [crypto], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-crypto], [disable crypto support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_crypto="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [ssl], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-ssl], [disable SSL support for TLS-based key exchange @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_ssl="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [x509-alt-username], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-x509-alt-username], [enable the --x509-username-field feature @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_x509_alt_username="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [multi], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-multi], [disable client/server support (--mode server + client mode) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_multi="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [server], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-server], [disable server support only (but retain client support) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_server="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [plugins], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-plugins], [disable plug-in support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_plugins="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [eurephia], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-eurephia], [disable support for the eurephia plug-in @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_eurephia="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [management], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-management], [disable management server support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_management="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [pkcs11], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pkcs11], [enable pkcs11 support @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_pkcs11="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [socks], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-socks], [disable Socks support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_socks="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [http-proxy], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-http-proxy], [disable HTTP proxy support @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_http_proxy="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [fragment], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-fragment], [disable internal fragmentation support (--fragment) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_fragment="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [multihome], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-multihome], [disable multi-homed UDP server support (--multihome) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_multihome="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [port-share], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-port-share], [disable TCP server port-share support (--port-share) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_port_share="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [debug], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-debug], [disable debugging support (disable gremlin and verb 7+ messages) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_debug="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [small], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-small], [enable smaller executable size (disable OCC, usage message, and verb 4 parm list) @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_small="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [password-save], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-password-save], [allow --askpass and --auth-user-pass passwords to be read from a file @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_password_save="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [iproute2], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-iproute2], [enable support for iproute2 @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_iproute2="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [def-auth], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-def-auth], [disable deferred authentication @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_def_auth="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [pf], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-pf], [disable internal packet filter @<:@default=yes@:>@])], + , + [enable_pf="yes"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [plugin-auth-pam], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-plugin-auth-pam], [disable auth-pam plugin @<:@default=platform specific@:>@])], + , + [ + case "$host" in + *-*-openbsd*) enable_plugin_auth_pam="no";; + *-mingw*) enable_plugin_auth_pam="no";; + *) enable_plugin_auth_pam="yes";; + esac + ] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [plugin-down-root], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-plugin-down-root], [disable down-root plugin @<:@default=platform specific@:>@])], + , + [ + case "$host" in + *-mingw*) enable_plugin_down_root="no";; + *) enable_plugin_down_root="yes";; + esac + ] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [pam-dlopen], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pam-dlopen], [dlopen libpam @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_pam_dlopen="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [strict], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-strict], [enable strict compiler warnings (debugging option) @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_strict="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [pedantic], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pedantic], [enable pedantic compiler warnings, will not generate a working executable (debugging option) @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_pedantic="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [strict-options], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-strict-options], [enable strict options check between peers (debugging option) @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_strict_options="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [selinux], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-selinux], [enable SELinux support @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_selinux="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_ENABLE( + [systemd], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-systemd], [enable systemd suppport @<:@default=no@:>@])], + , + [enable_systemd="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH( + [special-build], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-special-build=STRING], [specify special build string])], + [test -n "${withval}" && AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONFIGURE_SPECIAL_BUILD], ["${withval}"], [special build string])] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH( + [mem-check], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-mem-check=TYPE], [build with debug memory checking, TYPE=no|dmalloc|valgrind|ssl @<:@default=no@:>@])], + [ + case "${withval}" in + dmalloc|valgrind|ssl|no) ;; + *) AC_MSG_ERROR([bad value ${withval} for --mem-check]) ;; + esac + ], + [with_mem_check="no"] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH( + [crypto-library], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto-library=library], [build with the given crypto library, TYPE=openssl|polarssl @<:@default=openssl@:>@])], + [ + case "${withval}" in + openssl|polarssl) ;; + *) AC_MSG_ERROR([bad value ${withval} for --with-crypto-library]) ;; + esac + ], + [with_crypto_library="openssl"] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH( + [plugindir], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-plugindir], [plugin directory @<:@default=LIBDIR/openvpn@:>@])], + , + [with_plugindir="\$(libdir)/openvpn/plugins"] +) + + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_ALIAS], ["${host}"], [A string representing our host]) +case "$host" in + *-*-linux*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_LINUX], [1], [Are we running on Linux?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["L"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *-*-solaris*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_SOLARIS], [1], [Are we running on Solaris?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["S"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *-*-openbsd*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_OPENBSD], [1], [Are we running on OpenBSD?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["O"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *-*-freebsd*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_FREEBSD], [1], [Are we running on FreeBSD?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["F"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *-*-netbsd*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_NETBSD], [1], [Are we running NetBSD?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["N"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *-*-darwin*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_DARWIN], [1], [Are we running on Mac OS X?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["M"], [Target prefix]) + have_tap_header="yes" + dnl some Mac OS X tendering (we use vararg macros...) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -no-cpp-precomp" + ;; + *-mingw*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_WIN32], [1], [Are we running WIN32?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["W"], [Target prefix]) + CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN" + CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -DNTDDI_VERSION=NTDDI_WINXP -D_WIN32_WINNT=_WIN32_WINNT_WINXP" + WIN32=yes + ;; + *-*-dragonfly*) + AC_DEFINE([TARGET_DRAGONFLY], [1], [Are we running on DragonFlyBSD?]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["D"], [Target prefix]) + ;; + *) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TARGET_PREFIX], ["X"], [Target prefix]) + have_tap_header="yes" + ;; +esac + +PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG +AC_PROG_CPP +AC_PROG_INSTALL +AC_PROG_LN_S +AC_PROG_SED +AC_PROG_MAKE_SET + +AC_ARG_VAR([IFCONFIG], [full path to ipconfig utility]) +AC_ARG_VAR([ROUTE], [full path to route utility]) +AC_ARG_VAR([IPROUTE], [full path to ip utility]) +AC_ARG_VAR([NETSTAT], [path to netstat utility]) # tests +AC_ARG_VAR([MAN2HTML], [path to man2html utility]) +AC_ARG_VAR([GIT], [path to git utility]) +AC_PATH_PROGS([IFCONFIG], [ifconfig],, [$PATH:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin:/sbin]) +AC_PATH_PROGS([ROUTE], [route],, [$PATH:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin:/sbin]) +AC_PATH_PROGS([IPROUTE], [ip],, [$PATH:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin:/sbin]) +AC_CHECK_PROGS([NETSTAT], [netstat], [netstat], [$PATH:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/etc]) # tests +AC_CHECK_PROGS([MAN2HTML], [man2html]) +AC_CHECK_PROGS([GIT], [git]) # optional +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([IFCONFIG_PATH], ["$IFCONFIG"], [Path to ifconfig tool]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([IPROUTE_PATH], ["$IPROUTE"], [Path to iproute tool]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([ROUTE_PATH], ["$ROUTE"], [Path to route tool]) + +# +# Libtool +# +ifdef( + [LT_INIT], + [ + LT_INIT([win32-dll]) + LT_LANG([Windows Resource]) + ], + [ + AC_LIBTOOL_WIN32_DLL + AC_LIBTOOL_RC + AC_PROG_LIBTOOL + ] +) + +AC_C_CONST +AC_C_INLINE +AC_C_VOLATILE +AC_TYPE_OFF_T +AC_TYPE_PID_T +AC_TYPE_SIZE_T +AC_TYPE_UID_T +AC_TYPE_INT8_T +AC_TYPE_INT16_T +AC_TYPE_INT32_T +AC_TYPE_INT64_T +AC_TYPE_UINT8_T +AC_TYPE_UINT16_T +AC_TYPE_UINT32_T +AC_TYPE_UINT64_T +AC_TYPE_SIGNAL +AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO +AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC +AX_TYPE_SOCKLEN_T +AX_EMPTY_ARRAY +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([unsigned int]) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([unsigned long]) +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + stdio.h stdarg.h stdbool.h limits.h \ + time.h errno.h fcntl.h io.h direct.h \ + ctype.h sys/types.h sys/socket.h \ + signal.h unistd.h dlfcn.h \ + netinet/in.h netinet/in_systm.h \ + netinet/tcp.h arpa/inet.h netdb.h \ + windows.h winsock2.h ws2tcpip.h \ +]) +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + sys/time.h sys/ioctl.h sys/stat.h \ + sys/mman.h sys/file.h sys/wait.h \ + unistd.h signal.h libgen.h stropts.h \ + syslog.h pwd.h grp.h \ + sys/sockio.h sys/uio.h linux/sockios.h \ + linux/types.h sys/poll.h sys/epoll.h err.h \ +]) + +SOCKET_INCLUDES=" +#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_WINDOWS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif +" + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [net/if.h netinet/ip.h netinet/if_ether.h resolv.h sys/un.h], + , + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) + +AC_CHECK_TYPES( + [in_addr_t], + , + [AC_DEFINE([in_addr_t], [uint32_t], [Workaround missing in_addr_t])], + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct iphdr], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_IPHDR], [1], [struct iphdr needed for IPv6 support])], + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct sock_extended_err], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SOCK_EXTENDED_ERR], [1], [struct sock_extended_err needed for extended socket error support])], + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct msghdr], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MSGHDR], [1], [struct msghdr needed for extended socket error support])], + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct cmsghdr], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CMSGHDR], [1], [struct cmsghdr needed for extended socket error support])], + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct in_pktinfo], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_IN_PKTINFO], [1], [struct in_pktinfo needed for IP_PKTINFO support])], + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [struct sockaddr_in6], + , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([struct sockaddr_in6 not found, needed for ipv6 transport support.])], + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SO_MARK], + , + , + [[${SOCKET_INCLUDES}]] +) + +dnl We emulate signals in Windows +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SIGHUP], + , + [AC_DEFINE([SIGHUP], [1], [SIGHUP replacement])], + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SIGINT], + , + [AC_DEFINE([SIGINT], [2], [SIGINT replacement])], + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SIGUSR1], + , + [AC_DEFINE([SIGUSR1], [10], [SIGUSR1 replacement])], + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SIGUSR2], + , + [AC_DEFINE([SIGUSR2], [12], [SIGUSR2 replacement])], + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [SIGTERM], + , + [AC_DEFINE([SIGTERM], [15], [SIGTERM replacement])], + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) + +AC_FUNC_FORK + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + daemon chroot getpwnam setuid nice system getpid dup dup2 \ + getpass strerror syslog openlog mlockall getgrnam setgid \ + setgroups stat flock readv writev time gettimeofday \ + ctime memset vsnprintf strdup \ + setsid chdir putenv getpeername unlink \ + chsize ftruncate execve getpeereid umask basename dirname access \ + epoll_create \ +]) + +AC_CHECK_LIB( + [dl], + [dlopen], + [DL_LIBS="-ldl"] +) +AC_SUBST([DL_LIBS]) + +AC_CHECK_LIB( + [nsl], + [inet_ntoa], + [SOCKETS_LIBS="${SOCKETS_LIBS} -lnsl"] +) +AC_CHECK_LIB( + [socket], + [socket], + [SOCKETS_LIBS="${SOCKETS_LIBS} -lsocket"] +) +AC_CHECK_LIB( + [resolv], + [gethostbyname], + [SOCKETS_LIBS="${SOCKETS_LIBS} -lresolv"] +) +AC_SUBST([SOCKETS_LIBS]) + +old_LIBS="${LIBS}" +LIBS="${LIBS} ${SOCKETS_LIBS}" +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sendmsg recvmsg inet_ntop inet_pton]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS( + [res_init], + , + , + [[#include ]] +) +# Windows use stdcall for winsock so we cannot auto detect these +m4_define( + [SOCKET_FUNCS], +[socket recv recvfrom send sendto listen dnl +accept connect bind select gethostbyname inet_ntoa]dnl +) +m4_define( + [SOCKET_OPT_FUNCS], + [setsockopt getsockopt getsockname poll]dnl +) +if test "${WIN32}" = "yes"; then + m4_foreach( + [F], + m4_split(SOCKET_FUNCS SOCKET_OPT_FUNCS), + m4_define([UF], [[m4_join([_], [HAVE], m4_toupper(F))]]) + AC_DEFINE([UF], [1], [Win32 builtin]) + ) +else + AC_CHECK_FUNCS( + SOCKET_FUNCS, + , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([Required library function not found])] + ) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(SOCKET_OPT_FUNCS) +fi +LIBS="${old_LIBS}" + +AC_ARG_VAR([TAP_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for tap]) +old_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" +CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${TAP_CFLAGS}" +AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [ \ + net/if_tun.h net/tun/if_tun.h \ + linux/if_tun.h \ + tap-windows.h \ + ], + [have_tap_header="yes"] +) +AC_CHECK_DECLS( + [TUNSETPERSIST], + [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST], [1], [We have persist tun capability])], + , + [[ + #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H + #include + #endif + ]] +) +CFLAGS="${old_CFLAGS}" +test "${have_tap_header}" = "yes" || AC_MSG_ERROR([no tap header could be found]) + +AC_CHECK_LIB( + [selinux], + [setcon], + [SELINUX_LIBS="-lselinux"] +) +AC_SUBST([SELINUX_LIBS]) + +AC_ARG_VAR([LIBPAM_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for libpam]) +AC_ARG_VAR([LIBPAM_LIBS], [linker flags for libpam]) +if test -z "${LIBPAM_LIBS}"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB( + [pam], + [pam_start], + [LIBPAM_LIBS="-lpam"] + ) +fi + +case "${with_mem_check}" in + valgrind) + AC_CHECK_HEADER( + [valgrind/memcheck.h], + [ + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -g -fno-inline" + AC_DEFINE( + [USE_VALGRIND], + [1], + [Use valgrind memory debugging library] + ) + ], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([valgrind headers not found.])] + ) + ;; + dmalloc) + AC_CHECK_HEADER( + [dmalloc.h], + [AC_CHECK_LIB( + [dmalloc], + [malloc], + [ + LIBS="${LIBS} -ldmalloc" + AC_DEFINE( + [DMALLOC], + [1], + [Use dmalloc memory debugging library] + ) + ], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([dmalloc library not found.])] + )], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([dmalloc headers not found.])] + ) + ;; + ssl) + AC_CHECK_LIB( + [ssl], + [CRYPTO_mem_ctrl], + [ + AC_DEFINE( + [CRYPTO_MDEBUG], + [1], + [Use memory debugging function in OpenSSL] + ) + AC_MSG_NOTICE([NOTE: OpenSSL library must be compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG]) + ], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([Memory Debugging function in OpenSSL library not found.])] + ) + ;; +esac + +PKG_CHECK_MODULES( + [OPENSSL_CRYPTO], + [libcrypto >= 0.9.6], + [have_openssl_crypto="yes"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB( + [crypto], + [RSA_new], + [ + have_openssl_crypto="yes" + OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBS="-lcrypto" + ] + )] +) + +PKG_CHECK_MODULES( + [OPENSSL_SSL], + [libssl >= 0.9.6], + [have_openssl_ssl="yes"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB( + [ssl], + [SSL_CTX_new], + [ + have_openssl_ssl="yes" + OPENSSL_SSL_LIBS="-lssl" + ] + )] +) + +if test "${have_openssl_crypto}" = "yes"; then + saved_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" + saved_LIBS="${LIBS}" + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${OPENSSL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS}" + LIBS="${LIBS} ${OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBS}" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length]) + have_openssl_engine="yes" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS( + [ \ + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines \ + ENGINE_register_all_complete \ + ENGINE_cleanup \ + ], + , + [have_openssl_engine="no"; break] + ) + + CFLAGS="${saved_CFLAGS}" + LIBS="${saved_LIBS}" +fi + +AC_ARG_VAR([POLARSSL_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for polarssl]) +AC_ARG_VAR([POLARSSL_LIBS], [linker flags for polarssl]) +have_polarssl_ssl="yes" +have_polarssl_crypto="yes" +if test -z "${POLARSSL_LIBS}"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB( + [polarssl], + [ssl_init], + [POLARSSL_LIBS="-lpolarssl"], + [ + have_polarssl_ssl="no" + AC_CHECK_LIB( + [polarssl], + [aes_crypt_cbc], + , + [have_polarssl_crypto="no"] + ) + ] + ) +fi + +if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "polarssl" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([polarssl version]) + old_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" + CFLAGS="${POLARSSL_CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS}" + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[ +#include + ]], + [[ +#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01010000 +#error invalid version +#endif + ]] + )], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([ok])], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid polarssl version])] + ) + CFLAGS="${old_CFLAGS}" +fi + +AC_ARG_VAR([LZO_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for lzo]) +AC_ARG_VAR([LZO_LIBS], [linker flags for lzo]) +have_lzo="yes" +if test -z "${LZO_LIBS}"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB( + [lzo2], + [lzo1x_1_15_compress], + [LZO_LIBS="-llzo2"], + [AC_CHECK_LIB( + [lzo], + [lzo1x_1_15_compress], + [LZO_LIBS="-llzo"], + [have_lzo="no"] + )] + ) +fi +if test "${have_lzo}" = "yes"; then + saved_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}" + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${LZO_CFLAGS}" + AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [lzo/lzoutil.h], + , + [AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [lzoutil.h], + , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([lzoutil.h is missing])] + )] + ) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [lzo/lzo1x.h], + , + [AC_CHECK_HEADERS( + [lzo1x.h], + , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([lzo1x.h is missing])] + )] + ) + CFLAGS="${saved_CFLAGS}" +fi + +PKG_CHECK_MODULES( + [PKCS11_HELPER], + [libpkcs11-helper-1 >= 1.02], + [have_pkcs11_helper="yes"], + [] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([git checkout]) +GIT_CHECKOUT="no" +if test -n "${GIT}" -a -d "${srcdir}/.git"; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONFIG_VERSION_H], [1], [extra version available in config-version.h]) + GIT_CHECKOUT="yes" +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT([${GIT_CHECKOUT}]) + +if test -n "${SP_PLATFORM_WINDOWS}"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PATH_SEPARATOR], ['\\\\'], [Path separator]) #" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PATH_SEPARATOR_STR], ["\\\\"], [Path separator]) #" +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PATH_SEPARATOR], ['/'], [Path separator]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PATH_SEPARATOR_STR], ["/"], [Path separator]) +fi + +dnl enable --x509-username-field feature if requested +if test "${enable_x509_alt_username}" = "yes"; then + if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "polarssl" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([PolarSSL does not support the --x509-username-field feature]) + fi + + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME], [1], [Enable --x509-username-field feature]) +fi + +test "${ac_cv_header_sys_uio_h}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([HAVE_IOVEC], [1], [struct iovec needed for IPv6 support]) +test "${enable_multi}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_CLIENT_SERVER], [1], [Enable client/server capability]) +test "${enable_server}" = "no" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_CLIENT_ONLY], [1], [Enable client capability only]) +test "${enable_management}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_MANAGEMENT], [1], [Enable management server capability]) +test "${enable_socks}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SOCKS], [1], [Enable Socks proxy support]) +test "${enable_http_proxy}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY], [1], [Enable HTTP proxy support]) +test "${enable_multihome}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_MULTIHOME], [1], [Enable multi-homed UDP server capability]) +test "${enable_debug}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_DEBUG], [1], [Enable debugging support]) +test "${enable_small}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SMALL], [1], [Enable smaller executable size]) +test "${enable_fragment}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_FRAGMENT], [1], [Enable internal fragmentation support]) +test "${enable_port_share}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PORT_SHARE], [1], [Enable TCP Server port sharing]) +test "${enable_def_auth}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_DEF_AUTH], [1], [Enable deferred authentication]) +test "${enable_pf}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PF], [1], [Enable internal packet filter]) +test "${enable_strict_options}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_STRICT_OPTIONS_CHECK], [1], [Enable strict options check between peers]) +test "${enable_password_save}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE], [1], [Allow --askpass and --auth-user-pass passwords to be read from a file]) +test "${enable_systemd}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SYSTEMD], [1], [Enable systemd support]) + +case "${with_crypto_library}" in + openssl) + have_crypto_crypto="${have_openssl_crypto}" + have_crypto_ssl="${have_openssl_ssl}" + CRYPTO_CRYPTO_CFLAGS="${OPENSSL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS}" + CRYPTO_CRYPTO_LIBS="${OPENSSL_CRYPTO_LIBS}" + CRYPTO_SSL_CFLAGS="${OPENSSL_SSL_CFLAGS}" + CRYPTO_SSL_LIBS="${OPENSSL_SSL_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL], [1], [Use OpenSSL library]) + test "${have_openssl_engine}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Use crypto library]) + ;; + polarssl) + have_crypto_crypto="${have_polarssl_crypto}" + have_crypto_ssl="${have_polarssl_ssl}" + CRYPTO_CRYPTO_CFLAGS="${POLARSSL_CFLAGS}" + CRYPTO_CRYPTO_LIBS="${POLARSSL_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL], [1], [Use PolarSSL library]) + ;; +esac + +if test "${enable_ssl}" = "yes"; then + test "${enable_crypto}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([crypto must be enabled for ssl]) + test "${have_crypto_ssl}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([${with_ssl_library} ssl is required but missing]) + OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS="${OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS} ${CRYPTO_SSL_CFLAGS}" + OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS="${OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS} ${CRYPTO_SSL_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SSL], [1], [Enable ssl library]) +fi + +if test "${enable_crypto}" = "yes"; then + test "${have_crypto_crypto}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([${with_crypto_library} crypto is required but missing]) + OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS="${OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS} ${CRYPTO_CRYPTO_CFLAGS}" + OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS="${OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS} ${CRYPTO_CRYPTO_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_CRYPTO], [1], [Enable crypto library]) +fi + +if test "${enable_plugins}" = "yes"; then + OPTIONAL_DL_LIBS="${DL_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PLUGIN], [1], [Enable systemd support]) + test "${enable_eurephia}" = "yes" && AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_EUREPHIA], [1], [Enable support for the eurephia plug-in]) +else + enable_plugin_auth_pam="no" + enable_plugin_down_root="no" +fi + +if test "${enable_iproute2}" = "yes"; then + test -z "${IPROUTE}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([ip utility is required but missing]) + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_IPROUTE], [1], [enable iproute2 support]) +else + if test "${WIN32}" != "yes"; then + test -z "${ROUTE}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([route utility is required but missing]) + test -z "${IFCONFIG}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([ifconfig utility is required but missing]) + fi +fi + +if test "${enable_selinux}" = "yes"; then + test -z "${SELINUX_LIBS}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux required but missing]) + OPTIONAL_SELINUX_LIBS="${SELINUX_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SELINUX], [1], [SELinux support]) +fi + +if test "${enable_lzo}" = "yes"; then + test "${have_lzo}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([lzo enabled but missing]) + OPTIONAL_LZO_CFLAGS="${LZO_CFLAGS}" + OPTIONAL_LZO_LIBS="${LZO_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_LZO], [1], [Enable LZO compression library]) +fi +if test "${enable_lzo_stub}" = "yes"; then + test "${enable_lzo}" = "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot have both lzo stub and lzo enabled]) + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_LZO_STUB], [1], [Enable LZO stub capability]) + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_LZO], [1], [Enable LZO compression library]) +fi + +if test "${enable_pkcs11}" = "yes"; then + test "${have_pkcs11_helper}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([PKCS11 enabled but libpkcs11-helper is missing]) + test "${enable_ssl}" != "yes" && AC_MSG_ERROR([PKCS11 can be enabled only if SSL is enabled]) + OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_CFLAGS="${PKCS11_HELPER_CFLAGS}" + OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBS="${PKCS11_HELPER_LIBS}" + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [1], [Enable PKCS11]) +fi + +if test "${enable_pedantic}" = "yes"; then + enable_strict="yes" + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -pedantic" + test "${WIN32}" != "yes" && CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -ansi" +fi +if test "${enable_strict}" = "yes"; then + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} -Wall -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-unused-function" +fi + +if test "${WIN32}" = "yes"; then + test -z "${MAN2HTML}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([man2html is required for win32]) +fi + +if test "${enable_plugin_auth_pam}" = "yes"; then + PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_CFLAGS="${LIBPAM_CFLAGS}" + if test "${enable_pam_dlopen}" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM_DLOPEN], [1], [dlopen libpam]) + PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_LIBS="${DL_LIBS}" + else + test -z "${LIBPAM_LIBS}" && AC_MSG_ERROR([libpam required but missing]) + PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_LIBS="${LIBPAM_LIBS}" + fi +fi + +CONFIGURE_DEFINES="`set | grep '^enable_.*=' ; set | grep '^with_.*='`" +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONFIGURE_DEFINES], ["`echo ${CONFIGURE_DEFINES}`"], [Configuration settings]) + +TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID="PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID" +TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR="PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR" +TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR="PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR" +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID], ["${TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID}"], [The tap-windows id]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR], [${TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR}], [The tap-windows version number is required for OpenVPN]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR], [${TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR}], [The tap-windows version number is required for OpenVPN]) +AC_SUBST([TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID]) +AC_SUBST([TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR]) +AC_SUBST([TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR]) + +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_DL_LIBS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_SELINUX_LIBS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_LZO_CFLAGS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_LZO_LIBS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_CFLAGS]) +AC_SUBST([OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBS]) + +AC_SUBST([PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_CFLAGS]) +AC_SUBST([PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_LIBS]) + +AM_CONDITIONAL([WIN32], [test "${WIN32}" = "yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([GIT_CHECKOUT], [test "${GIT_CHECKOUT}" = "yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM], [test "${enable_plugin_auth_pam}" = "yes"]) +AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_PLUGIN_DOWN_ROOT], [test "${enable_plugin_down_root}" = "yes"]) + +plugindir="${with_plugindir}" +sampledir="\$(docdir)/sample" +AC_SUBST([plugindir]) +AC_SUBST([sampledir]) + +AC_CONFIG_FILES([ + version.sh + Makefile + build/Makefile + build/msvc/Makefile + build/msvc/msvc-generate/Makefile + distro/Makefile + distro/rpm/Makefile + distro/rpm/openvpn.spec + include/Makefile + src/Makefile + src/compat/Makefile + src/openvpn/Makefile + src/openvpnserv/Makefile + src/plugins/Makefile + src/plugins/auth-pam/Makefile + src/plugins/down-root/Makefile + tests/Makefile + sample/Makefile + doc/Makefile +]) +AC_CONFIG_FILES([tests/t_client.sh], [chmod +x tests/t_client.sh]) +AC_OUTPUT diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/OCSP_check/OCSP_check.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/OCSP_check/OCSP_check.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..847be450 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/OCSP_check/OCSP_check.sh @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Sample script to perform OCSP queries with OpenSSL +# given a certificate serial number. + +# If you run your own CA, you can set up a very simple +# OCSP server using the -port option to "openssl ocsp". + +# Full documentation and examples: +# http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ocsp.html + + +# Edit the following values to suit your needs + +# OCSP responder URL (mandatory) +# YOU MUST UNCOMMENT ONE OF THESE AND SET IT TO A VALID SERVER +#ocsp_url="http://ocsp.example.com/" +#ocsp_url="https://ocsp.secure.example.com/" + +# Path to issuer certificate (mandatory) +# YOU MUST SET THIS TO THE PATH TO THE CA CERTIFICATE +issuer="/path/to/CAcert.crt" + +# use a nonce in the query, set to "-no_nonce" to not use it +nonce="-nonce" + +# Verify the response +# YOU MUST SET THIS TO THE PATH TO THE RESPONSE VERIFICATION CERT +verify="/path/to/CAcert.crt" + +# Depth in the certificate chain where the cert to verify is. +# Set to -1 to run the verification at every level (NOTE that +# in that case you need a more complex script as the various +# parameters for the query will likely be different at each level) +# "0" is the usual value here, where the client certificate is +check_depth=0 + +cur_depth=$1 # this is the *CURRENT* depth +common_name=$2 # CN in case you need it + +# minimal sanity checks + +err=0 +if [ -z "$issuer" ] || [ ! -e "$issuer" ]; then + echo "Error: issuer certificate undefined or not found!" >&2 + err=1 +fi + +if [ -z "$verify" ] || [ ! -e "$verify" ]; then + echo "Error: verification certificate undefined or not found!" >&2 + err=1 +fi + +if [ -z "$ocsp_url" ]; then + echo "Error: OCSP server URL not defined!" >&2 + err=1 +fi + +if [ $err -eq 1 ]; then + echo "Did you forget to customize the variables in the script?" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# begin +if [ $check_depth -eq -1 ] || [ $cur_depth -eq $check_depth ]; then + + eval serial="\$tls_serial_${cur_depth}" + + # To successfully complete, the following must happen: + # + # - The serial number must not be empty + # - The exit status of "openssl ocsp" must be zero + # - The output of the above command must contain the line + # "0x${serial}: good" + # + # Everything else fails with exit status 1. + + if [ -n "$serial" ]; then + + # This is only an example; you are encouraged to run this command (without + # redirections) manually against your or your CA's OCSP server to see how + # it responds, and adapt accordingly. + # Sample output that is assumed here: + # + # Response verify OK + # 0x428740A5: good + # This Update: Apr 24 19:38:49 2010 GMT + # Next Update: May 2 14:23:42 2010 GMT + # + # NOTE: It is needed to check the exit code of OpenSSL explicitly. OpenSSL + # can in some circumstances give a "good" result if it could not + # reach the the OSCP server. In this case, the exit code will indicate + # if OpenSSL itself failed or not. If OpenSSL's exit code is not 0, + # don't trust the OpenSSL status. + + status=$(openssl ocsp -issuer "$issuer" \ + "$nonce" \ + -CAfile "$verify" \ + -url "$ocsp_url" \ + -serial "0x${serial}" 2>/dev/null) + + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + # check that it's good + if echo "$status" | grep -Fq "0x${serial}: good"; then + exit 0 + fi + fi + fi + # if we get here, something was wrong + exit 1 +fi diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1a57d0e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/README @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +This directory contains scripts and patches contributed +by users. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66fe61ad --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/README @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +OpenVPN fwmark Routing +Sean Reifschneider, +Thursday November 27, 2003 +========================== + +These scripts can be used with OpenVPN up and down scripts to set up +routing on a Linux system such that the VPN traffic is sent via normal +network connectivity, but other traffic to that network runs over the VPN. +The idea is to allow encryption of data to the network the remote host is +on, without interfering with the VPN traffic. You can't simply add a route +to the remote network, becaues that will cause the VPN traffic to also try +to run over the VPN, and breaks the VPN. + +These scripts use the Linux "fwmark" iptables rules to specify routing +based not only on IP address, but also by port and protocol. This allows +you to effectively say "if the packet is to this IP address on this port +using this protocol, then use the normal default gateway, otherwise use the +VPN gateway. + +This is set up on the client VPN system, not the VPN server. These scripts +also set up all ICMP echo-responses to run across the VPN. You can +comment the lines in the scripts to disable this, but I find this useful +at coffee shops which have networks that block ICMP. + +To configure this, you need to set up these scripts as your up and down +scripts in the config file. You will need to set these values in the +config file: + + up /etc/openvpn/fwmarkroute.up + down /etc/openvpn/fwmarkroute.down + up-restart + up-delay + + setenv remote_netmask_bits 24 + +Note: For this to work, you can't set the "user" or "group" config options, +because then the scripts will not run as root. + +The last setting allows you to control the size of the network the remote +system is on. The remote end has to be set up to route, probably with +masquerading or NAT. The network this netmask relates to is calculated +using the value of "remote" in the conf file. + +Sean diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.down b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.down new file mode 100755 index 00000000..87d67d4d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.down @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Bring down vpn routing. + +# calculate the network address +remote_network=`ipcalc -n "$remote"/"$remote_netmask_bits"` +remote_network="${remote_network#*=}" + +# clear routing via VPN +ip route del "$remote_network"/"$remote_netmask_bits" via "$5" table vpn.out +ip route del table vpnonly.out via "$5" +iptables -D OUTPUT -t mangle -p "$proto" \ + -d "$remote_network"/"$remote_netmask_bits" \ + --dport "$remote_port" -j ACCEPT +iptables -D OUTPUT -t mangle -d "$remote" -j MARK --set-mark 2 + +# undo the ICMP ping tunneling +iptables -D OUTPUT -t mangle --protocol icmp --icmp-type echo-request \ + -j MARK --set-mark 3 + +# flush route cache +ip route flush cache diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.up b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.up new file mode 100755 index 00000000..661ec313 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/openvpn-fwmarkroute-1.00/fwmarkroute.up @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Bring up vpn routing. + +# calculate the network address +remote_network=`ipcalc -n "$remote"/"$remote_netmask_bits"` +remote_network="${remote_network#*=}" + +# add the stuff that doesn't change if it's not already there +grep -q '^202 ' /etc/iproute2/rt_tables +if [ "$?" -ne 0 ] +then + echo 202 vpn.out >> /etc/iproute2/rt_tables +fi +grep -q '^203 ' /etc/iproute2/rt_tables +if [ "$?" -ne 0 ] +then + echo 203 vpnonly.out >> /etc/iproute2/rt_tables +fi +ip rule ls | grep -q 'lookup vpn.out *$' +if [ "$?" -ne 0 ] +then + ip rule add fwmark 2 table vpn.out +fi +ip rule ls | grep -q 'lookup vpnonly.out *$' +if [ "$?" -ne 0 ] +then + ip rule add fwmark 3 table vpnonly.out +fi + +# route VPN traffic using the normal table +iptables -A OUTPUT -t mangle -p "$proto" -d "$remote" --dport "$remote_port" \ + -j ACCEPT + +# route all other traffic to that host via VPN +iptables -A OUTPUT -t mangle -d "$remote_network"/"$remote_netmask_bits" \ + -j MARK --set-mark 2 + +# route all ICMP pings over the VPN +iptables -A OUTPUT -t mangle --protocol icmp --icmp-type echo-request \ + -j MARK --set-mark 3 + +# NAT traffic going over the VPN, so it doesn't have an unknown address +iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o "$1" -j SNAT --to-source "$4" + +# add routing commands +ip route add "$remote_network"/"$remote_netmask_bits" via "$5" table vpn.out +ip route add table vpnonly.out via "$5" +ip route flush cache diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.down b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.down new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05f2d4d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.down @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Copyright (c) 2005-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Licensed under the GPL version 2 + +# First version by Jesse Adelman +# someone at boldandbusted dink com +# http://www.boldandbusted.com/ + +# PURPOSE: This script automatically removes the /etc/resolv.conf entries previously +# set by the companion script "client.up". + +# INSTALL NOTES: +# Place this in /etc/openvpn/client.down +# Then, add the following to your /etc/openvpn/.conf: +# client +# up /etc/openvpn/client.up +# down /etc/openvpn/client.down +# Next, "chmod a+x /etc/openvpn/client.down" + +# USAGE NOTES: +# Note that this script is best served with the companion "client.up" +# script. + +# Tested under Debian lenny with OpenVPN 2.1_rc11 +# It should work with any UNIX with a POSIX sh, /etc/resolv.conf or resolvconf + +# This runs with the context of the OpenVPN UID/GID +# at the time of execution. This generally means that +# the client "up" script will run fine, but the "down" script +# will require the use of the OpenVPN "down-root" plugin +# which is in the plugins/ directory of the OpenVPN source tree + +# A horrid work around, from a security perspective, +# is to run OpenVPN as root. THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED. You have +# been WARNED. +PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin + +if type resolvconf >/dev/null 2>&1; then + resolvconf -d "${1}" -f +elif [ -e /etc/resolv.conf.ovpnsave ] ; then + # cp + rm rather than mv in case it's a symlink + cp /etc/resolv.conf.ovpnsave /etc/resolv.conf + rm -f /etc/resolv.conf.ovpnsave +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.up b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.up new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b28d4d19 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/contrib/pull-resolv-conf/client.up @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Copyright (c) 2005-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Licensed under the GPL version 2 + +# First version by Jesse Adelman +# someone at boldandbusted dink com +# http://www.boldandbusted.com/ + +# PURPOSE: This script automatically sets the proper /etc/resolv.conf entries +# as pulled down from an OpenVPN server. + +# INSTALL NOTES: +# Place this in /etc/openvpn/client.up +# Then, add the following to your /etc/openvpn/.conf: +# client +# up /etc/openvpn/client.up +# Next, "chmod a+x /etc/openvpn/client.up" + +# USAGE NOTES: +# Note that this script is best served with the companion "client.down" +# script. + +# Tested under Debian lenny with OpenVPN 2.1_rc11 +# It should work with any UNIX with a POSIX sh, /etc/resolv.conf or resolvconf + +# This runs with the context of the OpenVPN UID/GID +# at the time of execution. This generally means that +# the client "up" script will run fine, but the "down" script +# will require the use of the OpenVPN "down-root" plugin +# which is in the plugins/ directory of the OpenVPN source tree + +# A horrid work around, from a security perspective, +# is to run OpenVPN as root. THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED. You have +# been WARNED. +PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin + +# init variables + +i=1 +domains= +fopt= +ndoms=0 +nns=0 +nl=' +' + +# $foreign_option_ is something like +# "dhcp-option DOMAIN example.com" (multiple allowed) +# or +# "dhcp-option DNS 10.10.10.10" (multiple allowed) + +# each DNS option becomes a "nameserver" option in resolv.con +# if we get one DOMAIN, that becomes "domain" in resolv.conf +# if we get multiple DOMAINS, those become "search" lines in resolv.conf + +while true; do + eval fopt=\$foreign_option_${i} + [ -z "${fopt}" ] && break + + case ${fopt} in + dhcp-option\ DOMAIN\ *) + ndoms=$((ndoms + 1)) + domains="${domains} ${fopt#dhcp-option DOMAIN }" + ;; + dhcp-option\ DNS\ *) + nns=$((nns + 1)) + if [ $nns -le 3 ]; then + dns="${dns}${dns:+$nl}nameserver ${fopt#dhcp-option DNS }" + else + printf "%s\n" "Too many nameservers - ignoring after third" >&2 + fi + ;; + *) + printf "%s\n" "Unknown option \"${fopt}\" - ignored" >&2 + ;; + esac + i=$((i + 1)) +done + +ds=domain +if [ $ndoms -gt 1 ]; then + ds=search +fi + +# This is the complete file - "$domains" has a leading space already +out="# resolv.conf autogenerated by ${0} (${1})${nl}${dns}${nl}${ds}${domains}" + +# use resolvconf if it's available +if type resolvconf >/dev/null 2>&1; then + printf "%s\n" "${out}" | resolvconf -p -a "${1}" +else + # Preserve the existing resolv.conf + if [ -e /etc/resolv.conf ] ; then + cp /etc/resolv.conf /etc/resolv.conf.ovpnsave + fi + printf "%s\n" "${out}" > /etc/resolv.conf + chmod 644 /etc/resolv.conf +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/doval b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/doval new file mode 100755 index 00000000..e2155107 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/doval @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#!/bin/bash +PROGDIR=`dirname $0` +unset LD_LIBRARY_PATH +valgrind --tool=memcheck --error-limit=no --suppressions=$PROGDIR/debug/valgrind-suppress --gen-suppressions=all --leak-check=full --show-reachable=yes --num-callers=32 $PROGDIR/openvpn "$@" diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/dovalns b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/dovalns new file mode 100755 index 00000000..482ae3fd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/dovalns @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#!/bin/bash +valgrind --tool=memcheck --error-limit=no --gen-suppressions=all --leak-check=full --show-reachable=yes --num-callers=32 $* diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/valgrind-suppress b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/valgrind-suppress new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7de12fd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/debug/valgrind-suppress @@ -0,0 +1,1182 @@ +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + fun:__nss_next + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlopen + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlopen + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlsym + fun:libdl_resolve_symbol + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlopen + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Addr8 + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.7.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_verify + fun:EVP_VerifyFinal + fun:ASN1_item_verify + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:X509_verify_cert + fun:ssl_verify_cert_chain + fun:ssl3_get_client_certificate + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_sign + fun:ssl3_send_server_key_exchange + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_mod_exp_mont + fun:BN_BLINDING_create_param + fun:RSA_setup_blinding + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_sign + fun:ssl3_send_server_key_exchange + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_nnmod + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div + fun:BN_nnmod + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_verify + fun:EVP_VerifyFinal + fun:ASN1_item_verify + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:X509_verify_cert + fun:ssl_verify_cert_chain + fun:ssl3_get_client_certificate + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:ssl3_ctx_ctrl + fun:init_ssl + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_sign + fun:ssl3_send_server_key_exchange + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse + fun:BN_MONT_CTX_set + fun:BN_mod_exp_mont + fun:BN_BLINDING_create_param + fun:RSA_setup_blinding + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + obj:/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 + fun:RSA_sign + fun:ssl3_send_server_key_exchange + fun:ssl3_accept + fun:ssl3_read_bytes + fun:ssl3_read + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:BIO_read + fun:bio_read + fun:tls_process + fun:tls_multi_process + fun:check_tls_dowork + fun:pre_select + fun:multi_process_post + fun:multi_process_incoming_link + fun:multi_tcp_action + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:* + obj:* + obj:* +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + fun:__nss_next + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + fun:__nss_next + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + fun:__nss_next + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:gethostbyname_r + fun:gethostbyname + fun:getaddr + fun:resolve_remote + fun:link_socket_init_phase1 + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + fun:__libc_dlopen_mode + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlsym + fun:libdl_resolve_symbol + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + obj:/lib/ld-2.5.so + obj:/lib/libdl-2.5.so + fun:dlopen + fun:plugin_list_init + fun:init_plugins + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:CRYPTO_malloc + fun:sk_new + obj:/usr/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 + fun:SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods + fun:SSL_library_init + fun:init_ssl_lib + fun:init_static + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:getdelim + fun:getpass + fun:get_console_input + fun:get_user_pass + fun:context_init_1 + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:tsearch + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:tsearch + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:tsearch + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:tsearch + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + fun:tsearch + fun:__nss_lookup_function + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.5.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_tcp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getgrnam_r + fun:getgrnam + fun:get_group + fun:do_init_first_time + fun:init_instance + fun:init_instance_handle_signals + fun:tunnel_server_udp + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Leak + fun:malloc + obj:/lib/libc-2.7.so + fun:__nss_database_lookup + obj:* + obj:* + fun:getpwnam_r + fun:getpwnam + fun:get_user + fun:management_open + fun:open_management + fun:main +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_mod_inverse +} + +{ + + Memcheck:Cond + fun:BN_div +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2dd6a6ee --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +SUBDIRS = rpm diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..536061dd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +dist_noinst_DATA = \ + openvpn.spec \ + openvpn.init.d.rhel \ + openvpn.init.d.suse diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.rhel b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.rhel new file mode 100755 index 00000000..821abd58 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.rhel @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# openvpn This shell script takes care of starting and stopping +# openvpn on RedHat or other chkconfig-based system. +# +# chkconfig: 345 24 76 +# +# description: OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible tunneling application \ +# that uses all of the encryption, authentication, and \ +# certification features of the OpenSSL library to securely \ +# tunnel IP networks over a single UDP port. +# + +# Contributed to the OpenVPN project by +# Douglas Keller +# 2002.05.15 + +# To install: +# copy this file to /etc/rc.d/init.d/openvpn +# shell> chkconfig --add openvpn +# shell> mkdir /etc/openvpn +# make .conf or .sh files in /etc/openvpn (see below) + +# To uninstall: +# run: chkconfig --del openvpn + +# Author's Notes: +# +# I have created an /etc/init.d init script and enhanced openvpn.spec to +# automatically register the init script. Once the RPM is installed you +# can start and stop OpenVPN with "service openvpn start" and "service +# openvpn stop". +# +# The init script does the following: +# +# - Starts an openvpn process for each .conf file it finds in +# /etc/openvpn. +# +# - If /etc/openvpn/xxx.sh exists for a xxx.conf file then it executes +# it before starting openvpn (useful for doing openvpn --mktun...). +# +# - In addition to start/stop you can do: +# +# service openvpn reload - SIGHUP +# service openvpn reopen - SIGUSR1 +# service openvpn status - SIGUSR2 +# +# Modifications: +# +# 2003.05.02 +# * Changed == to = for sh compliance (Bishop Clark). +# * If condrestart|reload|reopen|status, check that we were +# actually started (James Yonan). +# * Added lock, piddir, and work variables (James Yonan). +# * If start is attempted twice, without an intervening stop, or +# if start is attempted when previous start was not properly +# shut down, then kill any previously started processes, before +# commencing new start operation (James Yonan). +# * Do a better job of flagging errors on start, and properly +# returning success or failure status to caller (James Yonan). +# +# 2005.04.04 +# * Added openvpn-startup and openvpn-shutdown script calls +# (James Yonan). +# + +# Location of openvpn binary +openvpn="" +openvpn_locations="/usr/sbin/openvpn /usr/local/sbin/openvpn" +for location in $openvpn_locations +do + if [ -f "$location" ] + then + openvpn=$location + fi +done + +# Lockfile +lock="/var/lock/subsys/openvpn" + +# PID directory +piddir="/var/run/openvpn" + +# Our working directory +work=/etc/openvpn + +# Source function library. +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +# Source networking configuration. +. /etc/sysconfig/network + +# Check that networking is up. +if [ ${NETWORKING} = "no" ] +then + echo "Networking is down" + exit 0 +fi + +# Check that binary exists +if ! [ -f $openvpn ] +then + echo "openvpn binary not found" + exit 0 +fi + +# See how we were called. +case "$1" in + start) + echo -n $"Starting openvpn: " + + /sbin/modprobe tun >/dev/null 2>&1 + + # From a security perspective, I think it makes + # sense to remove this, and have users who need + # it explictly enable in their --up scripts or + # firewall setups. + + #echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward + + # Run startup script, if defined + if [ -f $work/openvpn-startup ]; then + $work/openvpn-startup + fi + + if [ ! -d $piddir ]; then + mkdir $piddir + fi + + if [ -f $lock ]; then + # we were not shut down correctly + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + rm -f $pidf + done + rm -f $lock + sleep 2 + fi + + rm -f $piddir/*.pid + cd $work + + # Start every .conf in $work and run .sh if exists + errors=0 + successes=0 + for c in `/bin/ls *.conf 2>/dev/null`; do + bn=${c%%.conf} + if [ -f "$bn.sh" ]; then + . $bn.sh + fi + rm -f $piddir/$bn.pid + $openvpn --daemon --writepid $piddir/$bn.pid --config $c --cd $work + if [ $? = 0 ]; then + successes=1 + else + errors=1 + fi + done + + if [ $errors = 1 ]; then + failure; echo + else + success; echo + fi + + if [ $successes = 1 ]; then + touch $lock + fi + ;; + stop) + echo -n $"Shutting down openvpn: " + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + rm -f $pidf + done + + # Run shutdown script, if defined + if [ -f $work/openvpn-shutdown ]; then + $work/openvpn-shutdown + fi + + success; echo + rm -f $lock + ;; + restart) + $0 stop + sleep 2 + $0 start + ;; + reload) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -HUP `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + reopen) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -USR1 `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + condrestart) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + $0 stop + # avoid race + sleep 2 + $0 start + fi + ;; + status) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -USR2 `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + echo "Status written to /var/log/messages" + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: openvpn {start|stop|restart|condrestart|reload|reopen|status}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac +exit 0 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.suse b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.suse new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bac7f32 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.init.d.suse @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +#!/bin/sh +### BEGIN INIT INFO +# Provides: openvpn +# Required-Start: $network +# Required-Stop: $network +# Default-Start: 3 5 +# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 +# Short-Description: This shell script takes care of starting and stopping OpenVPN. +# Description: OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible tunneling application that uses all of the encryption, authentication, and certification features of the OpenSSL library to securely tunnel IP networks over a single UDP port. +### END INIT INFO + +# Contributed to the OpenVPN project by +# Douglas Keller +# 2002.05.15 + +# Modified for SuSE by +# Frank Plohmann +# 2003.08.24 +# Please feel free to contact me if you have problems or suggestions +# using this script. + +# To install: +# copy this file to /etc/rc.d/init.d/openvpn +# use the runlevel editor in Yast to add it to runlevel 3 and/or 5 +# shell> mkdir /etc/openvpn +# make .conf or .sh files in /etc/openvpn (see below) + +# To uninstall: +# use also Yast and the runlevel editor to uninstall + +# Author's Notes: +# +# I have created an /etc/init.d init script and enhanced openvpn.spec to +# automatically register the init script. Once the RPM is installed you +# can start and stop OpenVPN with "service openvpn start" and "service +# openvpn stop". +# +# The init script does the following: +# +# - Starts an openvpn process for each .conf file it finds in +# /etc/openvpn. +# +# - If /etc/openvpn/xxx.sh exists for a xxx.conf file then it executes +# it before starting openvpn (useful for doing openvpn --mktun...). +# +# - In addition to start/stop you can do: +# +# /etc/init.d/openvpn reload - SIGHUP +# /etc/init.d/openvpn reopen - SIGUSR1 +# /etc/init.d/openvpn status - SIGUSR2 + +# Modifications 2003.05.02 +# * Changed == to = for sh compliance (Bishop Clark). +# * If condrestart|reload|reopen|status, check that we were +# actually started (James Yonan). +# * Added lock, piddir, and work variables (James Yonan). +# * If start is attempted twice, without an intervening stop, or +# if start is attempted when previous start was not properly +# shut down, then kill any previously started processes, before +# commencing new start operation (James Yonan). +# * Do a better job of flagging errors on start, and properly +# returning success or failure status to caller (James Yonan). +# +# Modifications 2003.08.24 +# * Converted the script for SuSE Linux distribution. +# Tested with version 8.2 (Frank Plohmann). +# - removed "chkconfig" header +# - added Yast header +# - changed installation notes +# - corrected path to openvpn binary +# - removes sourcing "functions" +# - removed sourcing "network" +# - removed network checking. it seemed not to work with SuSE. +# - added sourcing "rc.status", comments and "rc_reset" command +# - removed "succes; echo" and "failure; echo" lines +# - added "rc_status" lines at the end of each section +# - changed "service" to "/etc/init.d/" in "In addition to start/stop" +# section above. +# +# Modifications 2005.04.04 +# * Added openvpn-startup and openvpn-shutdown script calls (James Yonan). +# + +# Location of openvpn binary +openvpn="/usr/sbin/openvpn" + +# Lockfile +lock="/var/lock/subsys/openvpn" + +# PID directory +piddir="/var/run/openvpn" + +# Our working directory +work=/etc/openvpn + +# Source rc functions +. /etc/rc.status + +# Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status: +# rc_check check and set local and overall rc status +# rc_status check and set local and overall rc status +# rc_status -v ditto but be verbose in local rc status +# rc_status -v -r ditto and clear the local rc status +# rc_failed set local and overall rc status to failed +# rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains) +# rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status + +# rc_status check and set local and overall rc status +# rc_status -v ditto but be verbose in local rc status +# rc_status -v -r ditto and clear the local rc status +# rc_failed set local and overall rc status to failed +# rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains) +# rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status + +# First reset status of this service +rc_reset + +[ -f $openvpn ] || exit 0 + +# See how we were called. +case "$1" in + start) + echo -n $"Starting openvpn: " + + /sbin/modprobe tun >/dev/null 2>&1 + + # From a security perspective, I think it makes + # sense to remove this, and have users who need + # it explictly enable in their --up scripts or + # firewall setups. + + #echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward + + # Run startup script, if defined + if [ -f $work/openvpn-startup ]; then + $work/openvpn-startup + fi + + if [ ! -d $piddir ]; then + mkdir $piddir + fi + + if [ -f $lock ]; then + # we were not shut down correctly + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + rm -f $pidf + done + rm -f $lock + sleep 2 + fi + + rm -f $piddir/*.pid + cd $work + + # Start every .conf in $work and run .sh if exists + errors=0 + successes=0 + for c in `/bin/ls *.conf 2>/dev/null`; do + bn=${c%%.conf} + if [ -f "$bn.sh" ]; then + . $bn.sh + fi + rm -f $piddir/$bn.pid + $openvpn --daemon --writepid $piddir/$bn.pid --config $c --cd $work + if [ $? = 0 ]; then + successes=1 + else + errors=1 + fi + done + + if [ $successes = 1 ]; then + touch $lock + fi + + rc_status -v + ;; + stop) + echo -n $"Shutting down openvpn: " + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + rm -f $pidf + done + + # Run shutdown script, if defined + if [ -f $work/openvpn-shutdown ]; then + $work/openvpn-shutdown + fi + + rm -f $lock + + rc_status -v + ;; + restart) + $0 stop + sleep 2 + $0 start + + rc_status + ;; + reload) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -HUP `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + + rc_status -v + ;; + reopen) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -USR1 `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + + rc_status -v + ;; + condrestart) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + $0 stop + # avoid race + sleep 2 + $0 start + fi + + rc_status + ;; + status) + if [ -f $lock ]; then + for pidf in `/bin/ls $piddir/*.pid 2>/dev/null`; do + if [ -s $pidf ]; then + kill -USR2 `cat $pidf` >/dev/null 2>&1 + fi + done + echo "Status written to /var/log/messages" + else + echo "openvpn: service not started" + exit 1 + fi + + rc_status -v + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: openvpn {start|stop|restart|condrestart|reload|reopen|status}" + exit 1 +esac + +exit 0 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.spec.in b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.spec.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..20a8c890 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/distro/rpm/openvpn.spec.in @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +# OpenVPN spec file, used to drive rpmbuild + +# OPTIONS +# +# Disable LZO +# rpmbuild -tb [openvpn.x.tar.gz] --define 'without_lzo 1' +# +# Disable PAM plugin +# rpmbuild -tb [openvpn.x.tar.gz] --define 'without_pam 1' +# +# Allow passwords to be read from files +# rpmbuild -tb [openvpn.x.tar.gz] --define 'with_password_save 1' + +Summary: OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible VPN daemon by James Yonan. +Name: @PACKAGE@ +Version: @VERSION@ +Release: 1 +URL: http://openvpn.net/ +Source0: http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/openvpn/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz + +License: GPL +Group: Applications/Internet +Vendor: James Yonan +Packager: James Yonan +BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%(id -un) + +# +# Include dependencies manually +# + +AutoReq: 0 + +BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.7 +Requires: openssl >= 0.9.7 + +%if "%{_vendor}" == "Mandrakesoft" +%{!?without_lzo:BuildRequires: liblzo1-devel >= 1.07} +%{!?without_lzo:Requires: liblzo1 >= 1.07} +%else +%if "%{_vendor}" == "MandrakeSoft" +%{!?without_lzo:BuildRequires: liblzo1-devel >= 1.07} +%{!?without_lzo:Requires: liblzo1 >= 1.07} +%else +%{!?without_lzo:BuildRequires: lzo-devel >= 1.07} +%{!?without_lzo:Requires: lzo >= 1.07} +%endif +%endif + +%{!?without_pam:BuildRequires: pam-devel} +%{!?without_pam:Requires: pam} + +%{?with_pkcs11:BuildRequires: pkcs11-helper-devel} +%{?with_pkcs11:Requires: pkcs11-helper} + +# +# Description +# + +%description +OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible VPN daemon by James Yonan. +OpenVPN supports SSL/TLS security, +ethernet bridging, +TCP or UDP tunnel transport through proxies or NAT, +support for dynamic IP addresses and DHCP, +scalability to hundreds or thousands of users, +and portability to most major OS platforms. + +%package devel +Summary: OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible VPN daemon by James Yonan. +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: %{name} +%description devel +Development support for OpenVPN. + +# +# Define vendor type +# + +%if "%{_vendor}" == "suse" || "%{_vendor}" == "pc" +%define VENDOR SuSE +%else +%define VENDOR %_vendor +%endif + +# +# Other definitions +# + +%define debug_package %{nil} + +# +# Build OpenVPN binary +# + +%prep +%setup -q + +%build +%configure \ + --disable-dependency-tracking \ + --docdir="%{_docdir}/%{name}-%{version}" \ + %{?with_password_save:--enable-password-save} \ + %{!?without_lzo:--enable-lzo} \ + %{?with_pkcs11:--enable-pkcs11} \ + %{?without_pam:--disable-plugin-auth-pam} +%__make + +# +# Installation section +# + +%install +[ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf %{buildroot} +%__make install DESTDIR="%{buildroot}" + +# Install init script +%if "%{VENDOR}" == "SuSE" +%__install -c -d -m 755 "%{buildroot}/etc/init.d" +%__install -c -m 755 "distro/rpm/%{name}.init.d.suse" "%{buildroot}/etc/init.d/%{name}" +%else +%__install -c -d -m 755 "%{buildroot}/etc/rc.d/init.d" +%__install -c -m 755 distro/rpm/%{name}.init.d.rhel "%{buildroot}/etc/rc.d/init.d/%{name}" +%endif + +# Install /etc/openvpn +%__install -c -d -m 755 "%{buildroot}/etc/%{name}" + +# Install extra %doc stuff +cp -r AUTHORS ChangeLog NEWS contrib/ sample/ \ + "%{buildroot}/%{_docdir}/%{name}-%{version}" + +# +# Clean section +# + +%clean +[ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf "%{buildroot}" + +# +# On Linux 2.4, make the device node +# + +%post +case "`uname -r`" in +2.4*) + /bin/mkdir /dev/net >/dev/null 2>&1 + /bin/mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200 >/dev/null 2>&1 + ;; +esac + +# +# Handle the init script +# + +/sbin/chkconfig --add %{name} +%if "%{VENDOR}" == "SuSE" +/etc/init.d/openvpn restart +%else +/sbin/service %{name} condrestart +%endif +%preun +if [ "$1" = 0 ] +then + %if "%{VENDOR}" == "SuSE" + /etc/init.d/openvpn stop + %else + /sbin/service %{name} stop + %endif + /sbin/chkconfig --del %{name} +fi + +# +# Files section +# +# don't use %doc as old rpmbuild removes it[1]. +# [1] http://rpm.org/ticket/836 + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%{_mandir} +%{_sbindir}/%{name} +%{_libdir}/%{name} +%{_docdir}/%{name}-%{version} +%dir /etc/%{name} +%if "%{VENDOR}" == "SuSE" +/etc/init.d/%{name} +%else +/etc/rc.d/init.d/%{name} +%endif + +%files devel +%defattr(-,root,root) +%{_includedir}/* + +%changelog +* Thu Jul 30 2009 David Sommerseth +- Removed management/ directory from %doc + +* Thu Dec 14 2006 Alon Bar-Lev +- Added with_pkcs11 + +* Mon Aug 2 2005 James Yonan +- Fixed build problem with --define 'without_pam 1' + +* Mon Apr 4 2005 James Yonan +- Moved some files from /usr/share/openvpn to %doc for compatibility + with Dag Wieers' RPM repository + +* Sat Mar 12 2005 Tom Walsh +- Added MandrakeSoft liblzo1 require + +* Fri Dec 10 2004 James Yonan +- Added AutoReq: 0 for manual dependencies + +* Fri Dec 10 2004 James Yonan +- Packaged the plugins + +* Sun Nov 7 2004 Umberto Nicoletti +- SuSE support + +* Wed Aug 18 2004 Bishop Clark (LC957) +- restrict what we claim in /etc/ to avoid ownership conflicts + +* Sun Feb 23 2003 Matthias Andree 1.3.2.14-1. +- Have the version number filled in by autoconf. + +* Wed Jul 10 2002 James Yonan 1.3.1-1 +- Fixed %preun to only remove service on final uninstall + +* Mon Jun 17 2002 bishop clark (LC957) 1.2.2-1 +- Added condrestart to openvpn.spec & openvpn.init. + +* Wed May 22 2002 James Yonan 1.2.0-1 +- Added mknod for Linux 2.4. + +* Wed May 15 2002 Doug Keller 1.1.1.16-2 +- Added init scripts +- Added conf file support + +* Mon May 13 2002 bishop clark (LC957) 1.1.1.14-1 +- Added new directories for config examples and such + +* Sun May 12 2002 bishop clark (LC957) 1.1.1.13-1 +- Updated buildroot directive and cleanup command +- added easy-rsa utilities + +* Mon Mar 25 2002 bishop clark (LC957) 1.0-1 +- Initial build. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d33e1edd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +CLEANFILES = openvpn.8.html + +dist_doc_DATA = \ + management-notes.txt + +dist_noinst_DATA = \ + README.plugins + +if WIN32 +dist_noinst_DATA += openvpn.8 +nodist_html_DATA = openvpn.8.html +openvpn.8.html: $(srcdir)/openvpn.8 + $(MAN2HTML) < $(srcdir)/openvpn.8 > openvpn.8.html +else +dist_man_MANS = openvpn.8 +endif + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/README.plugins b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/README.plugins new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e490c5a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/README.plugins @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +OpenVPN Plugins +--------------- + +Starting with OpenVPN 2.0-beta17, compiled plugin modules are +supported on any *nix OS which includes libdl or on Windows. +One or more modules may be loaded into OpenVPN using +the --plugin directive, and each plugin module is capable of +intercepting any of the script callbacks which OpenVPN supports: + +(1) up +(2) down +(3) route-up +(4) ipchange +(5) tls-verify +(6) auth-user-pass-verify +(7) client-connect +(8) client-disconnect +(9) learn-address + +See the openvpn-plugin.h file in the top-level directory of the +OpenVPN source distribution for more detailed information +on the plugin interface. + +Included Plugins +---------------- + +auth-pam -- Authenticate using PAM and a split privilege + execution model which functions even if + root privileges or the execution environment + have been altered with --user/--group/--chroot. + Tested on Linux only. + +down-root -- Enable the running of down scripts with root privileges + even if --user/--group/--chroot have been used + to drop root privileges or change the execution + environment. Not applicable on Windows. + +examples -- A simple example that demonstrates a portable + plugin, i.e. one which can be built for *nix + or Windows from the same source. + +Building Plugins +---------------- + +cd to the top-level directory of a plugin, and use the +"make" command to build it. The examples plugin is +built using a build script, not a makefile. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_compression.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_compression.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdc4a7ed --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_compression.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Compression module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup compression Data Channel Compression module + * + * This module offers compression of data channel packets. + * + * @par State structures + * The Data Channel Compression module stores its internal state in a \c + * lzo_compress_workspace structure. This state includes flags which + * control the module's behavior and preallocated working memory. One + * such structure is present for each VPN tunnel, and is stored in the \c + * context.c2.lzo_compwork of the \c context associated with that VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @par Initialization and cleanup + * Every time a new \c lzo_compress_workspace is needed, it must be + * initialized using the \c lzo_compress_init() function. Similarly, + * every time a \c lzo_compress_workspace is no longer needed, it must be + * cleaned up using the \c lzo_compress_uninit() function. These + * functions take care of the allocation and freeing of internal working + * memory, but not of the \c lzo_compress_workspace structures themselves. + * + * @par + * Because of the one-to-one relationship between \c + * lzo_compress_workspace structures and VPN tunnels, the above-mentioned + * initialization and cleanup functions are called directly from the \c + * init_instance() and \c close_instance() functions, which control the + * initialization and cleanup of VPN tunnel instances and their associated + * \c context structures. + * + * @par Packet processing functions + * This module receives data channel packets from the \link data_control + * Data Channel Control module\endlink and processes them according to the + * settings of the packet's VPN tunnel. The \link data_control Data + * Channel Control module\endlink uses the following interface functions: + * - For packets which will be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer: \c + * lzo_compress() + * - For packets which have been received from a remote OpenVPN peer: \c + * lzo_decompress() + * + * @par Settings that control this module's activity + * Whether or not the Data Channel Compression module is active depends on + * the compile-time \c ENABLE_LZO preprocessor macro and the runtime flags + * stored in \c lzo_compress_workspace.flags of the associated VPN tunnel. + * The latter are initialized from \c options.lzo, which gets its value + * from the process's configuration sources, such as its configuration + * file or command line %options. + * + * @par Adaptive compression + * The compression module supports adaptive compression. If this feature + * is enabled, the compression routines monitor their own performance and + * turn compression on or off depending on whether it is leading to + * significantly reduced payload size. + * + * @par Compression algorithms + * This module uses the Lempel-Ziv-Oberhumer (LZO) compression algorithms. + * These offer lossless compression and are designed for high-performance + * decompression. This module uses the external \c lzo library's + * implementation of the algorithms. + * + * @par + * For more information on the LZO library, see:\n + * http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..072dc372 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_processor.h @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Control Channel Processor module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup control_processor Control Channel Processor module + * + * This module controls the setup and maintenance of VPN tunnels and the + * associated security parameters. + * + * @par This module's role + * The Control Channel Processor module lies at the core of OpenVPN's + * activities. It handles the setup of new VPN tunnels, the negotiation + * of data channel security parameters, the managing of active VPN + * tunnels, and finally the cleanup of expired VPN tunnels. + * + * @par State structures + * A large amount of VPN tunnel state information must be stored within an + * OpenVPN process. A wide variety of container structures are used by + * this module for that purpose. Several of these structures are listed + * below, and the function of the first three VPN tunnel state containers + * is described in more detail later. + * - VPN tunnel state containers: + * - \c tls_multi, security parameter state for a single VPN tunnel. + * Contains three instances of the \c tls_session structure. + * - \c tls_session, security parameter state of a single session + * within a VPN tunnel. Contains two instances of the \c key_state + * structure. + * - \c key_state, security parameter state of one TLS and data + * channel %key set. + * - Data channel security parameter containers: + * - \c key_ctx_bi, container for two sets of OpenSSL cipher and/or + * HMAC context (both directions). Contains two instances of the \c + * key_ctx structure. + * - \c key_ctx, container for one set of OpenSSL cipher and/or HMAC + * context (one directions. + * - Key material containers: + * - \c key2, container for two sets of cipher and/or HMAC %key + * material (both directions). Contains two instances of the \c key + * structure. + * - \c key, container for one set of cipher and/or HMAC %key material + * (one direction). + * - \c key_direction_state, ordering of %key material within the \c + * key2.key array. + * - Key method 2 random material containers: + * - \c key_source2, container for both halves of random material used + * for %key method 2. Contains two instances of the \c key_source + * structure. + * - \c key_source, container for one half of random material used for + * %key method 2. + * + * @par The life of a \c tls_multi object + * A \c tls_multi structure contains all the security parameter state + * information related to the control and data channels of one VPN tunnel. + * Its life cycle can be summarized as follows: + * -# Initialization: \c tls_multi_init() and \c + * tls_multi_init_finalize(), which are called (indirectly) from \c + * init_instance() when initializing a new \c context structure. + * - Initializes a \c tls_multi structure. + * - Allocates the three \c tls_session objects contained by the \c + * tls_multi structure, and initializes as appropriate. + * -# Management: \c tls_multi_process() and \c tls_pre_decrypt() + * - If a new session is initiated by the remote peer, then \c + * tls_pre_decrypt() starts the new session negotiation in the + * un-trusted \c tls_session. + * - If the, as yet, un-trusted \c tls_session authenticates + * successfully, then \c tls_multi_process() moves it so as to be + * the active \c tls_session. + * - If an error occurs during processing of a \c key_state object, + * then \c tls_multi_process() cleans up and initializes the + * associated \c tls_session object. If the error occurred in the + * active \c key_state of the active \c tls_session and the + * lame-duck \c key_state of that \c tls_session has not yet + * expired, it is preserved as fallback. + * -# Cleanup: \c tls_multi_free(), which is called (indirectly) from \c + * close_instance() when cleaning up a \c context structure. + * - Cleans up a \c tls_multi structure. + * - Cleans up the three \c tls_session objects contained by the \c + * tls_multi structure. + * + * @par The life of a \c tls_session object + * A \c tls_session structure contains the state information related to an + * active and a lame-duck \c key_state. Its life cycle can be summarized + * as follows: + * -# Initialization: \c tls_session_init() + * - Initializes a \c tls_session structure. + * - Initializes the primary \c key_state by calling \c + * key_state_init(). + * -# Renegotiation: \c key_state_soft_reset() + * - Cleans up the old lame-duck \c key_state by calling \c + * key_state_free(). + * - Moves the old primary \c key_state to be the new lame-duck \c + * key_state. + * - Initializes a new primary \c key_state by calling \c + * key_state_init(). + * -# Cleanup: \c tls_session_free() + * - Cleans up a \c tls_session structure. + * - Cleans up all \c key_state objects associated with the session by + * calling \c key_state_free() for each. + * + * @par The life of a \c key_state object + * A \c key_state structure represents one control and data channel %key + * set. It contains an OpenSSL TLS object that encapsulates the control + * channel, and the data channel security parameters needed by the \link + * data_crypto Data Channel Crypto module\endlink to perform cryptographic + * operations on data channel packets. Its life cycle can be summarized + * as follows: + * -# Initialization: \c key_state_init() + * - Initializes a \c key_state structure. + * - Creates a new OpenSSL TLS object to encapsulate this new control + * channel session. + * - Sets \c key_state.state to \c S_INITIAL. + * - Allocates several internal buffers. + * - Initializes new reliability layer structures for this key set. + * -# Negotiation: \c tls_process() + * - The OpenSSL TLS object negotiates a TLS session between itself + * and the remote peer's TLS object. + * - Key material is generated and exchanged through the TLS session + * between OpenVPN peers. + * - Both peers initialize their data channel cipher and HMAC key + * contexts. + * - On successful negotiation, the \c key_state.state will progress + * from \c S_INITIAL to \c S_ACTIVE and \c S_NORMAL. + * -# Active tunneling: \link data_crypto Data Channel Crypto + * module\endlink + * - Data channel packet to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer: + * - \c tls_pre_encrypt() loads the security parameters from the \c + * key_state into a \c crypto_options structure. + * - \c openvpn_encrypt() uses the \c crypto_options to an encrypt + * and HMAC sign the data channel packet. + * - Data channel packet received from a remote OpenVPN peer: + * - \c tls_pre_decrypt() loads the security parameters from the \c + * key_state into a \c crypto_options structure. + * - \c openvpn_encrypt() uses the \c crypto_options to + * authenticate and decrypt the data channel packet. + * -# Cleanup: \c key_state_free() + * - Cleans up a \c key_state structure together with its OpenSSL TLS + * object, key material, internal buffers, and reliability layer + * structures. + * + * @par Control functions + * The following two functions drive the Control Channel Processor's + * activities. + * - \c tls_multi_process(), iterates through the \c tls_session objects + * within a given \c tls_multi of a VPN tunnel, and calls \c + * tls_process() for each \c tls_session which is being set up, is + * already active, or is busy expiring. + * - \c tls_process(), performs the Control Channel Processor module's + * core handling of received control channel messages, and generates + * appropriate messages to be sent. + * + * @par Functions which control data channel key generation + * - Key method 1 key exchange functions: + * - \c key_method_1_write(), generates and processes key material to + * be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. + * - \c key_method_1_read(), processes key material received from the + * remote OpenVPN peer. + * - Key method 2 key exchange functions: + * - \c key_method_2_write(), generates and processes key material to + * be sent to the remote OpenVPN peer. + * - \c key_method_2_read(), processes key material received from the + * remote OpenVPN peer. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_tls.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_tls.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aba55f77 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_control_tls.h @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Control Channel TLS module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup control_tls Control Channel TLS module + * + * This module provides secure encapsulation of control channel messages + * exchanged between OpenVPN peers. + * + * The Control Channel TLS module uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) + * protocol to provide an encrypted communication channel between the + * local OpenVPN process and a remote peer. This protocol simultaneously + * offers certificate-based authentication of the communicating parties. + * + * @par This module's roles + * The Control Channel TLS module is essential for the security of any + * OpenVPN-based system. On the one hand, it performs the security + * operations necessary to protect control channel messages exchanged + * between OpenVPN peers. On the other hand, before the control and data + * channels are even setup, it controls the exchange of certificates and + * verification of the remote's identity during negotiation of VPN + * tunnels. + * + * @par + * The former role is described below. The latter is described in the + * documentation for the \c verify_callback() function. + * + * @par + * In other words, this module takes care of the confidentiality and + * integrity of data channel communications, and the authentication of + * both the communicating parties and the control channel messages + * exchanged. + * + * @par Initialization and cleanup + * Because of the one-to-one relationship between control channel TLS + * state and \c key_state structures, the initialization and cleanup of an + * instance of the Control Channel TLS module's state happens within the + * \c key_state_init() and \c key_state_free() functions. In other words, + * each \c key_state object contains exactly one OpenSSL SSL-BIO object, + * which is initialized and cleaned up together with the rest of the \c + * key_state object. + * + * @par Packet processing functions + * This object behaves somewhat like a black box with a ciphertext and a + * plaintext I/O port. Its interaction with OpenVPN's control channel + * during operation takes place within the \c tls_process() function of + * the \link control_processor Control Channel Processor\endlink. The + * following functions are available for processing packets: + * - If ciphertext received from the remote peer is available in the \link + * reliable Reliability Layer\endlink: + * - Insert it into the ciphertext-side of the SSL-BIO. + * - Use function: \c key_state_write_ciphertext() + * - If ciphertext can be extracted from the ciphertext-side of the + * SSL-BIO: + * - Pass it to the \link reliable Reliability Layer\endlink for sending + * to the remote peer. + * - Use function: \c key_state_read_ciphertext() + * - If plaintext can be extracted from the plaintext-side of the SSL-BIO: + * - Pass it on to the \link control_processor Control Channel + * Processor\endlink for local processing. + * - Use function: \c key_state_read_plaintext() + * - If plaintext from the \link control_processor Control Channel + * Processor\endlink is available to be sent to the remote peer: + * - Insert it into the plaintext-side of the SSL-BIO. + * - Use function: \c key_state_write_plaintext() or \c + * key_state_write_plaintext_const() + * + * @par Transport Layer Security protocol implementation + * This module uses the OpenSSL library's implementation of the TLS + * protocol in the form of an OpenSSL SSL-BIO object. + * + * @par + * For more information on the OpenSSL library's BIO objects, please see: + * - OpenSSL's generic BIO objects: + * http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/bio.html + * - OpenSSL's SSL-BIO object: + * http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/BIO_f_ssl.html + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_control.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_control.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0f65ba3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_control.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Data Channel Control module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup data_control Data Channel Control module + * + * This module controls the processing of packets as they pass through the + * data channel. + * + * The Data Channel Control module controls the processing of packets as + * they pass through the data channel. The processing includes packet + * compression, fragmentation, and the performing of security operations + * on the packets. This module does not do the processing itself, but + * passes the packet to other data channel modules to perform the + * appropriate actions. + * + * Packets can travel in two directions through the data channel. They + * can be going to a remote destination which is reachable through a VPN + * tunnel, in which case this module prepares them to be sent out through + * a VPN tunnel. On the other hand, they can have been received through a + * VPN tunnel from a remote OpenVPN peer, in which case this module + * retrieves the packet in its original form as it was before entering the + * VPN tunnel on the remote OpenVPN peer. How this module processes + * packets traveling in the two directions is discussed in more detail + * below. + * + * @par Packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer + * This module's main function for processing packets traveling in this + * direction is \c encrypt_sign(), which performs the following processing + * steps: + * - Call the \link compression Data Channel Compression module\endlink to + * perform packet compression if necessary. + * - Call the \link fragmentation Data Channel Fragmentation + * module\endlink to perform packet fragmentation if necessary. + * - Call the \link data_crypto Data Channel Crypto module\endlink to + * perform the required security operations. + * + * @par + * See the \c encrypt_sign() documentation for details of these + * interactions. + * + * @par + * After the above processing is complete, the packet is ready to be sent + * to a remote OpenVPN peer as a VPN tunnel packet. The actual sending of + * the packet is handled by the \link external_multiplexer External + * Multiplexer\endlink. + * + * @par Packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer + * The function that controls how packets traveling in this direction are + * processed is \c process_incoming_link(). That function, however, also + * performs some of the tasks required for the \link external_multiplexer + * External Multiplexer\endlink and is therefore listed as part of that + * module, instead of here. + * + * @par + * After the \c process_incoming_link() function has determined that a + * received packet is a data channel packet, it performs the following + * processing steps: + * - Call the \link data_crypto Data Channel Crypto module\endlink to + * perform the required security operations. + * - Call the \link fragmentation Data Channel Fragmentation + * module\endlink to perform packet reassembly if necessary. + * - Call the \link compression Data Channel Compression module\endlink to + * perform packet decompression if necessary. + * + * @par + * See the \c process_incoming_link() documentation for details of these + * interactions. + * + * @par + * After the above processing is complete, the packet is in its original + * form again as it was received by the remote OpenVPN peer. It can now + * be routed further to its final destination. If that destination is a + * locally reachable host, then the \link internal_multiplexer Internal + * Multiplexer\endlink will send it there. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_crypto.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ee72b8cd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_data_crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Data Channel Crypto module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup data_crypto Data Channel Crypto module + * + * The Data Channel Crypto Module performs cryptographic operations on + * data channel packets. + * + * @par Security parameters + * This module is merely the user of a VPN tunnel's security parameters. + * It does not perform the negotiation and setup of the security + * parameters, nor the %key generation involved. These actions are done + * by the \link control_processor Control Channel Processor\endlink. This + * module receives the appropriate security parameters from that module in + * the form of a \c crypto_options structure when they are necessary for + * processing a packet. + * + * @par Packet processing functions + * This module receives data channel packets from the \link data_control + * Data Channel Control module\endlink and processes them according to the + * security parameters of the packet's VPN tunnel. The \link data_control + * Data Channel Control module\endlink uses the following interface + * functions: + * - For packets which will be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer: + * - \c tls_pre_encrypt() + * - \c openvpn_encrypt() + * - \c tls_post_encrypt() + * - For packets which have been received from a remote OpenVPN peer: + * - \c tls_pre_decrypt() (documented as part of the \link + * external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink) + * - \c openvpn_decrypt() + * + * @par Settings that control this module's activity + * Whether or not the Data Channel Crypto module is active depends on the + * compile-time \c ENABLE_CRYPTO and \c ENABLE_SSL preprocessor macros. How it + * processes packets received from the \link data_control Data Channel + * Control module\endlink at runtime depends on the associated \c + * crypto_options structure. To perform cryptographic operations, the \c + * crypto_options.key_ctx_bi must contain the correct cipher and HMAC + * security parameters for the direction the packet is traveling in. + * + * @par Crypto algorithms + * This module uses the crypto algorithm implementations of the external + * OpenSSL library. More precisely, it uses the OpenSSL library's \c + * EVP_Cipher* and \c HMAC_* set of functions to perform cryptographic + * operations on data channel packets. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_eventloop.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_eventloop.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a860db68 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_eventloop.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Main Event Loop module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup eventloop Main Event Loop module + * + * This main event loop module drives the packet processing of OpenVPN. + * + * OpenVPN is an event driven system. Its activities are driven by a main + * event loop, which repeatedly waits for one of several predefined events + * to occur, and then calls the appropriate module to handle the event. + * The major types of network events that OpenVPN processes are: + * - A packet can be read from the external network interface. + * - The main event loop activates the \link external_multiplexer + * External Multiplexer\endlink to read and process the packet. + * - A packet can be read from the virtual tun/tap network interface. + * - The main event loop activates the \link internal_multiplexer + * Internal Multiplexer\endlink to read and process the packet. + * - If a packet is ready to be sent out as a VPN tunnel packet: the + * external network interface can be written to. + * - The main event loop activates the \link external_multiplexer + * External Multiplexer\endlink to send the packet. + * - If a packet is ready to be sent to a locally reachable destination: + * the virtual tun/tap network interface can be written to. + * - The main event loop activates the \link internal_multiplexer + * Internal Multiplexer\endlink to send the packet. + * + * Beside these external events, OpenVPN also processes other types of + * internal events. These include scheduled events, such as resending of + * non-acknowledged control channel messages. + * + * @par Main event loop implementations + * + * Depending on the mode in which OpenVPN is running, a different main + * event loop function is called to drive the event processing. The + * following implementations are available: + * - Client mode using UDP or TCP: \c tunnel_point_to_point() + * - Server mode using UDP: \c tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded() + * - Server mode using TCP: \c tunnel_server_tcp() + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_external_multiplexer.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_external_multiplexer.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76532557 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_external_multiplexer.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * External Multiplexer module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup external_multiplexer External Multiplexer module + * + * The External Multiplexer is the link between the external network + * interface and the other OpenVPN modules. It reads packets from the + * external network interface, determines which remote OpenVPN peer and + * VPN tunnel they are associated with, and whether they are data channel + * or control channel packets. It then passes the packets on to the + * appropriate processing module. + * + * This module also handles packets traveling in the reverse direction, + * which have been generated by the local control channel or which have + * already been processed by the \link data_control Data Channel Control + * module\endlink and are destined for a remote host reachable through a + * VPN tunnel. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_fragmentation.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_fragmentation.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ef34cdb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_fragmentation.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Data Channel Fragmentation module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup fragmentation Data Channel Fragmentation module + * + * The Data Channel Fragmentation module offers fragmentation of data + * channel packets. + * + * @par State structures + * The Data Channel Fragmentation module stores its internal state in a \c + * fragment_master structure. One such structure is present for each VPN + * tunnel, and is stored in \c context.c2.fragment of the \c context + * associated with that VPN tunnel. + * + * @par + * The \c fragment_master structure contains one \c fragment_list + * structure \c fragment_master.incoming. This is a list of \c fragment + * structures, each of which can store the parts of one fragmented packet + * while it is being reassembled. The \c fragment_master structure also + * contains one \c buffer called \c fragment_master.outgoing, in which a + * data channel large packet to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer can be + * broken up into parts to be sent one by one. + * + * @par Initialization and cleanup + * Every time a new \c fragment_master is needed, it must be allocated and + * initialized by the \c fragment_init() function. Similarly, every time + * a \c fragment_master is no longer needed, it must be cleaned up using + * the \c fragment_free() function. These functions take care of the + * allocation and freeing of the \c fragment_master structure itself and + * all internal memory required for the use of that structure. Note that + * this behavior is different from that displayed by the \link compression + * Data Channel Compression module\endlink. + * + * @par + * Because of the one-to-one relationship between \c fragment_master + * structures and VPN tunnels, the above-mentioned initialization and + * cleanup functions are called directly from the \c init_instance() and + * \c close_instance() functions, which control the initialization and + * cleanup of VPN tunnel instances and their associated \c context + * structures. + * + * @par Packet processing functions + * This module receives data channel packets from the \link data_control + * Data Channel Control module\endlink and processes them according to the + * settings of the packet's VPN tunnel. The \link data_control Data + * Channel Control module\endlink uses the following interface functions: + * - For packets which will be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer: \c + * fragment_outgoing() \n This function inspects data channel packets as + * they are being made ready to be sent as VPN tunnel packets to a + * remote OpenVPN peer. If a packet's size is larger than its + * destination VPN tunnel's maximum transmission unit (MTU), then this + * module breaks that packet up into smaller parts, each of which is + * smaller than or equal to the VPN tunnel's MTU. See \c + * fragment_outgoing() for details. + * - For packets which have been received from a remote OpenVPN peer: \c + * fragment_incoming() \n This function inspects data channel packets + * that have been received from a remote OpenVPN peer through a VPN + * tunnel. It reads the fragmentation header of the packet, and + * depending on its value performs the appropriate action. See \c + * fragment_incoming() for details. + * + * @par Settings that control this module's activity + * Whether the Data Channel Fragmentation module is active or not depends + * on the compile-time \c ENABLE_FRAGMENT preprocessor macro and the + * runtime flag \c options.fragment, which gets its value from the + * process's configuration sources, such as the configuration file and + * commandline %options. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_internal_multiplexer.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_internal_multiplexer.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5142dd0d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_internal_multiplexer.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Internal Multiplexer module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @addtogroup internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer module + * + * The Internal Multiplexer is the link between the virtual tun/tap + * network interface and the \link data_control Data Channel Control + * module\endlink. It reads packets from the virtual network interface, + * determines for which remote OpenVPN peer they are destined, and then + * passes the packets on to the Data Channel Control module together with + * information about their destination VPN tunnel instance. + * + * This module also handles packets traveling in the reverse direction, + * which have already been processed by the Data Channel Control module + * and are destined for a locally reachable host. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..903a4652 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Key generation documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @page key_generation Data channel %key generation + * + * This section describes how OpenVPN peers generate and exchange %key + * material necessary for the security operations performed on data + * channel packets. + * + * The %key generation and exchange process between OpenVPN client and + * server occurs every time data channel security parameters are + * negotiated, for example during the initial setup of a VPN tunnel or + * when the active security parameters expire. In source code terms, this + * is when a new key_state structure is initialized. + * + * @section key_generation_method Key methods + * + * OpenVPN supports two different ways of generating and exchanging %key + * material between client and server. These are known as %key method 1 + * and %key method 2. %Key method 2 is the recommended method. Both are + * explained below. + * + * @subsection key_generation_method_1 Key method 1 + * + * -# Each host generates its own random material. + * -# Each host uses its locally generated random material as %key data + * for encrypting and signing packets sent to the remote peer. + * -# Each host then sends its random material to the remote peer, so that + * the remote peer can use that %key data for authenticating and + * decrypting received packets. + * + * @subsection key_generation_method_2 Key method 2 + * + * -# The client generates random material in the following amounts: + * - Pre-master secret: 48 bytes + * - Client's PRF seed for master secret: 32 bytes + * - Client's PRF seed for %key expansion: 32 bytes + * -# The client sends its share of random material to the server. + * -# The server generates random material in the following amounts: + * - Server's PRF seed for master secret: 32 bytes + * - Server's PRF seed for %key expansion: 32 bytes + * -# The server computes the %key expansion using its own and the + * client's random material. + * -# The server sends its share of random material to the client. + * -# The client computes the %key expansion using its own and the + * server's random material. + * + * %Key method 2 %key expansion is performed by the \c + * generate_key_expansion() function. Please refer to its source code for + * details of the %key expansion process. + * + * @subsection key_generation_random Source of random material + * + * OpenVPN uses the either the OpenSSL library or the PolarSSL library as its + * source of random material. + * + * In OpenSSL, the \c RAND_bytes() function is called + * to supply cryptographically strong pseudo-random data. The following links + * contain more information on this subject: + * - For OpenSSL's \c RAND_bytes() function: + * http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/RAND_bytes.html + * - For OpenSSL's pseudo-random number generating system: + * http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/rand.html + * - For OpenSSL's support for external crypto modules: + * http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/engine.html + * + * In PolarSSL, the Havege random number generator is used. For details, see + * the PolarSSL documentation. + * + * @section key_generation_exchange Key exchange: + * + * The %key exchange process is initiated by the OpenVPN process running + * in client mode. After the initial three-way handshake has successfully + * completed, the client sends its share of random material to the server, + * after which the server responds with its part. This process is + * depicted below: + * +@verbatim + Client Client Server Server + State Action Action State +---------- -------------------- -------------------- ---------- + + ... waiting until three-way handshake complete ... +S_START S_START + key_method_?_write() + send to server --> --> --> --> receive from client +S_SENT_KEY key_method_?_read() + S_GOT_KEY + key_method_?_write() + receive from server <-- <-- <-- <-- send to client + key_method_?_read() S_SENT_KEY +S_GOT_KEY + ... waiting until control channel fully synchronized ... +S_ACTIVE S_ACTIVE +@endverbatim + * + * For more information about the client and server state values, see the + * \link control_processor Control Channel Processor module\endlink. + * + * Depending on which %key method is used, the \c ? in the function names + * of the diagram above is a \c 1 or a \c 2. For example, if %key method + * 2 is used, that %key exchange would be started by the client calling \c + * key_method_2_write(). These functions are called from the \link + * control_processor Control Channel Processor module's\endlink \c + * tls_process() function and control the %key generation and exchange + * process as follows: + * - %Key method 1: + * - \c key_method_1_write(): generate random material locally, and load + * as "sending" keys. + * - \c key_method_1_read(): read random material received from remote + * peer, and load as "receiving" keys. + * - %Key method 2: + * - \c key_method_2_write(): generate random material locally, and if + * in server mode generate %key expansion. + * - \c key_method_2_read(): read random material received from remote + * peer, and if in client mode generate %key expansion. + * + * @subsection key_generation_encapsulation Transmission of key material + * + * The OpenVPN client and server communicate with each other through their + * control channel. This means that all of the data transmitted over the + * network, such as random material for %key generation, is encapsulated + * in a TLS layer. For more details, see the \link control_tls Control + * Channel TLS module\endlink documentation. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_mainpage.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_mainpage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..821b2e87 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_mainpage.h @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Main page documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @mainpage OpenVPN v2.1 source code documentation + * + * This documentation describes the internal structure of OpenVPN. It was + * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in + * OpenVPN's source code using Doxygen. (See + * http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/ for more information on Doxygen) + * + * The \ref mainpage_modules "Modules section" below gives an introduction + * into the high-level module concepts used throughout this documentation. + * The \ref mainpage_relatedpages "Related Pages section" below describes + * various special subjects related to OpenVPN's implementation which are + * discussed in the related pages section. + * + * @section mainpage_modules Modules + * + * For the purpose of describing the internal structure of OpenVPN, this + * documentation and the underlying source code has been broken up into a + * number of conceptually well-defined parts, known as modules. Each + * module plays a specific role within the OpenVPN process, and in most + * cases each module has a clear interfacing strategy for interacting with + * other modules. + * + * The following modules have been defined: + * - Driver module: + * - The \link eventloop Main Event Loop\endlink: this module drives the + * event handling of OpenVPN. It implements various types of + * select-loop which wait until an event happens, and then delegate + * the handling of that event to the appropriate module. + * - Network interface modules: + * - The \link external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink: this + * module sends and receives packets to and from remote OpenVPN peers + * over the external network interface. It also takes care of + * demultiplexing received packets to their appropriate VPN tunnel and + * splitting control channel and data channel packets. + * - The \link internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink: this + * module sends and receives packets to and from locally reachable + * posts over the virtual tun/tap network interface. It also takes + * care of determining through which VPN tunnel a received packet must + * be sent to reach its destination. + * - Control channel modules: + * - The \link reliable Reliability Layer\endlink: this module offers a + * %reliable and sequential transport layer for control channel + * messages. + * - The \link control_tls Control Channel TLS module\endlink: this + * module offers a secure encapsulation of control channel messages + * using the TLS protocol. + * - The \link control_processor Control Channel Processor\endlink: his + * module manages the setup, maintenance, and shut down of VPN + * tunnels. + * - Data channel modules: + * - The \link data_control Data Channel Control module\endlink: this + * module controls the processing of data channel packets and, + * depending on the settings of the packet's VPN tunnel, passes the + * packet to the three modules below for handling. + * - The \link data_crypto Data Channel Crypto module\endlink: this + * module performs security operations on data channel packets. + * - The \link fragmentation Data Channel Fragmentation module\endlink: + * this module offers fragmentation of data channel packets larger + * than the VPN tunnel's MTU. + * - The \link compression Data Channel Compression module\endlink: this + * module offers compression of data channel packets. + * + * @subsection mainpage_modules_example Example event: receiving a packet + * + * OpenVPN handles many types of events during operation. These include + * external events, such as network traffic being received, and internal + * events, such as a %key session timing out causing renegotiation. An + * example event, receiving a packet over the network, is described here + * together with which modules play what roles: + * -# The \link eventloop Main Event Loop\endlink detects that a packet + * can be read from the external or the virtual tun/tap network + * interface. + * -# The \link eventloop Main Event Loop\endlink calls the \link + * external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink or \link + * internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink to read and + * process the packet. + * -# The multiplexer module determines the type of packet and its + * destination, and passes the packet on to the appropriate handling + * module: + * - A control channel packet received by the \link + * external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink is passed on + * through the \link reliable Reliability Layer\endlink and the \link + * control_tls Control Channel TLS module\endlink to the \link + * control_processor Control Channel Processor\endlink. + * - A data channel packet received by either multiplexer module is + * passed on to the \link data_control Data Channel Control + * module\endlink. + * -# The packet is processed by the appropriate control channel or data + * channel modules. + * -# If, after processing the packet, a resulting packet is generated + * that needs to be sent to a local or remote destination, it is given + * to the \link external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink or + * \link internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink for sending. + * -# If a packet is waiting to be sent by either multiplexer module and + * the \link eventloop Main Event Loop\endlink detects that data can be + * written to the associated network interface, it calls the + * multiplexer module to send the packet. + * + * @section mainpage_relatedpages Related pages + * + * This documentation includes a number of descriptions of various aspects + * of OpenVPN and its implementation. These are not directly related to + * one module, function, or data structure, and are therefore listed + * separately under "Related Pages". + * + * @subsection mainpage_relatedpages_key_generation Data channel key generation + * + * The @ref key_generation "Data channel key generation" related page + * describes how, during VPN tunnel setup and renegotiation, OpenVPN peers + * generate and exchange the %key material required for the symmetric + * encryption/decryption and HMAC signing/verifying security operations + * performed on data channel packets. + * + * @subsection mainpage_relatedpages_tunnel_state VPN tunnel state + * + * The @ref tunnel_state "Structure of VPN tunnel state storage" related + * page describes how an OpenVPN process manages the state information + * associated with its active VPN tunnels. + * + * @subsection mainpage_relatedpages_network_protocol Network protocol + * + * The @ref network_protocol "Network protocol" related page describes the + * format and content of VPN tunnel packets exchanged between OpenVPN + * peers. + * + * @subsection mainpage_relatedpages_memory_management Memory management + * + * The @ref memory_management "Memory management strategies" related page + * gives a brief introduction into OpenVPN's memory %buffer library and + * garbage collection facilities. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_memory_management.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_memory_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f948783e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_memory_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Memory management strategies documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @page memory_management OpenVPN's memory management strategies + * + * This section describes several implementation details relating to + * OpenVPN's memory management strategies. + * + * During operation, the OpenVPN process performs all kinds of operations + * on blocks of data. Receiving packets, encrypting content, prepending + * headers, etc. To make the programmer's job easier and to decrease the + * likelihood of memory-related bugs, OpenVPN uses its own memory %buffer + * library and garbage collection facilities. These are described in + * brief here. + * + * @section memory_management_buffer The buffer structure + * + * The \c buffer structure is a wrapper around a block of dynamically + * allocated memory which keeps track of the block's capacity \c + * buffer.capacity and location in memory \c buffer.data. This structure + * supports efficient prepending and appending within the allocated memory + * through the use of offset \c buffer.offset and length \c buffer.len + * fields. See the \c buffer documentation for more details on the + * structure itself. + * + * OpenVPN's %buffer library, implemented in the \c buffer.h and \c + * buffer.c files, contains many utility functions for working with \c + * buffer structures. These functions facilitate common operations, such + * as allocating, freeing, reading and writing to \c buffer structures, + * and even offer several more advanced operations, such as string + * matching and creating sub-buffers. + * + * Not only do these utility functions make working with \c buffer + * structures easy, they also perform extensive error checking. Each + * function, where necessary, checks whether enough space is available + * before performing its actions. This minimizes the chance of bugs + * leading to %buffer overflows and other vulnerabilities. + * + * @section memory_management_frame The frame structure + * + * The \c frame structure keeps track of the maximum allowed packet + * geometries of a network connection. + * + * It is used, for example, to determine the size of \c buffer structures + * in which to store data channel packets. This is done by having each + * data channel processing module register the maximum amount of extra + * space it will need for header prepending and content expansion in the + * \c frame structure. Once these parameters are known, \c buffer + * structures can be allocated, based on the \c frame parameters, so that + * they are large enough to allow efficient prepending of headers and + * processing of content. + * + * @section memory_management_garbage Garbage collection + * + * OpenVPN has many sizable functions which perform various actions + * depending on their %context. This makes it difficult to know in advance + * exactly how much memory must be allocated. The garbage collection + * facilities are used to keep track of dynamic allocations, thereby + * allowing easy collective freeing of the allocated memory. + * + * The garbage collection system is implemented by the \c gc_arena and \c + * gc_entry structures. The arena represents a garbage collecting unit, + * and contains a linked list of entries. Each entry represents one block + * of dynamically allocated memory. + * + * The garbage collection system also contains various utility functions + * for working with the garbage collection structures. These include + * functions for initializing new arenas, allocating memory of a given + * size and registering the allocation in an arena, and freeing all the + * allocated memory associated with an arena. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26fed331 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_protocol_overview.h @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Network protocol overview documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @page network_protocol OpenVPN's network protocol + * + * Description of packet structure in OpenVPN's network protocol. + * + * This document describes the structure of packets exchanged between + * OpenVPN peers. It is based on the protocol description in the \c ssl.h + * file. + * + * @section network_protocol_external Outer structure of packets exchanged between OpenVPN peers + * + * VPN tunnel packets are transported between OpenVPN peers using the UDP + * or TCP protocols. Their structure is described below. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_external_structure External packet structure + * + * - packet length (16 bits, unsigned) [TCP-mode only]: always sent as + * plain text. Since TCP is a stream protocol, this packet length + * defines the packetization of the stream. + * - packet opcode and key_id (8 bits) [TLS-mode only]: + * - package message type (high 5 bits) + * - key_id (low 3 bits): the key_id refers to an already negotiated + * TLS session. OpenVPN seamlessly renegotiates the TLS session by + * using a new key_id for the new session. Overlap (controlled by + * user definable parameters) between old and new TLS sessions is + * allowed, providing a seamless transition during tunnel operation. + * - payload (n bytes) + * + * @subsection network_protocol_external_types Message types + * + * The type of a VPN tunnel packet is indicated by its opcode. The + * following describes the various opcodes available. + * + * - Control channel messages: + * - \c P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 -- %Key method 1, initial %key + * from client, forget previous state. + * - \c P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 -- %Key method 1, initial %key + * from server, forget previous state. + * - \c P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 -- %Key method 2, initial %key + * from client, forget previous state. + * - \c P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 -- %Key method 2, initial %key + * from server, forget previous state. + * - \c P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 -- New %key, with a graceful + * transition from old to new %key in the sense that a transition + * window exists where both the old or new key_id can be used. + * - \c P_CONTROL_V1 -- Control channel packet (usually TLS + * ciphertext). + * - \c P_ACK_V1 -- Acknowledgement for control channel packets + * received. + * - Data channel messages: + * - \c P_DATA_V1 -- Data channel packet containing data channel + * ciphertext. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_external_key_id Session IDs and Key IDs + * + * OpenVPN uses two different forms of packet identifiers: + * - The first form is 64 bits and is used for all control channel + * messages. This form is referred to as a \c session_id. + * - Data channel messages on the other hand use a shortened form of 3 + * bits for efficiency reasons since the vast majority of OpenVPN + * packets in an active tunnel will be data channel messages. This + * form is referred to as a \c key_id. + * + * The control and data channels use independent packet-id sequences, + * because the data channel is an unreliable channel while the control + * channel is a %reliable channel. Each use their own independent HMAC + * keys. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_external_reliable Control channel reliability layer + * + * Control channel messages (\c P_CONTROL_* and \c P_ACK_* message types) + * are TLS ciphertext packets which have been encapsulated inside of a + * reliability layer. The reliability layer is implemented as a + * straightforward acknowledge and retransmit model. + * + * Acknowledgments of received messages can be encoded in either the + * dedicated \c P_ACK_* record or they can be prepended to a \c + * P_CONTROL_* message. + * + * See the \link reliable Reliability Layer\endlink module for a detailed + * description. + * + * @section network_protocol_control Structure of control channel messages + * + * @subsection network_protocol_control_ciphertext Structure of ciphertext control channel messages + * + * Control channel packets in ciphertext form consist of the following + * parts: + * + * - local \c session_id (random 64 bit value to identify TLS session). + * - HMAC signature of entire encapsulation header for HMAC firewall + * [only if \c --tls-auth is specified] (usually 16 or 20 bytes). + * - packet-id for replay protection (4 or 8 bytes, includes sequence + * number and optional \c time_t timestamp). + * - acknowledgment packet-id array length (1 byte). + * - acknowledgment packet-id array (if length > 0). + * - acknowledgment remote session-id (if length > 0). + * - packet-id of this message (4 bytes). + * - TLS payload ciphertext (n bytes) (only for \c P_CONTROL_V1). + * + * Note that when \c --tls-auth is used, all message types are protected + * with an HMAC signature, even the initial packets of the TLS handshake. + * This makes it easy for OpenVPN to throw away bogus packets quickly, + * without wasting resources on attempting a TLS handshake which will + * ultimately fail. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_control_key_methods Control channel key methods and + * + * Once the TLS session has been initialized and authenticated, the TLS + * channel is used to exchange random %key material for bidirectional + * cipher and HMAC keys which will be used to secure data channel packets. + * OpenVPN currently implements two %key methods. %Key method 1 directly + * derives keys using random bits obtained from the \c RAND_bytes() + * OpenSSL function. %Key method 2 mixes random %key material from both + * sides of the connection using the TLS PRF mixing function. %Key method + * 2 is the preferred method and is the default for OpenVPN 2.0. + * + * The @ref key_generation "Data channel key generation" related page + * describes the %key methods in more detail. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_control_plaintext Structure of plaintext control channel messages + * + * - %Key method 1: + * - Cipher %key length in bytes (1 byte). + * - Cipher %key (n bytes). + * - HMAC %key length in bytes (1 byte). + * - HMAC %key (n bytes). + * - %Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server %options + * string should match). + * - %Key method 2: + * - Literal 0 (4 bytes). + * - %Key method (1 byte). + * - \c key_source structure (\c key_source.pre_master only defined + * for client -> server). + * - %Options string length, including null (2 bytes). + * - %Options string (n bytes, null terminated, client/server %options + * string must match). + * - [The username/password data below is optional, record can end at + * this point.] + * - Username string length, including null (2 bytes). + * - Username string (n bytes, null terminated). + * - Password string length, including null (2 bytes). + * - Password string (n bytes, null terminated). + * + * @section network_protocol_data Structure of data channel messages + * + * @subsection network_protocol_data_ciphertext Structure of ciphertext data channel messages + * + * The P_DATA_* payload represents encrypted, encapsulated tunnel packets + * which tend to be either IP packets or Ethernet frames. This is + * essentially the "payload" of the VPN. + * + * Data channel packets in ciphertext form consist of the following parts: + * - HMAC of ciphertext IV + ciphertext (if not disabled by \c --auth + * none). + * - Ciphertext IV (size is cipher-dependent, if not disabled by \c + * --no-iv). + * - Tunnel packet ciphertext. + * + * @subsection network_protocol_data_plaintext Structure of plaintext data channel messages + * + * Data channel packets in plaintext form consist of the following parts: + * - packet-id (4 or 8 bytes, if not disabled by --no-replay). + * - In TLS mode, 4 bytes are used because the implementation can + * force a TLS renegotation before \c 2^32 packets are sent. + * - In pre-shared %key mode, 8 bytes are used (sequence number and \c + * time_t value) to allow long-term %key usage without packet-id + * collisions. + * - User plaintext (n bytes). + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_reliable.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_reliable.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5264906a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_reliable.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * Reliability Layer module documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @defgroup reliable Reliability Layer module + * + * The Reliability Layer is part of OpenVPN's control channel. It + * provides a reliable and sequential transport mechanism for control + * channel messages between OpenVPN peers. This module forms the + * interface between the \link external_multiplexer External + * Multiplexer\endlink and the \link control_tls Control Channel TLS + * module\endlink. + * + * @par UDP or TCP as VPN tunnel transport + * + * This is especially important when OpenVPN is configured to communicate + * over UDP, because UDP does not offer a reliable and sequential + * transport. OpenVPN endpoints can also communicate over TCP which does + * provide a reliable and sequential transport. In both cases, using UDP + * or TCP as an external transport, the internal Reliability Layer is + * active. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_tunnel_state.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_tunnel_state.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6c93e71b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/doc_tunnel_state.h @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file + * VPN tunnel state documentation file. + */ + +/** + * @page tunnel_state Structure of the VPN tunnel state storage + * + * This section describes how OpenVPN stores its VPN tunnel state during + * operation. + * + * OpenVPN uses several data structures as storage containers for state + * information of active VPN tunnels. These are described in this + * section, together with a little bit of history to help understand the + * origin of the current architecture. + * + * Whether an OpenVPN process is running in client-mode or server-mode + * determines whether it can support only one or multiple simultaneously + * active VPN tunnels. This consequently also determines how the + * associated state information is wrapped up internally. This section + * gives an overview of the differences. + * + * @section tunnel_state_history Historic developments + * + * In the old v1.x series, an OpenVPN process managed only one single VPN + * tunnel. This allowed the VPN tunnel state to be stored together with + * process-global information in one single \c context structure. + * + * This changed, however, in the v2.x series, as new OpenVPN versions + * running in server-mode can support multiple simultaneously active VPN + * tunnels. This necessitated a redesign of the VPN tunnel state + * container structures, and modification of the \link + * external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink and \link + * internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink systems. The + * majority of these changes are only relevant for OpenVPN processes + * running in server-mode, and the client-mode structure has remained very + * similar to the v1.x single-tunnel form. + * + * @section tunnel_state_client Client-mode state + * + * An OpenVPN process running in client-mode can manage at most one single + * VPN tunnel at any one time. The state information for a client's VPN + * tunnel is stored in a \c context structure. + * + * The \c context structure is created in the \c main() function. That is + * also where process-wide initialization takes place, such as parsing + * command line %options and reading configuration files. The \c context + * is then passed to \c tunnel_point_to_point() which drives OpenVPN's + * main event processing loop. These functions are both part of the \link + * eventloop Main Event Loop\endlink module. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_client_init Initialization and cleanup + * + * Because there is only one \c context structure present, it can be + * initialized and cleaned up from the client's main event processing + * function. Before the \c tunnel_point_to_point() function enters its + * event loop, it calls \c init_instance_handle_signals() which calls \c + * init_instance() to initialize the single \c context structure. After + * the event loop stops, it calls \c close_instance() to clean up the \c + * context. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_client_event Event processing + * + * When the main event processing loop activates the external or internal + * multiplexer to handle a network event, it is not necessary to determine + * which VPN tunnel the event is associated with, because there is only + * one VPN tunnel active. + * + * @section tunnel_state_server Server-mode state + * + * An OpenVPN process running in server-mode can manage multiple + * simultaneously active VPN tunnels. For every VPN tunnel active, in + * other words for every OpenVPN client which is connected to a server, + * the OpenVPN server has one \c context structure in which it stores that + * particular VPN tunnel's state information. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_server_multi Multi_context and multi_instance structures + * + * To support multiple \c context structures, each is wrapped in a \c + * multi_instance structure, and all the \c multi_instance structures are + * registered in one single \c multi_context structure. The \link + * external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink and \link + * internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink then use the \c + * multi_context to retrieve the correct \c multi_instance and \c context + * associated with a given network address. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_server_init Startup and initialization + * + * An OpenVPN process running in server-mode starts in the same \c main() + * function as it would in client-mode. The same process-wide + * initialization is performed, and the resulting state and configuration + * is stored in a \c context structure. The server-mode and client-mode + * processes diverge when the \c main() function calls one of \c + * tunnel_point_to_point() or \c tunnel_server(). + * + * In server-mode, \c main() calls the \c tunnel_server() function, which + * transfers control to \c tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded() or \c + * tunnel_server_tcp() depending on the external transport protocol. + * + * These functions receive the \c context created in \c main(). This + * object has a special status in server-mode, as it does not represent an + * active VPN tunnel, but does contain process-wide configuration + * parameters. In the source code, it is often stored in "top" variables. + * To distinguish this object from other instances of the same type, its + * \c context.mode value is set to \c CM_TOP. Other \c context objects, + * which do represent active VPN tunnels, have a \c context.mode set to \c + * CM_CHILD_UDP or \c CM_CHILD_TCP, depending on the external transport + * protocol. + * + * Both \c tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded() and \c tunnel_server_tcp() + * perform similar initialization. In either case, a \c multi_context + * structure is created, and it is initialized according to the + * configuration stored in the top \c context by the \c multi_init() and + * \c multi_top_init() functions. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_server_tunnels Creating and destroying VPN tunnels + * + * When an OpenVPN client makes a new connection to a server, the server + * creates a new \c context and \c multi_instance. The latter is + * registered in the \c multi_context, which makes it possible for the + * external and internal multiplexers to retrieve the correct \c + * multi_instance and \c context when a network event occurs. + * + * @subsection tunnel_state_server_cleanup Final cleanup + * + * After the main event loop exits, both \c + * tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded() and \c tunnel_server_tcp() perform + * similar cleanup. They call \c multi_uninit() followed by \c + * multi_top_free() to clean up the \c multi_context structure. + */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/openvpn.doxyfile b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/openvpn.doxyfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d87172c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/doxygen/openvpn.doxyfile @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +# Doxyfile 1.5.5 + +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Project related configuration options +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +DOXYFILE_ENCODING = UTF-8 +PROJECT_NAME = "OpenVPN" +PROJECT_NUMBER = +OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = doxygen +CREATE_SUBDIRS = NO +OUTPUT_LANGUAGE = English +BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC = YES +REPEAT_BRIEF = YES +ABBREVIATE_BRIEF = "The $name class" \ + "The $name widget" \ + "The $name file" \ + is \ + provides \ + specifies \ + contains \ + represents \ + a \ + an \ + the +ALWAYS_DETAILED_SEC = NO +INLINE_INHERITED_MEMB = NO +FULL_PATH_NAMES = YES +STRIP_FROM_PATH = "" +STRIP_FROM_INC_PATH = +SHORT_NAMES = NO +JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF = YES # NO +QT_AUTOBRIEF = NO +MULTILINE_CPP_IS_BRIEF = NO +DETAILS_AT_TOP = NO +INHERIT_DOCS = YES +SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES = NO +TAB_SIZE = 8 +ALIASES = +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA = NO +OPTIMIZE_FOR_FORTRAN = NO +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_VHDL = NO +BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT = NO +CPP_CLI_SUPPORT = NO +SIP_SUPPORT = NO +DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC = NO +SUBGROUPING = YES +TYPEDEF_HIDES_STRUCT = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Build related configuration options +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +EXTRACT_ALL = YES +EXTRACT_PRIVATE = YES +EXTRACT_STATIC = YES +EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES = YES +EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS = YES +EXTRACT_ANON_NSPACES = YES +HIDE_UNDOC_MEMBERS = NO +HIDE_UNDOC_CLASSES = NO +HIDE_FRIEND_COMPOUNDS = NO +HIDE_IN_BODY_DOCS = NO +INTERNAL_DOCS = NO +CASE_SENSE_NAMES = NO +HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES = NO +SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES = YES +INLINE_INFO = YES +SORT_MEMBER_DOCS = YES +SORT_BRIEF_DOCS = NO +SORT_GROUP_NAMES = NO +SORT_BY_SCOPE_NAME = NO +GENERATE_TODOLIST = YES +GENERATE_TESTLIST = YES +GENERATE_BUGLIST = YES +GENERATE_DEPRECATEDLIST= YES +ENABLED_SECTIONS = +MAX_INITIALIZER_LINES = 30 +SHOW_USED_FILES = YES +SHOW_DIRECTORIES = NO +FILE_VERSION_FILTER = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to warning and progress messages +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +QUIET = NO +WARNINGS = YES +WARN_IF_UNDOCUMENTED = YES +WARN_IF_DOC_ERROR = YES +WARN_NO_PARAMDOC = NO +WARN_FORMAT = "$file:$line: $text" +WARN_LOGFILE = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the input files +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +INPUT = . +INPUT_ENCODING = UTF-8 +FILE_PATTERNS = *.c \ + *.cc \ + *.cxx \ + *.cpp \ + *.c++ \ + *.d \ + *.java \ + *.ii \ + *.ixx \ + *.ipp \ + *.i++ \ + *.inl \ + *.h \ + *.hh \ + *.hxx \ + *.hpp \ + *.h++ \ + *.idl \ + *.odl \ + *.cs \ + *.php \ + *.php3 \ + *.inc \ + *.m \ + *.mm \ + *.dox \ + *.py \ + *.f90 \ + *.f \ + *.vhd \ + *.vhdl +RECURSIVE = YES +EXCLUDE = +EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS = NO +EXCLUDE_PATTERNS = +EXCLUDE_SYMBOLS = +EXAMPLE_PATH = +EXAMPLE_PATTERNS = * +EXAMPLE_RECURSIVE = NO +IMAGE_PATH = +INPUT_FILTER = +FILTER_PATTERNS = +FILTER_SOURCE_FILES = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to source browsing +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +SOURCE_BROWSER = YES +INLINE_SOURCES = NO +STRIP_CODE_COMMENTS = YES +REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = YES +REFERENCES_RELATION = YES +REFERENCES_LINK_SOURCE = YES +USE_HTAGS = NO +VERBATIM_HEADERS = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the alphabetical class index +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +ALPHABETICAL_INDEX = NO +COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX = 5 +IGNORE_PREFIX = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the HTML output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_HTML = YES +HTML_OUTPUT = html +HTML_FILE_EXTENSION = .html +HTML_HEADER = +HTML_FOOTER = +HTML_STYLESHEET = +HTML_ALIGN_MEMBERS = YES +GENERATE_HTMLHELP = NO +GENERATE_DOCSET = NO +DOCSET_FEEDNAME = "Doxygen generated docs" +DOCSET_BUNDLE_ID = org.doxygen.Project +HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS = NO +CHM_FILE = +HHC_LOCATION = +GENERATE_CHI = NO +BINARY_TOC = NO +TOC_EXPAND = NO +DISABLE_INDEX = NO +ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE = 4 +GENERATE_TREEVIEW = NO +TREEVIEW_WIDTH = 250 +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the LaTeX output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_LATEX = YES +LATEX_OUTPUT = latex +LATEX_CMD_NAME = latex +MAKEINDEX_CMD_NAME = makeindex +COMPACT_LATEX = YES # NO +PAPER_TYPE = a4wide +EXTRA_PACKAGES = +LATEX_HEADER = +PDF_HYPERLINKS = YES +USE_PDFLATEX = YES +LATEX_BATCHMODE = NO +LATEX_HIDE_INDICES = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the RTF output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_RTF = NO +RTF_OUTPUT = rtf +COMPACT_RTF = NO +RTF_HYPERLINKS = NO +RTF_STYLESHEET_FILE = +RTF_EXTENSIONS_FILE = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the man page output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_MAN = NO +MAN_OUTPUT = man +MAN_EXTENSION = .3 +MAN_LINKS = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the XML output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_XML = NO +XML_OUTPUT = xml +XML_SCHEMA = +XML_DTD = +XML_PROGRAMLISTING = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_AUTOGEN_DEF = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the Perl module output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_PERLMOD = NO +PERLMOD_LATEX = NO +PERLMOD_PRETTY = YES +PERLMOD_MAKEVAR_PREFIX = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration options related to the preprocessor +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +ENABLE_PREPROCESSING = YES +MACRO_EXPANSION = NO +EXPAND_ONLY_PREDEF = NO +SEARCH_INCLUDES = YES +INCLUDE_PATH = +INCLUDE_FILE_PATTERNS = +PREDEFINED = WIN32 NTLM USE_LZO ENABLE_FRAGMENT P2MP P2MP_SERVER USE_CRYPTO USE_SSL ENABLE_PLUGIN ENABLE_MANAGEMENT ENABLE_OCC HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY +EXPAND_AS_DEFINED = +SKIP_FUNCTION_MACROS = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration::additions related to external references +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +TAGFILES = +GENERATE_TAGFILE = +ALLEXTERNALS = NO +EXTERNAL_GROUPS = YES +PERL_PATH = /usr/bin/perl +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration options related to the dot tool +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +CLASS_DIAGRAMS = NO +MSCGEN_PATH = +HIDE_UNDOC_RELATIONS = YES +HAVE_DOT = YES +CLASS_GRAPH = YES +COLLABORATION_GRAPH = YES +GROUP_GRAPHS = YES +UML_LOOK = NO +TEMPLATE_RELATIONS = NO +INCLUDE_GRAPH = YES +INCLUDED_BY_GRAPH = YES +CALL_GRAPH = NO # YES +CALLER_GRAPH = NO # YES +GRAPHICAL_HIERARCHY = YES +DIRECTORY_GRAPH = YES +DOT_IMAGE_FORMAT = png +DOT_PATH = "/usr/bin/dot" +DOTFILE_DIRS = +DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES = 50 +MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH = 1000 +DOT_TRANSPARENT = YES +DOT_MULTI_TARGETS = NO +GENERATE_LEGEND = YES +DOT_CLEANUP = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration::additions related to the search engine +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +SEARCHENGINE = NO diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/management-notes.txt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/management-notes.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ef39b855 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/management-notes.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1039 @@ +OpenVPN Management Interface Notes +---------------------------------- + +The OpenVPN Management interface allows OpenVPN to +be administratively controlled from an external program via +a TCP or unix domain socket. + +The interface has been specifically designed for developers +who would like to programmatically or remotely control +an OpenVPN daemon, and can be used when OpenVPN is running +as a client or server. + +The management interface is implemented using a client/server TCP +connection or unix domain socket where OpenVPN will listen on a +provided IP address and port for incoming management client connections. + +The management protocol is currently cleartext without an explicit +security layer. For this reason, it is recommended that the +management interface either listen on a unix domain socket, +localhost (127.0.0.1), or on the local VPN address. It's possible +to remotely connect to the management interface over the VPN itself, +though some capabilities will be limited in this mode, such as the +ability to provide private key passwords. + +The management interface is enabled in the OpenVPN +configuration file using the following directive: + +--management + +See the man page for documentation on this and related +directives. + +Once OpenVPN has started with the management layer enabled, +you can telnet to the management port (make sure to use +a telnet client which understands "raw" mode). + +Once connected to the management port, you can use +the "help" command to list all commands. + +COMMAND -- bytecount +-------------------- + +The bytecount command is used to request real-time notification +of OpenVPN bandwidth usage. + +Command syntax: + + bytecount n (where n > 0) -- set up automatic notification of + bandwidth usage once every n seconds + bytecount 0 -- turn off bytecount notifications + +If OpenVPN is running as a client, the bytecount notification +will look like this: + + >BYTECOUNT:{BYTES_IN},{BYTES_OUT} + +BYTES_IN is the number of bytes that have been received from +the server and BYTES_OUT is the number of bytes that have been +sent to the server. + +If OpenVPN is running as a server, the bytecount notification +will look like this: + + >BYTECOUNT_CLI:{CID},{BYTES_IN},{BYTES_OUT} + +CID is the Client ID, BYTES_IN is the number of bytes that have +been received from the client and BYTES_OUT is the number of +bytes that have been sent to the client. + +Note that when the bytecount command is used on the server, every +connected client will report its bandwidth numbers once every n +seconds. + +When the client disconnects, the final bandwidth numbers will be +placed in the 'bytes_received' and 'bytes_sent' environmental variables +as included in the >CLIENT:DISCONNECT notification. + +COMMAND -- echo +--------------- + +The echo capability is used to allow GUI-specific +parameters to be either embedded in the OpenVPN config file +or pushed to an OpenVPN client from a server. + +Command examples: + + echo on -- turn on real-time notification of echo messages + echo all -- print the current echo history list + echo off -- turn off real-time notification of echo messages + echo on all -- atomically enable real-time notification, + plus show any messages in history buffer + +For example, suppose you are developing a OpenVPN GUI and +you want to give the OpenVPN server the ability to ask +the GUI to forget any saved passwords. + +In the OpenVPN server config file, add: + + push "echo forget-passwords" + +When the OpenVPN client receives its pulled list of directives +from the server, the "echo forget-passwords" directive will +be in the list, and it will cause the management interface +to save the "forget-passwords" string in its list of echo +parameters. + +The management client can use "echo all" to output the full +list of echoed parameters, "echo on" to turn on real-time +notification of echoed parameters via the ">ECHO:" prefix, +or "echo off" to turn off real-time notification. + +When the GUI connects to the OpenVPN management socket, it +can issue an "echo all" command, which would produce output +like this: + + 1101519562,forget-passwords + END + +Essentially the echo command allowed us to pass parameters from +the OpenVPN server to the OpenVPN client, and then to the +management client (such as a GUI). The large integer is the +unix date/time when the echo parameter was received. + +If the management client had issued the command "echo on", +it would have enabled real-time notifications of echo +parameters. In this case, our "forget-passwords" message +would be output like this: + + >ECHO:1101519562,forget-passwords + +Like the log command, the echo command can atomically show +history while simultaneously activating real-time updates: + + echo on all + +The size of the echo buffer is currently hardcoded to 100 +messages. + +COMMAND -- exit, quit +--------------------- + +Close the managment session, and resume listening on the +management port for connections from other clients. Currently, +the OpenVPN daemon can at most support a single management client +any one time. + +COMMAND -- help +--------------- + +Print a summary of commands. + +COMMAND -- hold +--------------- + +The hold command can be used to manipulate the hold flag, +or release OpenVPN from a hold state. + +If the hold flag is set on initial startup or +restart, OpenVPN will hibernate prior to initializing +the tunnel until the management interface receives +a "hold release" command. + +The --management-hold directive of OpenVPN can be used +to start OpenVPN with the hold flag set. + +The hold flag setting is persistent and will not +be reset by restarts. + +OpenVPN will indicate that it is in a hold state by +sending a real-time notification to the management +client: + + >HOLD:Waiting for hold release + +Command examples: + + hold -- show current hold flag, 0=off, 1=on. + hold on -- turn on hold flag so that future restarts + will hold. + hold off -- turn off hold flag so that future restarts will + not hold. + hold release -- leave hold state and start OpenVPN, but + do not alter the current hold flag setting. + +COMMAND -- kill +--------------- + +In server mode, kill a particlar client instance. + +Command examples: + + kill Test-Client -- kill the client instance having a + common name of "Test-Client". + kill 1.2.3.4:4000 -- kill the client instance having a + source address and port of 1.2.3.4:4000 + +Use the "status" command to see which clients are connected. + +COMMAND -- log +-------------- + +Show the OpenVPN log file. Only the most recent n lines +of the log file are cached by the management interface, where +n is controlled by the OpenVPN --management-log-cache directive. + +Command examples: + + log on -- Enable real-time output of log messages. + log all -- Show currently cached log file history. + log on all -- Atomically show all currently cached log file + history then enable real-time notification of + new log file messages. + log off -- Turn off real-time notification of log messages. + log 20 -- Show the most recent 20 lines of log file history. + +Real-time notification format: + +Real-time log messages begin with the ">LOG:" prefix followed +by the following comma-separated fields: + + (a) unix integer date/time, + (b) zero or more message flags in a single string: + I -- informational + F -- fatal error + N -- non-fatal error + W -- warning + D -- debug, and + (c) message text. + +COMMAND -- mute +--------------- + +Change the OpenVPN --mute parameter. The mute parameter is +used to silence repeating messages of the same message +category. + +Command examples: + + mute 40 -- change the mute parameter to 40 + mute -- show the current mute setting + +COMMAND -- net +-------------- + +(Windows Only) Produce output equivalent to the OpenVPN +--show-net directive. The output includes OpenVPN's view +of the system network adapter list and routing table based +on information returned by the Windows IP helper API. + +COMMAND -- pid +-------------- + +Shows the process ID of the current OpenVPN process. + +COMMAND -- password and username +-------------------------------- + + The password command is used to pass passwords to OpenVPN. + + If OpenVPN is run with the --management-query-passwords + directive, it will query the management interface for RSA + private key passwords and the --auth-user-pass + username/password. + + When OpenVPN needs a password from the management interface, + it will produce a real-time ">PASSWORD:" message. + + Example 1: + + >PASSWORD:Need 'Private Key' password + + OpenVPN is indicating that it needs a password of type + "Private Key". + + The management client should respond to this query as follows: + + password "Private Key" foo + + Example 2: + + >PASSWORD:Need 'Auth' username/password + + OpenVPN needs a --auth-user-pass password. The management + client should respond: + + username "Auth" foo + password "Auth" bar + + The username/password itself can be in quotes, and special + characters such as double quote or backslash must be escaped, + for example, + + password "Private Key" "foo\"bar" + + The escaping rules are the same as for the config file. + See the "Command Parsing" section below for more info. + + The PASSWORD real-time message type can also be used to + indicate password or other types of authentication failure: + + Example 3: The private key password is incorrect and OpenVPN + is exiting: + + >PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Private Key' + + Example 4: The --auth-user-pass username/password failed, + and OpenVPN is exiting: + + >PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Auth' + + Example 5: The --auth-user-pass username/password failed, + and the server provided a custom client-reason-text string + using the client-deny server-side management interface command. + + >PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'custom server-generated string' + +COMMAND -- forget-passwords +--------------------------- + +The forget-passwords command will cause the daemon to forget passwords +entered during the session. + +Command example: + + forget-passwords -- forget passwords entered so far. + +COMMAND -- signal +----------------- + +The signal command will send a signal to the OpenVPN daemon. +The signal can be one of SIGHUP, SIGTERM, SIGUSR1, or SIGUSR2. + +Command example: + + signal SIGUSR1 -- send a SIGUSR1 signal to daemon + +COMMAND -- state +---------------- + +Show the current OpenVPN state, show state history, or +enable real-time notification of state changes. + +These are the OpenVPN states: + +CONNECTING -- OpenVPN's initial state. +WAIT -- (Client only) Waiting for initial response + from server. +AUTH -- (Client only) Authenticating with server. +GET_CONFIG -- (Client only) Downloading configuration options + from server. +ASSIGN_IP -- Assigning IP address to virtual network + interface. +ADD_ROUTES -- Adding routes to system. +CONNECTED -- Initialization Sequence Completed. +RECONNECTING -- A restart has occurred. +EXITING -- A graceful exit is in progress. + +Command examples: + + state -- Print current OpenVPN state. + state on -- Enable real-time notification of state changes. + state off -- Disable real-time notification of state changes. + state all -- Print current state history. + state 3 -- Print the 3 most recent state transitions. + state on all -- Atomically show state history while at the + same time enable real-time state notification + of future state transitions. + +The output format consists of 4 comma-separated parameters: + (a) the integer unix date/time, + (b) the state name, + (c) optional descriptive string (used mostly on RECONNECTING + and EXITING to show the reason for the disconnect), + (d) optional TUN/TAP local IP address (shown for ASSIGN_IP + and CONNECTED), and + (e) optional address of remote server (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher). + +Real-time state notifications will have a ">STATE:" prefix +prepended to them. + +COMMAND -- status +----------------- + +Show current daemon status information, in the same format as +that produced by the OpenVPN --status directive. + +Command examples: + +status -- Show status information using the default status + format version. + +status 3 -- Show status information using the format of + --status-version 3. + +COMMAND -- username +------------------- + +See the "password" section above. + +COMMAND -- verb +--------------- + +Change the OpenVPN --verb parameter. The verb parameter +controls the output verbosity, and may range from 0 (no output) +to 15 (maximum output). See the OpenVPN man page for additional +info on verbosity levels. + +Command examples: + + verb 4 -- change the verb parameter to 4 + mute -- show the current verb setting + +COMMAND -- version +------------------ + +Show the current OpenVPN and Management Interface versions. + + +COMMAND -- auth-retry +--------------------- + +Set the --auth-retry setting to control how OpenVPN responds to +username/password authentication errors. See the manual page +for more info. + +Command examples: + + auth-retry interact -- Don't exit when bad username/passwords are entered. + Query for new input and retry. + +COMMAND -- needok (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +------------------------------------------ + +Confirm a ">NEED-OK" real-time notification, normally used by +OpenVPN to block while waiting for a specific user action. + +Example: + + OpenVPN needs the user to insert a cryptographic token, + so it sends a real-time notification: + + >NEED-OK:Need 'token-insertion-request' confirmation MSG:Please insert your cryptographic token + + The management client, if it is a GUI, can flash a dialog + box containing the text after the "MSG:" marker to the user. + When the user acknowledges the dialog box, + the management client can issue this command: + + needok token-insertion-request ok + or + needok token-insertion-request cancel + +COMMAND -- needstr (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +------------------------------------------- + +Confirm a ">NEED-STR" real-time notification, normally used by +OpenVPN to block while waiting for a specific user input. + +Example: + + OpenVPN needs the user to specify some input, so it sends a + real-time notification: + + >NEED-STR:Need 'name' input MSG:Please specify your name + + The management client, if it is a GUI, can flash a dialog + box containing the text after the "MSG:" marker to the user. + When the user acknowledges the dialog box, + the management client can issue this command: + + needstr name "John" + +COMMAND -- pkcs11-id-count (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +--------------------------------------------------- + +Retrieve available number of certificates. + +Example: + + pkcs11-id-count + >PKCS11ID-COUNT:5 + +COMMAND -- pkcs11-id-get (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +------------------------------------------------- + +Retrieve certificate by index, the ID string should be provided +as PKCS#11 identity, the blob is BASE64 encoded certificate. + +Example: + + pkcs11-id-get 1 + PKCS11ID-ENTRY:'1', ID:'', BLOB:'' + +COMMAND -- client-auth (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +----------------------------------------------- + +Authorize a ">CLIENT:CONNECT" or ">CLIENT:REAUTH" request and specify +"client-connect" configuration directives in a subsequent text block. + +The OpenVPN server should have been started with the +--management-client-auth directive so that it will ask the management +interface to approve client connections. + + + client-auth {CID} {KID} + line_1 + line_2 + ... + line_n + END + +CID,KID -- client ID and Key ID. See documentation for ">CLIENT:" +notification for more info. + +line_1 to line_n -- client-connect configuration text block, as would be +returned by a --client-connect script. The text block may be null, with +"END" immediately following the "client-auth" line (using a null text +block is equivalent to using the client-auth-nt command). + +A client-connect configuration text block contains OpenVPN directives +that will be applied to the client instance object representing a newly +connected client. + +COMMAND -- client-auth-nt (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +-------------------------------------------------- + +Authorize a ">CLIENT:CONNECT" or ">CLIENT:REAUTH" request without specifying +client-connect configuration text. + +The OpenVPN server should have been started with the +--management-client-auth directive so that it will ask the management +interface to approve client connections. + + client-auth-nt {CID} {KID} + +CID,KID -- client ID and Key ID. See documentation for ">CLIENT:" +notification for more info. + +COMMAND -- client-deny (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +----------------------------------------------- + +Deny a ">CLIENT:CONNECT" or ">CLIENT:REAUTH" request. + + client-deny {CID} {KID} "reason-text" ["client-reason-text"] + +CID,KID -- client ID and Key ID. See documentation for ">CLIENT:" +notification for more info. + +reason-text: a human-readable message explaining why the authentication +request was denied. This message will be output to the OpenVPN log +file or syslog. + +client-reason-text: a message that will be sent to the client as +part of the AUTH_FAILED message. + +Note that client-deny denies a specific Key ID (pertaining to a +TLS renegotiation). A client-deny command issued in response to +an initial TLS key negotiation (notified by ">CLIENT:CONNECT") will +terminate the client session after returning "AUTH-FAILED" to the client. +On the other hand, a client-deny command issued in response to +a TLS renegotiation (">CLIENT:REAUTH") will invalidate the renegotiated +key, however the TLS session associated with the currently active +key will continue to live for up to --tran-window seconds before +expiration. + +To immediately kill a client session, use "client-kill". + +COMMAND -- client-kill (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +----------------------------------------------- + +Immediately kill a client instance by CID. + + client-kill {CID} + +CID -- client ID. See documentation for ">CLIENT:" notification for more +info. + +COMMAND -- client-pf (OpenVPN 2.1 or higher) +--------------------------------------------- + +Push a packet filter file to a specific client. + +The OpenVPN server should have been started with the +--management-client-pf directive so that it will require that +VPN tunnel packets sent or received by client instances must +conform to that client's packet filter configuration. + + client-pf {CID} + line_1 + line_2 + ... + line_n + END + +CID -- client ID. See documentation for ">CLIENT:" notification for +more info. + +line_1 to line_n -- the packet filter configuration file for this +client. + +Packet filter file grammar: + + [CLIENTS DROP|ACCEPT] + {+|-}common_name1 + {+|-}common_name2 + . . . + [SUBNETS DROP|ACCEPT] + {+|-}subnet1 + {+|-}subnet2 + . . . + [END] + + Subnet: IP-ADDRESS | IP-ADDRESS/NUM_NETWORK_BITS | "unknown" + + CLIENTS refers to the set of clients (by their common-name) which + this instance is allowed ('+') to connect to, or is excluded ('-') + from connecting to. Note that in the case of client-to-client + connections, such communication must be allowed by the packet filter + configuration files of both clients AND the --client-to-client + directive must have been specified in the OpenVPN server config. + + SUBNETS refers to IP addresses or IP address subnets which this + client instance may connect to ('+') or is excluded ('-') from + connecting to, and applies to IPv4 and ARP packets. The special + "unknown" tag refers to packets of unknown type, i.e. a packet that + is not IPv4 or ARP. + + DROP or ACCEPT defines default policy when there is no explicit match + for a common-name or subnet. The [END] tag must exist. + + Notes: + + * The SUBNETS section currently only supports IPv4 addresses and + subnets. + + * A given client or subnet rule applies to both incoming and + outgoing packets. + + * The CLIENTS list is order-invariant. Because the list is stored + as a hash-table, the order of the list does not affect its function. + + * The SUBNETS table is scanned sequentially, and the first item to + match is chosen. Therefore the SUBNETS table is NOT order-invariant. + + * No client-to-client communication is allowed unless the + --client-to-client configuration directive is enabled AND + the CLIENTS list of BOTH clients allows the communication. + +Example packet filter spec, as transmitted to the management interface: + + client-pf 42 + [CLIENTS ACCEPT] + -accounting + -enigma + [SUBNETS DROP] + -10.46.79.9 + +10.0.0.0/8 + [END] + END + +The above example sets the packet filter policy for the client +identified by CID=42. This client may connect to all other clients +except those having a common name of "accounting" or "enigma". +The client may only interact with external IP addresses in the +10.0.0.0/8 subnet, however access to 10.46.79.9 is specifically +excluded. + +Another example packet filter spec, as transmitted to the +management interface: + + client-pf 99 + [CLIENTS DENY] + +public + [SUBNETS ACCEPT] + +10.10.0.1 + -10.0.0.0/8 + -unknown + [END] + END + +The above example sets the packet filter policy for the client +identified by CID=99. This client may not connect to any other +clients except those having a common name of "public". It may +interact with any external IP address except those in the +10.0.0.0/8 netblock. However interaction with one address in +the 10.0.0.0/8 netblock is allowed: 10.10.0.1. Also, the client +may not interact with external IP addresses using an "unknown" +protocol (i.e. one that is not IPv4 or ARP). + +COMMAND -- remote (OpenVPN AS 2.1.5/OpenVPN 2.3 or higher) +-------------------------------------------- + +Provide remote host/port in response to a >REMOTE notification +(client only). Requires that the --management-query-remote +directive is used. + + remote ACTION [HOST PORT] + +The "remote" command should only be given in response to a >REMOTE +notification. For example, the following >REMOTE notification +indicates that the client config file would ordinarily connect +to vpn.example.com port 1194 (UDP): + + >REMOTE:vpn.example.com,1194,udp + +Now, suppose we want to override the host and port, connecting +instead to vpn.otherexample.com port 1234. After receiving +the above notification, use this command: + + remote MOD vpn.otherexample.com 1234 + +To accept the same host and port as the client would ordinarily +have connected to, use this command: + + remote ACCEPT + +To skip the current connection entry and advance to the next one, +use this command: + + remote SKIP + +COMMAND -- proxy (OpenVPN 2.3 or higher) +-------------------------------------------- + +Provide proxy server host/port and flags in response to a >PROXY +notification (client only). Requires that the --management-query-proxy +directive is used. + + proxy TYPE HOST PORT ["nct"] + +The "proxy" command must only be given in response to a >PROXY +notification. Use the "nct" flag if you only want to allow +non-cleartext auth with the proxy server. The following >PROXY +notification indicates that the client config file would ordinarily +connect to the first --remote configured, vpn.example.com using TCP: + + >PROXY:1,TCP,vpn.example.com + +Now, suppose we want to connect to the remote host using the proxy server +proxy.intranet port 8080 with secure authentication only, if required. +After receiving the above notification, use this command: + + proxy HTTP proxy.intranet 8080 nct + +You can also use the SOCKS keyword to pass a SOCKS server address, like: + + proxy SOCKS fe00::1 1080 + +To accept connecting to the host and port directly, use this command: + + proxy NONE + +COMMAND -- rsa-sig (OpenVPN 2.3 or higher) +------------------------------------------ +Provides support for external storage of the private key. Requires the +--management-external-key option. This option can be used instead of "key" +in client mode, and allows the client to run without the need to load the +actual private key. When the SSL protocol needs to perform an RSA sign +operation, the data to be signed will be sent to the management interface +via a notification as follows: + +>RSA_SIGN:[BASE64_DATA] + +The management interface client should then sign BASE64_DATA +using the private key and return the SSL signature as follows: + +rsa-sig +[BASE64_SIG_LINE] +. +. +. +END + +Base64 encoded output of RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1,... will provide a +correct signature. + +This capability is intended to allow the use of arbitrary cryptographic +service providers with OpenVPN via the management interface. + + +OUTPUT FORMAT +------------- + +(1) Command success/failure indicated by "SUCCESS: [text]" or + "ERROR: [text]". + +(2) For commands which print multiple lines of output, + the last line will be "END". + +(3) Real-time messages will be in the form ">[source]:[text]", + where source is "CLIENT", "ECHO", "FATAL", "HOLD", "INFO", "LOG", + "NEED-OK", "PASSWORD", or "STATE". + +REAL-TIME MESSAGE FORMAT +------------------------ + +The OpenVPN management interface produces two kinds of +output: (a) output from a command, or (b) asynchronous, +real-time output which can be generated at any time. + +Real-time messages start with a '>' character in the first +column and are immediately followed by a type keyword +indicating the type of real-time message. The following +types are currently defined: + +BYTECOUNT -- Real-time bandwidth usage notification, as enabled + by "bytecount" command when OpenVPN is running as + a client. + +BYTECOUNT_CLI -- Real-time bandwidth usage notification per-client, + as enabled by "bytecount" command when OpenVPN is + running as a server. + +CLIENT -- Notification of client connections and disconnections + on an OpenVPN server. Enabled when OpenVPN is started + with the --management-client-auth option. CLIENT + notifications may be multi-line. See "The CLIENT + notification" section below for detailed info. + +ECHO -- Echo messages as controlled by the "echo" command. + +FATAL -- A fatal error which is output to the log file just + prior to OpenVPN exiting. + +HOLD -- Used to indicate that OpenVPN is in a holding state + and will not start until it receives a + "hold release" command. + +INFO -- Informational messages such as the welcome message. + +LOG -- Log message output as controlled by the "log" command. + +NEED-OK -- OpenVPN needs the end user to do something, such as + insert a cryptographic token. The "needok" command can + be used to tell OpenVPN to continue. + +NEED-STR -- OpenVPN needs information from end, such as + a certificate to use. The "needstr" command can + be used to tell OpenVPN to continue. + +PASSWORD -- Used to tell the management client that OpenVPN + needs a password, also to indicate password + verification failure. + +STATE -- Shows the current OpenVPN state, as controlled + by the "state" command. + +The CLIENT notification +----------------------- + +The ">CLIENT:" notification is enabled by the --management-client-auth +OpenVPN configuration directive that gives the management interface client +the responsibility to authenticate OpenVPN clients after their client +certificate has been verified. CLIENT notifications may be multi-line, and +the sequentiality of a given CLIENT notification, its associated environmental +variables, and the terminating ">CLIENT:ENV,END" line are guaranteed to be +atomic. + +CLIENT notification types: + +(1) Notify new client connection ("CONNECT") or existing client TLS session + renegotiation ("REAUTH"). Information about the client is provided + by a list of environmental variables which are documented in the OpenVPN + man page. The environmental variables passed are equivalent to those + that would be passed to an --auth-user-pass-verify script. + + >CLIENT:CONNECT|REAUTH,{CID},{KID} + >CLIENT:ENV,name1=val1 + >CLIENT:ENV,name2=val2 + >CLIENT:ENV,... + >CLIENT:ENV,END + +(2) Notify successful client authentication and session initiation. + Called after CONNECT. + + >CLIENT:ESTABLISHED,{CID} + >CLIENT:ENV,name1=val1 + >CLIENT:ENV,name2=val2 + >CLIENT:ENV,... + >CLIENT:ENV,END + +(3) Notify existing client disconnection. The environmental variables passed + are equivalent to those that would be passed to a --client-disconnect + script. + + >CLIENT:DISCONNECT,{CID} + >CLIENT:ENV,name1=val1 + >CLIENT:ENV,name2=val2 + >CLIENT:ENV,... + >CLIENT:ENV,END + +(4) Notify that a particular virtual address or subnet + is now associated with a specific client. + + >CLIENT:ADDRESS,{CID},{ADDR},{PRI} + +Variables: + +CID -- Client ID, numerical ID for each connecting client, sequence = 0,1,2,... +KID -- Key ID, numerical ID for the key associated with a given client TLS session, + sequence = 0,1,2,... +PRI -- Primary (1) or Secondary (0) VPN address/subnet. All clients have at least + one primary IP address. Secondary address/subnets are associated with + client-specific "iroute" directives. +ADDR -- IPv4 address/subnet in the form 1.2.3.4 or 1.2.3.0/255.255.255.0 + +In the unlikely scenario of an extremely long-running OpenVPN server, +CID and KID should be assumed to recycle to 0 after (2^32)-1, however this +recycling behavior is guaranteed to be collision-free. + +Command Parsing +--------------- + +The management interface uses the same command line lexical analyzer +as is used by the OpenVPN config file parser. + +Whitespace is a parameter separator. + +Double quotation or single quotation characters ("", '') can be used +to enclose parameters containing whitespace. + +Backslash-based shell escaping is performed, using the following +mappings, when not in single quotations: + +\\ Maps to a single backslash character (\). +\" Pass a literal doublequote character ("), don't + interpret it as enclosing a parameter. +\[SPACE] Pass a literal space or tab character, don't + interpret it as a parameter delimiter. + +Challenge/Response Protocol +--------------------------- + +The OpenVPN Challenge/Response Protocol allows an OpenVPN server to +generate challenge questions that are shown to the user, and to see +the user's responses to those challenges. Based on the responses, the +server can allow or deny access. + +In this way, the OpenVPN Challenge/Response Protocol can be used +to implement multi-factor authentication. Two different +variations on the challenge/response protocol are supported: the +"Dynamic" and "Static" protocols. + +The basic idea of Challenge/Response is that the user must enter an +additional piece of information, in addition to the username and +password, to successfully authenticate. Normally, this information +is used to prove that the user posesses a certain key-like device +such as cryptographic token or a particular mobile phone. + +Dynamic protocol: + +The OpenVPN dynamic challenge/response protocol works by returning +a specially formatted error message after initial successful +authentication. This error message contains the challenge question, +and is formatted as such: + + CRV1:::: + +flags: a series of optional, comma-separated flags: + E : echo the response when the user types it + R : a response is required + +state_id: an opaque string that should be returned to the server + along with the response. + +username_base64 : the username formatted as base64 + +challenge_text : the challenge text to be shown to the user + +Example challenge: + + CRV1:R,E:Om01u7Fh4LrGBS7uh0SWmzwabUiGiW6l:Y3Ix:Please enter token PIN + +After showing the challenge_text and getting a response from the user +(if R flag is specified), the client should submit the following +auth creds back to the OpenVPN server: + +Username: [username decoded from username_base64] +Password: CRV1:::: + +Where state_id is taken from the challenge request and response_text +is what the user entered in response to the challenge_text. +If the R flag is not present, response_text may be the empty +string. + +Example response (suppose the user enters "8675309" for the token PIN): + + Username: cr1 ("Y3Ix" base64 decoded) + Password: CRV1::Om01u7Fh4LrGBS7uh0SWmzwabUiGiW6l::8675309 + +Static protocol: + +The static protocol differs from the dynamic protocol in that the +challenge question and response field is given to the user in the +initial username/password dialog, and the username, password, and +response are delivered back to the server in a single transaction. + +The "static-challenge" directive is used to give the challenge text +to OpenVPN and indicate whether or not the response should be echoed. + +When the "static-challenge" directive is used, the management +interface will respond as such when credentials are needed: + + >PASSWORD:Need 'Auth' username/password SC:, + + ECHO: "1" if response should be echoed, "0" to not echo + TEXT: challenge text that should be shown to the user to + facilitate their response + +For example: + + >PASSWORD:Need 'Auth' username/password SC:1,Please enter token PIN + +The above notification indicates that OpenVPN needs a --auth-user-pass +password plus a response to a static challenge ("Please enter token PIN"). +The "1" after the "SC:" indicates that the response should be echoed. + +The management interface client in this case should add the static +challenge text to the auth dialog followed by a field for the user to +enter a response. Then the client should pack the password and response +together into an encoded password: + + username "Auth" foo + password "Auth" "SCRV1::" + +For example, if the user entered "bar" as the password and 8675309 +as the PIN, the following management interface commands should be +issued: + + username "Auth" foo + password "Auth" "SCRV1:Zm9v:ODY3NTMwOQ==" + +Client-side support for challenge/response protocol: + +Currently, the Access Server client and standalone OpenVPN +client support both static and dynamic challenge/response +protocols. However, any OpenVPN client UI that drives OpenVPN +via the management interface needs to add explicit support +for the challenge/response protocol. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/openvpn.8 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/openvpn.8 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d66bd665 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/doc/openvpn.8 @@ -0,0 +1,6438 @@ +.\" OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +.\" over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +.\" session authentication and key exchange, +.\" packet encryption, packet authentication, and +.\" packet compression. +.\" +.\" Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +.\" +.\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +.\" it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +.\" as published by the Free Software Foundation. +.\" +.\" This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +.\" but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +.\" MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +.\" GNU General Public License for more details. +.\" +.\" You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +.\" along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this +.\" distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., +.\" 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA +.\" +.\" Manual page for openvpn +.\ +.\" SH section heading +.\" SS subsection heading +.\" LP paragraph +.\" IP indented paragraph +.\" TP hanging label +.\ +.\" .nf -- no formatting +.\" .fi -- resume formatting +.\" .ft 3 -- boldface +.\" .ft -- normal face +.\" .in +|-{n} -- indent +.\" +.TH openvpn 8 "17 November 2008" +.\"********************************************************* +.SH NAME +openvpn \- secure IP tunnel daemon. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH SYNOPSIS +.ft 3 +openvpn [ options ... ] +.ft +.\"********************************************************* +.SH INTRODUCTION +.LP +OpenVPN is an open source VPN daemon by James Yonan. +Because OpenVPN tries to +be a universal VPN tool offering a great deal of flexibility, +there are a lot of options on this manual page. +If you're new to OpenVPN, you might want to skip ahead to the +examples section where you will see how to construct simple +VPNs on the command line without even needing a configuration file. + +Also note that there's more documentation and examples on +the OpenVPN web site: +.I http://openvpn.net/ + +And if you would like to see a shorter version of this manual, +see the openvpn usage message which can be obtained by +running +.B openvpn +without any parameters. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH DESCRIPTION +.LP +OpenVPN is a robust and highly flexible VPN daemon. +OpenVPN supports SSL/TLS security, ethernet bridging, +TCP or UDP tunnel transport through proxies or NAT, +support for dynamic IP addresses and DHCP, +scalability to hundreds or thousands of users, +and portability to most major OS platforms. + +OpenVPN is tightly bound to the OpenSSL library, and derives much +of its crypto capabilities from it. + +OpenVPN supports +conventional encryption +using a pre-shared secret key +.B (Static Key mode) +or +public key security +.B (SSL/TLS mode) +using client & server certificates. +OpenVPN also +supports non-encrypted TCP/UDP tunnels. + +OpenVPN is designed to work with the +.B TUN/TAP +virtual networking interface that exists on most platforms. + +Overall, OpenVPN aims to offer many of the key features of IPSec but +with a relatively lightweight footprint. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH OPTIONS +OpenVPN allows any option to be placed either on the command line +or in a configuration file. Though all command line options are preceded +by a double-leading-dash ("\-\-"), this prefix can be removed when +an option is placed in a configuration file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-help +Show options. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-config file +Load additional config options from +.B file +where each line corresponds to one command line option, +but with the leading '\-\-' removed. + +If +.B \-\-config file +is the only option to the openvpn command, +the +.B \-\-config +can be removed, and the command can be given as +.B openvpn file + +Note that +configuration files can be nested to a reasonable depth. + +Double quotation or single quotation characters ("", '') +can be used to enclose single parameters containing whitespace, +and "#" or ";" characters in the first column +can be used to denote comments. + +Note that OpenVPN 2.0 and higher performs backslash-based shell +escaping for characters not in single quotations, +so the following mappings should be observed: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +\\\\ Maps to a single backslash character (\\). +\\" Pass a literal doublequote character ("), don't + interpret it as enclosing a parameter. +\\[SPACE] Pass a literal space or tab character, don't + interpret it as a parameter delimiter. +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +For example on Windows, use double backslashes to +represent pathnames: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +secret "c:\\\\OpenVPN\\\\secret.key" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +For examples of configuration files, +see +.I http://openvpn.net/examples.html + +Here is an example configuration file: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +# +# Sample OpenVPN configuration file for +# using a pre-shared static key. +# +# '#' or ';' may be used to delimit comments. + +# Use a dynamic tun device. +dev tun + +# Our remote peer +remote mypeer.mydomain + +# 10.1.0.1 is our local VPN endpoint +# 10.1.0.2 is our remote VPN endpoint +ifconfig 10.1.0.1 10.1.0.2 + +# Our pre-shared static key +secret static.key +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Tunnel Options: +.TP +.B \-\-mode m +Set OpenVPN major mode. By default, OpenVPN runs in +point-to-point mode ("p2p"). OpenVPN 2.0 introduces +a new mode ("server") which implements a multi-client +server capability. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-local host +Local host name or IP address for bind. +If specified, OpenVPN will bind to this address only. +If unspecified, OpenVPN will bind to all interfaces. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote host [port] [proto] +Remote host name or IP address. On the client, multiple +.B \-\-remote +options may be specified for redundancy, each referring +to a different OpenVPN server. Specifying multiple +.B \-\-remote +options for this purpose is a special case of the more +general connection-profile feature. See the +.B +documentation below. + +The OpenVPN client will try to connect to a server at +.B host:port +in the order specified by the list of +.B \-\-remote +options. + +.B proto +indicates the protocol to use when connecting with the +remote, and may be "tcp" or "udp". + +The client will move on to the next host in the list, +in the event of connection failure. +Note that at any given time, the OpenVPN client +will at most be connected to +one server. + +Note that since UDP is connectionless, connection failure +is defined by the +.B \-\-ping +and +.B \-\-ping-restart +options. + +Note the following corner case: If you use multiple +.B \-\-remote +options, AND you are dropping root privileges on +the client with +.B \-\-user +and/or +.B \-\-group, +AND the client is running a non-Windows OS, if the client needs +to switch to a different server, and that server pushes +back different TUN/TAP or route settings, the client may lack +the necessary privileges to close and reopen the TUN/TAP interface. +This could cause the client to exit with a fatal error. + +If +.B \-\-remote +is unspecified, OpenVPN will listen +for packets from any IP address, but will not act on those packets unless +they pass all authentication tests. This requirement for authentication +is binding on all potential peers, even those from known and supposedly +trusted IP addresses (it is very easy to forge a source IP address on +a UDP packet). + +When used in TCP mode, +.B \-\-remote +will act as a filter, rejecting connections from any host which does +not match +.B host. + +If +.B host +is a DNS name which resolves to multiple IP addresses, +one will be randomly +chosen, providing a sort of basic load-balancing and +failover capability. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote-random-hostname +Add a random string (6 characters) to first DNS label of hostname to prevent +DNS caching. For example, "foo.bar.gov" would be modified to +".foo.bar.gov". +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B +Define a client connection +profile. Client connection profiles are groups of OpenVPN options that +describe how to connect to a given OpenVPN server. Client connection +profiles are specified within an OpenVPN configuration file, and +each profile is bracketed by +.B +and +.B . + +An OpenVPN client will try each connection profile sequentially +until it achieves a successful connection. + +.B \-\-remote-random +can be used to initially "scramble" the connection +list. + +Here is an example of connection profile usage: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +client +dev tun + + +remote 198.19.34.56 1194 udp + + + +remote 198.19.34.56 443 tcp + + + +remote 198.19.34.56 443 tcp +http-proxy 192.168.0.8 8080 +http-proxy-retry + + + +remote 198.19.36.99 443 tcp +http-proxy 192.168.0.8 8080 +http-proxy-retry + + +persist-key +persist-tun +pkcs12 client.p12 +ns-cert-type server +verb 3 +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +First we try to connect to a server at 198.19.34.56:1194 using UDP. +If that fails, we then try to connect to 198.19.34.56:443 using TCP. +If that also fails, then try connecting through an HTTP proxy at +192.168.0.8:8080 to 198.19.34.56:443 using TCP. Finally, try to +connect through the same proxy to a server at 198.19.36.99:443 +using TCP. + +The following OpenVPN options may be used inside of +a +.B +block: + +.B bind, +.B connect-retry, +.B connect-retry-max, +.B connect-timeout, +.B float, +.B http-proxy, +.B http-proxy-option, +.B http-proxy-retry, +.B http-proxy-timeout, +.B local, +.B lport, +.B nobind, +.B port, +.B proto, +.B remote, +.B rport, +.B socks-proxy, and +.B socks-proxy-retry. + +A defaulting mechanism exists for specifying options to apply to +all +.B +profiles. If any of the above options (with the exception of +.B remote +) appear outside of a +.B +block, but in a configuration file which has one or more +.B +blocks, the option setting will be used as a default for +.B +blocks which follow it in the configuration file. + +For example, suppose the +.B nobind +option were placed in the sample configuration file above, near +the top of the file, before the first +.B +block. The effect would be as if +.B nobind +were declared in all +.B +blocks below it. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-proto-force p +When iterating through connection profiles, +only consider profiles using protocol +.B p +('tcp'|'udp'). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote-random +When multiple +.B \-\-remote +address/ports are specified, or if connection profiles are being +used, initially randomize the order of the list +as a kind of basic load-balancing measure. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-proto p +Use protocol +.B p +for communicating with remote host. +.B p +can be +.B udp, +.B tcp-client, +or +.B tcp-server. + +The default protocol is +.B udp +when +.B \-\-proto +is not specified. + +For UDP operation, +.B \-\-proto udp +should be specified on both peers. + +For TCP operation, one peer must use +.B \-\-proto tcp-server +and the other must use +.B \-\-proto tcp-client. +A peer started with +.B tcp-server +will wait indefinitely for an incoming connection. A peer +started with +.B tcp-client +will attempt to connect, and if that fails, will sleep for 5 +seconds (adjustable via the +.B \-\-connect-retry +option) and try again infinite or up to N retries (adjustable via the +.B \-\-connect-retry-max +option). Both TCP client and server will simulate +a SIGUSR1 restart signal if either side resets the connection. + +OpenVPN is designed to operate optimally over UDP, but TCP capability is provided +for situations where UDP cannot be used. +In comparison with UDP, TCP will usually be +somewhat less efficient and less robust when used over unreliable or congested +networks. + +This article outlines some of problems with tunneling IP over TCP: + +.I http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/tcp-tcp.html + +There are certain cases, however, where using TCP may be advantageous from +a security and robustness perspective, such as tunneling non-IP or +application-level UDP protocols, or tunneling protocols which don't +possess a built-in reliability layer. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-connect-retry n +Wait +.B n +seconds between connection attempts (default=5). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-connect-timeout n +For +.B \-\-proto tcp-client, +set connection timeout to +.B n +seconds (default=10). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-connect-retry-max n +.B n +specifies the number of times all +.B \-\-remote +respectively +.B +statements are tried. Specifiying +.B n +as one would try each entry exactly once. A sucessful connection +resets the counter. (default=umlimited). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-proxy-settings +Show sensed HTTP or SOCKS proxy settings. Currently, only Windows clients +support this option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-http-proxy server port [authfile|'auto'|'auto-nct'] [auth-method] +Connect to remote host through an HTTP proxy at address +.B server +and port +.B port. +If HTTP Proxy-Authenticate is required, +.B authfile +is a file containing a username and password on 2 lines, or +"stdin" to prompt from console. + +.B auth-method +should be one of "none", "basic", or "ntlm". + +HTTP Digest authentication is supported as well, but only via +the +.B auto +or +.B auto-nct +flags (below). + +The +.B auto +flag causes OpenVPN to automatically determine the +.B auth-method +and query stdin or the management interface for +username/password credentials, if required. This flag +exists on OpenVPN 2.1 or higher. + +The +.B auto-nct +flag (no clear-text auth) instructs OpenVPN to automatically +determine the authentication method, but to reject weak +authentication protocols such as HTTP Basic Authentication. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-http-proxy-retry +Retry indefinitely on HTTP proxy errors. If an HTTP proxy error +occurs, simulate a SIGUSR1 reset. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-http-proxy-timeout n +Set proxy timeout to +.B n +seconds, default=5. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-http-proxy-option type [parm] +Set extended HTTP proxy options. +Repeat to set multiple options. + +.B VERSION version \-\- +Set HTTP version number to +.B version +(default=1.0). + +.B AGENT user-agent \-\- +Set HTTP "User-Agent" string to +.B user-agent. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-socks-proxy server [port] +Connect to remote host through a Socks5 proxy at address +.B server +and port +.B port +(default=1080). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-socks-proxy-retry +Retry indefinitely on Socks proxy errors. If a Socks proxy error +occurs, simulate a SIGUSR1 reset. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-resolv-retry n +If hostname resolve fails for +.B \-\-remote, +retry resolve for +.B n +seconds before failing. + +Set +.B n +to "infinite" to retry indefinitely. + +By default, +.B \-\-resolv-retry infinite +is enabled. You can disable by setting n=0. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-float +Allow remote peer to change its IP address and/or port number, such as due to +DHCP (this is the default if +.B \-\-remote +is not used). +.B \-\-float +when specified with +.B \-\-remote +allows an OpenVPN session to initially connect to a peer +at a known address, however if packets arrive from a new +address and pass all authentication tests, the new address +will take control of the session. This is useful when +you are connecting to a peer which holds a dynamic address +such as a dial-in user or DHCP client. + +Essentially, +.B \-\-float +tells OpenVPN to accept authenticated packets +from any address, not only the address which was specified in the +.B \-\-remote +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ipchange cmd +Run command +.B cmd +when our remote ip-address is initially authenticated or +changes. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +When +.B cmd +is executed two arguments are appended after any arguments specified in +.B cmd +, as follows: + +.B cmd ip_address port_number + +Don't use +.B \-\-ipchange +in +.B \-\-mode server +mode. Use a +.B \-\-client-connect +script instead. + +See the "Environmental Variables" section below for +additional parameters passed as environmental variables. + +If you are running in a dynamic IP address environment where +the IP addresses of either peer could change without notice, +you can use this script, for example, to edit the +.I /etc/hosts +file with the current address of the peer. The script will +be run every time the remote peer changes its IP address. + +Similarly if +.I our +IP address changes due to DHCP, we should configure +our IP address change script (see man page for +.BR dhcpcd (8) +) to deliver a +.B SIGHUP +or +.B SIGUSR1 +signal to OpenVPN. OpenVPN will then +reestablish a connection with its most recently authenticated +peer on its new IP address. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-port port +TCP/UDP port number or port name for both local and remote. The current +default of 1194 represents the official IANA port number +assignment for OpenVPN and has been used since version 2.0-beta17. +Previous versions used port 5000 as the default. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-lport port +TCP/UDP port number or name for bind. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-rport port +TCP/UDP port number or name for remote. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-bind +Bind to local address and port. This is the default unless any of +.B \-\-proto tcp-client +, +.B \-\-http-proxy +or +.B \-\-socks-proxy +are used. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-nobind +Do not bind to local address and port. The IP stack will allocate +a dynamic port for returning packets. Since the value of the dynamic port +could not be known in advance by a peer, this option is only suitable for +peers which will be initiating connections by using the +.B \-\-remote +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dev tunX | tapX | null +TUN/TAP virtual network device ( +.B X +can be omitted for a dynamic device.) + +See examples section below +for an example on setting up a TUN device. + +You must use either tun devices on both ends of the connection +or tap devices on both ends. You cannot mix them, as they +represent different underlying network layers. + +.B tun +devices encapsulate IPv4 or IPv6 (OSI Layer 3) while +.B tap +devices encapsulate Ethernet 802.3 (OSI Layer 2). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dev-type device-type +Which device type are we using? +.B device-type +should be +.B tun +(OSI Layer 3) +or +.B tap +(OSI Layer 2). +Use this option only if the TUN/TAP device used with +.B \-\-dev +does not begin with +.B tun +or +.B tap. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-topology mode +Configure virtual addressing topology when running in +.B \-\-dev tun +mode. This directive has no meaning in +.B \-\-dev tap +mode, which always uses a +.B subnet +topology. + +If you set this directive on the server, the +.B \-\-server +and +.B \-\-server-bridge +directives will automatically push your chosen topology setting to clients +as well. This directive can also be manually pushed to clients. Like the +.B \-\-dev +directive, this directive must always be compatible between client and server. + +.B mode +can be one of: + +.B net30 \-\- +Use a point-to-point topology, by allocating one /30 subnet per client. +This is designed to allow point-to-point semantics when some +or all of the connecting clients might be Windows systems. This is the +default on OpenVPN 2.0. + +.B p2p \-\- +Use a point-to-point topology where the remote endpoint of the client's +tun interface always points to the local endpoint of the server's tun interface. +This mode allocates a single IP address per connecting client. +Only use +when none of the connecting clients are Windows systems. This mode +is functionally equivalent to the +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool-linear +directive which is available in OpenVPN 2.0 and is now deprecated. + +.B subnet \-\- +Use a subnet rather than a point-to-point topology by +configuring the tun interface with a local IP address and subnet mask, +similar to the topology used in +.B \-\-dev tap +and ethernet bridging mode. +This mode allocates a single IP address per connecting client and works on +Windows as well. Only available when server and clients are OpenVPN 2.1 or +higher, or OpenVPN 2.0.x which has been manually patched with the +.B \-\-topology +directive code. When used on Windows, requires version 8.2 or higher +of the TAP-Win32 driver. When used on *nix, requires that the tun +driver supports an +.BR ifconfig (8) +command which sets a subnet instead of a remote endpoint IP address. + +This option exists in OpenVPN 2.1 or higher. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tun-ipv6 +Build a tun link capable of forwarding IPv6 traffic. +Should be used in conjunction with +.B \-\-dev tun +or +.B \-\-dev tunX. +A warning will be displayed +if no specific IPv6 TUN support for your OS has been compiled into OpenVPN. + +See below for further IPv6-related configuration options. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dev-node node +Explicitly set the device node rather than using +/dev/net/tun, /dev/tun, /dev/tap, etc. If OpenVPN +cannot figure out whether +.B node +is a TUN or TAP device based on the name, you should +also specify +.B \-\-dev-type tun +or +.B \-\-dev-type tap. + +On Windows systems, select the TAP-Win32 adapter which +is named +.B node +in the Network Connections Control Panel or the +raw GUID of the adapter enclosed by braces. +The +.B \-\-show-adapters +option under Windows can also be used +to enumerate all available TAP-Win32 +adapters and will show both the network +connections control panel name and the GUID for +each TAP-Win32 adapter. +.TP +.B \-\-lladdr address +Specify the link layer address, more commonly known as the MAC address. +Only applied to TAP devices. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-iproute cmd +Set alternate command to execute instead of default iproute2 command. +May be used in order to execute OpenVPN in unprivileged environment. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig l rn +Set TUN/TAP adapter parameters. +.B l +is the IP address of the local VPN endpoint. +For TUN devices, +.B rn +is the IP address of the remote VPN endpoint. +For TAP devices, +.B rn +is the subnet mask of the virtual ethernet segment +which is being created or connected to. + +For TUN devices, which facilitate virtual +point-to-point IP connections, +the proper usage of +.B \-\-ifconfig +is to use two private IP addresses +which are not a member of any +existing subnet which is in use. +The IP addresses may be consecutive +and should have their order reversed +on the remote peer. After the VPN +is established, by pinging +.B rn, +you will be pinging across the VPN. + +For TAP devices, which provide +the ability to create virtual +ethernet segments, +.B \-\-ifconfig +is used to set an IP address and +subnet mask just as a physical +ethernet adapter would be +similarly configured. If you are +attempting to connect to a remote +ethernet bridge, the IP address +and subnet should be set to values +which would be valid on the +the bridged ethernet segment (note +also that DHCP can be used for the +same purpose). + +This option, while primarily a proxy for the +.BR ifconfig (8) +command, is designed to simplify TUN/TAP +tunnel configuration by providing a +standard interface to the different +ifconfig implementations on different +platforms. + +.B \-\-ifconfig +parameters which are IP addresses can +also be specified as a DNS or /etc/hosts +file resolvable name. + +For TAP devices, +.B \-\-ifconfig +should not be used if the TAP interface will be +getting an IP address lease from a DHCP +server. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-noexec +Don't actually execute ifconfig/netsh commands, instead +pass +.B \-\-ifconfig +parameters to scripts using environmental variables. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-nowarn +Don't output an options consistency check warning +if the +.B \-\-ifconfig +option on this side of the +connection doesn't match the remote side. This is useful +when you want to retain the overall benefits of the +options consistency check (also see +.B \-\-disable-occ +option) while only disabling the ifconfig component of +the check. + +For example, +if you have a configuration where the local host uses +.B \-\-ifconfig +but the remote host does not, use +.B \-\-ifconfig-nowarn +on the local host. + +This option will also silence warnings about potential +address conflicts which occasionally annoy more experienced +users by triggering "false positive" warnings. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route network/IP [netmask] [gateway] [metric] +Add route to routing table after connection is established. +Multiple routes can be specified. Routes will be +automatically torn down in reverse order prior to +TUN/TAP device close. + +This option is intended as +a convenience proxy for the +.BR route (8) +shell command, +while at the same time providing portable semantics +across OpenVPN's platform space. + +.B netmask +default \-\- 255.255.255.255 + +.B gateway +default \-\- taken from +.B \-\-route-gateway +or the second parameter to +.B \-\-ifconfig +when +.B \-\-dev tun +is specified. + +.B metric +default \-\- taken from +.B \-\-route-metric +otherwise 0. + +The default can be specified by leaving an option blank or setting +it to "default". + +The +.B network +and +.B gateway +parameters can +also be specified as a DNS or /etc/hosts +file resolvable name, or as one of three special keywords: + +.B vpn_gateway +\-\- The remote VPN endpoint address +(derived either from +.B \-\-route-gateway +or the second parameter to +.B \-\-ifconfig +when +.B \-\-dev tun +is specified). + +.B net_gateway +\-\- The pre-existing IP default gateway, read from the routing +table (not supported on all OSes). + +.B remote_host +\-\- The +.B \-\-remote +address if OpenVPN is being run in client mode, and is undefined in server mode. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-max-routes n +Allow a maximum number of n +.B \-\-route +options to be specified, either in the local configuration file, +or pulled from an OpenVPN server. By default, n=100. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-gateway gw|'dhcp' +Specify a default gateway +.B gw +for use with +.B \-\-route. + +If +.B dhcp +is specified as the parameter, +the gateway address will be extracted from a DHCP +negotiation with the OpenVPN server-side LAN. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-metric m +Specify a default metric +.B m +for use with +.B \-\-route. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-delay [n] [w] +Delay +.B n +seconds (default=0) after connection +establishment, before adding routes. If +.B n +is 0, routes will be added immediately upon connection +establishment. If +.B \-\-route-delay +is omitted, routes will be added immediately after TUN/TAP device +open and +.B \-\-up +script execution, before any +.B \-\-user +or +.B \-\-group +privilege downgrade (or +.B \-\-chroot +execution.) + +This option is designed to be useful in scenarios where DHCP is +used to set +tap adapter addresses. The delay will give the DHCP handshake +time to complete before routes are added. + +On Windows, +.B \-\-route-delay +tries to be more intelligent by waiting +.B w +seconds (w=30 by default) +for the TAP-Win32 adapter to come up before adding routes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-up cmd +Run command +.B cmd +after routes are added, subject to +.B \-\-route-delay. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +See the "Environmental Variables" section below for +additional parameters passed as environmental variables. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-pre-down cmd +Run command +.B cmd +before routes are removed upon disconnection. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +See the "Environmental Variables" section below for +additional parameters passed as environmental variables. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-noexec +Don't add or remove routes automatically. Instead pass routes to +.B \-\-route-up +script using environmental variables. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-nopull +When used with +.B \-\-client +or +.B \-\-pull, +accept options pushed by server EXCEPT for routes and dhcp options +like DNS servers. + +When used on the client, this option effectively bars the +server from adding routes to the client's routing table, +however note that this option still allows the server +to set the TCP/IP properties of the client's TUN/TAP interface. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-allow-pull-fqdn +Allow client to pull DNS names from server (rather than being limited +to IP address) for +.B \-\-ifconfig, +.B \-\-route, +and +.B \-\-route-gateway. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-nat snat|dnat network netmask alias +This pushable client option sets up a stateless one-to-one NAT +rule on packet addresses (not ports), and is useful in cases +where routes or ifconfig settings pushed to the client would +create an IP numbering conflict. + +.B network/netmask +(for example 192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0) +defines the local view of a resource from the client perspective, while +.B alias/netmask +(for example 10.64.0.0/255.255.0.0) +defines the remote view from the server perspective. + +Use +.B snat +(source NAT) for resources owned by the client and +.B dnat +(destination NAT) for remote resources. + +Set +.B \-\-verb 6 +for debugging info showing the transformation of src/dest +addresses in packets. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-redirect-gateway flags... +Automatically execute routing commands to cause all outgoing IP traffic +to be redirected over the VPN. This is a client-side option. + +This option performs three steps: + +.B (1) +Create a static route for the +.B \-\-remote +address which forwards to the pre-existing default gateway. +This is done so that +.B (3) +will not create a routing loop. + +.B (2) +Delete the default gateway route. + +.B (3) +Set the new default gateway to be the VPN endpoint address (derived either from +.B \-\-route-gateway +or the second parameter to +.B \-\-ifconfig +when +.B \-\-dev tun +is specified). + +When the tunnel is torn down, all of the above steps are reversed so +that the original default route is restored. + +Option flags: + +.B local \-\- +Add the +.B local +flag if both OpenVPN servers are directly connected via a common subnet, +such as with wireless. The +.B local +flag will cause step +.B 1 +above to be omitted. + +.B autolocal \-\- +Try to automatically determine whether to enable +.B local +flag above. + +.B def1 \-\- +Use this flag to override +the default gateway by using 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1 +rather than 0.0.0.0/0. This has the benefit of overriding +but not wiping out the original default gateway. + +.B bypass-dhcp \-\- +Add a direct route to the DHCP server (if it is non-local) which +bypasses the tunnel +(Available on Windows clients, may not be available +on non-Windows clients). + +.B bypass-dns \-\- +Add a direct route to the DNS server(s) (if they are non-local) which +bypasses the tunnel +(Available on Windows clients, may not be available +on non-Windows clients). + +.B block-local \-\- +Block access to local LAN when the tunnel is active, except for +the LAN gateway itself. This is accomplished by routing the local +LAN (except for the LAN gateway address) into the tunnel. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-link-mtu n +Sets an upper bound on the size of UDP packets which are sent +between OpenVPN peers. It's best not to set this parameter unless +you know what you're doing. +.\"********************************************************* +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-redirect-private [flags] +Like \-\-redirect-gateway, but omit actually changing the default +gateway. Useful when pushing private subnets. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tun-mtu n +Take the TUN device MTU to be +.B n +and derive the link MTU +from it (default=1500). In most cases, you will probably want to +leave this parameter set to its default value. + +The MTU (Maximum Transmission Units) is +the maximum datagram size in bytes that can be sent unfragmented +over a particular network path. OpenVPN requires that packets +on the control or data channels be sent unfragmented. + +MTU problems often manifest themselves as connections which +hang during periods of active usage. + +It's best to use the +.B \-\-fragment +and/or +.B \-\-mssfix +options to deal with MTU sizing issues. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tun-mtu-extra n +Assume that the TUN/TAP device might return as many as +.B n +bytes more than the +.B \-\-tun-mtu +size on read. This parameter defaults to 0, which is sufficient for +most TUN devices. TAP devices may introduce additional overhead in excess +of the MTU size, and a setting of 32 is the default when TAP devices are used. +This parameter only controls internal OpenVPN buffer sizing, +so there is no transmission overhead associated with using a larger value. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mtu-disc type +Should we do Path MTU discovery on TCP/UDP channel? Only supported on OSes such +as Linux that supports the necessary system call to set. + +.B 'no' +\-\- Never send DF (Don't Fragment) frames +.br +.B 'maybe' +\-\- Use per-route hints +.br +.B 'yes' +\-\- Always DF (Don't Fragment) +.br +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mtu-test +To empirically measure MTU on connection startup, +add the +.B \-\-mtu-test +option to your configuration. +OpenVPN will send ping packets of various sizes +to the remote peer and measure the largest packets +which were successfully received. The +.B \-\-mtu-test +process normally takes about 3 minutes to complete. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-fragment max +Enable internal datagram fragmentation so +that no UDP datagrams are sent which +are larger than +.B max +bytes. + +The +.B max +parameter is interpreted in the same way as the +.B \-\-link-mtu +parameter, i.e. the UDP packet size after encapsulation +overhead has been added in, but not including +the UDP header itself. + +The +.B \-\-fragment +option only makes sense when you are using the UDP protocol ( +.B \-\-proto udp +). + +.B \-\-fragment +adds 4 bytes of overhead per datagram. + +See the +.B \-\-mssfix +option below for an important related option to +.B \-\-fragment. + +It should also be noted that this option is not meant to replace +UDP fragmentation at the IP stack level. It is only meant as a +last resort when path MTU discovery is broken. Using this option +is less efficient than fixing path MTU discovery for your IP link and +using native IP fragmentation instead. + +Having said that, there are circumstances where using OpenVPN's +internal fragmentation capability may be your only option, such +as tunneling a UDP multicast stream which requires fragmentation. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mssfix max +Announce to TCP sessions running over the tunnel that they should limit +their send packet sizes such that after OpenVPN has encapsulated them, +the resulting UDP packet size that OpenVPN sends to its peer will not +exceed +.B max +bytes. The default value is +.B 1450. + +The +.B max +parameter is interpreted in the same way as the +.B \-\-link-mtu +parameter, i.e. the UDP packet size after encapsulation +overhead has been added in, but not including +the UDP header itself. + +The +.B \-\-mssfix +option only makes sense when you are using the UDP protocol +for OpenVPN peer-to-peer communication, i.e. +.B \-\-proto udp. + +.B \-\-mssfix +and +.B \-\-fragment +can be ideally used together, where +.B \-\-mssfix +will try to keep TCP from needing +packet fragmentation in the first place, +and if big packets come through anyhow +(from protocols other than TCP), +.B \-\-fragment +will internally fragment them. + +Both +.B \-\-fragment +and +.B \-\-mssfix +are designed to work around cases where Path MTU discovery +is broken on the network path between OpenVPN peers. + +The usual symptom of such a breakdown is an OpenVPN +connection which successfully starts, but then stalls +during active usage. + +If +.B \-\-fragment +and +.B \-\-mssfix +are used together, +.B \-\-mssfix +will take its default +.B max +parameter from the +.B \-\-fragment max +option. + +Therefore, one could lower the maximum UDP packet size +to 1300 (a good first try for solving MTU-related +connection problems) with the following options: + +.B \-\-tun-mtu 1500 \-\-fragment 1300 \-\-mssfix +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-sndbuf size +Set the TCP/UDP socket send buffer size. +Currently defaults to 65536 bytes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-rcvbuf size +Set the TCP/UDP socket receive buffer size. +Currently defaults to 65536 bytes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mark value +Mark encrypted packets being sent with value. The mark value can be +matched in policy routing and packetfilter rules. This option is +only supported in Linux and does nothing on other operating systems. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-socket-flags flags... +Apply the given flags to the OpenVPN transport socket. +Currently, only +.B TCP_NODELAY +is supported. + +The +.B TCP_NODELAY +socket flag is useful in TCP mode, and causes the kernel +to send tunnel packets immediately over the TCP connection without +trying to group several smaller packets into a larger packet. +This can result in a considerably improvement in latency. + +This option is pushable from server to client, and should be used +on both client and server for maximum effect. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-txqueuelen n +(Linux only) Set the TX queue length on the TUN/TAP interface. +Currently defaults to 100. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-shaper n +Limit bandwidth of outgoing tunnel data to +.B n +bytes per second on the TCP/UDP port. +If you want to limit the bandwidth +in both directions, use this option on both peers. + +OpenVPN uses the following algorithm to implement +traffic shaping: Given a shaper rate of +.I n +bytes per second, after a datagram write of +.I b +bytes is queued on the TCP/UDP port, wait a minimum of +.I (b / n) +seconds before queuing the next write. + +It should be noted that OpenVPN supports multiple +tunnels between the same two peers, allowing you +to construct full-speed and reduced bandwidth tunnels +at the same time, +routing low-priority data such as off-site backups +over the reduced bandwidth tunnel, and other data +over the full-speed tunnel. + +Also note that for low bandwidth tunnels +(under 1000 bytes per second), you should probably +use lower MTU values as well (see above), otherwise +the packet latency will grow so large as to trigger +timeouts in the TLS layer and TCP connections running +over the tunnel. + +OpenVPN allows +.B n +to be between 100 bytes/sec and 100 Mbytes/sec. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-inactive n [bytes] +Causes OpenVPN to exit after +.B n +seconds of inactivity on the TUN/TAP device. The time length of +inactivity is measured since the last incoming or outgoing tunnel +packet. The default value is 0 seconds, which disables this feature. + +If the optional +.B bytes +parameter is included, +exit if less than +.B bytes +of combined in/out traffic are produced on the tun/tap device +in +.B n +seconds. + +In any case, OpenVPN's internal ping packets (which are just +keepalives) and TLS control packets are not considered +"activity", nor are they counted as traffic, as they are used +internally by OpenVPN and are not an indication of actual user +activity. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ping n +Ping remote over the TCP/UDP control channel +if no packets have been sent for at least +.B n +seconds (specify +.B \-\-ping +on both peers to cause ping packets to be sent in both directions since +OpenVPN ping packets are not echoed like IP ping packets). +When used in one of OpenVPN's secure modes (where +.B \-\-secret, \-\-tls-server, +or +.B \-\-tls-client +is specified), the ping packet +will be cryptographically secure. + +This option has two intended uses: + +(1) Compatibility +with stateful firewalls. The periodic ping will ensure that +a stateful firewall rule which allows OpenVPN UDP packets to +pass will not time out. + +(2) To provide a basis for the remote to test the existence +of its peer using the +.B \-\-ping-exit +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ping-exit n +Causes OpenVPN to exit after +.B n +seconds pass without reception of a ping +or other packet from remote. +This option can be combined with +.B \-\-inactive, \-\-ping, +and +.B \-\-ping-exit +to create a two-tiered inactivity disconnect. + +For example, + +.B openvpn [options...] \-\-inactive 3600 \-\-ping 10 \-\-ping-exit 60 + +when used on both peers will cause OpenVPN to exit within 60 +seconds if its peer disconnects, but will exit after one +hour if no actual tunnel data is exchanged. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ping-restart n +Similar to +.B \-\-ping-exit, +but trigger a +.B SIGUSR1 +restart after +.B n +seconds pass without reception of a ping +or other packet from remote. + +This option is useful in cases +where the remote peer has a dynamic IP address and +a low-TTL DNS name is used to track the IP address using +a service such as +.I http://dyndns.org/ ++ a dynamic DNS client such +as +.B ddclient. + +If the peer cannot be reached, a restart will be triggered, causing +the hostname used with +.B \-\-remote +to be re-resolved (if +.B \-\-resolv-retry +is also specified). + +In server mode, +.B \-\-ping-restart, \-\-inactive, +or any other type of internally generated signal will always be +applied to +individual client instance objects, never to whole server itself. +Note also in server mode that any internally generated signal +which would normally cause a restart, will cause the deletion +of the client instance object instead. + +In client mode, the +.B \-\-ping-restart +parameter is set to 120 seconds by default. This default will +hold until the client pulls a replacement value from the server, based on +the +.B \-\-keepalive +setting in the server configuration. +To disable the 120 second default, set +.B \-\-ping-restart 0 +on the client. + +See the signals section below for more information +on +.B SIGUSR1. + +Note that the behavior of +.B SIGUSR1 +can be modified by the +.B \-\-persist-tun, \-\-persist-key, \-\-persist-local-ip, +and +.B \-\-persist-remote-ip +options. + +Also note that +.B \-\-ping-exit +and +.B \-\-ping-restart +are mutually exclusive and cannot be used together. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-keepalive n m +A helper directive designed to simplify the expression of +.B \-\-ping +and +.B \-\-ping-restart +in server mode configurations. + +The server timeout is set twice the value of the second argument. +This ensures that a timeout is dectected on client side +before the server side drops the connection. + +For example, +.B \-\-keepalive 10 60 +expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 + if mode server: + ping 10 + ping-restart 120 + push "ping 10" + push "ping-restart 60" + else + ping 10 + ping-restart 60 +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ping-timer-rem +Run the +.B \-\-ping-exit +/ +.B \-\-ping-restart +timer only if we have a remote address. Use this option if you are +starting the daemon in listen mode (i.e. without an explicit +.B \-\-remote +peer), and you don't want to start clocking timeouts until a remote +peer connects. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-persist-tun +Don't close and reopen TUN/TAP device or run up/down scripts +across +.B SIGUSR1 +or +.B \-\-ping-restart +restarts. + +.B SIGUSR1 +is a restart signal similar to +.B SIGHUP, +but which offers finer-grained control over +reset options. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-persist-key +Don't re-read key files across +.B SIGUSR1 +or +.B \-\-ping-restart. + +This option can be combined with +.B \-\-user nobody +to allow restarts triggered by the +.B SIGUSR1 +signal. +Normally if you drop root privileges in OpenVPN, +the daemon cannot be restarted since it will now be unable to re-read protected +key files. + +This option solves the problem by persisting keys across +.B SIGUSR1 +resets, so they don't need to be re-read. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-persist-local-ip +Preserve initially resolved local IP address and port number +across +.B SIGUSR1 +or +.B \-\-ping-restart +restarts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-persist-remote-ip +Preserve most recently authenticated remote IP address and port number +across +.B SIGUSR1 +or +.B \-\-ping-restart +restarts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mlock +Disable paging by calling the POSIX mlockall function. +Requires that OpenVPN be initially run as root (though +OpenVPN can subsequently downgrade its UID using the +.B \-\-user +option). + +Using this option ensures that key material and tunnel +data are never written to disk due to virtual +memory paging operations which occur under most +modern operating systems. It ensures that even if an +attacker was able to crack the box running OpenVPN, he +would not be able to scan the system swap file to +recover previously used +ephemeral keys, which are used for a period of time +governed by the +.B \-\-reneg +options (see below), then are discarded. + +The downside +of using +.B \-\-mlock +is that it will reduce the amount of physical +memory available to other applications. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-up cmd +Run command +.B cmd +after successful TUN/TAP device open +(pre +.B \-\-user +UID change). + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +The up command is useful for specifying route +commands which route IP traffic destined for +private subnets which exist at the other +end of the VPN connection into the tunnel. + +For +.B \-\-dev tun +execute as: + +.B cmd tun_dev tun_mtu link_mtu ifconfig_local_ip ifconfig_remote_ip [ init | restart ] + +For +.B \-\-dev tap +execute as: + +.B cmd tap_dev tap_mtu link_mtu ifconfig_local_ip ifconfig_netmask [ init | restart ] + +See the "Environmental Variables" section below for +additional parameters passed as environmental variables. + +Note that if +.B cmd +includes arguments, all OpenVPN-generated arguments will be appended +to them to build an argument list with which the executable will be +called. + +Typically, +.B cmd +will run a script to add routes to the tunnel. + +Normally the up script is called after the TUN/TAP device is opened. +In this context, the last command line parameter passed to the script +will be +.I init. +If the +.B \-\-up-restart +option is also used, the up script will be called for restarts as +well. A restart is considered to be a partial reinitialization +of OpenVPN where the TUN/TAP instance is preserved (the +.B \-\-persist-tun +option will enable such preservation). A restart +can be generated by a SIGUSR1 signal, a +.B \-\-ping-restart +timeout, or a connection reset when the TCP protocol is enabled +with the +.B \-\-proto +option. If a restart occurs, and +.B \-\-up-restart +has been specified, the up script will be called with +.I restart +as the last parameter. + +The following standalone example shows how the +.B \-\-up +script can be called in both an initialization and restart context. +(NOTE: for security reasons, don't run the following example unless UDP port +9999 is blocked by your firewall. Also, the example will run indefinitely, +so you should abort with control-c). + +.B openvpn \-\-dev tun \-\-port 9999 \-\-verb 4 \-\-ping-restart 10 \-\-up 'echo up' \-\-down 'echo down' \-\-persist-tun \-\-up-restart + +Note that OpenVPN also provides the +.B \-\-ifconfig +option to automatically ifconfig the TUN device, +eliminating the need to define an +.B \-\-up +script, unless you also want to configure routes +in the +.B \-\-up +script. + +If +.B \-\-ifconfig +is also specified, OpenVPN will pass the ifconfig local +and remote endpoints on the command line to the +.B \-\-up +script so that they can be used to configure routes such as: + +.B route add -net 10.0.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw $5 +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-up-delay +Delay TUN/TAP open and possible +.B \-\-up +script execution +until after TCP/UDP connection establishment with peer. + +In +.B \-\-proto udp +mode, this option normally requires the use of +.B \-\-ping +to allow connection initiation to be sensed in the absence +of tunnel data, since UDP is a "connectionless" protocol. + +On Windows, this option will delay the TAP-Win32 media state +transitioning to "connected" until connection establishment, +i.e. the receipt of the first authenticated packet from the peer. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-down cmd +Run command +.B cmd +after TUN/TAP device close +(post +.B \-\-user +UID change and/or +.B \-\-chroot +). +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +Called with the same parameters and environmental +variables as the +.B \-\-up +option above. + +Note that if you reduce privileges by using +.B \-\-user +and/or +.B \-\-group, +your +.B \-\-down +script will also run at reduced privilege. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-down-pre +Call +.B \-\-down +cmd/script before, rather than after, TUN/TAP close. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-up-restart +Enable the +.B \-\-up +and +.B \-\-down +scripts to be called for restarts as well as initial program start. +This option is described more fully above in the +.B \-\-up +option documentation. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-setenv name value +Set a custom environmental variable +.B name=value +to pass to script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-setenv FORWARD_COMPATIBLE 1 +Relax config file syntax checking so that unknown directives +will trigger a warning but not a fatal error, +on the assumption that a given unknown directive might be valid +in future OpenVPN versions. + +This option should be used with caution, as there are good security +reasons for having OpenVPN fail if it detects problems in a +config file. Having said that, there are valid reasons for wanting +new software features to gracefully degrade when encountered by +older software versions. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-setenv-safe name value +Set a custom environmental variable +.B OPENVPN_name=value +to pass to script. + +This directive is designed to be pushed by the server to clients, +and the prepending of "OPENVPN_" to the environmental variable +is a safety precaution to prevent a LD_PRELOAD style attack +from a malicious or compromised server. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-script-security level +This directive offers policy-level control over OpenVPN's usage of external programs +and scripts. Lower +.B level +values are more restrictive, higher values are more permissive. Settings for +.B level: + +.B 0 \-\- +Strictly no calling of external programs. +.br +.B 1 \-\- +(Default) Only call built-in executables such as ifconfig, ip, route, or netsh. +.br +.B 2 \-\- +Allow calling of built-in executables and user-defined scripts. +.br +.B 3 \-\- +Allow passwords to be passed to scripts via environmental variables (potentially unsafe). + +OpenVPN releases before v2.3 also supported a +.B method +flag which indicated how OpenVPN should call external commands and scripts. This +could be either +.B execve +or +.B system. +As of OpenVPN v2.3, this flag is no longer accepted. In most *nix environments the execve() +approach has been used without any issues. + +To run scripts in Windows in earlier OpenVPN +versions you needed to either add a full path to the script interpreter which can parse the +script or use the +.B system +flag to run these scripts. As of OpenVPN v2.3 it is now a strict requirement to have +full path to the script interpreter when running non-executables files. +This is not needed for executable files, such as .exe, .com, .bat or .cmd files. For +example, if you have a Visual Basic script, you must use this syntax now: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +\-\-up 'C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wscript.exe C:\\\\Program\\ Files\\\\OpenVPN\\\\config\\\\my-up-script.vbs' +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +Please note the single quote marks and the escaping of the backslashes (\\) and +the space character. + +The reason the support for the +.B system +flag was removed is due to the security implications with shell expansions +when executing scripts via the system() call. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-disable-occ +Don't output a warning message if option inconsistencies are detected between +peers. An example of an option inconsistency would be where one peer uses +.B \-\-dev tun +while the other peer uses +.B \-\-dev tap. + +Use of this option is discouraged, but is provided as +a temporary fix in situations where a recent version of OpenVPN must +connect to an old version. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-user user +Change the user ID of the OpenVPN process to +.B user +after initialization, dropping privileges in the process. +This option is useful to protect the system +in the event that some hostile party was able to gain control of +an OpenVPN session. Though OpenVPN's security features make +this unlikely, it is provided as a second line of defense. + +By setting +.B user +to +.I nobody +or somebody similarly unprivileged, the hostile party would be +limited in what damage they could cause. Of course once +you take away privileges, you cannot return them +to an OpenVPN session. This means, for example, that if +you want to reset an OpenVPN daemon with a +.B SIGUSR1 +signal +(for example in response +to a DHCP reset), you should make use of one or more of the +.B \-\-persist +options to ensure that OpenVPN doesn't need to execute any privileged +operations in order to restart (such as re-reading key files +or running +.BR ifconfig +on the TUN device). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-group group +Similar to the +.B \-\-user +option, +this option changes the group ID of the OpenVPN process to +.B group +after initialization. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-cd dir +Change directory to +.B dir +prior to reading any files such as +configuration files, key files, scripts, etc. +.B dir +should be an absolute path, with a leading "/", +and without any references +to the current directory such as "." or "..". + +This option is useful when you are running +OpenVPN in +.B \-\-daemon +mode, and you want to consolidate all of +your OpenVPN control files in one location. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-chroot dir +Chroot to +.B dir +after initialization. +.B \-\-chroot +essentially redefines +.B dir +as being the top +level directory tree (/). OpenVPN will therefore +be unable to access any files outside this tree. +This can be desirable from a security standpoint. + +Since the chroot operation is delayed until after +initialization, most OpenVPN options that reference +files will operate in a pre-chroot context. + +In many cases, the +.B dir +parameter can point to an empty directory, however +complications can result when scripts or restarts +are executed after the chroot operation. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-setcon context +Apply SELinux +.B context +after initialization. This +essentially provides the ability to restrict OpenVPN's +rights to only network I/O operations, thanks to +SELinux. This goes further than +.B \-\-user +and +.B \-\-chroot +in that those two, while being great security features, +unfortunately do not protect against privilege escalation +by exploitation of a vulnerable system call. You can of +course combine all three, but please note that since +setcon requires access to /proc you will have to provide +it inside the chroot directory (e.g. with mount \-\-bind). + +Since the setcon operation is delayed until after +initialization, OpenVPN can be restricted to just +network-related system calls, whereas by applying the +context before startup (such as the OpenVPN one provided +in the SELinux Reference Policies) you will have to +allow many things required only during initialization. + +Like with chroot, complications can result when scripts +or restarts are executed after the setcon operation, +which is why you should really consider using the +.B \-\-persist-key +and +.B \-\-persist-tun +options. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-daemon [progname] +Become a daemon after all initialization functions are completed. +This option will cause all message and error output to +be sent to the syslog file (such as /var/log/messages), +except for the output of scripts and +ifconfig commands, +which will go to /dev/null unless otherwise redirected. +The syslog redirection occurs immediately at the point +that +.B \-\-daemon +is parsed on the command line even though +the daemonization point occurs later. If one of the +.B \-\-log +options is present, it will supercede syslog +redirection. + +The optional +.B progname +parameter will cause OpenVPN to report its program name +to the system logger as +.B progname. +This can be useful in linking OpenVPN messages +in the syslog file with specific tunnels. +When unspecified, +.B progname +defaults to "openvpn". + +When OpenVPN is run with the +.B \-\-daemon +option, it will try to delay daemonization until the majority of initialization +functions which are capable of generating fatal errors are complete. This means +that initialization scripts can test the return status of the +openvpn command for a fairly reliable indication of whether the command +has correctly initialized and entered the packet forwarding event loop. + +In OpenVPN, the vast majority of errors which occur after initialization are non-fatal. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-syslog [progname] +Direct log output to system logger, but do not become a daemon. +See +.B \-\-daemon +directive above for description of +.B progname +parameter. +.TP +.B \-\-errors-to-stderr +Output errors to stderr instead of stdout unless log output is redirected by one of the +.B \-\-log +options. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-passtos +Set the TOS field of the tunnel packet to what the payload's TOS is. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-inetd [wait|nowait] [progname] +Use this option when OpenVPN is being run from the inetd or +.BR xinetd(8) +server. + +The +.B wait/nowait +option must match what is specified in the inetd/xinetd +config file. The +.B nowait +mode can only be used with +.B \-\-proto tcp-server. +The default is +.B wait. +The +.B nowait +mode can be used to instantiate the OpenVPN daemon as a classic TCP server, +where client connection requests are serviced on a single +port number. For additional information on this kind of configuration, +see the OpenVPN FAQ: +.I http://openvpn.net/faq.html#oneport + +This option precludes the use of +.B \-\-daemon, \-\-local, +or +.B \-\-remote. +Note that this option causes message and error output to be handled in the same +way as the +.B \-\-daemon +option. The optional +.B progname +parameter is also handled exactly as in +.B \-\-daemon. + +Also note that in +.B wait +mode, each OpenVPN tunnel requires a separate TCP/UDP port and +a separate inetd or xinetd entry. See the OpenVPN 1.x HOWTO for an example +on using OpenVPN with xinetd: +.I http://openvpn.net/1xhowto.html +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-log file +Output logging messages to +.B file, +including output to stdout/stderr which +is generated by called scripts. +If +.B file +already exists it will be truncated. +This option takes effect +immediately when it is parsed in the command line +and will supercede syslog output if +.B \-\-daemon +or +.B \-\-inetd +is also specified. +This option is persistent over the entire course of +an OpenVPN instantiation and will not be reset by SIGHUP, +SIGUSR1, or +.B \-\-ping-restart. + +Note that on Windows, when OpenVPN is started as a service, +logging occurs by default without the need to specify +this option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-log-append file +Append logging messages to +.B file. +If +.B file +does not exist, it will be created. +This option behaves exactly like +.B \-\-log +except that it appends to rather +than truncating the log file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-suppress-timestamps +Avoid writing timestamps to log messages, even when they +otherwise would be prepended. In particular, this applies to +log messages sent to stdout. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-writepid file +Write OpenVPN's main process ID to +.B file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-nice n +Change process priority after initialization +( +.B n +greater than 0 is lower priority, +.B n +less than zero is higher priority). +.\"********************************************************* +.\".TP +.\".B \-\-nice-work n +.\"Change priority of background TLS work thread. The TLS thread +.\"feature is enabled when OpenVPN is built +.\"with pthread support, and you are running OpenVPN +.\"in TLS mode (i.e. with +.\".B \-\-tls-client +.\"or +.\".B \-\-tls-server +.\"specified). +.\" +.\"Using a TLS thread offloads the CPU-intensive process of SSL/TLS-based +.\"key exchange to a background thread so that it does not become +.\"a latency bottleneck in the tunnel packet forwarding process. +.\" +.\"The parameter +.\".B n +.\"is interpreted exactly as with the +.\".B \-\-nice +.\"option above, but in relation to the work thread rather +.\"than the main thread. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-fast-io +(Experimental) Optimize TUN/TAP/UDP I/O writes by avoiding +a call to poll/epoll/select prior to the write operation. The purpose +of such a call would normally be to block until the device +or socket is ready to accept the write. Such blocking is unnecessary +on some platforms which don't support write blocking on UDP sockets +or TUN/TAP devices. In such cases, one can optimize the event loop +by avoiding the poll/epoll/select call, improving CPU efficiency +by 5% to 10%. + +This option can only be used on non-Windows systems, when +.B \-\-proto udp +is specified, and when +.B \-\-shaper +is NOT specified. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-multihome +Configure a multi-homed UDP server. This option can be used when +OpenVPN has been configured to listen on all interfaces, and will +attempt to bind client sessions to the interface on which packets +are being received, so that outgoing packets will be sent out +of the same interface. Note that this option is only relevant for +UDP servers and currently is only implemented on Linux. + +Note: clients connecting to a +.B \-\-multihome +server should always use the +.B \-\-nobind +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-echo [parms...] +Echo +.B parms +to log output. + +Designed to be used to send messages to a controlling application +which is receiving the OpenVPN log output. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remap-usr1 signal +Control whether internally or externally +generated SIGUSR1 signals are remapped to +SIGHUP (restart without persisting state) or +SIGTERM (exit). + +.B signal +can be set to "SIGHUP" or "SIGTERM". By default, no remapping +occurs. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-verb n +Set output verbosity to +.B n +(default=1). Each level shows all info from the previous levels. +Level 3 is recommended if you want a good summary +of what's happening without being swamped by output. + +.B 0 \-\- +No output except fatal errors. +.br +.B 1 to 4 \-\- +Normal usage range. +.br +.B 5 \-\- +Output +.B R +and +.B W +characters to the console for each packet read and write, uppercase is +used for TCP/UDP packets and lowercase is used for TUN/TAP packets. +.br +.B 6 to 11 \-\- +Debug info range (see errlevel.h for additional +information on debug levels). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-status file [n] +Write operational status to +.B file +every +.B n +seconds. + +Status can also be written to the syslog by sending a +.B SIGUSR2 +signal. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-status-version [n] +Choose the status file format version number. Currently +.B n +can be 1, 2, or 3 and defaults to 1. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mute n +Log at most +.B n +consecutive messages in the same category. This is useful to +limit repetitive logging of similar message types. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-comp-lzo [mode] +Use fast LZO compression \-\- may add up to 1 byte per +packet for incompressible data. +.B mode +may be "yes", "no", or "adaptive" (default). + +In a server mode setup, it is possible to selectively turn +compression on or off for individual clients. + +First, make sure the client-side config file enables selective +compression by having at least one +.B \-\-comp-lzo +directive, such as +.B \-\-comp-lzo no. +This will turn off compression by default, +but allow a future directive push from the server to +dynamically change the +on/off/adaptive setting. + +Next in a +.B \-\-client-config-dir +file, specify the compression setting for the client, +for example: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +comp-lzo yes +push "comp-lzo yes" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +The first line sets the +.B comp-lzo +setting for the server +side of the link, the second sets the client side. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-comp-noadapt +When used in conjunction with +.B \-\-comp-lzo, +this option will disable OpenVPN's adaptive compression algorithm. +Normally, adaptive compression is enabled with +.B \-\-comp-lzo. + +Adaptive compression tries to optimize the case where you have +compression enabled, but you are sending predominantly uncompressible +(or pre-compressed) packets over the tunnel, such as an FTP or rsync transfer +of a large, compressed file. With adaptive compression, +OpenVPN will periodically sample the compression process to measure its +efficiency. If the data being sent over the tunnel is already compressed, +the compression efficiency will be very low, triggering openvpn to disable +compression for a period of time until the next re-sample test. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management IP port [pw-file] +Enable a TCP server on +.B IP:port +to handle daemon management functions. +.B pw-file, +if specified, +is a password file (password on first line) +or "stdin" to prompt from standard input. The password +provided will set the password which TCP clients will need +to provide in order to access management functions. + +The management interface can also listen on a unix domain socket, +for those platforms that support it. To use a unix domain socket, specify +the unix socket pathname in place of +.B IP +and set +.B port +to 'unix'. While the default behavior is to create a unix domain socket +that may be connected to by any process, the +.B \-\-management-client-user +and +.B \-\-management-client-group +directives can be used to restrict access. + +The management interface provides a special mode where the TCP +management link can operate over the tunnel itself. To enable this mode, +set +.B IP += "tunnel". Tunnel mode will cause the management interface +to listen for a TCP connection on the local VPN address of the +TUN/TAP interface. + +While the management port is designed for programmatic control +of OpenVPN by other applications, it is possible to telnet +to the port, using a telnet client in "raw" mode. Once connected, +type "help" for a list of commands. + +For detailed documentation on the management interface, see +the management-notes.txt file in the +.B management +folder of +the OpenVPN source distribution. + +It is strongly recommended that +.B IP +be set to 127.0.0.1 +(localhost) to restrict accessibility of the management +server to local clients. +.TP +.B \-\-management-client +Management interface will connect as a TCP/unix domain client to +.B IP:port +specified by +.B \-\-management +rather than listen as a TCP server or on a unix domain socket. + +If the client connection fails to connect or is disconnected, +a SIGTERM signal will be generated causing OpenVPN to quit. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-query-passwords +Query management channel for private key password and +.B \-\-auth-user-pass +username/password. Only query the management channel +for inputs which ordinarily would have been queried from the +console. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-query-proxy +Query management channel for proxy server information for a specific +.B \-\-remote +(client-only). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-query-remote +Allow management interface to override +.B \-\-remote +directives (client-only). +.\"********************************************************* +.B \-\-management-external-key +Allows usage for external private key file instead of +.B \-\-key +option (client-only). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-forget-disconnect +Make OpenVPN forget passwords when management session +disconnects. + +This directive does not affect the +.B \-\-http-proxy +username/password. It is always cached. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-hold +Start OpenVPN in a hibernating state, until a client +of the management interface explicitly starts it +with the +.B hold release +command. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-signal +Send SIGUSR1 signal to OpenVPN if management session disconnects. +This is useful when you wish to disconnect an OpenVPN session on +user logoff. For --management-client this option is not needed since +a disconnect will always generate a SIGTERM. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-log-cache n +Cache the most recent +.B n +lines of log file history for usage +by the management channel. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-up-down +Report tunnel up/down events to management interface. +.B +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-client-auth +Gives management interface client the responsibility +to authenticate clients after their client certificate +has been verified. See management-notes.txt in OpenVPN +distribution for detailed notes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-client-pf +Management interface clients must specify a packet +filter file for each connecting client. See management-notes.txt +in OpenVPN distribution for detailed notes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-client-user u +When the management interface is listening on a unix domain socket, +only allow connections from user +.B u. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-management-client-group g +When the management interface is listening on a unix domain socket, +only allow connections from group +.B g. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-plugin module-pathname [init-string] +Load plug-in module from the file +.B module-pathname, +passing +.B init-string +as an argument +to the module initialization function. Multiple +plugin modules may be loaded into one OpenVPN +process. + +For more information and examples on how to build OpenVPN +plug-in modules, see the README file in the +.B plugin +folder of the OpenVPN source distribution. + +If you are using an RPM install of OpenVPN, see +/usr/share/openvpn/plugin. The documentation is +in +.B doc +and the actual plugin modules are in +.B lib. + +Multiple plugin modules can be cascaded, and modules can be +used in tandem with scripts. The modules will be called by +OpenVPN in the order that they are declared in the config +file. If both a plugin and script are configured for the same +callback, the script will be called last. If the +return code of the module/script controls an authentication +function (such as tls-verify, auth-user-pass-verify, or +client-connect), then +every module and script must return success (0) in order for +the connection to be authenticated. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Server Mode +Starting with OpenVPN 2.0, a multi-client TCP/UDP server mode +is supported, and can be enabled with the +.B \-\-mode server +option. In server mode, OpenVPN will listen on a single +port for incoming client connections. All client +connections will be routed through a single tun or tap +interface. This mode is designed for scalability and should +be able to support hundreds or even thousands of clients +on sufficiently fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must +be used in this mode. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-server network netmask +A helper directive designed to simplify the configuration +of OpenVPN's server mode. This directive will set up an +OpenVPN server which will allocate addresses to clients +out of the given network/netmask. The server itself +will take the ".1" address of the given network +for use as the server-side endpoint of the local +TUN/TAP interface. + +For example, +.B \-\-server 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 +expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 + mode server + tls-server + push "topology [topology]" + + if dev tun AND (topology == net30 OR topology == p2p): + ifconfig 10.8.0.1 10.8.0.2 + if !nopool: + ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.4 10.8.0.251 + route 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 + if client-to-client: + push "route 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0" + else if topology == net30: + push "route 10.8.0.1" + + if dev tap OR (dev tun AND topology == subnet): + ifconfig 10.8.0.1 255.255.255.0 + if !nopool: + ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.254 255.255.255.0 + push "route-gateway 10.8.0.1" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +Don't use +.B \-\-server +if you are ethernet bridging. Use +.B \-\-server-bridge +instead. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-server-bridge gateway netmask pool-start-IP pool-end-IP +.TP +.B \-\-server-bridge ['nogw'] + +A helper directive similar to +.B \-\-server +which is designed to simplify the configuration +of OpenVPN's server mode in ethernet bridging configurations. + +If +.B \-\-server-bridge +is used without any parameters, it will enable a DHCP-proxy +mode, where connecting OpenVPN clients will receive an IP +address for their TAP adapter from the DHCP server running +on the OpenVPN server-side LAN. +Note that only clients that support +the binding of a DHCP client with the TAP adapter (such as +Windows) can support this mode. The optional +.B nogw +flag (advanced) indicates that gateway information should not be +pushed to the client. + +To configure ethernet bridging, you +must first use your OS's bridging capability +to bridge the TAP interface with the ethernet +NIC interface. For example, on Linux this is done +with the +.B brctl +tool, and with Windows XP it is done in the Network +Connections Panel by selecting the ethernet and +TAP adapters and right-clicking on "Bridge Connections". + +Next you you must manually set the +IP/netmask on the bridge interface. The +.B gateway +and +.B netmask +parameters to +.B \-\-server-bridge +can be set to either the IP/netmask of the +bridge interface, or the IP/netmask of the +default gateway/router on the bridged +subnet. + +Finally, set aside a IP range in the bridged +subnet, +denoted by +.B pool-start-IP +and +.B pool-end-IP, +for OpenVPN to allocate to connecting +clients. + +For example, +.B server-bridge 10.8.0.4 255.255.255.0 10.8.0.128 10.8.0.254 +expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +mode server +tls-server + +ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.128 10.8.0.254 255.255.255.0 +push "route-gateway 10.8.0.4" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +In another example, +.B \-\-server-bridge +(without parameters) expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +mode server +tls-server + +push "route-gateway dhcp" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +Or +.B \-\-server-bridge nogw +expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +mode server +tls-server +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-push "option" +Push a config file option back to the client for remote +execution. Note that +.B +option +must be enclosed in double quotes (""). The client must specify +.B \-\-pull +in its config file. The set of options which can be +pushed is limited by both feasibility and security. +Some options such as those which would execute scripts +are banned, since they would effectively allow a compromised +server to execute arbitrary code on the client. +Other options such as TLS or MTU parameters +cannot be pushed because the client needs to know +them before the connection to the server can be initiated. + +This is a partial list of options which can currently be pushed: +.B \-\-route, \-\-route-gateway, \-\-route-delay, \-\-redirect-gateway, +.B \-\-ip-win32, \-\-dhcp-option, +.B \-\-inactive, \-\-ping, \-\-ping-exit, \-\-ping-restart, +.B \-\-setenv, +.B \-\-persist-key, \-\-persist-tun, \-\-echo, +.B \-\-comp-lzo, +.B \-\-socket-flags, +.B \-\-sndbuf, \-\-rcvbuf +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-push-reset +Don't inherit the global push list for a specific client instance. +Specify this option in a client-specific context such +as with a +.B \-\-client-config-dir +configuration file. This option will ignore +.B \-\-push +options at the global config file level. +.TP +.B \-\-push-peer-info +Push additional information about the client to server. The additional information +consists of the following data: + +IV_VER= -- the client OpenVPN version + +IV_PLAT=[linux|solaris|openbsd|mac|netbsd|freebsd|win] -- the client OS platform + +IV_HWADDR= -- the MAC address of clients default gateway + +IV_LZO_STUB=1 -- if client was built with LZO stub capability + +UV_= -- client environment variables whose names start with "UV_" +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-disable +Disable a particular client (based on the common name) +from connecting. Don't use this option to disable a client +due to key or password compromise. Use a CRL (certificate +revocation list) instead (see the +.B \-\-crl-verify +option). + +This option must be associated with a specific client instance, +which means that it must be specified either in a client +instance config file using +.B \-\-client-config-dir +or dynamically generated using a +.B \-\-client-connect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool start-IP end-IP [netmask] +Set aside a pool of subnets to be +dynamically allocated to connecting clients, similar +to a DHCP server. For tun-style +tunnels, each client will be given a /30 subnet (for +interoperability with Windows clients). For tap-style +tunnels, individual addresses will be allocated, and the +optional +.B netmask +parameter will also be pushed to clients. + +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool-persist file [seconds] +Persist/unpersist ifconfig-pool +data to +.B file, +at +.B seconds +intervals (default=600), as well as on program startup and +shutdown. + +The goal of this option is to provide a long-term association +between clients (denoted by their common name) and the virtual +IP address assigned to them from the ifconfig-pool. +Maintaining a long-term +association is good for clients because it allows them +to effectively use the +.B \-\-persist-tun +option. + +.B file +is a comma-delimited ASCII file, formatted as +,. + +If +.B seconds += 0, +.B file +will be treated as read-only. This is useful if +you would like to treat +.B file +as a configuration file. + +Note that the entries in this file are treated by OpenVPN as +suggestions only, based on past associations between +a common name and IP address. They do not guarantee that the given common +name will always receive the given IP address. If you want guaranteed +assignment, use +.B \-\-ifconfig-push +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool-linear +Modifies the +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool +directive to +allocate individual TUN interface addresses for +clients rather than /30 subnets. NOTE: This option +is incompatible with Windows clients. + +This option is deprecated, and should be replaced with +.B \-\-topology p2p +which is functionally equivalent. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ifconfig-push local remote-netmask [alias] +Push virtual IP endpoints for client tunnel, +overriding the \-\-ifconfig-pool dynamic allocation. + +The parameters +.B local +and +.B remote-netmask +are set according to the +.B \-\-ifconfig +directive which you want to execute on the client machine to +configure the remote end of the tunnel. Note that the parameters +.B local +and +.B remote-netmask +are from the perspective of the client, not the server. They may be +DNS names rather than IP addresses, in which case they will be resolved +on the server at the time of client connection. + +The optional +.B alias +parameter may be used in cases where NAT causes the client view +of its local endpoint to differ from the server view. In this case +.B local/remote-netmask +will refer to the server view while +.B alias/remote-netmask +will refer to the client view. + +This option must be associated with a specific client instance, +which means that it must be specified either in a client +instance config file using +.B \-\-client-config-dir +or dynamically generated using a +.B \-\-client-connect +script. + +Remember also to include a +.B \-\-route +directive in the main OpenVPN config file which encloses +.B local, +so that the kernel will know to route it +to the server's TUN/TAP interface. + +OpenVPN's internal client IP address selection algorithm works as +follows: + +.B 1 +\-\- Use +.B \-\-client-connect script +generated file for static IP (first choice). +.br +.B 2 +\-\- Use +.B \-\-client-config-dir +file for static IP (next choice). +.br +.B 3 +\-\- Use +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool +allocation for dynamic IP (last choice). +.br +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-iroute network [netmask] +Generate an internal route to a specific +client. The +.B netmask +parameter, if omitted, defaults to 255.255.255.255. + +This directive can be used to route a fixed subnet from +the server to a particular client, regardless +of where the client is connecting from. Remember +that you must also add the route to the system +routing table as well (such as by using the +.B \-\-route +directive). The reason why two routes are needed +is that the +.B \-\-route +directive routes the packet from the kernel +to OpenVPN. Once in OpenVPN, the +.B \-\-iroute +directive routes to the specific client. + +This option must be specified either in a client +instance config file using +.B \-\-client-config-dir +or dynamically generated using a +.B \-\-client-connect +script. + +The +.B \-\-iroute +directive also has an important interaction with +.B \-\-push +"route ...". +.B \-\-iroute +essentially defines a subnet which is owned by a +particular client (we will call this client A). +If you would like other clients to be able to reach A's +subnet, you can use +.B \-\-push +"route ..." +together with +.B \-\-client-to-client +to effect this. In order for all clients to see +A's subnet, OpenVPN must push this route to all clients +EXCEPT for A, since the subnet is already owned by A. +OpenVPN accomplishes this by not +not pushing a route to a client +if it matches one of the client's iroutes. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-to-client +Because the OpenVPN server mode handles multiple clients +through a single tun or tap interface, it is effectively +a router. The +.B \-\-client-to-client +flag tells OpenVPN to internally route client-to-client +traffic rather than pushing all client-originating traffic +to the TUN/TAP interface. + +When this option is used, each client will "see" the other +clients which are currently connected. Otherwise, each +client will only see the server. Don't use this option +if you want to firewall tunnel traffic using +custom, per-client rules. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-duplicate-cn +Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently connect. +In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client instance +upon connection of a new client having the same common name. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-connect cmd +Run +.B command cmd +on client connection. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +The command is passed the common name +and IP address of the just-authenticated client +as environmental variables (see environmental variable section +below). The command is also passed +the pathname of a freshly created temporary file as the last argument +(after any arguments specified in +.B cmd +), to be used by the command +to pass dynamically generated config file directives back to OpenVPN. + +If the script wants to generate a dynamic config file +to be applied on the server when the client connects, +it should write it to the file named by the last argument. + +See the +.B \-\-client-config-dir +option below for options which +can be legally used in a dynamically generated config file. + +Note that the return value of +.B script +is significant. If +.B script +returns a non-zero error status, it will cause the client +to be disconnected. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-disconnect cmd +Like +.B \-\-client-connect +but called on client instance shutdown. Will not be called +unless the +.B \-\-client-connect +script and plugins (if defined) +were previously called on this instance with +successful (0) status returns. + +The exception to this rule is if the +.B \-\-client-disconnect +command or plugins are cascaded, and at least one client-connect +function succeeded, then ALL of the client-disconnect functions for +scripts and plugins will be called on client instance object deletion, +even in cases where some of the related client-connect functions returned +an error status. + +The +.B \-\-client-disconnect +command is passed the same pathname as the corresponding +.B \-\-client-connect +command as its last argument. (after any arguments specified in +.B cmd +). +.B +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-config-dir dir +Specify a directory +.B dir +for custom client config files. After +a connecting client has been authenticated, OpenVPN will +look in this directory for a file having the same name +as the client's X509 common name. If a matching file +exists, it will be opened and parsed for client-specific +configuration options. If no matching file is found, OpenVPN +will instead try to open and parse a default file called +"DEFAULT", which may be provided but is not required. Note that +the configuration files must be readable by the OpenVPN process +after it has dropped it's root privileges. + +This file can specify a fixed IP address for a given +client using +.B \-\-ifconfig-push, +as well as fixed subnets owned by the client using +.B \-\-iroute. + +One of the useful properties of this option is that it +allows client configuration files to be conveniently +created, edited, or removed while the server is live, +without needing to restart the server. + +The following +options are legal in a client-specific context: +.B \-\-push, \-\-push-reset, \-\-iroute, \-\-ifconfig-push, +and +.B \-\-config. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ccd-exclusive +Require, as a +condition of authentication, that a connecting client has a +.B \-\-client-config-dir +file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tmp-dir dir +Specify a directory +.B dir +for temporary files. This directory will be used by +openvpn processes and script to communicate temporary +data with openvpn main process. Note that +the directory must be writable by the OpenVPN process +after it has dropped it's root privileges. + +This directory will be used by in the following cases: + +* +.B \-\-client-connect +scripts to dynamically generate client-specific +configuration files. + +* +.B OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY +plugin hook to return success/failure via auth_control_file +when using deferred auth method + +* +.B OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF +plugin hook to pass filtering rules via pf_file +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-hash-size r v +Set the size of the real address hash table to +.B r +and the virtual address table to +.B v. +By default, both tables are sized at 256 buckets. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-bcast-buffers n +Allocate +.B n +buffers for broadcast datagrams (default=256). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tcp-queue-limit n +Maximum number of output packets queued before TCP (default=64). + +When OpenVPN is tunneling data from a TUN/TAP device to a +remote client over a TCP connection, it is possible that the TUN/TAP device +might produce data at a faster rate than the TCP connection +can support. When the number of output packets queued before sending to +the TCP socket reaches this limit for a given client connection, +OpenVPN will start to drop outgoing packets directed +at this client. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tcp-nodelay +This macro sets the TCP_NODELAY socket flag on the server +as well as pushes it to connecting clients. The TCP_NODELAY +flag disables the Nagle algorithm on TCP sockets causing +packets to be transmitted immediately with low latency, +rather than waiting a short period of time in order +to aggregate several packets into a larger containing +packet. In VPN applications over TCP, TCP_NODELAY +is generally a good latency optimization. + +The macro expands as follows: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 + if mode server: + socket-flags TCP_NODELAY + push "socket-flags TCP_NODELAY" +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-max-clients n +Limit server to a maximum of +.B n +concurrent clients. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-max-routes-per-client n +Allow a maximum of +.B n +internal routes per client (default=256). +This is designed to +help contain DoS attacks where an authenticated client floods the +server with packets appearing to come from many unique MAC addresses, +forcing the server to deplete +virtual memory as its internal routing table expands. +This directive can be used in a +.B \-\-client-config-dir +file or auto-generated by a +.B \-\-client-connect +script to override the global value for a particular client. + +Note that this +directive affects OpenVPN's internal routing table, not the +kernel routing table. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-stale-routes-check n [t] +Remove routes haven't had activity for +.B n +seconds (i.e. the ageing time). + +This check is ran every +.B t +seconds (i.e. check interval). + +If +.B t +is not present it defaults to +.B n + +This option helps to keep the dynamic routing table small. +See also +.B \-\-max-routes-per-client +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-connect-freq n sec +Allow a maximum of +.B n +new connections per +.B sec +seconds from clients. This is designed to contain DoS attacks which flood +the server with connection requests using certificates which +will ultimately fail to authenticate. + +This is an imperfect solution however, because in a real +DoS scenario, legitimate connections might also be refused. + +For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, +use +.B \-\-proto udp +and +.B \-\-tls-auth. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-learn-address cmd +Run command +.B cmd +to validate client virtual addresses or routes. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +Three arguments will be appended to any arguments in +.B cmd +as follows: + +.B [1] operation \-\- +"add", "update", or "delete" based on whether or not +the address is being added to, modified, or deleted from +OpenVPN's internal routing table. +.br +.B [2] address \-\- +The address being learned or unlearned. This can be +an IPv4 address such as "198.162.10.14", an IPv4 subnet +such as "198.162.10.0/24", or an ethernet MAC address (when +.B \-\-dev tap +is being used) such as "00:FF:01:02:03:04". +.br +.B [3] common name \-\- +The common name on the certificate associated with the +client linked to this address. Only present for "add" +or "update" operations, not "delete". + +On "add" or "update" methods, if the script returns +a failure code (non-zero), OpenVPN will reject the address +and will not modify its internal routing table. + +Normally, the +.B cmd +script will use the information provided above to set +appropriate firewall entries on the VPN TUN/TAP interface. +Since OpenVPN provides the association between virtual IP +or MAC address and the client's authenticated common name, +it allows a user-defined script to configure firewall access +policies with regard to the client's high-level common name, +rather than the low level client virtual addresses. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify cmd method +Require the client to provide a username/password (possibly +in addition to a client certificate) for authentication. + +OpenVPN will run +.B command cmd +to validate the username/password +provided by the client. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +If +.B method +is set to "via-env", OpenVPN will call +.B script +with the environmental variables +.B username +and +.B password +set to the username/password strings provided by the client. +Be aware that this method is insecure on some platforms which +make the environment of a process publicly visible to other +unprivileged processes. + +If +.B method +is set to "via-file", OpenVPN will write the username and +password to the first two lines of a temporary file. The filename +will be passed as an argument to +.B script, +and the file will be automatically deleted by OpenVPN after +the script returns. The location of the temporary file is +controlled by the +.B \-\-tmp-dir +option, and will default to the current directory if unspecified. +For security, consider setting +.B \-\-tmp-dir +to a volatile storage medium such as +.B /dev/shm +(if available) to prevent the username/password file from touching the hard drive. + +The script should examine the username +and password, +returning a success exit code (0) if the +client's authentication request is to be accepted, or a failure +code (1) to reject the client. + +This directive is designed to enable a plugin-style interface +for extending OpenVPN's authentication capabilities. + +To protect against a client passing a maliciously formed +username or password string, the username string must +consist only of these characters: alphanumeric, underbar +('_'), dash ('-'), dot ('.'), or at ('@'). The password +string can consist of any printable characters except for +CR or LF. Any illegal characters in either the username +or password string will be converted to underbar ('_'). + +Care must be taken by any user-defined scripts to avoid +creating a security vulnerability in the way that these +strings are handled. Never use these strings in such a way +that they might be escaped or evaluated by a shell interpreter. + +For a sample script that performs PAM authentication, see +.B sample-scripts/auth-pam.pl +in the OpenVPN source distribution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-opt-verify +Clients that connect with options that are incompatible +with those of the server will be disconnected. + +Options that will be compared for compatibility include +dev-type, link-mtu, tun-mtu, proto, tun-ipv6, ifconfig, +comp-lzo, fragment, keydir, cipher, auth, keysize, secret, +no-replay, no-iv, tls-auth, key-method, tls-server, and tls-client. + +This option requires that +.B \-\-disable-occ +NOT be used. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-optional +Allow connections by clients that do not specify a username/password. +Normally, when +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +or +.B \-\-management-client-auth +is specified (or an authentication plugin module), the +OpenVPN server daemon will require connecting clients to specify a +username and password. This option makes the submission of a username/password +by clients optional, passing the responsibility to the user-defined authentication +module/script to accept or deny the client based on other factors +(such as the setting of X509 certificate fields). When this option is used, +and a connecting client does not submit a username/password, the user-defined +authentication module/script will see the username and password as being set +to empty strings (""). The authentication module/script MUST have logic +to detect this condition and respond accordingly. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-cert-not-required +Don't require client certificate, client will authenticate +using username/password only. Be aware that using this directive +is less secure than requiring certificates from all clients. + +If you use this directive, the +entire responsibility of authentication will rest on your +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script, so keep in mind that bugs in your script +could potentially compromise the security of your VPN. + +If you don't use this directive, but you also specify an +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script, then OpenVPN will perform double authentication. The +client certificate verification AND the +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script will need to succeed in order for a client to be +authenticated and accepted onto the VPN. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-username-as-common-name +For +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +authentication, use +the authenticated username as the common name, +rather than the common name from the client cert. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] +Until OpenVPN v2.3 the format of the X.509 Subject fields was formatted +like this: +.IP +.B +/C=US/L=Somewhere/CN=John Doe/emailAddress=john@example.com +.IP +In addition the old behavivour was to remap any character other than +alphanumeric, underscore ('_'), dash ('-'), dot ('.'), and slash ('/') to +underscore ('_'). The X.509 Subject string as returned by the +.B tls_id +environmental variable, could additionally contain colon (':') or equal ('='). +.IP +When using the +.B \-\-compat\-names +option, this old formatting and remapping will be re-enabled again. This is +purely implemented for compatibility reasons when using older plug-ins or +scripts which does not handle the new formatting or UTF-8 characters. +.IP +In OpenVPN v2.3 the formatting of these fields changed into a more +standardised format. It now looks like: +.IP +.B +C=US, L=Somewhere, CN=John Doe, emailAddress=john@example.com +.IP +The new default format in OpenVPN v2.3 also does not do the character remapping +which happened earlier. This new format enables proper support for UTF\-8 +characters in the usernames, X.509 Subject fields and Common Name variables and +it complies to the RFC 2253, UTF\-8 String Representation of Distinguished +Names. + +As a backwards compatibility for the removed \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature in +older OpenVPN versions, the +.B no\-remapping +mode flag can be used with the +.B +\-\-compat\-names +option. +When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, Subject, and username strings are +allowed to include any printable character including space, but excluding +control characters such as tab, newline, and carriage-return. It ensures +compatibility with the +.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping +option of OpenVPN versions before v2.3. + +.B Please note: +This option will not be around for a long time. It is only implemented +to make the transition to the new formatting less intrusive. It will be +removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you start +the process to support the new formatting as soon as possible. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-port-share host port [dir] +When run in TCP server mode, share the OpenVPN port with +another application, such as an HTTPS server. If OpenVPN +senses a connection to its port which is using a non-OpenVPN +protocol, it will proxy the connection to the server at +.B host:port. +Currently only designed to work with HTTP/HTTPS, +though it would be theoretically possible to extend to +other protocols such as ssh. + +.B dir +specifies an optional directory where a temporary file with name N +containing content C will be dynamically generated for each proxy +connection, where N is the source IP:port of the client connection +and C is the source IP:port of the connection to the proxy +receiver. This directory can be used as a dictionary by +the proxy receiver to determine the origin of the connection. +Each generated file will be automatically deleted when the proxied +connection is torn down. + +Not implemented on Windows. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Client Mode +Use client mode when connecting to an OpenVPN server +which has +.B \-\-server, \-\-server-bridge, +or +.B \-\-mode server +in it's configuration. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client +A helper directive designed to simplify the configuration +of OpenVPN's client mode. This directive is equivalent to: + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 + pull + tls-client +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pull +This option must be used on a client which is connecting +to a multi-client server. It indicates to OpenVPN that it +should accept options pushed by the server, provided they +are part of the legal set of pushable options (note that the +.B \-\-pull +option is implied by +.B \-\-client +). + +In particular, +.B \-\-pull +allows the server to push routes to the client, so you should +not use +.B \-\-pull +or +.B \-\-client +in situations where you don't trust the server to have control +over the client's routing table. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-user-pass [up] +Authenticate with server using username/password. +.B up +is a file containing username/password on 2 lines (Note: OpenVPN +will only read passwords from a file if it has been built +with the \-\-enable-password-save configure option, or on Windows +by defining ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE in win/settings.in). + +If +.B up +is omitted, username/password will be prompted from the +console. + +The server configuration must specify an +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script to verify the username/password provided by +the client. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-retry type +Controls how OpenVPN responds to username/password verification +errors such as the client-side response to an AUTH_FAILED message from the server +or verification failure of the private key password. + +Normally used to prevent auth errors from being fatal +on the client side, and to permit username/password requeries in case +of error. + +An AUTH_FAILED message is generated by the server if the client +fails +.B \-\-auth-user-pass +authentication, or if the server-side +.B \-\-client-connect +script returns an error status when the client +tries to connect. + +.B type +can be one of: + +.B none \-\- +Client will exit with a fatal error (this is the default). +.br +.B nointeract \-\- +Client will retry the connection without requerying for an +.B \-\-auth-user-pass +username/password. Use this option for unattended clients. +.br +.B interact \-\- +Client will requery for an +.B \-\-auth-user-pass +username/password and/or private key password before attempting a reconnection. + +Note that while this option cannot be pushed, it can be controlled +from the management interface. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-static\-challenge t e +Enable static challenge/response protocol using challenge text +.B t, +with +echo flag given by +.B e +(0|1). + +The echo flag indicates whether or not the user's response +to the challenge should be echoed. + +See management\-notes.txt in the OpenVPN distribution for a +description of the OpenVPN challenge/response protocol. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-server-poll-timeout n +when polling possible remote servers to connect to +in a round-robin fashion, spend no more than +.B n +seconds waiting for a response before trying the next server. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-explicit-exit-notify [n] +In UDP client mode or point-to-point mode, send server/peer an exit notification +if tunnel is restarted or OpenVPN process is exited. In client mode, on +exit/restart, this +option will tell the server to immediately close its client instance object +rather than waiting for a timeout. The +.B n +parameter (default=1) controls the maximum number of attempts that the client +will try to resend the exit notification message. OpenVPN will not send any exit +notifications unless this option is enabled. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Data Channel Encryption Options: +These options are meaningful for both Static & TLS-negotiated key modes +(must be compatible between peers). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-secret file [direction] +Enable Static Key encryption mode (non-TLS). +Use pre-shared secret +.B file +which was generated with +.B \-\-genkey. + +The optional +.B direction +parameter enables the use of 4 distinct keys +(HMAC-send, cipher-encrypt, HMAC-receive, cipher-decrypt), so that +each data flow direction has a different set of HMAC and cipher keys. +This has a number of desirable security properties including +eliminating certain kinds of DoS and message replay attacks. + +When the +.B direction +parameter is omitted, 2 keys are used bidirectionally, one for HMAC +and the other for encryption/decryption. + +The +.B direction +parameter should always be complementary on either side of the connection, +i.e. one side should use "0" and the other should use "1", or both sides +should omit it altogether. + +The +.B direction +parameter requires that +.B file +contains a 2048 bit key. While pre-1.5 versions of OpenVPN +generate 1024 bit key files, any version of OpenVPN which +supports the +.B direction +parameter, will also support 2048 bit key file generation +using the +.B \-\-genkey +option. + +Static key encryption mode has certain advantages, +the primary being ease of configuration. + +There are no certificates +or certificate authorities or complicated negotiation handshakes and protocols. +The only requirement is that you have a pre-existing secure channel with +your peer (such as +.B ssh +) to initially copy the key. This requirement, along with the +fact that your key never changes unless you manually generate a new one, +makes it somewhat less secure than TLS mode (see below). If an attacker +manages to steal your key, everything that was ever encrypted with +it is compromised. Contrast that to the perfect forward secrecy features of +TLS mode (using Diffie Hellman key exchange), where even if an attacker +was able to steal your private key, he would gain no information to help +him decrypt past sessions. + +Another advantageous aspect of Static Key encryption mode is that +it is a handshake-free protocol +without any distinguishing signature or feature +(such as a header or protocol handshake sequence) +that would mark the ciphertext packets as being +generated by OpenVPN. Anyone eavesdropping on the wire +would see nothing +but random-looking data. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-key-direction +Alternative way of specifying the optional direction parameter for the +.B \-\-tls-auth +and +.B \-\-secret +options. Useful when using inline files (See section on inline files). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth alg +Authenticate packets with HMAC using message +digest algorithm +.B alg. +(The default is +.B SHA1 +). +HMAC is a commonly used message authentication algorithm (MAC) that uses +a data string, a secure hash algorithm, and a key, to produce +a digital signature. + +OpenVPN's usage of HMAC is to first encrypt a packet, then HMAC the resulting ciphertext. + +In static-key encryption mode, the HMAC key +is included in the key file generated by +.B \-\-genkey. +In TLS mode, the HMAC key is dynamically generated and shared +between peers via the TLS control channel. If OpenVPN receives a packet with +a bad HMAC it will drop the packet. +HMAC usually adds 16 or 20 bytes per packet. +Set +.B alg=none +to disable authentication. + +For more information on HMAC see +.I http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-cipher alg +Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm +.B alg. +The default is +.B BF-CBC, +an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher Block Chaining mode. +Blowfish has the advantages of being fast, very secure, and allowing key sizes +of up to 448 bits. Blowfish is designed to be used in situations where +keys are changed infrequently. + +For more information on blowfish, see +.I http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html + +To see other ciphers that are available with +OpenVPN, use the +.B \-\-show-ciphers +option. + +OpenVPN supports the CBC, CFB, and OFB cipher modes, +however CBC is recommended and CFB and OFB should +be considered advanced modes. + +Set +.B alg=none +to disable encryption. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-keysize n +Size of cipher key in bits (optional). +If unspecified, defaults to cipher-specific default. The +.B \-\-show-ciphers +option (see below) shows all available OpenSSL ciphers, +their default key sizes, and whether the key size can +be changed. Use care in changing a cipher's default +key size. Many ciphers have not been extensively +cryptanalyzed with non-standard key lengths, and a +larger key may offer no real guarantee of greater +security, or may even reduce security. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-prng alg [nsl] +(Advanced) For PRNG (Pseudo-random number generator), +use digest algorithm +.B alg +(default=sha1), and set +.B nsl +(default=16) +to the size in bytes of the nonce secret length (between 16 and 64). + +Set +.B alg=none +to disable the PRNG and use the OpenSSL RAND_bytes function +instead for all of OpenVPN's pseudo-random number needs. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-engine [engine-name] +Enable OpenSSL hardware-based crypto engine functionality. + +If +.B engine-name +is specified, +use a specific crypto engine. Use the +.B \-\-show-engines +standalone option to list the crypto engines which are +supported by OpenSSL. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-no-replay +(Advanced) Disable OpenVPN's protection against replay attacks. +Don't use this option unless you are prepared to make +a tradeoff of greater efficiency in exchange for less +security. + +OpenVPN provides datagram replay protection by default. + +Replay protection is accomplished +by tagging each outgoing datagram with an identifier +that is guaranteed to be unique for the key being used. +The peer that receives the datagram will check for +the uniqueness of the identifier. If the identifier +was already received in a previous datagram, OpenVPN +will drop the packet. Replay protection is important +to defeat attacks such as a SYN flood attack, where +the attacker listens in the wire, intercepts a TCP +SYN packet (identifying it by the context in which +it occurs in relation to other packets), then floods +the receiving peer with copies of this packet. + +OpenVPN's replay protection is implemented in slightly +different ways, depending on the key management mode +you have selected. + +In Static Key mode +or when using an CFB or OFB mode cipher, OpenVPN uses a +64 bit unique identifier that combines a time stamp with +an incrementing sequence number. + +When using TLS mode for key exchange and a CBC cipher +mode, OpenVPN uses only a 32 bit sequence number without +a time stamp, since OpenVPN can guarantee the uniqueness +of this value for each key. As in IPSec, if the sequence number is +close to wrapping back to zero, OpenVPN will trigger +a new key exchange. + +To check for replays, OpenVPN uses +the +.I sliding window +algorithm used +by IPSec. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-replay-window n [t] +Use a replay protection sliding-window of size +.B n +and a time window of +.B t +seconds. + +By default +.B n +is 64 (the IPSec default) and +.B t +is 15 seconds. + +This option is only relevant in UDP mode, i.e. +when either +.B \-\-proto udp +is specifed, or no +.B \-\-proto +option is specified. + +When OpenVPN tunnels IP packets over UDP, there is the possibility that +packets might be dropped or delivered out of order. Because OpenVPN, like IPSec, +is emulating the physical network layer, +it will accept an out-of-order packet sequence, and +will deliver such packets in the same order they were received to +the TCP/IP protocol stack, provided they satisfy several constraints. + +.B (a) +The packet cannot be a replay (unless +.B \-\-no-replay +is specified, which disables replay protection altogether). + +.B (b) +If a packet arrives out of order, it will only be accepted if the difference +between its sequence number and the highest sequence number received +so far is less than +.B n. + +.B (c) +If a packet arrives out of order, it will only be accepted if it arrives no later +than +.B t +seconds after any packet containing a higher sequence number. + +If you are using a network link with a large pipeline (meaning that +the product of bandwidth and latency is high), you may want to use +a larger value for +.B n. +Satellite links in particular often require this. + +If you run OpenVPN at +.B \-\-verb 4, +you will see the message "Replay-window backtrack occurred [x]" +every time the maximum sequence number backtrack seen thus far +increases. This can be used to calibrate +.B n. + +There is some controversy on the appropriate method of handling packet +reordering at the security layer. + +Namely, to what extent should the +security layer protect the encapsulated protocol from attacks which masquerade +as the kinds of normal packet loss and reordering that occur over IP networks? + +The IPSec and OpenVPN approach is to allow packet reordering within a certain +fixed sequence number window. + +OpenVPN adds to the IPSec model by limiting the window size in time as well as +sequence space. + +OpenVPN also adds TCP transport as an option (not offered by IPSec) in which +case OpenVPN can adopt a very strict attitude towards message deletion and +reordering: Don't allow it. Since TCP guarantees reliability, any packet +loss or reordering event can be assumed to be an attack. + +In this sense, it could be argued that TCP tunnel transport is preferred when +tunneling non-IP or UDP application protocols which might be vulnerable to a +message deletion or reordering attack which falls within the normal +operational parameters of IP networks. + +So I would make the statement that one should never tunnel a non-IP protocol +or UDP application protocol over UDP, if the protocol might be vulnerable to a +message deletion or reordering attack that falls within the normal operating +parameters of what is to be expected from the physical IP layer. The problem +is easily fixed by simply using TCP as the VPN transport layer. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mute-replay-warnings +Silence the output of replay warnings, which are a common +false alarm on WiFi networks. This option preserves +the security of the replay protection code without +the verbosity associated with warnings about duplicate +packets. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-replay-persist file +Persist replay-protection state across sessions using +.B file +to save and reload the state. + +This option will strengthen protection against replay attacks, +especially when you are using OpenVPN in a dynamic context (such +as with +.B \-\-inetd) +when OpenVPN sessions are frequently started and stopped. + +This option will keep a disk copy of the current replay protection +state (i.e. the most recent packet timestamp and sequence number +received from the remote peer), so that if an OpenVPN session +is stopped and restarted, it will reject any replays of packets +which were already received by the prior session. + +This option only makes sense when replay protection is enabled +(the default) and you are using either +.B \-\-secret +(shared-secret key mode) or TLS mode with +.B \-\-tls-auth. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-no-iv +(Advanced) Disable OpenVPN's use of IV (cipher initialization vector). +Don't use this option unless you are prepared to make +a tradeoff of greater efficiency in exchange for less +security. + +OpenVPN uses an IV by default, and requires it for CFB and +OFB cipher modes (which are totally insecure without it). +Using an IV is important for security when multiple +messages are being encrypted/decrypted with the same key. + +IV is implemented differently depending on the cipher mode used. + +In CBC mode, OpenVPN uses a pseudo-random IV for each packet. + +In CFB/OFB mode, OpenVPN uses a unique sequence number and time stamp +as the IV. In fact, in CFB/OFB mode, OpenVPN uses a datagram +space-saving optimization that uses the unique identifier for +datagram replay protection as the IV. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-use-prediction-resistance +Enable prediction resistance on PolarSSL's RNG. + +Enabling prediction resistance causes the RNG to reseed in each +call for random. Reseeding this often can quickly deplete the kernel +entropy pool. + +If you need this option, please consider running a daemon that adds +entropy to the kernel pool. + +Note that this option only works with PolarSSL versions greater +than 1.1. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-test-crypto +Do a self-test of OpenVPN's crypto options by encrypting and +decrypting test packets using the data channel encryption options +specified above. This option does not require a peer to function, +and therefore can be specified without +.B \-\-dev +or +.B \-\-remote. + +The typical usage of +.B \-\-test-crypto +would be something like this: + +.B openvpn \-\-test-crypto \-\-secret key + +or + +.B openvpn \-\-test-crypto \-\-secret key \-\-verb 9 + +This option is very useful to test OpenVPN after it has been ported to +a new platform, or to isolate problems in the compiler, OpenSSL +crypto library, or OpenVPN's crypto code. Since it is a self-test mode, +problems with encryption and authentication can be debugged independently +of network and tunnel issues. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS TLS Mode Options: +TLS mode is the most powerful crypto mode of OpenVPN in both security and flexibility. +TLS mode works by establishing control and +data channels which are multiplexed over a single TCP/UDP port. OpenVPN initiates +a TLS session over the control channel and uses it to exchange cipher +and HMAC keys to protect the data channel. TLS mode uses a robust reliability +layer over the UDP connection for all control channel communication, while +the data channel, over which encrypted tunnel data passes, is forwarded without +any mediation. The result is the best of both worlds: a fast data channel +that forwards over UDP with only the overhead of encrypt, +decrypt, and HMAC functions, +and a control channel that provides all of the security features of TLS, +including certificate-based authentication and Diffie Hellman forward secrecy. + +To use TLS mode, each peer that runs OpenVPN should have its own local +certificate/key pair ( +.B \-\-cert +and +.B \-\-key +), signed by the root certificate which is specified +in +.B \-\-ca. + +When two OpenVPN peers connect, each presents its local certificate to the +other. Each peer will then check that its partner peer presented a +certificate which was signed by the master root certificate as specified in +.B \-\-ca. + +If that check on both peers succeeds, then the TLS negotiation +will succeed, both OpenVPN +peers will exchange temporary session keys, and the tunnel will begin +passing data. + +The OpenVPN distribution contains a set of scripts for +managing RSA certificates & keys, +located in the +.I easy-rsa +subdirectory. + +The easy-rsa package is also rendered in web form here: +.I http://openvpn.net/easyrsa.html +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-server +Enable TLS and assume server role during TLS handshake. Note that +OpenVPN is designed as a peer-to-peer application. The designation +of client or server is only for the purpose of negotiating the TLS +control channel. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-client +Enable TLS and assume client role during TLS handshake. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ca file +Certificate authority (CA) file in .pem format, also referred to as the +.I root +certificate. This file can have multiple +certificates in .pem format, concatenated together. You can construct your own +certificate authority certificate and private key by using a command such as: + +.B openssl req -nodes -new -x509 -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt + +Then edit your openssl.cnf file and edit the +.B certificate +variable to point to your new root certificate +.B ca.crt. + +For testing purposes only, the OpenVPN distribution includes a sample +CA certificate (ca.crt). +Of course you should never use +the test certificates and test keys distributed with OpenVPN in a +production environment, since by virtue of the fact that +they are distributed with OpenVPN, they are totally insecure. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-capath dir +Directory containing trusted certificates (CAs and CRLs). +Available with OpenSSL version >= 0.9.7 dev. +Not available with PolarSSL. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dh file +File containing Diffie Hellman parameters +in .pem format (required for +.B \-\-tls-server +only). Use + +.B openssl dhparam -out dh1024.pem 1024 + +to generate your own, or use the existing dh1024.pem file +included with the OpenVPN distribution. Diffie Hellman parameters +may be considered public. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-cert file +Local peer's signed certificate in .pem format \-\- must be signed +by a certificate authority whose certificate is in +.B \-\-ca file. +Each peer in an OpenVPN link running in TLS mode should have its own +certificate and private key file. In addition, each certificate should +have been signed by the key of a certificate +authority whose public key resides in the +.B \-\-ca +certificate authority file. +You can easily make your own certificate authority (see above) or pay money +to use a commercial service such as thawte.com (in which case you will be +helping to finance the world's second space tourist :). +To generate a certificate, +you can use a command such as: + +.B openssl req -nodes -new -keyout mycert.key -out mycert.csr + +If your certificate authority private key lives on another machine, copy +the certificate signing request (mycert.csr) to this other machine (this can +be done over an insecure channel such as email). Now sign the certificate +with a command such as: + +.B openssl ca -out mycert.crt -in mycert.csr + +Now copy the certificate (mycert.crt) +back to the peer which initially generated the .csr file (this +can be over a public medium). +Note that the +.B openssl ca +command reads the location of the certificate authority key from its +configuration file such as +.B /usr/share/ssl/openssl.cnf +\-\- note also +that for certificate authority functions, you must set up the files +.B index.txt +(may be empty) and +.B serial +(initialize to +.B +01 +). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-extra-certs file +Specify a +.B file +containing one or more PEM certs (concatenated together) +that complete the +local certificate chain. + +This option is useful for "split" CAs, where the CA for server +certs is different than the CA for client certs. Putting certs +in this file allows them to be used to complete the local +certificate chain without trusting them to verify the peer-submitted +certificate, as would be the case if the certs were placed in the +.B ca +file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-key file +Local peer's private key in .pem format. Use the private key which was generated +when you built your peer's certificate (see +.B -cert file +above). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs12 file +Specify a PKCS #12 file containing local private key, +local certificate, and root CA certificate. +This option can be used instead of +.B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, +and +.B \-\-key. +Not available with PolarSSL. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-verify-hash hash +Specify SHA1 fingerprint for level-1 cert. The level-1 cert is the +CA (or intermediate cert) that signs the leaf certificate, and is +one removed from the leaf certificate in the direction of the root. +When accepting a connection from a peer, the level-1 cert +fingerprint must match +.B hash +or certificate verification will fail. Hash is specified +as XX:XX:... For example: AD:B0:95:D8:09:C8:36:45:12:A9:89:C8:90:09:CB:13:72:A6:AD:16 +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-cert-private [0|1]... +Set if access to certificate object should be performed after login. +Every provider has its own setting. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-id name +Specify the serialized certificate id to be used. The id can be gotten +by the standalone +.B \-\-show-pkcs11-ids +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-id-management +Acquire PKCS#11 id from management interface. In this case a NEED-STR 'pkcs11-id-request' +real-time message will be triggered, application may use pkcs11-id-count command to +retrieve available number of certificates, and pkcs11-id-get command to retrieve certificate +id and certificate body. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-pin-cache seconds +Specify how many seconds the PIN can be cached, the default is until the token is removed. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-protected-authentication [0|1]... +Use PKCS#11 protected authentication path, useful for biometric and external +keypad devices. +Every provider has its own setting. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-providers provider... +Specify a RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki) providers +to load. +This option can be used instead of +.B \-\-cert, \-\-key, +and +.B \-\-pkcs12. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pkcs11-private-mode mode... +Specify which method to use in order to perform private key operations. +A different mode can be specified for each provider. +Mode is encoded as hex number, and can be a mask one of the following: + +.B 0 +(default) \-\- Try to determind automatically. +.br +.B 1 +\-\- Use sign. +.br +.B 2 +\-\- Use sign recover. +.br +.B 4 +\-\- Use decrypt. +.br +.B 8 +\-\- Use unwrap. +.br +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-cryptoapicert select-string +Load the certificate and private key from the +Windows Certificate System Store (Windows/OpenSSL Only). + +Use this option instead of +.B \-\-cert +and +.B \-\-key. + +This makes +it possible to use any smart card, supported by Windows, but also any +kind of certificate, residing in the Cert Store, where you have access to +the private key. This option has been tested with a couple of different +smart cards (GemSAFE, Cryptoflex, and Swedish Post Office eID) on the +client side, and also an imported PKCS12 software certificate on the +server side. + +To select a certificate, based on a substring search in the +certificate's subject: + +.B cryptoapicert +"SUBJ:Peter Runestig" + +To select a certificate, based on certificate's thumbprint: + +.B cryptoapicert +"THUMB:f6 49 24 41 01 b4 ..." + +The thumbprint hex string can easily be copy-and-pasted from the Windows +Certificate Store GUI. + +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-key-method m +Use data channel key negotiation method +.B m. +The key method must match on both sides of the connection. + +After OpenVPN negotiates a TLS session, a new set of keys +for protecting the tunnel data channel is generated and +exchanged over the TLS session. + +In method 1 (the default for OpenVPN 1.x), both sides generate +random encrypt and HMAC-send keys which are forwarded to +the other host over the TLS channel. + +In method 2, (the default for OpenVPN 2.0) +the client generates a random key. Both client +and server also generate some random seed material. All key source +material is exchanged over the TLS channel. The actual +keys are generated using the TLS PRF function, taking source +entropy from both client and server. Method 2 is designed to +closely parallel the key generation process used by TLS 1.0. + +Note that in TLS mode, two separate levels +of keying occur: + +(1) The TLS connection is initially negotiated, with both sides +of the connection producing certificates and verifying the certificate +(or other authentication info provided) of +the other side. The +.B \-\-key-method +parameter has no effect on this process. + +(2) After the TLS connection is established, the tunnel session keys are +separately negotiated over the existing secure TLS channel. Here, +.B \-\-key-method +determines the derivation of the tunnel session keys. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-cipher l +A list +.B l +of allowable TLS ciphers delimited by a colon (":"). +If you require a high level of security, +you may want to set this parameter manually, to prevent a +version rollback attack where a man-in-the-middle attacker tries +to force two peers to negotiate to the lowest level +of security they both support. +Use +.B \-\-show-tls +to see a list of supported TLS ciphers. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-timeout n +Packet retransmit timeout on TLS control channel +if no acknowledgment from remote within +.B n +seconds (default=2). When OpenVPN sends a control +packet to its peer, it will expect to receive an +acknowledgement within +.B n +seconds or it will retransmit the packet, subject +to a TCP-like exponential backoff algorithm. This parameter +only applies to control channel packets. Data channel +packets (which carry encrypted tunnel data) are never +acknowledged, sequenced, or retransmitted by OpenVPN because +the higher level network protocols running on top of the tunnel +such as TCP expect this role to be left to them. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-reneg-bytes n +Renegotiate data channel key after +.B n +bytes sent or received (disabled by default). +OpenVPN allows the lifetime of a key +to be expressed as a number of bytes encrypted/decrypted, a number of packets, or +a number of seconds. A key renegotiation will be forced +if any of these three criteria are met by either peer. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-reneg-pkts n +Renegotiate data channel key after +.B n +packets sent and received (disabled by default). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-reneg-sec n +Renegotiate data channel key after +.B n +seconds (default=3600). + +When using dual-factor authentication, note that this default value may +cause the end user to be challenged to reauthorize once per hour. + +Also, keep in mind that this option can be used on both the client and server, +and whichever uses the lower value will be the one to trigger the renegotiation. +A common mistake is to set +.B \-\-reneg-sec +to a higher value on either the client or server, while the other side of the connection +is still using the default value of 3600 seconds, meaning that the renegotiation will +still occur once per 3600 seconds. The solution is to increase \-\-reneg-sec on both the +client and server, or set it to 0 on one side of the connection (to disable), and to +your chosen value on the other side. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-hand-window n +Handshake Window \-\- the TLS-based key exchange must finalize within +.B n +seconds +of handshake initiation by any peer (default = 60 seconds). +If the handshake fails +we will attempt to reset our connection with our peer and try again. +Even in the event of handshake failure we will still use +our expiring key for up to +.B \-\-tran-window +seconds to maintain continuity of transmission of tunnel +data. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tran-window n +Transition window \-\- our old key can live this many seconds +after a new a key renegotiation begins (default = 3600 seconds). +This feature allows for a graceful transition from old to new +key, and removes the key renegotiation sequence from the critical +path of tunnel data forwarding. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-single-session +After initially connecting to a remote peer, disallow any new connections. +Using this +option means that a remote peer cannot connect, disconnect, and then +reconnect. + +If the daemon is reset by a signal or +.B \-\-ping-restart, +it will allow one new connection. + +.B \-\-single-session +can be used with +.B \-\-ping-exit +or +.B \-\-inactive +to create a single dynamic session that will exit when finished. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-exit +Exit on TLS negotiation failure. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-auth file [direction] +Add an additional layer of HMAC authentication on top of the TLS +control channel to protect against DoS attacks. + +In a nutshell, +.B \-\-tls-auth +enables a kind of "HMAC firewall" on OpenVPN's TCP/UDP port, +where TLS control channel packets +bearing an incorrect HMAC signature can be dropped immediately without +response. + +.B file +(required) is a key file which can be in one of two formats: + +.B (1) +An OpenVPN static key file generated by +.B \-\-genkey +(required if +.B direction +parameter is used). + +.B (2) +A freeform passphrase file. In this case the HMAC key will +be derived by taking a secure hash of this file, similar to +the +.BR md5sum (1) +or +.BR sha1sum (1) +commands. + +OpenVPN will first try format (1), and if the file fails to parse as +a static key file, format (2) will be used. + +See the +.B \-\-secret +option for more information on the optional +.B direction +parameter. + +.B \-\-tls-auth +is recommended when you are running OpenVPN in a mode where +it is listening for packets from any IP address, such as when +.B \-\-remote +is not specified, or +.B \-\-remote +is specified with +.B \-\-float. + +The rationale for +this feature is as follows. TLS requires a multi-packet exchange +before it is able to authenticate a peer. During this time +before authentication, OpenVPN is allocating resources (memory +and CPU) to this potential peer. The potential peer is also +exposing many parts of OpenVPN and the OpenSSL library to the packets +it is sending. Most successful network attacks today seek +to either exploit bugs in programs (such as buffer overflow attacks) or +force a program to consume so many resources that it becomes unusable. +Of course the first line of defense is always to produce clean, +well-audited code. OpenVPN has been written with buffer overflow +attack prevention as a top priority. +But as history has shown, many of the most widely used +network applications have, from time to time, +fallen to buffer overflow attacks. + +So as a second line of defense, OpenVPN offers +this special layer of authentication on top of the TLS control channel so that +every packet on the control channel is authenticated by an +HMAC signature and a unique ID for replay protection. +This signature will also help protect against DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. +An important rule of thumb in reducing vulnerability to DoS attacks is to +minimize the amount of resources a potential, but as yet unauthenticated, +client is able to consume. + +.B \-\-tls-auth +does this by signing every TLS control channel packet with an HMAC signature, +including packets which are sent before the TLS level has had a chance +to authenticate the peer. +The result is that packets without +the correct signature can be dropped immediately upon reception, +before they have a chance to consume additional system resources +such as by initiating a TLS handshake. +.B \-\-tls-auth +can be strengthened by adding the +.B \-\-replay-persist +option which will keep OpenVPN's replay protection state +in a file so that it is not lost across restarts. + +It should be emphasized that this feature is optional and that the +passphrase/key file used with +.B \-\-tls-auth +gives a peer nothing more than the power to initiate a TLS +handshake. It is not used to encrypt or authenticate any tunnel data. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-askpass [file] +Get certificate password from console or +.B file +before we daemonize. + +For the extremely +security conscious, it is possible to protect your private key with +a password. Of course this means that every time the OpenVPN +daemon is started you must be there to type the password. The +.B \-\-askpass +option allows you to start OpenVPN from the command line. It will +query you for a password before it daemonizes. To protect a private +key with a password you should omit the +.B -nodes +option when you use the +.B openssl +command line tool to manage certificates and private keys. + +If +.B file +is specified, read the password from the first line of +.B file. +Keep in mind that storing your password in a file +to a certain extent invalidates the extra security provided by +using an encrypted key (Note: OpenVPN +will only read passwords from a file if it has been built +with the \-\-enable-password-save configure option, or on Windows +by defining ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE in win/settings.in). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-nocache +Don't cache +.B \-\-askpass +or +.B \-\-auth-user-pass +username/passwords in virtual memory. + +If specified, this directive will cause OpenVPN to immediately +forget username/password inputs after they are used. As a result, +when OpenVPN needs a username/password, it will prompt for input +from stdin, which may be multiple times during the duration of an +OpenVPN session. + +This directive does not affect the +.B \-\-http-proxy +username/password. It is always cached. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-verify cmd +Run command +.B cmd +to verify the X509 name of a +pending TLS connection that has otherwise passed all other +tests of certification (except for revocation via +.B \-\-crl-verify +directive; the revocation test occurs after the +.B \-\-tls-verify +test). + +.B cmd +should return 0 to allow the TLS handshake to proceed, or 1 to fail. + +.B cmd +consists of a path to script (or executable program), optionally +followed by arguments. The path and arguments may be single- or double-quoted +and/or escaped using a backslash, and should be separated by one or more spaces. + +When +.B cmd +is executed two arguments are appended after any arguments specified in +.B cmd +, as follows: + +.B cmd certificate_depth subject + +These arguments are, respectively, the current certificate depth and +the X509 common name (cn) of the peer. + +This feature is useful if the peer you want to trust has a certificate +which was signed by a certificate authority who also signed many +other certificates, where you don't necessarily want to trust all of them, +but rather be selective about which +peer certificate you will accept. This feature allows you to write a script +which will test the X509 name on a certificate and decide whether or +not it should be accepted. For a simple perl script which will test +the common name field on the certificate, see the file +.B verify-cn +in the OpenVPN distribution. + +See the "Environmental Variables" section below for +additional parameters passed as environmental variables. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-export-cert directory +Store the certificates the clients uses upon connection to this +directory. This will be done before \-\-tls-verify is called. The +certificates will use a temporary name and will be deleted when +the tls-verify script returns. The file name used for the certificate +is available via the peer_cert environment variable. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-x509-username-field fieldname +Field in x509 certificate subject to be used as username (default=CN). +.B Fieldname +will be uppercased before matching. When this option is used, the +--tls-remote option will match against the chosen fieldname instead +of the CN. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-remote name +Accept connections only from a host with X509 name +or common name equal to +.B name. +The remote host must also pass all other tests +of verification. + +.B NOTE: +Because tls-remote may test against a common name prefix, +only use this option when you are using OpenVPN with a custom CA +certificate that is under your control. +Never use this option when your client certificates are signed by +a third party, such as a commercial web CA. + +Name can also be a common name prefix, for example if you +want a client to only accept connections to "Server-1", +"Server-2", etc., you can simply use +.B \-\-tls-remote Server + +Using a common name prefix is a useful alternative to managing +a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) on the client, since it allows the client +to refuse all certificates except for those associated +with designated servers. + +.B \-\-tls-remote +is a useful replacement for the +.B \-\-tls-verify +option to verify the remote host, because +.B \-\-tls-remote +works in a +.B \-\-chroot +environment too. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-x509-track attribute +Save peer X509 +.B attribute +value in environment for use by plugins and management interface. +Prepend a '+' to +.B attribute +to save values from full cert chain. Values will be encoded +as X509__=. Multiple +.B \-\-x509-track +options can be defined to track multiple attributes. +Not available with PolarSSL. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ns-cert-type client|server +Require that peer certificate was signed with an explicit +.B nsCertType +designation of "client" or "server". + +This is a useful security option for clients, to ensure that +the host they connect with is a designated server. + +See the easy-rsa/build-key-server script for an example +of how to generate a certificate with the +.B nsCertType +field set to "server". + +If the server certificate's nsCertType field is set +to "server", then the clients can verify this with +.B \-\-ns-cert-type server. + +This is an important security precaution to protect against +a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client +attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. +The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify +the server certificate using any one of +.B \-\-ns-cert-type, \-\-tls-remote, +or +.B \-\-tls-verify. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote-cert-ku v... +Require that peer certificate was signed with an explicit +.B key usage. + +This is a useful security option for clients, to ensure that +the host they connect to is a designated server. + +The key usage should be encoded in hex, more than one key +usage can be specified. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote-cert-eku oid +Require that peer certificate was signed with an explicit +.B extended key usage. + +This is a useful security option for clients, to ensure that +the host they connect to is a designated server. + +The extended key usage should be encoded in oid notation, or +OpenSSL symbolic representation. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls client|server +Require that peer certificate was signed with an explicit +.B key usage +and +.B extended key usage +based on RFC3280 TLS rules. + +This is a useful security option for clients, to ensure that +the host they connect to is a designated server. + +The +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls client +option is equivalent to +.B +\-\-remote-cert-ku 80 08 88 \-\-remote-cert-eku "TLS Web Client Authentication" + +The key usage is digitalSignature and/or keyAgreement. + +The +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls server +option is equivalent to +.B +\-\-remote-cert-ku a0 88 \-\-remote-cert-eku "TLS Web Server Authentication" + +The key usage is digitalSignature and ( keyEncipherment or keyAgreement ). + +This is an important security precaution to protect against +a man-in-the-middle attack where an authorized client +attempts to connect to another client by impersonating the server. +The attack is easily prevented by having clients verify +the server certificate using any one of +.B \-\-remote-cert-tls, \-\-tls-remote, +or +.B \-\-tls-verify. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-crl-verify crl ['dir'] +Check peer certificate against the file +.B crl +in PEM format. + +A CRL (certificate revocation list) is used when a particular key is +compromised but when the overall PKI is still intact. + +Suppose you had a PKI consisting of a CA, root certificate, and a number of +client certificates. Suppose a laptop computer containing a client key and +certificate was stolen. By adding the stolen certificate to the CRL file, +you could reject any connection which attempts to use it, while preserving the +overall integrity of the PKI. + +The only time when it would be necessary to rebuild the entire PKI from scratch would be +if the root certificate key itself was compromised. + +If the optional +.B dir +flag is specified, enable a different mode where +.B crl +is a directory containing files named as revoked serial numbers +(the files may be empty, the contents are never read). If a client +requests a connection, where the client certificate serial number +(decimal string) is the name of a file present in the directory, +it will be rejected. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS SSL Library information: +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-ciphers +(Standalone) +Show all cipher algorithms to use with the +.B \-\-cipher +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-digests +(Standalone) +Show all message digest algorithms to use with the +.B \-\-auth +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-tls +(Standalone) +Show all TLS ciphers (TLS used only as a control channel). The TLS +ciphers will be sorted from highest preference (most secure) to +lowest. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-engines +(Standalone) +Show currently available hardware-based crypto acceleration +engines supported by the OpenSSL library. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Generate a random key: +Used only for non-TLS static key encryption mode. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-genkey +(Standalone) +Generate a random key to be used as a shared secret, +for use with the +.B \-\-secret +option. This file must be shared with the +peer over a pre-existing secure channel such as +.BR scp (1) +. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-secret file +Write key to +.B file. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS TUN/TAP persistent tunnel config mode: +Available with linux 2.4.7+. These options comprise a standalone mode +of OpenVPN which can be used to create and delete persistent tunnels. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-mktun +(Standalone) +Create a persistent tunnel on platforms which support them such +as Linux. Normally TUN/TAP tunnels exist only for +the period of time that an application has them open. This option +takes advantage of the TUN/TAP driver's ability to build persistent +tunnels that live through multiple instantiations of OpenVPN and die +only when they are deleted or the machine is rebooted. + +One of the advantages of persistent tunnels is that they eliminate the +need for separate +.B \-\-up +and +.B \-\-down +scripts to run the appropriate +.BR ifconfig (8) +and +.BR route (8) +commands. These commands can be placed in the the same shell script +which starts or terminates an OpenVPN session. + +Another advantage is that open connections through the TUN/TAP-based tunnel +will not be reset if the OpenVPN peer restarts. This can be useful to +provide uninterrupted connectivity through the tunnel in the event of a DHCP +reset of the peer's public IP address (see the +.B \-\-ipchange +option above). + +One disadvantage of persistent tunnels is that it is harder to automatically +configure their MTU value (see +.B \-\-link-mtu +and +.B \-\-tun-mtu +above). + +On some platforms such as Windows, TAP-Win32 tunnels are persistent by +default. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-rmtun +(Standalone) +Remove a persistent tunnel. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dev tunX | tapX +TUN/TAP device +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-user user +Optional user to be owner of this tunnel. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-group group +Optional group to be owner of this tunnel. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Windows-Specific Options: +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-win-sys path +Set the Windows system directory pathname to use when looking for system +executables such as +.B route.exe +and +.B netsh.exe. +By default, if this directive is +not specified, OpenVPN will use the SystemRoot environment variable. + +This option have changed behaviour in OpenVPN 2.3. Earlier you had to +define +.B --win-sys env +to use the SystemRoot environment variable, otherwise it defaulted to C:\\WINDOWS. +It is not needed to use the +.B env +keyword any more, and it will just be ignored. A warning is logged when this +is found in the configuration file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ip-win32 method +When using +.B \-\-ifconfig +on Windows, set the TAP-Win32 adapter +IP address and netmask using +.B method. +Don't use this option unless you are also using +.B \-\-ifconfig. + +.B manual \-\- +Don't set the IP address or netmask automatically. +Instead output a message +to the console telling the user to configure the +adapter manually and indicating the IP/netmask which +OpenVPN expects the adapter to be set to. + +.B dynamic [offset] [lease-time] \-\- +Automatically set the IP address and netmask by replying to +DHCP query messages generated by the kernel. This mode is +probably the "cleanest" solution +for setting the TCP/IP properties since it uses the well-known +DHCP protocol. There are, however, two prerequisites for using +this mode: (1) The TCP/IP properties for the TAP-Win32 +adapter must be set to "Obtain an IP address automatically," and +(2) OpenVPN needs to claim an IP address in the subnet for use +as the virtual DHCP server address. By default in +.B \-\-dev tap +mode, OpenVPN will +take the normally unused first address in the subnet. For example, +if your subnet is 192.168.4.0 netmask 255.255.255.0, then +OpenVPN will take the IP address 192.168.4.0 to use as the +virtual DHCP server address. In +.B \-\-dev tun +mode, OpenVPN will cause the DHCP server to masquerade as if it were +coming from the remote endpoint. The optional offset parameter is +an integer which is > -256 and < 256 and which defaults to 0. +If offset is positive, the DHCP server will masquerade as the IP +address at network address + offset. +If offset is negative, the DHCP server will masquerade as the IP +address at broadcast address + offset. The Windows +.B ipconfig /all +command can be used to show what Windows thinks the DHCP server +address is. OpenVPN will "claim" this address, so make sure to +use a free address. Having said that, different OpenVPN instantiations, +including different ends of the same connection, can share the same +virtual DHCP server address. The +.B lease-time +parameter controls the lease time of the DHCP assignment given to +the TAP-Win32 adapter, and is denoted in seconds. +Normally a very long lease time is preferred +because it prevents routes involving the TAP-Win32 adapter from +being lost when the system goes to sleep. The default +lease time is one year. + +.B netsh \-\- +Automatically set the IP address and netmask using +the Windows command-line "netsh" +command. This method appears to work correctly on +Windows XP but not Windows 2000. + +.B ipapi \-\- +Automatically set the IP address and netmask using the +Windows IP Helper API. This approach +does not have ideal semantics, though testing has indicated +that it works okay in practice. If you use this option, +it is best to leave the TCP/IP properties for the TAP-Win32 +adapter in their default state, i.e. "Obtain an IP address +automatically." + +.B adaptive \-\- +(Default) Try +.B dynamic +method initially and fail over to +.B netsh +if the DHCP negotiation with the TAP-Win32 adapter does +not succeed in 20 seconds. Such failures have been known +to occur when certain third-party firewall packages installed +on the client machine block the DHCP negotiation used by +the TAP-Win32 adapter. +Note that if the +.B netsh +failover occurs, the TAP-Win32 adapter +TCP/IP properties will be reset from DHCP to static, and this +will cause future OpenVPN startups using the +.B adaptive +mode to use +.B netsh +immediately, rather than trying +.B dynamic +first. To "unstick" the +.B adaptive +mode from using +.B netsh, +run OpenVPN at least once using the +.B dynamic +mode to restore the TAP-Win32 adapter TCP/IP properties +to a DHCP configuration. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-method m +Which method +.B m +to use for adding routes on Windows? + +.B adaptive +(default) \-\- Try IP helper API first. If that fails, fall +back to the route.exe shell command. +.br +.B ipapi +\-\- Use IP helper API. +.br +.B exe +\-\- Call the route.exe shell command. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dhcp-option type [parm] +Set extended TAP-Win32 TCP/IP properties, must +be used with +.B \-\-ip-win32 dynamic +or +.B \-\-ip-win32 adaptive. +This option can be used to set additional TCP/IP properties +on the TAP-Win32 adapter, and is particularly useful for +configuring an OpenVPN client to access a Samba server +across the VPN. + +.B DOMAIN name \-\- +Set Connection-specific DNS Suffix. + +.B DNS addr \-\- +Set primary domain name server address. Repeat +this option to set secondary DNS server addresses. + +.B WINS addr \-\- +Set primary WINS server address (NetBIOS over TCP/IP Name Server). +Repeat this option to set secondary WINS server addresses. + +.B NBDD addr \-\- +Set primary NBDD server address (NetBIOS over TCP/IP Datagram Distribution Server) +Repeat this option +to set secondary NBDD server addresses. + +.B NTP addr \-\- +Set primary NTP server address (Network Time Protocol). +Repeat this option +to set secondary NTP server addresses. + +.B NBT type \-\- +Set NetBIOS over TCP/IP Node type. Possible options: +.B 1 += b-node (broadcasts), +.B 2 += p-node (point-to-point +name queries to a WINS server), +.B 4 += m-node (broadcast +then query name server), and +.B 8 += h-node (query name server, then broadcast). + +.B NBS scope-id \-\- +Set NetBIOS over TCP/IP Scope. A NetBIOS Scope ID provides an extended +naming service for the NetBIOS over TCP/IP (Known as NBT) module. The +primary purpose of a NetBIOS scope ID is to isolate NetBIOS traffic on +a single network to only those nodes with the same NetBIOS scope ID. +The NetBIOS scope ID is a character string that is appended to the NetBIOS +name. The NetBIOS scope ID on two hosts must match, or the two hosts +will not be able to communicate. The NetBIOS Scope ID also allows +computers to use the same computer name, as they have different +scope IDs. The Scope ID becomes a part of the NetBIOS name, making the name unique. +(This description of NetBIOS scopes courtesy of NeonSurge@abyss.com) + +.B DISABLE-NBT \-\- +Disable Netbios-over-TCP/IP. + +Note that if +.B \-\-dhcp-option +is pushed via +.B \-\-push +to a non-windows client, the option will be saved in the client's +environment before the up script is called, under +the name "foreign_option_{n}". +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tap-sleep n +Cause OpenVPN to sleep for +.B n +seconds immediately after the TAP-Win32 adapter state +is set to "connected". + +This option is intended to be used to troubleshoot problems +with the +.B \-\-ifconfig +and +.B \-\-ip-win32 +options, and is used to give +the TAP-Win32 adapter time to come up before +Windows IP Helper API operations are applied to it. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-net-up +Output OpenVPN's view of the system routing table and network +adapter list to the syslog or log file after the TUN/TAP adapter +has been brought up and any routes have been added. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dhcp-renew +Ask Windows to renew the TAP adapter lease on startup. +This option is normally unnecessary, as Windows automatically +triggers a DHCP renegotiation on the TAP adapter when it +comes up, however if you set the TAP-Win32 adapter +Media Status property to "Always Connected", you may need this +flag. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-dhcp-release +Ask Windows to release the TAP adapter lease on shutdown. +This option has the same caveats as +.B \-\-dhcp-renew +above. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-register-dns +Run net stop dnscache, net start dnscache, ipconfig /flushdns +and ipconfig /registerdns on connection initiation. +This is known to kick Windows into +recognizing pushed DNS servers. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-pause-exit +Put up a "press any key to continue" message on the console prior +to OpenVPN program exit. This option is automatically used by the +Windows explorer when OpenVPN is run on a configuration +file using the right-click explorer menu. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-service exit-event [0|1] +Should be used when OpenVPN is being automatically executed by another +program in such +a context that no interaction with the user via display or keyboard +is possible. In general, end-users should never need to explicitly +use this option, as it is automatically added by the OpenVPN service wrapper +when a given OpenVPN configuration is being run as a service. + +.B exit-event +is the name of a Windows global event object, and OpenVPN will continuously +monitor the state of this event object and exit when it becomes signaled. + +The second parameter indicates the initial state of +.B exit-event +and normally defaults to 0. + +Multiple OpenVPN processes can be simultaneously executed with the same +.B exit-event +parameter. In any case, the controlling process can signal +.B exit-event, +causing all such OpenVPN processes to exit. + +When executing an OpenVPN process using the +.B \-\-service +directive, OpenVPN will probably not have a console +window to output status/error +messages, therefore it is useful to use +.B \-\-log +or +.B \-\-log-append +to write these messages to a file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-adapters +(Standalone) +Show available TAP-Win32 adapters which can be selected using the +.B \-\-dev-node +option. On non-Windows systems, the +.BR ifconfig (8) +command provides similar functionality. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-allow-nonadmin [TAP-adapter] +(Standalone) +Set +.B TAP-adapter +to allow access from non-administrative accounts. If +.B TAP-adapter +is omitted, all TAP adapters on the system will be configured to allow +non-admin access. +The non-admin access setting will only persist for the length of time that +the TAP-Win32 device object and driver remain loaded, and will need +to be re-enabled after a reboot, or if the driver is unloaded +and reloaded. +This directive can only be used by an administrator. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-valid-subnets +(Standalone) +Show valid subnets for +.B \-\-dev tun +emulation. Since the TAP-Win32 driver +exports an ethernet interface to Windows, and since TUN devices are +point-to-point in nature, it is necessary for the TAP-Win32 driver +to impose certain constraints on TUN endpoint address selection. + +Namely, the point-to-point endpoints used in TUN device emulation +must be the middle two addresses of a /30 subnet (netmask 255.255.255.252). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-net +(Standalone) +Show OpenVPN's view of the system routing table and network +adapter list. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS PKCS#11 Standalone Options: +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-show-pkcs11-ids provider [cert_private] +(Standalone) +Show PKCS#11 token object list. Specify cert_private as 1 +if certificates are stored as private objects. + +.B \-\-verb +option can be used BEFORE this option to produce debugging information. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS IPv6 Related Options +.\"********************************************************* +The following options exist to support IPv6 tunneling in peer-to-peer +and client-server mode. As of now, this is just very basic +documentation of the IPv6-related options. More documentation can be +found on http://www.greenie.net/ipv6/openvpn.html. +.TP +.B --ifconfig-ipv6 ipv6addr/bits ipv6remote +configure IPv6 address +.B ipv6addr/bits +on the ``tun'' device. The second parameter is used as route target for +.B --route-ipv6 +if no gateway is specified. +.TP +.B --route-ipv6 ipv6addr/bits [gateway] [metric] +setup IPv6 routing in the system to send the specified IPv6 network +into OpenVPN's ``tun'' device +.TP +.B --server-ipv6 ipv6addr/bits +convenience-function to enable a number of IPv6 related options at +once, namely +.B --ifconfig-ipv6, --ifconfig-ipv6-pool, --tun-ipv6 +and +.B --push tun-ipv6 +Is only accepted if ``--mode server'' or ``--server'' is set. +.TP +.B --ifconfig-ipv6-pool ipv6addr/bits +Specify an IPv6 address pool for dynamic assignment to clients. The +pool starts at +.B ipv6addr +and increments by +1 for every new client (linear mode). The +.B /bits +setting controls the size of the pool. +.TP +.B --ifconfig-ipv6-push ipv6addr/bits ipv6remote +for ccd/ per-client static IPv6 interface configuration, see +.B --client-config-dir +and +.B --ifconfig-push +for more details. +.TP +.B --iroute-ipv6 ipv6addr/bits +for ccd/ per-client static IPv6 route configuration, see +.B --iroute +for more details how to setup and use this, and how +.B --iroute +and +.B --route +interact. + +.\"********************************************************* +.SH SCRIPTING AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES +OpenVPN exports a series +of environmental variables for use by user-defined scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Script Order of Execution +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-up +Executed after TCP/UDP socket bind and TUN/TAP open. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-tls-verify +Executed when we have a still untrusted remote peer. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-ipchange +Executed after connection authentication, or remote IP address change. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-connect +Executed in +.B \-\-mode server +mode immediately after client authentication. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-up +Executed after connection authentication, either +immediately after, or some number of seconds after +as defined by the +.B \-\-route-delay +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-route-pre-down +Executed right before the routes are removed. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-client-disconnect +Executed in +.B \-\-mode server +mode on client instance shutdown. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-down +Executed after TCP/UDP and TUN/TAP close. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-learn-address +Executed in +.B \-\-mode server +mode whenever an IPv4 address/route or MAC address is added to OpenVPN's +internal routing table. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +Executed in +.B \-\-mode server +mode on new client connections, when the client is +still untrusted. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS String Types and Remapping +In certain cases, OpenVPN will perform remapping of characters +in strings. Essentially, any characters outside the set of +permitted characters for each string type will be converted +to underbar ('_'). + +.B Q: +Why is string remapping necessary? + +.B A: +It's an important security feature to prevent the malicious coding of +strings from untrusted sources to be passed as parameters to scripts, +saved in the environment, used as a common name, translated to a filename, +etc. + +.B Q: +Can string remapping be disabled? + +.B A: +Yes, by using the +.B \-\-no-name-remapping +option, however this should be considered an advanced option. + +Here is a brief rundown of OpenVPN's current string types and the +permitted character class for each string: + +.B X509 Names: +Alphanumeric, underbar ('_'), dash ('-'), dot ('.'), at +('@'), colon (':'), slash ('/'), and equal ('='). Alphanumeric is defined +as a character which will cause the C library isalnum() function to return +true. + +.B Common Names: +Alphanumeric, underbar ('_'), dash ('-'), dot ('.'), and at +('@'). + +.B \-\-auth-user-pass username: +Same as Common Name, with one exception: starting with OpenVPN 2.0.1, +the username is passed to the OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY plugin in its raw form, +without string remapping. + +.B \-\-auth-user-pass password: +Any "printable" character except CR or LF. +Printable is defined to be a character which will cause the C library +isprint() function to return true. + +.B \-\-client-config-dir filename as derived from common name or username: +Alphanumeric, underbar ('_'), dash ('-'), and dot ('.') except for "." or +".." as standalone strings. As of 2.0.1-rc6, the at ('@') character has +been added as well for compatibility with the common name character class. + +.B Environmental variable names: +Alphanumeric or underbar ('_'). + +.B Environmental variable values: +Any printable character. + +For all cases, characters in a string which are not members of the legal +character class for that string type will be remapped to underbar ('_'). +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Environmental Variables +Once set, a variable is persisted +indefinitely until it is reset by a new value or a restart, + +As of OpenVPN 2.0-beta12, in server mode, environmental +variables set by OpenVPN +are scoped according to the client objects +they are +associated with, so there should not be any issues with +scripts having access to stale, previously set variables +which refer to different client instances. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B bytes_received +Total number of bytes received from client during VPN session. +Set prior to execution of the +.B \-\-client-disconnect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B bytes_sent +Total number of bytes sent to client during VPN session. +Set prior to execution of the +.B \-\-client-disconnect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B common_name +The X509 common name of an authenticated client. +Set prior to execution of +.B \-\-client-connect, \-\-client-disconnect, +and +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B config +Name of first +.B \-\-config +file. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B daemon +Set to "1" if the +.B \-\-daemon +directive is specified, or "0" otherwise. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B daemon_log_redirect +Set to "1" if the +.B \-\-log +or +.B \-\-log-append +directives are specified, or "0" otherwise. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B dev +The actual name of the TUN/TAP device, including +a unit number if it exists. +Set prior to +.B \-\-up +or +.B \-\-down +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B foreign_option_{n} +An option pushed via +.B \-\-push +to a client which does not natively support it, +such as +.B \-\-dhcp-option +on a non-Windows system, will be recorded to this +environmental variable sequence prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_broadcast +The broadcast address for the virtual +ethernet segment which is derived from the +.B \-\-ifconfig +option when +.B \-\-dev tap +is used. +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_ipv6_local +The local VPN endpoint IPv6 address specified in the +.B \-\-ifconfig-ipv6 +option (first parameter). +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_ipv6_netbits +The prefix length of the IPv6 network on the VPN interface. Derived from +the /nnn parameter of the IPv6 address in the +.B \-\-ifconfig-ipv6 +option (first parameter). +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_ipv6_remote +The remote VPN endpoint IPv6 address specified in the +.B \-\-ifconfig-ipv6 +option (second parameter). +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_local +The local VPN endpoint IP address specified in the +.B \-\-ifconfig +option (first parameter). +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_remote +The remote VPN endpoint IP address specified in the +.B \-\-ifconfig +option (second parameter) when +.B \-\-dev tun +is used. +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_netmask +The subnet mask of the virtual ethernet segment +that is specified as the second parameter to +.B \-\-ifconfig +when +.B \-\-dev tap +is being used. +Set prior to OpenVPN calling the +.I ifconfig +or +.I netsh +(windows version of ifconfig) commands which +normally occurs prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_pool_local_ip +The local +virtual IP address for the TUN/TAP tunnel taken from an +.B \-\-ifconfig-push +directive if specified, or otherwise from +the ifconfig pool (controlled by the +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool +config file directive). +Only set for +.B \-\-dev tun +tunnels. +This option is set on the server prior to execution +of the +.B \-\-client-connect +and +.B \-\-client-disconnect +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_pool_netmask +The +virtual IP netmask for the TUN/TAP tunnel taken from an +.B \-\-ifconfig-push +directive if specified, or otherwise from +the ifconfig pool (controlled by the +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool +config file directive). +Only set for +.B \-\-dev tap +tunnels. +This option is set on the server prior to execution +of the +.B \-\-client-connect +and +.B \-\-client-disconnect +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B ifconfig_pool_remote_ip +The remote +virtual IP address for the TUN/TAP tunnel taken from an +.B \-\-ifconfig-push +directive if specified, or otherwise from +the ifconfig pool (controlled by the +.B \-\-ifconfig-pool +config file directive). +This option is set on the server prior to execution +of the +.B \-\-client-connect +and +.B \-\-client-disconnect +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B link_mtu +The maximum packet size (not including the IP header) +of tunnel data in UDP tunnel transport mode. +Set prior to +.B \-\-up +or +.B \-\-down +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B local +The +.B \-\-local +parameter. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B local_port +The local port number or name, specified by +.B \-\-port +or +.B \-\-lport. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B password +The password provided by a connecting client. +Set prior to +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script execution only when the +.B via-env +modifier is specified, and deleted from the environment +after the script returns. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B proto +The +.B \-\-proto +parameter. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B remote_{n} +The +.B \-\-remote +parameter. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B remote_port_{n} +The remote port number, specified by +.B \-\-port +or +.B \-\-rport. +Set on program initiation and reset on SIGHUP. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B route_net_gateway +The pre-existing default IP gateway in the system routing +table. +Set prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B route_vpn_gateway +The default gateway used by +.B \-\-route +options, as specified in either the +.B \-\-route-gateway +option or the second parameter to +.B \-\-ifconfig +when +.B \-\-dev tun +is specified. +Set prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B route_{parm}_{n} +A set of variables which define each route to be added, and +are set prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. + +.B parm +will be one of "network", "netmask", "gateway", or "metric". + +.B n +is the OpenVPN route number, starting from 1. + +If the network or gateway are resolvable DNS names, +their IP address translations will be recorded rather +than their names as denoted on the command line +or configuration file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B route_ipv6_{parm}_{n} +A set of variables which define each IPv6 route to be added, and +are set prior to +.B \-\-up +script execution. + +.B parm +will be one of "network" or "gateway" ("netmask" is contained as "/nnn" +in the route_ipv6_network_{n}, unlike IPv4 where it is passed in a separate +environment variable). + +.B n +is the OpenVPN route number, starting from 1. + +If the network or gateway are resolvable DNS names, +their IP address translations will be recorded rather +than their names as denoted on the command line +or configuration file. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B peer_cert +Temporary file name containing the client certificate upon +connection. Useful in conjunction with --tls-verify +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B script_context +Set to "init" or "restart" prior to up/down script execution. +For more information, see +documentation for +.B \-\-up. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B script_type +Prior to execution of any script, this variable is set to the type of +script being run. It can be one of the following: +.B up, down, ipchange, route-up, tls-verify, auth-user-pass-verify, +.B client-connect, client-disconnect, +or +.B learn-address. +Set prior to execution of any script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B signal +The reason for exit or restart. Can be one of +.B sigusr1, sighup, sigterm, sigint, inactive +(controlled by +.B \-\-inactive +option), +.B ping-exit +(controlled by +.B \-\-ping-exit +option), +.B ping-restart +(controlled by +.B \-\-ping-restart +option), +.B connection-reset +(triggered on TCP connection reset), +.B error, +or +.B unknown +(unknown signal). This variable is set just prior to down script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B time_ascii +Client connection timestamp, formatted as a human-readable +time string. +Set prior to execution of the +.B \-\-client-connect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B time_duration +The duration (in seconds) of the client session which is now +disconnecting. +Set prior to execution of the +.B \-\-client-disconnect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B time_unix +Client connection timestamp, formatted as a unix integer +date/time value. +Set prior to execution of the +.B \-\-client-connect +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B tls_id_{n} +A series of certificate fields from the remote peer, +where +.B n +is the verification level. Only set for TLS connections. Set prior +to execution of +.B \-\-tls-verify +script. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B tls_serial_{n} +The serial number of the certificate from the remote peer, +where +.B n +is the verification level. Only set for TLS connections. Set prior +to execution of +.B \-\-tls-verify +script. This is in the form of a hex string like "37AB46E0", which is +suitable for doing serial-based OCSP queries (with OpenSSL, you have +to prepend "0x" to the string). If something goes wrong while reading +the value from the certificate it will be an empty string, so your +code should check that. +See the contrib/OCSP_check/OCSP_check.sh script for an example. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B tun_mtu +The MTU of the TUN/TAP device. +Set prior to +.B \-\-up +or +.B \-\-down +script execution. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B trusted_ip (or trusted_ip6) +Actual IP address of connecting client or peer which has been authenticated. +Set prior to execution of +.B \-\-ipchange, \-\-client-connect, +and +.B \-\-client-disconnect +scripts. +If using ipv6 endpoints (udp6, tcp6), +.B trusted_ip6 +will be set instead. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B trusted_port +Actual port number of connecting client or peer which has been authenticated. +Set prior to execution of +.B \-\-ipchange, \-\-client-connect, +and +.B \-\-client-disconnect +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B untrusted_ip (or untrusted_ip6) +Actual IP address of connecting client or peer which has not been authenticated +yet. Sometimes used to +.B nmap +the connecting host in a +.B \-\-tls-verify +script to ensure it is firewalled properly. +Set prior to execution of +.B \-\-tls-verify +and +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +scripts. +If using ipv6 endpoints (udp6, tcp6), +.B untrusted_ip6 +will be set instead. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B untrusted_port +Actual port number of connecting client or peer which has not been authenticated +yet. +Set prior to execution of +.B \-\-tls-verify +and +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +scripts. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B username +The username provided by a connecting client. +Set prior to +.B \-\-auth-user-pass-verify +script execution only when the +.B via-env +modifier is specified. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B X509_{n}_{subject_field} +An X509 subject field from the remote peer certificate, +where +.B n +is the verification level. Only set for TLS connections. Set prior +to execution of +.B \-\-tls-verify +script. This variable is similar to +.B tls_id_{n} +except the component X509 subject fields are broken out, and +no string remapping occurs on these field values (except for remapping +of control characters to "_"). +For example, the following variables would be set on the +OpenVPN server using the sample client certificate +in sample-keys (client.crt). +Note that the verification level is 0 for the client certificate +and 1 for the CA certificate. + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 +X509_0_emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain +X509_0_CN=Test-Client +X509_0_O=OpenVPN-TEST +X509_0_ST=NA +X509_0_C=KG +X509_1_emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain +X509_1_O=OpenVPN-TEST +X509_1_L=BISHKEK +X509_1_ST=NA +X509_1_C=KG +.in -4 +.ft +.fi +.\"********************************************************* +.SH INLINE FILE SUPPORT +OpenVPN allows including files in the main configuration for the +.B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, \-\-dh, \-\-extra-certs, \-\-key, \-\-pkcs12, \-\-secret +and +.B \-\-tls-auth +options. + +Each inline file started by the line +.B + +Here is an example of an inline file usage + +.nf +.ft 3 +.in +4 + +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +[...] +-----END CERTIFICATE----- + +.in -4 +.ft +.fi + +When using the inline file feature with +.B \-\-pkcs12 +the inline file has to be base64 encoded. Encoding of a .p12 file into base64 can be done for example with OpenSSL by running +.B openssl base64 -in input.p12 + +.SH SIGNALS +.TP +.B SIGHUP +Cause OpenVPN to close all TUN/TAP and +network connections, +restart, re-read the configuration file (if any), +and reopen TUN/TAP and network connections. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B SIGUSR1 +Like +.B SIGHUP, +except don't re-read configuration file, and possibly don't close and reopen TUN/TAP +device, re-read key files, preserve local IP address/port, or preserve most recently authenticated +remote IP address/port based on +.B \-\-persist-tun, \-\-persist-key, \-\-persist-local-ip, +and +.B \-\-persist-remote-ip +options respectively (see above). + +This signal may also be internally generated by a timeout condition, governed +by the +.B \-\-ping-restart +option. + +This signal, when combined with +.B \-\-persist-remote-ip, +may be +sent when the underlying parameters of the host's network interface change +such as when the host is a DHCP client and is assigned a new IP address. +See +.B \-\-ipchange +above for more information. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B SIGUSR2 +Causes OpenVPN to display its current statistics (to the syslog +file if +.B \-\-daemon +is used, or stdout otherwise). +.\"********************************************************* +.TP +.B SIGINT, SIGTERM +Causes OpenVPN to exit gracefully. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH TUN/TAP DRIVER SETUP +If you are running Linux 2.4.7 or higher, you probably have the TUN/TAP driver +already installed. If so, there are still a few things you need to do: + +Make device: +.B mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200 + +Load driver: +.B modprobe tun +.\"********************************************************* +.SH EXAMPLES +Prior to running these examples, you should have OpenVPN installed on two +machines with network connectivity between them. If you have not +yet installed OpenVPN, consult the INSTALL file included in the OpenVPN +distribution. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS TUN/TAP Setup: +If you are using Linux 2.4 or higher, +make the tun device node and load the tun module: +.IP +.B mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200 +.LP +.IP +.B modprobe tun +.LP +If you installed from RPM, the +.B mknod +step may be omitted, because the RPM install does that for you. + +Only Linux 2.4 and newer are supported. + +For other platforms, consult the INSTALL file at +.I http://openvpn.net/install.html +for more information. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Firewall Setup: +If firewalls exist between +the two machines, they should be set to forward UDP port 1194 +in both directions. If you do not have control over the firewalls +between the two machines, you may still be able to use OpenVPN by adding +.B \-\-ping 15 +to each of the +.B openvpn +commands used below in the examples (this will cause each peer to send out +a UDP ping to its remote peer once every 15 seconds which will cause many +stateful firewalls to forward packets in both directions +without an explicit firewall rule). + +If you are using a Linux iptables-based firewall, you may need to enter +the following command to allow incoming packets on the TUN device: +.IP +.B iptables -A INPUT -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +See the firewalls section below for more information on configuring firewalls +for use with OpenVPN. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS VPN Address Setup: +For purposes +of our example, our two machines will be called +.B may.kg +and +.B june.kg. +If you are constructing a VPN over the internet, then replace +.B may.kg +and +.B june.kg +with the internet hostname or IP address that each machine will use +to contact the other over the internet. + +Now we will choose the tunnel endpoints. Tunnel endpoints are +private IP addresses that only have meaning in the context of +the VPN. Each machine will use the tunnel endpoint of the other +machine to access it over the VPN. In our example, +the tunnel endpoint for may.kg +will be 10.4.0.1 and for june.kg, 10.4.0.2. + +Once the VPN is established, you have essentially +created a secure alternate path between the two hosts +which is addressed by using the tunnel endpoints. You can +control which network +traffic passes between the hosts +(a) over the VPN or (b) independently of the VPN, by choosing whether to use +(a) the VPN endpoint address or (b) the public internet address, +to access the remote host. For example if you are on may.kg and you wish to connect to june.kg +via +.B ssh +without using the VPN (since +.B ssh +has its own built-in security) you would use the command +.B ssh june.kg. +However in the same scenario, you could also use the command +.B telnet 10.4.0.2 +to create a telnet session with june.kg over the VPN, that would +use the VPN to secure the session rather than +.B ssh. + +You can use any address you wish for the +tunnel endpoints +but make sure that they are private addresses +(such as those that begin with 10 or 192.168) and that they are +not part of any existing subnet on the networks of +either peer, unless you are bridging. If you use an address that is part of +your local subnet for either of the tunnel endpoints, +you will get a weird feedback loop. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Example 1: A simple tunnel without security +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote june.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.1 10.4.0.2 \-\-verb 9 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote may.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.2 10.4.0.1 \-\-verb 9 +.LP +Now verify the tunnel is working by pinging across the tunnel. +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.2 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.1 +.LP +The +.B \-\-verb 9 +option will produce verbose output, similar to the +.BR tcpdump (8) +program. Omit the +.B \-\-verb 9 +option to have OpenVPN run quietly. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Example 2: A tunnel with static-key security (i.e. using a pre-shared secret) +First build a static key on may. +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-genkey \-\-secret key +.LP +This command will build a random key file called +.B key +(in ascii format). +Now copy +.B key +to june over a secure medium such as by +using the +.BR scp (1) +program. +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote june.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.1 10.4.0.2 \-\-verb 5 \-\-secret key +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote may.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.2 10.4.0.1 \-\-verb 5 \-\-secret key +.LP +Now verify the tunnel is working by pinging across the tunnel. +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.2 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.1 +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Example 3: A tunnel with full TLS-based security +For this test, we will designate +.B may +as the TLS client and +.B june +as the TLS server. +.I Note that client or server designation only has meaning for the TLS subsystem. It has no bearing on OpenVPN's peer-to-peer, UDP-based communication model. + +First, build a separate certificate/key pair +for both may and june (see above where +.B \-\-cert +is discussed for more info). Then construct +Diffie Hellman parameters (see above where +.B \-\-dh +is discussed for more info). You can also use the +included test files client.crt, client.key, +server.crt, server.key and ca.crt. +The .crt files are certificates/public-keys, the .key +files are private keys, and ca.crt is a certification +authority who has signed both +client.crt and server.crt. For Diffie Hellman +parameters you can use the included file dh1024.pem. +.I Note that all client, server, and certificate authority certificates and keys included in the OpenVPN distribution are totally insecure and should be used for testing only. +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote june.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.1 10.4.0.2 \-\-tls-client \-\-ca ca.crt \-\-cert client.crt \-\-key client.key \-\-reneg-sec 60 \-\-verb 5 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B openvpn \-\-remote may.kg \-\-dev tun1 \-\-ifconfig 10.4.0.2 10.4.0.1 \-\-tls-server \-\-dh dh1024.pem \-\-ca ca.crt \-\-cert server.crt \-\-key server.key \-\-reneg-sec 60 \-\-verb 5 +.LP +Now verify the tunnel is working by pinging across the tunnel. +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.2 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B ping 10.4.0.1 +.LP +Notice the +.B \-\-reneg-sec 60 +option we used above. That tells OpenVPN to renegotiate +the data channel keys every minute. +Since we used +.B \-\-verb 5 +above, you will see status information on each new key negotiation. + +For production operations, a key renegotiation interval of 60 seconds +is probably too frequent. Omit the +.B \-\-reneg-sec 60 +option to use OpenVPN's default key renegotiation interval of one hour. +.\"********************************************************* +.SS Routing: +Assuming you can ping across the tunnel, +the next step is to route a real subnet over +the secure tunnel. Suppose that may and june have two network +interfaces each, one connected +to the internet, and the other to a private +network. Our goal is to securely connect +both private networks. We will assume that may's private subnet +is 10.0.0.0/24 and june's is 10.0.1.0/24. +.LP +First, ensure that IP forwarding is enabled on both peers. +On Linux, enable routing: +.IP +.B echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward +.LP +and enable TUN packet forwarding through the firewall: +.IP +.B iptables -A FORWARD -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +On may: +.IP +.B route add -net 10.0.1.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 10.4.0.2 +.LP +On june: +.IP +.B route add -net 10.0.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 10.4.0.1 +.LP +Now any machine on the 10.0.0.0/24 subnet can +access any machine on the 10.0.1.0/24 subnet +over the secure tunnel (or vice versa). + +In a production environment, you could put the route command(s) +in a script and execute with the +.B \-\-up +option. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH FIREWALLS +OpenVPN's usage of a single UDP port makes it fairly firewall-friendly. +You should add an entry to your firewall rules to allow incoming OpenVPN +packets. On Linux 2.4+: +.IP +.B iptables -A INPUT -p udp -s 1.2.3.4 \-\-dport 1194 -j ACCEPT +.LP +This will allow incoming packets on UDP port 1194 (OpenVPN's default UDP port) +from an OpenVPN peer at 1.2.3.4. + +If you are using HMAC-based packet authentication (the default in any of +OpenVPN's secure modes), having the firewall filter on source +address can be considered optional, since HMAC packet authentication +is a much more secure method of verifying the authenticity of +a packet source. In that case: +.IP +.B iptables -A INPUT -p udp \-\-dport 1194 -j ACCEPT +.LP +would be adequate and would not render the host inflexible with +respect to its peer having a dynamic IP address. + +OpenVPN also works well on stateful firewalls. In some cases, you may +not need to add any static rules to the firewall list if you are +using a stateful firewall that knows how to track UDP connections. +If you specify +.B \-\-ping n, +OpenVPN will be guaranteed +to send a packet to its peer at least once every +.B n +seconds. If +.B n +is less than the stateful firewall connection timeout, you can +maintain an OpenVPN connection indefinitely without explicit +firewall rules. + +You should also add firewall rules to allow incoming IP traffic on +TUN or TAP devices such as: +.IP +.B iptables -A INPUT -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +to allow input packets from tun devices, +.IP +.B iptables -A FORWARD -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +to allow input packets from tun devices to be forwarded to +other hosts on the local network, +.IP +.B iptables -A INPUT -i tap+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +to allow input packets from tap devices, and +.IP +.B iptables -A FORWARD -i tap+ -j ACCEPT +.LP +to allow input packets from tap devices to be forwarded to +other hosts on the local network. + +These rules are secure if you use packet authentication, +since no incoming packets will arrive on a TUN or TAP +virtual device +unless they first pass an HMAC authentication test. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH FAQ +.I http://openvpn.net/faq.html +.\"********************************************************* +.SH HOWTO +For a more comprehensive guide to setting up OpenVPN +in a production setting, see the OpenVPN HOWTO at +.I http://openvpn.net/howto.html +.\"********************************************************* +.SH PROTOCOL +For a description of OpenVPN's underlying protocol, +see +.I http://openvpn.net/security.html +.\"********************************************************* +.SH WEB +OpenVPN's web site is at +.I http://openvpn.net/ + +Go here to download the latest version of OpenVPN, subscribe +to the mailing lists, read the mailing list +archives, or browse the SVN repository. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH BUGS +Report all bugs to the OpenVPN team . +.\"********************************************************* +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR dhcpcd (8), +.BR ifconfig (8), +.BR openssl (1), +.BR route (8), +.BR scp (1) +.BR ssh (1) +.\"********************************************************* +.SH NOTES +.LP +This product includes software developed by the +OpenSSL Project ( +.I http://www.openssl.org/ +) + +For more information on the TLS protocol, see +.I http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + +For more information on the LZO real-time compression library see +.I http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ +.\"********************************************************* +.SH COPYRIGHT +Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. This program is free software; +you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 +as published by the Free Software Foundation. +.\"********************************************************* +.SH AUTHORS +James Yonan diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13dee61d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +include_HEADERS = openvpn-plugin.h diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/openvpn-plugin.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/openvpn-plugin.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0879f490 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/include/openvpn-plugin.h @@ -0,0 +1,794 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H_ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H_ + +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_VERSION 3 + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#include +#ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +#define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t; +#endif +#else +#include +#ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +#define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +typedef X509 openvpn_x509_cert_t; +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Plug-in types. These types correspond to the set of script callbacks + * supported by OpenVPN. + * + * This is the general call sequence to expect when running in server mode: + * + * Initial Server Startup: + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_open_v1 + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1 (this is the top-level "generic" + * client template) + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP + * + * New Client Connection: + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1 + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY (called once for every cert + * in the server chain) + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE + * + * [If OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY returned OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED, + * we don't proceed until authentication is verified via auth_control_file] + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2 + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS + * + * [Client session ensues] + * + * For each "TLS soft reset", according to reneg-sec option (or similar): + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY (called once for every cert + * in the server chain) + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL + * + * [If OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY returned OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED, + * we expect that authentication is verified via auth_control_file within + * the number of seconds defined by the "hand-window" option. Data channel traffic + * will continue to flow uninterrupted during this period.] + * + * [Client session continues] + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1 + * + * [ some time may pass ] + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS (this coincides with a + * lazy free of initial + * learned addr object) + * Server Shutdown: + * + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_func_v1 OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1 (top-level "generic" client) + * FUNC: openvpn_plugin_close_v1 + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP 0 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN 1 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP 2 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE 3 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY 4 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY 5 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT 6 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT 7 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS 8 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2 9 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL 10 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF 11 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_PREDOWN 12 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_N 13 + +/* + * Build a mask out of a set of plug-in types. + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK(x) (1<<(x)) + +/* + * A pointer to a plugin-defined object which contains + * the object state. + */ +typedef void *openvpn_plugin_handle_t; + +/* + * Return value for openvpn_plugin_func_v1 function + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS 0 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR 1 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED 2 + +/* + * For Windows (needs to be modified for MSVC) + */ +#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H) +# define OPENVPN_EXPORT __declspec(dllexport) +#else +# define OPENVPN_EXPORT +#endif + +/* + * If OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H is defined, we know that we are being + * included in an OpenVPN compile, rather than a plugin compile. + */ +#ifdef OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H + +/* + * We are compiling OpenVPN. + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF typedef +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(name) (*name) + +#else + +/* + * We are compiling plugin. + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF OPENVPN_EXPORT +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(name) name + +#endif + +/* + * Used by openvpn_plugin_func to return structured + * data. The plugin should allocate all structure + * instances, name strings, and value strings with + * malloc, since OpenVPN will assume that it + * can free the list by calling free() over the same. + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_string_list +{ + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *next; + char *name; + char *value; +}; + + +/* openvpn_plugin_{open,func}_v3() related structs */ + +/* Defines version of the v3 plugin argument structs + * + * Whenever one or more of these structs are modified, this constant + * must be updated. A changelog should be appended in this comment + * as well, to make it easier to see what information is available + * in the different versions. + * + * Version Comment + * 1 Initial plugin v3 structures providing the same API as + * the v2 plugin interface + X509 certificate information. + * + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGINv3_STRUCTVER 1 + +/** + * Definitions needed for the plug-in callback functions. + */ +typedef enum +{ + PLOG_ERR = (1 << 0), /* Error condition message */ + PLOG_WARN = (1 << 1), /* General warning message */ + PLOG_NOTE = (1 << 2), /* Informational message */ + PLOG_DEBUG = (1 << 3), /* Debug message, displayed if verb >= 7 */ + + PLOG_ERRNO = (1 << 8), /* Add error description to message */ + PLOG_NOMUTE = (1 << 9), /* Mute setting does not apply for message */ + +} openvpn_plugin_log_flags_t; + + +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO +# define _ovpn_chk_fmt(a, b) __attribute__ ((format(gnu_printf, (a), (b)))) +#else +# define _ovpn_chk_fmt(a, b) __attribute__ ((format(__printf__, (a), (b)))) +#endif +#else +# define _ovpn_chk_fmt(a, b) +#endif + +typedef void (*plugin_log_t) (openvpn_plugin_log_flags_t flags, + const char *plugin_name, + const char *format, ...) _ovpn_chk_fmt(3, 4); + +typedef void (*plugin_vlog_t) (openvpn_plugin_log_flags_t flags, + const char *plugin_name, + const char *format, + va_list arglist) _ovpn_chk_fmt(3, 0); + +#undef _ovpn_chk_fmt + +/** + * Used by the openvpn_plugin_open_v3() function to pass callback + * function pointers to the plug-in. + * + * plugin_log + * plugin_vlog : Use these functions to add information to the OpenVPN log file. + * Messages will only be displayed if the plugin_name parameter + * is set. PLOG_DEBUG messages will only be displayed with plug-in + * debug log verbosity (at the time of writing that's verb >= 7). + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_callbacks +{ + plugin_log_t plugin_log; + plugin_vlog_t plugin_vlog; +}; + +/** + * Arguments used to transport variables to the plug-in. + * The struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_in is only used + * by the openvpn_plugin_open_v3() function. + * + * STRUCT MEMBERS + * + * type_mask : Set by OpenVPN to the logical OR of all script + * types which this version of OpenVPN supports. + * + * argv : a NULL-terminated array of options provided to the OpenVPN + * "plug-in" directive. argv[0] is the dynamic library pathname. + * + * envp : a NULL-terminated array of OpenVPN-set environmental + * variables in "name=value" format. Note that for security reasons, + * these variables are not actually written to the "official" + * environmental variable store of the process. + * + * callbacks : a pointer to the plug-in callback function struct. + * + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_in +{ + const int type_mask; + const char ** const argv; + const char ** const envp; + struct openvpn_plugin_callbacks *callbacks; +}; + + +/** + * Arguments used to transport variables from the plug-in back + * to the OpenVPN process. The struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_return + * is only used by the openvpn_plugin_open_v3() function. + * + * STRUCT MEMBERS + * + * *type_mask : The plug-in should set this value to the logical OR of all script + * types which the plug-in wants to intercept. For example, if the + * script wants to intercept the client-connect and client-disconnect + * script types: + * + * *type_mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK(OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT) + * | OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK(OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT) + * + * *handle : Pointer to a global plug-in context, created by the plug-in. This pointer + * is passed on to the other plug-in calls. + * + * return_list : used to return data back to OpenVPN. + * + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_return +{ + int type_mask; + openvpn_plugin_handle_t *handle; + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list; +}; + +/** + * Arguments used to transport variables to and from the + * plug-in. The struct openvpn_plugin_args_func is only used + * by the openvpn_plugin_func_v3() function. + * + * STRUCT MEMBERS: + * + * type : one of the PLUGIN_x types. + * + * argv : a NULL-terminated array of "command line" options which + * would normally be passed to the script. argv[0] is the dynamic + * library pathname. + * + * envp : a NULL-terminated array of OpenVPN-set environmental + * variables in "name=value" format. Note that for security reasons, + * these variables are not actually written to the "official" + * environmental variable store of the process. + * + * *handle : Pointer to a global plug-in context, created by the plug-in's openvpn_plugin_open_v3(). + * + * *per_client_context : the per-client context pointer which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1, if defined. + * + * current_cert_depth : Certificate depth of the certificate being passed over (only if compiled with ENABLE_SSL defined) + * + * *current_cert : X509 Certificate object received from the client (only if compiled with ENABLE_SSL defined) + * + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_in +{ + const int type; + const char ** const argv; + const char ** const envp; + openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle; + void *per_client_context; +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + int current_cert_depth; + openvpn_x509_cert_t *current_cert; +#else + int __current_cert_depth_disabled; /* Unused, for compatibility purposes only */ + void *__current_cert_disabled; /* Unused, for compatibility purposes only */ +#endif +}; + + +/** + * Arguments used to transport variables to and from the + * plug-in. The struct openvpn_plugin_args_func is only used + * by the openvpn_plugin_func_v3() function. + * + * STRUCT MEMBERS: + * + * return_list : used to return data back to OpenVPN for further processing/usage by + * the OpenVPN executable. + * + */ +struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_return +{ + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list; +}; + +/* + * Multiple plugin modules can be cascaded, and modules can be + * used in tandem with scripts. The order of operation is that + * the module func() functions are called in the order that + * the modules were specified in the config file. If a script + * was specified as well, it will be called last. If the + * return code of the module/script controls an authentication + * function (such as tls-verify or auth-user-pass-verify), then + * every module and script must return success (0) in order for + * the connection to be authenticated. + * + * Notes: + * + * Plugins which use a privilege-separation model (by forking in + * their initialization function before the main OpenVPN process + * downgrades root privileges and/or executes a chroot) must + * daemonize after a fork if the "daemon" environmental variable is + * set. In addition, if the "daemon_log_redirect" variable is set, + * the plugin should preserve stdout/stderr across the daemon() + * syscall. See the daemonize() function in plugin/auth-pam/auth-pam.c + * for an example. + */ + +/* + * Prototypes for functions which OpenVPN plug-ins must define. + */ + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_open_v2 + * + * REQUIRED: YES + * + * Called on initial plug-in load. OpenVPN will preserve plug-in state + * across SIGUSR1 restarts but not across SIGHUP restarts. A SIGHUP reset + * will cause the plugin to be closed and reopened. + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * *type_mask : Set by OpenVPN to the logical OR of all script + * types which this version of OpenVPN supports. The plug-in + * should set this value to the logical OR of all script types + * which the plug-in wants to intercept. For example, if the + * script wants to intercept the client-connect and + * client-disconnect script types: + * + * *type_mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK(OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT) + * | OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK(OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT) + * + * argv : a NULL-terminated array of options provided to the OpenVPN + * "plug-in" directive. argv[0] is the dynamic library pathname. + * + * envp : a NULL-terminated array of OpenVPN-set environmental + * variables in "name=value" format. Note that for security reasons, + * these variables are not actually written to the "official" + * environmental variable store of the process. + * + * return_list : used to return data back to OpenVPN. + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * An openvpn_plugin_handle_t value on success, NULL on failure + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF openvpn_plugin_handle_t OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_open_v2) + (unsigned int *type_mask, + const char *argv[], + const char *envp[], + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_func_v2 + * + * Called to perform the work of a given script type. + * + * REQUIRED: YES + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * type : one of the PLUGIN_x types + * + * argv : a NULL-terminated array of "command line" options which + * would normally be passed to the script. argv[0] is the dynamic + * library pathname. + * + * envp : a NULL-terminated array of OpenVPN-set environmental + * variables in "name=value" format. Note that for security reasons, + * these variables are not actually written to the "official" + * environmental variable store of the process. + * + * per_client_context : the per-client context pointer which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1, if defined. + * + * return_list : used to return data back to OpenVPN. + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS on success, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR on failure + * + * In addition, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED may be returned by + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY. This enables asynchronous + * authentication where the plugin (or one of its agents) may indicate + * authentication success/failure some number of seconds after the return + * of the OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY handler by writing a single + * char to the file named by auth_control_file in the environmental variable + * list (envp). + * + * first char of auth_control_file: + * '0' -- indicates auth failure + * '1' -- indicates auth success + * + * OpenVPN will delete the auth_control_file after it goes out of scope. + * + * If an OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF handler is defined and returns success + * for a particular client instance, packet filtering will be enabled for that + * instance. OpenVPN will then attempt to read the packet filter configuration + * from the temporary file named by the environmental variable pf_file. This + * file may be generated asynchronously and may be dynamically updated during the + * client session, however the client will be blocked from sending or receiving + * VPN tunnel packets until the packet filter file has been generated. OpenVPN + * will periodically test the packet filter file over the life of the client + * instance and reload when modified. OpenVPN will delete the packet filter file + * when the client instance goes out of scope. + * + * Packet filter file grammar: + * + * [CLIENTS DROP|ACCEPT] + * {+|-}common_name1 + * {+|-}common_name2 + * . . . + * [SUBNETS DROP|ACCEPT] + * {+|-}subnet1 + * {+|-}subnet2 + * . . . + * [END] + * + * Subnet: IP-ADDRESS | IP-ADDRESS/NUM_NETWORK_BITS + * + * CLIENTS refers to the set of clients (by their common-name) which + * this instance is allowed ('+') to connect to, or is excluded ('-') + * from connecting to. Note that in the case of client-to-client + * connections, such communication must be allowed by the packet filter + * configuration files of both clients. + * + * SUBNETS refers to IP addresses or IP address subnets which this + * instance may connect to ('+') or is excluded ('-') from connecting + * to. + * + * DROP or ACCEPT defines default policy when there is no explicit match + * for a common-name or subnet. The [END] tag must exist. A special + * purpose tag called [KILL] will immediately kill the client instance. + * A given client or subnet rule applies to both incoming and outgoing + * packets. + * + * See plugin/defer/simple.c for an example on using asynchronous + * authentication and client-specific packet filtering. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_func_v2) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, + const int type, + const char *argv[], + const char *envp[], + void *per_client_context, + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list); + + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_open_v3 + * + * REQUIRED: YES + * + * Called on initial plug-in load. OpenVPN will preserve plug-in state + * across SIGUSR1 restarts but not across SIGHUP restarts. A SIGHUP reset + * will cause the plugin to be closed and reopened. + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * version : fixed value, defines the API version of the OpenVPN plug-in API. The plug-in + * should validate that this value is matching the OPENVPN_PLUGIN_VERSION value. + * + * arguments : Structure with all arguments available to the plug-in. + * + * retptr : used to return data back to OpenVPN. + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS on success, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR on failure + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_open_v3) + (const int version, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_in const *arguments, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_return *retptr); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_func_v3 + * + * Called to perform the work of a given script type. + * + * REQUIRED: YES + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * version : fixed value, defines the API version of the OpenVPN plug-in API. The plug-in + * should validate that this value is matching the OPENVPN_PLUGIN_VERSION value. + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * return_list : used to return data back to OpenVPN. + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS on success, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR on failure + * + * In addition, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED may be returned by + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY. This enables asynchronous + * authentication where the plugin (or one of its agents) may indicate + * authentication success/failure some number of seconds after the return + * of the OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY handler by writing a single + * char to the file named by auth_control_file in the environmental variable + * list (envp). + * + * first char of auth_control_file: + * '0' -- indicates auth failure + * '1' -- indicates auth success + * + * OpenVPN will delete the auth_control_file after it goes out of scope. + * + * If an OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF handler is defined and returns success + * for a particular client instance, packet filtering will be enabled for that + * instance. OpenVPN will then attempt to read the packet filter configuration + * from the temporary file named by the environmental variable pf_file. This + * file may be generated asynchronously and may be dynamically updated during the + * client session, however the client will be blocked from sending or receiving + * VPN tunnel packets until the packet filter file has been generated. OpenVPN + * will periodically test the packet filter file over the life of the client + * instance and reload when modified. OpenVPN will delete the packet filter file + * when the client instance goes out of scope. + * + * Packet filter file grammar: + * + * [CLIENTS DROP|ACCEPT] + * {+|-}common_name1 + * {+|-}common_name2 + * . . . + * [SUBNETS DROP|ACCEPT] + * {+|-}subnet1 + * {+|-}subnet2 + * . . . + * [END] + * + * Subnet: IP-ADDRESS | IP-ADDRESS/NUM_NETWORK_BITS + * + * CLIENTS refers to the set of clients (by their common-name) which + * this instance is allowed ('+') to connect to, or is excluded ('-') + * from connecting to. Note that in the case of client-to-client + * connections, such communication must be allowed by the packet filter + * configuration files of both clients. + * + * SUBNETS refers to IP addresses or IP address subnets which this + * instance may connect to ('+') or is excluded ('-') from connecting + * to. + * + * DROP or ACCEPT defines default policy when there is no explicit match + * for a common-name or subnet. The [END] tag must exist. A special + * purpose tag called [KILL] will immediately kill the client instance. + * A given client or subnet rule applies to both incoming and outgoing + * packets. + * + * See plugin/defer/simple.c for an example on using asynchronous + * authentication and client-specific packet filtering. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_func_v3) + (const int version, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_in const *arguments, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_return *retptr); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_close_v1 + * + * REQUIRED: YES + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * Called immediately prior to plug-in unload. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF void OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_close_v1) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 + * + * REQUIRED: NO + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * Called when OpenVPN is in the process of aborting due to a fatal error. + * Will only be called on an open context returned by a prior successful + * openvpn_plugin_open callback. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF void OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_abort_v1) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1 + * + * Called to allocate a per-client memory region, which + * is then passed to the openvpn_plugin_func_v2 function. + * This function is called every time the OpenVPN server + * constructs a client instance object, which normally + * occurs when a session-initiating packet is received + * by a new client, even before the client has authenticated. + * + * This function should allocate the private memory needed + * by the plugin to track individual OpenVPN clients, and + * return a void * to this memory region. + * + * REQUIRED: NO + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * void * pointer to plugin's private per-client memory region, or NULL + * if no memory region is required. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF void * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1 + * + * This function is called on client instance object destruction. + * + * REQUIRED: NO + * + * ARGUMENTS + * + * handle : the openvpn_plugin_handle_t value which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_open. + * + * per_client_context : the per-client context pointer which was returned by + * openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1, if defined. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF void OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, void *per_client_context); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_select_initialization_point_v1 + * + * Several different points exist in OpenVPN's initialization sequence where + * the openvpn_plugin_open function can be called. While the default is + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_DAEMON, this function can be used to select a + * different initialization point. For example, if your plugin needs to + * return configuration parameters to OpenVPN, use + * OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_CONFIG_PARSE. + * + * REQUIRED: NO + * + * RETURN VALUE: + * + * An OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_x value. + */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_CONFIG_PARSE 1 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_DAEMON 2 /* default */ +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_POST_DAEMON 3 +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_POST_UID_CHANGE 4 + +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_select_initialization_point_v1) + (void); + +/* + * FUNCTION: openvpn_plugin_min_version_required_v1 + * + * This function is called by OpenVPN to query the minimum + plugin interface version number required by the plugin. + * + * REQUIRED: NO + * + * RETURN VALUE + * + * The minimum OpenVPN plugin interface version number necessary to support + * this plugin. + */ +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_min_version_required_v1) + (void); + +/* + * Deprecated functions which are still supported for backward compatibility. + */ + +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF openvpn_plugin_handle_t OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_open_v1) + (unsigned int *type_mask, + const char *argv[], + const char *envp[]); + +OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DEF int OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC(openvpn_plugin_func_v1) + (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/.keep b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/.keep new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e69de29b diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_emptyarray.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_emptyarray.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c6781c17 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_emptyarray.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +dnl @synopsis AX_EMPTY_ARRAY +dnl +dnl Define EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE to be either "0" +dnl or "" depending on which syntax the compiler +dnl prefers for empty arrays in structs. +dnl +dnl @version +dnl @author James Yonan +AC_DEFUN([AX_EMPTY_ARRAY], [ + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([VAR],[ax_cv_c_empty_array])dnl + AC_CACHE_CHECK( + [for C compiler empty array size], + [VAR], + [AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + , + [[ +struct { int foo; int bar[0]; } mystruct; + ]] + )], + [VAR=0], + [AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + , + [[ +struct { int foo; int bar[]; } mystruct; + ]] + )], + [VAR=], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([C compiler is unable to creaty empty arrays])] + )] + )] + )dnl + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED( + [EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE], + [$VAR], + [Dimension to use for empty array declaration] + )dnl + AS_VAR_POPDEF([VAR])dnl +]) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_socklen_t.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_socklen_t.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd7cad8a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_socklen_t.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +dnl -- The following is base of curl's acinclude.m4 -- +dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in +dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different +dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we +dnl have to test to find something that will work. +AC_DEFUN([AX_TYPE_SOCKLEN_T], [ + AC_CHECK_TYPE( + [socklen_t], + , + [ + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([VAR],[ax_cv_socklen_t_equiv])dnl + AC_CACHE_CHECK( + [for socklen_t equivalent], + [VAR], + [ + #AS_CASE is not supported on +#include +int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *); + ]], + [[ +$t len; +getpeername(0,0,&len); + ]] + )], + [VAR="$t"; break] + ) + done + test -n "$VAR" && break + done + ;; + esac + ] + AS_VAR_IF( + [VAR], + [], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])], + [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED( + [socklen_t], + [$VAR], + [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined] + )] + ) + ) + ], + [[ +#include +#ifdef WIN32 +#include +#else +#include +#endif + ]] + ) +]) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_varargs.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_varargs.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c295d21f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/ax_varargs.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +dnl @synopsis AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC +dnl +dnl Test if the preprocessor understands GNU GCC-style vararg macros. +dnl If it does, defines HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC to 1. +dnl +dnl @version +dnl @author James Yonan , Matthias Andree +AC_DEFUN([AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC], [dnl + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([VAR], [ax_cv_cpp_vararg_macro_gcc])dnl + AC_CACHE_CHECK( + [for GNU GCC vararg macro support], + [VAR], + [AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[ +#define macro(a, b...) func(a, b) +int func(int a, int b, int c); + ]], + [[ +int i = macro(1, 2, 3); + ]] + )], + [VAR=yes], + [VAR=no] + )] + )dnl + + AS_VAR_IF( + [VAR], + [yes], + [AC_DEFINE( + [HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC], + [1], + [Define to 1 if your compiler supports GNU GCC-style variadic macros] + )] + )dnl + AS_VAR_POPDEF([VAR])dnl +]) + +dnl @synopsis AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO +dnl +dnl Test if the preprocessor understands ISO C 1999 vararg macros. +dnl If it does, defines HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO to 1. +dnl +dnl @version +dnl @author James Yonan , Matthias Andree +AC_DEFUN([AX_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO], [dnl + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([VAR],[ax_cv_cpp_vararg_macro_iso])dnl + AC_CACHE_CHECK( + [for ISO C 1999 vararg macro support], + [VAR], + [AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[ +#define macro(a, ...) func(a, __VA_ARGS__) +int func(int a, int b, int c); + ]], + [[ +int i = macro(1, 2, 3); + ]] + )], + [VAR=yes], + [VAR=no] + )] + )dnl + + AS_VAR_IF( + [VAR], + [yes], + [AC_DEFINE( + [HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO], + [1], + [Define to 1 if your compiler supports ISO C99 variadic macros] + )] + )dnl + AS_VAR_POPDEF([VAR])dnl +]) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/pkg.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/pkg.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9a71878c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/m4/pkg.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +# pkg.m4 - Macros to locate and utilise pkg-config. -*- Autoconf -*- +# serial 1 (pkg-config-0.24) +# +# Copyright © 2004 Scott James Remnant . +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG([MIN-VERSION]) +# ---------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG], +[m4_pattern_forbid([^_?PKG_[A-Z_]+$]) +m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_CONFIG(_(PATH|LIBDIR|SYSROOT_DIR|ALLOW_SYSTEM_(CFLAGS|LIBS)))?$]) +m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_CONFIG_(DISABLE_UNINSTALLED|TOP_BUILD_DIR|DEBUG_SPEW)$]) +AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG], [path to pkg-config utility]) +AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG_PATH], [directories to add to pkg-config's search path]) +AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR], [path overriding pkg-config's built-in search path]) + +if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then + AC_PATH_TOOL([PKG_CONFIG], [pkg-config]) +fi +if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then + _pkg_min_version=m4_default([$1], [0.9.0]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version]) + if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + PKG_CONFIG="" + fi +fi[]dnl +])# PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG + +# PKG_CHECK_EXISTS(MODULES, [ACTION-IF-FOUND], [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND]) +# +# Check to see whether a particular set of modules exists. Similar +# to PKG_CHECK_MODULES(), but does not set variables or print errors. +# +# Please remember that m4 expands AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG]) +# only at the first occurence in configure.ac, so if the first place +# it's called might be skipped (such as if it is within an "if", you +# have to call PKG_CHECK_EXISTS manually +# -------------------------------------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_EXISTS], +[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])dnl +if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG" && \ + AC_RUN_LOG([$PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors "$1"]); then + m4_default([$2], [:]) +m4_ifvaln([$3], [else + $3])dnl +fi]) + +# _PKG_CONFIG([VARIABLE], [COMMAND], [MODULES]) +# --------------------------------------------- +m4_define([_PKG_CONFIG], +[if test -n "$$1"; then + pkg_cv_[]$1="$$1" + elif test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then + PKG_CHECK_EXISTS([$3], + [pkg_cv_[]$1=`$PKG_CONFIG --[]$2 "$3" 2>/dev/null` + test "x$?" != "x0" && pkg_failed=yes ], + [pkg_failed=yes]) + else + pkg_failed=untried +fi[]dnl +])# _PKG_CONFIG + +# _PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED +# ----------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([_PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED], +[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG]) +if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version 0.20; then + _pkg_short_errors_supported=yes +else + _pkg_short_errors_supported=no +fi[]dnl +])# _PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED + + +# PKG_CHECK_MODULES(VARIABLE-PREFIX, MODULES, [ACTION-IF-FOUND], +# [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND]) +# +# +# Note that if there is a possibility the first call to +# PKG_CHECK_MODULES might not happen, you should be sure to include an +# explicit call to PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG in your configure.ac +# +# +# -------------------------------------------------------------- +AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_MODULES], +[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])dnl +AC_ARG_VAR([$1][_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for $1, overriding pkg-config])dnl +AC_ARG_VAR([$1][_LIBS], [linker flags for $1, overriding pkg-config])dnl + +pkg_failed=no +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) + +_PKG_CONFIG([$1][_CFLAGS], [cflags], [$2]) +_PKG_CONFIG([$1][_LIBS], [libs], [$2]) + +m4_define([_PKG_TEXT], [Alternatively, you may set the environment variables $1[]_CFLAGS +and $1[]_LIBS to avoid the need to call pkg-config. +See the pkg-config man page for more details.]) + +if test $pkg_failed = yes; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + _PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED + if test $_pkg_short_errors_supported = yes; then + $1[]_PKG_ERRORS=`$PKG_CONFIG --short-errors --print-errors --cflags --libs "$2" 2>&1` + else + $1[]_PKG_ERRORS=`$PKG_CONFIG --print-errors --cflags --libs "$2" 2>&1` + fi + # Put the nasty error message in config.log where it belongs + echo "$$1[]_PKG_ERRORS" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD + + m4_default([$4], [AC_MSG_ERROR( +[Package requirements ($2) were not met: + +$$1_PKG_ERRORS + +Consider adjusting the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable if you +installed software in a non-standard prefix. + +_PKG_TEXT])[]dnl + ]) +elif test $pkg_failed = untried; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + m4_default([$4], [AC_MSG_FAILURE( +[The pkg-config script could not be found or is too old. Make sure it +is in your PATH or set the PKG_CONFIG environment variable to the full +path to pkg-config. + +_PKG_TEXT + +To get pkg-config, see .])[]dnl + ]) +else + $1[]_CFLAGS=$pkg_cv_[]$1[]_CFLAGS + $1[]_LIBS=$pkg_cv_[]$1[]_LIBS + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + $3 +fi[]dnl +])# PKG_CHECK_MODULES diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-build.bat b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-build.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd6d5588 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-build.bat @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +@echo off +rem Copyright (C) 2008-2012 Alon Bar-Lev + +@rem this stupid command needed for SetEnv.cmd to operate +setlocal ENABLEDELAYEDEXPANSION + +cd /d %0\.. +call msvc-env.bat + +set PLATFORMS=Win32 +set CONFIGURATIONS=Release + +if exist "%VCHOME%\vcvarsall.bat" ( + call "%VCHOME%\vcvarsall.bat" +) else if exist "%VCHOME%\bin\vcvars32.bat" ( + call "%VCHOME%\bin\vcvars32.bat" +) else ( + echo Cannot detect visual studio + goto error +) + +msbuild /help > nul 2>&1 +if errorlevel 1 set DO_VCBUILD=1 + +for %%p in (%PLATFORMS%) do ( + for %%c in (%CONFIGURATIONS%) do ( + rmdir /q /s %SOURCEBASE%\%%p\%%c > nul 2>&1 + + if "%DO_VCBUILD%" NEQ "" ( + vcbuild /errfile:error.log /showenv "%SOLUTION%" /rebuild /platform:%%p "%%c|%%p" + for %%f in (error.log) do if %%~zf GTR 0 goto error + ) else ( + msbuild "%SOLUTION%" /p:Configuration="%%c" /p:Platform="%%p" + if errorlevel 1 goto error + ) + ) +) + +exit /b 0 +goto end + +:error +exit /b 1 +goto end + +:end + +endlocal diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-dev.bat b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-dev.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dbd7be07 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-dev.bat @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +@echo off + +setlocal +cd /d %0\.. +call msvc-env.bat + +if exist "%VSHOME%\Common7\IDE\VCExpress.exe" ( + set IDE=%VSHOME%\Common7\IDE\VCExpress.exe +) else if exist "%VSHOME%\Common7\IDE\devenv.exe" ( + set IDE=%VSHOME%\Common7\IDE\devenv.exe +) else ( + echo "Cannot detect visual studio environment" + goto error +) +start "" "%IDE%" "%SOLUTION%" + +exit /b 0 +goto end + +:error +exit /b 1 +goto end + +:end + +endlocal diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-env.bat b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-env.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2dd0f00d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/msvc-env.bat @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +@echo off + +rem Put your own settings at msvc-env-local.bat +if exist msvc-env-local.bat call msvc-env-local.bat + +if "%ProgramFiles(x86)%"=="" set ProgramFiles(x86)=%ProgramFiles% +if "%VSCOMNTOOLS%"=="" SET VSCOMNTOOLS=%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft Visual Studio 10.0\Common7\Tools +if "%VSCOMNTOOLS%"=="" SET VSCOMNTOOLS=%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft Visual Studio 9.0\Common7\Tools +if "%VSHOME%"=="" SET VSHOME=%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\.. +if "%VCHOME%"=="" SET VCHOME=%VSHOME%\VC + +set SOURCEBASE=%cd% +set SOLUTION=openvpn.sln +set CPPFLAGS=%CPPFLAGS%;_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS;WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN;_CRT_NONSTDC_NO_WARNINGS;_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS +set CPPFLAGS=%CPPFLAGS%;NTDDI_VERSION=NTDDI_WINXP;_WIN32_WINNT=_WIN32_WINNT_WINXP +set CPPFLAGS=%CPPFLAGS%;_USE_32BIT_TIME_T +set CPPFLAGS=%CPPFLAGS%;%EXTRA_CPPFLAGS% + +if exist config-msvc-local.h set CPPFLAGS="%CPPFLAGS%;HAVE_CONFIG_MSVC_LOCAL_H" + +if "%OPENVPN_DEPROOT%" == "" set OPENVPN_DEPROOT=c:\Temp\openvpn-deps +if "%OPENSSL_HOME%" == "" set OPENSSL_HOME=%OPENVPN_DEPROOT% +if "%LZO_HOME%" == "" set LZO_HOME=%OPENVPN_DEPROOT% +if "%PKCS11H_HOME%" == "" set PKCS11H_HOME=%OPENVPN_DEPROOT% +if "%TAP_WINDOWS_HOME%" == "" set TAP_WINDOWS_HOME=%OPENVPN_DEPROOT% + +if not exist "%OPENSSL_HOME%" echo WARNING: openssl '%OPENSSL_HOME%' does not exist +if not exist "%LZO_HOME%" echo WARNING: lzo '%LZO_HOME%' does not exist +if not exist "%PKCS11H_HOME%" echo WARNING: pkcs11-helper '%PKCS11H_HOME%' does not exist +if not exist "%TAP_WINDOWS_HOME%" echo WARNING: tap-windows '%TAP_WINDOWS_HOME%' does not exist diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/openvpn.sln b/bitmask_android/openvpn/openvpn.sln new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f832e7a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/openvpn.sln @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ + +Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 11.00 +# Visual C++ Express 2010 +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "openvpnserv", "src\openvpnserv\openvpnserv.vcxproj", "{9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD}" +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "openvpn", "src\openvpn\openvpn.vcxproj", "{29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94}" +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "msvc-generate", "build\msvc\msvc-generate\msvc-generate.vcxproj", "{8598C2C8-34C4-47A1-99B0-7C295A890615}" +EndProject +Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "compat", "src\compat\compat.vcxproj", "{4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19}" +EndProject +Global + GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution + Debug|Win32 = Debug|Win32 + Release|Win32 = Release|Win32 + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution + {9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {8598C2C8-34C4-47A1-99B0-7C295A890615}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {8598C2C8-34C4-47A1-99B0-7C295A890615}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {8598C2C8-34C4-47A1-99B0-7C295A890615}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {8598C2C8-34C4-47A1-99B0-7C295A890615}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + {4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = Debug|Win32 + {4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = Debug|Win32 + {4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = Release|Win32 + {4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = Release|Win32 + EndGlobalSection + GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution + HideSolutionNode = FALSE + EndGlobalSection +EndGlobal diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..be30c88a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +EXTRA_DIST = \ + sample-plugins \ + sample-config-files \ + sample-windows \ + sample-keys \ + sample-scripts + +if WIN32 +sample_DATA = \ + client.ovpn \ + server.ovpn \ + sample-windows/sample.ovpn + +client.ovpn: sample-config-files/client.conf + -rm -f client.ovpn + cp "$(srcdir)/sample-config-files/client.conf" client.ovpn +server.ovpn: sample-config-files/server.conf + -rm -f server.ovpn + cp "$(srcdir)/sample-config-files/server.conf" server.ovpn +endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d53ac79a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/README @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +Sample OpenVPN Configuration Files. + +These files are part of the OpenVPN HOWTO +which is located at: + +http://openvpn.net/howto.html diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/client.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/client.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58b2038b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/client.conf @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +############################################## +# Sample client-side OpenVPN 2.0 config file # +# for connecting to multi-client server. # +# # +# This configuration can be used by multiple # +# clients, however each client should have # +# its own cert and key files. # +# # +# On Windows, you might want to rename this # +# file so it has a .ovpn extension # +############################################## + +# Specify that we are a client and that we +# will be pulling certain config file directives +# from the server. +client + +# Use the same setting as you are using on +# the server. +# On most systems, the VPN will not function +# unless you partially or fully disable +# the firewall for the TUN/TAP interface. +;dev tap +dev tun + +# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name +# from the Network Connections panel +# if you have more than one. On XP SP2, +# you may need to disable the firewall +# for the TAP adapter. +;dev-node MyTap + +# Are we connecting to a TCP or +# UDP server? Use the same setting as +# on the server. +;proto tcp +proto udp + +# The hostname/IP and port of the server. +# You can have multiple remote entries +# to load balance between the servers. +remote my-server-1 1194 +;remote my-server-2 1194 + +# Choose a random host from the remote +# list for load-balancing. Otherwise +# try hosts in the order specified. +;remote-random + +# Keep trying indefinitely to resolve the +# host name of the OpenVPN server. Very useful +# on machines which are not permanently connected +# to the internet such as laptops. +resolv-retry infinite + +# Most clients don't need to bind to +# a specific local port number. +nobind + +# Downgrade privileges after initialization (non-Windows only) +;user nobody +;group nobody + +# Try to preserve some state across restarts. +persist-key +persist-tun + +# If you are connecting through an +# HTTP proxy to reach the actual OpenVPN +# server, put the proxy server/IP and +# port number here. See the man page +# if your proxy server requires +# authentication. +;http-proxy-retry # retry on connection failures +;http-proxy [proxy server] [proxy port #] + +# Wireless networks often produce a lot +# of duplicate packets. Set this flag +# to silence duplicate packet warnings. +;mute-replay-warnings + +# SSL/TLS parms. +# See the server config file for more +# description. It's best to use +# a separate .crt/.key file pair +# for each client. A single ca +# file can be used for all clients. +ca ca.crt +cert client.crt +key client.key + +# Verify server certificate by checking +# that the certicate has the nsCertType +# field set to "server". This is an +# important precaution to protect against +# a potential attack discussed here: +# http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm +# +# To use this feature, you will need to generate +# your server certificates with the nsCertType +# field set to "server". The build-key-server +# script in the easy-rsa folder will do this. +ns-cert-type server + +# If a tls-auth key is used on the server +# then every client must also have the key. +;tls-auth ta.key 1 + +# Select a cryptographic cipher. +# If the cipher option is used on the server +# then you must also specify it here. +;cipher x + +# Enable compression on the VPN link. +# Don't enable this unless it is also +# enabled in the server config file. +comp-lzo + +# Set log file verbosity. +verb 3 + +# Silence repeating messages +;mute 20 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/firewall.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/firewall.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..19d75ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/firewall.sh @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# A Sample OpenVPN-aware firewall. + +# eth0 is connected to the internet. +# eth1 is connected to a private subnet. + +# Change this subnet to correspond to your private +# ethernet subnet. Home will use HOME_NET/24 and +# Office will use OFFICE_NET/24. +PRIVATE=10.0.0.0/24 + +# Loopback address +LOOP=127.0.0.1 + +# Delete old iptables rules +# and temporarily block all traffic. +iptables -P OUTPUT DROP +iptables -P INPUT DROP +iptables -P FORWARD DROP +iptables -F + +# Set default policies +iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT +iptables -P INPUT DROP +iptables -P FORWARD DROP + +# Prevent external packets from using loopback addr +iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s $LOOP -j DROP +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -s $LOOP -j DROP +iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -d $LOOP -j DROP +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -d $LOOP -j DROP + +# Anything coming from the Internet should have a real Internet address +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j DROP +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j DROP +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP +iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j DROP +iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j DROP +iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP + +# Block outgoing NetBios (if you have windows machines running +# on the private subnet). This will not affect any NetBios +# traffic that flows over the VPN tunnel, but it will stop +# local windows machines from broadcasting themselves to +# the internet. +iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --sport 137:139 -o eth0 -j DROP +iptables -A FORWARD -p udp --sport 137:139 -o eth0 -j DROP +iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 137:139 -o eth0 -j DROP +iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --sport 137:139 -o eth0 -j DROP + +# Check source address validity on packets going out to internet +iptables -A FORWARD -s ! $PRIVATE -i eth1 -j DROP + +# Allow local loopback +iptables -A INPUT -s $LOOP -j ACCEPT +iptables -A INPUT -d $LOOP -j ACCEPT + +# Allow incoming pings (can be disabled) +iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT + +# Allow services such as www and ssh (can be disabled) +iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport http -j ACCEPT +iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport ssh -j ACCEPT + +# Allow incoming OpenVPN packets +# Duplicate the line below for each +# OpenVPN tunnel, changing --dport n +# to match the OpenVPN UDP port. +# +# In OpenVPN, the port number is +# controlled by the --port n option. +# If you put this option in the config +# file, you can remove the leading '--' +# +# If you taking the stateful firewall +# approach (see the OpenVPN HOWTO), +# then comment out the line below. + +iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 1194 -j ACCEPT + +# Allow packets from TUN/TAP devices. +# When OpenVPN is run in a secure mode, +# it will authenticate packets prior +# to their arriving on a tun or tap +# interface. Therefore, it is not +# necessary to add any filters here, +# unless you want to restrict the +# type of packets which can flow over +# the tunnel. + +iptables -A INPUT -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +iptables -A FORWARD -i tun+ -j ACCEPT +iptables -A INPUT -i tap+ -j ACCEPT +iptables -A FORWARD -i tap+ -j ACCEPT + +# Allow packets from private subnets +iptables -A INPUT -i eth1 -j ACCEPT +iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -j ACCEPT + +# Keep state of connections from local machine and private subnets +iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state NEW -o eth0 -j ACCEPT +iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT +iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state NEW -o eth0 -j ACCEPT +iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT + +# Masquerade local subnet +iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s $PRIVATE -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/home.up b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/home.up new file mode 100755 index 00000000..9c347cc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/home.up @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#!/bin/sh +route add -net 10.0.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw $5 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-client b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-client new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7f59e69 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-client @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# Perform a TLS loopback test -- client side. +# +# This test performs a TLS negotiation once every 10 seconds, +# and will terminate after 2 minutes. +# +# From the root directory of the OpenVPN distribution, +# after openvpn has been built, run: +# +# ./openvpn --config sample-config-files/loopback-client (In one window) +# ./openvpn --config sample-config-files/loopback-server (Simultaneously in another window) + +rport 16000 +lport 16001 +remote localhost +local localhost +dev null +verb 3 +reneg-sec 10 +tls-client +ca sample-keys/ca.crt +key sample-keys/client.key +cert sample-keys/client.crt +cipher DES-EDE3-CBC +ping 1 +inactive 120 10000000 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-server b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-server new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d21bcec --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/loopback-server @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# Perform a TLS loopback test -- server side. +# +# This test performs a TLS negotiation once every 10 seconds, +# and will terminate after 2 minutes. +# +# From the root directory of the OpenVPN distribution, +# after openvpn has been built, run: +# +# ./openvpn --config sample-config-files/loopback-client (In one window) +# ./openvpn --config sample-config-files/loopback-server (Simultaneously in another window) + +rport 16001 +lport 16000 +remote localhost +local localhost +dev null +verb 3 +reneg-sec 10 +tls-server +dh sample-keys/dh1024.pem +ca sample-keys/ca.crt +key sample-keys/server.key +cert sample-keys/server.crt +cipher DES-EDE3-CBC +ping 1 +inactive 120 10000000 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/office.up b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/office.up new file mode 100755 index 00000000..74a71a33 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/office.up @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#!/bin/sh +route add -net 10.0.1.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw $5 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-shutdown.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-shutdown.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..8ed2d1d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-shutdown.sh @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# stop all openvpn processes + +killall -TERM openvpn diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-startup.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-startup.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..0ee006bc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/openvpn-startup.sh @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# A sample OpenVPN startup script +# for Linux. + +# openvpn config file directory +dir=/etc/openvpn + +# load the firewall +$dir/firewall.sh + +# load TUN/TAP kernel module +modprobe tun + +# enable IP forwarding +echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward + +# Invoke openvpn for each VPN tunnel +# in daemon mode. Alternatively, +# you could remove "--daemon" from +# the command line and add "daemon" +# to the config file. +# +# Each tunnel should run on a separate +# UDP port. Use the "port" option +# to control this. Like all of +# OpenVPN's options, you can +# specify "--port 8000" on the command +# line or "port 8000" in the config +# file. + +openvpn --cd $dir --daemon --config vpn1.conf +openvpn --cd $dir --daemon --config vpn2.conf +openvpn --cd $dir --daemon --config vpn2.conf diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/server.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/server.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f483b6bb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/server.conf @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +################################################# +# Sample OpenVPN 2.0 config file for # +# multi-client server. # +# # +# This file is for the server side # +# of a many-clients <-> one-server # +# OpenVPN configuration. # +# # +# OpenVPN also supports # +# single-machine <-> single-machine # +# configurations (See the Examples page # +# on the web site for more info). # +# # +# This config should work on Windows # +# or Linux/BSD systems. Remember on # +# Windows to quote pathnames and use # +# double backslashes, e.g.: # +# "C:\\Program Files\\OpenVPN\\config\\foo.key" # +# # +# Comments are preceded with '#' or ';' # +################################################# + +# Which local IP address should OpenVPN +# listen on? (optional) +;local a.b.c.d + +# Which TCP/UDP port should OpenVPN listen on? +# If you want to run multiple OpenVPN instances +# on the same machine, use a different port +# number for each one. You will need to +# open up this port on your firewall. +port 1194 + +# TCP or UDP server? +;proto tcp +proto udp + +# "dev tun" will create a routed IP tunnel, +# "dev tap" will create an ethernet tunnel. +# Use "dev tap0" if you are ethernet bridging +# and have precreated a tap0 virtual interface +# and bridged it with your ethernet interface. +# If you want to control access policies +# over the VPN, you must create firewall +# rules for the the TUN/TAP interface. +# On non-Windows systems, you can give +# an explicit unit number, such as tun0. +# On Windows, use "dev-node" for this. +# On most systems, the VPN will not function +# unless you partially or fully disable +# the firewall for the TUN/TAP interface. +;dev tap +dev tun + +# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name +# from the Network Connections panel if you +# have more than one. On XP SP2 or higher, +# you may need to selectively disable the +# Windows firewall for the TAP adapter. +# Non-Windows systems usually don't need this. +;dev-node MyTap + +# SSL/TLS root certificate (ca), certificate +# (cert), and private key (key). Each client +# and the server must have their own cert and +# key file. The server and all clients will +# use the same ca file. +# +# See the "easy-rsa" directory for a series +# of scripts for generating RSA certificates +# and private keys. Remember to use +# a unique Common Name for the server +# and each of the client certificates. +# +# Any X509 key management system can be used. +# OpenVPN can also use a PKCS #12 formatted key file +# (see "pkcs12" directive in man page). +ca ca.crt +cert server.crt +key server.key # This file should be kept secret + +# Diffie hellman parameters. +# Generate your own with: +# openssl dhparam -out dh1024.pem 1024 +# Substitute 2048 for 1024 if you are using +# 2048 bit keys. +dh dh1024.pem + +# Configure server mode and supply a VPN subnet +# for OpenVPN to draw client addresses from. +# The server will take 10.8.0.1 for itself, +# the rest will be made available to clients. +# Each client will be able to reach the server +# on 10.8.0.1. Comment this line out if you are +# ethernet bridging. See the man page for more info. +server 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 + +# Maintain a record of client <-> virtual IP address +# associations in this file. If OpenVPN goes down or +# is restarted, reconnecting clients can be assigned +# the same virtual IP address from the pool that was +# previously assigned. +ifconfig-pool-persist ipp.txt + +# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging. +# You must first use your OS's bridging capability +# to bridge the TAP interface with the ethernet +# NIC interface. Then you must manually set the +# IP/netmask on the bridge interface, here we +# assume 10.8.0.4/255.255.255.0. Finally we +# must set aside an IP range in this subnet +# (start=10.8.0.50 end=10.8.0.100) to allocate +# to connecting clients. Leave this line commented +# out unless you are ethernet bridging. +;server-bridge 10.8.0.4 255.255.255.0 10.8.0.50 10.8.0.100 + +# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging +# using a DHCP-proxy, where clients talk +# to the OpenVPN server-side DHCP server +# to receive their IP address allocation +# and DNS server addresses. You must first use +# your OS's bridging capability to bridge the TAP +# interface with the ethernet NIC interface. +# Note: this mode only works on clients (such as +# Windows), where the client-side TAP adapter is +# bound to a DHCP client. +;server-bridge + +# Push routes to the client to allow it +# to reach other private subnets behind +# the server. Remember that these +# private subnets will also need +# to know to route the OpenVPN client +# address pool (10.8.0.0/255.255.255.0) +# back to the OpenVPN server. +;push "route 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0" +;push "route 192.168.20.0 255.255.255.0" + +# To assign specific IP addresses to specific +# clients or if a connecting client has a private +# subnet behind it that should also have VPN access, +# use the subdirectory "ccd" for client-specific +# configuration files (see man page for more info). + +# EXAMPLE: Suppose the client +# having the certificate common name "Thelonious" +# also has a small subnet behind his connecting +# machine, such as 192.168.40.128/255.255.255.248. +# First, uncomment out these lines: +;client-config-dir ccd +;route 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248 +# Then create a file ccd/Thelonious with this line: +# iroute 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248 +# This will allow Thelonious' private subnet to +# access the VPN. This example will only work +# if you are routing, not bridging, i.e. you are +# using "dev tun" and "server" directives. + +# EXAMPLE: Suppose you want to give +# Thelonious a fixed VPN IP address of 10.9.0.1. +# First uncomment out these lines: +;client-config-dir ccd +;route 10.9.0.0 255.255.255.252 +# Then add this line to ccd/Thelonious: +# ifconfig-push 10.9.0.1 10.9.0.2 + +# Suppose that you want to enable different +# firewall access policies for different groups +# of clients. There are two methods: +# (1) Run multiple OpenVPN daemons, one for each +# group, and firewall the TUN/TAP interface +# for each group/daemon appropriately. +# (2) (Advanced) Create a script to dynamically +# modify the firewall in response to access +# from different clients. See man +# page for more info on learn-address script. +;learn-address ./script + +# If enabled, this directive will configure +# all clients to redirect their default +# network gateway through the VPN, causing +# all IP traffic such as web browsing and +# and DNS lookups to go through the VPN +# (The OpenVPN server machine may need to NAT +# or bridge the TUN/TAP interface to the internet +# in order for this to work properly). +;push "redirect-gateway def1 bypass-dhcp" + +# Certain Windows-specific network settings +# can be pushed to clients, such as DNS +# or WINS server addresses. CAVEAT: +# http://openvpn.net/faq.html#dhcpcaveats +# The addresses below refer to the public +# DNS servers provided by opendns.com. +;push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.222.222" +;push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.220.220" + +# Uncomment this directive to allow different +# clients to be able to "see" each other. +# By default, clients will only see the server. +# To force clients to only see the server, you +# will also need to appropriately firewall the +# server's TUN/TAP interface. +;client-to-client + +# Uncomment this directive if multiple clients +# might connect with the same certificate/key +# files or common names. This is recommended +# only for testing purposes. For production use, +# each client should have its own certificate/key +# pair. +# +# IF YOU HAVE NOT GENERATED INDIVIDUAL +# CERTIFICATE/KEY PAIRS FOR EACH CLIENT, +# EACH HAVING ITS OWN UNIQUE "COMMON NAME", +# UNCOMMENT THIS LINE OUT. +;duplicate-cn + +# The keepalive directive causes ping-like +# messages to be sent back and forth over +# the link so that each side knows when +# the other side has gone down. +# Ping every 10 seconds, assume that remote +# peer is down if no ping received during +# a 120 second time period. +keepalive 10 120 + +# For extra security beyond that provided +# by SSL/TLS, create an "HMAC firewall" +# to help block DoS attacks and UDP port flooding. +# +# Generate with: +# openvpn --genkey --secret ta.key +# +# The server and each client must have +# a copy of this key. +# The second parameter should be '0' +# on the server and '1' on the clients. +;tls-auth ta.key 0 # This file is secret + +# Select a cryptographic cipher. +# This config item must be copied to +# the client config file as well. +;cipher BF-CBC # Blowfish (default) +;cipher AES-128-CBC # AES +;cipher DES-EDE3-CBC # Triple-DES + +# Enable compression on the VPN link. +# If you enable it here, you must also +# enable it in the client config file. +comp-lzo + +# The maximum number of concurrently connected +# clients we want to allow. +;max-clients 100 + +# It's a good idea to reduce the OpenVPN +# daemon's privileges after initialization. +# +# You can uncomment this out on +# non-Windows systems. +;user nobody +;group nobody + +# The persist options will try to avoid +# accessing certain resources on restart +# that may no longer be accessible because +# of the privilege downgrade. +persist-key +persist-tun + +# Output a short status file showing +# current connections, truncated +# and rewritten every minute. +status openvpn-status.log + +# By default, log messages will go to the syslog (or +# on Windows, if running as a service, they will go to +# the "\Program Files\OpenVPN\log" directory). +# Use log or log-append to override this default. +# "log" will truncate the log file on OpenVPN startup, +# while "log-append" will append to it. Use one +# or the other (but not both). +;log openvpn.log +;log-append openvpn.log + +# Set the appropriate level of log +# file verbosity. +# +# 0 is silent, except for fatal errors +# 4 is reasonable for general usage +# 5 and 6 can help to debug connection problems +# 9 is extremely verbose +verb 3 + +# Silence repeating messages. At most 20 +# sequential messages of the same message +# category will be output to the log. +;mute 20 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-home.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-home.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9666874 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-home.conf @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +# +# Sample OpenVPN configuration file for +# home using a pre-shared static key. +# +# '#' or ';' may be used to delimit comments. + +# Use a dynamic tun device. +# For Linux 2.2 or non-Linux OSes, +# you may want to use an explicit +# unit number such as "tun1". +# OpenVPN also supports virtual +# ethernet "tap" devices. +dev tun + +# Our OpenVPN peer is the office gateway. +remote 1.2.3.4 + +# 10.1.0.2 is our local VPN endpoint (home). +# 10.1.0.1 is our remote VPN endpoint (office). +ifconfig 10.1.0.2 10.1.0.1 + +# Our up script will establish routes +# once the VPN is alive. +up ./home.up + +# Our pre-shared static key +secret static.key + +# OpenVPN 2.0 uses UDP port 1194 by default +# (official port assignment by iana.org 11/04). +# OpenVPN 1.x uses UDP port 5000 by default. +# Each OpenVPN tunnel must use +# a different port number. +# lport or rport can be used +# to denote different ports +# for local and remote. +; port 1194 + +# Downgrade UID and GID to +# "nobody" after initialization +# for extra security. +; user nobody +; group nobody + +# If you built OpenVPN with +# LZO compression, uncomment +# out the following line. +; comp-lzo + +# Send a UDP ping to remote once +# every 15 seconds to keep +# stateful firewall connection +# alive. Uncomment this +# out if you are using a stateful +# firewall. +; ping 15 + +# Uncomment this section for a more reliable detection when a system +# loses its connection. For example, dial-ups or laptops that +# travel to other locations. +; ping 15 +; ping-restart 45 +; ping-timer-rem +; persist-tun +; persist-key + +# Verbosity level. +# 0 -- quiet except for fatal errors. +# 1 -- mostly quiet, but display non-fatal network errors. +# 3 -- medium output, good for normal operation. +# 9 -- verbose, good for troubleshooting +verb 3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-office.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-office.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..68030cc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/static-office.conf @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# +# Sample OpenVPN configuration file for +# office using a pre-shared static key. +# +# '#' or ';' may be used to delimit comments. + +# Use a dynamic tun device. +# For Linux 2.2 or non-Linux OSes, +# you may want to use an explicit +# unit number such as "tun1". +# OpenVPN also supports virtual +# ethernet "tap" devices. +dev tun + +# 10.1.0.1 is our local VPN endpoint (office). +# 10.1.0.2 is our remote VPN endpoint (home). +ifconfig 10.1.0.1 10.1.0.2 + +# Our up script will establish routes +# once the VPN is alive. +up ./office.up + +# Our pre-shared static key +secret static.key + +# OpenVPN 2.0 uses UDP port 1194 by default +# (official port assignment by iana.org 11/04). +# OpenVPN 1.x uses UDP port 5000 by default. +# Each OpenVPN tunnel must use +# a different port number. +# lport or rport can be used +# to denote different ports +# for local and remote. +; port 1194 + +# Downgrade UID and GID to +# "nobody" after initialization +# for extra security. +; user nobody +; group nobody + +# If you built OpenVPN with +# LZO compression, uncomment +# out the following line. +; comp-lzo + +# Send a UDP ping to remote once +# every 15 seconds to keep +# stateful firewall connection +# alive. Uncomment this +# out if you are using a stateful +# firewall. +; ping 15 + +# Uncomment this section for a more reliable detection when a system +# loses its connection. For example, dial-ups or laptops that +# travel to other locations. +; ping 15 +; ping-restart 45 +; ping-timer-rem +; persist-tun +; persist-key + +# Verbosity level. +# 0 -- quiet except for fatal errors. +# 1 -- mostly quiet, but display non-fatal network errors. +# 3 -- medium output, good for normal operation. +# 9 -- verbose, good for troubleshooting +verb 3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-home.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-home.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daa4ea1e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-home.conf @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# +# Sample OpenVPN configuration file for +# home using SSL/TLS mode and RSA certificates/keys. +# +# '#' or ';' may be used to delimit comments. + +# Use a dynamic tun device. +# For Linux 2.2 or non-Linux OSes, +# you may want to use an explicit +# unit number such as "tun1". +# OpenVPN also supports virtual +# ethernet "tap" devices. +dev tun + +# Our OpenVPN peer is the office gateway. +remote 1.2.3.4 + +# 10.1.0.2 is our local VPN endpoint (home). +# 10.1.0.1 is our remote VPN endpoint (office). +ifconfig 10.1.0.2 10.1.0.1 + +# Our up script will establish routes +# once the VPN is alive. +up ./home.up + +# In SSL/TLS key exchange, Office will +# assume server role and Home +# will assume client role. +tls-client + +# Certificate Authority file +ca my-ca.crt + +# Our certificate/public key +cert home.crt + +# Our private key +key home.key + +# OpenVPN 2.0 uses UDP port 1194 by default +# (official port assignment by iana.org 11/04). +# OpenVPN 1.x uses UDP port 5000 by default. +# Each OpenVPN tunnel must use +# a different port number. +# lport or rport can be used +# to denote different ports +# for local and remote. +; port 1194 + +# Downgrade UID and GID to +# "nobody" after initialization +# for extra security. +; user nobody +; group nobody + +# If you built OpenVPN with +# LZO compression, uncomment +# out the following line. +; comp-lzo + +# Send a UDP ping to remote once +# every 15 seconds to keep +# stateful firewall connection +# alive. Uncomment this +# out if you are using a stateful +# firewall. +; ping 15 + +# Uncomment this section for a more reliable detection when a system +# loses its connection. For example, dial-ups or laptops that +# travel to other locations. +; ping 15 +; ping-restart 45 +; ping-timer-rem +; persist-tun +; persist-key + +# Verbosity level. +# 0 -- quiet except for fatal errors. +# 1 -- mostly quiet, but display non-fatal network errors. +# 3 -- medium output, good for normal operation. +# 9 -- verbose, good for troubleshooting +verb 3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-office.conf b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-office.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f790f469 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/tls-office.conf @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# +# Sample OpenVPN configuration file for +# office using SSL/TLS mode and RSA certificates/keys. +# +# '#' or ';' may be used to delimit comments. + +# Use a dynamic tun device. +# For Linux 2.2 or non-Linux OSes, +# you may want to use an explicit +# unit number such as "tun1". +# OpenVPN also supports virtual +# ethernet "tap" devices. +dev tun + +# 10.1.0.1 is our local VPN endpoint (office). +# 10.1.0.2 is our remote VPN endpoint (home). +ifconfig 10.1.0.1 10.1.0.2 + +# Our up script will establish routes +# once the VPN is alive. +up ./office.up + +# In SSL/TLS key exchange, Office will +# assume server role and Home +# will assume client role. +tls-server + +# Diffie-Hellman Parameters (tls-server only) +dh dh1024.pem + +# Certificate Authority file +ca my-ca.crt + +# Our certificate/public key +cert office.crt + +# Our private key +key office.key + +# OpenVPN 2.0 uses UDP port 1194 by default +# (official port assignment by iana.org 11/04). +# OpenVPN 1.x uses UDP port 5000 by default. +# Each OpenVPN tunnel must use +# a different port number. +# lport or rport can be used +# to denote different ports +# for local and remote. +; port 1194 + +# Downgrade UID and GID to +# "nobody" after initialization +# for extra security. +; user nobody +; group nobody + +# If you built OpenVPN with +# LZO compression, uncomment +# out the following line. +; comp-lzo + +# Send a UDP ping to remote once +# every 15 seconds to keep +# stateful firewall connection +# alive. Uncomment this +# out if you are using a stateful +# firewall. +; ping 15 + +# Uncomment this section for a more reliable detection when a system +# loses its connection. For example, dial-ups or laptops that +# travel to other locations. +; ping 15 +; ping-restart 45 +; ping-timer-rem +; persist-tun +; persist-key + +# Verbosity level. +# 0 -- quiet except for fatal errors. +# 1 -- mostly quiet, but display non-fatal network errors. +# 3 -- medium output, good for normal operation. +# 9 -- verbose, good for troubleshooting +verb 3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-client-config b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-client-config new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03c5c1fa --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-client-config @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# This OpenVPN config file +# is the client side counterpart +# of xinetd-server-config + +dev tun +ifconfig 10.4.0.1 10.4.0.2 +remote my-server +port 1194 +user nobody +secret /root/openvpn/key +inactive 600 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-server-config b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-server-config new file mode 100644 index 00000000..803a6f8f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-config-files/xinetd-server-config @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# An xinetd configuration file for OpenVPN. +# +# This file should be renamed to openvpn or something suitably +# descriptive and copied to the /etc/xinetd.d directory. +# xinetd can then be made aware of this file by restarting +# it or sending it a SIGHUP signal. +# +# For each potential incoming client, create a separate version +# of this configuration file on a unique port number. Also note +# that the key file and ifconfig endpoints should be unique for +# each client. This configuration assumes that the OpenVPN +# executable and key live in /root/openvpn. Change this to fit +# your environment. + +service openvpn_1 +{ + type = UNLISTED + port = 1194 + socket_type = dgram + protocol = udp + wait = yes + user = root + server = /root/openvpn/openvpn + server_args = --inetd --dev tun --ifconfig 10.4.0.2 10.4.0.1 --secret /root/openvpn/key --inactive 600 --user nobody +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cd473a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/README @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +Sample RSA keys. + +See the examples section of the man page +for usage examples. + +NOTE: THESE KEYS ARE FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY. + DON'T USE THEM FOR ANY REAL WORK BECAUSE + THEY ARE TOTALLY INSECURE! + +ca.{crt,key} -- sample CA key/cert +client.{crt,key} -- sample client key/cert +server.{crt,key} -- sample server key/cert (nsCertType=server) +pass.{crt,key} -- sample client key/cert with password-encrypted key + password = "password" diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.crt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e063ccce --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.crt @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDBjCCAm+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLRzEL +MAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hLRUsxFTATBgNVBAoTDE9wZW5WUE4t +VEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlob3N0Lm15ZG9tYWluMB4XDTA0MTEy +NTE0NDA1NVoXDTE0MTEyMzE0NDA1NVowZjELMAkGA1UEBhMCS0cxCzAJBgNVBAgT +Ak5BMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdCSVNIS0VLMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcGVuVlBOLVRFU1QxITAf +BgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEm1lQG15aG9zdC5teWRvbWFpbjCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF +AAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAqPjWJnesPu6bR/iec4FMz3opVaPdBHxg+ORKNmrnVZPh0t8/ +ZT34KXkYoI9B82scurp8UlZVXG8JdUsz+yai8ti9+g7vcuyKUtcCIjn0HLgmdPu5 +gFX25lB0pXw+XIU031dOfPvtROdG5YZN5yCErgCy7TE7zntLnkEDuRmyU6cCAwEA +AaOBwzCBwDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUiaZg47rqPq/8ZH9MvYzSSI3gzEYwgZAGA1UdIwSB +iDCBhYAUiaZg47rqPq/8ZH9MvYzSSI3gzEahaqRoMGYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAktHMQsw +CQYDVQQIEwJOQTEQMA4GA1UEBxMHQklTSEtFSzEVMBMGA1UEChMMT3BlblZQTi1U +RVNUMSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJtZUBteWhvc3QubXlkb21haW6CAQAwDAYDVR0T +BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBfJoiWYrYdjM0mKPEzUQk0nLYTovBP +I0es/2rfGrin1zbcFY+4dhVBd1E/StebnG+CP8r7QeEIwu7x8gYDdOLLsZn+2vBL +e4jNU1ClI6Q0L7jrzhhunQ5mAaZztVyYwFB15odYcdN2iO0tP7jtEsvrRqxICNy3 +8itzViPTf5W4sA== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.key b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b4bf792a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/ca.key @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXQIBAAKBgQCo+NYmd6w+7ptH+J5zgUzPeilVo90EfGD45Eo2audVk+HS3z9l +PfgpeRigj0Hzaxy6unxSVlVcbwl1SzP7JqLy2L36Du9y7IpS1wIiOfQcuCZ0+7mA +VfbmUHSlfD5chTTfV058++1E50blhk3nIISuALLtMTvOe0ueQQO5GbJTpwIDAQAB +AoGAQuVREyWp4bhhbZr2UFBOco2ws6EOLWp4kdD/uI+WSoEjlHKiDJj+GJ1CrL5K +o+4yD5MpCQf4/4FOQ0ukprfjJpDwDinTG6vzuWSLTHNiTgvksW3vy7IsNMJx97hT +4D2QOOl9HhA50Qqg70teMPYXOgLRMVsdCIV7p7zDNy4nM+ECQQDX8m5ZcQmPtUDA +38dPTfpL4U7kMB94FItJYH/Lk5kMW1/J33xymNhL+BHaG064ol9n2ubGW4XEO5t2 +qE1IOsVpAkEAyE/x/OBVSI1s75aYGlEwMd87p3qaDdtXT7WzujjRY7r8Y1ynkMU6 +GtMeneBX/lk4BY/6I+5bhAzce+hqhaXejwJBAL5Wg+c4GApf41xdogqHm7doNyYw +OHyZ9w9NDDc+uGbI30xLPSCxEe0cEXgiG6foDpm2uzRZFTWaqHPU8pFYpAkCQGNX +cpWM0/7VVK9Fqk1y8knpgfY/UWOJ4jU/0dCLGR0ywLSuYNPlXDmtdkOp3TnhGW14 +x/9F2NEWZ8pzq1B4wHUCQQC5ztD4m/rpiIpinoewUJODoeBJXYBKqx1+mdrALCq6 +ESvK1WRiusMaY3xmsdv4J2TB5iUPryELbn3jU12WGcQc +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.crt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0474461 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.crt @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 2 (0x2) + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=KG, ST=NA, L=BISHKEK, O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Validity + Not Before: Nov 25 14:46:49 2004 GMT + Not After : Nov 23 14:46:49 2014 GMT + Subject: C=KG, ST=NA, O=OpenVPN-TEST, CN=Test-Client/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) + Modulus (1024 bit): + 00:d2:12:5c:c6:4d:13:34:ae:cf:fa:ab:fe:cb:de: + 8c:f1:4b:4a:95:28:60:87:82:2c:b8:c1:e5:8e:c6: + 5d:11:58:61:a4:a5:f1:42:d7:86:74:6c:9d:9c:7a: + f0:3a:5c:29:e6:53:3b:5e:6d:d8:f0:45:06:2c:23: + ee:09:bc:02:8f:0e:b8:d5:33:1f:c3:4a:11:02:48: + 0b:cc:4b:ad:6e:74:e0:a2:53:b1:d6:cc:89:b9:e2: + 6f:db:15:b3:19:1e:57:04:79:48:3a:da:76:31:fc: + bf:d3:34:21:e7:32:d8:9e:06:4e:be:f3:e3:79:b0: + 54:fd:d1:42:32:aa:3e:7a:c1 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:FALSE + Netscape Comment: + OpenSSL Generated Certificate + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 17:B7:3F:C7:62:A0:A9:FD:A4:31:0E:58:D7:D9:94:7B:4B:3F:CB:56 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:89:A6:60:E3:BA:EA:3E:AF:FC:64:7F:4C:BD:8C:D2:48:8D:E0:CC:46 + DirName:/C=KG/ST=NA/L=BISHKEK/O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + 61:c6:d1:fa:24:0f:c7:be:09:3b:d8:04:17:63:31:17:07:f9: + 56:99:af:4c:67:fa:db:cb:94:cf:55:a5:7b:16:20:8b:42:64: + 13:23:62:45:28:93:5e:36:f7:db:02:95:a1:e9:fd:e3:0f:8d: + 73:a1:7b:0e:55:78:4d:a5:c4:b7:22:12:a0:ee:55:e0:b8:0e: + c9:9b:12:e3:b0:ef:9b:68:93:57:6e:6c:ad:16:68:8e:8d:30: + 33:fe:2a:1b:c3:03:8f:b6:0a:2d:0c:b1:3c:bb:f9:58:3f:8c: + 81:59:6b:14:dd:62:b5:c2:93:ed:5d:c6:19:0f:9b:4b:52:b3: + 7c:78 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDNTCCAp6gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLRzEL +MAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hLRUsxFTATBgNVBAoTDE9wZW5WUE4t +VEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlob3N0Lm15ZG9tYWluMB4XDTA0MTEy +NTE0NDY0OVoXDTE0MTEyMzE0NDY0OVowajELMAkGA1UEBhMCS0cxCzAJBgNVBAgT +Ak5BMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcGVuVlBOLVRFU1QxFDASBgNVBAMTC1Rlc3QtQ2xpZW50 +MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJtZUBteWhvc3QubXlkb21haW4wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcN +AQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANISXMZNEzSuz/qr/svejPFLSpUoYIeCLLjB5Y7GXRFY +YaSl8ULXhnRsnZx68DpcKeZTO15t2PBFBiwj7gm8Ao8OuNUzH8NKEQJIC8xLrW50 +4KJTsdbMibnib9sVsxkeVwR5SDradjH8v9M0Iecy2J4GTr7z43mwVP3RQjKqPnrB +AgMBAAGjge4wgeswCQYDVR0TBAIwADAsBglghkgBhvhCAQ0EHxYdT3BlblNTTCBH +ZW5lcmF0ZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFBe3P8dioKn9pDEOWNfZlHtL +P8tWMIGQBgNVHSMEgYgwgYWAFImmYOO66j6v/GR/TL2M0kiN4MxGoWqkaDBmMQsw +CQYDVQQGEwJLRzELMAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hLRUsxFTATBgNV +BAoTDE9wZW5WUE4tVEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlob3N0Lm15ZG9t +YWluggEAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA4GBAGHG0fokD8e+CTvYBBdjMRcH+VaZr0xn ++tvLlM9VpXsWIItCZBMjYkUok14299sClaHp/eMPjXOhew5VeE2lxLciEqDuVeC4 +DsmbEuOw75tok1dubK0WaI6NMDP+KhvDA4+2Ci0MsTy7+Vg/jIFZaxTdYrXCk+1d +xhkPm0tSs3x4 +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.key b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17b95091 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/client.key @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXAIBAAKBgQDSElzGTRM0rs/6q/7L3ozxS0qVKGCHgiy4weWOxl0RWGGkpfFC +14Z0bJ2cevA6XCnmUztebdjwRQYsI+4JvAKPDrjVMx/DShECSAvMS61udOCiU7HW +zIm54m/bFbMZHlcEeUg62nYx/L/TNCHnMtieBk6+8+N5sFT90UIyqj56wQIDAQAB +AoGBAK8RoIGekCfym99DYYfTg9A/t/tQeAnWYaDj7oSrKbqf1lgZ91OGPEZgkoVr +KzLnxf9uU+bhUs8CJx+4HdO8/L9rAJA+oD9QNuMp0elN4AKuEGE1Eq3a0e3cmgPI ++VIoXM6WVAGgK9I03Zu/UerYQ/DdXWGOIsKhFe8qyQoG9pKxAkEA9ld6O9MHQt3d +JAjJkgCNn4psozxjrfLWy2huXd3H3CRqGMjLITDGzdkVSgXjHokBYroi0+TZTu4M +ulJSJaWwBQJBANpO2DAexH2zRHw5Z6QyeEVxz7B3/FzU4GgJx9BH+FSBh+F0G5Ln +ir5Vst8vZ/LGcgpYjHQLNAvZVgUjiQ4Y6I0CQGvwMJL+CHR4GmmroAblTyjU0n1D +/Lk/anZ+L73Za7U+D28ErFzCrpmLwRRKOBYtGfpUbOZDpCQ9kj4hy/TLALECQCcL +9ysUNbzt9Y/qjJkX1d9F7gn4TBEmmkTBixW76bTjvjQbGlt6Qpyso2O8DPGlgPxM +vkJ7RoHgC7y7kGYPGnkCQBVxSNGIjLx4NQBgN4HD0y4+fars1PTUGnckBcS4npb9 +onLNyerBlWdBwbARyBS7WPIbyyf5VCrn3yIqWxaARO0= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/dh1024.pem b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/dh1024.pem new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ce05f0c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/dh1024.pem @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS----- +MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh +1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32 +9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC +-----END DH PARAMETERS----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.crt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8bb7b17a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.crt @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 3 (0x3) + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=KG, ST=NA, L=BISHKEK, O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Validity + Not Before: Nov 25 14:48:55 2004 GMT + Not After : Nov 23 14:48:55 2014 GMT + Subject: C=KG, ST=NA, O=OpenVPN-TEST, CN=Test-Client-Password/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) + Modulus (1024 bit): + 00:ca:b4:05:67:7b:51:c1:d2:fe:21:57:b1:a5:57: + 5c:c0:86:38:05:a8:91:cf:e7:a4:bd:7a:76:d8:3b: + cf:fe:f3:78:65:24:d6:72:7d:1b:6d:b6:da:04:f2: + a8:f6:b4:04:78:d2:24:a7:21:2f:ca:29:46:96:0f: + 0b:91:31:66:1e:4d:22:9a:5d:05:17:99:9c:a0:7e: + e0:2a:be:78:0c:a1:b9:d4:04:c4:ec:f8:61:79:62: + b5:52:2d:f5:41:af:db:9f:8c:ab:08:1b:b7:95:b8: + c1:f0:29:d3:da:fb:00:3f:8e:5c:27:e3:8d:fa:ee: + dc:b4:3b:0b:8b:e0:ab:c1:c1 + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:FALSE + Netscape Comment: + OpenSSL Generated Certificate + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 40:57:F1:8C:9C:86:B2:DA:E0:3F:A7:B8:D7:85:43:45:07:8A:40:73 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:89:A6:60:E3:BA:EA:3E:AF:FC:64:7F:4C:BD:8C:D2:48:8D:E0:CC:46 + DirName:/C=KG/ST=NA/L=BISHKEK/O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + a5:79:72:7f:a2:08:28:8e:66:da:e1:d0:be:bb:97:3d:65:9f: + ab:1e:19:ac:f1:66:44:14:8f:4e:7c:eb:ea:1e:2f:57:ea:44: + 46:4c:b9:56:5b:c0:0c:58:d2:45:87:26:6d:82:de:8c:64:b8: + 8b:22:61:61:c6:68:36:08:9d:5a:fd:2f:e5:21:e1:a2:0c:7f: + 3e:ca:e1:06:ea:9f:81:62:3d:a0:ce:f1:1e:0d:ab:86:89:ed: + 9a:89:34:32:c9:e9:6d:7d:f5:11:c3:5d:7e:a5:f7:f1:a6:83: + 77:1b:94:67:d9:0f:5c:ac:0e:08:4a:88:98:65:49:eb:66:9e: + 2d:28 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDPjCCAqegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLRzEL +MAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hLRUsxFTATBgNVBAoTDE9wZW5WUE4t +VEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlob3N0Lm15ZG9tYWluMB4XDTA0MTEy +NTE0NDg1NVoXDTE0MTEyMzE0NDg1NVowczELMAkGA1UEBhMCS0cxCzAJBgNVBAgT +Ak5BMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcGVuVlBOLVRFU1QxHTAbBgNVBAMTFFRlc3QtQ2xpZW50 +LVBhc3N3b3JkMSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJtZUBteWhvc3QubXlkb21haW4wgZ8w +DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMq0BWd7UcHS/iFXsaVXXMCGOAWokc/n +pL16dtg7z/7zeGUk1nJ9G2222gTyqPa0BHjSJKchL8opRpYPC5ExZh5NIppdBReZ +nKB+4Cq+eAyhudQExOz4YXlitVIt9UGv25+Mqwgbt5W4wfAp09r7AD+OXCfjjfru +3LQ7C4vgq8HBAgMBAAGjge4wgeswCQYDVR0TBAIwADAsBglghkgBhvhCAQ0EHxYd +T3BlblNTTCBHZW5lcmF0ZWQgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFEBX8YychrLa +4D+nuNeFQ0UHikBzMIGQBgNVHSMEgYgwgYWAFImmYOO66j6v/GR/TL2M0kiN4MxG +oWqkaDBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLRzELMAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hL +RUsxFTATBgNVBAoTDE9wZW5WUE4tVEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlo +b3N0Lm15ZG9tYWluggEAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA4GBAKV5cn+iCCiOZtrh0L67 +lz1ln6seGazxZkQUj0586+oeL1fqREZMuVZbwAxY0kWHJm2C3oxkuIsiYWHGaDYI +nVr9L+Uh4aIMfz7K4Qbqn4FiPaDO8R4Nq4aJ7ZqJNDLJ6W199RHDXX6l9/Gmg3cb +lGfZD1ysDghKiJhlSetmni0o +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.key b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4916364c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pass.key @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,959F7365DBBFDB77 + +nGm57l+rR/8dAZOHL/1x/6dt11zUca7rphjsgw6XRnSf3M/CWmHvHVjApWcNLEs5 +SWNMp1xfUogtGzsKoMBbnlZLDA7RVHUYD6dVMyCpc64UjzT08LmdZhtQYLAKmlUC +PT1VXS4Ae+SrqCPUqJkw1xP3kr0F1EVCXNu0nhOBAuuTGOS7PPEyW2N+k4nRHtsR +IaPp8GCuIeoR6CdymTFTq6d/GeCiEcyrUM4BNrG4GtRRrURxxOrzQFEOS5sjBPSg +Km1lwa6zBQFRLg9dKjRBL4teKuPY5Z2Nmpcml/aN4CkdkVEso4lW6/UHLE/joOMQ +0MdpdYtu8wnt1WI/Z4immQfl3MF+QcPMkqXXzCEhGG/5SbAo89KC46UXvu1Z5OhS +8XFHhvYBivOYWgZ3XUQqyZ0ulF60mFX7aE1Ph/eEbhWBHmU39hGjxzop1UoPwqLx +ahvtfvCkR3ZeqlWO9SHzCA3MlrKwQ1p1UL6nG6AJhNN9jSevH6by+8wr07NBZOqX +fJx+J/8EdVsUCFG2UJxPwM83ZSwAsvKRqph6CuWEl9ndUb7rw6khmRIoY0Iz3LbU +1MlcDoJNcJas6lYDr1UeFSk86g0SiGCHXZIqsjyUgq6HIy4YrAYiQUthnlF8tp2Q +nNQBPLo1GsHf0dC2MqKfDFASu7ST+Bl+yajHcIiUXvUJPxWbjkWYG9Q2p2ZBLzZD +uqeRr66OKxTzUS4go/QbHDNsAulXl61gQIEOdZw5uy/Jl11kyAI6EQbzmehagKdH +EshTgKp8ks62y0bBHgy3FMKyidJ5Hm58ZDhBxrwN0w+vhRoTGOepTA== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pkcs12.p12 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pkcs12.p12 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..253d4081 Binary files /dev/null and b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/pkcs12.p12 differ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.crt b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.crt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28bb4d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.crt @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +Certificate: + Data: + Version: 3 (0x2) + Serial Number: 1 (0x1) + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + Issuer: C=KG, ST=NA, L=BISHKEK, O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Validity + Not Before: Nov 25 14:42:22 2004 GMT + Not After : Nov 23 14:42:22 2014 GMT + Subject: C=KG, ST=NA, O=OpenVPN-TEST, CN=Test-Server/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + Subject Public Key Info: + Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption + RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) + Modulus (1024 bit): + 00:cb:4e:ac:f9:83:57:f6:69:d2:32:29:b4:bc:ad: + e6:f7:26:21:89:33:30:43:40:a3:35:d9:de:26:01: + d6:b4:f0:bc:0a:19:55:99:3b:f1:4c:91:60:b6:fd: + 74:34:8d:5a:c7:62:ec:ce:f2:d6:02:ce:57:32:f4: + 35:8c:71:a0:6d:65:2a:e7:80:ae:29:59:cf:36:73: + f8:7c:4a:73:90:fc:30:28:d5:46:7d:35:a4:4e:c9: + 9f:90:7b:e2:09:21:36:c5:a8:ec:85:82:9a:32:b4: + 91:3b:c1:d6:4f:9f:d1:f8:6f:68:f4:1d:d2:06:91: + 32:cc:9a:48:fd:cd:98:7f:2f + Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) + X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Basic Constraints: + CA:FALSE + Netscape Cert Type: + SSL Server + Netscape Comment: + OpenSSL Generated Server Certificate + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 69:11:FE:E7:9F:89:7B:71:34:69:C0:DC:82:F8:D0:5D:4D:FB:78:DF + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + keyid:89:A6:60:E3:BA:EA:3E:AF:FC:64:7F:4C:BD:8C:D2:48:8D:E0:CC:46 + DirName:/C=KG/ST=NA/L=BISHKEK/O=OpenVPN-TEST/emailAddress=me@myhost.mydomain + serial:00 + + Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption + 35:5c:75:da:57:ef:b5:79:f2:a2:db:36:e4:75:e8:c7:bc:73: + 26:cf:30:36:4b:2e:51:46:37:60:2f:4e:2b:f6:71:a2:23:db: + 8e:d8:5c:d5:af:2e:22:28:dd:30:a8:89:66:3a:cc:5b:3c:0f: + 96:12:20:de:5e:41:52:74:35:ed:4c:26:40:19:ca:73:df:54: + b1:30:96:9c:a5:14:d0:38:28:3f:ab:30:07:d7:de:98:d2:7f: + 7f:90:b2:52:1d:e5:95:88:ed:ba:8a:6a:14:85:66:76:ec:75: + 30:e8:ae:94:f4:e1:76:fa:4b:0e:f1:53:d7:95:be:fb:69:fa: + 3d:32 +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIDUTCCArqgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJLRzEL +MAkGA1UECBMCTkExEDAOBgNVBAcTB0JJU0hLRUsxFTATBgNVBAoTDE9wZW5WUE4t +VEVTVDEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSbWVAbXlob3N0Lm15ZG9tYWluMB4XDTA0MTEy +NTE0NDIyMloXDTE0MTEyMzE0NDIyMlowajELMAkGA1UEBhMCS0cxCzAJBgNVBAgT +Ak5BMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcGVuVlBOLVRFU1QxFDASBgNVBAMTC1Rlc3QtU2VydmVy +MSEwHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhJtZUBteWhvc3QubXlkb21haW4wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcN +AQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMtOrPmDV/Zp0jIptLyt5vcmIYkzMENAozXZ3iYB1rTw +vAoZVZk78UyRYLb9dDSNWsdi7M7y1gLOVzL0NYxxoG1lKueArilZzzZz+HxKc5D8 +MCjVRn01pE7Jn5B74gkhNsWo7IWCmjK0kTvB1k+f0fhvaPQd0gaRMsyaSP3NmH8v +AgMBAAGjggEJMIIBBTAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBEGCWCGSAGG+EIBAQQEAwIGQDAzBglg +hkgBhvhCAQ0EJhYkT3BlblNTTCBHZW5lcmF0ZWQgU2VydmVyIENlcnRpZmljYXRl +MB0GA1UdDgQWBBRpEf7nn4l7cTRpwNyC+NBdTft43zCBkAYDVR0jBIGIMIGFgBSJ +pmDjuuo+r/xkf0y9jNJIjeDMRqFqpGgwZjELMAkGA1UEBhMCS0cxCzAJBgNVBAgT +Ak5BMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdCSVNIS0VLMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxPcGVuVlBOLVRFU1QxITAf +BgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEm1lQG15aG9zdC5teWRvbWFpboIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQF +AAOBgQA1XHXaV++1efKi2zbkdejHvHMmzzA2Sy5RRjdgL04r9nGiI9uO2FzVry4i +KN0wqIlmOsxbPA+WEiDeXkFSdDXtTCZAGcpz31SxMJacpRTQOCg/qzAH196Y0n9/ +kLJSHeWViO26imoUhWZ27HUw6K6U9OF2+ksO8VPXlb77afo9Mg== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.key b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.key new file mode 100644 index 00000000..976acabf --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-keys/server.key @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXgIBAAKBgQDLTqz5g1f2adIyKbS8reb3JiGJMzBDQKM12d4mAda08LwKGVWZ +O/FMkWC2/XQ0jVrHYuzO8tYCzlcy9DWMcaBtZSrngK4pWc82c/h8SnOQ/DAo1UZ9 +NaROyZ+Qe+IJITbFqOyFgpoytJE7wdZPn9H4b2j0HdIGkTLMmkj9zZh/LwIDAQAB +AoGBAKP1ljA/iY/zNY447kZ/5NWKzd7tBk4mcbl7M9no/7O6tZtbZRoIKoi6cYoC +C1ZabUyBbkNTud5XdCFmq0zRUjOWvoFMZ9VZfd2kRPvl4TGczBtJAq65b+EYMGui +q6T9p61xPdtzu0vM+Ecj127pAMk5XcJyxu8XQK7lZWmG5UoJAkEA8CxXNZN+A3qD +bMBPI3VdwKCNSjNVEQEnygMbNgw7VLdxPpspzZziqJEGdzsM4dsnOBwKxIWFLN2h +lbGBOquAswJBANi0atGWM8VUxDjvqqHCTS9RUXWgnvYhee4/xraJBQPBSivjC9P0 +vKT7PjBHU6djtKSLKGaHn1vHqmyY7PCMjZUCQQCNVSqExqSzG1dXmdt4PErNXi2G +6qo2dX2arTVIGu6XLdQgSWLSMm5XT/CEHWW5SyPLKwVTHFeATXQXCPvJML9tAkEA +k0yXax0g1ZoXwufN4SQUmPw6Va03P/BjU/nP1ZVvbiz9gLVU/d7WN4J7tA9XomkY +idv5OzAmtxkSE70jGSNAvQJAWhCf9+iHkzOHRyKKOYlh1DHUwDfSEp+hlZYg9H03 +P2sraQzUxgWDY/DIY63KvW78ny863baFz7onz21MYGgJXg== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8990f8b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/README @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +OpenVPN plugin examples. + +Examples provided: + +simple.c -- using the --auth-user-pass-verify callback, + test deferred authentication. + +To build: + + ./build simple (Linux/BSD/etc.) + ./winbuild simple (MinGW on Windows) + +To use in OpenVPN, add to config file: + + plugin simple.so (Linux/BSD/etc.) + plugin simple.dll (MinGW on Windows) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65398657 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * This file implements a simple OpenVPN plugin module which + * will test deferred authentication and packet filtering. + * + * Will run on Windows or *nix. + * + * Sample usage: + * + * setenv test_deferred_auth 20 + * setenv test_packet_filter 10 + * plugin plugin/defer/simple.so + * + * This will enable deferred authentication to occur 20 + * seconds after the normal TLS authentication process, + * and will cause a packet filter file to be generated 10 + * seconds after the initial TLS negotiation, using + * {common-name}.pf as the source. + * + * Sample packet filter configuration: + * + * [CLIENTS DROP] + * +otherclient + * [SUBNETS DROP] + * +10.0.0.0/8 + * -10.10.0.8 + * [END] + * + * See the README file for build instructions. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openvpn-plugin.h" + +/* bool definitions */ +#define bool int +#define true 1 +#define false 0 + +/* + * Our context, where we keep our state. + */ + +struct plugin_context { + int test_deferred_auth; + int test_packet_filter; +}; + +struct plugin_per_client_context { + int n_calls; + bool generated_pf_file; +}; + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* used for safe printf of possible NULL strings */ +static const char * +np (const char *str) +{ + if (str) + return str; + else + return "[NULL]"; +} + +static int +atoi_null0 (const char *str) +{ + if (str) + return atoi (str); + else + return 0; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT openvpn_plugin_handle_t +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 (unsigned int *type_mask, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct plugin_context *context; + + printf ("FUNC: openvpn_plugin_open_v1\n"); + + /* + * Allocate our context + */ + context = (struct plugin_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct plugin_context)); + + context->test_deferred_auth = atoi_null0 (get_env ("test_deferred_auth", envp)); + printf ("TEST_DEFERRED_AUTH %d\n", context->test_deferred_auth); + + context->test_packet_filter = atoi_null0 (get_env ("test_packet_filter", envp)); + printf ("TEST_PACKET_FILTER %d\n", context->test_packet_filter); + + /* + * Which callbacks to intercept. + */ + *type_mask = + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF); + + return (openvpn_plugin_handle_t) context; +} + +static int +auth_user_pass_verify (struct plugin_context *context, struct plugin_per_client_context *pcc, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + if (context->test_deferred_auth) + { + /* get username/password from envp string array */ + const char *username = get_env ("username", envp); + const char *password = get_env ("password", envp); + + /* get auth_control_file filename from envp string array*/ + const char *auth_control_file = get_env ("auth_control_file", envp); + + printf ("DEFER u='%s' p='%s' acf='%s'\n", + np(username), + np(password), + np(auth_control_file)); + + /* Authenticate asynchronously in n seconds */ + if (auth_control_file) + { + char buf[256]; + int auth = 2; + sscanf (username, "%d", &auth); + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "( sleep %d ; echo AUTH %s %d ; echo %d >%s ) &", + context->test_deferred_auth, + auth_control_file, + auth, + pcc->n_calls < auth, + auth_control_file); + printf ("%s\n", buf); + system (buf); + pcc->n_calls++; + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +static int +tls_final (struct plugin_context *context, struct plugin_per_client_context *pcc, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + if (context->test_packet_filter) + { + if (!pcc->generated_pf_file) + { + const char *pff = get_env ("pf_file", envp); + const char *cn = get_env ("username", envp); + if (pff && cn) + { + char buf[256]; + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "( sleep %d ; echo PF %s/%s ; cp \"%s.pf\" \"%s\" ) &", + context->test_packet_filter, cn, pff, cn, pff); + printf ("%s\n", buf); + system (buf); + pcc->generated_pf_file = true; + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v2 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, + const int type, + const char *argv[], + const char *envp[], + void *per_client_context, + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + struct plugin_per_client_context *pcc = (struct plugin_per_client_context *) per_client_context; + switch (type) + { + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY\n"); + return auth_user_pass_verify (context, pcc, argv, envp); + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL\n"); + return tls_final (context, pcc, argv, envp); + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF\n"); + if (context->test_packet_filter) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + default: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_?\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void * +openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + printf ("FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1\n"); + return calloc (1, sizeof (struct plugin_per_client_context)); +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, void *per_client_context) +{ + printf ("FUNC: openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1\n"); + free (per_client_context); +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + printf ("FUNC: openvpn_plugin_close_v1\n"); + free (context); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.def b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.def new file mode 100755 index 00000000..a87507d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/simple.def @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +LIBRARY OpenVPN_PLUGIN_SAMPLE +DESCRIPTION "Sample OpenVPN plug-in module." +EXPORTS + openvpn_plugin_open_v1 @1 + openvpn_plugin_func_v1 @2 + openvpn_plugin_close_v1 @3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/winbuild b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/winbuild new file mode 100755 index 00000000..82927d96 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/defer/winbuild @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Build an OpenVPN plugin module on Windows/MinGW. +# The argument should be the base name of the C source file +# (without the .c). +# + +# This directory is where we will look for openvpn-plugin.h +INCLUDE="-I../../../build" + +CC_FLAGS="-O2 -Wall" + +gcc -DBUILD_DLL $CC_FLAGS $INCLUDE -c $1.c +gcc --disable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o junk.tmp -Wl,--base-file,base.tmp $1.o +rm junk.tmp +dlltool --dllname $1.dll --base-file base.tmp --output-exp temp.exp --input-def $1.def +rm base.tmp +gcc --enable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o $1.dll $1.o -Wl,temp.exp +rm temp.exp diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1cc4650e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * This plugin is similar to simple.c, except it also logs extra information + * to stdout for every plugin method called by OpenVPN. + * + * See the README file for build instructions. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openvpn-plugin.h" + +/* + * Our context, where we keep our state. + */ +struct plugin_context { + const char *username; + const char *password; +}; + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT openvpn_plugin_handle_t +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 (unsigned int *type_mask, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct plugin_context *context; + + /* + * Allocate our context + */ + context = (struct plugin_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct plugin_context)); + + /* + * Set the username/password we will require. + */ + context->username = "foo"; + context->password = "bar"; + + /* + * Which callbacks to intercept. + */ + *type_mask = + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL); + + return (openvpn_plugin_handle_t) context; +} + +void +show (const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + size_t i; + switch (type) + { + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL\n"); + break; + default: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_?\n"); + break; + } + + printf ("ARGV\n"); + for (i = 0; argv[i] != NULL; ++i) + printf ("%d '%s'\n", (int)i, argv[i]); + + printf ("ENVP\n"); + for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; ++i) + printf ("%d '%s'\n", (int)i, envp[i]); +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + + show (type, argv, envp); + + /* check entered username/password against what we require */ + if (type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) + { + /* get username/password from envp string array */ + const char *username = get_env ("username", envp); + const char *password = get_env ("password", envp); + + if (username && !strcmp (username, context->username) + && password && !strcmp (password, context->password)) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + free (context); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log_v3.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log_v3.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..742c7568 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/log_v3.c @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * This plugin is similar to simple.c, except it also logs extra information + * to stdout for every plugin method called by OpenVPN. The only difference + * between this (log_v3.c) and log.c is that this module uses the v3 plug-in + * API. + * + * See the README file for build instructions. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#define ENABLE_SSL + +#include "openvpn-plugin.h" + +/* + * Our context, where we keep our state. + */ +struct plugin_context { + const char *username; + const char *password; +}; + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_open_v3 (const int v3structver, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_in const *args, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_return *ret) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = NULL; + + /* Check that we are API compatible */ + if( v3structver != OPENVPN_PLUGINv3_STRUCTVER ) { + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + /* Which callbacks to intercept. */ + ret->type_mask = + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS) | + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL); + + + /* Allocate our context */ + context = (struct plugin_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct plugin_context)); + + /* Set the username/password we will require. */ + context->username = "foo"; + context->password = "bar"; + + /* Point the global context handle to our newly created context */ + ret->handle = (void *) context; + + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +void +show (const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + size_t i; + switch (type) + { + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS\n"); + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL\n"); + break; + default: + printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_?\n"); + break; + } + + printf ("ARGV\n"); + for (i = 0; argv[i] != NULL; ++i) + printf ("%d '%s'\n", (int)i, argv[i]); + + printf ("ENVP\n"); + for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; ++i) + printf ("%d '%s'\n", (int)i, envp[i]); +} + +static void +x509_print_info (X509 *x509crt) +{ + int i, n; + int fn_nid; + ASN1_OBJECT *fn; + ASN1_STRING *val; + X509_NAME *x509_name; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent; + const char *objbuf; + unsigned char *buf; + + x509_name = X509_get_subject_name (x509crt); + n = X509_NAME_entry_count (x509_name); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + ent = X509_NAME_get_entry (x509_name, i); + if (!ent) + continue; + fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object (ent); + if (!fn) + continue; + val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent); + if (!val) + continue; + fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid (fn); + if (fn_nid == NID_undef) + continue; + objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn (fn_nid); + if (!objbuf) + continue; + buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */ + if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) <= 0) + continue; + + printf("X509 %s: %s\n", objbuf, (char *)buf); + OPENSSL_free (buf); + } +} + + + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v3 (const int version, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_in const *args, + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_return *retptr) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) args->handle; + + printf("\nopenvpn_plugin_func_v3() :::::>> "); + show (args->type, args->argv, args->envp); + + /* Dump some X509 information if we're in the TLS_VERIFY phase */ + if ((args->type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY) && args->current_cert ) { + printf("---- X509 Subject information ----\n"); + printf("Certificate depth: %i\n", args->current_cert_depth); + x509_print_info(args->current_cert); + printf("----------------------------------\n"); + } + + /* check entered username/password against what we require */ + if (args->type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) + { + /* get username/password from envp string array */ + const char *username = get_env ("username", args->envp); + const char *password = get_env ("password", args->envp); + + if (username && !strcmp (username, context->username) + && password && !strcmp (password, context->password)) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + free (context); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/winbuild b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/winbuild new file mode 100755 index 00000000..decf05f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/log/winbuild @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Build an OpenVPN plugin module on Windows/MinGW. +# The argument should be the base name of the C source file +# (without the .c). +# + +# This directory is where we will look for openvpn-plugin.h +INCLUDE="-I../../../include" + +CC_FLAGS="-O2 -Wall" + +gcc -DBUILD_DLL $CC_FLAGS $INCLUDE -c $1.c +gcc --disable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o junk.tmp -Wl,--base-file,base.tmp $1.o +rm junk.tmp +dlltool --dllname $1.dll --base-file base.tmp --output-exp temp.exp --input-def $1.def +rm base.tmp +gcc --enable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o $1.dll $1.o -Wl,temp.exp +rm temp.exp diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/README b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4400cd30 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/README @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +OpenVPN plugin examples. + +Examples provided: + +simple.c -- using the --auth-user-pass-verify callback, verify + that the username/password is "foo"/"bar". + +To build: + + ./build simple (Linux/BSD/etc.) + ./winbuild simple (MinGW on Windows) + +To use in OpenVPN, add to config file: + + plugin simple.so (Linux/BSD/etc.) + plugin simple.dll (MinGW on Windows) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f26d89f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * This file implements a simple OpenVPN plugin module which + * will examine the username/password provided by a client, + * and make an accept/deny determination. Will run + * on Windows or *nix. + * + * See the README file for build instructions. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openvpn-plugin.h" + +/* + * Our context, where we keep our state. + */ +struct plugin_context { + const char *username; + const char *password; +}; + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT openvpn_plugin_handle_t +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 (unsigned int *type_mask, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct plugin_context *context; + + /* + * Allocate our context + */ + context = (struct plugin_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct plugin_context)); + + /* + * Set the username/password we will require. + */ + context->username = "foo"; + context->password = "bar"; + + /* + * We are only interested in intercepting the + * --auth-user-pass-verify callback. + */ + *type_mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY); + + return (openvpn_plugin_handle_t) context; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + + /* get username/password from envp string array */ + const char *username = get_env ("username", envp); + const char *password = get_env ("password", envp); + + /* check entered username/password against what we require */ + if (username && !strcmp (username, context->username) + && password && !strcmp (password, context->password)) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + else + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct plugin_context *context = (struct plugin_context *) handle; + free (context); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.def b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.def new file mode 100755 index 00000000..a87507d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/simple.def @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +LIBRARY OpenVPN_PLUGIN_SAMPLE +DESCRIPTION "Sample OpenVPN plug-in module." +EXPORTS + openvpn_plugin_open_v1 @1 + openvpn_plugin_func_v1 @2 + openvpn_plugin_close_v1 @3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/winbuild b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/winbuild new file mode 100755 index 00000000..decf05f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-plugins/simple/winbuild @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Build an OpenVPN plugin module on Windows/MinGW. +# The argument should be the base name of the C source file +# (without the .c). +# + +# This directory is where we will look for openvpn-plugin.h +INCLUDE="-I../../../include" + +CC_FLAGS="-O2 -Wall" + +gcc -DBUILD_DLL $CC_FLAGS $INCLUDE -c $1.c +gcc --disable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o junk.tmp -Wl,--base-file,base.tmp $1.o +rm junk.tmp +dlltool --dllname $1.dll --base-file base.tmp --output-exp temp.exp --input-def $1.def +rm base.tmp +gcc --enable-stdcall-fixup -mdll -DBUILD_DLL -o $1.dll $1.o -Wl,temp.exp +rm temp.exp diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/auth-pam.pl b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/auth-pam.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5333badc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/auth-pam.pl @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -t + +# OpenVPN PAM AUTHENTICATON +# This script can be used to add PAM-based authentication +# to OpenVPN 2.0. The OpenVPN client must provide +# a username/password, using the --auth-user-pass directive. +# The OpenVPN server should specify --auth-user-pass-verify +# with this script as the argument and the 'via-file' method +# specified. The server can also optionally specify +# --client-cert-not-required and/or --username-as-common-name. + +# SCRIPT OPERATION +# Return success or failure status based on whether or not a +# given username/password authenticates using PAM. +# Caller should write username/password as two lines in a file +# which is passed to this script as a command line argument. + +# CAVEATS +# * Requires Authen::PAM module, which may also +# require the pam-devel package. +# * May need to be run as root in order to +# access username/password file. + +# NOTES +# * This script is provided mostly as a demonstration of the +# --auth-user-pass-verify script capability in OpenVPN. +# For real world usage, see the auth-pam module in the plugin +# folder. + +use Authen::PAM; +use POSIX; + +# This "conversation function" will pass +# $password to PAM when it asks for it. + +sub my_conv_func { + my @res; + while ( @_ ) { + my $code = shift; + my $msg = shift; + my $ans = ""; + + $ans = $password if $msg =~ /[Pp]assword/; + + push @res, (PAM_SUCCESS(),$ans); + } + push @res, PAM_SUCCESS(); + return @res; +} + +# Identify service type to PAM +$service = "login"; + +# Get username/password from file + +if ($ARG = shift @ARGV) { + if (!open (UPFILE, "<$ARG")) { + print "Could not open username/password file: $ARG\n"; + exit 1; + } +} else { + print "No username/password file specified on command line\n"; + exit 1; +} + +$username = ; +$password = ; + +if (!$username || !$password) { + print "Username/password not found in file: $ARG\n"; + exit 1; +} + +chomp $username; +chomp $password; + +close (UPFILE); + +# Initialize PAM object + +if (!ref($pamh = new Authen::PAM($service, $username, \&my_conv_func))) { + print "Authen::PAM init failed\n"; + exit 1; +} + +# Authenticate with PAM + +$res = $pamh->pam_authenticate; + +# Return success or failure + +if ($res == PAM_SUCCESS()) { + exit 0; +} else { + print "Auth '$username' failed, PAM said: ", $pamh->pam_strerror($res), "\n"; + exit 1; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-start b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-start new file mode 100755 index 00000000..d20a2603 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-start @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +################################# +# Set up Ethernet bridge on Linux +# Requires: bridge-utils +################################# + +# Define Bridge Interface +br="br0" + +# Define list of TAP interfaces to be bridged, +# for example tap="tap0 tap1 tap2". +tap="tap0" + +# Define physical ethernet interface to be bridged +# with TAP interface(s) above. +eth="eth0" +eth_ip="192.168.8.4" +eth_netmask="255.255.255.0" +eth_broadcast="192.168.8.255" + +for t in $tap; do + openvpn --mktun --dev $t +done + +brctl addbr $br +brctl addif $br $eth + +for t in $tap; do + brctl addif $br $t +done + +for t in $tap; do + ifconfig $t 0.0.0.0 promisc up +done + +ifconfig $eth 0.0.0.0 promisc up + +ifconfig $br $eth_ip netmask $eth_netmask broadcast $eth_broadcast diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-stop b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-stop new file mode 100755 index 00000000..81927794 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/bridge-stop @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +#################################### +# Tear Down Ethernet bridge on Linux +#################################### + +# Define Bridge Interface +br="br0" + +# Define list of TAP interfaces to be bridged together +tap="tap0" + +ifconfig $br down +brctl delbr $br + +for t in $tap; do + openvpn --rmtun --dev $t +done diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/ucn.pl b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/ucn.pl new file mode 100755 index 00000000..6d708f82 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/ucn.pl @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -t + +# OpenVPN --auth-user-pass-verify script. +# Only authenticate if username equals common_name. +# In OpenVPN config file: +# auth-user-pass-verify ./ucn.pl via-env + +$username = $ENV{'username'}; +$common_name = $ENV{'common_name'}; + +exit !(length($username) > 0 && length($common_name) > 0 && $username eq $common_name); diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/verify-cn b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/verify-cn new file mode 100755 index 00000000..6e747ef1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-scripts/verify-cn @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl + +# verify-cn -- a sample OpenVPN tls-verify script +# +# Return 0 if cn matches the common name component of +# subject, 1 otherwise. +# +# For example in OpenVPN, you could use the directive: +# +# tls-verify "./verify-cn /etc/openvpn/allowed_clients" +# +# This would cause the connection to be dropped unless +# the client common name is listed on a line in the +# allowed_clients file. + +die "usage: verify-cn cnfile certificate_depth subject" if (@ARGV != 3); + +# Parse out arguments: +# cnfile -- The file containing the list of common names, one per +# line, which the client is required to have, +# taken from the argument to the tls-verify directive +# in the OpenVPN config file. +# The file can have blank lines and comment lines that begin +# with the # character. +# depth -- The current certificate chain depth. In a typical +# bi-level chain, the root certificate will be at level +# 1 and the client certificate will be at level 0. +# This script will be called separately for each level. +# x509 -- the X509 subject string as extracted by OpenVPN from +# the client's provided certificate. +($cnfile, $depth, $x509) = @ARGV; + +if ($depth == 0) { + # If depth is zero, we know that this is the final + # certificate in the chain (i.e. the client certificate), + # and the one we are interested in examining. + # If so, parse out the common name substring in + # the X509 subject string. + + if ($x509 =~ / CN=([^,]+)/) { + $cn = $1; + # Accept the connection if the X509 common name + # string matches the passed cn argument. + open(FH, '<', $cnfile) or exit 1; # can't open, nobody authenticates! + while (defined($line = )) { + if ($line !~ /^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/o) { + chop($line); + if ($line eq $cn) { + exit 0; + } + } + } + close(FH); + } + + # Authentication failed -- Either we could not parse + # the X509 subject string, or the common name in the + # subject string didn't match the passed cn argument. + exit 1; +} + +# If depth is nonzero, tell OpenVPN to continue processing +# the certificate chain. +exit 0; diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-windows/sample.ovpn b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-windows/sample.ovpn new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5accd573 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/sample/sample-windows/sample.ovpn @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +# Edit this file, and save to a .ovpn extension +# so that OpenVPN will activate it when run +# as a service. + +# Change 'myremote' to be your remote host, +# or comment out to enter a listening +# server mode. +remote myremote + +# Uncomment this line to use a different +# port number than the default of 1194. +; port 1194 + +# Choose one of three protocols supported by +# OpenVPN. If left commented out, defaults +# to udp. +; proto [tcp-server | tcp-client | udp] + +# You must specify one of two possible network +# protocols, 'dev tap' or 'dev tun' to be used +# on both sides of the connection. 'tap' creates +# a VPN using the ethernet protocol while 'tun' +# uses the IP protocol. You must use 'tap' +# if you are ethernet bridging or want to route +# broadcasts. 'tun' is somewhat more efficient +# but requires configuration of client software +# to not depend on broadcasts. Some platforms +# such as Solaris, OpenBSD, and Mac OS X only +# support 'tun' interfaces, so if you are +# connecting to such a platform, you must also +# use a 'tun' interface on the Windows side. + +# Enable 'dev tap' or 'dev tun' but not both! +dev tap + +# This is a 'dev tap' ifconfig that creates +# a virtual ethernet subnet. +# 10.3.0.1 is the local VPN IP address +# and 255.255.255.0 is the VPN subnet. +# Only define this option for 'dev tap'. +ifconfig 10.3.0.1 255.255.255.0 + +# This is a 'dev tun' ifconfig that creates +# a point-to-point IP link. +# 10.3.0.1 is the local VPN IP address and +# 10.3.0.2 is the remote VPN IP address. +# Only define this option for 'dev tun'. +# Make sure to include the "tun-mtu" option +# on the remote machine, but swap the order +# of the ifconfig addresses. +;tun-mtu 1500 +;ifconfig 10.3.0.1 10.3.0.2 + +# If you have fragmentation issues or misconfigured +# routers in the path which block Path MTU discovery, +# lower the TCP MSS and internally fragment non-TCP +# protocols. +;fragment 1300 +;mssfix + +# If you have set up more than one TAP-Win32 adapter +# on your system, you must refer to it by name. +;dev-node my-tap + +# You can generate a static OpenVPN key +# by selecting the Generate Key option +# in the start menu. +# +# You can also generate key.txt manually +# with the following command: +# openvpn --genkey --secret key.txt +# +# key must match on both ends of the connection, +# so you should generate it on one machine and +# copy it to the other over a secure medium. +# Place key.txt in the same directory as this +# config file. +secret key.txt + +# Uncomment this section for a more reliable +# detection when a system loses its connection. +# For example, dial-ups or laptops that travel +# to other locations. +# +# If this section is enabled and "myremote" +# above is a dynamic DNS name (i.e. dyndns.org), +# OpenVPN will dynamically "follow" the IP +# address of "myremote" if it changes. +; ping-restart 60 +; ping-timer-rem +; persist-tun +; persist-key +; resolv-retry 86400 + +# keep-alive ping +ping 10 + +# enable LZO compression +comp-lzo + +# moderate verbosity +verb 4 +mute 10 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c04468a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +SUBDIRS = compat openvpn openvpnserv plugins diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ad44525 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +EXTRA_DIST = \ + compat.vcxproj \ + compat.vcxproj.filters + +noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libcompat.la + +libcompat_la_SOURCES = \ + compat.h \ + compat-stdbool.h \ + compat-dirname.c \ + compat-basename.c \ + compat-gettimeofday.c \ + compat-daemon.c \ + compat-inet_ntop.c \ + compat-inet_pton.c diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-basename.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-basename.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0576919 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-basename.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME + +#include "compat.h" +#include + +/* Modified version based on glibc-2.14.1 by Roland McGrath + * This version is extended to handle both / and \ in path names + */ +char * +basename (char *filename) +{ + char *p = strrchr (filename, '/'); + if (!p) { + /* If NULL, check for \ instead ... might be Windows a path */ + p = strrchr (filename, '\\'); + } + return p ? p + 1 : (char *) filename; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_BASENAME */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-daemon.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-daemon.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dde96a20 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-daemon.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif + +int +daemon(int nochdir, int noclose) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_FORK) && defined(HAVE_SETSID) + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + return (-1); + case 0: + break; + default: + exit(0); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) + return (-1); + + if (!nochdir) + chdir("/"); + + if (!noclose) { +#if defined(HAVE_DUP) && defined(HAVE_DUP2) + int fd; + if ((fd = open ("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + dup2 (fd, 0); + dup2 (fd, 1); + dup2 (fd, 2); + if (fd > 2) { + close (fd); + } + } +#endif + } + + return 0; +#else + (void)nochdir; + (void)noclose; + errno = EFAULT; + return -1; +#endif +} + +#endif + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-dirname.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-dirname.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..88785950 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-dirname.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + + +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME + +#include "compat.h" +#include + +/* Unoptimised version of glibc memrchr(). + * This is considered fast enough, as only this compat + * version of dirname() depends on it. + */ +static const char * +__memrchr(const char *str, int c, size_t n) +{ + const char *end = str; + + end += n - 1; /* Go to the end of the string */ + while (end >= str) { + if(c == *end) + return end; + else + end--; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* Modified version based on glibc-2.14.1 by Ulrich Drepper + * This version is extended to handle both / and \ in path names. + */ +char * +dirname (char *path) +{ + static const char dot[] = "."; + char *last_slash; + char separator = '/'; + + /* Find last '/'. */ + last_slash = path != NULL ? strrchr (path, '/') : NULL; + /* If NULL, check for \ instead ... might be Windows a path */ + if (!last_slash) { + last_slash = path != NULL ? strrchr (path, '\\') : NULL; + separator = last_slash ? '\\' : '/'; /* Change the separator if \ was found */ + } + + if (last_slash != NULL && last_slash != path && last_slash[1] == '\0') { + /* Determine whether all remaining characters are slashes. */ + char *runp; + + for (runp = last_slash; runp != path; --runp) + if (runp[-1] != separator) + break; + + /* The '/' is the last character, we have to look further. */ + if (runp != path) + last_slash = (char *) __memrchr (path, separator, runp - path); + } + + if (last_slash != NULL) { + /* Determine whether all remaining characters are slashes. */ + char *runp; + + for (runp = last_slash; runp != path; --runp) + if (runp[-1] != separator) + break; + + /* Terminate the path. */ + if (runp == path) { + /* The last slash is the first character in the string. We have to + return "/". As a special case we have to return "//" if there + are exactly two slashes at the beginning of the string. See + XBD 4.10 Path Name Resolution for more information. */ + if (last_slash == path + 1) + ++last_slash; + else + last_slash = path + 1; + } + else + last_slash = runp; + + last_slash[0] = '\0'; + } else + /* This assignment is ill-designed but the XPG specs require to + return a string containing "." in any case no directory part is + found and so a static and constant string is required. */ + path = (char *) dot; + + return path; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_DIRNAME */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-gettimeofday.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-gettimeofday.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f32d5d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-gettimeofday.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +#include "compat.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 +/* + * NOTICE: mingw has much faster gettimeofday! + * autoconf will set HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + */ + +#include +#include + +static time_t gtc_base = 0; +static DWORD gtc_last = 0; +static time_t last_sec = 0; +static unsigned int last_msec = 0; +static int bt_last = 0; + +static void +gettimeofday_calibrate (void) +{ + const time_t t = time(NULL); + const DWORD gtc = GetTickCount(); + gtc_base = t - gtc/1000; + gtc_last = gtc; +} + +/* + * Rewritten by JY for OpenVPN 2.1, after I realized that + * QueryPerformanceCounter takes nearly 2 orders of magnitude + * more processor cycles than GetTickCount. + */ +int +gettimeofday (struct timeval *tv, void *tz) +{ + const DWORD gtc = GetTickCount(); + int bt = 0; + time_t sec; + unsigned int msec; + const int backtrack_hold_seconds = 10; + + (void)tz; + + /* recalibrate at the dreaded 49.7 day mark */ + if (!gtc_base || gtc < gtc_last) + gettimeofday_calibrate (); + gtc_last = gtc; + + sec = gtc_base + gtc / 1000; + msec = gtc % 1000; + + if (sec == last_sec) + { + if (msec < last_msec) + { + msec = last_msec; + bt = 1; + } + } + else if (sec < last_sec) + { + /* We try to dampen out backtracks of less than backtrack_hold_seconds. + Larger backtracks will be passed through and dealt with by the + TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION code (if enabled) */ + if (sec > last_sec - backtrack_hold_seconds) + { + sec = last_sec; + msec = last_msec; + } + bt = 1; + } + + tv->tv_sec = (long)last_sec = (long)sec; + tv->tv_usec = (last_msec = msec) * 1000; + + if (bt && !bt_last) + gettimeofday_calibrate (); + bt_last = bt; + + return 0; +} + +#else + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +int +gettimeofday (struct timeval *tv, void *tz) +{ + (void)tz; + tv->tv_sec = time(NULL); + tv->tv_usec = 0; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +#endif /* HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_ntop.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_ntop.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d521425 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_ntop.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +#include "compat.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#include + +/* + * inet_ntop() and inet_pton() wrap-implementations using + * WSAAddressToString() and WSAStringToAddress() functions + * + * this is needed as long as we support running OpenVPN on WinXP + */ + +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + unsigned long s = size; + + ZeroMemory(&ss, sizeof(ss)); + ss.ss_family = af; + + switch(af) { + case AF_INET: + ((struct sockaddr_in *)&ss)->sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)src; + break; + case AF_INET6: + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss)->sin6_addr = *(struct in6_addr *)src; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + /* cannot direclty use &size because of strict aliasing rules */ + return (WSAAddressToString((struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), NULL, dst, &s) == 0)? + dst : NULL; +} + +#else + +#error no emulation for inet_ntop + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_pton.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_pton.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cdc8d4b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-inet_pton.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_PTON + +#include "compat.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#include +#include + +/* + * inet_ntop() and inet_pton() wrap-implementations using + * WSAAddressToString() and WSAStringToAddress() functions + * + * this is needed as long as we support running OpenVPN on WinXP + */ + + +int +inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + int size = sizeof(ss); + char src_copy[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN+1]; + + ZeroMemory(&ss, sizeof(ss)); + /* stupid non-const API */ + strncpy (src_copy, src, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN+1); + src_copy[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = 0; + + if (WSAStringToAddress(src_copy, af, NULL, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, &size) == 0) { + switch(af) { + case AF_INET: + *(struct in_addr *)dst = ((struct sockaddr_in *)&ss)->sin_addr; + return 1; + case AF_INET6: + *(struct in6_addr *)dst = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss)->sin6_addr; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +#else + +#error no emulation for inet_ntop + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-rsa_generate_key.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-rsa_generate_key.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99725da1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat-rsa_generate_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#include +#include +#include "cryptlib.h" +#include +#include + +RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value, + void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg) +{ + BN_GENCB cb; + int i; + RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); + BIGNUM *e = BN_new(); + + if(!rsa || !e) goto err; + + /* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG, + * unsigned long can be larger */ + for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++) + { + if (e_value & (1UL< +#else +typedef int bool; +#define false 0 +#define true 1 +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..021573eb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 - David Sommerseth + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef COMPAT_H +#define COMPAT_H + +#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME +char * dirname(char *str); +#endif /* HAVE_DIRNAME */ + +#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME +char * basename(char *str); +#endif /* HAVE_BASENAME */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY +int gettimeofday (struct timeval *tv, void *tz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON +int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP +const char * inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_PTON +int inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst); +#endif + +#endif /* COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d872fa75 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Release + Win32 + + + + {4B2E2719-E661-45D7-9203-F6F456B22F19} + compat + Win32Proj + + + + StaticLibrary + MultiByte + true + + + StaticLibrary + MultiByte + + + + + + + + + + + + + <_ProjectFileVersion>10.0.30319.1 + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + + + + Disabled + $(SOURCEBASE);$(SOURCEBASE)/include;$(OPENSSL_HOME)/include;$(LZO_HOME)/include;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/include;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;_DEBUG;_LIB;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + true + EnableFastChecks + MultiThreadedDebugDLL + + + Level3 + EditAndContinue + + + + + MaxSpeed + true + $(SOURCEBASE);$(SOURCEBASE)/include;$(OPENSSL_HOME)/include;$(LZO_HOME)/include;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/include;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;NDEBUG;_LIB;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + MultiThreadedDLL + true + + + Level3 + ProgramDatabase + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj.filters b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj.filters new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9576c512 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/compat/compat.vcxproj.filters @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ + + + + + {4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF} + cpp;c;cc;cxx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx + + + {93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB} + h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl;inc;xsd + + + {67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01} + rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav + + + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + + + Header Files + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d38628d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +include $(top_srcdir)/build/ltrc.inc + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +EXTRA_DIST = \ + openvpn.vcxproj \ + openvpn.vcxproj.filters + +INCLUDES = \ + -I$(top_srcdir)/include \ + -I$(top_srcdir)/src/compat + +AM_CFLAGS = \ + $(TAP_CFLAGS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_CFLAGS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_LZO_CFLAGS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_CFLAGS) +if WIN32 +# we want unicode entry point but not the macro +AM_CFLAGS += -municode -UUNICODE +endif + +sbin_PROGRAMS = openvpn + +openvpn_SOURCES = \ + base64.c base64.h \ + basic.h \ + buffer.c buffer.h \ + circ_list.h \ + clinat.c clinat.h \ + common.h \ + crypto.c crypto.h crypto_backend.h \ + crypto_openssl.c crypto_openssl.h \ + crypto_polarssl.c crypto_polarssl.h \ + dhcp.c dhcp.h \ + errlevel.h \ + error.c error.h \ + event.c event.h \ + fdmisc.c fdmisc.h \ + forward.c forward.h forward-inline.h \ + fragment.c fragment.h \ + gremlin.c gremlin.h \ + helper.c helper.h \ + httpdigest.c httpdigest.h \ + lladdr.c lladdr.h \ + init.c init.h \ + integer.h \ + interval.c interval.h \ + list.c list.h \ + lzo.c lzo.h \ + manage.c manage.h \ + mbuf.c mbuf.h \ + memdbg.h \ + misc.c misc.h \ + platform.c platform.h \ + console.c console.h \ + mroute.c mroute.h \ + mss.c mss.h \ + mstats.c mstats.h \ + mtcp.c mtcp.h \ + mtu.c mtu.h \ + mudp.c mudp.h \ + multi.c multi.h \ + ntlm.c ntlm.h \ + occ.c occ.h occ-inline.h \ + pkcs11.c pkcs11.h pkcs11_backend.h \ + pkcs11_openssl.c \ + pkcs11_polarssl.c \ + openvpn.c openvpn.h \ + options.c options.h \ + otime.c otime.h \ + packet_id.c packet_id.h \ + perf.c perf.h \ + pf.c pf.h pf-inline.h \ + ping.c ping.h ping-inline.h \ + plugin.c plugin.h \ + pool.c pool.h \ + proto.c proto.h \ + proxy.c proxy.h \ + ps.c ps.h \ + push.c push.h \ + pushlist.h \ + reliable.c reliable.h \ + route.c route.h \ + schedule.c schedule.h \ + session_id.c session_id.h \ + shaper.c shaper.h \ + sig.c sig.h \ + socket.c socket.h \ + socks.c socks.h \ + ssl.c ssl.h ssl_backend.h \ + ssl_openssl.c ssl_openssl.h \ + ssl_polarssl.c ssl_polarssl.h \ + ssl_common.h \ + ssl_verify.c ssl_verify.h ssl_verify_backend.h \ + ssl_verify_openssl.c ssl_verify_openssl.h \ + ssl_verify_polarssl.c ssl_verify_polarssl.h \ + status.c status.h \ + syshead.h \ + tun.c tun.h \ + win32.h win32.c \ + cryptoapi.h cryptoapi.c +openvpn_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/src/compat/libcompat.la \ + $(SOCKETS_LIBS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_LZO_LIBS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_CRYPTO_LIBS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_SELINUX_LIBS) \ + $(OPTIONAL_DL_LIBS) +if WIN32 +openvpn_SOURCES += openvpn_win32_resources.rc +openvpn_LDADD += -lgdi32 -lws2_32 -lwininet -lcrypt32 -liphlpapi -lwinmm +endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb89aae3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) || defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) || defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_CR) || defined(MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY) + +#include "base64.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +static char base64_chars[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; +/* + * base64 encode input data of length size to malloced + * buffer which is returned as *str. Returns string + * length of *str. + */ +int +openvpn_base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str) +{ + char *s, *p; + int i; + int c; + const unsigned char *q; + + if (size < 0) + return -1; + p = s = (char *) malloc(size * 4 / 3 + 4); + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + q = (const unsigned char *) data; + i = 0; + for (i = 0; i < size;) { + c = q[i++]; + c *= 256; + if (i < size) + c += q[i]; + i++; + c *= 256; + if (i < size) + c += q[i]; + i++; + p[0] = base64_chars[(c & 0x00fc0000) >> 18]; + p[1] = base64_chars[(c & 0x0003f000) >> 12]; + p[2] = base64_chars[(c & 0x00000fc0) >> 6]; + p[3] = base64_chars[(c & 0x0000003f) >> 0]; + if (i > size) + p[3] = '='; + if (i > size + 1) + p[2] = '='; + p += 4; + } + *p = 0; + *str = s; + return strlen(s); +} + +static int +pos(char c) +{ + char *p; + for (p = base64_chars; *p; p++) + if (*p == c) + return p - base64_chars; + return -1; +} + +#define DECODE_ERROR 0xffffffff + +static unsigned int +token_decode(const char *token) +{ + int i; + unsigned int val = 0; + int marker = 0; + if (strlen(token) < 4) + return DECODE_ERROR; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + val *= 64; + if (token[i] == '=') + marker++; + else if (marker > 0) + return DECODE_ERROR; + else + val += pos(token[i]); + } + if (marker > 2) + return DECODE_ERROR; + return (marker << 24) | val; +} +/* + * Decode base64 str, outputting data to buffer + * at data of length size. Return length of + * decoded data written or -1 on error or overflow. + */ +int +openvpn_base64_decode(const char *str, void *data, int size) +{ + const char *p; + unsigned char *q; + unsigned char *e = NULL; + + q = data; + if (size >= 0) + e = q + size; + for (p = str; *p && (*p == '=' || strchr(base64_chars, *p)); p += 4) { + unsigned int val = token_decode(p); + unsigned int marker = (val >> 24) & 0xff; + if (val == DECODE_ERROR) + return -1; + if (e && q >= e) + return -1; + *q++ = (val >> 16) & 0xff; + if (marker < 2) + { + if (e && q >= e) + return -1; + *q++ = (val >> 8) & 0xff; + } + if (marker < 1) + { + if (e && q >= e) + return -1; + *q++ = val & 0xff; + } + } + return q - (unsigned char *) data; +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY, ENABLE_PKCS11, ENABLE_CLIENT_CR */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28a9677c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _BASE64_H_ +#define _BASE64_H_ + +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) || defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) || defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_CR) || defined(MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY) + +int openvpn_base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str); +int openvpn_base64_decode(const char *str, void *data, int size); + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/basic.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/basic.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..298cf103 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/basic.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef BASIC_H +#define BASIC_H + +#define BOOL_CAST(x) ((x) ? (true) : (false)) + +/* size of an array */ +#define SIZE(x) (sizeof(x)/sizeof(x[0])) + +/* clear an object */ +#define CLEAR(x) memset(&(x), 0, sizeof(x)) + +#define IPV4_NETMASK_HOST 0xffffffffU + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.cpp b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.cpp new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77c469f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ + +#include "breakpad.h" +#include "client/linux/handler/exception_handler.h" + + +static +bool DumpCallback(const google_breakpad::MinidumpDescriptor& descriptor, + void* context, + bool succeeded) { + printf("Dump path: %s\n", descriptor.path()); + fflush(stdout); + fflush(stderr); + return succeeded; +} + +static google_breakpad::MinidumpDescriptor* desc; +static google_breakpad::ExceptionHandler* eh; + +void breakpad_setup(void) +{ + printf("Initializing Google Breakpad!\n"); + desc = new google_breakpad::MinidumpDescriptor("/data/data/se.leap.openvpn/cache"); + eh = new google_breakpad::ExceptionHandler(*desc, NULL, DumpCallback, NULL, true,-1); +} + +void breakpad_dodump(void) +{ + eh->WriteMinidump(); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84df62ab --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/breakpad.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +#ifndef BUFFER_H +#define BUFFER_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + void breakpad_setup(void); + void breakpad_dodump(void); +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..56d14b1a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,1111 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +size_t +array_mult_safe (const size_t m1, const size_t m2, const size_t extra) +{ + const size_t limit = 0xFFFFFFFF; + unsigned long long res = (unsigned long long)m1 * (unsigned long long)m2 + (unsigned long long)extra; + if (unlikely(m1 > limit) || unlikely(m2 > limit) || unlikely(extra > limit) || unlikely(res > (unsigned long long)limit)) + msg (M_FATAL, "attemped allocation of excessively large array"); + return (size_t) res; +} + +void +buf_size_error (const size_t size) +{ + msg (M_FATAL, "fatal buffer size error, size=%lu", (unsigned long)size); +} + +struct buffer +#ifdef DMALLOC +alloc_buf_debug (size_t size, const char *file, int line) +#else +alloc_buf (size_t size) +#endif +{ + struct buffer buf; + + if (!buf_size_valid (size)) + buf_size_error (size); + buf.capacity = (int)size; + buf.offset = 0; + buf.len = 0; +#ifdef DMALLOC + buf.data = openvpn_dmalloc (file, line, size); +#else + buf.data = calloc (1, size); +#endif + check_malloc_return(buf.data); + + return buf; +} + +struct buffer +#ifdef DMALLOC +alloc_buf_gc_debug (size_t size, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line) +#else +alloc_buf_gc (size_t size, struct gc_arena *gc) +#endif +{ + struct buffer buf; + if (!buf_size_valid (size)) + buf_size_error (size); + buf.capacity = (int)size; + buf.offset = 0; + buf.len = 0; +#ifdef DMALLOC + buf.data = (uint8_t *) gc_malloc_debug (size, false, gc, file, line); +#else + buf.data = (uint8_t *) gc_malloc (size, false, gc); +#endif + if (size) + *buf.data = 0; + return buf; +} + +struct buffer +#ifdef DMALLOC +clone_buf_debug (const struct buffer* buf, const char *file, int line) +#else +clone_buf (const struct buffer* buf) +#endif +{ + struct buffer ret; + ret.capacity = buf->capacity; + ret.offset = buf->offset; + ret.len = buf->len; +#ifdef DMALLOC + ret.data = (uint8_t *) openvpn_dmalloc (file, line, buf->capacity); +#else + ret.data = (uint8_t *) malloc (buf->capacity); +#endif + check_malloc_return (ret.data); + memcpy (BPTR (&ret), BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef BUF_INIT_TRACKING + +bool +buf_init_debug (struct buffer *buf, int offset, const char *file, int line) +{ + buf->debug_file = file; + buf->debug_line = line; + return buf_init_dowork (buf, offset); +} + +static inline int +buf_debug_line (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf->debug_line; +} + +static const char * +buf_debug_file (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf->debug_file; +} + +#else + +#define buf_debug_line(buf) 0 +#define buf_debug_file(buf) "[UNDEF]" + +#endif + +void +buf_clear (struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf->capacity > 0) + memset (buf->data, 0, buf->capacity); + buf->len = 0; + buf->offset = 0; +} + +bool +buf_assign (struct buffer *dest, const struct buffer *src) +{ + if (!buf_init (dest, src->offset)) + return false; + return buf_write (dest, BPTR (src), BLEN (src)); +} + +struct buffer +clear_buf () +{ + struct buffer buf; + CLEAR (buf); + return buf; +} + +void +free_buf (struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf->data) + free (buf->data); + CLEAR (*buf); +} + +/* + * Return a buffer for write that is a subset of another buffer + */ +struct buffer +buf_sub (struct buffer *buf, int size, bool prepend) +{ + struct buffer ret; + uint8_t *data; + + CLEAR (ret); + data = prepend ? buf_prepend (buf, size) : buf_write_alloc (buf, size); + if (data) + { + ret.capacity = size; + ret.data = data; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * printf append to a buffer with overflow check + */ +bool +buf_printf (struct buffer *buf, const char *format, ...) +{ + int ret = false; + if (buf_defined (buf)) + { + va_list arglist; + uint8_t *ptr = BEND (buf); + int cap = buf_forward_capacity (buf); + + if (cap > 0) + { + int stat; + va_start (arglist, format); + stat = vsnprintf ((char *)ptr, cap, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); + *(buf->data + buf->capacity - 1) = 0; /* windows vsnprintf needs this */ + buf->len += (int) strlen ((char *)ptr); + if (stat >= 0 && stat < cap) + ret = true; + } + } + return ret; +} + +bool +buf_puts(struct buffer *buf, const char *str) +{ + int ret = false; + uint8_t *ptr = BEND (buf); + int cap = buf_forward_capacity (buf); + if (cap > 0) + { + strncpynt ((char *)ptr,str, cap); + *(buf->data + buf->capacity - 1) = 0; /* windows vsnprintf needs this */ + buf->len += (int) strlen ((char *)ptr); + ret = true; + } + return ret; +} + + +/* + * This is necessary due to certain buggy implementations of snprintf, + * that don't guarantee null termination for size > 0. + * + * Return false on overflow. + * + * This function is duplicated into service-win32/openvpnserv.c + * Any modifications here should be done to the other place as well. + */ + +bool openvpn_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + int len = -1; + if (size > 0) + { + va_start (arglist, format); + len = vsnprintf (str, size, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); + str[size - 1] = 0; + } + return (len >= 0 && len < size); +} + +/* + * write a string to the end of a buffer that was + * truncated by buf_printf + */ +void +buf_catrunc (struct buffer *buf, const char *str) +{ + if (buf_forward_capacity (buf) <= 1) + { + int len = (int) strlen (str) + 1; + if (len < buf_forward_capacity_total (buf)) + { + strncpynt ((char *)(buf->data + buf->capacity - len), str, len); + } + } +} + +/* + * convert a multi-line output to one line + */ +void +convert_to_one_line (struct buffer *buf) +{ + uint8_t *cp = BPTR(buf); + int len = BLEN(buf); + while (len--) + { + if (*cp == '\n') + *cp = '|'; + ++cp; + } +} + +/* NOTE: requires that string be null terminated */ +void +buf_write_string_file (const struct buffer *buf, const char *filename, int fd) +{ + const int len = strlen ((char *) BPTR (buf)); + const int size = write (fd, BPTR (buf), len); + if (size != len) + msg (M_ERR, "Write error on file '%s'", filename); +} + +/* + * Garbage collection + */ + +void * +#ifdef DMALLOC +gc_malloc_debug (size_t size, bool clear, struct gc_arena *a, const char *file, int line) +#else +gc_malloc (size_t size, bool clear, struct gc_arena *a) +#endif +{ + void *ret; + struct gc_entry *e; + ASSERT (NULL != a); + +#ifdef DMALLOC + e = (struct gc_entry *) openvpn_dmalloc (file, line, size + sizeof (struct gc_entry)); +#else + e = (struct gc_entry *) malloc (size + sizeof (struct gc_entry)); +#endif + check_malloc_return (e); + ret = (char *) e + sizeof (struct gc_entry); + e->next = a->list; + a->list = e; + +#ifndef ZERO_BUFFER_ON_ALLOC + if (clear) +#endif + memset (ret, 0, size); + return ret; +} + +void +x_gc_free (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + struct gc_entry *e; + e = a->list; + a->list = NULL; + + while (e != NULL) + { + struct gc_entry *next = e->next; + free (e); + e = next; + } +} + +/* + * Transfer src arena to dest, resetting src to an empty arena. + */ +void +gc_transfer (struct gc_arena *dest, struct gc_arena *src) +{ + if (dest && src) + { + struct gc_entry *e = src->list; + if (e) + { + while (e->next != NULL) + e = e->next; + e->next = dest->list; + dest->list = src->list; + src->list = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* + * Hex dump -- Output a binary buffer to a hex string and return it. + */ + +char * +format_hex_ex (const uint8_t *data, int size, int maxoutput, + int space_break, const char* separator, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (maxoutput ? maxoutput : + ((size * 2) + (size / space_break) * (int) strlen (separator) + 2), + gc); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) + { + if (separator && i && !(i % space_break)) + buf_printf (&out, "%s", separator); + buf_printf (&out, "%02x", data[i]); + } + buf_catrunc (&out, "[more...]"); + return (char *)out.data; +} + +/* + * remove specific trailing character + */ + +void +buf_rmtail (struct buffer *buf, uint8_t remove) +{ + uint8_t *cp = BLAST(buf); + if (cp && *cp == remove) + { + *cp = '\0'; + --buf->len; + } +} + +/* + * force a null termination even it requires + * truncation of the last char. + */ +void +buf_null_terminate (struct buffer *buf) +{ + char *last = (char *) BLAST (buf); + if (last && *last == '\0') /* already terminated? */ + return; + + if (!buf_safe (buf, 1)) /* make space for trailing null */ + buf_inc_len (buf, -1); + + buf_write_u8 (buf, 0); +} + +/* + * Remove trailing \r and \n chars and ensure + * null termination. + */ +void +buf_chomp (struct buffer *buf) +{ + while (true) + { + char *last = (char *) BLAST (buf); + if (!last) + break; + if (char_class (*last, CC_CRLF|CC_NULL)) + { + if (!buf_inc_len (buf, -1)) + break; + } + else + break; + } + buf_null_terminate (buf); +} + +const char * +skip_leading_whitespace (const char *str) +{ + while (*str) + { + const char c = *str; + if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\t')) + break; + ++str; + } + return str; +} + +/* + * like buf_null_terminate, but operate on strings + */ +void +string_null_terminate (char *str, int len, int capacity) +{ + ASSERT (len >= 0 && len <= capacity && capacity > 0); + if (len < capacity) + *(str + len) = '\0'; + else if (len == capacity) + *(str + len - 1) = '\0'; +} + +/* + * Remove trailing \r and \n chars. + */ +void +chomp (char *str) +{ + rm_trailing_chars (str, "\r\n"); +} + +/* + * Remove trailing chars + */ +void +rm_trailing_chars (char *str, const char *what_to_delete) +{ + bool modified; + do { + const int len = strlen (str); + modified = false; + if (len > 0) + { + char *cp = str + (len - 1); + if (strchr (what_to_delete, *cp) != NULL) + { + *cp = '\0'; + modified = true; + } + } + } while (modified); +} + +/* + * Allocate a string + */ +char * +#ifdef DMALLOC +string_alloc_debug (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line) +#else +string_alloc (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +#endif +{ + if (str) + { + const int n = strlen (str) + 1; + char *ret; + + if (gc) { +#ifdef DMALLOC + ret = (char *) gc_malloc_debug (n, false, gc, file, line); +#else + ret = (char *) gc_malloc (n, false, gc); +#endif + } else { + /* If there are no garbage collector available, it's expected + * that the caller cleans up afterwards. This is coherent with the + * earlier behaviour when gc_malloc() would be called with gc == NULL + */ +#ifdef DMALLOC + ret = openvpn_dmalloc (file, line, n); + memset(ret, 0, n); +#else + ret = calloc(1, n); +#endif + check_malloc_return(ret); + } + memcpy (ret, str, n); + return ret; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Erase all characters in a string + */ +void +string_clear (char *str) +{ + if (str) + { + const int len = strlen (str); + if (len > 0) + memset (str, 0, len); + } +} + +/* + * Return the length of a string array + */ +int +string_array_len (const char **array) +{ + int i = 0; + if (array) + { + while (array[i]) + ++i; + } + return i; +} + +char * +print_argv (const char **p, struct gc_arena *gc, const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + int i = 0; + for (;;) + { + const char *cp = *p++; + if (!cp) + break; + if (i) + buf_printf (&out, " "); + if (flags & PA_BRACKET) + buf_printf (&out, "[%s]", cp); + else + buf_printf (&out, "%s", cp); + ++i; + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Allocate a string inside a buffer + */ +struct buffer +#ifdef DMALLOC +string_alloc_buf_debug (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line) +#else +string_alloc_buf (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +#endif +{ + struct buffer buf; + + ASSERT (str); + +#ifdef DMALLOC + buf_set_read (&buf, (uint8_t*) string_alloc_debug (str, gc, file, line), strlen (str) + 1); +#else + buf_set_read (&buf, (uint8_t*) string_alloc (str, gc), strlen (str) + 1); +#endif + + if (buf.len > 0) /* Don't count trailing '\0' as part of length */ + --buf.len; + + return buf; +} + +/* + * String comparison + */ + +bool +buf_string_match_head_str (const struct buffer *src, const char *match) +{ + const int size = strlen (match); + if (size < 0 || size > src->len) + return false; + return memcmp (BPTR (src), match, size) == 0; +} + +bool +buf_string_compare_advance (struct buffer *src, const char *match) +{ + if (buf_string_match_head_str (src, match)) + { + buf_advance (src, strlen (match)); + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +int +buf_substring_len (const struct buffer *buf, int delim) +{ + int i = 0; + struct buffer tmp = *buf; + int c; + + while ((c = buf_read_u8 (&tmp)) >= 0) + { + ++i; + if (c == delim) + return i; + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * String parsing + */ + +bool +buf_parse (struct buffer *buf, const int delim, char *line, const int size) +{ + bool eol = false; + int n = 0; + int c; + + ASSERT (size > 0); + + do + { + c = buf_read_u8 (buf); + if (c < 0) + eol = true; + if (c <= 0 || c == delim) + c = 0; + if (n >= size) + break; + line[n++] = c; + } + while (c); + + line[size-1] = '\0'; + return !(eol && !strlen (line)); +} + +/* + * Print a string which might be NULL + */ +const char * +np (const char *str) +{ + if (str) + return str; + else + return "[NULL]"; +} + +/* + * Classify and mutate strings based on character types. + */ + +bool +char_class (const unsigned char c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (!flags) + return false; + if (flags & CC_ANY) + return true; + + if ((flags & CC_NULL) && c == '\0') + return true; + + if ((flags & CC_ALNUM) && isalnum (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_ALPHA) && isalpha (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_ASCII) && isascii (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_CNTRL) && iscntrl (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_DIGIT) && isdigit (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_PRINT) && (c >= 32 && c != 127)) /* allow ascii non-control and UTF-8, consider DEL to be a control */ + return true; + if ((flags & CC_PUNCT) && ispunct (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_SPACE) && isspace (c)) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_XDIGIT) && isxdigit (c)) + return true; + + if ((flags & CC_BLANK) && (c == ' ' || c == '\t')) + return true; + if ((flags & CC_NEWLINE) && c == '\n') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_CR) && c == '\r') + return true; + + if ((flags & CC_BACKSLASH) && c == '\\') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_UNDERBAR) && c == '_') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_DASH) && c == '-') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_DOT) && c == '.') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_COMMA) && c == ',') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_COLON) && c == ':') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_SLASH) && c == '/') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_SINGLE_QUOTE) && c == '\'') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_DOUBLE_QUOTE) && c == '\"') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_REVERSE_QUOTE) && c == '`') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_AT) && c == '@') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_EQUAL) && c == '=') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_LESS_THAN) && c == '<') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_GREATER_THAN) && c == '>') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_PIPE) && c == '|') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_QUESTION_MARK) && c == '?') + return true; + if ((flags & CC_ASTERISK) && c == '*') + return true; + + return false; +} + +static inline bool +char_inc_exc (const char c, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive) +{ + return char_class (c, inclusive) && !char_class (c, exclusive); +} + +bool +string_class (const char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive) +{ + char c; + ASSERT (str); + while ((c = *str++)) + { + if (!char_inc_exc (c, inclusive, exclusive)) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/* + * Modify string in place. + * Guaranteed to not increase string length. + */ +bool +string_mod (char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive, const char replace) +{ + const char *in = str; + bool ret = true; + + ASSERT (str); + + while (true) + { + char c = *in++; + if (c) + { + if (!char_inc_exc (c, inclusive, exclusive)) + { + c = replace; + ret = false; + } + if (c) + *str++ = c; + } + else + { + *str = '\0'; + break; + } + } + return ret; +} + +const char * +string_mod_const (const char *str, + const unsigned int inclusive, + const unsigned int exclusive, + const char replace, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (str) + { + char *buf = string_alloc (str, gc); + string_mod (buf, inclusive, exclusive, replace); + return buf; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +void +string_replace_leading (char *str, const char match, const char replace) +{ + ASSERT (match != '\0'); + while (*str) + { + if (*str == match) + *str = replace; + else + break; + ++str; + } +} + +#ifdef CHARACTER_CLASS_DEBUG + +#define CC_INCLUDE (CC_PRINT) +#define CC_EXCLUDE (0) +#define CC_REPLACE ('.') + +void +character_class_debug (void) +{ + char buf[256]; + + while (fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), stdin) != NULL) + { + string_mod (buf, CC_INCLUDE, CC_EXCLUDE, CC_REPLACE); + printf ("%s", buf); + } +} + +#endif + +#ifdef VERIFY_ALIGNMENT +void +valign4 (const struct buffer *buf, const char *file, const int line) +{ + if (buf && buf->len) + { + int msglevel = D_ALIGN_DEBUG; + const unsigned int u = (unsigned int) BPTR (buf); + + if (u & (PAYLOAD_ALIGN-1)) + msglevel = D_ALIGN_ERRORS; + + msg (msglevel, "%sAlignment at %s/%d ptr=" ptr_format " OLC=%d/%d/%d I=%s/%d", + (msglevel == D_ALIGN_ERRORS) ? "ERROR: " : "", + file, + line, + (ptr_type)buf->data, + buf->offset, + buf->len, + buf->capacity, + buf_debug_file (buf), + buf_debug_line (buf)); + } +} +#endif + +/* + * struct buffer_list + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_BUFFER_LIST + +struct buffer_list * +buffer_list_new (const int max_size) +{ + struct buffer_list *ret; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ret, struct buffer_list); + ret->max_size = max_size; + ret->size = 0; + return ret; +} + +void +buffer_list_free (struct buffer_list *ol) +{ + if (ol) + { + buffer_list_reset (ol); + free (ol); + } +} + +bool +buffer_list_defined (const struct buffer_list *ol) +{ + return ol && ol->head != NULL; +} + +void +buffer_list_reset (struct buffer_list *ol) +{ + struct buffer_entry *e = ol->head; + while (e) + { + struct buffer_entry *next = e->next; + free_buf (&e->buf); + free (e); + e = next; + } + ol->head = ol->tail = NULL; + ol->size = 0; +} + +void +buffer_list_push (struct buffer_list *ol, const unsigned char *str) +{ + if (str) + { + const size_t len = strlen ((const char *)str); + struct buffer_entry *e = buffer_list_push_data (ol, str, len+1); + if (e) + e->buf.len = len; /* Don't count trailing '\0' as part of length */ + } +} + +struct buffer_entry * +buffer_list_push_data (struct buffer_list *ol, const uint8_t *data, size_t size) +{ + struct buffer_entry *e = NULL; + if (data && (!ol->max_size || ol->size < ol->max_size)) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (e, struct buffer_entry); + + ++ol->size; + if (ol->tail) + { + ASSERT (ol->head); + ol->tail->next = e; + } + else + { + ASSERT (!ol->head); + ol->head = e; + } + e->buf = alloc_buf (size); + memcpy (e->buf.data, data, size); + e->buf.len = (int)size; + ol->tail = e; + } + return e; +} + +struct buffer * +buffer_list_peek (struct buffer_list *ol) +{ + if (ol && ol->head) + return &ol->head->buf; + else + return NULL; +} + +void +buffer_list_aggregate (struct buffer_list *bl, const size_t max) +{ + if (bl->head) + { + struct buffer_entry *more = bl->head; + size_t size = 0; + int count = 0; + for (count = 0; more && size <= max; ++count) + { + size += BLEN(&more->buf); + more = more->next; + } + + if (count >= 2) + { + int i; + struct buffer_entry *e = bl->head, *f; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (f, struct buffer_entry); + f->buf.data = malloc (size); + check_malloc_return (f->buf.data); + f->buf.capacity = size; + for (i = 0; e && i < count; ++i) + { + struct buffer_entry *next = e->next; + buf_copy (&f->buf, &e->buf); + free_buf (&e->buf); + free (e); + e = next; + } + bl->head = f; + f->next = more; + if (!more) + bl->tail = f; + } + } +} + +void +buffer_list_pop (struct buffer_list *ol) +{ + if (ol && ol->head) + { + struct buffer_entry *e = ol->head->next; + free_buf (&ol->head->buf); + free (ol->head); + ol->head = e; + --ol->size; + if (!e) + ol->tail = NULL; + } +} + +void +buffer_list_advance (struct buffer_list *ol, int n) +{ + if (ol->head) + { + struct buffer *buf = &ol->head->buf; + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, n)); + if (!BLEN (buf)) + buffer_list_pop (ol); + } +} + +struct buffer_list * +buffer_list_file (const char *fn, int max_line_len) +{ + FILE *fp = platform_fopen (fn, "r"); + struct buffer_list *bl = NULL; + + if (fp) + { + char *line = (char *) malloc (max_line_len); + if (line) + { + bl = buffer_list_new (0); + while (fgets (line, max_line_len, fp) != NULL) + buffer_list_push (bl, (unsigned char *)line); + free (line); + } + fclose (fp); + } + return bl; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e11de05 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/buffer.h @@ -0,0 +1,919 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef BUFFER_H +#define BUFFER_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "error.h" + +#define BUF_SIZE_MAX 1000000 + +/* + * Define verify_align function, otherwise + * it will be a noop. + */ +/* #define VERIFY_ALIGNMENT */ + +/* + * Keep track of source file/line of buf_init calls + */ +#ifdef VERIFY_ALIGNMENT +#define BUF_INIT_TRACKING +#endif + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Wrapper structure for dynamically allocated memory. + * + * The actual content stored in a \c buffer structure starts at the memory + * location \c buffer.data \c + \c buffer.offset, and has a length of \c + * buffer.len bytes. This, together with the space available before and + * after the content, is represented in the pseudocode below: +@code +uint8_t *content_start = buffer.data + buffer.offset; +uint8_t *content_end = buffer.data + buffer.offset + buffer.len; +int prepend_capacity = buffer.offset; +int append_capacity = buffer.capacity - (buffer.offset + buffer.len); +@endcode + */ +struct buffer +{ + int capacity; /**< Size in bytes of memory allocated by + * \c malloc(). */ + int offset; /**< Offset in bytes of the actual content + * within the allocated memory. */ + int len; /**< Length in bytes of the actual content + * within the allocated memory. */ + uint8_t *data; /**< Pointer to the allocated memory. */ + +#ifdef BUF_INIT_TRACKING + const char *debug_file; + int debug_line; +#endif +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Garbage collection entry for one dynamically allocated block of memory. + * + * This structure represents one link in the linked list contained in a \c + * gc_arena structure. Each time the \c gc_malloc() function is called, + * it allocates \c sizeof(gc_entry) + the requested number of bytes. The + * \c gc_entry is then stored as a header in front of the memory address + * returned to the caller. + */ +struct gc_entry +{ + struct gc_entry *next; /**< Pointer to the next item in the + * linked list. */ +}; + + +/** + * Garbage collection arena used to keep track of dynamically allocated + * memory. + * + * This structure contains a linked list of \c gc_entry structures. When + * a block of memory is allocated using the \c gc_malloc() function, the + * allocation is registered in the function's \c gc_arena argument. All + * the dynamically allocated memory registered in a \c gc_arena can be + * freed using the \c gc_free() function. + */ +struct gc_arena +{ + struct gc_entry *list; /**< First element of the linked list of + * \c gc_entry structures. */ +}; + + +#define BPTR(buf) (buf_bptr(buf)) +#define BEND(buf) (buf_bend(buf)) +#define BLAST(buf) (buf_blast(buf)) +#define BLEN(buf) (buf_len(buf)) +#define BDEF(buf) (buf_defined(buf)) +#define BSTR(buf) (buf_str(buf)) +#define BCAP(buf) (buf_forward_capacity (buf)) + +void buf_clear (struct buffer *buf); + +struct buffer clear_buf (void); +void free_buf (struct buffer *buf); + +bool buf_assign (struct buffer *dest, const struct buffer *src); + +void string_clear (char *str); +int string_array_len (const char **array); + +size_t array_mult_safe (const size_t m1, const size_t m2, const size_t extra); + +#define PA_BRACKET (1<<0) +char *print_argv (const char **p, struct gc_arena *gc, const unsigned int flags); + +void buf_size_error (const size_t size); + +/* for dmalloc debugging */ + +#ifdef DMALLOC + +#define alloc_buf(size) alloc_buf_debug (size, __FILE__, __LINE__) +#define alloc_buf_gc(size, gc) alloc_buf_gc_debug (size, gc, __FILE__, __LINE__); +#define clone_buf(buf) clone_buf_debug (buf, __FILE__, __LINE__); +#define gc_malloc(size, clear, arena) gc_malloc_debug (size, clear, arena, __FILE__, __LINE__) +#define string_alloc(str, gc) string_alloc_debug (str, gc, __FILE__, __LINE__) +#define string_alloc_buf(str, gc) string_alloc_buf_debug (str, gc, __FILE__, __LINE__) + +struct buffer alloc_buf_debug (size_t size, const char *file, int line); +struct buffer alloc_buf_gc_debug (size_t size, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line); +struct buffer clone_buf_debug (const struct buffer* buf, const char *file, int line); +void *gc_malloc_debug (size_t size, bool clear, struct gc_arena *a, const char *file, int line); +char *string_alloc_debug (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line); +struct buffer string_alloc_buf_debug (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc, const char *file, int line); + +#else + +struct buffer alloc_buf (size_t size); +struct buffer alloc_buf_gc (size_t size, struct gc_arena *gc); /* allocate buffer with garbage collection */ +struct buffer clone_buf (const struct buffer* buf); +void *gc_malloc (size_t size, bool clear, struct gc_arena *a); +char *string_alloc (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc); +struct buffer string_alloc_buf (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif + +#ifdef BUF_INIT_TRACKING +#define buf_init(buf, offset) buf_init_debug (buf, offset, __FILE__, __LINE__) +bool buf_init_debug (struct buffer *buf, int offset, const char *file, int line); +#else +#define buf_init(buf, offset) buf_init_dowork (buf, offset) +#endif + + +/* inline functions */ + +static inline bool +buf_defined (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf->data != NULL; +} + +static inline bool +buf_valid (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return likely (buf->data != NULL) && likely (buf->len >= 0); +} + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_bptr (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf)) + return buf->data + buf->offset; + else + return NULL; +} + +static int +buf_len (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf)) + return buf->len; + else + return 0; +} + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_bend (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf_bptr (buf) + buf_len (buf); +} + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_blast (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_len (buf) > 0) + return buf_bptr (buf) + buf_len (buf) - 1; + else + return NULL; +} + +static inline bool +buf_size_valid (const size_t size) +{ + return likely (size < BUF_SIZE_MAX); +} + +static inline bool +buf_size_valid_signed (const int size) +{ + return likely (size >= -BUF_SIZE_MAX) && likely (size < BUF_SIZE_MAX); +} + +static inline char * +buf_str (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + return (char *)buf_bptr(buf); +} + +static inline void +buf_reset (struct buffer *buf) +{ + buf->capacity = 0; + buf->offset = 0; + buf->len = 0; + buf->data = NULL; +} + +static inline void +buf_reset_len (struct buffer *buf) +{ + buf->len = 0; + buf->offset = 0; +} + +static inline bool +buf_init_dowork (struct buffer *buf, int offset) +{ + if (offset < 0 || offset > buf->capacity || buf->data == NULL) + return false; + buf->len = 0; + buf->offset = offset; + return true; +} + +static inline void +buf_set_write (struct buffer *buf, uint8_t *data, int size) +{ + if (!buf_size_valid (size)) + buf_size_error (size); + buf->len = 0; + buf->offset = 0; + buf->capacity = size; + buf->data = data; + if (size > 0 && data) + *data = 0; +} + +static inline void +buf_set_read (struct buffer *buf, const uint8_t *data, int size) +{ + if (!buf_size_valid (size)) + buf_size_error (size); + buf->len = buf->capacity = size; + buf->offset = 0; + buf->data = (uint8_t *)data; +} + +/* Like strncpy but makes sure dest is always null terminated */ +static inline void +strncpynt (char *dest, const char *src, size_t maxlen) +{ + strncpy (dest, src, maxlen); + if (maxlen > 0) + dest[maxlen - 1] = 0; +} + +/* return true if string contains at least one numerical digit */ +static inline bool +has_digit (const unsigned char* src) +{ + unsigned char c; + while ((c = *src++)) + { + if (isdigit(c)) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* + * printf append to a buffer with overflow check + */ +bool buf_printf (struct buffer *buf, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 2, 3))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 2, 3))) +#endif +#endif + ; + +/* + * puts append to a buffer with overflow check + */ +bool buf_puts (struct buffer *buf, const char *str); + +/* + * Like snprintf but guarantees null termination for size > 0 + */ +bool openvpn_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 3, 4))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 3, 4))) +#endif +#endif + ; + +/* + * remove/add trailing characters + */ + +void buf_null_terminate (struct buffer *buf); +void buf_chomp (struct buffer *buf); +void buf_rmtail (struct buffer *buf, uint8_t remove); + +/* + * non-buffer string functions + */ +void chomp (char *str); +void rm_trailing_chars (char *str, const char *what_to_delete); +const char *skip_leading_whitespace (const char *str); +void string_null_terminate (char *str, int len, int capacity); + +/* + * Write string in buf to file descriptor fd. + * NOTE: requires that string be null terminated. + */ +void buf_write_string_file (const struct buffer *buf, const char *filename, int fd); + +/* + * write a string to the end of a buffer that was + * truncated by buf_printf + */ +void buf_catrunc (struct buffer *buf, const char *str); + +/* + * convert a multi-line output to one line + */ +void convert_to_one_line (struct buffer *buf); + +/* + * Parse a string based on a given delimiter char + */ +bool buf_parse (struct buffer *buf, const int delim, char *line, const int size); + +/* + * Hex dump -- Output a binary buffer to a hex string and return it. + */ +char * +format_hex_ex (const uint8_t *data, int size, int maxoutput, + int space_break, const char* separator, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +static inline char * +format_hex (const uint8_t *data, int size, int maxoutput, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return format_hex_ex (data, size, maxoutput, 4, " ", gc); +} + +/* + * Return a buffer that is a subset of another buffer. + */ +struct buffer buf_sub (struct buffer *buf, int size, bool prepend); + +/* + * Check if sufficient space to append to buffer. + */ + +static inline bool +buf_safe (const struct buffer *buf, int len) +{ + return buf_valid (buf) && buf_size_valid (len) + && buf->offset + buf->len + len <= buf->capacity; +} + +static inline bool +buf_safe_bidir (const struct buffer *buf, int len) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf) && buf_size_valid_signed (len)) + { + const int newlen = buf->len + len; + return newlen >= 0 && buf->offset + newlen <= buf->capacity; + } + else + return false; +} + +static inline int +buf_forward_capacity (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf)) + { + int ret = buf->capacity - (buf->offset + buf->len); + if (ret < 0) + ret = 0; + return ret; + } + else + return 0; +} + +static inline int +buf_forward_capacity_total (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf)) + { + int ret = buf->capacity - buf->offset; + if (ret < 0) + ret = 0; + return ret; + } + else + return 0; +} + +static inline int +buf_reverse_capacity (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (buf_valid (buf)) + return buf->offset; + else + return 0; +} + +static inline bool +buf_inc_len (struct buffer *buf, int inc) +{ + if (!buf_safe_bidir (buf, inc)) + return false; + buf->len += inc; + return true; +} + +/* + * Make space to prepend to a buffer. + * Return NULL if no space. + */ + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_prepend (struct buffer *buf, int size) +{ + if (!buf_valid (buf) || size < 0 || size > buf->offset) + return NULL; + buf->offset -= size; + buf->len += size; + return BPTR (buf); +} + +static inline bool +buf_advance (struct buffer *buf, int size) +{ + if (!buf_valid (buf) || size < 0 || buf->len < size) + return false; + buf->offset += size; + buf->len -= size; + return true; +} + +/* + * Return a pointer to allocated space inside a buffer. + * Return NULL if no space. + */ + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_write_alloc (struct buffer *buf, int size) +{ + uint8_t *ret; + if (!buf_safe (buf, size)) + return NULL; + ret = BPTR (buf) + buf->len; + buf->len += size; + return ret; +} + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_write_alloc_prepend (struct buffer *buf, int size, bool prepend) +{ + return prepend ? buf_prepend (buf, size) : buf_write_alloc (buf, size); +} + +static inline uint8_t * +buf_read_alloc (struct buffer *buf, int size) +{ + uint8_t *ret; + if (size < 0 || buf->len < size) + return NULL; + ret = BPTR (buf); + buf->offset += size; + buf->len -= size; + return ret; +} + +static inline bool +buf_write (struct buffer *dest, const void *src, int size) +{ + uint8_t *cp = buf_write_alloc (dest, size); + if (!cp) + return false; + memcpy (cp, src, size); + return true; +} + +static inline bool +buf_write_prepend (struct buffer *dest, const void *src, int size) +{ + uint8_t *cp = buf_prepend (dest, size); + if (!cp) + return false; + memcpy (cp, src, size); + return true; +} + +static inline bool +buf_write_u8 (struct buffer *dest, int data) +{ + uint8_t u8 = (uint8_t) data; + return buf_write (dest, &u8, sizeof (uint8_t)); +} + +static inline bool +buf_write_u16 (struct buffer *dest, int data) +{ + uint16_t u16 = htons ((uint16_t) data); + return buf_write (dest, &u16, sizeof (uint16_t)); +} + +static inline bool +buf_write_u32 (struct buffer *dest, int data) +{ + uint32_t u32 = htonl ((uint32_t) data); + return buf_write (dest, &u32, sizeof (uint32_t)); +} + +static inline bool +buf_copy (struct buffer *dest, const struct buffer *src) +{ + return buf_write (dest, BPTR (src), BLEN (src)); +} + +static inline bool +buf_copy_n (struct buffer *dest, struct buffer *src, int n) +{ + uint8_t *cp = buf_read_alloc (src, n); + if (!cp) + return false; + return buf_write (dest, cp, n); +} + +static inline bool +buf_copy_range (struct buffer *dest, + int dest_index, + const struct buffer *src, + int src_index, + int src_len) +{ + if (src_index < 0 + || src_len < 0 + || src_index + src_len > src->len + || dest_index < 0 + || dest->offset + dest_index + src_len > dest->capacity) + return false; + memcpy (dest->data + dest->offset + dest_index, src->data + src->offset + src_index, src_len); + if (dest_index + src_len > dest->len) + dest->len = dest_index + src_len; + return true; +} + +/* truncate src to len, copy excess data beyond len to dest */ +static inline bool +buf_copy_excess (struct buffer *dest, + struct buffer *src, + int len) +{ + if (len < 0) + return false; + if (src->len > len) + { + struct buffer b = *src; + src->len = len; + if (!buf_advance (&b, len)) + return false; + return buf_copy (dest, &b); + } + else + { + return true; + } +} + +static inline bool +buf_read (struct buffer *src, void *dest, int size) +{ + uint8_t *cp = buf_read_alloc (src, size); + if (!cp) + return false; + memcpy (dest, cp, size); + return true; +} + +static inline int +buf_read_u8 (struct buffer *buf) +{ + int ret; + if (BLEN (buf) < 1) + return -1; + ret = *BPTR(buf); + buf_advance (buf, 1); + return ret; +} + +static inline int +buf_read_u16 (struct buffer *buf) +{ + uint16_t ret; + if (!buf_read (buf, &ret, sizeof (uint16_t))) + return -1; + return ntohs (ret); +} + +static inline uint32_t +buf_read_u32 (struct buffer *buf, bool *good) +{ + uint32_t ret; + if (!buf_read (buf, &ret, sizeof (uint32_t))) + { + if (good) + *good = false; + return 0; + } + else + { + if (good) + *good = true; + return ntohl (ret); + } +} + +static inline bool +buf_string_match (const struct buffer *src, const void *match, int size) +{ + if (size != src->len) + return false; + return memcmp (BPTR (src), match, size) == 0; +} + +static inline bool +buf_string_match_head (const struct buffer *src, const void *match, int size) +{ + if (size < 0 || size > src->len) + return false; + return memcmp (BPTR (src), match, size) == 0; +} + +bool buf_string_match_head_str (const struct buffer *src, const char *match); +bool buf_string_compare_advance (struct buffer *src, const char *match); +int buf_substring_len (const struct buffer *buf, int delim); + +/* + * Bitwise operations + */ +static inline void +xor (uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *src, int len) +{ + while (len-- > 0) + *dest++ ^= *src++; +} + +/* + * Print a string which might be NULL + */ +const char *np (const char *str); + +/*#define CHARACTER_CLASS_DEBUG*/ + +/* character classes */ + +#define CC_ANY (1<<0) +#define CC_NULL (1<<1) + +#define CC_ALNUM (1<<2) +#define CC_ALPHA (1<<3) +#define CC_ASCII (1<<4) +#define CC_CNTRL (1<<5) +#define CC_DIGIT (1<<6) +#define CC_PRINT (1<<7) +#define CC_PUNCT (1<<8) +#define CC_SPACE (1<<9) +#define CC_XDIGIT (1<<10) + +#define CC_BLANK (1<<11) +#define CC_NEWLINE (1<<12) +#define CC_CR (1<<13) + +#define CC_BACKSLASH (1<<14) +#define CC_UNDERBAR (1<<15) +#define CC_DASH (1<<16) +#define CC_DOT (1<<17) +#define CC_COMMA (1<<18) +#define CC_COLON (1<<19) +#define CC_SLASH (1<<20) +#define CC_SINGLE_QUOTE (1<<21) +#define CC_DOUBLE_QUOTE (1<<22) +#define CC_REVERSE_QUOTE (1<<23) +#define CC_AT (1<<24) +#define CC_EQUAL (1<<25) +#define CC_LESS_THAN (1<<26) +#define CC_GREATER_THAN (1<<27) +#define CC_PIPE (1<<28) +#define CC_QUESTION_MARK (1<<29) +#define CC_ASTERISK (1<<30) + +/* macro classes */ +#define CC_NAME (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR) +#define CC_CRLF (CC_CR|CC_NEWLINE) + +bool char_class (const unsigned char c, const unsigned int flags); +bool string_class (const char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive); +bool string_mod (char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive, const char replace); + +const char *string_mod_const (const char *str, + const unsigned int inclusive, + const unsigned int exclusive, + const char replace, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +void string_replace_leading (char *str, const char match, const char replace); + +#ifdef CHARACTER_CLASS_DEBUG +void character_class_debug (void); +#endif + +/* + * Verify that a pointer is correctly aligned + */ +#ifdef VERIFY_ALIGNMENT + void valign4 (const struct buffer *buf, const char *file, const int line); +# define verify_align_4(ptr) valign4(buf, __FILE__, __LINE__) +#else +# define verify_align_4(ptr) +#endif + +/* + * Very basic garbage collection, mostly for routines that return + * char ptrs to malloced strings. + */ + +void gc_transfer (struct gc_arena *dest, struct gc_arena *src); + +void x_gc_free (struct gc_arena *a); + +static inline bool +gc_defined (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + return a->list != NULL; +} + +static inline void +gc_init (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + a->list = NULL; +} + +static inline void +gc_detach (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + gc_init (a); +} + +static inline struct gc_arena +gc_new (void) +{ + struct gc_arena ret; + ret.list = NULL; + return ret; +} + +static inline void +gc_free (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + if (a->list) + x_gc_free (a); +} + +static inline void +gc_reset (struct gc_arena *a) +{ + gc_free (a); +} + +/* + * Allocate memory to hold a structure + */ + +#define ALLOC_OBJ(dptr, type) \ +{ \ + check_malloc_return ((dptr) = (type *) malloc (sizeof (type))); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(dptr, type) \ +{ \ + ALLOC_OBJ (dptr, type); \ + memset ((dptr), 0, sizeof(type)); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_ARRAY(dptr, type, n) \ +{ \ + check_malloc_return ((dptr) = (type *) malloc (array_mult_safe (sizeof (type), (n), 0))); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_ARRAY_GC(dptr, type, n, gc) \ +{ \ + (dptr) = (type *) gc_malloc (array_mult_safe (sizeof (type), (n), 0), false, (gc)); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR(dptr, type, n) \ +{ \ + ALLOC_ARRAY (dptr, type, n); \ + memset ((dptr), 0, (array_mult_safe (sizeof(type), (n), 0))); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC(dptr, type, n, gc) \ +{ \ + (dptr) = (type *) gc_malloc (array_mult_safe (sizeof (type), (n), 0), true, (gc)); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_VAR_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC(dptr, type, atype, n, gc) \ +{ \ + (dptr) = (type *) gc_malloc (array_mult_safe (sizeof (atype), (n), sizeof (type)), true, (gc)); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_OBJ_GC(dptr, type, gc) \ +{ \ + (dptr) = (type *) gc_malloc (sizeof (type), false, (gc)); \ +} + +#define ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC(dptr, type, gc) \ +{ \ + (dptr) = (type *) gc_malloc (sizeof (type), true, (gc)); \ +} + +static inline void +check_malloc_return (void *p) +{ + if (!p) + out_of_memory (); +} + +/* + * Manage lists of buffers + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_BUFFER_LIST + +struct buffer_entry +{ + struct buffer buf; + struct buffer_entry *next; +}; + +struct buffer_list +{ + struct buffer_entry *head; /* next item to pop/peek */ + struct buffer_entry *tail; /* last item pushed */ + int size; /* current number of entries */ + int max_size; /* maximum size list should grow to */ +}; + +struct buffer_list *buffer_list_new (const int max_size); +void buffer_list_free (struct buffer_list *ol); + +bool buffer_list_defined (const struct buffer_list *ol); +void buffer_list_reset (struct buffer_list *ol); + +void buffer_list_push (struct buffer_list *ol, const unsigned char *str); +struct buffer_entry *buffer_list_push_data (struct buffer_list *ol, const uint8_t *data, size_t size); +struct buffer *buffer_list_peek (struct buffer_list *ol); +void buffer_list_advance (struct buffer_list *ol, int n); +void buffer_list_pop (struct buffer_list *ol); + +void buffer_list_aggregate (struct buffer_list *bl, const size_t max); + +struct buffer_list *buffer_list_file (const char *fn, int max_line_len); + +#endif + +#endif /* BUFFER_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/circ_list.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/circ_list.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..583701a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/circ_list.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef CIRC_LIST_H +#define CIRC_LIST_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "error.h" + +#define CIRC_LIST(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + int x_head; \ + int x_size; \ + int x_cap; \ + int x_sizeof; \ + type x_list[EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE]; \ +} + +#define CIRC_LIST_PUSH(obj, item) \ +{ \ + (obj)->x_head = modulo_add ((obj)->x_head, -1, (obj)->x_cap); \ + (obj)->x_list[(obj)->x_head] = (item); \ + (obj)->x_size = min_int ((obj)->x_size + 1, (obj)->x_cap); \ +} + +#define CIRC_LIST_SIZE(obj) \ + ((obj)->x_size) + +#define CIRC_LIST_INDEX(obj, index) \ + modulo_add ((obj)->x_head, \ + index_verify ((index), (obj)->x_size, __FILE__, __LINE__), \ + (obj)->x_cap) + +#define CIRC_LIST_ITEM(obj, index) \ + ((obj)->x_list[CIRC_LIST_INDEX((obj), (index))]) + +#define CIRC_LIST_RESET(obj) \ +{ \ + (obj)->x_head = 0; \ + (obj)->x_size = 0; \ +} + +#define CIRC_LIST_ALLOC(dest, list_type, size) \ +{ \ + const int so = sizeof (list_type) + sizeof ((dest)->x_list[0]) * (size); \ + (dest) = (list_type *) malloc (so); \ + check_malloc_return (dest); \ + memset ((dest), 0, so); \ + (dest)->x_cap = size; \ + (dest)->x_sizeof = so; \ +} + +#define CIRC_LIST_FREE(dest) \ + free (dest) + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af75fc9d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.c @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT) + +#include "clinat.h" +#include "proto.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "memdbg.h" + +static bool +add_entry(struct client_nat_option_list *dest, + const struct client_nat_entry *e) +{ + if (dest->n >= MAX_CLIENT_NAT) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: client-nat table overflow (max %d entries)", MAX_CLIENT_NAT); + return false; + } + else + { + dest->entries[dest->n++] = *e; + return true; + } +} + +void +print_client_nat_list(const struct client_nat_option_list *list, int msglevel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + + msg (msglevel, "*** CNAT list"); + if (list) + { + for (i = 0; i < list->n; ++i) + { + const struct client_nat_entry *e = &list->entries[i]; + msg (msglevel, " CNAT[%d] t=%d %s/%s/%s", + i, + e->type, + print_in_addr_t (e->network, IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (e->netmask, IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (e->foreign_network, IA_NET_ORDER, &gc)); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +struct client_nat_option_list * +new_client_nat_list (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct client_nat_option_list *ret; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (ret, struct client_nat_option_list, gc); + return ret; +} + +struct client_nat_option_list * +clone_client_nat_option_list (const struct client_nat_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct client_nat_option_list *ret; + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (ret, struct client_nat_option_list, gc); + *ret = *src; + return ret; +} + +void +copy_client_nat_option_list (struct client_nat_option_list *dest, + const struct client_nat_option_list *src) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < src->n; ++i) + { + if (!add_entry(dest, &src->entries[i])) + break; + } +} + +void +add_client_nat_to_option_list (struct client_nat_option_list *dest, + const char *type, + const char *network, + const char *netmask, + const char *foreign_network, + int msglevel) +{ + struct client_nat_entry e; + bool ok; + + if (!strcmp(type, "snat")) + e.type = CN_SNAT; + else if (!strcmp(type, "dnat")) + e.type = CN_DNAT; + else + { + msg(msglevel, "client-nat: type must be 'snat' or 'dnat'"); + return; + } + + e.network = getaddr(0, network, 0, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) + { + msg(msglevel, "client-nat: bad network: %s", network); + return; + } + e.netmask = getaddr(0, netmask, 0, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) + { + msg(msglevel, "client-nat: bad netmask: %s", netmask); + return; + } + e.foreign_network = getaddr(0, foreign_network, 0, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) + { + msg(msglevel, "client-nat: bad foreign network: %s", foreign_network); + return; + } + + add_entry(dest, &e); +} + +#if 0 +static void +print_checksum (struct openvpn_iphdr *iph, const char *prefix) +{ + uint16_t *sptr; + unsigned int sum = 0; + int i = 0; + for (sptr = (uint16_t *)iph; (uint8_t *)sptr < (uint8_t *)iph + sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr); sptr++) + { + i += 1; + sum += *sptr; + } + msg (M_INFO, "** CKSUM[%d] %s %08x", i, prefix, sum); +} +#endif + +static void +print_pkt (struct openvpn_iphdr *iph, const char *prefix, const int direction, const int msglevel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + char *dirstr = "???"; + if (direction == CN_OUTGOING) + dirstr = "OUT"; + else if (direction == CN_INCOMING) + dirstr = "IN"; + + msg(msglevel, "** CNAT %s %s %s -> %s", + dirstr, + prefix, + print_in_addr_t (iph->saddr, IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (iph->daddr, IA_NET_ORDER, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +client_nat_transform (const struct client_nat_option_list *list, + struct buffer *ipbuf, + const int direction) +{ + struct ip_tcp_udp_hdr *h = (struct ip_tcp_udp_hdr *) BPTR (ipbuf); + int i; + uint32_t addr, *addr_ptr; + const uint32_t *from, *to; + int accumulate = 0; + unsigned int amask; + unsigned int alog = 0; + + if (check_debug_level (D_CLIENT_NAT)) + print_pkt (&h->ip, "BEFORE", direction, D_CLIENT_NAT); + + for (i = 0; i < list->n; ++i) + { + const struct client_nat_entry *e = &list->entries[i]; /* current NAT rule */ + if (e->type ^ direction) + { + addr = *(addr_ptr = &h->ip.daddr); + amask = 2; + } + else + { + addr = *(addr_ptr = &h->ip.saddr); + amask = 1; + } + if (direction) + { + from = &e->foreign_network; + to = &e->network; + } + else + { + from = &e->network; + to = &e->foreign_network; + } + + if (((addr & e->netmask) == *from) && !(amask & alog)) + { + /* pre-adjust IP checksum */ + ADD_CHECKSUM_32(accumulate, addr); + + /* do NAT transform */ + addr = (addr & ~e->netmask) | *to; + + /* post-adjust IP checksum */ + SUB_CHECKSUM_32(accumulate, addr); + + /* write the modified address to packet */ + *addr_ptr = addr; + + /* mark as modified */ + alog |= amask; + } + } + if (alog) + { + if (check_debug_level (D_CLIENT_NAT)) + print_pkt (&h->ip, "AFTER", direction, D_CLIENT_NAT); + + ADJUST_CHECKSUM(accumulate, h->ip.check); + + if (h->ip.protocol == OPENVPN_IPPROTO_TCP) + { + if (BLEN(ipbuf) >= sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr) + sizeof(struct openvpn_tcphdr)) + { + ADJUST_CHECKSUM(accumulate, h->u.tcp.check); + } + } + else if (h->ip.protocol == OPENVPN_IPPROTO_UDP) + { + if (BLEN(ipbuf) >= sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr) + sizeof(struct openvpn_udphdr)) + { + ADJUST_CHECKSUM(accumulate, h->u.udp.check); + } + } + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d55a727a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/clinat.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#if !defined(CLINAT_H) && defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT) +#define CLINAT_H + +#include "buffer.h" + +#define MAX_CLIENT_NAT 64 + +#define CN_OUTGOING 0 +#define CN_INCOMING 1 + +struct client_nat_entry { +# define CN_SNAT 0 +# define CN_DNAT 1 + int type; + in_addr_t network; + in_addr_t netmask; + in_addr_t foreign_network; +}; + +struct client_nat_option_list { + int n; + struct client_nat_entry entries[MAX_CLIENT_NAT]; +}; + +struct client_nat_option_list *new_client_nat_list (struct gc_arena *gc); +struct client_nat_option_list *clone_client_nat_option_list (const struct client_nat_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *gc); +void copy_client_nat_option_list (struct client_nat_option_list *dest, const struct client_nat_option_list *src); +void print_client_nat_list(const struct client_nat_option_list *list, int msglevel); + +void add_client_nat_to_option_list (struct client_nat_option_list *dest, + const char *type, + const char *network, + const char *netmask, + const char *foreign_network, + int msglevel); + +void client_nat_transform (const struct client_nat_option_list *list, + struct buffer *ipbuf, + const int direction); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/common.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd2c83f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef COMMON_H +#define COMMON_H + +/* + * Statistics counters and associated printf formats. + */ +#ifdef USE_64_BIT_COUNTERS + typedef unsigned long long int counter_type; +# ifdef WIN32 +# define counter_format "%I64u" +# else +# define counter_format "%llu" +# endif +#else + typedef unsigned int counter_type; +# define counter_format "%u" +#endif + +/* + * Time intervals + */ +typedef int interval_t; + +/* + * Used as an upper bound for timeouts. + */ +#define BIG_TIMEOUT (60*60*24*7) /* one week (in seconds) */ + +/* + * Printf formats for special types + */ +#ifdef _WIN64 +#define ptr_format "0x%I64x" +#else +#define ptr_format "0x%08lx" +#endif +#define time_format "%lu" +#define fragment_header_format "0x%08x" + +/* these are used to cast the arguments + * and MUST match the formats above */ +typedef unsigned long time_type; +#ifdef _WIN64 +typedef unsigned long long ptr_type; +#else +typedef unsigned long ptr_type; +#endif + +/* the --client-config-dir default file */ +#define CCD_DEFAULT "DEFAULT" + +/* + * This parameter controls the TLS channel buffer size and the + * maximum size of a single TLS message (cleartext). + * This parameter must be >= PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE + */ +#define TLS_CHANNEL_BUF_SIZE 2048 + +/* + * This parameter controls the maximum size of a bundle + * of pushed options. + */ +#define PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE 1024 + +/* + * In how many seconds does client re-send PUSH_REQUEST if we haven't yet received a reply + */ +#define PUSH_REQUEST_INTERVAL 5 + +/* + * A sort of pseudo-filename for data provided inline within + * the configuration file. + */ +#define INLINE_FILE_TAG "[[INLINE]]" + +/* + * Script security warning + */ +#define SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING "WARNING: External program may not be called unless '--script-security 2' or higher is enabled. Use '--script-security 3 system' for backward compatibility with 2.1_rc8 and earlier. See --help text or man page for detailed info." + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afda8ca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "console.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#include "win32.h" + +/* + * Get input from console. + * + * Return false on input error, or if service + * exit event is signaled. + */ + +static bool +get_console_input_win32 (const char *prompt, const bool echo, char *input, const int capacity) +{ + HANDLE in = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + HANDLE err = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + DWORD len = 0; + + ASSERT (prompt); + ASSERT (input); + ASSERT (capacity > 0); + + input[0] = '\0'; + + in = GetStdHandle (STD_INPUT_HANDLE); + err = get_orig_stderr (); + + if (in != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE + && err != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE + && !win32_service_interrupt (&win32_signal) + && WriteFile (err, prompt, strlen (prompt), &len, NULL)) + { + bool is_console = (GetFileType (in) == FILE_TYPE_CHAR); + DWORD flags_save = 0; + int status = 0; + WCHAR *winput; + + if (is_console) + { + if (GetConsoleMode (in, &flags_save)) + { + DWORD flags = ENABLE_LINE_INPUT | ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT; + if (echo) + flags |= ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT; + SetConsoleMode (in, flags); + } + else + is_console = 0; + } + + if (is_console) + { + winput = malloc (capacity * sizeof (WCHAR)); + if (winput == NULL) + return false; + + status = ReadConsoleW (in, winput, capacity, &len, NULL); + WideCharToMultiByte (CP_UTF8, 0, winput, len, input, capacity, NULL, NULL); + free (winput); + } + else + status = ReadFile (in, input, capacity, &len, NULL); + + string_null_terminate (input, (int)len, capacity); + chomp (input); + + if (!echo) + WriteFile (err, "\r\n", 2, &len, NULL); + if (is_console) + SetConsoleMode (in, flags_save); + if (status && !win32_service_interrupt (&win32_signal)) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GETPASS + +static FILE * +open_tty (const bool write) +{ + FILE *ret; + ret = fopen ("/dev/tty", write ? "w" : "r"); + if (!ret) + ret = write ? stderr : stdin; + return ret; +} + +static void +close_tty (FILE *fp) +{ + if (fp != stderr && fp != stdin) + fclose (fp); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SYSTEMD + +/* + * is systemd running + */ + +static bool +check_systemd_running () +{ + struct stat a, b; + + /* We simply test whether the systemd cgroup hierarchy is + * mounted */ + + return (lstat("/sys/fs/cgroup", &a) == 0) + && (lstat("/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd", &b) == 0) + && (a.st_dev != b.st_dev); + +} + +static bool +get_console_input_systemd (const char *prompt, const bool echo, char *input, const int capacity) +{ + int std_out; + bool ret = false; + struct argv argv; + + argv_init (&argv); + argv_printf (&argv, "/bin/systemd-ask-password"); + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", prompt); + + if ((std_out = openvpn_popen (&argv, NULL)) < 0) { + return false; + } + CLEAR (*input); + if (read (std_out, input, capacity) != 0) + { + chomp (input); + ret = true; + } + close (std_out); + + argv_reset (&argv); + + return ret; +} + + +#endif + +/* + * Get input from console + */ +bool +get_console_input (const char *prompt, const bool echo, char *input, const int capacity) +{ + bool ret = false; + ASSERT (prompt); + ASSERT (input); + ASSERT (capacity > 0); + input[0] = '\0'; + +#ifdef ENABLE_SYSTEMD + if (check_systemd_running ()) + return get_console_input_systemd (prompt, echo, input, capacity); +#endif + +#if defined(WIN32) + return get_console_input_win32 (prompt, echo, input, capacity); +#elif defined(HAVE_GETPASS) + if (echo) + { + FILE *fp; + + fp = open_tty (true); + fprintf (fp, "%s", prompt); + fflush (fp); + close_tty (fp); + + fp = open_tty (false); + if (fgets (input, capacity, fp) != NULL) + { + chomp (input); + ret = true; + } + close_tty (fp); + } + else + { + char *gp = getpass (prompt); + if (gp) + { + strncpynt (input, gp, capacity); + memset (gp, 0, strlen (gp)); + ret = true; + } + } +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I can't get console input on this OS (%s)", prompt); +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..268f3feb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/console.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef CONSOLE_H +#define CONSOLE_H + +#include "basic.h" + +bool +get_console_input (const char *prompt, const bool echo, char *input, const int capacity); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac2eecdd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,1451 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +#include "crypto.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Encryption and Compression Routines. + * + * On entry, buf contains the input data and length. + * On exit, it should be set to the output data and length. + * + * If buf->len is <= 0 we should return + * If buf->len is set to 0 on exit it tells the caller to ignore the packet. + * + * work is a workspace buffer we are given of size BUF_SIZE. + * work may be used to return output data, or the input buffer + * may be modified and returned as output. If output data is + * returned in work, the data should start after FRAME_HEADROOM bytes + * of padding to leave room for downstream routines to prepend. + * + * Up to a total of FRAME_HEADROOM bytes may be prepended to the input buf + * by all routines (encryption, decryption, compression, and decompression). + * + * Note that the buf_prepend return will assert if we try to + * make a header bigger than FRAME_HEADROOM. This should not + * happen unless the frame parameters are wrong. + */ + +#define CRYPT_ERROR(format) \ + do { msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "%s: " format, error_prefix); goto error_exit; } while (false) + +void +openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + const struct crypto_options *opt, + const struct frame* frame) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + gc_init (&gc); + + if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi) + { + struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->encrypt; + + /* Do Encrypt from buf -> work */ + if (ctx->cipher) + { + uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher); + const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher); + int outlen; + + if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC) + { + CLEAR (iv_buf); + + /* generate pseudo-random IV */ + if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) + prng_bytes (iv_buf, iv_size); + + /* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */ + if (opt->packet_id) + { + struct packet_id_net pin; + packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)); + ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true)); + } + } + else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB) + { + struct packet_id_net pin; + struct buffer b; + + ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */ + ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */ + + packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, true); + memset (iv_buf, 0, iv_size); + buf_set_write (&b, iv_buf, iv_size); + ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, &b, true, false)); + } + else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */ + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */ + ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + + /* set the IV pseudo-randomly */ + if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc)); + + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", + format_hex (BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), 80, &gc)); + + /* cipher_ctx was already initialized with key & keylen */ + ASSERT (cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf)); + + /* Buffer overflow check */ + if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d cbs=%d", + buf->capacity, + buf->offset, + buf->len, + work.capacity, + work.offset, + work.len, + cipher_ctx_block_size (ctx->cipher)); + goto err; + } + + /* Encrypt packet ID, payload */ + ASSERT (cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf))); + work.len += outlen; + + /* Flush the encryption buffer */ + ASSERT(cipher_ctx_final(ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen)); + work.len += outlen; + ASSERT (outlen == iv_size); + + /* prepend the IV to the ciphertext */ + if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) + { + uint8_t *output = buf_prepend (&work, iv_size); + ASSERT (output); + memcpy (output, iv_buf, iv_size); + } + + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", + format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc)); + } + else /* No Encryption */ + { + if (opt->packet_id) + { + struct packet_id_net pin; + packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&opt->packet_id->send, &pin, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)); + ASSERT (packet_id_write (&pin, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true)); + } + work = *buf; + } + + /* HMAC the ciphertext (or plaintext if !cipher) */ + if (ctx->hmac) + { + uint8_t *output = NULL; + + hmac_ctx_reset (ctx->hmac); + hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work)); + output = buf_prepend (&work, hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac)); + ASSERT (output); + hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, output); + } + + *buf = work; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return; + +err: + crypto_clear_error(); + buf->len = 0; + gc_free (&gc); + return; +} + +/* + * If (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) is not NULL, we will read an IV from the packet. + * + * Set buf->len to 0 and return false on decrypt error. + * + * On success, buf is set to point to plaintext, true + * is returned. + */ +bool +openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + const struct crypto_options *opt, + const struct frame* frame) +{ + static const char error_prefix[] = "Authenticate/Decrypt packet error"; + struct gc_arena gc; + gc_init (&gc); + + if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi) + { + struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->decrypt; + struct packet_id_net pin; + bool have_pin = false; + + /* Verify the HMAC */ + if (ctx->hmac) + { + int hmac_len; + uint8_t local_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; /* HMAC of ciphertext computed locally */ + + hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac); + + /* Assume the length of the input HMAC */ + hmac_len = hmac_ctx_size (ctx->hmac); + + /* Authentication fails if insufficient data in packet for HMAC */ + if (buf->len < hmac_len) + CRYPT_ERROR ("missing authentication info"); + + hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR (buf) + hmac_len, BLEN (buf) - hmac_len); + hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, local_hmac); + + /* Compare locally computed HMAC with packet HMAC */ + if (memcmp (local_hmac, BPTR (buf), hmac_len)) + CRYPT_ERROR ("packet HMAC authentication failed"); + + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, hmac_len)); + } + + /* Decrypt packet ID + payload */ + + if (ctx->cipher) + { + const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher); + const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher); + uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + int outlen; + + /* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */ + ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT))); + + /* use IV if user requested it */ + CLEAR (iv_buf); + if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) + { + if (buf->len < iv_size) + CRYPT_ERROR ("missing IV info"); + memcpy (iv_buf, BPTR (buf), iv_size); + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, iv_size)); + } + + /* show the IV's initial state */ + if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc)); + + if (buf->len < 1) + CRYPT_ERROR ("missing payload"); + + /* ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */ + if (!cipher_ctx_reset (ctx->cipher, iv_buf)) + CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher init failed"); + + /* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */ + if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len)) + CRYPT_ERROR ("buffer overflow"); + + /* Decrypt packet ID, payload */ + if (!cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf))) + CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher update failed"); + work.len += outlen; + + /* Flush the decryption buffer */ + if (!cipher_ctx_final (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen)) + CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher final failed"); + work.len += outlen; + + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s", + format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc)); + + /* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */ + { + if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC) + { + if (opt->packet_id) + { + if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))) + CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CBC packet-id"); + have_pin = true; + } + } + else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB) + { + struct buffer b; + + ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */ + ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */ + + buf_set_read (&b, iv_buf, iv_size); + if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &b, true)) + CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CFB/OFB packet-id"); + have_pin = true; + } + else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */ + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } + } + else + { + work = *buf; + if (opt->packet_id) + { + if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))) + CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading packet-id"); + have_pin = !BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID); + } + } + + if (have_pin) + { + packet_id_reap_test (&opt->packet_id->rec); + if (packet_id_test (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin)) + { + packet_id_add (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin); + if (opt->pid_persist && (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)) + packet_id_persist_save_obj (opt->pid_persist, opt->packet_id); + } + else + { + if (!(opt->flags & CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS)) + msg (D_REPLAY_ERRORS, "%s: bad packet ID (may be a replay): %s -- see the man page entry for --no-replay and --replay-window for more info or silence this warning with --mute-replay-warnings", + error_prefix, packet_id_net_print (&pin, true, &gc)); + goto error_exit; + } + } + *buf = work; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + + error_exit: + crypto_clear_error(); + buf->len = 0; + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +/* + * How many bytes will we add to frame buffer for a given + * set of crypto options? + */ +void +crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame, + const struct key_type* kt, + bool cipher_defined, + bool use_iv, + bool packet_id, + bool packet_id_long_form) +{ + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, + (packet_id ? packet_id_size (packet_id_long_form) : 0) + + ((cipher_defined && use_iv) ? cipher_kt_iv_size (kt->cipher) : 0) + + (cipher_defined ? cipher_kt_block_size (kt->cipher) : 0) + /* worst case padding expansion */ + kt->hmac_length); +} + +/* + * Build a struct key_type. + */ +void +init_key_type (struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, + bool ciphername_defined, const char *authname, + bool authname_defined, int keysize, + bool cfb_ofb_allowed, bool warn) +{ + CLEAR (*kt); + if (ciphername && ciphername_defined) + { + kt->cipher = cipher_kt_get (ciphername); + kt->cipher_length = cipher_kt_key_size (kt->cipher); + if (keysize > 0 && keysize <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) + kt->cipher_length = keysize; + + /* check legal cipher mode */ + { + const unsigned int mode = cipher_kt_mode (kt->cipher); + if (!(mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC +#ifdef ALLOW_NON_CBC_CIPHERS + || (cfb_ofb_allowed && (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB)) +#endif + )) +#ifdef ENABLE_SMALL + msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' mode not supported", ciphername); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' uses a mode not supported by " PACKAGE_NAME " in your current configuration. CBC mode is always supported, while CFB and OFB modes are supported only when using SSL/TLS authentication and key exchange mode, and when " PACKAGE_NAME " has been built with ALLOW_NON_CBC_CIPHERS.", ciphername); +#endif + } + } + else + { + if (warn) + msg (M_WARN, "******* WARNING *******: null cipher specified, no encryption will be used"); + } + if (authname && authname_defined) + { + kt->digest = md_kt_get (authname); + kt->hmac_length = md_kt_size (kt->digest); + } + else + { + if (warn) + msg (M_WARN, "******* WARNING *******: null MAC specified, no authentication will be used"); + } +} + +/* given a key and key_type, build a key_ctx */ +void +init_key_ctx (struct key_ctx *ctx, struct key *key, + const struct key_type *kt, int enc, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + CLEAR (*ctx); + if (kt->cipher && kt->cipher_length > 0) + { + + ALLOC_OBJ(ctx->cipher, cipher_ctx_t); + cipher_ctx_init (ctx->cipher, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, + kt->cipher, enc); + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "%s: Cipher '%s' initialized with %d bit key", + prefix, + cipher_kt_name(kt->cipher), + kt->cipher_length *8); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS, "%s: CIPHER KEY: %s", prefix, + format_hex (key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "%s: CIPHER block_size=%d iv_size=%d", + prefix, + cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher), + cipher_kt_iv_size(kt->cipher)); + } + if (kt->digest && kt->hmac_length > 0) + { + ALLOC_OBJ(ctx->hmac, hmac_ctx_t); + hmac_ctx_init (ctx->hmac, key->hmac, kt->hmac_length, kt->digest); + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, + "%s: Using %d bit message hash '%s' for HMAC authentication", + prefix, md_kt_size(kt->digest) * 8, md_kt_name(kt->digest)); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS, "%s: HMAC KEY: %s", prefix, + format_hex (key->hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc)); + + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "%s: HMAC size=%d block_size=%d", + prefix, + md_kt_size(kt->digest), + hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac)); + + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +free_key_ctx (struct key_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->cipher) + { + cipher_ctx_cleanup(ctx->cipher); + free(ctx->cipher); + ctx->cipher = NULL; + } + if (ctx->hmac) + { + hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx->hmac); + free(ctx->hmac); + ctx->hmac = NULL; + } +} + +void +free_key_ctx_bi (struct key_ctx_bi *ctx) +{ + free_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt); + free_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt); +} + + +static bool +key_is_zero (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < kt->cipher_length; ++i) + if (key->cipher[i]) + return false; + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: WARNING: zero key detected"); + return true; +} + +/* + * Make sure that cipher key is a valid key for current key_type. + */ +bool +check_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt) +{ + if (kt->cipher) + { + /* + * Check for zero key + */ + if (key_is_zero(key, kt)) + return false; + + /* + * Check for weak or semi-weak DES keys. + */ + { + const int ndc = key_des_num_cblocks (kt->cipher); + if (ndc) + return key_des_check (key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, ndc); + else + return true; + } + } + return true; +} + +/* + * Make safe mutations to key to ensure it is valid, + * such as ensuring correct parity on DES keys. + * + * This routine cannot guarantee it will generate a good + * key. You must always call check_key after this routine + * to make sure. + */ +void +fixup_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (kt->cipher) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + const struct key orig = *key; +#endif + const int ndc = key_des_num_cblocks (kt->cipher); + + if (ndc) + key_des_fixup (key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, ndc); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG)) + { + if (memcmp (orig.cipher, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length)) + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key: before=%s after=%s", + format_hex (orig.cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc), + format_hex (key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc)); + } +#endif + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +check_replay_iv_consistency (const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id, bool use_iv) +{ + if (cfb_ofb_mode (kt) && !(packet_id && use_iv)) + msg (M_FATAL, "--no-replay or --no-iv cannot be used with a CFB or OFB mode cipher"); +} + +bool +cfb_ofb_mode (const struct key_type* kt) +{ + if (kt && kt->cipher) { + const unsigned int mode = cipher_kt_mode (kt->cipher); + return mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB; + } + return false; +} + +/* + * Generate a random key. If key_type is provided, make + * sure generated key is valid for key_type. + */ +void +generate_key_random (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt) +{ + int cipher_len = MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH; + int hmac_len = MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH; + + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + do { + CLEAR (*key); + if (kt) + { + if (kt->cipher && kt->cipher_length > 0 && kt->cipher_length <= cipher_len) + cipher_len = kt->cipher_length; + + if (kt->digest && kt->hmac_length > 0 && kt->hmac_length <= hmac_len) + hmac_len = kt->hmac_length; + } + if (!rand_bytes (key->cipher, cipher_len) + || !rand_bytes (key->hmac, hmac_len)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for key generation"); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "Cipher source entropy: %s", format_hex (key->cipher, cipher_len, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "HMAC source entropy: %s", format_hex (key->hmac, hmac_len, 0, &gc)); + + if (kt) + fixup_key (key, kt); + } while (kt && !check_key (key, kt)); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Print key material + */ +void +key2_print (const struct key2* k, + const struct key_type *kt, + const char* prefix0, + const char* prefix1) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + ASSERT (k->n == 2); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (cipher): %s", + prefix0, + format_hex (k->keys[0].cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (hmac): %s", + prefix0, + format_hex (k->keys[0].hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (cipher): %s", + prefix1, + format_hex (k->keys[1].cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (hmac): %s", + prefix1, + format_hex (k->keys[1].hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +test_crypto (const struct crypto_options *co, struct frame* frame) +{ + int i, j; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer src = alloc_buf_gc (TUN_MTU_SIZE (frame), &gc); + struct buffer work = alloc_buf_gc (BUF_SIZE (frame), &gc); + struct buffer encrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc (BUF_SIZE (frame), &gc); + struct buffer decrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc (BUF_SIZE (frame), &gc); + struct buffer buf = clear_buf(); + + /* init work */ + ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + + msg (M_INFO, "Entering " PACKAGE_NAME " crypto self-test mode."); + for (i = 1; i <= TUN_MTU_SIZE (frame); ++i) + { + update_time (); + + msg (M_INFO, "TESTING ENCRYPT/DECRYPT of packet length=%d", i); + + /* + * Load src with random data. + */ + ASSERT (buf_init (&src, 0)); + ASSERT (i <= src.capacity); + src.len = i; + ASSERT (rand_bytes (BPTR (&src), BLEN (&src))); + + /* copy source to input buf */ + buf = work; + memcpy (buf_write_alloc (&buf, BLEN (&src)), BPTR (&src), BLEN (&src)); + + /* encrypt */ + openvpn_encrypt (&buf, encrypt_workspace, co, frame); + + /* decrypt */ + openvpn_decrypt (&buf, decrypt_workspace, co, frame); + + /* compare */ + if (buf.len != src.len) + msg (M_FATAL, "SELF TEST FAILED, src.len=%d buf.len=%d", src.len, buf.len); + for (j = 0; j < i; ++j) + { + const uint8_t in = *(BPTR (&src) + j); + const uint8_t out = *(BPTR (&buf) + j); + if (in != out) + msg (M_FATAL, "SELF TEST FAILED, pos=%d in=%d out=%d", j, in, out); + } + } + msg (M_INFO, PACKAGE_NAME " crypto self-test mode SUCCEEDED."); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + +void +get_tls_handshake_key (const struct key_type *key_type, + struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, + const char *passphrase_file, + const int key_direction, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (passphrase_file && key_type->hmac_length) + { + struct key2 key2; + struct key_type kt = *key_type; + struct key_direction_state kds; + + /* for control channel we are only authenticating, not encrypting */ + kt.cipher_length = 0; + kt.cipher = NULL; + + if (flags & GHK_INLINE) + { + /* key was specified inline, key text is in passphrase_file */ + read_key_file (&key2, passphrase_file, RKF_INLINE|RKF_MUST_SUCCEED); + + /* succeeded? */ + if (key2.n == 2) + msg (M_INFO, "Control Channel Authentication: tls-auth using INLINE static key file"); + else + msg (M_FATAL, "INLINE tls-auth file lacks the requisite 2 keys"); + } + else + { + /* first try to parse as an OpenVPN static key file */ + read_key_file (&key2, passphrase_file, 0); + + /* succeeded? */ + if (key2.n == 2) + { + msg (M_INFO, + "Control Channel Authentication: using '%s' as a " PACKAGE_NAME " static key file", + passphrase_file); + } + else + { + int hash_size; + + CLEAR (key2); + + /* failed, now try to get hash from a freeform file */ + hash_size = read_passphrase_hash (passphrase_file, + kt.digest, + key2.keys[0].hmac, + MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT (hash_size == kt.hmac_length); + + /* suceeded */ + key2.n = 1; + + msg (M_INFO, + "Control Channel Authentication: using '%s' as a free-form passphrase file", + passphrase_file); + } + } + /* handle key direction */ + + key_direction_state_init (&kds, key_direction); + must_have_n_keys (passphrase_file, "tls-auth", &key2, kds.need_keys); + + /* initialize hmac key in both directions */ + + init_key_ctx (&ctx->encrypt, &key2.keys[kds.out_key], &kt, OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT, + "Outgoing Control Channel Authentication"); + init_key_ctx (&ctx->decrypt, &key2.keys[kds.in_key], &kt, OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT, + "Incoming Control Channel Authentication"); + + CLEAR (key2); + } + else + { + CLEAR (*ctx); + } +} +#endif + +/* header and footer for static key file */ +static const char static_key_head[] = "-----BEGIN OpenVPN Static key V1-----"; +static const char static_key_foot[] = "-----END OpenVPN Static key V1-----"; + +static const char printable_char_fmt[] = + "Non-Hex character ('%c') found at line %d in key file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)"; + +static const char unprintable_char_fmt[] = + "Non-Hex, unprintable character (0x%02x) found at line %d in key file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)"; + +/* read key from file */ + +void +read_key_file (struct key2 *key2, const char *file, const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer in; + int fd, size; + uint8_t hex_byte[3] = {0, 0, 0}; + const char *error_filename = file; + + /* parse info */ + const unsigned char *cp; + int hb_index = 0; + int line_num = 1; + int line_index = 0; + int match = 0; + + /* output */ + uint8_t* out = (uint8_t*) &key2->keys; + const int keylen = sizeof (key2->keys); + int count = 0; + + /* parse states */ +# define PARSE_INITIAL 0 +# define PARSE_HEAD 1 +# define PARSE_DATA 2 +# define PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE 3 +# define PARSE_FOOT 4 +# define PARSE_FINISHED 5 + int state = PARSE_INITIAL; + + /* constants */ + const int hlen = strlen (static_key_head); + const int flen = strlen (static_key_foot); + const int onekeylen = sizeof (key2->keys[0]); + + CLEAR (*key2); + + /* + * Key can be provided as a filename in 'file' or if RKF_INLINE + * is set, the actual key data itself in ascii form. + */ + if (flags & RKF_INLINE) /* 'file' is a string containing ascii representation of key */ + { + size = strlen (file) + 1; + buf_set_read (&in, (const uint8_t *)file, size); + error_filename = INLINE_FILE_TAG; + } + else /* 'file' is a filename which refers to a file containing the ascii key */ + { + in = alloc_buf_gc (2048, &gc); + fd = platform_open (file, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot open file key file '%s'", file); + size = read (fd, in.data, in.capacity); + if (size < 0) + msg (M_FATAL, "Read error on key file ('%s')", file); + if (size == in.capacity) + msg (M_FATAL, "Key file ('%s') can be a maximum of %d bytes", file, (int)in.capacity); + close (fd); + } + + cp = (unsigned char *)in.data; + while (size > 0) + { + const unsigned char c = *cp; + +#if 0 + msg (M_INFO, "char='%c'[%d] s=%d ln=%d li=%d m=%d c=%d", + c, (int)c, state, line_num, line_index, match, count); +#endif + + if (c == '\n') + { + line_index = match = 0; + ++line_num; + } + else + { + /* first char of new line */ + if (!line_index) + { + /* first char of line after header line? */ + if (state == PARSE_HEAD) + state = PARSE_DATA; + + /* first char of footer */ + if ((state == PARSE_DATA || state == PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE) && c == '-') + state = PARSE_FOOT; + } + + /* compare read chars with header line */ + if (state == PARSE_INITIAL) + { + if (line_index < hlen && c == static_key_head[line_index]) + { + if (++match == hlen) + state = PARSE_HEAD; + } + } + + /* compare read chars with footer line */ + if (state == PARSE_FOOT) + { + if (line_index < flen && c == static_key_foot[line_index]) + { + if (++match == flen) + state = PARSE_FINISHED; + } + } + + /* reading key */ + if (state == PARSE_DATA) + { + if (isxdigit(c)) + { + ASSERT (hb_index >= 0 && hb_index < 2); + hex_byte[hb_index++] = c; + if (hb_index == 2) + { + unsigned int u; + ASSERT(sscanf((const char *)hex_byte, "%x", &u) == 1); + *out++ = u; + hb_index = 0; + if (++count == keylen) + state = PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE; + } + } + else if (isspace(c)) + ; + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, + (isprint (c) ? printable_char_fmt : unprintable_char_fmt), + c, line_num, error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen); + } + } + ++line_index; + } + ++cp; + --size; + } + + /* + * Normally we will read either 1 or 2 keys from file. + */ + key2->n = count / onekeylen; + + ASSERT (key2->n >= 0 && key2->n <= (int) SIZE (key2->keys)); + + if (flags & RKF_MUST_SUCCEED) + { + if (!key2->n) + msg (M_FATAL, "Insufficient key material or header text not found in file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)", + error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen); + + if (state != PARSE_FINISHED) + msg (M_FATAL, "Footer text not found in file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)", + error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen); + } + + /* zero file read buffer if not an inline file */ + if (!(flags & RKF_INLINE)) + buf_clear (&in); + + if (key2->n) + warn_if_group_others_accessible (error_filename); + +#if 0 + /* DEBUGGING */ + { + int i; + printf ("KEY READ, n=%d\n", key2->n); + for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE (key2->keys); ++i) + { + /* format key as ascii */ + const char *fmt = format_hex_ex ((const uint8_t*)&key2->keys[i], + sizeof (key2->keys[i]), + 0, + 16, + "\n", + &gc); + printf ("[%d]\n%s\n\n", i, fmt); + } + } +#endif + + /* pop our garbage collection level */ + gc_free (&gc); +} + +int +read_passphrase_hash (const char *passphrase_file, + const md_kt_t *digest, + uint8_t *output, + int len) +{ + unsigned int outlen = 0; + md_ctx_t md; + + ASSERT (len >= md_kt_size(digest)); + memset (output, 0, len); + + md_ctx_init(&md, digest); + + /* read passphrase file */ + { + const int min_passphrase_size = 8; + uint8_t buf[64]; + int total_size = 0; + int fd = platform_open (passphrase_file, O_RDONLY, 0); + + if (fd == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot open passphrase file: '%s'", passphrase_file); + + for (;;) + { + int size = read (fd, buf, sizeof (buf)); + if (size == 0) + break; + if (size == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "Read error on passphrase file: '%s'", + passphrase_file); + md_ctx_update(&md, buf, size); + total_size += size; + } + close (fd); + + warn_if_group_others_accessible (passphrase_file); + + if (total_size < min_passphrase_size) + msg (M_FATAL, + "Passphrase file '%s' is too small (must have at least %d characters)", + passphrase_file, min_passphrase_size); + } + md_ctx_final(&md, output); + md_ctx_cleanup(&md); + return md_kt_size(digest); +} + +/* + * Write key to file, return number of random bits + * written. + */ +int +write_key_file (const int nkeys, const char *filename) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + int fd, i; + int nbits = 0; + + /* must be large enough to hold full key file */ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (2048, &gc); + struct buffer nbits_head_text = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + + /* how to format the ascii file representation of key */ + const int bytes_per_line = 16; + + /* open key file */ + fd = platform_open (filename, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + + if (fd == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot open shared secret file '%s' for write", filename); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", static_key_head); + + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; ++i) + { + struct key key; + char* fmt; + + /* generate random bits */ + generate_key_random (&key, NULL); + + /* format key as ascii */ + fmt = format_hex_ex ((const uint8_t*)&key, + sizeof (key), + 0, + bytes_per_line, + "\n", + &gc); + + /* increment random bits counter */ + nbits += sizeof (key) * 8; + + /* write to holding buffer */ + buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", fmt); + + /* zero memory which held key component (will be freed by GC) */ + memset (fmt, 0, strlen(fmt)); + CLEAR (key); + } + + buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", static_key_foot); + + /* write number of bits */ + buf_printf (&nbits_head_text, "#\n# %d bit OpenVPN static key\n#\n", nbits); + buf_write_string_file (&nbits_head_text, filename, fd); + + /* write key file, now formatted in out, to file */ + buf_write_string_file (&out, filename, fd); + + if (close (fd)) + msg (M_ERR, "Close error on shared secret file %s", filename); + + /* zero memory which held file content (memory will be freed by GC) */ + buf_clear (&out); + + /* pop our garbage collection level */ + gc_free (&gc); + + return nbits; +} + +void +must_have_n_keys (const char *filename, const char *option, const struct key2 *key2, int n) +{ + if (key2->n < n) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_SMALL + msg (M_FATAL, "Key file '%s' used in --%s contains insufficient key material [keys found=%d required=%d]", filename, option, key2->n, n); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Key file '%s' used in --%s contains insufficient key material [keys found=%d required=%d] -- try generating a new key file with '" PACKAGE " --genkey --secret [file]', or use the existing key file in bidirectional mode by specifying --%s without a key direction parameter", filename, option, key2->n, n, option); +#endif + } +} + +int +ascii2keydirection (int msglevel, const char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL; + else if (!strcmp (str, "0")) + return KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL; + else if (!strcmp (str, "1")) + return KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "Unknown key direction '%s' -- must be '0' or '1'", str); + return -1; + } + return KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +const char * +keydirection2ascii (int kd, bool remote) +{ + if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL) + return NULL; + else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL) + return remote ? "1" : "0"; + else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE) + return remote ? "0" : "1"; + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + return NULL; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +void +key_direction_state_init (struct key_direction_state *kds, int key_direction) +{ + CLEAR (*kds); + switch (key_direction) + { + case KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL: + kds->out_key = 0; + kds->in_key = 1; + kds->need_keys = 2; + break; + case KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE: + kds->out_key = 1; + kds->in_key = 0; + kds->need_keys = 2; + break; + case KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL: + kds->out_key = 0; + kds->in_key = 0; + kds->need_keys = 1; + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +} + +void +verify_fix_key2 (struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared_secret_file) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < key2->n; ++i) + { + /* Fix parity for DES keys and make sure not a weak key */ + fixup_key (&key2->keys[i], kt); + + /* This should be a very improbable failure */ + if (!check_key (&key2->keys[i], kt)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Key #%d in '%s' is bad. Try making a new key with --genkey.", + i+1, shared_secret_file); + } +} + +/* given a key and key_type, write key to buffer */ +bool +write_key (const struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, + struct buffer *buf) +{ + ASSERT (kt->cipher_length <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH + && kt->hmac_length <= MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH); + + if (!buf_write (buf, &kt->cipher_length, 1)) + return false; + if (!buf_write (buf, &kt->hmac_length, 1)) + return false; + if (!buf_write (buf, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length)) + return false; + if (!buf_write (buf, key->hmac, kt->hmac_length)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +/* + * Given a key_type and buffer, read key from buffer. + * Return: 1 on success + * -1 read failure + * 0 on key length mismatch + */ +int +read_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf) +{ + uint8_t cipher_length; + uint8_t hmac_length; + + CLEAR (*key); + if (!buf_read (buf, &cipher_length, 1)) + goto read_err; + if (!buf_read (buf, &hmac_length, 1)) + goto read_err; + + if (!buf_read (buf, key->cipher, cipher_length)) + goto read_err; + if (!buf_read (buf, key->hmac, hmac_length)) + goto read_err; + + if (cipher_length != kt->cipher_length || hmac_length != kt->hmac_length) + goto key_len_err; + + return 1; + +read_err: + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: error reading key from remote"); + return -1; + +key_len_err: + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: key length mismatch, local cipher/hmac %d/%d, remote cipher/hmac %d/%d", + kt->cipher_length, kt->hmac_length, cipher_length, hmac_length); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Random number functions, used in cases where we want + * reasonably strong cryptographic random number generation + * without depleting our entropy pool. Used for random + * IV values and a number of other miscellaneous tasks. + */ + +static uint8_t *nonce_data = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ +static const md_kt_t *nonce_md = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ +static int nonce_secret_len = 0; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* Reset the nonce value, also done periodically to refresh entropy */ +static void +prng_reset_nonce () +{ + const int size = md_kt_size (nonce_md) + nonce_secret_len; +#if 1 /* Must be 1 for real usage */ + if (!rand_bytes (nonce_data, size)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for PRNG"); +#else + /* Only for testing -- will cause a predictable PRNG sequence */ + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) + nonce_data[i] = (uint8_t) i; + } +#endif +} + +void +prng_init (const char *md_name, const int nonce_secret_len_parm) +{ + prng_uninit (); + nonce_md = md_name ? md_kt_get (md_name) : NULL; + if (nonce_md) + { + ASSERT (nonce_secret_len_parm >= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN && nonce_secret_len_parm <= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MAX); + nonce_secret_len = nonce_secret_len_parm; + { + const int size = md_kt_size(nonce_md) + nonce_secret_len; + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "PRNG init md=%s size=%d", md_kt_name(nonce_md), size); + nonce_data = (uint8_t*) malloc (size); + check_malloc_return (nonce_data); + prng_reset_nonce(); + } + } +} + +void +prng_uninit (void) +{ + free (nonce_data); + nonce_data = NULL; + nonce_md = NULL; + nonce_secret_len = 0; +} + +void +prng_bytes (uint8_t *output, int len) +{ + static size_t processed = 0; + + if (nonce_md) + { + const int md_size = md_kt_size (nonce_md); + while (len > 0) + { + unsigned int outlen = 0; + const int blen = min_int (len, md_size); + md_full(nonce_md, nonce_data, md_size + nonce_secret_len, nonce_data); + memcpy (output, nonce_data, blen); + output += blen; + len -= blen; + + /* Ensure that random data is reset regularly */ + processed += blen; + if(processed > PRNG_NONCE_RESET_BYTES) { + prng_reset_nonce(); + processed = 0; + } + } + } + else + rand_bytes (output, len); +} + +/* an analogue to the random() function, but use prng_bytes */ +long int +get_random() +{ + long int l; + prng_bytes ((unsigned char *)&l, sizeof(l)); + if (l < 0) + l = -l; + return l; +} + +#ifndef ENABLE_SSL + +void +init_ssl_lib (void) +{ + crypto_init_lib (); +} + +void +free_ssl_lib (void) +{ + crypto_uninit_lib (); + prng_uninit(); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + +/* + * md5 functions + */ + +const char * +md5sum (uint8_t *buf, int len, int n_print_chars, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + + md_full(md5_kt, buf, len, digest); + + return format_hex (digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, n_print_chars, gc); +} + +void +md5_state_init (struct md5_state *s) +{ + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + + md_ctx_init(&s->ctx, md5_kt); +} + +void +md5_state_update (struct md5_state *s, void *data, size_t len) +{ + md_ctx_update(&s->ctx, data, len); +} + +void +md5_state_final (struct md5_state *s, struct md5_digest *out) +{ + md_ctx_final(&s->ctx, out->digest); + md_ctx_cleanup(&s->ctx); +} + +void +md5_digest_clear (struct md5_digest *digest) +{ + CLEAR (*digest); +} + +bool +md5_digest_defined (const struct md5_digest *digest) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; ++i) + if (digest->digest[i]) + return true; + return false; +} + +bool +md5_digest_equal (const struct md5_digest *d1, const struct md5_digest *d2) +{ + return memcmp(d1->digest, d2->digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0; +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b4b88ea --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography Module + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTO_H +#define CRYPTO_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +#define ALLOW_NON_CBC_CIPHERS + +#include "crypto_backend.h" +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "mtu.h" + +/* + * Defines a key type and key length for both cipher and HMAC. + */ +struct key_type +{ + uint8_t cipher_length; /**< Cipher length, in bytes */ + uint8_t hmac_length; /**< HMAC length, in bytes */ + const cipher_kt_t *cipher; /**< Cipher static parameters */ + const md_kt_t *digest; /**< Message digest static parameters */ +}; + +/** + * Container for unidirectional cipher and HMAC %key material. + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key +{ + uint8_t cipher[MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH]; + /**< %Key material for cipher operations. */ + uint8_t hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; + /**< %Key material for HMAC operations. */ +}; + + +/** + * Container for one set of OpenSSL cipher and/or HMAC contexts. + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key_ctx +{ + cipher_ctx_t *cipher; /**< Generic cipher %context. */ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac; /**< Generic HMAC %context. */ +}; + +#define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */ +#define KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL 1 /* encrypt with keys[0], decrypt with keys[1] */ +#define KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE 2 /* encrypt with keys[1], decrypt with keys[0] */ + +/** + * Container for bidirectional cipher and HMAC %key material. + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key2 +{ + int n; /**< The number of \c key objects stored + * in the \c key2.keys array. */ + struct key keys[2]; /**< Two unidirectional sets of %key + * material. */ +}; + +/** + * %Key ordering of the \c key2.keys array. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This structure takes care of correct ordering when using unidirectional + * or bidirectional %key material, and allows the same shared secret %key + * file to be loaded in the same way by client and server by having one of + * the hosts use an reversed ordering. + */ +struct key_direction_state +{ + int out_key; /**< Index into the \c key2.keys array for + * the sending direction. */ + int in_key; /**< Index into the \c key2.keys array for + * the receiving direction. */ + int need_keys; /**< The number of key objects necessary + * to support both sending and + * receiving. + * + * This will be 1 if the same keys are + * used in both directions, or 2 if + * there are two sets of unidirectional + * keys. */ +}; + +/** + * Container for two sets of OpenSSL cipher and/or HMAC contexts for both + * sending and receiving directions. + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key_ctx_bi +{ + struct key_ctx encrypt; /**< OpenSSL cipher and/or HMAC contexts + * for sending direction. */ + struct key_ctx decrypt; /**< OpenSSL cipher and/or HMAC contexts + * for receiving direction. */ +}; + +/** + * Security parameter state for processing data channel packets. + * @ingroup data_crypto + */ +struct crypto_options +{ + struct key_ctx_bi *key_ctx_bi; + /**< OpenSSL cipher and HMAC contexts for + * both sending and receiving + * directions. */ + struct packet_id *packet_id; /**< Current packet ID state for both + * sending and receiving directions. */ + struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist; + /**< Persistent packet ID state for + * keeping state between successive + * OpenVPN process startups. */ + +# define CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM (1<<0) + /**< Bit-flag indicating whether to use + * OpenVPN's long packet ID format. */ +# define CO_USE_IV (1<<1) + /**< Bit-flag indicating whether to + * generate a pseudo-random IV for each + * packet being encrypted. */ +# define CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID (1<<2) + /**< Bit-flag indicating whether to ignore + * the packet ID of a received packet. + * This flag is used during processing + * of the first packet received from a + * client. */ +# define CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS (1<<3) + /**< Bit-flag indicating not to display + * replay warnings. */ + unsigned int flags; /**< Bit-flags determining behavior of + * security operation functions. */ +}; + +#define RKF_MUST_SUCCEED (1<<0) +#define RKF_INLINE (1<<1) +void read_key_file (struct key2 *key2, const char *file, const unsigned int flags); + +int write_key_file (const int nkeys, const char *filename); + +int read_passphrase_hash (const char *passphrase_file, + const md_kt_t *digest, + uint8_t *output, + int len); + +void generate_key_random (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt); + +void check_replay_iv_consistency(const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id, bool use_iv); + +bool check_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt); + +void fixup_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt); + +bool write_key (const struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, + struct buffer *buf); + +int read_key (struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf); + +bool cfb_ofb_mode (const struct key_type* kt); + +void init_key_type (struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, + bool ciphername_defined, const char *authname, bool authname_defined, + int keysize, bool cfb_ofb_allowed, bool warn); + +/* + * Key context functions + */ + +void init_key_ctx (struct key_ctx *ctx, struct key *key, + const struct key_type *kt, int enc, + const char *prefix); + +void free_key_ctx (struct key_ctx *ctx); + +void free_key_ctx_bi (struct key_ctx_bi *ctx); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for performing security operations on data channel packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Encrypt and HMAC sign a packet so that it can be sent as a data channel + * VPN tunnel packet to a remote OpenVPN peer. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * This function handles encryption and HMAC signing of a data channel + * packet before it is sent to its remote OpenVPN peer. It receives the + * necessary security parameters in the \a opt argument, which should have + * been set to the correct values by the \c tls_pre_encrypt() function. + * + * This function calls the \c EVP_Cipher* and \c HMAC_* functions of the + * OpenSSL library to perform the actual security operations. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, then the \a buf %buffer is set to + * empty. + * + * @param buf - The %buffer containing the packet on which to + * perform security operations. + * @param work - A working %buffer. + * @param opt - The security parameter state for this VPN tunnel. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + * @return This function returns void.\n On return, the \a buf argument + * will point to the resulting %buffer. This %buffer will either + * contain the processed packet ready for sending, or be empty if an + * error occurred. + */ +void openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + const struct crypto_options *opt, + const struct frame* frame); + + +/** + * HMAC verify and decrypt a data channel packet received from a remote + * OpenVPN peer. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * This function handles authenticating and decrypting a data channel + * packet received from a remote OpenVPN peer. It receives the necessary + * security parameters in the \a opt argument, which should have been set + * to the correct values by the \c tls_pre_decrypt() function. + * + * This function calls the \c EVP_Cipher* and \c HMAC_* functions of the + * OpenSSL library to perform the actual security operations. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, then the \a buf %buffer is set to + * empty. + * + * @param buf - The %buffer containing the packet received from a + * remote OpenVPN peer on which to perform security + * operations. + * @param work - A working %buffer. + * @param opt - The security parameter state for this VPN tunnel. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return + * @li True, if the packet was authenticated and decrypted successfully. + * @li False, if an error occurred. \n On return, the \a buf argument will + * point to the resulting %buffer. This %buffer will either contain + * the plaintext packet ready for further processing, or be empty if + * an error occurred. + */ +bool openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + const struct crypto_options *opt, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** @} name Functions for performing security operations on data channel packets */ + +void crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame, + const struct key_type* kt, + bool cipher_defined, + bool use_iv, + bool packet_id, + bool packet_id_long_form); + + +/* Minimum length of the nonce used by the PRNG */ +#define NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN 16 + +/* Maximum length of the nonce used by the PRNG */ +#define NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MAX 64 + +/** Number of bytes of random to allow before resetting the nonce */ +#define PRNG_NONCE_RESET_BYTES 1024 + +/** + * Pseudo-random number generator initialisation. + * (see \c prng_rand_bytes()) + * + * @param md_name Name of the message digest to use + * @param nonce_secret_len_param Length of the nonce to use + */ +void prng_init (const char *md_name, const int nonce_secret_len_parm); + +/* + * Message digest-based pseudo random number generator. + * + * If the PRNG was initialised with a certain message digest, uses the digest + * to calculate the next random number, and prevent depletion of the entropy + * pool. + * + * This PRNG is aimed at IV generation and similar miscellaneous tasks. Use + * \c rand_bytes() for higher-assurance functionality. + * + * Retrieves len bytes of pseudo random data, and places it in output. + * + * @param output Output buffer + * @param len Length of the output buffer + */ +void prng_bytes (uint8_t *output, int len); + +void prng_uninit (); + +void test_crypto (const struct crypto_options *co, struct frame* f); + + +/* key direction functions */ + +void key_direction_state_init (struct key_direction_state *kds, int key_direction); + +void verify_fix_key2 (struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared_secret_file); + +void must_have_n_keys (const char *filename, const char *option, const struct key2 *key2, int n); + +int ascii2keydirection (int msglevel, const char *str); + +const char *keydirection2ascii (int kd, bool remote); + +/* print keys */ +void key2_print (const struct key2* k, + const struct key_type *kt, + const char* prefix0, + const char* prefix1); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + +#define GHK_INLINE (1<<0) +void get_tls_handshake_key (const struct key_type *key_type, + struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, + const char *passphrase_file, + const int key_direction, + const unsigned int flags); + +#else + +void init_ssl_lib (void); +void free_ssl_lib (void); + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + +/* + * md5 functions + */ + +struct md5_state { + md_ctx_t ctx; +}; + +struct md5_digest { + uint8_t digest [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}; + +const char *md5sum(uint8_t *buf, int len, int n_print_chars, struct gc_arena *gc); +void md5_state_init (struct md5_state *s); +void md5_state_update (struct md5_state *s, void *data, size_t len); +void md5_state_final (struct md5_state *s, struct md5_digest *out); +void md5_digest_clear (struct md5_digest *digest); +bool md5_digest_defined (const struct md5_digest *digest); +bool md5_digest_equal (const struct md5_digest *d1, const struct md5_digest *d2); + +/* + * Inline functions + */ + +static inline bool +key_ctx_bi_defined(const struct key_ctx_bi* key) +{ + return key->encrypt.cipher || key->encrypt.hmac || key->decrypt.cipher || key->decrypt.hmac; +} + + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1eac6115 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h @@ -0,0 +1,488 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography SSL library-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTO_BACKEND_H_ +#define CRYPTO_BACKEND_H_ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include "crypto_openssl.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#include "crypto_polarssl.h" +#endif +#include "basic.h" + + +/* + * This routine should have additional OpenSSL crypto library initialisations + * used by both crypto and ssl components of OpenVPN. + */ +void crypto_init_lib (void); + +void crypto_uninit_lib (void); + +void crypto_clear_error (void); + +/* + * Initialise the given named crypto engine. + */ +void crypto_init_lib_engine (const char *engine_name); + +#ifdef DMALLOC +/* + * OpenSSL memory debugging. If dmalloc debugging is enabled, tell + * OpenSSL to use our private malloc/realloc/free functions so that + * we can dispatch them to dmalloc. + */ +void crypto_init_dmalloc (void); +#endif /* DMALLOC */ + +void show_available_ciphers (void); + +void show_available_digests (void); + +void show_available_engines (void); + +/* + * + * Random number functions, used in cases where we want + * reasonably strong cryptographic random number generation + * without depleting our entropy pool. Used for random + * IV values and a number of other miscellaneous tasks. + * + */ + +/** + * Wrapper for secure random number generator. Retrieves len bytes of random + * data, and places it in output. + * + * @param output Output buffer + * @param len Length of the output buffer, in bytes + * + * @return \c 1 on success, \c 0 on failure + */ +int rand_bytes (uint8_t *output, int len); + +/* + * + * Key functions, allow manipulation of keys. + * + */ + + +/** + * Return number of DES cblocks (1 cblock = length of a single-DES key) for the + * current key type or 0 if not a DES cipher. + * + * @param kt Type of key + * + * @return Number of DES cblocks that the key consists of, or 0. + */ +int key_des_num_cblocks (const cipher_kt_t *kt); + +/* + * Check the given DES key. Checks the given key's length, weakness and parity. + * + * @param key Key to check + * @param key_len Length of the key, in bytes + * @param ndc Number of DES cblocks that the key is made up of. + * + * @return \c true if the key is valid, \c false otherwise. + */ +bool key_des_check (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc); + +/* + * Fix the given DES key, setting its parity to odd. + * + * @param key Key to check + * @param key_len Length of the key, in bytes + * @param ndc Number of DES cblocks that the key is made up of. + */ +void key_des_fixup (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc); + +/** + * Encrypt the given block, using DES ECB mode + * + * @param key DES key to use. + * @param src Buffer containing the 8-byte source. + * @param dst Buffer containing the 8-byte destination + */ +void cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (const unsigned char key[DES_KEY_LENGTH], + unsigned char src[DES_KEY_LENGTH], + unsigned char dst[DES_KEY_LENGTH]); + +/* + * + * Generic cipher key type functions + * + */ +/* + * Max size in bytes of any cipher key that might conceivably be used. + * + * This value is checked at compile time in crypto.c to make sure + * it is always at least EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH. + * + * We define our own value, since this parameter + * is used to control the size of static key files. + * If the OpenSSL library increases EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH, + * we don't want our key files to be suddenly rendered + * unusable. + */ +#define MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH 64 + +/** + * Return cipher parameters, based on the given cipher name. The + * contents of these parameters are library-specific, and can be used to + * initialise encryption/decryption. + * + * @param ciphername Name of the cipher to retrieve parameters for (e.g. + * \c AES-128-CBC). + * + * @return A statically allocated structure containing parameters + * for the given cipher. + */ +const cipher_kt_t * cipher_kt_get (const char *ciphername); + +/** + * Retrieve a string describing the cipher (e.g. \c AES-128-CBC). + * + * @param cipher_kt Static cipher parameters + * + * @return a statically allocated string describing the cipher. + */ +const char * cipher_kt_name (const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt); + +/** + * Returns the size of keys used by the cipher, in bytes. If the cipher has a + * variable key size, return the default key size. + * + * @param cipher_kt Static cipher parameters + * + * @return (Default) size of keys used by the cipher, in bytes. + */ +int cipher_kt_key_size (const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt); + +/** + * Returns the size of the IV used by the cipher, in bytes, or 0 if no IV is + * used. + * + * @param cipher_kt Static cipher parameters + * + * @return Size of the IV, in bytes, or 0 if the cipher does not + * use an IV. + */ +int cipher_kt_iv_size (const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt); + +/** + * Returns the block size of the cipher, in bytes. + * + * @param cipher_kt Static cipher parameters + * + * @return Block size, in bytes. + */ +int cipher_kt_block_size (const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt); + +/** + * Returns the mode that the cipher runs in. + * + * @param cipher_kt Static cipher parameters + * + * @return Cipher mode, either \c OPENVPN_MODE_CBC, \c + * OPENVPN_MODE_OFB or \c OPENVPN_MODE_CFB + */ +int cipher_kt_mode (const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt); + + +/** + * + * Generic cipher functions + * + */ + +/** + * Initialise a cipher context, based on the given key and key type. + * + * @param ctx Cipher context. May not be NULL + * @param key Buffer containing the key to use + * @param key_len Length of the key, in bytes + * @param kt Static cipher parameters to use + * @param enc Whether to encrypt or decrypt (either + * \c POLARSSL_OP_ENCRYPT or \c POLARSSL_OP_DECRYPT). + */ +void cipher_ctx_init (cipher_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *key, int key_len, + const cipher_kt_t *kt, int enc); + +/** + * Cleanup the specified context. + * + * @param ctx Cipher context to cleanup. + */ +void cipher_ctx_cleanup (cipher_ctx_t *ctx); + +/** + * Returns the size of the IV used by the cipher, in bytes, or 0 if no IV is + * used. + * + * @param ctx The cipher's context + * + * @return Size of the IV, in bytes, or \c 0 if the cipher does not + * use an IV or ctx was NULL. + */ +int cipher_ctx_iv_length (const cipher_ctx_t *ctx); + +/** + * Returns the block size of the cipher, in bytes. + * + * @param ctx The cipher's context + * + * @return Block size, in bytes, or 0 if ctx was NULL. + */ +int cipher_ctx_block_size (const cipher_ctx_t *ctx); + +/** + * Returns the mode that the cipher runs in. + * + * @param ctx Cipher's context. May not be NULL. + * + * @return Cipher mode, either \c OPENVPN_MODE_CBC, \c + * OPENVPN_MODE_OFB or \c OPENVPN_MODE_CFB + */ +int cipher_ctx_mode (const cipher_ctx_t *ctx); + +/** + * Resets the given cipher context, setting the IV to the specified value. + * Preserves the associated key information. + * + * @param ctx Cipher's context. May not be NULL. + * @param iv_buf The IV to use. + * + * @return \c 0 on failure, \c 1 on success. + */ +int cipher_ctx_reset (cipher_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf); + +/** + * Updates the given cipher context, encrypting data in the source buffer, and + * placing any complete blocks in the destination buffer. + * + * Note that if a complete block cannot be written, data is cached in the + * context, and emitted at a later call to \c cipher_ctx_update, or by a call + * to \c cipher_ctx_final(). This implies that dst should have enough room for + * src_len + \c cipher_ctx_block_size() - 1. + * + * @param ctx Cipher's context. May not be NULL. + * @param dst Destination buffer + * @param dst_len Length of the destination buffer, in bytes + * @param src Source buffer + * @param src_len Length of the source buffer, in bytes + * + * @return \c 0 on failure, \c 1 on success. + */ +int cipher_ctx_update (cipher_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, + uint8_t *src, int src_len); + +/** + * Pads the final cipher block using PKCS padding, and output to the destination + * buffer. + * + * @param ctx Cipher's context. May not be NULL. + * @param dst Destination buffer + * @param dst_len Length of the destination buffer, in bytes + * + * @return \c 0 on failure, \c 1 on success. + */ +int cipher_ctx_final (cipher_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len); + +/* + * + * Generic message digest information functions + * + */ + +/* + * Max size in bytes of any HMAC key that might conceivably be used. + * + * This value is checked at compile time in crypto.c to make sure + * it is always at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We define our own value + * for the same reason as above. + */ +#define MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH 64 + +/** + * Return message digest parameters, based on the given digest name. The + * contents of these parameters are library-specific, and can be used to + * initialise HMAC or message digest operations. + * + * @param digest Name of the digest to retrieve parameters for (e.g. + * \c MD5). + * + * @return A statically allocated structure containing parameters + * for the given message digest. + */ +const md_kt_t * md_kt_get (const char *digest); + +/** + * Retrieve a string describing the digest digest (e.g. \c SHA1). + * + * @param kt Static message digest parameters + * + * @return Statically allocated string describing the message + * digest. + */ +const char * md_kt_name (const md_kt_t *kt); + +/** + * Returns the size of the message digest, in bytes. + * + * @param kt Static message digest parameters + * + * @return Message digest size, in bytes, or 0 if ctx was NULL. + */ +int md_kt_size (const md_kt_t *kt); + + +/* + * + * Generic message digest functions + * + */ + +/* + * Calculates the message digest for the given buffer. + * + * @param kt Static message digest parameters + * @param src Buffer to digest. May not be NULL. + * @param src_len The length of the incoming buffer. + * @param dst Buffer to write the message digest to. May not be NULL. + * + * @return \c 1 on success, \c 0 on failure + */ +int md_full (const md_kt_t *kt, const uint8_t *src, int src_len, uint8_t *dst); + +/* + * Initialises the given message digest context. + * + * @param ctx Message digest context + * @param kt Static message digest parameters + */ +void md_ctx_init (md_ctx_t *ctx, const md_kt_t *kt); + +/* + * Free the given message digest context. + * + * @param ctx Message digest context + */ +void md_ctx_cleanup(md_ctx_t *ctx); + +/* + * Returns the size of the message digest output by the given context + * + * @param ctx Message digest context. + * + * @return Size of the message digest, or \0 if ctx is NULL. + */ +int md_ctx_size (const md_ctx_t *ctx); + +/* + * Process the given data for use in the message digest. + * + * @param ctx Message digest context. May not be NULL. + * @param src Buffer to digest. May not be NULL. + * @param src_len The length of the incoming buffer. + */ +void md_ctx_update (md_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len); + +/* + * Output the message digest to the given buffer. + * + * @param ctx Message digest context. May not be NULL. + * @param dst Buffer to write the message digest to. May not be NULL. + */ +void md_ctx_final (md_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst); + + +/* + * + * Generic HMAC functions + * + */ + +/* + * Initialises the given HMAC context, using the given digest + * and key. + * + * @param ctx HMAC context to intialise + * @param key The key to use for the HMAC + * @param key_len The key length to use + * @param kt Static message digest parameters + * + */ +void hmac_ctx_init (hmac_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int key_length, + const md_kt_t *kt); + +/* + * Free the given HMAC context. + * + * @param ctx HMAC context + */ +void hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac_ctx_t *ctx); + +/* + * Returns the size of the HMAC output by the given HMAC Context + * + * @param ctx HMAC context. + * + * @return Size of the HMAC, or \0 if ctx is NULL. + */ +int hmac_ctx_size (const hmac_ctx_t *ctx); + +/* + * Resets the given HMAC context, preserving the associated key information + * + * @param ctx HMAC context. May not be NULL. + */ +void hmac_ctx_reset (hmac_ctx_t *ctx); + +/* + * Process the given data for use in the HMAC. + * + * @param ctx HMAC context. May not be NULL. + * @param src The buffer to HMAC. May not be NULL. + * @param src_len The length of the incoming buffer. + */ +void hmac_ctx_update (hmac_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len); + +/* + * Output the HMAC to the given buffer. + * + * @param ctx HMAC context. May not be NULL. + * @param dst buffer to write the HMAC to. May not be NULL. + */ +void hmac_ctx_final (hmac_ctx_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst); + +#endif /* CRYPTO_BACKEND_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53425029 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,753 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography OpenSSL-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "crypto_backend.h" +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Check for key size creepage. + */ + +#if MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH < EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH +#warning Some OpenSSL EVP ciphers now support key lengths greater than MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH -- consider increasing MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH +#endif + +#if MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH < EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE +#warning Some OpenSSL HMAC message digests now support key lengths greater than MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH -- consider increasing MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH +#endif + +/* + * + * Workarounds for incompatibilites between OpenSSL libraries. + * Right now we accept OpenSSL libraries from 0.9.5 to 0.9.7. + * + */ + +#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L + +/* Workaround: EVP_CIPHER_mode is defined wrong in OpenSSL 0.9.6 but is fixed in 0.9.7 */ +#undef EVP_CIPHER_mode +#define EVP_CIPHER_mode(e) (((e)->flags) & EVP_CIPH_MODE) + +#define DES_cblock des_cblock +#define DES_is_weak_key des_is_weak_key +#define DES_check_key_parity des_check_key_parity +#define DES_set_odd_parity des_set_odd_parity + +#define HMAC_CTX_init(ctx) CLEAR (*ctx) +#define HMAC_Init_ex(ctx,sec,len,md,impl) HMAC_Init(ctx, sec, len, md) +#define HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx) HMAC_cleanup(ctx) +#define EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md) CLEAR (*md) + +#define INFO_CALLBACK_SSL_CONST + +#endif + +static inline int +EVP_CipherInit_ov (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, uint8_t *key, uint8_t *iv, int enc) +{ + return EVP_CipherInit (ctx, type, key, iv, enc); +} + +static inline int +EVP_CipherUpdate_ov (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *outl, uint8_t *in, int inl) +{ + return EVP_CipherUpdate (ctx, out, outl, in, inl); +} + +static inline bool +cipher_ok (const char* name) +{ + return true; +} + +#ifndef EVP_CIPHER_name +#define EVP_CIPHER_name(e) OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(e)) +#endif + +#ifndef EVP_MD_name +#define EVP_MD_name(e) OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(e)) +#endif + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE +#include + +static bool engine_initialized = false; /* GLOBAL */ + +static ENGINE *engine_persist = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */ +static ENGINE * +try_load_engine (const char *engine) +{ + ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id ("dynamic"); + if (e) + { + if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string (e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0) + || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string (e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) + { + ENGINE_free (e); + e = NULL; + } + } + return e; +} + +static ENGINE * +setup_engine (const char *engine) +{ + ENGINE *e = NULL; + + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines (); + + if (engine) + { + if (strcmp (engine, "auto") == 0) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Initializing OpenSSL auto engine support"); + ENGINE_register_all_complete (); + return NULL; + } + if ((e = ENGINE_by_id (engine)) == NULL + && (e = try_load_engine (engine)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "OpenSSL error: cannot load engine '%s'", engine); + } + + if (!ENGINE_set_default (e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "OpenSSL error: ENGINE_set_default failed on engine '%s'", + engine); + } + + msg (M_INFO, "Initializing OpenSSL support for engine '%s'", + ENGINE_get_id (e)); + } + return e; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE */ + +void +crypto_init_lib_engine (const char *engine_name) +{ +#if HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE + if (!engine_initialized) + { + ASSERT (engine_name); + ASSERT (!engine_persist); + engine_persist = setup_engine (engine_name); + engine_initialized = true; + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "Note: OpenSSL hardware crypto engine functionality is not available"); +#endif +} + +/* + * + * Functions related to the core crypto library + * + */ + +void +crypto_init_lib (void) +{ +#ifndef USE_SSL +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + ERR_load_crypto_strings (); +#endif + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms (); +#endif + + /* + * If you build the OpenSSL library and OpenVPN with + * CRYPTO_MDEBUG, you will get a listing of OpenSSL + * memory leaks on program termination. + */ + +#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG + CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); +#endif +} + +void +crypto_uninit_lib (void) +{ +#ifndef USE_SSL + EVP_cleanup (); +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + ERR_free_strings (); +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG + FILE* fp = fopen ("sdlog", "w"); + ASSERT (fp); + CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp (fp); + fclose (fp); +#endif + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE + if (engine_initialized) + { + ENGINE_cleanup (); + engine_persist = NULL; + engine_initialized = false; + } +#endif +} + +void +crypto_clear_error (void) +{ + ERR_clear_error (); +} + +/* + * + * OpenSSL memory debugging. If dmalloc debugging is enabled, tell + * OpenSSL to use our private malloc/realloc/free functions so that + * we can dispatch them to dmalloc. + * + */ + +#ifdef DMALLOC +static void * +crypto_malloc (size_t size, const char *file, int line) +{ + return dmalloc_malloc(file, line, size, DMALLOC_FUNC_MALLOC, 0, 0); +} + +static void * +crypto_realloc (void *ptr, size_t size, const char *file, int line) +{ + return dmalloc_realloc(file, line, ptr, size, DMALLOC_FUNC_REALLOC, 0); +} + +static void +crypto_free (void *ptr) +{ + dmalloc_free (__FILE__, __LINE__, ptr, DMALLOC_FUNC_FREE); +} + +void +crypto_init_dmalloc (void) +{ + CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions (crypto_malloc, + crypto_realloc, + crypto_free); +} +#endif /* DMALLOC */ + +void +show_available_ciphers () +{ + int nid; + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + printf ("The following ciphers and cipher modes are available\n" + "for use with " PACKAGE_NAME ". Each cipher shown below may be\n" + "used as a parameter to the --cipher option. The default\n" + "key size is shown as well as whether or not it can be\n" + "changed with the --keysize directive. Using a CBC mode\n" + "is recommended.\n\n"); +#endif + + for (nid = 0; nid < 10000; ++nid) /* is there a better way to get the size of the nid list? */ + { + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid (nid); + if (cipher && cipher_ok (OBJ_nid2sn (nid))) + { + const unsigned int mode = EVP_CIPHER_mode (cipher); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE +#ifdef ALLOW_NON_CBC_CIPHERS + || mode == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE +#endif + ) + printf ("%s %d bit default key (%s)\n", + OBJ_nid2sn (nid), + EVP_CIPHER_key_length (cipher) * 8, + ((EVP_CIPHER_flags (cipher) & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH) ? + "variable" : "fixed")); + } + } + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +show_available_digests () +{ + int nid; + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + printf ("The following message digests are available for use with\n" + PACKAGE_NAME ". A message digest is used in conjunction with\n" + "the HMAC function, to authenticate received packets.\n" + "You can specify a message digest as parameter to\n" + "the --auth option.\n\n"); +#endif + + for (nid = 0; nid < 10000; ++nid) + { + const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_get_digestbynid (nid); + if (digest) + { + printf ("%s %d bit digest size\n", + OBJ_nid2sn (nid), EVP_MD_size (digest) * 8); + } + } + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +show_available_engines () +{ +#if HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE /* Only defined for OpenSSL */ + ENGINE *e; + + printf ("OpenSSL Crypto Engines\n\n"); + + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines (); + + e = ENGINE_get_first (); + while (e) + { + printf ("%s [%s]\n", + ENGINE_get_name (e), + ENGINE_get_id (e)); + e = ENGINE_get_next (e); + } + ENGINE_cleanup (); +#else + printf ("Sorry, OpenSSL hardware crypto engine functionality is not available.\n"); +#endif +} + +/* + * + * Random number functions, used in cases where we want + * reasonably strong cryptographic random number generation + * without depleting our entropy pool. Used for random + * IV values and a number of other miscellaneous tasks. + * + */ + +int rand_bytes(uint8_t *output, int len) +{ + return RAND_bytes (output, len); +} + +/* + * + * Key functions, allow manipulation of keys. + * + */ + + +int +key_des_num_cblocks (const EVP_CIPHER *kt) +{ + int ret = 0; + const char *name = OBJ_nid2sn (EVP_CIPHER_nid (kt)); + if (name) + { + if (!strncmp (name, "DES-", 4)) + { + ret = EVP_CIPHER_key_length (kt) / sizeof (DES_cblock); + } + else if (!strncmp (name, "DESX-", 5)) + { + ret = 1; + } + } + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "CRYPTO INFO: n_DES_cblocks=%d", ret); + return ret; +} + +bool +key_des_check (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc) +{ + int i; + struct buffer b; + + buf_set_read (&b, key, key_len); + + for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i) + { + DES_cblock *dc = (DES_cblock*) buf_read_alloc (&b, sizeof (DES_cblock)); + if (!dc) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: insufficient key material"); + goto err; + } + if (DES_is_weak_key(dc)) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: weak key detected"); + goto err; + } + if (!DES_check_key_parity (dc)) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: bad parity detected"); + goto err; + } + } + return true; + + err: + ERR_clear_error (); + return false; +} + +void +key_des_fixup (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc) +{ + int i; + struct buffer b; + + buf_set_read (&b, key, key_len); + for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i) + { + DES_cblock *dc = (DES_cblock*) buf_read_alloc(&b, sizeof(DES_cblock)); + if (!dc) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key_DES: insufficient key material"); + ERR_clear_error (); + return; + } + DES_set_odd_parity (dc); + } +} + + +/* + * + * Generic cipher key type functions + * + */ + + +const EVP_CIPHER * +cipher_kt_get (const char *ciphername) +{ + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + + ASSERT (ciphername); + + cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname (ciphername); + + if ((NULL == cipher) || !cipher_ok (OBJ_nid2sn (EVP_CIPHER_nid (cipher)))) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cipher algorithm '%s' not found", ciphername); + + if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length (cipher) > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher algorithm '%s' uses a default key size (%d bytes) which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum key size (%d bytes)", + ciphername, + EVP_CIPHER_key_length (cipher), + MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH); + + return cipher; +} + +const char * +cipher_kt_name (const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_kt) +{ + if (NULL == cipher_kt) + return "[null-cipher]"; + return EVP_CIPHER_name (cipher_kt); +} + +int +cipher_kt_key_size (const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_kt) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_key_length (cipher_kt); +} + +int +cipher_kt_iv_size (const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_kt) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_iv_length (cipher_kt); +} + +int +cipher_kt_block_size (const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_kt) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_block_size (cipher_kt); +} + +int +cipher_kt_mode (const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != cipher_kt); + return EVP_CIPHER_mode (cipher_kt); +} + +/* + * + * Generic cipher context functions + * + */ + + +void +cipher_ctx_init (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *key, int key_len, + const EVP_CIPHER *kt, int enc) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != kt && NULL != ctx); + + CLEAR (*ctx); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (ctx); + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ov (ctx, kt, NULL, NULL, enc)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "EVP cipher init #1"); +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length (ctx, key_len)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "EVP set key size"); +#endif + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ov (ctx, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "EVP cipher init #2"); + + /* make sure we used a big enough key */ + ASSERT (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length (ctx) <= key_len); +} + +void +cipher_ctx_cleanup (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (ctx); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_iv_length (const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length (ctx); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size (ctx); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_mode (const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode (ctx); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_reset (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf) +{ + return EVP_CipherInit_ov (ctx, NULL, NULL, iv_buf, -1); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_update (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, + uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + return EVP_CipherUpdate_ov (ctx, dst, dst_len, src, src_len); +} + +int +cipher_ctx_final (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len) +{ + return EVP_CipherFinal (ctx, dst, dst_len); +} + + +void +cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (const unsigned char key[DES_KEY_LENGTH], + unsigned char *src, + unsigned char *dst) +{ + DES_key_schedule sched; + + DES_set_key_unchecked((DES_cblock*)key, &sched); + DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)src, (DES_cblock *)dst, &sched, DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +/* + * + * Generic message digest information functions + * + */ + + +const EVP_MD * +md_kt_get (const char *digest) +{ + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + ASSERT (digest); + md = EVP_get_digestbyname (digest); + if (!md) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Message hash algorithm '%s' not found", digest); + if (EVP_MD_size (md) > MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH) + msg (M_FATAL, "Message hash algorithm '%s' uses a default hash size (%d bytes) which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum hash size (%d bytes)", + digest, + EVP_MD_size (md), + MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH); + return md; +} + +const char * +md_kt_name (const EVP_MD *kt) +{ + if (NULL == kt) + return "[null-digest]"; + return EVP_MD_name (kt); +} + +int +md_kt_size (const EVP_MD *kt) +{ + return EVP_MD_size(kt); +} + + +/* + * + * Generic message digest functions + * + */ + +int +md_full (const EVP_MD *kt, const uint8_t *src, int src_len, uint8_t *dst) +{ + unsigned int in_md_len = 0; + + return EVP_Digest(src, src_len, dst, &in_md_len, kt, NULL); +} + +void +md_ctx_init (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx && NULL != kt); + + CLEAR (*ctx); + + EVP_MD_CTX_init (ctx); + EVP_DigestInit(ctx, kt); +} + +void +md_ctx_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); +} + +int +md_ctx_size (const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + return EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx); +} + +void +md_ctx_update (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, src, src_len); +} + +void +md_ctx_final (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst) +{ + unsigned int in_md_len = 0; + + EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, dst, &in_md_len); +} + + +/* + * + * Generic HMAC functions + * + */ + + +void +hmac_ctx_init (HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int key_len, + const EVP_MD *kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != kt && NULL != ctx); + + CLEAR(*ctx); + + HMAC_CTX_init (ctx); + HMAC_Init_ex (ctx, key, key_len, kt, NULL); + + /* make sure we used a big enough key */ + ASSERT (HMAC_size (ctx) <= key_len); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) +{ + HMAC_CTX_cleanup (ctx); +} + +int +hmac_ctx_size (const HMAC_CTX *ctx) +{ + return HMAC_size (ctx); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_reset (HMAC_CTX *ctx) +{ + HMAC_Init_ex (ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_update (HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + HMAC_Update (ctx, src, src_len); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_final (HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *dst) +{ + unsigned int in_hmac_len = 0; + + HMAC_Final (ctx, dst, &in_hmac_len); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f883c2a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography OpenSSL-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H_ +#define CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H_ + +#include +#include +#include + +/** Generic cipher key type %context. */ +typedef EVP_CIPHER cipher_kt_t; + +/** Generic message digest key type %context. */ +typedef EVP_MD md_kt_t; + +/** Generic cipher %context. */ +typedef EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx_t; + +/** Generic message digest %context. */ +typedef EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx_t; + +/** Generic HMAC %context. */ +typedef HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx_t; + +/** Maximum length of an IV */ +#define OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + +/** Cipher is in CBC mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_CBC EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE + +/** Cipher is in OFB mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_OFB EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE + +/** Cipher is in CFB mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_CFB EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE + +/** Cipher should encrypt */ +#define OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT 1 + +/** Cipher should decrypt */ +#define OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT 0 + +#define DES_KEY_LENGTH 8 +#define MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 + +#endif /* CRYPTO_OPENSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3978a3c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,605 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography PolarSSL-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + +#include "errlevel.h" +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "crypto_backend.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * + * Hardware engine support. Allows loading/unloading of engines. + * + */ + +void +crypto_init_lib_engine (const char *engine_name) +{ + msg (M_WARN, "Note: PolarSSL hardware crypto engine functionality is not " + "available"); +} + +/* + * + * Functions related to the core crypto library + * + */ + +void +crypto_init_lib (void) +{ +} + +void +crypto_uninit_lib (void) +{ +} + +void +crypto_clear_error (void) +{ +} + +#ifdef DMALLOC +void +crypto_init_dmalloc (void) +{ + msg (M_ERR, "Error: dmalloc support is not available for PolarSSL."); +} +#endif /* DMALLOC */ + +void +show_available_ciphers () +{ + const int *ciphers = cipher_list(); + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + printf ("The following ciphers and cipher modes are available\n" + "for use with " PACKAGE_NAME ". Each cipher shown below may be\n" + "used as a parameter to the --cipher option. The default\n" + "key size is shown as well as whether or not it can be\n" + "changed with the --keysize directive. Using a CBC mode\n" + "is recommended.\n\n"); +#endif + + while (*ciphers != 0) + { + const cipher_info_t *info = cipher_info_from_type(*ciphers); + + if (info && info->mode == POLARSSL_MODE_CBC) + printf ("%s %d bit default key\n", + info->name, info->key_length); + + ciphers++; + } + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +show_available_digests () +{ + const int *digests = md_list(); + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + printf ("The following message digests are available for use with\n" + PACKAGE_NAME ". A message digest is used in conjunction with\n" + "the HMAC function, to authenticate received packets.\n" + "You can specify a message digest as parameter to\n" + "the --auth option.\n\n"); +#endif + + while (*digests != 0) + { + const md_info_t *info = md_info_from_type(*digests); + + if (info) + printf ("%s %d bit default key\n", + info->name, info->size * 8); + digests++; + } + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +show_available_engines () +{ + printf ("Sorry, PolarSSL hardware crypto engine functionality is not " + "available\n"); +} + +/* + * + * Random number functions, used in cases where we want + * reasonably strong cryptographic random number generation + * without depleting our entropy pool. Used for random + * IV values and a number of other miscellaneous tasks. + * + */ + +/* + * Initialise the given ctr_drbg context, using a personalisation string and an + * entropy gathering function. + */ +ctr_drbg_context * rand_ctx_get() +{ + static entropy_context ec = {0}; + static ctr_drbg_context cd_ctx = {0}; + static bool rand_initialised = false; + + if (!rand_initialised) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + struct buffer pers_string = alloc_buf_gc(100, &gc); + + /* + * Personalisation string, should be as unique as possible (see NIST + * 800-90 section 8.7.1). We have very little information at this stage. + * Include Program Name, memory address of the context and PID. + */ + buf_printf(&pers_string, "OpenVPN %0u %p %s", platform_getpid(), &cd_ctx, time_string(0, 0, 0, &gc)); + + /* Initialise PolarSSL RNG, and built-in entropy sources */ + entropy_init(&ec); + + if (0 != ctr_drbg_init(&cd_ctx, entropy_func, &ec, BPTR(&pers_string), BLEN(&pers_string))) + msg (M_FATAL, "Failed to initialize random generator"); + + gc_free(&gc); + rand_initialised = true; + } + + return &cd_ctx; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE +void rand_ctx_enable_prediction_resistance() +{ + ctr_drbg_context *cd_ctx = rand_ctx_get(); + + ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(cd_ctx, 1); +} +#endif /* ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE */ + +int +rand_bytes (uint8_t *output, int len) +{ + ctr_drbg_context *rng_ctx = rand_ctx_get(); + + while (len > 0) + { + const size_t blen = min_int (len, CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST); + if (0 != ctr_drbg_random(rng_ctx, output, blen)) + return 0; + + output += blen; + len -= blen; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * + * Key functions, allow manipulation of keys. + * + */ + + +int +key_des_num_cblocks (const cipher_info_t *kt) +{ + int ret = 0; + if (kt->type == POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC) + ret = 1; + if (kt->type == POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC) + ret = 2; + if (kt->type == POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC) + ret = 3; + + dmsg (D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "CRYPTO INFO: n_DES_cblocks=%d", ret); + return ret; +} + +bool +key_des_check (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc) +{ + int i; + struct buffer b; + + buf_set_read (&b, key, key_len); + + for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i) + { + unsigned char *key = buf_read_alloc(&b, DES_KEY_SIZE); + if (!key) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: insufficient key material"); + goto err; + } + if (0 != des_key_check_weak(key)) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: weak key detected"); + goto err; + } + if (0 != des_key_check_key_parity(key)) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: bad parity detected"); + goto err; + } + } + return true; + + err: + return false; +} + +void +key_des_fixup (uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc) +{ + int i; + struct buffer b; + + buf_set_read (&b, key, key_len); + for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i) + { + unsigned char *key = buf_read_alloc(&b, DES_KEY_SIZE); + if (!key) + { + msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key_DES: insufficient key material"); + return; + } + des_key_set_parity(key); + } +} + +/* + * + * Generic cipher key type functions + * + */ + + +const cipher_info_t * +cipher_kt_get (const char *ciphername) +{ + const cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; + + ASSERT (ciphername); + + cipher = cipher_info_from_string(ciphername); + + if (NULL == cipher) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher algorithm '%s' not found", ciphername); + + if (cipher->key_length/8 > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cipher algorithm '%s' uses a default key size (%d bytes) which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum key size (%d bytes)", + ciphername, + cipher->key_length/8, + MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH); + + return cipher; +} + +const char * +cipher_kt_name (const cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) +{ + if (NULL == cipher_kt) + return "[null-cipher]"; + return cipher_kt->name; +} + +int +cipher_kt_key_size (const cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) +{ + if (NULL == cipher_kt) + return 0; + return cipher_kt->key_length/8; +} + +int +cipher_kt_iv_size (const cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) +{ + if (NULL == cipher_kt) + return 0; + return cipher_kt->iv_size; +} + +int +cipher_kt_block_size (const cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) +{ + if (NULL == cipher_kt) + return 0; + return cipher_kt->block_size; +} + +int +cipher_kt_mode (const cipher_info_t *cipher_kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != cipher_kt); + return cipher_kt->mode; +} + + +/* + * + * Generic cipher context functions + * + */ + + +void +cipher_ctx_init (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *key, int key_len, + const cipher_info_t *kt, int enc) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != kt && NULL != ctx); + + CLEAR (*ctx); + + if (0 != cipher_init_ctx(ctx, kt)) + msg (M_FATAL, "PolarSSL cipher context init #1"); + + if (0 != cipher_setkey(ctx, key, key_len*8, enc)) + msg (M_FATAL, "PolarSSL cipher set key"); + + /* make sure we used a big enough key */ + ASSERT (ctx->key_length <= key_len*8); +} + +void cipher_ctx_cleanup (cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + cipher_free_ctx(ctx); +} + +int cipher_ctx_iv_length (const cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + return cipher_get_iv_size(ctx); +} + +int cipher_ctx_block_size(const cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + return cipher_get_block_size(ctx); +} + +int cipher_ctx_mode (const cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + return cipher_kt_mode(ctx->cipher_info); +} + +int cipher_ctx_reset (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *iv_buf) +{ + return 0 == cipher_reset(ctx, iv_buf); +} + +int cipher_ctx_update (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len, + uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + int retval = 0; + size_t s_dst_len = *dst_len; + + retval = cipher_update(ctx, src, (size_t)src_len, dst, &s_dst_len); + + *dst_len = s_dst_len; + + return 0 == retval; +} + +int cipher_ctx_final (cipher_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst, int *dst_len) +{ + int retval = 0; + size_t s_dst_len = *dst_len; + + retval = cipher_finish(ctx, dst, &s_dst_len); + *dst_len = s_dst_len; + + return 0 == retval; +} + +void +cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (const unsigned char key[DES_KEY_LENGTH], + unsigned char *src, + unsigned char *dst) +{ + des_context ctx; + + des_setkey_enc(&ctx, key); + des_crypt_ecb(&ctx, src, dst); +} + + + +/* + * + * Generic message digest information functions + * + */ + + +const md_info_t * +md_kt_get (const char *digest) +{ + const md_info_t *md = NULL; + ASSERT (digest); + + md = md_info_from_string(digest); + if (!md) + msg (M_FATAL, "Message hash algorithm '%s' not found", digest); + if (md->size > MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH) + msg (M_FATAL, "Message hash algorithm '%s' uses a default hash size (%d bytes) which is larger than " PACKAGE_NAME "'s current maximum hash size (%d bytes)", + digest, + md->size, + MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH); + return md; +} + +const char * +md_kt_name (const md_info_t *kt) +{ + if (NULL == kt) + return "[null-digest]"; + return md_get_name (kt); +} + +int +md_kt_size (const md_info_t *kt) +{ + if (NULL == kt) + return 0; + return md_get_size(kt); +} + +/* + * + * Generic message digest functions + * + */ + +int +md_full (const md_kt_t *kt, const uint8_t *src, int src_len, uint8_t *dst) +{ + return 0 == md(kt, src, src_len, dst); +} + + +void +md_ctx_init (md_context_t *ctx, const md_info_t *kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx && NULL != kt); + + CLEAR(*ctx); + + ASSERT(0 == md_init_ctx(ctx, kt)); + ASSERT(0 == md_starts(ctx)); +} + +void +md_ctx_cleanup(md_context_t *ctx) +{ +} + +int +md_ctx_size (const md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (NULL == ctx) + return 0; + return md_get_size(ctx->md_info); +} + +void +md_ctx_update (md_context_t *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_update(ctx, src, src_len)); +} + +void +md_ctx_final (md_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_finish(ctx, dst)); + ASSERT(0 == md_free_ctx(ctx)); +} + + +/* + * + * Generic HMAC functions + * + */ + + +/* + * TODO: re-enable dmsg for crypto debug + */ +void +hmac_ctx_init (md_context_t *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int key_len, const md_info_t *kt) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != kt && NULL != ctx); + + CLEAR(*ctx); + + ASSERT(0 == md_init_ctx(ctx, kt)); + ASSERT(0 == md_hmac_starts(ctx, key, key_len)); + + /* make sure we used a big enough key */ + ASSERT (md_get_size(kt) <= key_len); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_cleanup(md_context_t *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_free_ctx(ctx)); +} + +int +hmac_ctx_size (const md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (NULL == ctx) + return 0; + return md_get_size(ctx->md_info); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_reset (md_context_t *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_hmac_reset(ctx)); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_update (md_context_t *ctx, const uint8_t *src, int src_len) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_hmac_update(ctx, src, src_len)); +} + +void +hmac_ctx_final (md_context_t *ctx, uint8_t *dst) +{ + ASSERT(0 == md_hmac_finish(ctx, dst)); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bfabb91b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/crypto_polarssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Cryptography PolarSSL-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTO_POLARSSL_H_ +#define CRYPTO_POLARSSL_H_ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** Generic cipher key type %context. */ +typedef cipher_info_t cipher_kt_t; + +/** Generic message digest key type %context. */ +typedef md_info_t md_kt_t; + +/** Generic cipher %context. */ +typedef cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_t; + +/** Generic message digest %context. */ +typedef md_context_t md_ctx_t; + +/** Generic HMAC %context. */ +typedef md_context_t hmac_ctx_t; + +/** Maximum length of an IV */ +#define OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH + +/** Cipher is in CBC mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_CBC POLARSSL_MODE_CBC + +/** Cipher is in OFB mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_OFB POLARSSL_MODE_OFB + +/** Cipher is in CFB mode */ +#define OPENVPN_MODE_CFB POLARSSL_MODE_CFB128 + +/** Cipher should encrypt */ +#define OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT POLARSSL_ENCRYPT + +/** Cipher should decrypt */ +#define OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT POLARSSL_DECRYPT + +#define MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 +#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 +#define SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 +#define DES_KEY_LENGTH 8 + +/** + * Returns a singleton instance of the PolarSSL random number generator. + * + * For PolarSSL 1.1+, this is the CTR_DRBG random number generator. If it + * hasn't been initialised yet, the RNG will be initialised using the default + * entropy sources. Aside from the default platform entropy sources, an + * additional entropy source, the HAVEGE random number generator will also be + * added. During initialisation, a personalisation string will be added based + * on the time, the PID, and a pointer to the random context. + */ +ctr_drbg_context * rand_ctx_get(); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE +/** + * Enable prediction resistance on the random number generator. + */ +void rand_ctx_enable_prediction_resistance(); +#endif + +#endif /* CRYPTO_POLARSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7fc11e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Peter 'Luna' Runestig + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modifi- + * cation, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * + * o Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright no- + * tice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the do- + * cumentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * o The names of the contributors may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior written + * permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LI- + * ABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUEN- + * TIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEV- + * ER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABI- + * LITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF + * THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* MinGW w32api 3.17 is still incomplete when it comes to CryptoAPI while + * MinGW32-w64 defines all macros used. This is a hack around that problem. + */ +#ifndef CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCATION_SHIFT +#define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCATION_SHIFT 16 +#endif +#ifndef CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER_ID +#define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER_ID 1 +#endif +#ifndef CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER +#define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER (CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER_ID << CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCATION_SHIFT) +#endif +#ifndef CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG +#define CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG 0x00008000 +#endif +#ifndef CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG +#define CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG 0x00004000 +#endif + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +/* try to funnel any Windows/CryptoAPI error messages to OpenSSL ERR_... */ +#define ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI (ERR_LIB_USER + 69) /* 69 is just a number... */ +#define CRYPTOAPIerr(f) err_put_ms_error(GetLastError(), (f), __FILE__, __LINE__) +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_OPEN_SYSTEM_STORE 100 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_FIND_CERTIFICATE_IN_STORE 101 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_ACQUIRE_CERTIFICATE_PRIVATE_KEY 102 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_CREATE_HASH 103 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_GET_HASH_PARAM 104 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SET_HASH_PARAM 105 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SIGN_HASH 106 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_LOAD_LIBRARY 107 +#define CRYPTOAPI_F_GET_PROC_ADDRESS 108 + +static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTOAPI_str_functs[] = { + { ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI, 0, 0), "microsoft cryptoapi"}, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_OPEN_SYSTEM_STORE, 0), "CertOpenSystemStore" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_FIND_CERTIFICATE_IN_STORE, 0), "CertFindCertificateInStore" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_ACQUIRE_CERTIFICATE_PRIVATE_KEY, 0), "CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_CREATE_HASH, 0), "CryptCreateHash" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_GET_HASH_PARAM, 0), "CryptGetHashParam" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SET_HASH_PARAM, 0), "CryptSetHashParam" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SIGN_HASH, 0), "CryptSignHash" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_LOAD_LIBRARY, 0), "LoadLibrary" }, + { ERR_PACK(0, CRYPTOAPI_F_GET_PROC_ADDRESS, 0), "GetProcAddress" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +typedef struct _CAPI_DATA { + const CERT_CONTEXT *cert_context; + HCRYPTPROV crypt_prov; + DWORD key_spec; + BOOL free_crypt_prov; +} CAPI_DATA; + +static char *ms_error_text(DWORD ms_err) +{ + LPVOID lpMsgBuf = NULL; + char *rv = NULL; + + FormatMessage( + FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | + FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM | + FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS, + NULL, ms_err, + MAKELANGID(LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_DEFAULT), /* Default language */ + (LPTSTR) &lpMsgBuf, 0, NULL); + if (lpMsgBuf) { + char *p; + rv = strdup(lpMsgBuf); + LocalFree(lpMsgBuf); + /* trim to the left */ + if (rv) + for (p = rv + strlen(rv) - 1; p >= rv; p--) { + if (isspace(*p)) + *p = '\0'; + else + break; + } + } + return rv; +} + +static void err_put_ms_error(DWORD ms_err, int func, const char *file, int line) +{ + static int init = 0; +# define ERR_MAP_SZ 16 + static struct { + int err; + DWORD ms_err; /* I don't think we get more than 16 *different* errors */ + } err_map[ERR_MAP_SZ]; /* in here, before we give up the whole thing... */ + int i; + + if (ms_err == 0) + /* 0 is not an error */ + return; + if (!init) { + ERR_load_strings(ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI, CRYPTOAPI_str_functs); + memset(&err_map, 0, sizeof(err_map)); + init++; + } + /* since MS error codes are 32 bit, and the ones in the ERR_... system is + * only 12, we must have a mapping table between them. */ + for (i = 0; i < ERR_MAP_SZ; i++) { + if (err_map[i].ms_err == ms_err) { + ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI, func, err_map[i].err, file, line); + break; + } else if (err_map[i].ms_err == 0 ) { + /* end of table, add new entry */ + ERR_STRING_DATA *esd = calloc(2, sizeof(*esd)); + if (esd == NULL) + break; + err_map[i].ms_err = ms_err; + err_map[i].err = esd->error = i + 100; + esd->string = ms_error_text(ms_err); + ERR_load_strings(ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI, esd); + ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_CRYPTOAPI, func, err_map[i].err, file, line); + break; + } + } +} + +/* encrypt */ +static int rsa_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + /* I haven't been able to trigger this one, but I want to know if it happens... */ + assert(0); + + return 0; +} + +/* verify arbitrary data */ +static int rsa_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + /* I haven't been able to trigger this one, but I want to know if it happens... */ + assert(0); + + return 0; +} + +/* sign arbitrary data */ +static int rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + CAPI_DATA *cd = (CAPI_DATA *) rsa->meth->app_data; + HCRYPTHASH hash; + DWORD hash_size, len, i; + unsigned char *buf; + + if (cd == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { + /* AFAICS, CryptSignHash() *always* uses PKCS1 padding. */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + return 0; + } + /* Unfortunately, there is no "CryptSign()" function in CryptoAPI, that would + * be way to straightforward for M$, I guess... So we have to do it this + * tricky way instead, by creating a "Hash", and load the already-made hash + * from 'from' into it. */ + /* For now, we only support NID_md5_sha1 */ + if (flen != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if (!CryptCreateHash(cd->crypt_prov, CALG_SSL3_SHAMD5, 0, 0, &hash)) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_CREATE_HASH); + return 0; + } + len = sizeof(hash_size); + if (!CryptGetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHSIZE, (BYTE *) &hash_size, &len, 0)) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_GET_HASH_PARAM); + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + return 0; + } + if ((int) hash_size != flen) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + return 0; + } + if (!CryptSetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHVAL, (BYTE * ) from, 0)) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SET_HASH_PARAM); + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + return 0; + } + + len = RSA_size(rsa); + buf = malloc(len); + if (buf == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + return 0; + } + if (!CryptSignHash(hash, cd->key_spec, NULL, 0, buf, &len)) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_SIGN_HASH); + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + free(buf); + return 0; + } + /* and now, we have to reverse the byte-order in the result from CryptSignHash()... */ + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + to[i] = buf[len - i - 1]; + free(buf); + + CryptDestroyHash(hash); + return len; +} + +/* decrypt */ +static int rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + /* I haven't been able to trigger this one, but I want to know if it happens... */ + assert(0); + + return 0; +} + +/* called at RSA_new */ +static int init(RSA *rsa) +{ + + return 0; +} + +/* called at RSA_free */ +static int finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + CAPI_DATA *cd = (CAPI_DATA *) rsa->meth->app_data; + + if (cd == NULL) + return 0; + if (cd->crypt_prov && cd->free_crypt_prov) + CryptReleaseContext(cd->crypt_prov, 0); + if (cd->cert_context) + CertFreeCertificateContext(cd->cert_context); + free(rsa->meth->app_data); + free((char *) rsa->meth); + rsa->meth = NULL; + return 1; +} + +static const CERT_CONTEXT *find_certificate_in_store(const char *cert_prop, HCERTSTORE cert_store) +{ + /* Find, and use, the desired certificate from the store. The + * 'cert_prop' certificate search string can look like this: + * SUBJ: + * THUMB:, e.g. + * THUMB:f6 49 24 41 01 b4 fb 44 0c ce f4 36 ae d0 c4 c9 df 7a b6 28 + */ + const CERT_CONTEXT *rv = NULL; + + if (!strncmp(cert_prop, "SUBJ:", 5)) { + /* skip the tag */ + cert_prop += 5; + rv = CertFindCertificateInStore(cert_store, X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, + 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_STR_A, cert_prop, NULL); + + } else if (!strncmp(cert_prop, "THUMB:", 6)) { + unsigned char hash[255]; + char *p; + int i, x = 0; + CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob; + + /* skip the tag */ + cert_prop += 6; + for (p = (char *) cert_prop, i = 0; *p && i < sizeof(hash); i++) { + if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9') + x = (*p - '0') << 4; + else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'F') + x = (*p - 'A' + 10) << 4; + else if (*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'f') + x = (*p - 'a' + 10) << 4; + if (!*++p) /* unexpected end of string */ + break; + if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9') + x += *p - '0'; + else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'F') + x += *p - 'A' + 10; + else if (*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'f') + x += *p - 'a' + 10; + hash[i] = x; + /* skip any space(s) between hex numbers */ + for (p++; *p && *p == ' '; p++); + } + blob.cbData = i; + blob.pbData = (unsigned char *) &hash; + rv = CertFindCertificateInStore(cert_store, X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, + 0, CERT_FIND_HASH, &blob, NULL); + + } + + return rv; +} + +int SSL_CTX_use_CryptoAPI_certificate(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, const char *cert_prop) +{ + HCERTSTORE cs; + X509 *cert = NULL; + RSA *rsa = NULL, *pub_rsa; + CAPI_DATA *cd = calloc(1, sizeof(*cd)); + RSA_METHOD *my_rsa_method = calloc(1, sizeof(*my_rsa_method)); + + if (cd == NULL || my_rsa_method == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* search CURRENT_USER first, then LOCAL_MACHINE */ + cs = CertOpenStore((LPCSTR) CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM, 0, 0, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER | + CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG, L"MY"); + if (cs == NULL) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_OPEN_SYSTEM_STORE); + goto err; + } + cd->cert_context = find_certificate_in_store(cert_prop, cs); + CertCloseStore(cs, 0); + if (!cd->cert_context) { + cs = CertOpenStore((LPCSTR) CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM, 0, 0, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE | + CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG, L"MY"); + if (cs == NULL) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_OPEN_SYSTEM_STORE); + goto err; + } + cd->cert_context = find_certificate_in_store(cert_prop, cs); + CertCloseStore(cs, 0); + if (cd->cert_context == NULL) { + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CERT_FIND_CERTIFICATE_IN_STORE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* cert_context->pbCertEncoded is the cert X509 DER encoded. */ + cert = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **) &cd->cert_context->pbCertEncoded, + cd->cert_context->cbCertEncoded); + if (cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* set up stuff to use the private key */ + if (!CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey(cd->cert_context, CRYPT_ACQUIRE_COMPARE_KEY_FLAG, + NULL, &cd->crypt_prov, &cd->key_spec, &cd->free_crypt_prov)) { + /* if we don't have a smart card reader here, and we try to access a + * smart card certificate, we get: + * "Error 1223: The operation was canceled by the user." */ + CRYPTOAPIerr(CRYPTOAPI_F_CRYPT_ACQUIRE_CERTIFICATE_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto err; + } + /* here we don't need to do CryptGetUserKey() or anything; all necessary key + * info is in cd->cert_context, and then, in cd->crypt_prov. */ + + my_rsa_method->name = "Microsoft CryptoAPI RSA Method"; + my_rsa_method->rsa_pub_enc = rsa_pub_enc; + my_rsa_method->rsa_pub_dec = rsa_pub_dec; + my_rsa_method->rsa_priv_enc = rsa_priv_enc; + my_rsa_method->rsa_priv_dec = rsa_priv_dec; + /* my_rsa_method->init = init; */ + my_rsa_method->finish = finish; + my_rsa_method->flags = RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK; + my_rsa_method->app_data = (char *) cd; + + rsa = RSA_new(); + if (rsa == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* cert->cert_info->key->pkey is NULL until we call SSL_CTX_use_certificate(), + * so we do it here then... */ + if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ssl_ctx, cert)) + goto err; + /* the public key */ + pub_rsa = cert->cert_info->key->pkey->pkey.rsa; + /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate() increased the reference count in 'cert', so + * we decrease it here with X509_free(), or it will never be cleaned up. */ + X509_free(cert); + cert = NULL; + + /* I'm not sure about what we have to fill in in the RSA, trying out stuff... */ + /* rsa->n indicates the key size */ + rsa->n = BN_dup(pub_rsa->n); + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + if (!RSA_set_method(rsa, my_rsa_method)) + goto err; + + if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl_ctx, rsa)) + goto err; + /* SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey() increased the reference count in 'rsa', so + * we decrease it here with RSA_free(), or it will never be cleaned up. */ + RSA_free(rsa); + return 1; + + err: + if (cert) + X509_free(cert); + if (rsa) + RSA_free(rsa); + else { + if (my_rsa_method) + free(my_rsa_method); + if (cd) { + if (cd->free_crypt_prov && cd->crypt_prov) + CryptReleaseContext(cd->crypt_prov, 0); + if (cd->cert_context) + CertFreeCertificateContext(cd->cert_context); + free(cd); + } + } + return 0; +} + +#else +#ifdef _MSC_VER /* Dummy function needed to avoid empty file compiler warning in Microsoft VC */ +static void dummy (void) {} +#endif +#endif /* WIN32 */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8ac6db36 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.h @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +#ifndef _CRYPTOAPI_H_ +#define _CRYPTOAPI_H_ + +int SSL_CTX_use_CryptoAPI_certificate(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, const char *cert_prop); + + +#endif /* !_CRYPTOAPI_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d0b18ac --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "dhcp.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "error.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +static int +get_dhcp_message_type (const struct dhcp *dhcp, const int optlen) +{ + const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) (dhcp + 1); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < optlen; ++i) + { + const uint8_t type = p[i]; + const int room = optlen - i; + if (type == DHCP_END) /* didn't find what we were looking for */ + return -1; + else if (type == DHCP_PAD) /* no-operation */ + ; + else if (type == DHCP_MSG_TYPE) /* what we are looking for */ + { + if (room >= 3) + { + if (p[i+1] == 1) /* option length should be 1 */ + return p[i+2]; /* return message type */ + } + return -1; + } + else /* some other option */ + { + if (room >= 2) + { + const int len = p[i+1]; /* get option length */ + i += (len + 1); /* advance to next option */ + } + } + } + return -1; +} + +static in_addr_t +do_extract (struct dhcp *dhcp, int optlen) +{ + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) (dhcp + 1); + int i; + in_addr_t ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < optlen; ) + { + const uint8_t type = p[i]; + const int room = optlen - i; + if (type == DHCP_END) + break; + else if (type == DHCP_PAD) + ++i; + else if (type == DHCP_ROUTER) + { + if (room >= 2) + { + const int len = p[i+1]; /* get option length */ + if (len <= (room-2)) + { + /* get router IP address */ + if (!ret && len >= 4 && (len & 3) == 0) + { + memcpy (&ret, p+i+2, 4); + ret = ntohl (ret); + } + { + /* delete the router option */ + uint8_t *dest = p + i; + const int owlen = len + 2; /* len of data to overwrite */ + uint8_t *src = dest + owlen; + uint8_t *end = p + optlen; + const int movlen = end - src; + if (movlen > 0) + memmove(dest, src, movlen); /* overwrite router option */ + memset(end - owlen, DHCP_PAD, owlen); /* pad tail */ + } + } + else + break; + } + else + break; + } + else /* some other option */ + { + if (room >= 2) + { + const int len = p[i+1]; /* get option length */ + i += (len + 2); /* advance to next option */ + } + else + break; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static uint16_t +udp_checksum (const uint8_t *buf, + const int len_udp, + const uint8_t *src_addr, + const uint8_t *dest_addr) +{ + uint16_t word16; + uint32_t sum = 0; + int i; + + /* make 16 bit words out of every two adjacent 8 bit words and */ + /* calculate the sum of all 16 bit words */ + for (i = 0; i < len_udp; i += 2){ + word16 = ((buf[i] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((i + 1 < len_udp) ? (buf[i+1] & 0xFF) : 0); + sum += word16; + } + + /* add the UDP pseudo header which contains the IP source and destination addresses */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i += 2){ + word16 =((src_addr[i] << 8) & 0xFF00) + (src_addr[i+1] & 0xFF); + sum += word16; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4; i += 2){ + word16 =((dest_addr[i] << 8) & 0xFF00) + (dest_addr[i+1] & 0xFF); + sum += word16; + } + + /* the protocol number and the length of the UDP packet */ + sum += (uint16_t) OPENVPN_IPPROTO_UDP + (uint16_t) len_udp; + + /* keep only the last 16 bits of the 32 bit calculated sum and add the carries */ + while (sum >> 16) + sum = (sum & 0xFFFF) + (sum >> 16); + + /* Take the one's complement of sum */ + return ((uint16_t) ~sum); +} + +in_addr_t +dhcp_extract_router_msg (struct buffer *ipbuf) +{ + struct dhcp_full *df = (struct dhcp_full *) BPTR (ipbuf); + const int optlen = BLEN (ipbuf) - (sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr) + sizeof (struct openvpn_udphdr) + sizeof (struct dhcp)); + + if (optlen >= 0 + && df->ip.protocol == OPENVPN_IPPROTO_UDP + && df->udp.source == htons (BOOTPS_PORT) + && df->udp.dest == htons (BOOTPC_PORT) + && df->dhcp.op == BOOTREPLY) + { + const int message_type = get_dhcp_message_type (&df->dhcp, optlen); + if (message_type == DHCPACK || message_type == DHCPOFFER) + { + /* get the router IP address while padding out all DHCP router options */ + const in_addr_t ret = do_extract (&df->dhcp, optlen); + + /* recompute the UDP checksum */ + df->udp.check = 0; + df->udp.check = htons (udp_checksum ((uint8_t *) &df->udp, + sizeof (struct openvpn_udphdr) + sizeof (struct dhcp) + optlen, + (uint8_t *)&df->ip.saddr, + (uint8_t *)&df->ip.daddr)); + + /* only return the extracted Router address if DHCPACK */ + if (message_type == DHCPACK) + { + if (ret) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (D_ROUTE, "Extracted DHCP router address: %s", print_in_addr_t (ret, 0, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + } + + return ret; + } + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e823a4a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/dhcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef DHCP_H +#define DHCP_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "proto.h" + +#pragma pack(1) + +/* DHCP Option types */ +#define DHCP_PAD 0 +#define DHCP_ROUTER 3 +#define DHCP_MSG_TYPE 53 /* message type (u8) */ +#define DHCP_END 255 + +/* DHCP Messages types */ +#define DHCPDISCOVER 1 +#define DHCPOFFER 2 +#define DHCPREQUEST 3 +#define DHCPDECLINE 4 +#define DHCPACK 5 +#define DHCPNAK 6 +#define DHCPRELEASE 7 +#define DHCPINFORM 8 + +/* DHCP UDP port numbers */ +#define BOOTPS_PORT 67 +#define BOOTPC_PORT 68 + +struct dhcp { +# define BOOTREQUEST 1 +# define BOOTREPLY 2 + uint8_t op; /* message op */ + + uint8_t htype; /* hardware address type (e.g. '1' = 10Mb Ethernet) */ + uint8_t hlen; /* hardware address length (e.g. '6' for 10Mb Ethernet) */ + uint8_t hops; /* client sets to 0, may be used by relay agents */ + uint32_t xid; /* transaction ID, chosen by client */ + uint16_t secs; /* seconds since request process began, set by client */ + uint16_t flags; + uint32_t ciaddr; /* client IP address, client sets if known */ + uint32_t yiaddr; /* 'your' IP address -- server's response to client */ + uint32_t siaddr; /* server IP address */ + uint32_t giaddr; /* relay agent IP address */ + uint8_t chaddr[16]; /* client hardware address */ + uint8_t sname[64]; /* optional server host name */ + uint8_t file[128]; /* boot file name */ + uint32_t magic; /* must be 0x63825363 (network order) */ +}; + +struct dhcp_full { + struct openvpn_iphdr ip; + struct openvpn_udphdr udp; + struct dhcp dhcp; +# define DHCP_OPTIONS_BUFFER_SIZE 256 + uint8_t options[DHCP_OPTIONS_BUFFER_SIZE]; +}; + +#pragma pack() + +in_addr_t dhcp_extract_router_msg (struct buffer *ipbuf); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/errlevel.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/errlevel.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ee4ebc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/errlevel.h @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef ERRLEVEL_H +#define ERRLEVEL_H + +#include "error.h" + +/* + * Debug level at and above where we + * display time to microsecond resolution. + */ +#define DEBUG_LEVEL_USEC_TIME 4 + +/* + * In non-server modes, delay n milliseconds after certain kinds + * of non-fatal network errors to avoid a barrage of errors. + * + * To disable all delays, set to 0. + */ +#define P2P_ERROR_DELAY_MS 0 + +/* + * Enable D_LOG_RW + */ +#define LOG_RW + +/* + * Debugging levels for various kinds + * of output. + */ + +#define M_VERB0 LOGLEV(0, 0, 0) /* Messages displayed even at --verb 0 (fatal errors only) */ + +#define M_INFO LOGLEV(1, 0, 0) /* default informational messages */ + +#define D_LINK_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 1, M_NONFATAL) /* show link errors from main event loop */ +#define D_CRYPT_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 2, M_NONFATAL) /* show errors from encrypt/decrypt */ +#define D_TLS_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 3, M_NONFATAL) /* show TLS control channel errors */ +#define D_RESOLVE_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 4, M_NONFATAL) /* show hostname resolve errors */ +#define D_COMP_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 5, M_NONFATAL) /* show compression errors */ +#define D_REPLAY_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 6, M_NONFATAL) /* show packet replay errors */ +#define D_STREAM_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 7, M_NONFATAL) /* TCP stream error requiring restart */ +#define D_IMPORT_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 8, M_NONFATAL) /* show server import option errors */ +#define D_MULTI_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 9, M_NONFATAL) /* show multi-client server errors */ +#define D_EVENT_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 10, M_NONFATAL) /* show event.[ch] errors */ +#define D_PUSH_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 11, M_NONFATAL) /* show push/pull errors */ +#define D_PID_PERSIST LOGLEV(1, 12, M_NONFATAL) /* show packet_id persist errors */ +#define D_FRAG_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 13, M_NONFATAL) /* show fragmentation errors */ +#define D_ALIGN_ERRORS LOGLEV(1, 14, M_NONFATAL) /* show bad struct alignments */ + +#define D_HANDSHAKE LOGLEV(2, 20, 0) /* show data & control channel handshakes */ +#define D_CLOSE LOGLEV(2, 22, 0) /* show socket and TUN/TAP close */ +#define D_PROXY LOGLEV(2, 24, 0) /* show http proxy control packets */ +#define D_ARGV LOGLEV(2, 25, 0) /* show struct argv errors */ + +#define D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW LOGLEV(3, 20, 0) /* low frequency info from tls_session routines */ +#define D_GREMLIN LOGLEV(3, 30, 0) /* show simulated outage info from gremlin module */ +#define D_GENKEY LOGLEV(3, 31, 0) /* print message after key generation */ +#define D_ROUTE LOGLEV(3, 0, 0) /* show routes added and deleted (don't mute) */ +#define D_TUNTAP_INFO LOGLEV(3, 32, 0) /* show debugging info from TUN/TAP driver */ +#define D_RESTART LOGLEV(3, 33, 0) /* show certain restart messages */ +#define D_PUSH LOGLEV(3, 34, 0) /* show push/pull info */ +#define D_IFCONFIG_POOL LOGLEV(3, 35, 0) /* show ifconfig pool info */ +#define D_AUTH LOGLEV(3, 37, 0) /* show user/pass auth info */ +#define D_MULTI_LOW LOGLEV(3, 38, 0) /* show point-to-multipoint low-freq debug info */ +#define D_PLUGIN LOGLEV(3, 39, 0) /* show plugin calls */ +#define D_MANAGEMENT LOGLEV(3, 40, 0) /* show --management info */ +#define D_SCHED_EXIT LOGLEV(3, 41, 0) /* show arming of scheduled exit */ +#define D_ROUTE_QUOTA LOGLEV(3, 42, 0) /* show route quota exceeded messages */ +#define D_OSBUF LOGLEV(3, 43, 0) /* show socket/tun/tap buffer sizes */ +#define D_PS_PROXY LOGLEV(3, 44, 0) /* messages related to --port-share option */ +#define D_PF_INFO LOGLEV(3, 45, 0) /* packet filter informational messages */ + +#define D_SHOW_PARMS LOGLEV(4, 50, 0) /* show all parameters on program initiation */ +#define D_SHOW_OCC LOGLEV(4, 51, 0) /* show options compatibility string */ +#define D_LOW LOGLEV(4, 52, 0) /* miscellaneous low-frequency debug info */ +#define D_DHCP_OPT LOGLEV(4, 53, 0) /* show DHCP options binary string */ +#define D_MBUF LOGLEV(4, 54, 0) /* mbuf.[ch] routines */ +#define D_PACKET_TRUNC_ERR LOGLEV(4, 55, 0) /* PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK */ +#define D_PF_DROPPED LOGLEV(4, 56, 0) /* packet filter dropped a packet */ +#define D_MULTI_DROPPED LOGLEV(4, 57, 0) /* show point-to-multipoint packet drops */ +#define D_MULTI_MEDIUM LOGLEV(4, 58, 0) /* show medium frequency multi messages */ +#define D_X509_ATTR LOGLEV(4, 59, 0) /* show x509-track attributes on connection */ +#define D_INIT_MEDIUM LOGLEV(4, 60, 0) /* show medium frequency init messages */ +#define D_MTU_INFO LOGLEV(4, 61, 0) /* show terse MTU info */ +#define D_SHOW_OCC_HASH LOGLEV(4, 62, 0) /* show MD5 hash of option compatibility string */ +#define D_PID_DEBUG_LOW LOGLEV(4, 63, 0) /* show low-freq packet-id debugging info */ +#define D_PID_DEBUG_MEDIUM LOGLEV(4, 64, 0) /* show medium-freq packet-id debugging info */ + +#define D_LOG_RW LOGLEV(5, 0, 0) /* Print 'R' or 'W' to stdout for read/write */ + +#define D_LINK_RW LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG) /* show TCP/UDP reads/writes (terse) */ +#define D_TUN_RW LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG) /* show TUN/TAP reads/writes */ +#define D_TAP_WIN_DEBUG LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG) /* show TAP-Windows driver debug info */ +#define D_CLIENT_NAT LOGLEV(6, 69, M_DEBUG) /* show client NAT debug info */ + +#define D_SHOW_KEYS LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show data channel encryption keys */ +#define D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show data channel key source entropy */ +#define D_REL_LOW LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show low frequency info from reliable layer */ +#define D_FRAG_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show fragment debugging info */ +#define D_WIN32_IO_LOW LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* low freq win32 I/O debugging info */ +#define D_MTU_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show MTU debugging info */ +#define D_MULTI_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show medium-freq multi debugging info */ +#define D_MSS LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show MSS adjustments */ +#define D_COMP_LOW LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show adaptive compression state changes */ +#define D_CONNECTION_LIST LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show list info */ +#define D_SCRIPT LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show parms & env vars passed to scripts */ +#define D_SHOW_NET LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show routing table and adapter list */ +#define D_ROUTE_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show verbose route.[ch] output */ +#define D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* no TLS state for client */ +#define D_SEMAPHORE_LOW LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show Win32 semaphore waits (low freq) */ +#define D_SEMAPHORE LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show Win32 semaphore waits */ +#define D_TEST_FILE LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show test_file() calls */ +#define D_MANAGEMENT_DEBUG LOGLEV(3, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show --management debug info */ +#define D_PLUGIN_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show verbose plugin calls */ +#define D_SOCKET_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show socket.[ch] debugging info */ +#define D_SHOW_PKCS11 LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show PKCS#11 actions */ +#define D_ALIGN_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show verbose struct alignment info */ +#define D_PACKET_TRUNC_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK verbose */ +#define D_PING LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* PING send/receive messages */ +#define D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* port share proxy debug */ +#define D_AUTO_USERID LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* AUTO_USERID debugging */ +#define D_TLS_KEYSELECT LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show information on key selection for data channel */ +#define D_ARGV_PARSE_CMD LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show parse_line() errors in argv_printf %sc */ +#define D_CRYPTO_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show detailed info from crypto.c routines */ +#define D_PID_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show packet-id debugging info */ +#define D_PF_DROPPED_BCAST LOGLEV(7, 71, M_DEBUG) /* packet filter dropped a broadcast packet */ +#define D_PF_DEBUG LOGLEV(7, 72, M_DEBUG) /* packet filter debugging, must also define PF_DEBUG in pf.h */ + +#define D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show detailed description of each handshake */ +#define D_TLS_DEBUG_MED LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* limited info from tls_session routines */ +#define D_INTERVAL LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show interval.h debugging info */ +#define D_SCHEDULER LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show scheduler debugging info */ +#define D_GREMLIN_VERBOSE LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show verbose info from gremlin module */ +#define D_REL_DEBUG LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show detailed info from reliable routines */ +#define D_EVENT_WAIT LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show detailed info from event waits */ +#define D_MULTI_TCP LOGLEV(8, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show debug info from mtcp.c */ + +#define D_TLS_DEBUG LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show detailed info from TLS routines */ +#define D_COMP LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show compression info */ +#define D_READ_WRITE LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show all tun/tcp/udp reads/writes/opens */ +#define D_PACKET_CONTENT LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show before/after encryption packet content */ +#define D_TLS_NO_SEND_KEY LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show when no data channel send-key exists */ +#define D_PID_PERSIST_DEBUG LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show packet-id persist debugging info */ +#define D_LINK_RW_VERBOSE LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show link reads/writes with greater verbosity */ +#define D_STREAM_DEBUG LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show TCP stream debug info */ +#define D_WIN32_IO LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* win32 I/O debugging info */ +#define D_PKCS11_DEBUG LOGLEV(9, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show PKCS#11 debugging */ + +#define D_SHAPER_DEBUG LOGLEV(10, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show traffic shaper info */ + +#define D_REGISTRY LOGLEV(11, 70, M_DEBUG) /* win32 registry debugging info */ +#define D_OPENSSL_LOCK LOGLEV(11, 70, M_DEBUG) /* show OpenSSL locks */ + +/*#define D_THREAD_DEBUG LOGLEV(4, 70, M_DEBUG)*/ /* show pthread debug information */ + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98611a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,893 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "error.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "tun.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "perf.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "ps.h" +#include "mstats.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include +#endif +#endif + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY +#ifndef LOG_OPENVPN +#define LOG_OPENVPN LOG_DAEMON +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef GOOGLE_BREAKPAD +#include "breakpad.h" +#endif + +/* Globals */ +unsigned int x_debug_level; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* Mute state */ +static int mute_cutoff; /* GLOBAL */ +static int mute_count; /* GLOBAL */ +static int mute_category; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Output mode priorities are as follows: + * + * (1) --log-x overrides everything + * (2) syslog is used if --daemon or --inetd is defined and not --log-x + * (3) if OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE is defined, output + * to constant logfile name. + * (4) Output to stdout. + */ + +/* If true, indicates that stdin/stdout/stderr + have been redirected due to --log */ +static bool std_redir; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* Should messages be written to the syslog? */ +static bool use_syslog; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* Should timestamps be included on messages to stdout/stderr? */ +static bool suppress_timestamps; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* The program name passed to syslog */ +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY +static char *pgmname_syslog; /* GLOBAL */ +#endif + +/* If non-null, messages should be written here (used for debugging only) */ +static FILE *msgfp; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* If true, we forked from main OpenVPN process */ +static bool forked; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* our default output targets */ +static FILE *default_out; /* GLOBAL */ +static FILE *default_err; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +msg_forked (void) +{ + forked = true; +} + +bool +set_debug_level (const int level, const unsigned int flags) +{ + const int ceiling = 15; + + if (level >= 0 && level <= ceiling) + { + x_debug_level = level; + return true; + } + else if (flags & SDL_CONSTRAIN) + { + x_debug_level = constrain_int (level, 0, ceiling); + return true; + } + return false; +} + +bool +set_mute_cutoff (const int cutoff) +{ + if (cutoff >= 0) + { + mute_cutoff = cutoff; + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +int +get_debug_level (void) +{ + return x_debug_level; +} + +int +get_mute_cutoff (void) +{ + return mute_cutoff; +} + +void +set_suppress_timestamps (bool suppressed) +{ + suppress_timestamps = suppressed; +} + +void +error_reset () +{ + use_syslog = std_redir = false; + suppress_timestamps = false; + x_debug_level = 1; + mute_cutoff = 0; + mute_count = 0; + mute_category = 0; + default_out = OPENVPN_MSG_FP; + default_err = OPENVPN_MSG_FP; + +#ifdef OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE + msgfp = fopen (OPENVPN_DEBUG_FILE, "w"); + if (!msgfp) + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_CANNOT_OPEN_DEBUG_FILE); /* exit point */ +#else + msgfp = NULL; +#endif +} + +void +errors_to_stderr (void) +{ + default_err = OPENVPN_ERROR_FP; +} + +/* + * Return a file to print messages to before syslog is opened. + */ +FILE * +msg_fp(const unsigned int flags) +{ + FILE *fp = msgfp; + if (!fp) + fp = (flags & (M_FATAL|M_USAGE_SMALL)) ? default_err : default_out; + if (!fp) + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_CANNOT_OPEN_DEBUG_FILE); /* exit point */ + return fp; +} + +#define SWAP { tmp = m1; m1 = m2; m2 = tmp; } + +int x_msg_line_num; /* GLOBAL */ + +void x_msg (const unsigned int flags, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + va_start (arglist, format); + x_msg_va (flags, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); +} + +void x_msg_va (const unsigned int flags, const char *format, va_list arglist) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY + int level; +#endif + char *m1; + char *m2; + char *tmp; + int e; + const char *prefix; + const char *prefix_sep; + + void usage_small (void); + +#ifndef HAVE_VARARG_MACROS + /* the macro has checked this otherwise */ + if (!MSG_TEST (flags)) + return; +#endif + + e = openvpn_errno (); + + /* + * Apply muting filter. + */ +#ifndef HAVE_VARARG_MACROS + /* the macro has checked this otherwise */ + if (!dont_mute (flags)) + return; +#endif + + gc_init (&gc); + + m1 = (char *) gc_malloc (ERR_BUF_SIZE, false, &gc); + m2 = (char *) gc_malloc (ERR_BUF_SIZE, false, &gc); + + vsnprintf (m1, ERR_BUF_SIZE, format, arglist); + m1[ERR_BUF_SIZE - 1] = 0; /* windows vsnprintf needs this */ + + if ((flags & M_ERRNO) && e) + { + openvpn_snprintf (m2, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "%s: %s (errno=%d)", + m1, strerror_ts (e, &gc), e); + SWAP; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL + if (flags & M_SSL) + { + int nerrs = 0; + size_t err; + while ((err = ERR_get_error ())) + { + openvpn_snprintf (m2, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "%s: %s", + m1, ERR_error_string (err, NULL)); + SWAP; + ++nerrs; + } + if (!nerrs) + { + openvpn_snprintf (m2, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "%s (OpenSSL)", m1); + SWAP; + } + } +#endif +#endif + + if (flags & M_OPTERR) + { + openvpn_snprintf (m2, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "Options error: %s", m1); + SWAP; + } + +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY + if (flags & (M_FATAL|M_NONFATAL|M_USAGE_SMALL)) + level = LOG_ERR; + else if (flags & M_WARN) + level = LOG_WARNING; + else + level = LOG_NOTICE; +#endif + + /* set up client prefix */ + if (flags & M_NOIPREFIX) + prefix = NULL; + else + prefix = msg_get_prefix (); + prefix_sep = " "; + if (!prefix) + prefix_sep = prefix = ""; + + /* virtual output capability used to copy output to management subsystem */ + if (!forked) + { + const struct virtual_output *vo = msg_get_virtual_output (); + if (vo) + { + openvpn_snprintf (m2, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "%s%s%s", + prefix, + prefix_sep, + m1); + virtual_output_print (vo, flags, m2); + } + } + + if (!(flags & M_MSG_VIRT_OUT)) + { + if (use_syslog && !std_redir && !forked) + { +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY + syslog (level, "%s%s%s", + prefix, + prefix_sep, + m1); +#endif + } + else + { + FILE *fp = msg_fp(flags); + const bool show_usec = check_debug_level (DEBUG_LEVEL_USEC_TIME); + + if ((flags & M_NOPREFIX) || suppress_timestamps) + { + fprintf (fp, "%s%s%s%s", + prefix, + prefix_sep, + m1, + (flags&M_NOLF) ? "" : "\n"); + } + else + { + fprintf (fp, "%s %s%s%s%s", + time_string (0, 0, show_usec, &gc), + prefix, + prefix_sep, + m1, + (flags&M_NOLF) ? "" : "\n"); + } + fflush(fp); + ++x_msg_line_num; + } + } + + if (flags & M_FATAL) + msg (M_INFO, "Exiting due to fatal error"); + + if (flags & M_FATAL) + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_ERROR); /* exit point */ + + if (flags & M_USAGE_SMALL) + usage_small (); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Apply muting filter. + */ +bool +dont_mute (unsigned int flags) +{ + bool ret = true; + if (mute_cutoff > 0 && !(flags & M_NOMUTE)) + { + const int mute_level = DECODE_MUTE_LEVEL (flags); + if (mute_level > 0 && mute_level == mute_category) + { + if (mute_count == mute_cutoff) + msg (M_INFO | M_NOMUTE, "NOTE: --mute triggered..."); + if (++mute_count > mute_cutoff) + ret = false; + } + else + { + const int suppressed = mute_count - mute_cutoff; + if (suppressed > 0) + msg (M_INFO | M_NOMUTE, + "%d variation(s) on previous %d message(s) suppressed by --mute", + suppressed, + mute_cutoff); + mute_count = 1; + mute_category = mute_level; + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +assert_failed (const char *filename, int line) +{ +#ifdef GOOGLE_BREAKPAD + breakpad_dodump(); +#endif + msg (M_FATAL, "Assertion failed at %s:%d", filename, line); +} + +/* + * Fail memory allocation. Don't use msg() because it tries + * to allocate memory as part of its operation. + */ +void +out_of_memory (void) +{ + fprintf (stderr, PACKAGE_NAME ": Out of Memory\n"); + exit (1); +} + +void +open_syslog (const char *pgmname, bool stdio_to_null) +{ +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY + if (!msgfp && !std_redir) + { + if (!use_syslog) + { + pgmname_syslog = string_alloc (pgmname ? pgmname : PACKAGE, NULL); + openlog (pgmname_syslog, LOG_PID, LOG_OPENVPN); + use_syslog = true; + + /* Better idea: somehow pipe stdout/stderr output to msg() */ + if (stdio_to_null) + set_std_files_to_null (false); + } + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "Warning on use of --daemon/--inetd: this operating system lacks daemon logging features, therefore when I become a daemon, I won't be able to log status or error messages"); +#endif +} + +void +close_syslog () +{ +#if SYSLOG_CAPABILITY + if (use_syslog) + { + closelog(); + use_syslog = false; + if (pgmname_syslog) + { + free (pgmname_syslog); + pgmname_syslog = NULL; + } + } +#endif +} + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static HANDLE orig_stderr; + +HANDLE +get_orig_stderr (void) +{ + if (orig_stderr) + return orig_stderr; + else + return GetStdHandle (STD_ERROR_HANDLE); +} + +#endif + +void +redirect_stdout_stderr (const char *file, bool append) +{ +#if defined(WIN32) + if (!std_redir) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + HANDLE log_handle; + int log_fd; + + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES saAttr; + saAttr.nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES); + saAttr.bInheritHandle = TRUE; + saAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL; + + log_handle = CreateFileW (wide_string (file, &gc), + GENERIC_WRITE, + FILE_SHARE_READ, + &saAttr, + append ? OPEN_ALWAYS : CREATE_ALWAYS, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + NULL); + + gc_free (&gc); + + if (log_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "Warning: cannot open --log file: %s", file); + return; + } + + /* append to logfile? */ + if (append) + { + if (SetFilePointer (log_handle, 0, NULL, FILE_END) == INVALID_SET_FILE_POINTER) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: cannot seek to end of --log file: %s", file); + } + + /* save original stderr for password prompts */ + orig_stderr = GetStdHandle (STD_ERROR_HANDLE); + +#if 0 /* seems not be necessary with stdout/stderr redirection below*/ + /* set up for redirection */ + if (!SetStdHandle (STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE, log_handle) + || !SetStdHandle (STD_ERROR_HANDLE, log_handle)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: cannot redirect stdout/stderr to --log file: %s", file); +#endif + + /* direct stdout/stderr to point to log_handle */ + log_fd = _open_osfhandle ((intptr_t)log_handle, _O_TEXT); + if (log_fd == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: --log redirect failed due to _open_osfhandle failure"); + + /* open log_handle as FILE stream */ + ASSERT (msgfp == NULL); + msgfp = _fdopen (log_fd, "wt"); + if (msgfp == NULL) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: --log redirect failed due to _fdopen"); + + /* redirect C-library stdout/stderr to log file */ + if (_dup2 (log_fd, 1) == -1 || _dup2 (log_fd, 2) == -1) + msg (M_WARN, "Error: --log redirect of stdout/stderr failed"); + + std_redir = true; + } +#elif defined(HAVE_DUP2) + if (!std_redir) + { + int out = open (file, + O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | (append ? O_APPEND : O_TRUNC), + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + + if (out < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "Warning: Error redirecting stdout/stderr to --log file: %s", file); + return; + } + + if (dup2 (out, 1) == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "--log file redirection error on stdout"); + if (dup2 (out, 2) == -1) + msg (M_ERR, "--log file redirection error on stderr"); + + if (out > 2) + close (out); + + std_redir = true; + } + +#else + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: The --log option is not supported on this OS because it lacks the dup2 function"); +#endif +} + +/* + * Functions used to check return status + * of I/O operations. + */ + +unsigned int x_cs_info_level; /* GLOBAL */ +unsigned int x_cs_verbose_level; /* GLOBAL */ +unsigned int x_cs_err_delay_ms; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +reset_check_status () +{ + x_cs_info_level = 0; + x_cs_verbose_level = 0; +} + +void +set_check_status (unsigned int info_level, unsigned int verbose_level) +{ + x_cs_info_level = info_level; + x_cs_verbose_level = verbose_level; +} + +/* + * Called after most socket or tun/tap operations, via the inline + * function check_status(). + * + * Decide if we should print an error message, and see if we can + * extract any useful info from the error, such as a Path MTU hint + * from the OS. + */ +void +x_check_status (int status, + const char *description, + struct link_socket *sock, + struct tuntap *tt) +{ + const int my_errno = openvpn_errno (); + const char *extended_msg = NULL; + + msg (x_cs_verbose_level, "%s %s returned %d", + sock ? proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true) : "", + description, + status); + + if (status < 0) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); +#if EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY + /* get extended socket error message and possible PMTU hint from OS */ + if (sock) + { + int mtu; + extended_msg = format_extended_socket_error (sock->sd, &mtu, &gc); + if (mtu > 0 && sock->mtu != mtu) + { + sock->mtu = mtu; + sock->info.mtu_changed = true; + } + } +#elif defined(WIN32) + /* get possible driver error from TAP-Windows driver */ + extended_msg = tap_win_getinfo (tt, &gc); +#endif + if (!ignore_sys_error (my_errno)) + { + if (extended_msg) + msg (x_cs_info_level, "%s %s [%s]: %s (code=%d)", + description, + sock ? proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true) : "", + extended_msg, + strerror_ts (my_errno, &gc), + my_errno); + else + msg (x_cs_info_level, "%s %s: %s (code=%d)", + description, + sock ? proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true) : "", + strerror_ts (my_errno, &gc), + my_errno); + + if (x_cs_err_delay_ms) + platform_sleep_milliseconds (x_cs_err_delay_ms); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +/* + * In multiclient mode, put a client-specific prefix + * before each message. + */ +const char *x_msg_prefix; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Allow MSG to be redirected through a virtual_output object + */ + +const struct virtual_output *x_msg_virtual_output; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Exiting. + */ + +void +openvpn_exit (const int status) +{ + if (!forked) + { + void tun_abort(); +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + void plugin_abort (void); +#endif + + tun_abort(); + +#ifdef WIN32 + uninit_win32 (); +#endif + + close_syslog (); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + plugin_abort (); +#endif + +#if PORT_SHARE + if (port_share) + port_share_abort (port_share); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + mstats_close(); +#endif + +#ifdef ABORT_ON_ERROR + if (status == OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_ERROR) + abort (); +#endif + + if (status == OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD) + perf_output_results (); + } + + exit (status); +} + +/* + * Translate msg flags into a string + */ +const char * +msg_flags_string (const unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (16, gc); + if (flags == M_INFO) + buf_printf (&out, "I"); + if (flags & M_FATAL) + buf_printf (&out, "F"); + if (flags & M_NONFATAL) + buf_printf (&out, "N"); + if (flags & M_WARN) + buf_printf (&out, "W"); + if (flags & M_DEBUG) + buf_printf (&out, "D"); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void +crash (void) +{ + char *null = NULL; + *null = 0; +} +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + +const char * +strerror_win32 (DWORD errnum, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + /* + * This code can be omitted, though often the Windows + * WSA error messages are less informative than the + * Posix equivalents. + */ +#if 1 + switch (errnum) { + /* + * When the TAP-Windows driver returns STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL, this code + * gets returned to user space. + */ + case ERROR_GEN_FAILURE: + return "General failure (ERROR_GEN_FAILURE)"; + case ERROR_IO_PENDING: + return "I/O Operation in progress (ERROR_IO_PENDING)"; + case WSA_IO_INCOMPLETE: + return "I/O Operation in progress (WSA_IO_INCOMPLETE)"; + case WSAEINTR: + return "Interrupted system call (WSAEINTR)"; + case WSAEBADF: + return "Bad file number (WSAEBADF)"; + case WSAEACCES: + return "Permission denied (WSAEACCES)"; + case WSAEFAULT: + return "Bad address (WSAEFAULT)"; + case WSAEINVAL: + return "Invalid argument (WSAEINVAL)"; + case WSAEMFILE: + return "Too many open files (WSAEMFILE)"; + case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: + return "Operation would block (WSAEWOULDBLOCK)"; + case WSAEINPROGRESS: + return "Operation now in progress (WSAEINPROGRESS)"; + case WSAEALREADY: + return "Operation already in progress (WSAEALREADY)"; + case WSAEDESTADDRREQ: + return "Destination address required (WSAEDESTADDRREQ)"; + case WSAEMSGSIZE: + return "Message too long (WSAEMSGSIZE)"; + case WSAEPROTOTYPE: + return "Protocol wrong type for socket (WSAEPROTOTYPE)"; + case WSAENOPROTOOPT: + return "Bad protocol option (WSAENOPROTOOPT)"; + case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT: + return "Protocol not supported (WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT)"; + case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT: + return "Socket type not supported (WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT)"; + case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: + return "Operation not supported on socket (WSAEOPNOTSUPP)"; + case WSAEPFNOSUPPORT: + return "Protocol family not supported (WSAEPFNOSUPPORT)"; + case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT: + return "Address family not supported by protocol family (WSAEAFNOSUPPORT)"; + case WSAEADDRINUSE: + return "Address already in use (WSAEADDRINUSE)"; + case WSAENETDOWN: + return "Network is down (WSAENETDOWN)"; + case WSAENETUNREACH: + return "Network is unreachable (WSAENETUNREACH)"; + case WSAENETRESET: + return "Net dropped connection or reset (WSAENETRESET)"; + case WSAECONNABORTED: + return "Software caused connection abort (WSAECONNABORTED)"; + case WSAECONNRESET: + return "Connection reset by peer (WSAECONNRESET)"; + case WSAENOBUFS: + return "No buffer space available (WSAENOBUFS)"; + case WSAEISCONN: + return "Socket is already connected (WSAEISCONN)"; + case WSAENOTCONN: + return "Socket is not connected (WSAENOTCONN)"; + case WSAETIMEDOUT: + return "Connection timed out (WSAETIMEDOUT)"; + case WSAECONNREFUSED: + return "Connection refused (WSAECONNREFUSED)"; + case WSAELOOP: + return "Too many levels of symbolic links (WSAELOOP)"; + case WSAENAMETOOLONG: + return "File name too long (WSAENAMETOOLONG)"; + case WSAEHOSTDOWN: + return "Host is down (WSAEHOSTDOWN)"; + case WSAEHOSTUNREACH: + return "No Route to Host (WSAEHOSTUNREACH)"; + case WSAENOTEMPTY: + return "Directory not empty (WSAENOTEMPTY)"; + case WSAEPROCLIM: + return "Too many processes (WSAEPROCLIM)"; + case WSAEUSERS: + return "Too many users (WSAEUSERS)"; + case WSAEDQUOT: + return "Disc Quota Exceeded (WSAEDQUOT)"; + case WSAESTALE: + return "Stale NFS file handle (WSAESTALE)"; + case WSASYSNOTREADY: + return "Network SubSystem is unavailable (WSASYSNOTREADY)"; + case WSAVERNOTSUPPORTED: + return "WINSOCK DLL Version out of range (WSAVERNOTSUPPORTED)"; + case WSANOTINITIALISED: + return "Successful WSASTARTUP not yet performed (WSANOTINITIALISED)"; + case WSAEREMOTE: + return "Too many levels of remote in path (WSAEREMOTE)"; + case WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND: + return "Host not found (WSAHOST_NOT_FOUND)"; + default: + break; + } +#endif + + /* format a windows error message */ + { + char message[256]; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + const int status = FormatMessage ( + FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS + | FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM + | FORMAT_MESSAGE_ARGUMENT_ARRAY, + NULL, + errnum, + 0, + message, + sizeof (message), + NULL); + if (!status) + { + buf_printf (&out, "[Unknown Win32 Error]"); + } + else + { + char *cp; + for (cp = message; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) + { + if (*cp == '\n' || *cp == '\r') + *cp = ' '; + } + + buf_printf(&out, "%s", message); + } + + return BSTR (&out); + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27c48b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/error.h @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef ERROR_H +#define ERROR_H + +#include "basic.h" + +/* #define ABORT_ON_ERROR */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#define ERR_BUF_SIZE 8192 +#else +#define ERR_BUF_SIZE 1280 +#endif + +struct gc_arena; + +/* + * Where should messages be printed before syslog is opened? + * Not used if OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE is defined. + */ +#define OPENVPN_MSG_FP stdout +#define OPENVPN_ERROR_FP stderr + +/* + * Exit status codes + */ + +#define OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD 0 +#define OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_ERROR 1 +#define OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_USAGE 1 +#define OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_CANNOT_OPEN_DEBUG_FILE 1 + +/* + * Special command line debugging mode. + * If OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE + * is defined, contents of argc/argv will + * be dumped to OPENVPN_DEBUG_FILE as well + * as all other OpenVPN messages. + */ + +/* #define OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE */ +#define OPENVPN_DEBUG_FILE PACKAGE ".log" + +/* String and Error functions */ + +#ifdef WIN32 +# define openvpn_errno() GetLastError() +# define openvpn_strerror(e, gc) strerror_win32(e, gc) + const char *strerror_win32 (DWORD errnum, struct gc_arena *gc); +#else +# define openvpn_errno() errno +# define openvpn_strerror(x, gc) strerror(x) +#endif + +/* + * These globals should not be accessed directly, + * but rather through macros or inline functions defined below. + */ +extern unsigned int x_debug_level; +extern int x_msg_line_num; + +/* msg() flags */ + +#define M_DEBUG_LEVEL (0x0F) /* debug level mask */ + +#define M_FATAL (1<<4) /* exit program */ +#define M_NONFATAL (1<<5) /* non-fatal error */ +#define M_WARN (1<<6) /* call syslog with LOG_WARNING */ +#define M_DEBUG (1<<7) + +#define M_ERRNO (1<<8) /* show errno description */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +# define M_SSL (1<<10) /* show SSL error */ +#endif + +#define M_NOMUTE (1<<11) /* don't do mute processing */ +#define M_NOPREFIX (1<<12) /* don't show date/time prefix */ +#define M_USAGE_SMALL (1<<13) /* fatal options error, call usage_small */ +#define M_MSG_VIRT_OUT (1<<14) /* output message through msg_status_output callback */ +#define M_OPTERR (1<<15) /* print "Options error:" prefix */ +#define M_NOLF (1<<16) /* don't print new line */ +#define M_NOIPREFIX (1<<17) /* don't print instance prefix */ + +/* flag combinations which are frequently used */ +#define M_ERR (M_FATAL | M_ERRNO) +#define M_SSLERR (M_FATAL | M_SSL) +#define M_USAGE (M_USAGE_SMALL | M_NOPREFIX | M_OPTERR) +#define M_CLIENT (M_MSG_VIRT_OUT | M_NOMUTE | M_NOIPREFIX) + +/* + * Mute levels are designed to avoid large numbers of + * mostly similar messages clogging the log file. + * + * A mute level of 0 is always printed. + */ +#define MUTE_LEVEL_SHIFT 24 +#define MUTE_LEVEL_MASK 0xFF + +#define ENCODE_MUTE_LEVEL(mute_level) (((mute_level) & MUTE_LEVEL_MASK) << MUTE_LEVEL_SHIFT) +#define DECODE_MUTE_LEVEL(flags) (((flags) >> MUTE_LEVEL_SHIFT) & MUTE_LEVEL_MASK) + +/* + * log_level: verbosity level n (--verb n) must be >= log_level to print. + * mute_level: don't print more than n (--mute n) consecutive messages at + * a given mute level, or if 0 disable muting and print everything. + * + * Mask map: + * Bits 0-3: log level + * Bits 4-23: M_x flags + * Bits 24-31: mute level + */ +#define LOGLEV(log_level, mute_level, other) ((log_level) | ENCODE_MUTE_LEVEL(mute_level) | other) + +/* + * If compiler supports variable arguments in macros, define + * msg() as a macro for optimization win. + */ + +bool dont_mute (unsigned int flags); /* check muting filter */ + +#define MSG_TEST(flags) (unlikely((((unsigned int)flags) & M_DEBUG_LEVEL) <= x_debug_level) && dont_mute (flags)) + +#if defined(HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO) && !defined(__LCLINT__) +# define HAVE_VARARG_MACROS +# define msg(flags, ...) do { if (MSG_TEST(flags)) x_msg((flags), __VA_ARGS__); } while (false) +# ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +# define dmsg(flags, ...) do { if (MSG_TEST(flags)) x_msg((flags), __VA_ARGS__); } while (false) +# else +# define dmsg(flags, ...) +# endif +#elif defined(HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC) && !defined(__LCLINT__) +# define HAVE_VARARG_MACROS +# define msg(flags, args...) do { if (MSG_TEST(flags)) x_msg((flags), args); } while (false) +# ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +# define dmsg(flags, args...) do { if (MSG_TEST(flags)) x_msg((flags), args); } while (false) +# else +# define dmsg(flags, args...) +# endif +#else +# if !PEDANTIC +# ifdef _MSC_VER +# pragma message("this compiler appears to lack vararg macros which will cause a significant degradation in efficiency") +# else +# warning this compiler appears to lack vararg macros which will cause a significant degradation in efficiency (you can ignore this warning if you are using LCLINT) +# endif +# endif +# define msg x_msg +# define dmsg x_msg +#endif + +void x_msg (const unsigned int flags, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 2, 3))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 2, 3))) +#endif +#endif + ; /* should be called via msg above */ + +void x_msg_va (const unsigned int flags, const char *format, va_list arglist); + +/* + * Function prototypes + */ + +void error_reset (void); + +/* route errors to stderr that would normally go to stdout */ +void errors_to_stderr (void); + +void set_suppress_timestamps (bool suppressed); + +#define SDL_CONSTRAIN (1<<0) +bool set_debug_level (const int level, const unsigned int flags); + +bool set_mute_cutoff (const int cutoff); + +int get_debug_level (void); +int get_mute_cutoff (void); + +const char *msg_flags_string (const unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * File to print messages to before syslog is opened. + */ +FILE *msg_fp(const unsigned int flags); + +/* Fatal logic errors */ +#define ASSERT(x) do { if (!(x)) assert_failed(__FILE__, __LINE__); } while (false) + +void assert_failed (const char *filename, int line); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void crash (void); /* force a segfault (debugging only) */ +#endif + +/* Inline functions */ + +static inline bool +check_debug_level (unsigned int level) +{ + return (level & M_DEBUG_LEVEL) <= x_debug_level; +} + +/* Call if we forked */ +void msg_forked (void); + +/* syslog output */ + +void open_syslog (const char *pgmname, bool stdio_to_null); +void close_syslog (); + +/* log file output */ +void redirect_stdout_stderr (const char *file, bool append); + +#ifdef WIN32 +/* get original stderr handle, even if redirected by --log/--log-append */ +HANDLE get_orig_stderr (void); +#endif + +/* exit program */ +void openvpn_exit (const int status); + +/* exit program on out of memory error */ +void out_of_memory (void); + +/* + * Check the return status of read/write routines. + */ + +struct link_socket; +struct tuntap; + +extern unsigned int x_cs_info_level; +extern unsigned int x_cs_verbose_level; +extern unsigned int x_cs_err_delay_ms; + +void reset_check_status (void); +void set_check_status (unsigned int info_level, unsigned int verbose_level); + +void x_check_status (int status, + const char *description, + struct link_socket *sock, + struct tuntap *tt); + +static inline void +check_status (int status, const char *description, struct link_socket *sock, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (status < 0 || check_debug_level (x_cs_verbose_level)) + x_check_status (status, description, sock, tt); +} + +static inline void +set_check_status_error_delay (unsigned int milliseconds) +{ + x_cs_err_delay_ms = milliseconds; +} + +/* + * In multiclient mode, put a client-specific prefix + * before each message. + * + * TODO: x_msg_prefix should be thread-local + */ + +extern const char *x_msg_prefix; + +void msg_thread_init (void); +void msg_thread_uninit (void); + +static inline void +msg_set_prefix (const char *prefix) +{ + x_msg_prefix = prefix; +} + +static inline const char * +msg_get_prefix (void) +{ + return x_msg_prefix; +} + +/* + * Allow MSG to be redirected through a virtual_output object + */ + +struct virtual_output; + +extern const struct virtual_output *x_msg_virtual_output; + +static inline void +msg_set_virtual_output (const struct virtual_output *vo) +{ + x_msg_virtual_output = vo; +} + +static inline const struct virtual_output * +msg_get_virtual_output (void) +{ + return x_msg_virtual_output; +} + +/* + * Return true if this is a system error + * which can be safely ignored. + */ +static inline bool +ignore_sys_error (const int err) +{ + /* I/O operation pending */ +#ifdef WIN32 + if (err == WSAEWOULDBLOCK || err == WSAEINVAL) + return true; +#else + if (err == EAGAIN) + return true; +#endif + +#if 0 /* if enabled, suppress ENOBUFS errors */ +#ifdef ENOBUFS + /* No buffer space available */ + if (err == ENOBUFS) + return true; +#endif +#endif + + return false; +} + +#include "errlevel.h" + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a13e1cf --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.c @@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "event.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Some OSes will prefer select() over poll() + * when both are available. + */ +#if defined(TARGET_DARWIN) +#define SELECT_PREFERRED_OVER_POLL +#endif + +/* + * All non-windows OSes are assumed to have select() + */ +#ifdef WIN32 +#define SELECT 0 +#else +#define SELECT 1 +#endif + +/* + * This should be set to the highest file descriptor + * which can be used in one of the FD_ macros. + */ +#ifdef FD_SETSIZE +#define SELECT_MAX_FDS FD_SETSIZE +#else +#define SELECT_MAX_FDS 256 +#endif + +static inline int +tv_to_ms_timeout (const struct timeval *tv) +{ + if (tv->tv_sec == 0 && tv->tv_usec == 0) + return 0; + else + return max_int (tv->tv_sec * 1000 + (tv->tv_usec + 500) / 1000, 1); +} + +#ifdef WIN32 + +struct we_set +{ + struct event_set_functions func; + bool fast; + HANDLE *events; + struct event_set_return *esr; + int n_events; + int capacity; +}; + +static inline void +we_set_event (struct we_set *wes, int i, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + ASSERT (i >= 0 && i < wes->capacity); + + if (rwflags == EVENT_READ) + { + ASSERT (event->read != NULL); + wes->events[i] = event->read; + } + else if (rwflags == EVENT_WRITE) + { + ASSERT (event->write != NULL); + wes->events[i] = event->write; + } + else + msg (M_FATAL, "fatal error in we_set_events: rwflags=%d", rwflags); + + wes->esr[i].rwflags = rwflags; + wes->esr[i].arg = arg; +} + +static inline bool +we_append_event (struct we_set *wes, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + { + if (wes->n_events < wes->capacity) + { + we_set_event (wes, wes->n_events, event, EVENT_WRITE, arg); + ++wes->n_events; + } + else + return false; + } + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + { + if (wes->n_events < wes->capacity) + { + we_set_event (wes, wes->n_events, event, EVENT_READ, arg); + ++wes->n_events; + } + else + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static void +we_del_event (struct we_set *wes, event_t event) +{ + int i, j = 0; + const int len = wes->n_events; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + { + const HANDLE h = wes->events[i]; + if (h == event->read || h == event->write) + --wes->n_events; + else + { + if (i != j) + { + wes->events[j] = wes->events[i]; + wes->esr[j] = wes->esr[i]; + } + ++j; + } + } +} + +static void +we_del_index (struct we_set *wes, int index) +{ + int i; + ASSERT (index >= 0 && index < wes->n_events); + for (i = index; i < wes->n_events - 1; ++i) + { + wes->events[i] = wes->events[i+1]; + wes->esr[i] = wes->esr[i+1]; + } + --wes->n_events; +} + +static void +we_get_rw_indices (struct we_set *wes, event_t event, int *ri, int *wi) +{ + int i; + *ri = *wi = -1; + for (i = 0; i < wes->n_events; ++i) + { + const HANDLE h = wes->events[i]; + if (h == event->read) + { + ASSERT (*ri == -1); + *ri = i; + } + else if (h == event->write) + { + ASSERT (*wi == -1); + *wi = i; + } + } +} + +static void +we_free (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct we_set *wes = (struct we_set *) es; + free (wes->events); + free (wes->esr); + free (wes); +} + +static void +we_reset (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct we_set *wes = (struct we_set *) es; + ASSERT (wes->fast); + wes->n_events = 0; +} + +static void +we_del (struct event_set *es, event_t event) +{ + struct we_set *wes = (struct we_set *) es; + ASSERT (!wes->fast); + we_del_event (wes, event); +} + +static void +we_ctl (struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + struct we_set *wes = (struct we_set *) es; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_CTL n=%d ev=%p rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format, + wes->n_events, + event, + rwflags, + (ptr_type)arg); + + if (wes->fast) + { + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, rwflags, arg)) + goto err; + } + else + { + int ri, wi; + int one = -1; + int n = 0; + + we_get_rw_indices (wes, event, &ri, &wi); + if (wi >= 0) + { + one = wi; + ++n; + } + if (ri >= 0) + { + one = ri; + ++n; + } + switch (rwflags) + { + case 0: + switch (n) + { + case 0: + break; + case 1: + we_del_index (wes, one); + break; + case 2: + we_del_event (wes, event); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + break; + case EVENT_READ: + switch (n) + { + case 0: + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, EVENT_READ, arg)) + goto err; + break; + case 1: + we_set_event (wes, one, event, EVENT_READ, arg); + break; + case 2: + we_del_index (wes, wi); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + break; + case EVENT_WRITE: + switch (n) + { + case 0: + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, EVENT_WRITE, arg)) + goto err; + break; + case 1: + we_set_event (wes, one, event, EVENT_WRITE, arg); + break; + case 2: + we_del_index (wes, ri); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + break; + case EVENT_READ|EVENT_WRITE: + switch (n) + { + case 0: + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, EVENT_READ|EVENT_WRITE, arg)) + goto err; + break; + case 1: + if (ri == -1) + { + ASSERT (wi != -1); + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, EVENT_READ, arg)) + goto err; + } + else if (wi == -1) + { + if (!we_append_event (wes, event, EVENT_WRITE, arg)) + goto err; + } + else + ASSERT (0); + break; + case 2: + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + break; + default: + msg (M_FATAL, "fatal error in we_ctl: rwflags=%d", rwflags); + } + } + return; + + err: + msg (D_EVENT_ERRORS, "Error: Windows resource limit WSA_MAXIMUM_WAIT_EVENTS (%d) has been exceeded", WSA_MAXIMUM_WAIT_EVENTS); +} + +static int +we_wait (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + struct we_set *wes = (struct we_set *) es; + const int timeout = tv_to_ms_timeout (tv); + DWORD status; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_WAIT enter n=%d to=%d", wes->n_events, timeout); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_EVENT_WAIT)) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < wes->n_events; ++i) + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "[%d] ev=%p rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format, + i, + wes->events[i], + wes->esr[i].rwflags, + (ptr_type)wes->esr[i].arg); + } +#endif + + /* + * First poll our event list with 0 timeout + */ + status = WSAWaitForMultipleEvents( + (DWORD) wes->n_events, + wes->events, + FALSE, + (DWORD) 0, + FALSE); + + /* + * If at least one event is already set, we must + * individually poll the whole list. + */ + if (status >= WSA_WAIT_EVENT_0 && status < WSA_WAIT_EVENT_0 + (DWORD) wes->n_events) + { + int i; + int j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < wes->n_events; ++i) + { + if (j >= outlen) + break; + if (WaitForSingleObject (wes->events[i], 0) == WAIT_OBJECT_0) + { + *out = wes->esr[i]; + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_WAIT leave [%d,%d] rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format, + i, j, out->rwflags, (ptr_type)out->arg); + ++j; + ++out; + } + } + return j; + } + else + { + /* + * If caller specified timeout > 0, we know at this point + * that no events are set, so wait only for the first event + * (or timeout) and return at most one event_set_return object. + * + * If caller specified timeout == 0, the second call to + * WSAWaitForMultipleEvents would be redundant -- just + * return 0 indicating timeout. + */ + if (timeout > 0) + status = WSAWaitForMultipleEvents( + (DWORD) wes->n_events, + wes->events, + FALSE, + (DWORD) timeout, + FALSE); + + if (outlen >= 1 && status >= WSA_WAIT_EVENT_0 && status < WSA_WAIT_EVENT_0 + (DWORD) wes->n_events) + { + *out = wes->esr[status - WSA_WAIT_EVENT_0]; + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_WAIT leave rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format, + out->rwflags, (ptr_type)out->arg); + return 1; + } + else if (status == WSA_WAIT_TIMEOUT) + return 0; + else + return -1; + } +} + +static struct event_set * +we_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct we_set *wes; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_INIT maxevents=%d flags=0x%08x", *maxevents, flags); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (wes, struct we_set); + + /* set dispatch functions */ + wes->func.free = we_free; + wes->func.reset = we_reset; + wes->func.del = we_del; + wes->func.ctl = we_ctl; + wes->func.wait = we_wait; + + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_FAST) + wes->fast = true; + wes->n_events = 0; + + /* Figure our event capacity */ + ASSERT (*maxevents > 0); + wes->capacity = min_int (*maxevents * 2, WSA_MAXIMUM_WAIT_EVENTS); + *maxevents = min_int (*maxevents, WSA_MAXIMUM_WAIT_EVENTS); + + /* Allocate space for Win32 event handles */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (wes->events, HANDLE, wes->capacity); + + /* Allocate space for event_set_return objects */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (wes->esr, struct event_set_return, wes->capacity); + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "WE_INIT maxevents=%d capacity=%d", + *maxevents, wes->capacity); + + return (struct event_set *) wes; +} + +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +#if EPOLL + +struct ep_set +{ + struct event_set_functions func; + bool fast; + int epfd; + int maxevents; + struct epoll_event *events; +}; + +static void +ep_free (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct ep_set *eps = (struct ep_set *) es; + close (eps->epfd); + free (eps->events); + free (eps); +} + +static void +ep_reset (struct event_set *es) +{ + const struct ep_set *eps = (struct ep_set *) es; + ASSERT (eps->fast); +} + +static void +ep_del (struct event_set *es, event_t event) +{ + struct epoll_event ev; + struct ep_set *eps = (struct ep_set *) es; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "EP_DEL ev=%d", (int)event); + + ASSERT (!eps->fast); + CLEAR (ev); + epoll_ctl (eps->epfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, event, &ev); +} + +static void +ep_ctl (struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + struct ep_set *eps = (struct ep_set *) es; + struct epoll_event ev; + + CLEAR (ev); + + ev.data.ptr = arg; + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + ev.events |= EPOLLIN; + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + ev.events |= EPOLLOUT; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "EP_CTL fd=%d rwflags=0x%04x ev=0x%08x arg=" ptr_format, + (int)event, + rwflags, + (unsigned int)ev.events, + (ptr_type)ev.data.ptr); + + if (epoll_ctl (eps->epfd, EPOLL_CTL_MOD, event, &ev) < 0) + { + if (errno == ENOENT) + { + if (epoll_ctl (eps->epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, event, &ev) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "EVENT: epoll_ctl EPOLL_CTL_ADD failed, sd=%d", (int)event); + } + else + msg (M_ERR, "EVENT: epoll_ctl EPOLL_CTL_MOD failed, sd=%d", (int)event); + } +} + +static int +ep_wait (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + struct ep_set *eps = (struct ep_set *) es; + int stat; + + if (outlen > eps->maxevents) + outlen = eps->maxevents; + + stat = epoll_wait (eps->epfd, eps->events, outlen, tv_to_ms_timeout (tv)); + ASSERT (stat <= outlen); + + if (stat > 0) + { + int i; + const struct epoll_event *ev = eps->events; + struct event_set_return *esr = out; + for (i = 0; i < stat; ++i) + { + esr->rwflags = 0; + if (ev->events & (EPOLLIN|EPOLLPRI|EPOLLERR|EPOLLHUP)) + esr->rwflags |= EVENT_READ; + if (ev->events & EPOLLOUT) + esr->rwflags |= EVENT_WRITE; + esr->arg = ev->data.ptr; + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "EP_WAIT[%d] rwflags=0x%04x ev=0x%08x arg=" ptr_format, + i, esr->rwflags, ev->events, (ptr_type)ev->data.ptr); + ++ev; + ++esr; + } + } + return stat; +} + +static struct event_set * +ep_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct ep_set *eps; + int fd; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "EP_INIT maxevents=%d flags=0x%08x", *maxevents, flags); + + /* open epoll file descriptor */ + fd = epoll_create (*maxevents); + if (fd < 0) + return NULL; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (eps, struct ep_set); + + /* set dispatch functions */ + eps->func.free = ep_free; + eps->func.reset = ep_reset; + eps->func.del = ep_del; + eps->func.ctl = ep_ctl; + eps->func.wait = ep_wait; + + /* fast method ("sort of") corresponds to epoll one-shot */ + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_FAST) + eps->fast = true; + + /* allocate space for epoll_wait return */ + ASSERT (*maxevents > 0); + eps->maxevents = *maxevents; + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (eps->events, struct epoll_event, eps->maxevents); + + /* set epoll control fd */ + eps->epfd = fd; + + return (struct event_set *) eps; +} +#endif /* EPOLL */ + +#if POLL + +struct po_set +{ + struct event_set_functions func; + bool fast; + struct pollfd *events; + void **args; + int n_events; + int capacity; +}; + +static void +po_free (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct po_set *pos = (struct po_set *) es; + free (pos->events); + free (pos->args); + free (pos); +} + +static void +po_reset (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct po_set *pos = (struct po_set *) es; + ASSERT (pos->fast); + pos->n_events = 0; +} + +static void +po_del (struct event_set *es, event_t event) +{ + struct po_set *pos = (struct po_set *) es; + int i; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "PO_DEL ev=%d", (int)event); + + ASSERT (!pos->fast); + for (i = 0; i < pos->n_events; ++i) + { + if (pos->events[i].fd == event) + { + int j; + for (j = i; j < pos->n_events - 1; ++j) + { + pos->events[j] = pos->events[j+1]; + pos->args[j] = pos->args[j+1]; + } + --pos->n_events; + break; + } + } +} + +static inline void +po_set_pollfd_events (struct pollfd *pfdp, unsigned int rwflags) +{ + pfdp->events = 0; + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + pfdp->events |= POLLOUT; + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + pfdp->events |= (POLLIN|POLLPRI); +} + +static inline bool +po_append_event (struct po_set *pos, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + if (pos->n_events < pos->capacity) + { + struct pollfd *pfdp = &pos->events[pos->n_events]; + pfdp->fd = event; + pos->args[pos->n_events] = arg; + po_set_pollfd_events (pfdp, rwflags); + ++pos->n_events; + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +static void +po_ctl (struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + struct po_set *pos = (struct po_set *) es; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "PO_CTL rwflags=0x%04x ev=%d arg=" ptr_format, + rwflags, (int)event, (ptr_type)arg); + + if (pos->fast) + { + if (!po_append_event (pos, event, rwflags, arg)) + goto err; + } + else + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < pos->n_events; ++i) + { + struct pollfd *pfdp = &pos->events[i]; + if (pfdp->fd == event) + { + pos->args[i] = arg; + po_set_pollfd_events (pfdp, rwflags); + goto done; + } + } + if (!po_append_event (pos, event, rwflags, arg)) + goto err; + } + + done: + return; + + err: + msg (D_EVENT_ERRORS, "Error: poll: too many I/O wait events"); +} + +static int +po_wait (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + struct po_set *pos = (struct po_set *) es; + int stat; + + stat = poll (pos->events, pos->n_events, tv_to_ms_timeout (tv)); + + ASSERT (stat <= pos->n_events); + + if (stat > 0) + { + int i, j=0; + const struct pollfd *pfdp = pos->events; + for (i = 0; i < pos->n_events && j < outlen; ++i) + { + if (pfdp->revents & (POLLIN|POLLPRI|POLLERR|POLLHUP|POLLOUT)) + { + out->rwflags = 0; + if (pfdp->revents & (POLLIN|POLLPRI|POLLERR|POLLHUP)) + out->rwflags |= EVENT_READ; + if (pfdp->revents & POLLOUT) + out->rwflags |= EVENT_WRITE; + out->arg = pos->args[i]; + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "PO_WAIT[%d,%d] fd=%d rev=0x%08x rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format " %s", + i, j, pfdp->fd, pfdp->revents, out->rwflags, (ptr_type)out->arg, pos->fast ? "" : "[scalable]"); + ++out; + ++j; + } + else if (pfdp->revents) + { + msg (D_EVENT_ERRORS, "Error: poll: unknown revents=0x%04x", (unsigned int)pfdp->revents); + } + ++pfdp; + } + return j; + } + return stat; +} + +static struct event_set * +po_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct po_set *pos; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "PO_INIT maxevents=%d flags=0x%08x", *maxevents, flags); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pos, struct po_set); + + /* set dispatch functions */ + pos->func.free = po_free; + pos->func.reset = po_reset; + pos->func.del = po_del; + pos->func.ctl = po_ctl; + pos->func.wait = po_wait; + + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_FAST) + pos->fast = true; + + pos->n_events = 0; + + /* Figure our event capacity */ + ASSERT (*maxevents > 0); + pos->capacity = *maxevents; + + /* Allocate space for pollfd structures to be passed to poll() */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (pos->events, struct pollfd, pos->capacity); + + /* Allocate space for event_set_return objects */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (pos->args, void *, pos->capacity); + + return (struct event_set *) pos; +} +#endif /* POLL */ + +#if SELECT + +struct se_set +{ + struct event_set_functions func; + bool fast; + fd_set readfds; + fd_set writefds; + void **args; /* allocated to capacity size */ + int maxfd; /* largest fd seen so far, always < capacity */ + int capacity; /* fixed largest fd + 1 */ +}; + +static void +se_free (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + free (ses->args); + free (ses); +} + +static void +se_reset (struct event_set *es) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + int i; + ASSERT (ses->fast); + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_RESET"); + + FD_ZERO (&ses->readfds); + FD_ZERO (&ses->writefds); + for (i = 0; i <= ses->maxfd; ++i) + ses->args[i] = NULL; + ses->maxfd = -1; +} + +static void +se_del (struct event_set *es, event_t event) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + ASSERT (!ses->fast); + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_DEL ev=%d", (int)event); + + if (event >= 0 && event < ses->capacity) + { + FD_CLR (event, &ses->readfds); + FD_CLR (event, &ses->writefds); + ses->args[event] = NULL; + } + else + msg (D_EVENT_ERRORS, "Error: select/se_del: too many I/O wait events"); + return; +} + +static void +se_ctl (struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_CTL rwflags=0x%04x ev=%d fast=%d cap=%d maxfd=%d arg=" ptr_format, + rwflags, (int)event, (int)ses->fast, ses->capacity, ses->maxfd, (ptr_type)arg); + + if (event >= 0 && event < ses->capacity) + { + ses->maxfd = max_int (event, ses->maxfd); + ses->args[event] = arg; + if (ses->fast) + { + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + FD_SET (event, &ses->readfds); + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + FD_SET (event, &ses->writefds); + } + else + { + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + FD_SET (event, &ses->readfds); + else + FD_CLR (event, &ses->readfds); + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + FD_SET (event, &ses->writefds); + else + FD_CLR (event, &ses->writefds); + } + } + else + { + msg (D_EVENT_ERRORS, "Error: select: too many I/O wait events, fd=%d cap=%d", + (int) event, + ses->capacity); + } +} + +static int +se_wait_return (struct se_set *ses, + fd_set *read, + fd_set *write, + struct event_set_return *out, + int outlen) +{ + int i, j = 0; + for (i = 0; i <= ses->maxfd && j < outlen; ++i) + { + const bool r = FD_ISSET (i, read); + const bool w = FD_ISSET (i, write); + if (r || w) + { + out->rwflags = 0; + if (r) + out->rwflags |= EVENT_READ; + if (w) + out->rwflags |= EVENT_WRITE; + out->arg = ses->args[i]; + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_WAIT[%d,%d] rwflags=0x%04x arg=" ptr_format, + i, j, out->rwflags, (ptr_type)out->arg); + ++out; + ++j; + } + } + return j; +} + +static int +se_wait_fast (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + struct timeval tv_tmp = *tv; + int stat; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_WAIT_FAST maxfd=%d tv=%d/%d", + ses->maxfd, + (int)tv_tmp.tv_sec, + (int)tv_tmp.tv_usec); + + stat = select (ses->maxfd + 1, &ses->readfds, &ses->writefds, NULL, &tv_tmp); + + if (stat > 0) + stat = se_wait_return (ses, &ses->readfds, &ses->writefds, out, outlen); + + return stat; +} + +static int +se_wait_scalable (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + struct se_set *ses = (struct se_set *) es; + struct timeval tv_tmp = *tv; + fd_set read = ses->readfds; + fd_set write = ses->writefds; + int stat; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_WAIT_SCALEABLE maxfd=%d tv=%d/%d", + ses->maxfd, (int)tv_tmp.tv_sec, (int)tv_tmp.tv_usec); + + stat = select (ses->maxfd + 1, &read, &write, NULL, &tv_tmp); + + if (stat > 0) + stat = se_wait_return (ses, &read, &write, out, outlen); + + return stat; +} + +static struct event_set * +se_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct se_set *ses; + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "SE_INIT maxevents=%d flags=0x%08x", *maxevents, flags); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ses, struct se_set); + + /* set dispatch functions */ + ses->func.free = se_free; + ses->func.reset = se_reset; + ses->func.del = se_del; + ses->func.ctl = se_ctl; + ses->func.wait = se_wait_scalable; + + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_FAST) + { + ses->fast = true; + ses->func.wait = se_wait_fast; + } + + /* Select needs to be passed this value + 1 */ + ses->maxfd = -1; + + /* Set our event capacity */ + ASSERT (*maxevents > 0); + *maxevents = min_int (*maxevents, SELECT_MAX_FDS); + ses->capacity = SELECT_MAX_FDS; + + /* Allocate space for event_set_return void * args */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (ses->args, void *, ses->capacity); + + return (struct event_set *) ses; +} +#endif /* SELECT */ + +static struct event_set * +event_set_init_simple (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct event_set *ret = NULL; +#ifdef WIN32 + ret = we_init (maxevents, flags); +#elif POLL && SELECT +#if 0 /* Define to 1 if EVENT_METHOD_US_TIMEOUT should cause select to be favored over poll */ + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_US_TIMEOUT) + ret = se_init (maxevents, flags); +#endif +# ifdef SELECT_PREFERRED_OVER_POLL + if (!ret) + ret = se_init (maxevents, flags); + if (!ret) + ret = po_init (maxevents, flags); +# else + if (!ret) + ret = po_init (maxevents, flags); + if (!ret) + ret = se_init (maxevents, flags); +# endif +#elif POLL + ret = po_init (maxevents, flags); +#elif SELECT + ret = se_init (maxevents, flags); +#else +#error At least one of poll, select, or WSAWaitForMultipleEvents must be supported by the kernel +#endif + ASSERT (ret); + return ret; +} + +static struct event_set * +event_set_init_scalable (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + struct event_set *ret = NULL; +#if EPOLL + ret = ep_init (maxevents, flags); + if (!ret) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Note: sys_epoll API is unavailable, falling back to poll/select API"); + ret = event_set_init_simple (maxevents, flags); + } +#else + ret = event_set_init_simple (maxevents, flags); +#endif + ASSERT (ret); + return ret; +} + +struct event_set * +event_set_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags) +{ + if (flags & EVENT_METHOD_FAST) + return event_set_init_simple (maxevents, flags); + else + return event_set_init_scalable (maxevents, flags); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd29fdc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/event.h @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef EVENT_H +#define EVENT_H + +#include "win32.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "perf.h" + +/* + * rwflags passed to event_ctl and returned by + * struct event_set_return. + */ +#define EVENT_UNDEF 4 +#define EVENT_READ (1<<0) +#define EVENT_WRITE (1<<1) +/* + * Initialization flags passed to event_set_init + */ +#define EVENT_METHOD_US_TIMEOUT (1<<0) +#define EVENT_METHOD_FAST (1<<1) + +#ifdef WIN32 + +typedef const struct rw_handle *event_t; + +#define UNDEFINED_EVENT (NULL) + +#else + +typedef int event_t; + +#define UNDEFINED_EVENT (-1) + +#endif + +struct event_set; +struct event_set_return; + +struct event_set_functions +{ + void (*free)(struct event_set *es); + void (*reset)(struct event_set *es); + void (*del)(struct event_set *es, event_t event); + void (*ctl)(struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg); + + /* + * Return status for wait: + * -1 on signal or error + * 0 on timeout + * length of event_set_return if at least 1 event is returned + */ + int (*wait)(struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen); +}; + +struct event_set_return +{ + unsigned int rwflags; + void *arg; +}; + +struct event_set +{ + struct event_set_functions func; +}; + +/* + * maxevents on input: desired max number of event_t descriptors + * simultaneously set with event_ctl + * maxevents on output: may be modified down, depending on limitations + * of underlying API + * flags: EVENT_METHOD_x flags + */ +struct event_set *event_set_init (int *maxevents, unsigned int flags); + +static inline void +event_free (struct event_set *es) +{ + if (es) + (*es->func.free)(es); +} + +static inline void +event_reset (struct event_set *es) +{ + (*es->func.reset)(es); +} + +static inline void +event_del (struct event_set *es, event_t event) +{ + (*es->func.del)(es, event); +} + +static inline void +event_ctl (struct event_set *es, event_t event, unsigned int rwflags, void *arg) +{ + (*es->func.ctl)(es, event, rwflags, arg); +} + +static inline int +event_wait (struct event_set *es, const struct timeval *tv, struct event_set_return *out, int outlen) +{ + int ret; + perf_push (PERF_IO_WAIT); + ret = (*es->func.wait)(es, tv, out, outlen); + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +static inline void +event_set_return_init (struct event_set_return *esr) +{ + esr->rwflags = 0; + esr->arg = NULL; +} + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static inline void +wait_signal (struct event_set *es, void *arg) +{ + if (HANDLE_DEFINED (win32_signal.in.read)) + event_ctl (es, &win32_signal.in, EVENT_READ, arg); +} + +#else + +static inline void +wait_signal (struct event_set *es, void *arg) +{ +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fe449c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "error.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* Set a file descriptor to non-blocking */ +bool +set_nonblock_action (int fd) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + u_long arg = 1; + if (ioctlsocket (fd, FIONBIO, &arg)) + return false; +#else + if (fcntl (fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) + return false; +#endif + return true; +} + +/* Set a file descriptor to not be passed across execs */ +bool +set_cloexec_action (int fd) +{ +#ifndef WIN32 + if (fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) + return false; +#endif + return true; +} + +/* Set a file descriptor to non-blocking */ +void +set_nonblock (int fd) +{ + if (!set_nonblock_action (fd)) + msg (M_ERR, "Set socket to non-blocking mode failed"); +} + +/* Set a file descriptor to not be passed across execs */ +void +set_cloexec (int fd) +{ + if (!set_cloexec_action (fd)) + msg (M_ERR, "Set FD_CLOEXEC flag on file descriptor failed"); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b6b6d04 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fdmisc.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include "basic.h" + +bool set_nonblock_action (int fd); +bool set_cloexec_action (int fd); + +void set_nonblock (int fd); +void set_cloexec (int fd); diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward-inline.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward-inline.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7eb480dd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward-inline.h @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef FORWARD_INLINE_H +#define FORWARD_INLINE_H + +/* + * Inline functions + */ + +/* + * Does TLS session need service? + */ +static inline void +check_tls (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + void check_tls_dowork (struct context *c); + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + check_tls_dowork (c); +#endif +} + +/* + * TLS errors are fatal in TCP mode. + * Also check for --tls-exit trigger. + */ +static inline void +check_tls_errors (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + void check_tls_errors_co (struct context *c); + void check_tls_errors_nco (struct context *c); + if (c->c2.tls_multi && c->c2.tls_exit_signal) + { + if (link_socket_connection_oriented (c->c2.link_socket)) + { + if (c->c2.tls_multi->n_soft_errors) + check_tls_errors_co (c); + } + else + { + if (c->c2.tls_multi->n_hard_errors) + check_tls_errors_nco (c); + } + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Check for possible incoming configuration + * messages on the control channel. + */ +static inline void +check_incoming_control_channel (struct context *c) +{ +#if P2MP + void check_incoming_control_channel_dowork (struct context *c); + if (tls_test_payload_len (c->c2.tls_multi) > 0) + check_incoming_control_channel_dowork (c); +#endif +} + +/* + * Options like --up-delay need to be triggered by this function which + * checks for connection establishment. + */ +static inline void +check_connection_established (struct context *c) +{ + void check_connection_established_dowork (struct context *c); + if (event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.wait_for_connect)) + check_connection_established_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Should we add routes? + */ +static inline void +check_add_routes (struct context *c) +{ + void check_add_routes_dowork (struct context *c); + if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.route_wakeup, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + check_add_routes_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Should we exit due to inactivity timeout? + */ +static inline void +check_inactivity_timeout (struct context *c) +{ + void check_inactivity_timeout_dowork (struct context *c); + + if (c->options.inactivity_timeout + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.inactivity_interval, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + check_inactivity_timeout_dowork (c); +} + +#if P2MP + +static inline void +check_server_poll_timeout (struct context *c) +{ + void check_server_poll_timeout_dowork (struct context *c); + + if (c->options.server_poll_timeout + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.server_poll_interval, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + check_server_poll_timeout_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Scheduled exit? + */ +static inline void +check_scheduled_exit (struct context *c) +{ + void check_scheduled_exit_dowork (struct context *c); + + if (event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.scheduled_exit)) + { + if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.scheduled_exit, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + check_scheduled_exit_dowork (c); + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Should we write timer-triggered status file. + */ +static inline void +check_status_file (struct context *c) +{ + void check_status_file_dowork (struct context *c); + + if (c->c1.status_output) + { + if (status_trigger_tv (c->c1.status_output, &c->c2.timeval)) + check_status_file_dowork (c); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT +/* + * Should we deliver a datagram fragment to remote? + */ +static inline void +check_fragment (struct context *c) +{ + void check_fragment_dowork (struct context *c); + if (c->c2.fragment) + check_fragment_dowork (c); +} +#endif + +#if P2MP + +/* + * see if we should send a push_request in response to --pull + */ +static inline void +check_push_request (struct context *c) +{ + void check_push_request_dowork (struct context *c); + if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.push_request_interval, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + check_push_request_dowork (c); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +/* + * Should we persist our anti-replay packet ID state to disk? + */ +static inline void +check_packet_id_persist_flush (struct context *c) +{ + if (packet_id_persist_enabled (&c->c1.pid_persist) + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.packet_id_persist_interval, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + packet_id_persist_save (&c->c1.pid_persist); +} +#endif + +/* + * Set our wakeup to 0 seconds, so we will be rescheduled + * immediately. + */ +static inline void +context_immediate_reschedule (struct context *c) +{ + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = 0; /* ZERO-TIMEOUT */ + c->c2.timeval.tv_usec = 0; +} + +static inline void +context_reschedule_sec (struct context *c, int sec) +{ + if (sec < 0) + sec = 0; + if (sec < c->c2.timeval.tv_sec) + { + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = sec; + c->c2.timeval.tv_usec = 0; + } +} + +static inline struct link_socket_info * +get_link_socket_info (struct context *c) +{ + + if (c->c2.link_socket_info) + return c->c2.link_socket_info; + else + return &c->c2.link_socket->info; +} + +static inline void +register_activity (struct context *c, const int size) +{ + if (c->options.inactivity_timeout) + { + c->c2.inactivity_bytes += size; + if (c->c2.inactivity_bytes >= c->options.inactivity_minimum_bytes) + { + c->c2.inactivity_bytes = 0; + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.inactivity_interval); + } + } +} + +/* + * Return the io_wait() flags appropriate for + * a point-to-point tunnel. + */ +static inline unsigned int +p2p_iow_flags (const struct context *c) +{ + unsigned int flags = (IOW_SHAPER|IOW_CHECK_RESIDUAL|IOW_FRAG|IOW_READ|IOW_WAIT_SIGNAL); + if (c->c2.to_link.len > 0) + flags |= IOW_TO_LINK; + if (c->c2.to_tun.len > 0) + flags |= IOW_TO_TUN; + return flags; +} + +/* + * This is the core I/O wait function, used for all I/O waits except + * for TCP in server mode. + */ +static inline void +io_wait (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + void io_wait_dowork (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags); + + if (c->c2.fast_io && (flags & (IOW_TO_TUN|IOW_TO_LINK|IOW_MBUF))) + { + /* fast path -- only for TUN/TAP/UDP writes */ + unsigned int ret = 0; + if (flags & IOW_TO_TUN) + ret |= TUN_WRITE; + if (flags & (IOW_TO_LINK|IOW_MBUF)) + ret |= SOCKET_WRITE; + c->c2.event_set_status = ret; + } + else + { + /* slow path */ + io_wait_dowork (c, flags); + } +} + +#define CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED(c) (get_link_socket_info(c)->connection_established) + +#endif /* EVENT_INLINE_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e9c406c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.c @@ -0,0 +1,1557 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "forward.h" +#include "init.h" +#include "push.h" +#include "gremlin.h" +#include "mss.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "ps.h" +#include "dhcp.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "forward-inline.h" +#include "occ-inline.h" +#include "ping-inline.h" +#include "mstats.h" + +counter_type link_read_bytes_global; /* GLOBAL */ +counter_type link_write_bytes_global; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* show event wait debugging info */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +const char * +wait_status_string (struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "I/O WAIT %s|%s|%s|%s %s", + tun_stat (c->c1.tuntap, EVENT_READ, gc), + tun_stat (c->c1.tuntap, EVENT_WRITE, gc), + socket_stat (c->c2.link_socket, EVENT_READ, gc), + socket_stat (c->c2.link_socket, EVENT_WRITE, gc), + tv_string (&c->c2.timeval, gc)); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +void +show_wait_status (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "%s", wait_status_string (c, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +/* + * In TLS mode, let TLS level respond to any control-channel + * packets which were received, or prepare any packets for + * transmission. + * + * tmp_int is purely an optimization that allows us to call + * tls_multi_process less frequently when there's not much + * traffic on the control-channel. + * + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) +void +check_tls_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + interval_t wakeup = BIG_TIMEOUT; + + if (interval_test (&c->c2.tmp_int)) + { + const int tmp_status = tls_multi_process + (c->c2.tls_multi, &c->c2.to_link, &c->c2.to_link_addr, + get_link_socket_info (c), &wakeup); + if (tmp_status == TLSMP_ACTIVE) + { + update_time (); + interval_action (&c->c2.tmp_int); + } + else if (tmp_status == TLSMP_KILL) + { + register_signal (c, SIGTERM, "auth-control-exit"); + } + + interval_future_trigger (&c->c2.tmp_int, wakeup); + } + + interval_schedule_wakeup (&c->c2.tmp_int, &wakeup); + + if (wakeup) + context_reschedule_sec (c, wakeup); +} +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +void +check_tls_errors_co (struct context *c) +{ + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Fatal TLS error (check_tls_errors_co), restarting"); + register_signal (c, c->c2.tls_exit_signal, "tls-error"); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- TLS error */ +} + +void +check_tls_errors_nco (struct context *c) +{ + register_signal (c, c->c2.tls_exit_signal, "tls-error"); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- TLS error */ +} + +#endif + +#if P2MP + +/* + * Handle incoming configuration + * messages on the control channel. + */ +void +check_incoming_control_channel_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + const int len = tls_test_payload_len (c->c2.tls_multi); + if (len) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc (len, &gc); + if (tls_rec_payload (c->c2.tls_multi, &buf)) + { + /* force null termination of message */ + buf_null_terminate (&buf); + + /* enforce character class restrictions */ + string_mod (BSTR (&buf), CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, 0); + + if (buf_string_match_head_str (&buf, "AUTH_FAILED")) + receive_auth_failed (c, &buf); + else if (buf_string_match_head_str (&buf, "PUSH_")) + incoming_push_message (c, &buf); + else if (buf_string_match_head_str (&buf, "RESTART")) + server_pushed_signal (c, &buf, true, 7); + else if (buf_string_match_head_str (&buf, "HALT")) + server_pushed_signal (c, &buf, false, 4); + else + msg (D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received unknown control message: %s", BSTR (&buf)); + } + else + { + msg (D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Receive control message failed"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +/* + * Periodically resend PUSH_REQUEST until PUSH message received + */ +void +check_push_request_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + send_push_request (c); + + /* if no response to first push_request, retry at PUSH_REQUEST_INTERVAL second intervals */ + event_timeout_modify_wakeup (&c->c2.push_request_interval, PUSH_REQUEST_INTERVAL); +} + +#endif /* P2MP */ + +/* + * Things that need to happen immediately after connection initiation should go here. + */ +void +check_connection_established_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.wait_for_connect, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + { + if (CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED (c)) + { +#if P2MP + /* if --pull was specified, send a push request to server */ + if (c->c2.tls_multi && c->options.pull) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_GET_CONFIG, + NULL, + 0, + 0); + } +#endif + /* send push request in 1 sec */ + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.push_request_interval, 1, now); + reset_coarse_timers (c); + } + else +#endif + { + do_up (c, false, 0); + } + + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.wait_for_connect); + } + } +} + +/* + * Send a string to remote over the TLS control channel. + * Used for push/pull messages, passing username/password, + * etc. + */ +bool +send_control_channel_string (struct context *c, const char *str, int msglevel) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (c->c2.tls_multi) { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool stat; + + /* buffered cleartext write onto TLS control channel */ + stat = tls_send_payload (c->c2.tls_multi, (uint8_t*) str, strlen (str) + 1); + + /* + * Reschedule tls_multi_process. + * NOTE: in multi-client mode, usually the below two statements are + * insufficient to reschedule the client instance object unless + * multi_schedule_context_wakeup(m, mi) is also called. + */ + interval_action (&c->c2.tmp_int); + context_immediate_reschedule (c); /* ZERO-TIMEOUT */ + + msg (msglevel, "SENT CONTROL [%s]: '%s' (status=%d)", + tls_common_name (c->c2.tls_multi, false), + sanitize_control_message (str, &gc), + (int) stat); + + gc_free (&gc); + return stat; + } +#endif + return true; +} + +/* + * Add routes. + */ + +static void +check_add_routes_action (struct context *c, const bool errors) +{ + do_route (&c->options, c->c1.route_list, c->c1.route_ipv6_list, + c->c1.tuntap, c->plugins, c->c2.es); + update_time (); + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.route_wakeup); + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.route_wakeup_expire); + initialization_sequence_completed (c, errors ? ISC_ERRORS : 0); /* client/p2p --route-delay was defined */ +} + +void +check_add_routes_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + if (test_routes (c->c1.route_list, c->c1.tuntap)) + { + check_add_routes_action (c, false); + } + else if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.route_wakeup_expire, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + { + check_add_routes_action (c, true); + } + else + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route: Waiting for TUN/TAP interface to come up..."); + if (c->c1.tuntap) + { + if (!tun_standby (c->c1.tuntap)) + { + register_signal (c, SIGHUP, "ip-fail"); + c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds = 10; +#ifdef WIN32 + show_routes (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + show_adapters (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); +#endif + } + } + update_time (); + if (c->c2.route_wakeup.n != 1) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.route_wakeup, 1, now); + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.ping_rec_interval); + } +} + +/* + * Should we exit due to inactivity timeout? + */ +void +check_inactivity_timeout_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + msg (M_INFO, "Inactivity timeout (--inactive), exiting"); + register_signal (c, SIGTERM, "inactive"); +} + +#if P2MP + +void +check_server_poll_timeout_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.server_poll_interval); + if (!tls_initial_packet_received (c->c2.tls_multi)) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Server poll timeout, restarting"); + register_signal (c, SIGUSR1, "server_poll"); + c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds = -1; + } +} + +/* + * Schedule a signal n_seconds from now. + */ +void +schedule_exit (struct context *c, const int n_seconds, const int signal) +{ + tls_set_single_session (c->c2.tls_multi); + update_time (); + reset_coarse_timers (c); + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.scheduled_exit, n_seconds, now); + c->c2.scheduled_exit_signal = signal; + msg (D_SCHED_EXIT, "Delayed exit in %d seconds", n_seconds); +} + +/* + * Scheduled exit? + */ +void +check_scheduled_exit_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + register_signal (c, c->c2.scheduled_exit_signal, "delayed-exit"); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Should we write timer-triggered status file. + */ +void +check_status_file_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c1.status_output) + print_status (c, c->c1.status_output); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT +/* + * Should we deliver a datagram fragment to remote? + */ +void +check_fragment_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + struct link_socket_info *lsi = get_link_socket_info (c); + + /* OS MTU Hint? */ + if (lsi->mtu_changed && c->c2.ipv4_tun) + { + frame_adjust_path_mtu (&c->c2.frame_fragment, c->c2.link_socket->mtu, + c->options.ce.proto); + lsi->mtu_changed = false; + } + + if (fragment_outgoing_defined (c->c2.fragment)) + { + if (!c->c2.to_link.len) + { + /* encrypt a fragment for output to TCP/UDP port */ + ASSERT (fragment_ready_to_send (c->c2.fragment, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.frame_fragment)); + encrypt_sign (c, false); + } + } + + fragment_housekeeping (c->c2.fragment, &c->c2.frame_fragment, &c->c2.timeval); +} +#endif + +/* + * Buffer reallocation, for use with null encryption. + */ +static inline void +buffer_turnover (const uint8_t *orig_buf, struct buffer *dest_stub, struct buffer *src_stub, struct buffer *storage) +{ + if (orig_buf == src_stub->data && src_stub->data != storage->data) + { + buf_assign (storage, src_stub); + *dest_stub = *storage; + } + else + { + *dest_stub = *src_stub; + } +} + +/* + * Compress, fragment, encrypt and HMAC-sign an outgoing packet. + * Input: c->c2.buf + * Output: c->c2.to_link + */ +void +encrypt_sign (struct context *c, bool comp_frag) +{ + struct context_buffers *b = c->c2.buffers; + const uint8_t *orig_buf = c->c2.buf.data; + +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* + * Drop non-TLS outgoing packet if client-connect script/plugin + * has not yet succeeded. + */ + if (c->c2.context_auth != CAS_SUCCEEDED) + c->c2.buf.len = 0; +#endif + + if (comp_frag) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + /* Compress the packet. */ + if (lzo_defined (&c->c2.lzo_compwork)) + lzo_compress (&c->c2.buf, b->lzo_compress_buf, &c->c2.lzo_compwork, &c->c2.frame); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (c->c2.fragment) + fragment_outgoing (c->c2.fragment, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.frame_fragment); +#endif + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* + * If TLS mode, get the key we will use to encrypt + * the packet. + */ + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + tls_pre_encrypt (c->c2.tls_multi, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.crypto_options); + } +#endif + + /* + * Encrypt the packet and write an optional + * HMAC signature. + */ + openvpn_encrypt (&c->c2.buf, b->encrypt_buf, &c->c2.crypto_options, &c->c2.frame); +#endif + /* + * Get the address we will be sending the packet to. + */ + link_socket_get_outgoing_addr (&c->c2.buf, get_link_socket_info (c), + &c->c2.to_link_addr); +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* + * In TLS mode, prepend the appropriate one-byte opcode + * to the packet which identifies it as a data channel + * packet and gives the low-permutation version of + * the key-id to the recipient so it knows which + * decrypt key to use. + */ + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + tls_post_encrypt (c->c2.tls_multi, &c->c2.buf); + } +#endif +#endif + + /* if null encryption, copy result to read_tun_buf */ + buffer_turnover (orig_buf, &c->c2.to_link, &c->c2.buf, &b->read_tun_buf); +} + +/* + * Coarse timers work to 1 second resolution. + */ +static void +process_coarse_timers (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + /* flush current packet-id to file once per 60 + seconds if --replay-persist was specified */ + check_packet_id_persist_flush (c); +#endif + + /* should we update status file? */ + check_status_file (c); + + /* process connection establishment items */ + check_connection_established (c); + +#if P2MP + /* see if we should send a push_request in response to --pull */ + check_push_request (c); +#endif + +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF + pf_check_reload (c); +#endif + + /* process --route options */ + check_add_routes (c); + + /* possibly exit due to --inactive */ + check_inactivity_timeout (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; + + /* restart if ping not received */ + check_ping_restart (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; + +#if P2MP + check_server_poll_timeout (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; + + check_scheduled_exit (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* Should we send an OCC_REQUEST message? */ + check_send_occ_req (c); + + /* Should we send an MTU load test? */ + check_send_occ_load_test (c); + + /* Should we send an OCC_EXIT message to remote? */ + if (c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait) + process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup (c); +#endif + + /* Should we ping the remote? */ + check_ping_send (c); +} + +static void +check_coarse_timers_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + const struct timeval save = c->c2.timeval; + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = BIG_TIMEOUT; + c->c2.timeval.tv_usec = 0; + process_coarse_timers (c); + c->c2.coarse_timer_wakeup = now + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec; + + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "TIMER: coarse timer wakeup %d seconds", (int) c->c2.timeval.tv_sec); + + /* Is the coarse timeout NOT the earliest one? */ + if (c->c2.timeval.tv_sec > save.tv_sec) + c->c2.timeval = save; +} + +static inline void +check_coarse_timers (struct context *c) +{ + const time_t local_now = now; + if (local_now >= c->c2.coarse_timer_wakeup) + check_coarse_timers_dowork (c); + else + context_reschedule_sec (c, c->c2.coarse_timer_wakeup - local_now); +} + +static void +check_timeout_random_component_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + const int update_interval = 10; /* seconds */ + c->c2.update_timeout_random_component = now + update_interval; + c->c2.timeout_random_component.tv_usec = (time_t) get_random () & 0x0003FFFF; + c->c2.timeout_random_component.tv_sec = 0; + + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "RANDOM USEC=%d", (int) c->c2.timeout_random_component.tv_usec); +} + +static inline void +check_timeout_random_component (struct context *c) +{ + if (now >= c->c2.update_timeout_random_component) + check_timeout_random_component_dowork (c); + if (c->c2.timeval.tv_sec >= 1) + tv_add (&c->c2.timeval, &c->c2.timeout_random_component); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + +/* + * Handle addition and removal of the 10-byte Socks5 header + * in UDP packets. + */ + +static inline void +socks_postprocess_incoming_link (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.link_socket->socks_proxy && c->c2.link_socket->info.proto == PROTO_UDP) + socks_process_incoming_udp (&c->c2.buf, &c->c2.from); +} + +static inline void +socks_preprocess_outgoing_link (struct context *c, + struct link_socket_actual **to_addr, + int *size_delta) +{ + if (c->c2.link_socket->socks_proxy && c->c2.link_socket->info.proto == PROTO_UDP) + { + *size_delta += socks_process_outgoing_udp (&c->c2.to_link, c->c2.to_link_addr); + *to_addr = &c->c2.link_socket->socks_relay; + } +} + +/* undo effect of socks_preprocess_outgoing_link */ +static inline void +link_socket_write_post_size_adjust (int *size, + int size_delta, + struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (size_delta > 0 && *size > size_delta) + { + *size -= size_delta; + if (!buf_advance (buf, size_delta)) + *size = 0; + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Output: c->c2.buf + */ + +void +read_incoming_link (struct context *c) +{ + /* + * Set up for recvfrom call to read datagram + * sent to our TCP/UDP port. + */ + int status; + + /*ASSERT (!c->c2.to_tun.len);*/ + + perf_push (PERF_READ_IN_LINK); + + c->c2.buf = c->c2.buffers->read_link_buf; + ASSERT (buf_init (&c->c2.buf, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (&c->c2.frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_LINK))); + + status = link_socket_read (c->c2.link_socket, + &c->c2.buf, + MAX_RW_SIZE_LINK (&c->c2.frame), + &c->c2.from); + + if (socket_connection_reset (c->c2.link_socket, status)) + { +#if PORT_SHARE + if (port_share && socket_foreign_protocol_detected (c->c2.link_socket)) + { + const struct buffer *fbuf = socket_foreign_protocol_head (c->c2.link_socket); + const int sd = socket_foreign_protocol_sd (c->c2.link_socket); + port_share_redirect (port_share, fbuf, sd); + register_signal (c, SIGTERM, "port-share-redirect"); + } + else +#endif + { + /* received a disconnect from a connection-oriented protocol */ + if (c->options.inetd) + { + register_signal (c, SIGTERM, "connection-reset-inetd"); + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Connection reset, inetd/xinetd exit [%d]", status); + } + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (event_timeout_defined(&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval)) + { + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Connection reset during exit notification period, ignoring [%d]", status); + openvpn_sleep(1); + } + else +#endif + { + register_signal (c, SIGUSR1, "connection-reset"); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- TCP connection reset */ + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Connection reset, restarting [%d]", status); + } + } + } + perf_pop (); + return; + } + + /* check recvfrom status */ + check_status (status, "read", c->c2.link_socket, NULL); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* Remove socks header if applicable */ + socks_postprocess_incoming_link (c); +#endif + + perf_pop (); +} + +/* + * Input: c->c2.buf + * Output: c->c2.to_tun + */ + +void +process_incoming_link (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool decrypt_status; + struct link_socket_info *lsi = get_link_socket_info (c); + const uint8_t *orig_buf = c->c2.buf.data; + + perf_push (PERF_PROC_IN_LINK); + + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0) + { + c->c2.link_read_bytes += c->c2.buf.len; + link_read_bytes_global += c->c2.buf.len; +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + if (mmap_stats) + mmap_stats->link_read_bytes = link_read_bytes_global; +#endif + c->c2.original_recv_size = c->c2.buf.len; +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_bytes_in (management, c->c2.buf.len); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + management_bytes_server (management, &c->c2.link_read_bytes, &c->c2.link_write_bytes, &c->c2.mda_context); +#endif + } +#endif + } + else + c->c2.original_recv_size = 0; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + /* take action to corrupt packet if we are in gremlin test mode */ + if (c->options.gremlin) { + if (!ask_gremlin (c->options.gremlin)) + c->c2.buf.len = 0; + corrupt_gremlin (&c->c2.buf, c->options.gremlin); + } +#endif + + /* log incoming packet */ +#ifdef LOG_RW + if (c->c2.log_rw && c->c2.buf.len > 0) + fprintf (stderr, "R"); +#endif + msg (D_LINK_RW, "%s READ [%d] from %s: %s", + proto2ascii (lsi->proto, lsi->af, true), + BLEN (&c->c2.buf), + print_link_socket_actual (&c->c2.from, &gc), + PROTO_DUMP (&c->c2.buf, &gc)); + + /* + * Good, non-zero length packet received. + * Commence multi-stage processing of packet, + * such as authenticate, decrypt, decompress. + * If any stage fails, it sets buf.len to 0 or -1, + * telling downstream stages to ignore the packet. + */ + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0) + { + if (!link_socket_verify_incoming_addr (&c->c2.buf, lsi, &c->c2.from)) + link_socket_bad_incoming_addr (&c->c2.buf, lsi, &c->c2.from); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + /* + * If tls_pre_decrypt returns true, it means the incoming + * packet was a good TLS control channel packet. If so, TLS code + * will deal with the packet and set buf.len to 0 so downstream + * stages ignore it. + * + * If the packet is a data channel packet, tls_pre_decrypt + * will load crypto_options with the correct encryption key + * and return false. + */ + if (tls_pre_decrypt (c->c2.tls_multi, &c->c2.from, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.crypto_options)) + { + interval_action (&c->c2.tmp_int); + + /* reset packet received timer if TLS packet */ + if (c->options.ping_rec_timeout) + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.ping_rec_interval); + } + } +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* + * Drop non-TLS packet if client-connect script/plugin has not + * yet succeeded. + */ + if (c->c2.context_auth != CAS_SUCCEEDED) + c->c2.buf.len = 0; +#endif +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + + /* authenticate and decrypt the incoming packet */ + decrypt_status = openvpn_decrypt (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.buffers->decrypt_buf, &c->c2.crypto_options, &c->c2.frame); + + if (!decrypt_status && link_socket_connection_oriented (c->c2.link_socket)) + { + /* decryption errors are fatal in TCP mode */ + register_signal (c, SIGUSR1, "decryption-error"); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- decryption error in TCP mode */ + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Fatal decryption error (process_incoming_link), restarting"); + goto done; + } + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (c->c2.fragment) + fragment_incoming (c->c2.fragment, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.frame_fragment); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + /* decompress the incoming packet */ + if (lzo_defined (&c->c2.lzo_compwork)) + lzo_decompress (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.buffers->lzo_decompress_buf, &c->c2.lzo_compwork, &c->c2.frame); +#endif + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + /* if (c->c2.buf.len > 1) --c->c2.buf.len; */ + ipv4_packet_size_verify (BPTR (&c->c2.buf), + BLEN (&c->c2.buf), + TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), + "POST_DECRYPT", + &c->c2.n_trunc_post_decrypt); +#endif + + /* + * Set our "official" outgoing address, since + * if buf.len is non-zero, we know the packet + * authenticated. In TLS mode we do nothing + * because TLS mode takes care of source address + * authentication. + * + * Also, update the persisted version of our packet-id. + */ + if (!TLS_MODE (c)) + link_socket_set_outgoing_addr (&c->c2.buf, lsi, &c->c2.from, NULL, c->c2.es); + + /* reset packet received timer */ + if (c->options.ping_rec_timeout && c->c2.buf.len > 0) + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.ping_rec_interval); + + /* increment authenticated receive byte count */ + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0) + { + c->c2.link_read_bytes_auth += c->c2.buf.len; + c->c2.max_recv_size_local = max_int (c->c2.original_recv_size, c->c2.max_recv_size_local); + } + + /* Did we just receive an openvpn ping packet? */ + if (is_ping_msg (&c->c2.buf)) + { + dmsg (D_PING, "RECEIVED PING PACKET"); + c->c2.buf.len = 0; /* drop packet */ + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* Did we just receive an OCC packet? */ + if (is_occ_msg (&c->c2.buf)) + process_received_occ_msg (c); +#endif + + buffer_turnover (orig_buf, &c->c2.to_tun, &c->c2.buf, &c->c2.buffers->read_link_buf); + + /* to_tun defined + unopened tuntap can cause deadlock */ + if (!tuntap_defined (c->c1.tuntap)) + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + else + { + buf_reset (&c->c2.to_tun); + } + done: + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Output: c->c2.buf + */ + +void +read_incoming_tun (struct context *c) +{ + /* + * Setup for read() call on TUN/TAP device. + */ + /*ASSERT (!c->c2.to_link.len);*/ + + perf_push (PERF_READ_IN_TUN); + + c->c2.buf = c->c2.buffers->read_tun_buf; +#ifdef TUN_PASS_BUFFER + read_tun_buffered (c->c1.tuntap, &c->c2.buf, MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame)); +#else + ASSERT (buf_init (&c->c2.buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&c->c2.frame))); + ASSERT (buf_safe (&c->c2.buf, MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame))); + c->c2.buf.len = read_tun (c->c1.tuntap, BPTR (&c->c2.buf), MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame)); +#endif + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + ipv4_packet_size_verify (BPTR (&c->c2.buf), + BLEN (&c->c2.buf), + TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), + "READ_TUN", + &c->c2.n_trunc_tun_read); +#endif + + /* Was TUN/TAP interface stopped? */ + if (tuntap_stop (c->c2.buf.len)) + { + register_signal (c, SIGTERM, "tun-stop"); + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP interface has been stopped, exiting"); + perf_pop (); + return; + } + + /* Check the status return from read() */ + check_status (c->c2.buf.len, "read from TUN/TAP", NULL, c->c1.tuntap); + + perf_pop (); +} + +/* + * Input: c->c2.buf + * Output: c->c2.to_link + */ + +void +process_incoming_tun (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + perf_push (PERF_PROC_IN_TUN); + + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0) + c->c2.tun_read_bytes += c->c2.buf.len; + +#ifdef LOG_RW + if (c->c2.log_rw && c->c2.buf.len > 0) + fprintf (stderr, "r"); +#endif + + /* Show packet content */ + dmsg (D_TUN_RW, "TUN READ [%d]", BLEN (&c->c2.buf)); + + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0) + { + /* + * The --passtos and --mssfix options require + * us to examine the IP header (IPv4 or IPv6). + */ + process_ip_header (c, PIPV4_PASSTOS|PIP_MSSFIX|PIPV4_CLIENT_NAT, &c->c2.buf); + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + /* if (c->c2.buf.len > 1) --c->c2.buf.len; */ + ipv4_packet_size_verify (BPTR (&c->c2.buf), + BLEN (&c->c2.buf), + TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), + "PRE_ENCRYPT", + &c->c2.n_trunc_pre_encrypt); +#endif + + encrypt_sign (c, true); + } + else + { + buf_reset (&c->c2.to_link); + } + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +process_ip_header (struct context *c, unsigned int flags, struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (!c->options.ce.mssfix) + flags &= ~PIP_MSSFIX; +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + if (!c->options.passtos) + flags &= ~PIPV4_PASSTOS; +#endif + if (!c->options.route_gateway_via_dhcp) + flags &= ~PIPV4_EXTRACT_DHCP_ROUTER; + + if (buf->len > 0) + { + /* + * The --passtos and --mssfix options require + * us to examine the IPv4 header. + */ +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + if (flags & (PIPV4_PASSTOS|PIP_MSSFIX)) +#else + if (flags & PIP_MSSFIX) +#endif + { + struct buffer ipbuf = *buf; + if (is_ipv4 (TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), &ipbuf)) + { +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + /* extract TOS from IP header */ + if (flags & PIPV4_PASSTOS) + link_socket_extract_tos (c->c2.link_socket, &ipbuf); +#endif + + /* possibly alter the TCP MSS */ + if (flags & PIP_MSSFIX) + mss_fixup_ipv4 (&ipbuf, MTU_TO_MSS (TUN_MTU_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&c->c2.frame))); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + /* possibly do NAT on packet */ + if ((flags & PIPV4_CLIENT_NAT) && c->options.client_nat) + { + const int direction = (flags & PIPV4_OUTGOING) ? CN_INCOMING : CN_OUTGOING; + client_nat_transform (c->options.client_nat, &ipbuf, direction); + } +#endif + /* possibly extract a DHCP router message */ + if (flags & PIPV4_EXTRACT_DHCP_ROUTER) + { + const in_addr_t dhcp_router = dhcp_extract_router_msg (&ipbuf); + if (dhcp_router) + route_list_add_vpn_gateway (c->c1.route_list, c->c2.es, dhcp_router); + } + } + else if (is_ipv6 (TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), &ipbuf)) + { + /* possibly alter the TCP MSS */ + if (flags & PIP_MSSFIX) + mss_fixup_ipv6 (&ipbuf, MTU_TO_MSS (TUN_MTU_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&c->c2.frame))); + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Input: c->c2.to_link + */ + +void +process_outgoing_link (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + perf_push (PERF_PROC_OUT_LINK); + + if (c->c2.to_link.len > 0 && c->c2.to_link.len <= EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame)) + { + /* + * Setup for call to send/sendto which will send + * packet to remote over the TCP/UDP port. + */ + int size = 0; + ASSERT (link_socket_actual_defined (c->c2.to_link_addr)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + /* In gremlin-test mode, we may choose to drop this packet */ + if (!c->options.gremlin || ask_gremlin (c->options.gremlin)) +#endif + { + /* + * Let the traffic shaper know how many bytes + * we wrote. + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + if (c->options.shaper) + shaper_wrote_bytes (&c->c2.shaper, BLEN (&c->c2.to_link) + + datagram_overhead (c->options.ce.proto)); +#endif + /* + * Let the pinger know that we sent a packet. + */ + if (c->options.ping_send_timeout) + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.ping_send_interval); + +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + /* Set TOS */ + link_socket_set_tos (c->c2.link_socket); +#endif + + /* Log packet send */ +#ifdef LOG_RW + if (c->c2.log_rw) + fprintf (stderr, "W"); +#endif + msg (D_LINK_RW, "%s WRITE [%d] to %s: %s", + proto2ascii (c->c2.link_socket->info.proto, c->c2.link_socket->info.proto, true), + BLEN (&c->c2.to_link), + print_link_socket_actual (c->c2.to_link_addr, &gc), + PROTO_DUMP (&c->c2.to_link, &gc)); + + /* Packet send complexified by possible Socks5 usage */ + { + struct link_socket_actual *to_addr = c->c2.to_link_addr; +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + int size_delta = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* If Socks5 over UDP, prepend header */ + socks_preprocess_outgoing_link (c, &to_addr, &size_delta); +#endif + /* Send packet */ + size = link_socket_write (c->c2.link_socket, + &c->c2.to_link, + to_addr); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* Undo effect of prepend */ + link_socket_write_post_size_adjust (&size, size_delta, &c->c2.to_link); +#endif + } + + if (size > 0) + { + c->c2.max_send_size_local = max_int (size, c->c2.max_send_size_local); + c->c2.link_write_bytes += size; + link_write_bytes_global += size; +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + if (mmap_stats) + mmap_stats->link_write_bytes = link_write_bytes_global; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_bytes_out (management, size); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + management_bytes_server (management, &c->c2.link_read_bytes, &c->c2.link_write_bytes, &c->c2.mda_context); +#endif + } +#endif + } + } + + /* Check return status */ + check_status (size, "write", c->c2.link_socket, NULL); + + if (size > 0) + { + /* Did we write a different size packet than we intended? */ + if (size != BLEN (&c->c2.to_link)) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "TCP/UDP packet was truncated/expanded on write to %s (tried=%d,actual=%d)", + print_link_socket_actual (c->c2.to_link_addr, &gc), + BLEN (&c->c2.to_link), + size); + } + + /* if not a ping/control message, indicate activity regarding --inactive parameter */ + if (c->c2.buf.len > 0 ) + register_activity (c, size); + } + else + { + if (c->c2.to_link.len > 0) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "TCP/UDP packet too large on write to %s (tried=%d,max=%d)", + print_link_socket_actual (c->c2.to_link_addr, &gc), + c->c2.to_link.len, + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame)); + } + + buf_reset (&c->c2.to_link); + + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Input: c->c2.to_tun + */ + +void +process_outgoing_tun (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* + * Set up for write() call to TUN/TAP + * device. + */ + if (c->c2.to_tun.len <= 0) + return; + + perf_push (PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN); + + /* + * The --mssfix option requires + * us to examine the IP header (IPv4 or IPv6). + */ + process_ip_header (c, PIP_MSSFIX|PIPV4_EXTRACT_DHCP_ROUTER|PIPV4_CLIENT_NAT|PIPV4_OUTGOING, &c->c2.to_tun); + + if (c->c2.to_tun.len <= MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame)) + { + /* + * Write to TUN/TAP device. + */ + int size; + +#ifdef LOG_RW + if (c->c2.log_rw) + fprintf (stderr, "w"); +#endif + dmsg (D_TUN_RW, "TUN WRITE [%d]", BLEN (&c->c2.to_tun)); + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + ipv4_packet_size_verify (BPTR (&c->c2.to_tun), + BLEN (&c->c2.to_tun), + TUNNEL_TYPE (c->c1.tuntap), + "WRITE_TUN", + &c->c2.n_trunc_tun_write); +#endif + +#ifdef TUN_PASS_BUFFER + size = write_tun_buffered (c->c1.tuntap, &c->c2.to_tun); +#else + size = write_tun (c->c1.tuntap, BPTR (&c->c2.to_tun), BLEN (&c->c2.to_tun)); +#endif + + if (size > 0) + c->c2.tun_write_bytes += size; + check_status (size, "write to TUN/TAP", NULL, c->c1.tuntap); + + /* check written packet size */ + if (size > 0) + { + /* Did we write a different size packet than we intended? */ + if (size != BLEN (&c->c2.to_tun)) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "TUN/TAP packet was destructively fragmented on write to %s (tried=%d,actual=%d)", + c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, + BLEN (&c->c2.to_tun), + size); + + /* indicate activity regarding --inactive parameter */ + register_activity (c, size); + } + } + else + { + /* + * This should never happen, probably indicates some kind + * of MTU mismatch. + */ + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "tun packet too large on write (tried=%d,max=%d)", + c->c2.to_tun.len, + MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame)); + } + + buf_reset (&c->c2.to_tun); + + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +pre_select (struct context *c) +{ + /* make sure current time (now) is updated on function entry */ + + /* + * Start with an effectively infinite timeout, then let it + * reduce to a timeout that reflects the component which + * needs the earliest service. + */ + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = BIG_TIMEOUT; + c->c2.timeval.tv_usec = 0; + +#if defined(WIN32) + if (check_debug_level (D_TAP_WIN_DEBUG)) + { + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = 1; + if (tuntap_defined (c->c1.tuntap)) + tun_show_debug (c->c1.tuntap); + } +#endif + + /* check coarse timers? */ + check_coarse_timers (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; + + /* Does TLS need service? */ + check_tls (c); + + /* In certain cases, TLS errors will require a restart */ + check_tls_errors (c); + if (c->sig->signal_received) + return; + + /* check for incoming configuration info on the control channel */ + check_incoming_control_channel (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* Should we send an OCC message? */ + check_send_occ_msg (c); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* Should we deliver a datagram fragment to remote? */ + check_fragment (c); +#endif + + /* Update random component of timeout */ + check_timeout_random_component (c); +} + +/* + * Wait for I/O events. Used for both TCP & UDP sockets + * in point-to-point mode and for UDP sockets in + * point-to-multipoint mode. + */ + +void +io_wait_dowork (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + unsigned int socket = 0; + unsigned int tuntap = 0; + struct event_set_return esr[4]; + + /* These shifts all depend on EVENT_READ and EVENT_WRITE */ + static int socket_shift = 0; /* depends on SOCKET_READ and SOCKET_WRITE */ + static int tun_shift = 2; /* depends on TUN_READ and TUN_WRITE */ + static int err_shift = 4; /* depends on ES_ERROR */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + static int management_shift = 6; /* depends on MANAGEMENT_READ and MANAGEMENT_WRITE */ +#endif + + /* + * Decide what kind of events we want to wait for. + */ + event_reset (c->c2.event_set); + + /* + * On win32 we use the keyboard or an event object as a source + * of asynchronous signals. + */ + if (flags & IOW_WAIT_SIGNAL) + wait_signal (c->c2.event_set, (void*)&err_shift); + + /* + * If outgoing data (for TCP/UDP port) pending, wait for ready-to-send + * status from TCP/UDP port. Otherwise, wait for incoming data on + * TUN/TAP device. + */ + if (flags & IOW_TO_LINK) + { + if (flags & IOW_SHAPER) + { + /* + * If sending this packet would put us over our traffic shaping + * quota, don't send -- instead compute the delay we must wait + * until it will be OK to send the packet. + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + int delay = 0; + + /* set traffic shaping delay in microseconds */ + if (c->options.shaper) + delay = max_int (delay, shaper_delay (&c->c2.shaper)); + + if (delay < 1000) + { + socket |= EVENT_WRITE; + } + else + { + shaper_soonest_event (&c->c2.timeval, delay); + } +#else /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ + socket |= EVENT_WRITE; +#endif /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ + } + else + { + socket |= EVENT_WRITE; + } + } + else if (!((flags & IOW_FRAG) && TO_LINK_FRAG (c))) + { + if (flags & IOW_READ_TUN) + tuntap |= EVENT_READ; + } + + /* + * If outgoing data (for TUN/TAP device) pending, wait for ready-to-send status + * from device. Otherwise, wait for incoming data on TCP/UDP port. + */ + if (flags & IOW_TO_TUN) + { + tuntap |= EVENT_WRITE; + } + else + { + if (flags & IOW_READ_LINK) + socket |= EVENT_READ; + } + + /* + * outgoing bcast buffer waiting to be sent? + */ + if (flags & IOW_MBUF) + socket |= EVENT_WRITE; + + /* + * Force wait on TUN input, even if also waiting on TCP/UDP output + */ + if (flags & IOW_READ_TUN_FORCE) + tuntap |= EVENT_READ; + + /* + * Configure event wait based on socket, tuntap flags. + */ + socket_set (c->c2.link_socket, c->c2.event_set, socket, (void*)&socket_shift, NULL); + tun_set (c->c1.tuntap, c->c2.event_set, tuntap, (void*)&tun_shift, NULL); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_socket_set (management, c->c2.event_set, (void*)&management_shift, NULL); +#endif + + /* + * Possible scenarios: + * (1) tcp/udp port has data available to read + * (2) tcp/udp port is ready to accept more data to write + * (3) tun dev has data available to read + * (4) tun dev is ready to accept more data to write + * (5) we received a signal (handler sets signal_received) + * (6) timeout (tv) expired + */ + + c->c2.event_set_status = ES_ERROR; + + if (!c->sig->signal_received) + { + if (!(flags & IOW_CHECK_RESIDUAL) || !socket_read_residual (c->c2.link_socket)) + { + int status; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_EVENT_WAIT)) + show_wait_status (c); +#endif + + /* + * Wait for something to happen. + */ + status = event_wait (c->c2.event_set, &c->c2.timeval, esr, SIZE(esr)); + + check_status (status, "event_wait", NULL, NULL); + + if (status > 0) + { + int i; + c->c2.event_set_status = 0; + for (i = 0; i < status; ++i) + { + const struct event_set_return *e = &esr[i]; + c->c2.event_set_status |= ((e->rwflags & 3) << *((int*)e->arg)); + } + } + else if (status == 0) + { + c->c2.event_set_status = ES_TIMEOUT; + } + } + else + { + c->c2.event_set_status = SOCKET_READ; + } + } + + /* 'now' should always be a reasonably up-to-date timestamp */ + update_time (); + + /* set signal_received if a signal was received */ + if (c->c2.event_set_status & ES_ERROR) + get_signal (&c->sig->signal_received); + + dmsg (D_EVENT_WAIT, "I/O WAIT status=0x%04x", c->c2.event_set_status); +} + +void +process_io (struct context *c) +{ + const unsigned int status = c->c2.event_set_status; + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (status & (MANAGEMENT_READ|MANAGEMENT_WRITE)) + { + ASSERT (management); + management_io (management); + } +#endif + + /* TCP/UDP port ready to accept write */ + if (status & SOCKET_WRITE) + { + process_outgoing_link (c); + } + /* TUN device ready to accept write */ + else if (status & TUN_WRITE) + { + process_outgoing_tun (c); + } + /* Incoming data on TCP/UDP port */ + else if (status & SOCKET_READ) + { + read_incoming_link (c); + if (!IS_SIG (c)) + process_incoming_link (c); + } + /* Incoming data on TUN device */ + else if (status & TUN_READ) + { + read_incoming_tun (c); + if (!IS_SIG (c)) + process_incoming_tun (c); + } +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1830a00b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/forward.h @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + + +/** + * @file + * Interface functions to the internal and external multiplexers. + */ + + +#ifndef FORWARD_H +#define FORWARD_H + +#include "openvpn.h" +#include "occ.h" +#include "ping.h" + +#define TUN_OUT(c) (BLEN(&(c)->c2.to_tun) > 0) +#define LINK_OUT(c) (BLEN(&(c)->c2.to_link) > 0) +#define ANY_OUT(c) (TUN_OUT(c) || LINK_OUT(c)) + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT +#define TO_LINK_FRAG(c) ((c)->c2.fragment && fragment_outgoing_defined ((c)->c2.fragment)) +#else +#define TO_LINK_FRAG(c) (false) +#endif + +#define TO_LINK_DEF(c) (LINK_OUT(c) || TO_LINK_FRAG(c)) + +#define IOW_TO_TUN (1<<0) +#define IOW_TO_LINK (1<<1) +#define IOW_READ_TUN (1<<2) +#define IOW_READ_LINK (1<<3) +#define IOW_SHAPER (1<<4) +#define IOW_CHECK_RESIDUAL (1<<5) +#define IOW_FRAG (1<<6) +#define IOW_MBUF (1<<7) +#define IOW_READ_TUN_FORCE (1<<8) +#define IOW_WAIT_SIGNAL (1<<9) + +#define IOW_READ (IOW_READ_TUN|IOW_READ_LINK) + + +void pre_select (struct context *c); +void process_io (struct context *c); + +const char *wait_status_string (struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc); +void show_wait_status (struct context *c); + + +/**********************************************************************/ +/** + * Process a data channel packet that will be sent through a VPN tunnel. + * @ingroup data_control + * + * This function controls the processing of a data channel packet which + * will be sent through a VPN tunnel to a remote OpenVPN peer. It's + * general structure is as follows: + * - Check that the client authentication has succeeded; if not, drop the + * packet. + * - If the \a comp_frag argument is true: + * - Call \c lzo_compress() of the \link Data Channel Compression + * module\endlink to (possibly) compress the packet. + * - Call \c fragment_outgoing() of the \link Data Channel Fragmentation + * module\endlink to (possibly) fragment the packet. + * - Activate the \link Data Channel Crypto module\endlink to perform + * security operations on the packet. + * - Call \c tls_pre_encrypt() to choose the appropriate security + * parameters for this packet. + * - Call \c openvpn_encrypt() to encrypt and HMAC signed the packet. + * - Call \c tls_post_encrypt() to prepend the one-byte OpenVPN header + * and do some TLS accounting. + * - Place the resulting packet in \c c->c2.to_link so that it can be sent + * over the external network interface to its remote destination by the + * \link external_multiplexer External Multiplexer\endlink. + * + * @param c - The context structure of the VPN tunnel associated with this + * packet. + * @param comp_frag - Whether to do packet compression and fragmentation. + * This flag is set to true the first time a packet is processed. If + * the packet then gets fragmented, this function will be called again + * once for each remaining fragment with this parameter set to false. + */ +void encrypt_sign (struct context *c, bool comp_frag); + + +/**********************************************************************/ +/** + * Read a packet from the external network interface. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * The packet read from the external network interface is stored in \c + * c->c2.buf and its source address in \c c->c2.from. If an error + * occurred, the length of \c c->c2.buf will be 0. + * + * OpenVPN running as client or as UDP server only has a single external + * network socket, so this function can be called with the single (client + * mode) or top level (UDP server) context as its argument. OpenVPN + * running as TCP server, on the other hand, has a network socket for each + * active VPN tunnel. In that case this function must be called with the + * context associated with the appropriate VPN tunnel for which data is + * available to be read. + * + * @param c - The context structure which contains the external + * network socket from which to read incoming packets. + */ +void read_incoming_link (struct context *c); + + +/** + * Process a packet read from the external network interface. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * This function controls the processing of a data channel packet which + * has come out of a VPN tunnel. It's high-level structure is as follows: + * - Verify that a nonzero length packet has been received from a valid + * source address for the given context \a c. + * - Call \c tls_pre_decrypt(), which splits data channel and control + * channel packets: + * - If a data channel packet, the appropriate security parameters are + * loaded. + * - If a control channel packet, this function process is it and + * afterwards sets the packet's buffer length to 0, so that the data + * channel processing steps below will ignore it. + * - Call \c openvpn_decrypt() of the \link data_crypto Data Channel + * Crypto module\endlink to authenticate and decrypt the packet using + * the security parameters loaded by \c tls_pre_decrypt() above. + * - Call \c fragment_incoming() of the \link fragmentation Data Channel + * Fragmentation module\endlink to reassemble the packet if it's + * fragmented. + * - Call \c lzo_decompress() of the \link compression Data Channel + * Compression module\endlink to decompress the packet if it's + * compressed. + * - Place the resulting packet in \c c->c2.to_tun so that it can be sent + * over the virtual tun/tap network interface to its local destination + * by the \link internal_multiplexer Internal Multiplexer\endlink. + * + * @param c - The context structure of the VPN tunnel associated with the + * packet. + */ +void process_incoming_link (struct context *c); + + +/** + * Write a packet to the external network interface. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * This function writes the packet stored in \c c->c2.to_link to the + * external network device contained within \c c->c1.link_socket. + * + * If an error occurs, it is logged and the packet is dropped. + * + * @param c - The context structure of the VPN tunnel associated with the + * packet. + */ +void process_outgoing_link (struct context *c); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Read a packet from the virtual tun/tap network interface. + * @ingroup internal_multiplexer + * + * This function reads a packet from the virtual tun/tap network device \c + * c->c1.tuntap and stores it in \c c->c2.buf. + * + * If an error occurs, it is logged and the packet is dropped. + * + * @param c - The context structure in which to store the received + * packet. + */ +void read_incoming_tun (struct context *c); + + +/** + * Process a packet read from the virtual tun/tap network interface. + * @ingroup internal_multiplexer + * + * This function calls \c encrypt_sign() of the \link data_control Data + * Channel Control module\endlink to process the packet. + * + * If an error occurs, it is logged and the packet is dropped. + * + * @param c - The context structure of the VPN tunnel associated with the + * packet. + */ +void process_incoming_tun (struct context *c); + + +/** + * Write a packet to the virtual tun/tap network interface. + * @ingroup internal_multiplexer + * + * This function writes the packet stored in \c c->c2.to_tun to the + * virtual tun/tap network device \c c->c1.tuntap. + * + * If an error occurs, it is logged and the packet is dropped. + * + * @param c - The context structure of the VPN tunnel associated with + * the packet. + */ +void process_outgoing_tun (struct context *c); + + +/**************************************************************************/ + +bool send_control_channel_string (struct context *c, const char *str, int msglevel); + +#define PIPV4_PASSTOS (1<<0) +#define PIP_MSSFIX (1<<1) /* v4 and v6 */ +#define PIPV4_OUTGOING (1<<2) +#define PIPV4_EXTRACT_DHCP_ROUTER (1<<3) +#define PIPV4_CLIENT_NAT (1<<4) + +void process_ip_header (struct context *c, unsigned int flags, struct buffer *buf); + +#if P2MP +void schedule_exit (struct context *c, const int n_seconds, const int signal); +#endif + +#endif /* FORWARD_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ad1d616 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.c @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + +#include "misc.h" +#include "fragment.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "memdbg.h" + +#define FRAG_ERR(s) { errmsg = s; goto error; } + +static void +fragment_list_buf_init (struct fragment_list *list, const struct frame *frame) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < N_FRAG_BUF; ++i) + list->fragments[i].buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); +} + +static void +fragment_list_buf_free (struct fragment_list *list) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < N_FRAG_BUF; ++i) + free_buf (&list->fragments[i].buf); +} + +/* + * Given a sequence ID number, get a fragment buffer. Use a sliding window, + * similar to packet_id code. + */ +static struct fragment * +fragment_list_get_buf (struct fragment_list *list, int seq_id) +{ + int diff; + if (abs (diff = modulo_subtract (seq_id, list->seq_id, N_SEQ_ID)) >= N_FRAG_BUF) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < N_FRAG_BUF; ++i) + list->fragments[i].defined = false; + list->index = 0; + list->seq_id = seq_id; + diff = 0; + } + while (diff > 0) + { + list->fragments[list->index = modulo_add (list->index, 1, N_FRAG_BUF)].defined = false; + list->seq_id = modulo_add (list->seq_id, 1, N_SEQ_ID); + --diff; + } + return &list->fragments[modulo_add (list->index, diff, N_FRAG_BUF)]; +} + +struct fragment_master * +fragment_init (struct frame *frame) +{ + struct fragment_master *ret; + + /* code that initializes other parts of + fragment_master assume an initial CLEAR */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ret, struct fragment_master); + + /* add in the size of our contribution to the expanded frame size */ + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, sizeof(fragment_header_type)); + + /* + * Outgoing sequence ID is randomized to reduce + * the probability of sequence number collisions + * when openvpn sessions are restarted. This is + * not done out of any need for security, as all + * fragmentation control information resides + * inside of the encrypted/authenticated envelope. + */ + ret->outgoing_seq_id = (int)get_random() & (N_SEQ_ID - 1); + + event_timeout_init (&ret->wakeup, FRAG_WAKEUP_INTERVAL, now); + + return ret; +} + +void +fragment_free (struct fragment_master *f) +{ + fragment_list_buf_free (&f->incoming); + free_buf (&f->outgoing); + free_buf (&f->outgoing_return); + free (f); +} + +void +fragment_frame_init (struct fragment_master *f, const struct frame *frame) +{ + fragment_list_buf_init (&f->incoming, frame); + f->outgoing = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + f->outgoing_return = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); +} + +/* + * Accept an incoming datagram (which may be a fragment) from remote. + * If the datagram is whole (i.e not a fragment), pass through. + * If the datagram is a fragment, join with other fragments received so far. + * If a fragment fully completes the datagram, return the datagram. + */ +void +fragment_incoming (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame) +{ + const char *errmsg = NULL; + fragment_header_type flags = 0; + int frag_type = 0; + + if (buf->len > 0) + { + /* get flags from packet head */ + if (!buf_read (buf, &flags, sizeof (flags))) + FRAG_ERR ("flags not found in packet"); + flags = ntoh_fragment_header_type (flags); + + /* get fragment type from flags */ + frag_type = ((flags >> FRAG_TYPE_SHIFT) & FRAG_TYPE_MASK); + +#if 0 + /* + * If you want to extract FRAG_EXTRA_MASK/FRAG_EXTRA_SHIFT bits, + * do it here. + */ + if (frag_type == FRAG_WHOLE || frag_type == FRAG_YES_NOTLAST) + { + } +#endif + + /* handle the fragment type */ + if (frag_type == FRAG_WHOLE) + { + dmsg (D_FRAG_DEBUG, + "FRAG_IN buf->len=%d type=FRAG_WHOLE flags=" + fragment_header_format, + buf->len, + flags); + + if (flags & (FRAG_SEQ_ID_MASK | FRAG_ID_MASK)) + FRAG_ERR ("spurrious FRAG_WHOLE flags"); + } + else if (frag_type == FRAG_YES_NOTLAST || frag_type == FRAG_YES_LAST) + { + const int seq_id = ((flags >> FRAG_SEQ_ID_SHIFT) & FRAG_SEQ_ID_MASK); + const int n = ((flags >> FRAG_ID_SHIFT) & FRAG_ID_MASK); + const int size = ((frag_type == FRAG_YES_LAST) + ? (int)(((flags >> FRAG_SIZE_SHIFT) & FRAG_SIZE_MASK) << FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_SHIFT) + : buf->len); + + /* get the appropriate fragment buffer based on received seq_id */ + struct fragment *frag = fragment_list_get_buf (&f->incoming, seq_id); + + dmsg (D_FRAG_DEBUG, + "FRAG_IN len=%d type=%d seq_id=%d frag_id=%d size=%d flags=" + fragment_header_format, + buf->len, + frag_type, + seq_id, + n, + size, + flags); + + /* make sure that size is an even multiple of 1<defined || (frag->defined && frag->max_frag_size != size)) + { + frag->defined = true; + frag->max_frag_size = size; + frag->map = 0; + ASSERT (buf_init (&frag->buf, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_FRAGMENT))); + } + + /* copy the data to fragment buffer */ + if (!buf_copy_range (&frag->buf, n * size, buf, 0, buf->len)) + FRAG_ERR ("fragment buffer overflow"); + + /* set elements in bit array to reflect which fragments have been received */ + frag->map |= (((frag_type == FRAG_YES_LAST) ? FRAG_MAP_MASK : 1) << n); + + /* update timestamp on partially built datagram */ + frag->timestamp = now; + + /* received full datagram? */ + if ((frag->map & FRAG_MAP_MASK) == FRAG_MAP_MASK) + { + frag->defined = false; + *buf = frag->buf; + } + else + { + buf->len = 0; + } + } + else if (frag_type == FRAG_TEST) + { + FRAG_ERR ("FRAG_TEST not implemented"); + } + else + { + FRAG_ERR ("unknown fragment type"); + } + } + + return; + + error: + if (errmsg) + msg (D_FRAG_ERRORS, "FRAG_IN error flags=" fragment_header_format ": %s", flags, errmsg); + buf->len = 0; + return; +} + +/* pack fragment parms into a uint32_t and prepend to buffer */ +static void +fragment_prepend_flags (struct buffer *buf, + int type, + int seq_id, + int frag_id, + int frag_size) +{ + fragment_header_type flags = ((type & FRAG_TYPE_MASK) << FRAG_TYPE_SHIFT) + | ((seq_id & FRAG_SEQ_ID_MASK) << FRAG_SEQ_ID_SHIFT) + | ((frag_id & FRAG_ID_MASK) << FRAG_ID_SHIFT); + + if (type == FRAG_WHOLE || type == FRAG_YES_NOTLAST) + { + /* + * If you want to set FRAG_EXTRA_MASK/FRAG_EXTRA_SHIFT bits, + * do it here. + */ + dmsg (D_FRAG_DEBUG, + "FRAG_OUT len=%d type=%d seq_id=%d frag_id=%d frag_size=%d flags=" + fragment_header_format, + buf->len, type, seq_id, frag_id, frag_size, flags); + } + else + { + flags |= (((frag_size >> FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_SHIFT) & FRAG_SIZE_MASK) << FRAG_SIZE_SHIFT); + + dmsg (D_FRAG_DEBUG, + "FRAG_OUT len=%d type=%d seq_id=%d frag_id=%d frag_size=%d flags=" + fragment_header_format, + buf->len, type, seq_id, frag_id, frag_size, flags); + } + + flags = hton_fragment_header_type (flags); + ASSERT (buf_write_prepend (buf, &flags, sizeof (flags))); +} + +/* + * Without changing the number of fragments, return a possibly smaller + * max fragment size that will allow for the last fragment to be of + * similar size as previous fragments. + */ +static inline int +optimal_fragment_size (int len, int max_frag_size) +{ + const int mfs_aligned = (max_frag_size & ~FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_MASK); + const int div = len / mfs_aligned; + const int mod = len % mfs_aligned; + + if (div > 0 && mod > 0 && mod < mfs_aligned * 3 / 4) + return min_int (mfs_aligned, (max_frag_size - ((max_frag_size - mod) / (div + 1)) + + FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_MASK) & ~FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_MASK); + else + return mfs_aligned; +} + +/* process an outgoing datagram, possibly breaking it up into fragments */ +void +fragment_outgoing (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame) +{ + const char *errmsg = NULL; + if (buf->len > 0) + { + /* The outgoing buffer should be empty so we can put new data in it */ + if (f->outgoing.len) + msg (D_FRAG_ERRORS, "FRAG: outgoing buffer is not empty, len=[%d,%d]", + buf->len, f->outgoing.len); + if (buf->len > PAYLOAD_SIZE_DYNAMIC(frame)) /* should we fragment? */ + { + /* + * Send the datagram as a series of 2 or more fragments. + */ + f->outgoing_frag_size = optimal_fragment_size (buf->len, PAYLOAD_SIZE_DYNAMIC(frame)); + if (buf->len > f->outgoing_frag_size * MAX_FRAGS) + FRAG_ERR ("too many fragments would be required to send datagram"); + ASSERT (buf_init (&f->outgoing, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + ASSERT (buf_copy (&f->outgoing, buf)); + f->outgoing_seq_id = modulo_add (f->outgoing_seq_id, 1, N_SEQ_ID); + f->outgoing_frag_id = 0; + buf->len = 0; + ASSERT (fragment_ready_to_send (f, buf, frame)); + } + else + { + /* + * Send the datagram whole. + */ + fragment_prepend_flags (buf, + FRAG_WHOLE, + 0, + 0, + 0); + } + } + return; + + error: + if (errmsg) + msg (D_FRAG_ERRORS, "FRAG_OUT error, len=%d frag_size=%d MAX_FRAGS=%d: %s", + buf->len, f->outgoing_frag_size, MAX_FRAGS, errmsg); + buf->len = 0; + return; +} + +/* return true (and set buf) if we have an outgoing fragment which is ready to send */ +bool +fragment_ready_to_send (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame) +{ + if (fragment_outgoing_defined (f)) + { + /* get fragment size, and determine if it is the last fragment */ + int size = f->outgoing_frag_size; + int last = false; + if (f->outgoing.len <= size) + { + size = f->outgoing.len; + last = true; + } + + /* initialize return buffer */ + *buf = f->outgoing_return; + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + ASSERT (buf_copy_n (buf, &f->outgoing, size)); + + /* fragment flags differ based on whether or not we are sending the last fragment */ + fragment_prepend_flags (buf, + last ? FRAG_YES_LAST : FRAG_YES_NOTLAST, + f->outgoing_seq_id, + f->outgoing_frag_id++, + f->outgoing_frag_size); + + ASSERT (!last || !f->outgoing.len); /* outgoing buffer length should be zero after last fragment sent */ + + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +static void +fragment_ttl_reap (struct fragment_master *f) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < N_FRAG_BUF; ++i) + { + struct fragment *frag = &f->incoming.fragments[i]; + if (frag->defined && frag->timestamp + FRAG_TTL_SEC <= now) + { + msg (D_FRAG_ERRORS, "FRAG TTL expired i=%d", i); + frag->defined = false; + } + } +} + +/* called every FRAG_WAKEUP_INTERVAL seconds */ +void +fragment_wakeup (struct fragment_master *f, struct frame *frame) +{ + /* delete fragments with expired TTLs */ + fragment_ttl_reap (f); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..866573b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/fragment.h @@ -0,0 +1,479 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef FRAGMENT_H +#define FRAGMENT_H + +/** + * @file + * Data Channel Fragmentation module header file. + */ + + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + +/** + * @addtogroup fragmentation + * @{ + */ + + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "interval.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "shaper.h" +#include "error.h" + + +#define N_FRAG_BUF 25 + /**< Number of packet buffers for + * reassembling incoming fragmented + * packets. */ + +#define FRAG_TTL_SEC 10 + /**< Time-to-live in seconds for a %fragment. */ + +#define FRAG_WAKEUP_INTERVAL 5 + /**< Interval in seconds between calls to + * wakeup code. */ + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Structure for reassembling one incoming fragmented packet. + */ +struct fragment { + bool defined; /**< Whether reassembly is currently + * taking place in this structure. */ + + int max_frag_size; /**< Maximum size of each %fragment. */ + +# define FRAG_MAP_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF + /**< Mask for reassembly map. */ +# define MAX_FRAGS 32 /**< Maximum number of fragments per packet. */ + unsigned int map; + /**< Reassembly map for recording which + * fragments have been received. + * + * A bit array where each bit + * corresponds to a %fragment. A 1 bit + * in element n means that the %fragment + * n has been received. Needs to have + * at least \c MAX_FRAGS bits. */ + + time_t timestamp; /**< Timestamp for time-to-live purposes. */ + + struct buffer buf; /**< Buffer in which received datagrams + * are reassembled. */ +}; + + +/** + * List of fragment structures for reassembling multiple incoming packets + * concurrently. + */ +struct fragment_list { + int seq_id; /**< Highest fragmentation sequence ID of + * the packets currently being + * reassembled. */ + int index; /**< Index of the packet being reassembled + * with the highest fragmentation + * sequence ID into the \c + * fragment_list.fragments array. */ + +/** Array of reassembly structures, each can contain one whole packet. + * + * The fragmentation sequence IDs of the packets being reassembled in + * this array are linearly increasing. \c + * fragment_list.fragments[fragment_list.index] has an ID of \c + * fragment_list.seq_id. This means that one of these \c fragment_list + * structures can at any one time contain at most packets with the + * fragmentation sequence IDs in the range \c fragment_list.seq_id \c - + * \c N_FRAG_BUF \c + \c 1 to \c fragment_list.seq_id, inclusive. + */ + struct fragment fragments[N_FRAG_BUF]; +}; + + +/** + * Fragmentation and reassembly state for one VPN tunnel instance. + * + * This structure contains all the state necessary for sending and + * receiving fragmented data channel packets associated with one VPN + * tunnel. + * + * The fragmented packet currently being sent to a remote OpenVPN peer is + * stored in \c fragment_master.outgoing. It is copied into that buffer + * by the \c fragment_outgoing() function and the remaining parts to be + * sent can be retrieved by successive calls to \c + * fragment_ready_to_send(). + * + * The received packets currently being reassembled are stored in the \c + * fragment_master.incoming array of \c fragment structures. The \c + * fragment_incoming() function adds newly received parts into this array + * and returns the whole packets once reassembly is complete. + */ +struct fragment_master { + struct event_timeout wakeup; /**< Timeout structure used by the main + * event loop to know when to do + * fragmentation housekeeping. */ + bool received_os_mtu_hint; /**< Whether the operating system has + * explicitly recommended an MTU value. */ +# define N_SEQ_ID 256 + /**< One more than the maximum fragment + * sequence ID, above which the IDs wrap + * to zero. Should be a power of 2. */ + int outgoing_seq_id; /**< Fragment sequence ID of the current + * fragmented packet waiting to be sent. + * + * All parts of a fragmented packet + * share the same sequence ID, so that + * the remote OpenVPN peer can determine + * which parts belong to which original + * packet. */ +# define MAX_FRAG_PKT_SIZE 65536 + /**< (Not used) Maximum packet size before + * fragmenting. */ + int outgoing_frag_size; /**< Size in bytes of each part to be + * sent, except for the last part which + * may be smaller. + * + * This value is computed by the \c + * optimal_fragment_size() function. Its + * value is sent to the remote peer in + * the fragmentation header of the last + * part (i.e. with %fragment type \c + * FRAG_YES_LAST) using the \c + * FRAG_SIZE_MASK and \c FRAG_SIZE_SHIFT + * bits. */ + int outgoing_frag_id; /**< The fragment ID of the next part to + * be sent. Must have a value between 0 + * and \c MAX_FRAGS-1. */ + struct buffer outgoing; /**< Buffer containing the remaining parts + * of the fragmented packet being sent. */ + struct buffer outgoing_return; + /**< Buffer used by \c + * fragment_ready_to_send() to return a + * part to send. */ + + struct fragment_list incoming; + /**< List of structures for reassembling + * incoming packets. */ +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Fragment header + * @todo Add description of %fragment header format. + *//** @{ *//*************************************/ + +typedef uint32_t fragment_header_type; + /**< Fragmentation information is stored in + * a 32-bit packet header. */ + +#define hton_fragment_header_type(x) htonl(x) + /**< Convert a fragment_header_type from + * host to network order. */ + +#define ntoh_fragment_header_type(x) ntohl(x) + /**< Convert a \c fragment_header_type + * from network to host order. */ + +#define FRAG_TYPE_MASK 0x00000003 + /**< Bit mask for %fragment type info. */ +#define FRAG_TYPE_SHIFT 0 /**< Bit shift for %fragment type info. */ + +#define FRAG_WHOLE 0 /**< Fragment type indicating packet is + * whole. */ +#define FRAG_YES_NOTLAST 1 /**< Fragment type indicating packet is + * part of a fragmented packet, but not + * the last part in the sequence. */ +#define FRAG_YES_LAST 2 /**< Fragment type indicating packet is + * the last part in the sequence of + * parts. */ +#define FRAG_TEST 3 /**< Fragment type not implemented yet. + * In the future might be used as a + * control packet for establishing MTU + * size. */ + +#define FRAG_SEQ_ID_MASK 0x000000ff + /**< Bit mask for %fragment sequence ID. */ +#define FRAG_SEQ_ID_SHIFT 2 /**< Bit shift for %fragment sequence ID. */ + +#define FRAG_ID_MASK 0x0000001f + /**< Bit mask for %fragment ID. */ +#define FRAG_ID_SHIFT 10 + /**< Bit shift for %fragment ID. */ + +/* + * FRAG_SIZE 14 bits + * + * IF FRAG_YES_LAST (FRAG_SIZE): + * The max size of a %fragment. If a %fragment is not the last %fragment in the packet, + * then the %fragment size is guaranteed to be equal to the max %fragment size. Therefore, + * max_frag_size is only sent over the wire if FRAG_LAST is set. Otherwise it is assumed + * to be the actual %fragment size received. + */ +#define FRAG_SIZE_MASK 0x00003fff + /**< Bit mask for %fragment size. */ +#define FRAG_SIZE_SHIFT 15 + /**< Bit shift for %fragment size. */ +#define FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_SHIFT 2 /**< Bit shift for %fragment size rounding. */ +#define FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_MASK ((1 << FRAG_SIZE_ROUND_SHIFT) - 1) + /**< Bit mask for %fragment size rounding. */ + +/* + * FRAG_EXTRA 16 bits + * + * IF FRAG_WHOLE or FRAG_YES_NOTLAST, these 16 bits are available (not currently used) + */ +#define FRAG_EXTRA_MASK 0x0000ffff + /**< Bit mask for extra bits. */ +#define FRAG_EXTRA_SHIFT 15 + /**< Bit shift for extra bits. */ + +/** @} name Fragment header *//********************************************/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup *//** @{ *//************/ + +/** + * Allocate and initialize a \c fragment_master structure. + * + * This function also modifies the \a frame packet geometry parameters to + * include space for the fragmentation header. + * + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel, modified by this function to include the + * fragmentation header. + * + * @return A pointer to the new \c fragment_master structure. + */ +struct fragment_master *fragment_init (struct frame *frame); + + +/** + * Allocate internal packet buffers for a \c fragment_master structure. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure for which to + * allocate the internal buffers. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel, used to determine how much memory to + * allocate for each packet buffer. + */ +void fragment_frame_init (struct fragment_master *f, const struct frame *frame); + + +/** + * Free a \c fragment_master structure and its internal packet buffers. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure to free. + */ +void fragment_free (struct fragment_master *f); + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup *//*******************/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for processing packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer */ +/** @{ */ + +/** + * Process an incoming packet, which may or may not be fragmented. + * + * This function inspects the fragmentation header of the incoming packet + * and processes the packet accordingly. Depending on the %fragment type + * bits (\c FRAG_TYPE_MASK and \c FRAG_TYPE_SHIFT) the packet is processed + * in the following ways: + * - \c FRAG_WHOLE: the packet is not fragmented, and this function does + * not modify its contents, except for removing the fragmentation + * header. + * - \c FRAG_YES_NOTLAST or \c FRAG_YES_LAST: the packet is part of a + * fragmented packet. This function copies the packet into an internal + * reassembly buffer. If the incoming part completes the packet being + * reassembled, the \a buf argument is modified to point to the fully + * reassembled packet. If, on the other hand, reassembly is not yet + * complete, then the the \a buf buffer is set to empty. + * - Any other value: error. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, an error message is logged and + * the length of \a buf is set to zero. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure for this VPN + * tunnel. + * @param buf - A pointer to the buffer structure containing the + * incoming packet. This pointer will have been + * modified on return either to point to a + * completely reassembled packet, or to have length + * set to zero if reassembly is not yet complete. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return Void.\n On return, the \a buf argument will point to a buffer. + * The buffer will have nonzero length if the incoming packet passed + * to this function was whole and unfragmented, or if it was the final + * part of a fragmented packet thereby completing reassembly. On the + * other hand, the buffer will have a length of zero if the incoming + * packet was part of a fragmented packet and reassembly is not yet + * complete. If an error occurs during processing, the buffer length + * is also set to zero. + */ +void fragment_incoming (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** @} name Functions for processing packets received from a VPN tunnel */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for processing packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer */ +/** @{ */ + +/** + * Process an outgoing packet, which may or may not need to be fragmented. + * + * This function inspects the outgoing packet, determines whether it needs + * to be fragmented, and processes it accordingly. + * + * Depending on the size of the outgoing packet and the packet geometry + * parameters for the VPN tunnel, the packet will or will not be + * fragmented. + * @li Packet size is less than or equal to the maximum packet size for + * this VPN tunnel: fragmentation is not necessary. The \a buf + * argument points to a buffer containing the unmodified outgoing + * packet with a fragmentation header indicating the packet is whole + * (FRAG_WHOLE) prepended. + * @li Packet size is greater than the maximum packet size for this VPN + * tunnel: fragmentation is necessary. The original outgoing packet + * is copied into an internal buffer for fragmentation. The \a buf + * argument is modified to point to the first part of the fragmented + * packet. The remaining parts remain stored in the internal buffer, + * and can be retrieved using the \c fragment_ready_to_send() + * function. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, an error message is logged and + * the length of \a buf is set to zero. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure for this VPN + * tunnel. + * @param buf - A pointer to the buffer structure containing the + * outgoing packet. This pointer will be modified + * to point to a whole unfragmented packet or to the + * first part of a fragmented packet on return. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return Void.\n On return, the \a buf argument will point to a buffer. + * This buffer contains either the whole original outgoing packet if + * fragmentation was not necessary, or the first part of the + * fragmented outgoing packet if fragmentation was necessary. In both + * cases a fragmentation header will have been prepended to inform the + * remote peer how to handle the packet. + */ +void fragment_outgoing (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** + * Check whether outgoing fragments are ready to be send, and if so make + * one available. + * + * This function checks whether the internal buffer for fragmenting + * outgoing packets contains any unsent parts. If it does not, meaning + * there is nothing waiting to be sent, it returns false. Otherwise there + * are parts ready to be sent, and it returns true. In that case it also + * modifies the \a buf argument to point to a buffer containing the next + * part to be sent. + * + * @param f - The \a fragment_master structure for this VPN + * tunnel. + * @param buf - A pointer to a buffer structure which on return, + * if there are parts waiting to be sent, will point + * to the next part to be sent. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return + * @li True, if an outgoing packet has been fragmented and not all parts + * have been sent yet. In this case this function will modify the \a + * buf argument to point to a buffer containing the next part to be + * sent. + * @li False, if there are no outgoing fragmented parts waiting to be + * sent. + */ +bool fragment_ready_to_send (struct fragment_master *f, struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** + * Check whether a \c fragment_master structure contains fragments ready + * to be sent. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return + * @li True, if there are one or more fragments ready to be sent. + * @li False, otherwise. + */ +static inline bool +fragment_outgoing_defined (struct fragment_master *f) +{ + return f->outgoing.len > 0; +} + +/** @} name Functions for processing packets going out through a VPN tunnel */ + + +void fragment_wakeup (struct fragment_master *f, struct frame *frame); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for regular housekeeping *//** @{ *//******************/ + +/** + * Perform housekeeping of a \c fragment_master structure. + * + * Housekeeping includes scanning incoming packet reassembly buffers for + * packets which have not yet been reassembled completely but are already + * older than their time-to-live. + * + * @param f - The \c fragment_master structure for this VPN + * tunnel. + * @param frame - The packet geometry parameters for this VPN + * tunnel. + */ +static inline void +fragment_housekeeping (struct fragment_master *f, struct frame *frame, struct timeval *tv) +{ + if (event_timeout_trigger (&f->wakeup, tv, ETT_DEFAULT)) + fragment_wakeup (f, frame); +} + +/** @} name Functions for regular housekeeping *//*************************/ + + +/** @} addtogroup fragmentation *//****************************************/ + + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0aa7f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.c @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Test protocol robustness by simulating dropped packets and + * network outages when the --gremlin option is used. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +#include "error.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "gremlin.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Parameters for packet corruption and droppage. + * Each parameter has 4 possible levels, 0 = disabled, + * while 1, 2, and 3 are enumerated in the below arrays. + * The parameter is a 2-bit field within the --gremlin + * parameter. + */ + +/* + * Probability that we will drop a packet is 1 / n + */ +static const int drop_freq[] = { 500, 100, 50 }; + +/* + * Probability that we will corrupt a packet is 1 / n + */ +static const int corrupt_freq[] = { 500, 100, 50 }; + +/* + * When network goes up, it will be up for between + * UP_LOW and UP_HIGH seconds. + */ +static const int up_low[] = { 60, 10, 5 }; +static const int up_high[] = { 600, 60, 10 }; + +/* + * When network goes down, it will be down for between + * DOWN_LOW and DOWN_HIGH seconds. + */ +static const int down_low[] = { 5, 10, 10 }; +static const int down_high[] = { 10, 60, 120 }; + +/* + * Packet flood levels: + * { number of packets, packet size } + */ +static const struct packet_flood_parms packet_flood_data[] = + {{10, 100}, {10, 1500}, {100, 1500}}; + +struct packet_flood_parms +get_packet_flood_parms (int level) +{ + ASSERT (level > 0 && level < 4); + return packet_flood_data [level - 1]; +} + +/* + * Return true with probability 1/n + */ +static bool flip(int n) { + return (get_random() % n) == 0; +} + +/* + * Return uniformly distributed random number between + * low and high. + */ +static int roll(int low, int high) { + int ret; + ASSERT (low <= high); + ret = low + (get_random() % (high - low + 1)); + ASSERT (ret >= low && ret <= high); + return ret; +} + +static bool initialized; /* GLOBAL */ +static bool up; /* GLOBAL */ +static time_t next; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Return false if we should drop a packet. + */ +bool +ask_gremlin (int flags) +{ + const int up_down_level = GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_LEVEL (flags); + const int drop_level = GREMLIN_DROP_LEVEL (flags); + + if (!initialized) + { + initialized = true; + + if (up_down_level) + up = false; + else + up = true; + + next = now; + } + + if (up_down_level) /* change up/down state? */ + { + if (now >= next) + { + int delta; + if (up) + { + delta = roll (down_low[up_down_level-1], down_high[up_down_level-1]); + up = false; + } + else + { + delta = roll (up_low[up_down_level-1], up_high[up_down_level-1]); + up = true; + } + + msg (D_GREMLIN, + "GREMLIN: CONNECTION GOING %s FOR %d SECONDS", + (up ? "UP" : "DOWN"), + delta); + next = now + delta; + } + } + + if (drop_level) + { + if (up && flip (drop_freq[drop_level-1])) + { + dmsg (D_GREMLIN_VERBOSE, "GREMLIN: Random packet drop"); + return false; + } + } + + return up; +} + +/* + * Possibly corrupt a packet. + */ +void corrupt_gremlin (struct buffer *buf, int flags) { + const int corrupt_level = GREMLIN_CORRUPT_LEVEL (flags); + if (corrupt_level) + { + if (flip (corrupt_freq[corrupt_level-1])) + { + do + { + if (buf->len > 0) + { + uint8_t r = roll (0, 255); + int method = roll (0, 5); + + switch (method) { + case 0: /* corrupt the first byte */ + *BPTR (buf) = r; + break; + case 1: /* corrupt the last byte */ + *(BPTR (buf) + buf->len - 1) = r; + break; + case 2: /* corrupt a random byte */ + *(BPTR(buf) + roll (0, buf->len - 1)) = r; + break; + case 3: /* append a random byte */ + buf_write (buf, &r, 1); + break; + case 4: /* reduce length by 1 */ + --buf->len; + break; + case 5: /* reduce length by a random amount */ + buf->len -= roll (0, buf->len - 1); + break; + } + dmsg (D_GREMLIN_VERBOSE, "GREMLIN: Packet Corruption, method=%d", method); + } + else + break; + } while (flip (2)); /* a 50% chance we will corrupt again */ + } + } +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c0aeab18 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/gremlin.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef GREMLIN_H +#define GREMLIN_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +/* + * Gremlin options, presented as bitmask argument to --gremlin directive + */ + +#define GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_SHIFT (0) +#define GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_MASK (0x07) + +#define GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_SHIFT (3) +#define GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_MASK (0x03) + +#define GREMLIN_CORRUPT_SHIFT (5) +#define GREMLIN_CORRUPT_MASK (0x03) + +#define GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_SHIFT (7) +#define GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_MASK (0x03) + +/* 512:1/500 1024:1/100 1536:1/50 */ + +#define GREMLIN_DROP_SHIFT (9) +#define GREMLIN_DROP_MASK (0x03) + +/* extract gremlin parms */ + +#define GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_LEVEL(x) (((x)>>GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_SHIFT) & GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_MASK) +#define GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_LEVEL(x) (((x)>>GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_SHIFT) & GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_MASK) +#define GREMLIN_CORRUPT_LEVEL(x) (((x)>>GREMLIN_CORRUPT_SHIFT) & GREMLIN_CORRUPT_MASK) +#define GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_LEVEL(x) (((x)>>GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_SHIFT) & GREMLIN_UP_DOWN_MASK) +#define GREMLIN_DROP_LEVEL(x) (((x)>>GREMLIN_DROP_SHIFT) & GREMLIN_DROP_MASK) + +#include "buffer.h" + +struct packet_flood_parms +{ + int n_packets; + int packet_size; +}; + +bool ask_gremlin (int flags); +void corrupt_gremlin (struct buffer* buf, int flags); +struct packet_flood_parms get_packet_flood_parms (int level); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9eef03b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.c @@ -0,0 +1,537 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "forward.h" +#include "helper.h" +#include "pool.h" +#include "push.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +static const char * +print_netmask (int netbits, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + const in_addr_t netmask = netbits_to_netmask (netbits); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s (/%d)", print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, gc), netbits); + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_opt_route_gateway (const in_addr_t route_gateway, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + ASSERT (route_gateway); + buf_printf (&out, "route-gateway %s", print_in_addr_t (route_gateway, 0, gc)); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_opt_route_gateway_dhcp (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (32, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "route-gateway dhcp"); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_opt_route (const in_addr_t network, const in_addr_t netmask, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + ASSERT (network); + + if (netmask) + buf_printf (&out, "route %s %s", + print_in_addr_t (network, 0, gc), + print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, gc)); + else + buf_printf (&out, "route %s", + print_in_addr_t (network, 0, gc)); + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_opt_topology (const int topology, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "topology %s", print_topology (topology)); + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_str_int (const char *str, const int i, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "%s %d", str, i); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static const char * +print_str (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", str); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static void +helper_add_route (const in_addr_t network, const in_addr_t netmask, struct options *o) +{ + rol_check_alloc (o); + add_route_to_option_list (o->routes, + print_in_addr_t (network, 0, &o->gc), + print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, &o->gc), + NULL, + NULL); +} + +static void +verify_common_subnet (const char *opt, const in_addr_t a, const in_addr_t b, const in_addr_t subnet) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if ((a & subnet) != (b & subnet)) + msg (M_USAGE, "%s IP addresses %s and %s are not in the same %s subnet", + opt, + print_in_addr_t (a, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (b, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (subnet, 0, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Process server, server-bridge, and client helper + * directives after the parameters themselves have been + * parsed and placed in struct options. + */ +void +helper_client_server (struct options *o) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + +#if P2MP +#if P2MP_SERVER + +/* + * Get tun/tap/null device type + */ + const int dev = dev_type_enum (o->dev, o->dev_type); + const int topology = o->topology; + + /* + * + * HELPER DIRECTIVE for IPv6 + * + * server-ipv6 2001:db8::/64 + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * tun-ipv6 + * push "tun-ipv6" + * ifconfig-ipv6 2001:db8::1 2001:db8::2 + * if !nopool: + * ifconfig-ipv6-pool 2001:db8::1:0/64 + * + */ + if ( o->server_ipv6_defined ) + { + if ( ! o->server_defined ) + { + msg (M_USAGE, "--server-ipv6 must be used together with --server"); + } + if ( o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL ) + { + msg( M_USAGE, "--server-ipv6 is incompatible with 'nopool' option" ); + } + if ( o->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined ) + { + msg( M_USAGE, "--server-ipv6 already defines an ifconfig-ipv6-pool, so you can't also specify --ifconfig-pool explicitly"); + } + + /* local ifconfig is "base address + 1" and "+2" */ + o->ifconfig_ipv6_local = + print_in6_addr( add_in6_addr( o->server_network_ipv6, 1), 0, &o->gc ); + o->ifconfig_ipv6_remote = + print_in6_addr( add_in6_addr( o->server_network_ipv6, 2), 0, &o->gc ); + o->ifconfig_ipv6_netbits = o->server_netbits_ipv6; + + /* pool starts at "base address + 0x1000" - leave enough room */ + ASSERT( o->server_netbits_ipv6 <= 112 ); /* want 16 bits */ + + o->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined = true; + o->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base = + add_in6_addr( o->server_network_ipv6, 0x1000 ); + o->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits = o->server_netbits_ipv6; + + o->tun_ipv6 = true; + + push_option( o, "tun-ipv6", M_USAGE ); + } + + /* + * + * HELPER DIRECTIVE: + * + * server 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * mode server + * tls-server + * push "topology [topology]" + * + * if tun AND (topology == net30 OR topology == p2p): + * ifconfig 10.8.0.1 10.8.0.2 + * if !nopool: + * ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.4 10.8.0.251 + * route 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0 + * if client-to-client: + * push "route 10.8.0.0 255.255.255.0" + * else if topology == net30: + * push "route 10.8.0.1" + * + * if tap OR (tun AND topology == subnet): + * ifconfig 10.8.0.1 255.255.255.0 + * if !nopool: + * ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.254 255.255.255.0 + * push "route-gateway 10.8.0.1" + */ + + if (o->server_defined) + { + int netbits = -2; + bool status = false; + + if (o->client) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server and --client cannot be used together"); + + if (o->server_bridge_defined || o->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server and --server-bridge cannot be used together"); + + if (o->shared_secret_file) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server and --secret cannot be used together (you must use SSL/TLS keys)"); + + if (!(o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL) && o->ifconfig_pool_defined) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server already defines an ifconfig-pool, so you can't also specify --ifconfig-pool explicitly"); + + if (!(dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP || dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive only makes sense with --dev tun or --dev tap"); + + status = netmask_to_netbits (o->server_network, o->server_netmask, &netbits); + if (!status) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive network/netmask combination is invalid"); + + if (netbits < 0) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive netmask is invalid"); + + if (netbits < IFCONFIG_POOL_MIN_NETBITS) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive netmask allows for too many host addresses (subnet must be %s or higher)", + print_netmask (IFCONFIG_POOL_MIN_NETBITS, &gc)); + + if (dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + int pool_end_reserve = 4; + + if (netbits > 29) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive when used with --dev tun must define a subnet of %s or lower", + print_netmask (29, &gc)); + + if (netbits == 29) + pool_end_reserve = 0; + + o->mode = MODE_SERVER; + o->tls_server = true; + + if (topology == TOP_NET30 || topology == TOP_P2P) + { + o->ifconfig_local = print_in_addr_t (o->server_network + 1, 0, &o->gc); + o->ifconfig_remote_netmask = print_in_addr_t (o->server_network + 2, 0, &o->gc); + + if (!(o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL)) + { + o->ifconfig_pool_defined = true; + o->ifconfig_pool_start = o->server_network + 4; + o->ifconfig_pool_end = (o->server_network | ~o->server_netmask) - pool_end_reserve; + ifconfig_pool_verify_range (M_USAGE, o->ifconfig_pool_start, o->ifconfig_pool_end); + } + + helper_add_route (o->server_network, o->server_netmask, o); + if (o->enable_c2c) + push_option (o, print_opt_route (o->server_network, o->server_netmask, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + else if (topology == TOP_NET30) + push_option (o, print_opt_route (o->server_network + 1, 0, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else if (topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + o->ifconfig_local = print_in_addr_t (o->server_network + 1, 0, &o->gc); + o->ifconfig_remote_netmask = print_in_addr_t (o->server_netmask, 0, &o->gc); + + if (!(o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL)) + { + o->ifconfig_pool_defined = true; + o->ifconfig_pool_start = o->server_network + 2; + o->ifconfig_pool_end = (o->server_network | ~o->server_netmask) - 2; + ifconfig_pool_verify_range (M_USAGE, o->ifconfig_pool_start, o->ifconfig_pool_end); + } + o->ifconfig_pool_netmask = o->server_netmask; + + push_option (o, print_opt_route_gateway (o->server_network + 1, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else + ASSERT (0); + + push_option (o, print_opt_topology (topology, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else if (dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + if (netbits > 30) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server directive when used with --dev tap must define a subnet of %s or lower", + print_netmask (30, &gc)); + + o->mode = MODE_SERVER; + o->tls_server = true; + o->ifconfig_local = print_in_addr_t (o->server_network + 1, 0, &o->gc); + o->ifconfig_remote_netmask = print_in_addr_t (o->server_netmask, 0, &o->gc); + + if (!(o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL)) + { + o->ifconfig_pool_defined = true; + o->ifconfig_pool_start = o->server_network + 2; + o->ifconfig_pool_end = (o->server_network | ~o->server_netmask) - 1; + ifconfig_pool_verify_range (M_USAGE, o->ifconfig_pool_start, o->ifconfig_pool_end); + } + o->ifconfig_pool_netmask = o->server_netmask; + + push_option (o, print_opt_route_gateway (o->server_network + 1, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* set push-ifconfig-constraint directive */ + if ((dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP || topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + { + o->push_ifconfig_constraint_defined = true; + o->push_ifconfig_constraint_network = o->server_network; + o->push_ifconfig_constraint_netmask = o->server_netmask; + } + } + + /* + * HELPER DIRECTIVE: + * + * server-bridge 10.8.0.4 255.255.255.0 10.8.0.128 10.8.0.254 + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * mode server + * tls-server + * + * ifconfig-pool 10.8.0.128 10.8.0.254 255.255.255.0 + * push "route-gateway 10.8.0.4" + * + * OR + * + * server-bridge + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * mode server + * tls-server + * + * if !nogw: + * push "route-gateway dhcp" + */ + else if (o->server_bridge_defined | o->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp) + { + if (o->client) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server-bridge and --client cannot be used together"); + + if (!(o->server_flags & SF_NOPOOL) && o->ifconfig_pool_defined) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server-bridge already defines an ifconfig-pool, so you can't also specify --ifconfig-pool explicitly"); + + if (o->shared_secret_file) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server-bridge and --secret cannot be used together (you must use SSL/TLS keys)"); + + if (dev != DEV_TYPE_TAP) + msg (M_USAGE, "--server-bridge directive only makes sense with --dev tap"); + + if (o->server_bridge_defined) + { + verify_common_subnet ("--server-bridge", o->server_bridge_ip, o->server_bridge_pool_start, o->server_bridge_netmask); + verify_common_subnet ("--server-bridge", o->server_bridge_pool_start, o->server_bridge_pool_end, o->server_bridge_netmask); + verify_common_subnet ("--server-bridge", o->server_bridge_ip, o->server_bridge_pool_end, o->server_bridge_netmask); + } + + o->mode = MODE_SERVER; + o->tls_server = true; + + if (o->server_bridge_defined) + { + o->ifconfig_pool_defined = true; + o->ifconfig_pool_start = o->server_bridge_pool_start; + o->ifconfig_pool_end = o->server_bridge_pool_end; + ifconfig_pool_verify_range (M_USAGE, o->ifconfig_pool_start, o->ifconfig_pool_end); + o->ifconfig_pool_netmask = o->server_bridge_netmask; + push_option (o, print_opt_route_gateway (o->server_bridge_ip, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else if (o->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp && !(o->server_flags & SF_NO_PUSH_ROUTE_GATEWAY)) + { + push_option (o, print_opt_route_gateway_dhcp (&o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + } + else +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ + + /* + * HELPER DIRECTIVE: + * + * client + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * pull + * tls-client + */ + if (o->client) + { + if (o->key_method != 2) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client requires --key-method 2"); + + o->pull = true; + o->tls_client = true; + } + +#endif /* P2MP */ + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * + * HELPER DIRECTIVE: + * + * keepalive 10 60 + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * if mode server: + * ping 10 + * ping-restart 120 + * push "ping 10" + * push "ping-restart 60" + * else + * ping 10 + * ping-restart 60 + */ +void +helper_keepalive (struct options *o) +{ + if (o->keepalive_ping || o->keepalive_timeout) + { + /* + * Sanity checks. + */ + if (o->keepalive_ping <= 0 || o->keepalive_timeout <= 0) + msg (M_USAGE, "--keepalive parameters must be > 0"); + if (o->keepalive_ping * 2 > o->keepalive_timeout) + msg (M_USAGE, "the second parameter to --keepalive (restart timeout=%d) must be at least twice the value of the first parameter (ping interval=%d). A ratio of 1:5 or 1:6 would be even better. Recommended setting is --keepalive 10 60.", + o->keepalive_timeout, + o->keepalive_ping); + if (o->ping_send_timeout || o->ping_rec_timeout) + msg (M_USAGE, "--keepalive conflicts with --ping, --ping-exit, or --ping-restart. If you use --keepalive, you don't need any of the other --ping directives."); + + /* + * Expand. + */ + if (o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT) + { + o->ping_rec_timeout_action = PING_RESTART; + o->ping_send_timeout = o->keepalive_ping; + o->ping_rec_timeout = o->keepalive_timeout; + } +#if P2MP_SERVER + else if (o->mode == MODE_SERVER) + { + o->ping_rec_timeout_action = PING_RESTART; + o->ping_send_timeout = o->keepalive_ping; + o->ping_rec_timeout = o->keepalive_timeout * 2; + push_option (o, print_str_int ("ping", o->keepalive_ping, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + push_option (o, print_str_int ("ping-restart", o->keepalive_timeout, &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } +#endif + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } +} + +/* + * + * HELPER DIRECTIVE: + * + * tcp-nodelay + * + * EXPANDS TO: + * + * if mode server: + * socket-flags TCP_NODELAY + * push "socket-flags TCP_NODELAY" + */ +void +helper_tcp_nodelay (struct options *o) +{ +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (o->server_flags & SF_TCP_NODELAY_HELPER) + { + if (o->mode == MODE_SERVER) + { + o->sockflags |= SF_TCP_NODELAY; + push_option (o, print_str ("socket-flags TCP_NODELAY", &o->gc), M_USAGE); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } +#endif +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..444969c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/helper.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Process helper directives such as server, client, and keepalive. + */ + +#ifndef HELPER_H +#define HELPER_H + +#include "options.h" + +void helper_keepalive (struct options *o); +void helper_client_server (struct options *o); +void helper_tcp_nodelay (struct options *o); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..78b8344d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH + +#include "crypto.h" +#include "httpdigest.h" + +static void +CvtHex( + IN HASH Bin, + OUT HASHHEX Hex + ) +{ + unsigned short i; + unsigned char j; + + for (i = 0; i < HASHLEN; i++) { + j = (Bin[i] >> 4) & 0xf; + if (j <= 9) + Hex[i*2] = (j + '0'); + else + Hex[i*2] = (j + 'a' - 10); + j = Bin[i] & 0xf; + if (j <= 9) + Hex[i*2+1] = (j + '0'); + else + Hex[i*2+1] = (j + 'a' - 10); + }; + Hex[HASHHEXLEN] = '\0'; +}; + +/* calculate H(A1) as per spec */ +void +DigestCalcHA1( + IN char * pszAlg, + IN char * pszUserName, + IN char * pszRealm, + IN char * pszPassword, + IN char * pszNonce, + IN char * pszCNonce, + OUT HASHHEX SessionKey + ) +{ + HASH HA1; + md_ctx_t md5_ctx; + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + + md_ctx_init(&md5_ctx, md5_kt); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszUserName, strlen(pszUserName)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszRealm, strlen(pszRealm)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszPassword, strlen(pszPassword)); + md_ctx_final(&md5_ctx, HA1); + if (pszAlg && strcasecmp(pszAlg, "md5-sess") == 0) + { + md_ctx_init(&md5_ctx, md5_kt); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, HA1, HASHLEN); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce)); + md_ctx_final(&md5_ctx, HA1); + }; + md_ctx_cleanup(&md5_ctx); + CvtHex(HA1, SessionKey); +} + +/* calculate request-digest/response-digest as per HTTP Digest spec */ +void +DigestCalcResponse( + IN HASHHEX HA1, /* H(A1) */ + IN char * pszNonce, /* nonce from server */ + IN char * pszNonceCount, /* 8 hex digits */ + IN char * pszCNonce, /* client nonce */ + IN char * pszQop, /* qop-value: "", "auth", "auth-int" */ + IN char * pszMethod, /* method from the request */ + IN char * pszDigestUri, /* requested URL */ + IN HASHHEX HEntity, /* H(entity body) if qop="auth-int" */ + OUT HASHHEX Response /* request-digest or response-digest */ + ) +{ + HASH HA2; + HASH RespHash; + HASHHEX HA2Hex; + + md_ctx_t md5_ctx; + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + + /* calculate H(A2) */ + md_ctx_init(&md5_ctx, md5_kt); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszMethod, strlen(pszMethod)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszDigestUri, strlen(pszDigestUri)); + if (strcasecmp(pszQop, "auth-int") == 0) + { + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN); + }; + md_ctx_final(&md5_ctx, HA2); + CvtHex(HA2, HA2Hex); + + /* calculate response */ + md_ctx_init(&md5_ctx, md5_kt); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, HA1, HASHHEXLEN); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + if (*pszQop) + { + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszNonceCount, strlen(pszNonceCount)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, pszQop, strlen(pszQop)); + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, ":", 1); + }; + md_ctx_update(&md5_ctx, HA2Hex, HASHHEXLEN); + md_ctx_final(&md5_ctx, RespHash); + md_ctx_cleanup(&md5_ctx); + CvtHex(RespHash, Response); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..84238413 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/httpdigest.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#if PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH + +#define HASHLEN 16 +typedef unsigned char HASH[HASHLEN]; +#define HASHHEXLEN 32 +typedef unsigned char HASHHEX[HASHHEXLEN+1]; +#undef IN +#undef OUT +#define IN const +#define OUT + +/* calculate H(A1) as per HTTP Digest spec */ +void DigestCalcHA1( + IN char * pszAlg, + IN char * pszUserName, + IN char * pszRealm, + IN char * pszPassword, + IN char * pszNonce, + IN char * pszCNonce, + OUT HASHHEX SessionKey + ); + +/* calculate request-digest/response-digest as per HTTP Digest spec */ +void DigestCalcResponse( + IN HASHHEX HA1, /* H(A1) */ + IN char * pszNonce, /* nonce from server */ + IN char * pszNonceCount, /* 8 hex digits */ + IN char * pszCNonce, /* client nonce */ + IN char * pszQop, /* qop-value: "", "auth", "auth-int" */ + IN char * pszMethod, /* method from the request */ + IN char * pszDigestUri, /* requested URL */ + IN HASHHEX HEntity, /* H(entity body) if qop="auth-int" */ + OUT HASHHEX Response /* request-digest or response-digest */ + ); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3125282 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,3775 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "win32.h" +#include "init.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "occ.h" +#include "list.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "pool.h" +#include "gremlin.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "ps.h" +#include "lladdr.h" +#include "ping.h" +#include "mstats.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "occ-inline.h" + +static struct context *static_context; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Crypto initialization flags + */ +#define CF_LOAD_PERSISTED_PACKET_ID (1<<0) +#define CF_INIT_TLS_MULTI (1<<1) +#define CF_INIT_TLS_AUTH_STANDALONE (1<<2) + +static void do_init_first_time (struct context *c); + +void +context_clear (struct context *c) +{ + CLEAR (*c); +} + +void +context_clear_1 (struct context *c) +{ + CLEAR (c->c1); +} + +void +context_clear_2 (struct context *c) +{ + CLEAR (c->c2); +} + +void +context_clear_all_except_first_time (struct context *c) +{ + const bool first_time_save = c->first_time; + const struct context_persist cpsave = c->persist; + context_clear (c); + c->first_time = first_time_save; + c->persist = cpsave; +} + +/* + * Should be called after options->ce is modified at the top + * of a SIGUSR1 restart. + */ +static void +update_options_ce_post (struct options *options) +{ +#if P2MP + /* + * In pull mode, we usually import --ping/--ping-restart parameters from + * the server. However we should also set an initial default --ping-restart + * for the period of time before we pull the --ping-restart parameter + * from the server. + */ + if (options->pull + && options->ping_rec_timeout_action == PING_UNDEF + && proto_is_dgram(options->ce.proto)) + { + options->ping_rec_timeout = PRE_PULL_INITIAL_PING_RESTART; + options->ping_rec_timeout_action = PING_RESTART; + } +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT +static bool +management_callback_proxy_cmd (void *arg, const char **p) +{ + struct context *c = arg; + struct connection_entry *ce = &c->options.ce; + struct gc_arena *gc = &c->c2.gc; + bool ret = false; + + update_time(); + if (streq (p[1], "NONE")) + ret = true; + else if (p[2] && p[3]) + { + if (streq (p[1], "HTTP")) + { +#ifndef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + msg (M_WARN, "HTTP proxy support is not available"); +#else + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + if (ce->proto != PROTO_TCP && ce->proto != PROTO_TCP_CLIENT ) { + msg (M_WARN, "HTTP proxy support only works for TCP based connections"); + return false; + } + ho = init_http_proxy_options_once (&ce->http_proxy_options, gc); + ho->server = string_alloc (p[2], gc); + ho->port = string_alloc (p[3], gc); + ho->retry = true; + ho->auth_retry = (p[4] && streq (p[4], "nct") ? PAR_NCT : PAR_ALL); + ret = true; +#endif + } + else if (streq (p[1], "SOCKS")) + { +#ifndef ENABLE_SOCKS + msg (M_WARN, "SOCKS proxy support is not available"); +#else + ce->socks_proxy_server = string_alloc (p[2], gc); + ce->socks_proxy_port = p[3]; + ret = true; +#endif + } + } + else + msg (M_WARN, "Bad proxy command"); + + ce->flags &= ~CE_MAN_QUERY_PROXY; + + return ret; +} + +static bool +ce_management_query_proxy (struct context *c) +{ + const struct connection_list *l = c->options.connection_list; + struct connection_entry *ce = &c->options.ce; + struct gc_arena gc; + bool ret = true; + + update_time(); + if (management) + { + gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + buf_printf (&out, ">PROXY:%u,%s,%s", (l ? l->current : 0) + 1, + (proto_is_udp (ce->proto) ? "UDP" : "TCP"), np (ce->remote)); + management_notify_generic (management, BSTR (&out)); + ce->flags |= CE_MAN_QUERY_PROXY; + while (ce->flags & CE_MAN_QUERY_PROXY) + { + management_event_loop_n_seconds (management, 1); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + { + ret = false; + break; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + + return ret; +} + + +static bool +management_callback_remote_cmd (void *arg, const char **p) +{ + struct context *c = (struct context *) arg; + struct connection_entry *ce = &c->options.ce; + int ret = false; + if (p[1] && ((ce->flags>>CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SHIFT)&CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK) == CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_QUERY) + { + int flags = 0; + if (!strcmp(p[1], "ACCEPT")) + { + flags = CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_ACCEPT; + ret = true; + } + else if (!strcmp(p[1], "SKIP")) + { + flags = CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SKIP; + ret = true; + } + else if (!strcmp(p[1], "MOD") && p[2] && p[3]) + { + if (strlen(p[2]) < RH_HOST_LEN && strlen(p[3]) < RH_PORT_LEN) + { + struct remote_host_store *rhs = c->options.rh_store; + if (!rhs) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (rhs, struct remote_host_store, &c->options.gc); + c->options.rh_store = rhs; + } + strncpynt(rhs->host, p[2], RH_HOST_LEN); + strncpynt(rhs->port, p[3], RH_PORT_LEN); + + ce->remote = rhs->host; + ce->remote_port = rhs->port; + flags = CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MOD; + ret = true; + } + } + if (ret) + { + ce->flags &= ~(CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK<flags |= ((flags&CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK)<options.ce; + int ret = true; + update_time(); + if (management) + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + buf_printf (&out, ">REMOTE:%s,%s,%s", np(ce->remote), ce->remote_port, proto2ascii(ce->proto, ce->af, false)); + management_notify_generic(management, BSTR (&out)); + ce->flags &= ~(CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK<flags |= (CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_QUERY<flags>>CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SHIFT) & CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK) == CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_QUERY) + { + management_event_loop_n_seconds (management, 1); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + { + ret = false; + break; + } + } + } + { + const int flags = ((ce->flags>>CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SHIFT) & CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK); + ret = (flags != CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SKIP); + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} +#endif /* ENABLE_MANAGEMENT */ + +/* + * Initialize and possibly randomize connection list. + */ +static void +init_connection_list (struct context *c) +{ + struct connection_list *l = c->options.connection_list; + l->current = -1; + if (c->options.remote_random) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < l->len; ++i) + { + const int j = get_random () % l->len; + if (i != j) + { + struct connection_entry *tmp; + tmp = l->array[i]; + l->array[i] = l->array[j]; + l->array[j] = tmp; + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Clear the remote address list + */ +static void clear_remote_addrlist (struct link_socket_addr *lsa) +{ + if (lsa->remote_list) { + freeaddrinfo(lsa->remote_list); + } + lsa->remote_list = NULL; + lsa->current_remote = NULL; +} + +/* + * Increment to next connection entry + */ +static void +next_connection_entry (struct context *c) +{ + struct connection_list *l = c->options.connection_list; + bool ce_defined; + struct connection_entry *ce; + int n_cycles = 0; + + do { + ce_defined = true; + if (c->options.no_advance && l->current >= 0) + { + c->options.no_advance = false; + } + else + { + /* Check if there is another resolved address to try for + * the current connection */ + if (c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote && + c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote->ai_next) + { + c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote = + c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote->ai_next; + } + else + { + /* FIXME (schwabe) fix the persist-remote-ip option for real, + * this is broken probably ever since connection lists and multiple + * remote existed + */ + + if (!c->options.persist_remote_ip) + clear_remote_addrlist (&c->c1.link_socket_addr); + else + c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote = + c->c1.link_socket_addr.remote_list; + + /* + * Increase the number of connection attempts + * If this is connect-retry-max * size(l) + * OpenVPN will quit + */ + + c->options.unsuccessful_attempts++; + + if (++l->current >= l->len) + { + + l->current = 0; + if (++n_cycles >= 2) + msg (M_FATAL, "No usable connection profiles are present"); + } + } + } + + ce = l->array[l->current]; + + if (ce->flags & CE_DISABLED) + ce_defined = false; + + c->options.ce = *ce; +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (ce_defined && management && management_query_remote_enabled(management)) + { + /* allow management interface to override connection entry details */ + ce_defined = ce_management_query_remote(c); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + break; + } + else +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (ce_defined && management && management_query_proxy_enabled (management)) + { + ce_defined = ce_management_query_proxy (c); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + break; + } +#endif + } while (!ce_defined); + + /* Check if this connection attempt would bring us over the limit */ + if (c->options.connect_retry_max > 0 && + c->options.unsuccessful_attempts > (l->len * c->options.connect_retry_max)) + msg(M_FATAL, "All connections have been connect-retry-max (%d) times unsuccessful, exiting", + c->options.connect_retry_max); + update_options_ce_post (&c->options); +} + +/* + * Query for private key and auth-user-pass username/passwords + */ +static void +init_query_passwords (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + /* Certificate password input */ + if (c->options.key_pass_file) + pem_password_setup (c->options.key_pass_file); +#endif + +#if P2MP + /* Auth user/pass input */ + if (c->options.auth_user_pass_file) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + auth_user_pass_setup (c->options.auth_user_pass_file, &c->options.sc_info); +#else + auth_user_pass_setup (c->options.auth_user_pass_file, NULL); +#endif + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize/Uninitialize HTTP or SOCKS proxy + */ + +#ifdef GENERAL_PROXY_SUPPORT + +static void +uninit_proxy_dowork (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (c->c1.http_proxy_owned && c->c1.http_proxy) + { + http_proxy_close (c->c1.http_proxy); + c->c1.http_proxy = NULL; + c->c1.http_proxy_owned = false; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (c->c1.socks_proxy_owned && c->c1.socks_proxy) + { + socks_proxy_close (c->c1.socks_proxy); + c->c1.socks_proxy = NULL; + c->c1.socks_proxy_owned = false; + } +#endif +} + +static void +init_proxy_dowork (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + bool did_http = false; +#else + const bool did_http = false; +#endif + + uninit_proxy_dowork (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (c->options.ce.http_proxy_options) + { + /* Possible HTTP proxy user/pass input */ + c->c1.http_proxy = http_proxy_new (c->options.ce.http_proxy_options); + if (c->c1.http_proxy) + { + did_http = true; + c->c1.http_proxy_owned = true; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (!did_http && c->options.ce.socks_proxy_server) + { + c->c1.socks_proxy = socks_proxy_new (c->options.ce.socks_proxy_server, + c->options.ce.socks_proxy_port, + c->options.ce.socks_proxy_authfile, + c->options.ce.socks_proxy_retry); + if (c->c1.socks_proxy) + { + c->c1.socks_proxy_owned = true; + } + } +#endif +} + +static void +init_proxy (struct context *c) +{ + init_proxy_dowork (c); +} + +static void +uninit_proxy (struct context *c) +{ + uninit_proxy_dowork (c); +} + +#else + +static inline void +init_proxy (struct context *c, const int scope) +{ +} + +static inline void +uninit_proxy (struct context *c) +{ +} + +#endif + +void +context_init_1 (struct context *c) +{ + context_clear_1 (c); + + packet_id_persist_init (&c->c1.pid_persist); + + init_connection_list (c); + + init_query_passwords (c); + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + if (c->first_time) { + int i; + pkcs11_initialize (true, c->options.pkcs11_pin_cache_period); + for (i=0;ioptions.pkcs11_providers[i] != NULL;i++) + pkcs11_addProvider (c->options.pkcs11_providers[i], c->options.pkcs11_protected_authentication[i], + c->options.pkcs11_private_mode[i], c->options.pkcs11_cert_private[i]); + } +#endif + +#if 0 /* test get_user_pass with GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK flag */ + { + /* + * In the management interface, you can okay the request by entering "needok token-insertion-request ok" + */ + struct user_pass up; + CLEAR (up); + strcpy (up.username, "Please insert your cryptographic token"); /* put the high-level message in up.username */ + get_user_pass (&up, NULL, "token-insertion-request", GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK); + msg (M_INFO, "RET:%s", up.password); /* will return the third argument to management interface + 'needok' command, usually 'ok' or 'cancel'. */ + } +#endif + +} + +void +context_gc_free (struct context *c) +{ + gc_free (&c->c2.gc); + gc_free (&c->options.gc); + gc_free (&c->gc); +} + +#if PORT_SHARE + +static void +close_port_share (void) +{ + if (port_share) + { + port_share_close (port_share); + port_share = NULL; + } +} + +static void +init_port_share (struct context *c) +{ + if (!port_share && (c->options.port_share_host && c->options.port_share_port)) + { + port_share = port_share_open (c->options.port_share_host, + c->options.port_share_port, + MAX_RW_SIZE_LINK (&c->c2.frame), + c->options.port_share_journal_dir); + if (port_share == NULL) + msg (M_FATAL, "Fatal error: Port sharing failed"); + } +} + +#endif + +bool +init_static (void) +{ + /* configure_path (); */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(DMALLOC) + crypto_init_dmalloc(); +#endif + + init_random_seed (); /* init random() function, only used as + source for weak random numbers */ + error_reset (); /* initialize error.c */ + reset_check_status (); /* initialize status check code in socket.c */ + +#ifdef WIN32 + init_win32 (); +#endif + +#ifdef OPENVPN_DEBUG_COMMAND_LINE + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) + msg (M_INFO, "argv[%d] = '%s'", i, argv[i]); + } +#endif + + update_time (); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + init_ssl_lib (); + + /* init PRNG used for IV generation */ + /* When forking, copy this to more places in the code to avoid fork + random-state predictability */ + prng_init (NULL, 0); +#endif + +#ifdef PID_TEST + packet_id_interactive_test (); /* test the sequence number code */ + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + schedule_test (); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef LIST_TEST + list_test (); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef IFCONFIG_POOL_TEST + ifconfig_pool_test (0x0A010004, 0x0A0100FF); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef CHARACTER_CLASS_DEBUG + character_class_debug (); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef EXTRACT_X509_FIELD_TEST + extract_x509_field_test (); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef TIME_TEST + time_test (); + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef TEST_GET_DEFAULT_GATEWAY + { + struct route_gateway_info rgi; + get_default_gateway(&rgi); + print_default_gateway(M_INFO, &rgi); + return false; + } +#endif + +#ifdef GEN_PATH_TEST + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *fn = gen_path ("foo", + "bar", + &gc); + printf ("%s\n", fn); + gc_free (&gc); + } + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef STATUS_PRINTF_TEST + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *tmp_file = create_temp_file ("/tmp", "foo", &gc); + struct status_output *so = status_open (tmp_file, 0, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); + status_printf (so, "%s", "foo"); + status_printf (so, "%s", "bar"); + if (!status_close (so)) + msg (M_WARN, "STATUS_PRINTF_TEST: %s: write error", tmp_file); + gc_free (&gc); + } + return false; +#endif + +#ifdef ARGV_TEST + { + void argv_test (void); + argv_test (); + return false; + } +#endif + +#ifdef PRNG_TEST + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + uint8_t rndbuf[8]; + int i; + prng_init ("sha1", 16); + /*prng_init (NULL, 0);*/ + const int factor = 1; + for (i = 0; i < factor * 8; ++i) + { +#if 1 + prng_bytes (rndbuf, sizeof (rndbuf)); +#else + ASSERT(rand_bytes (rndbuf, sizeof (rndbuf))); +#endif + printf ("[%d] %s\n", i, format_hex (rndbuf, sizeof (rndbuf), 0, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + prng_uninit (); + return false; + } +#endif + +#ifdef BUFFER_LIST_AGGREGATE_TEST + /* test buffer_list_aggregate function */ + { + static const char *text[] = { + "It was a bright cold day in April, ", + "and the clocks were striking ", + "thirteen. ", + "Winston Smith, ", + "his chin nuzzled into his breast in an ", + "effort to escape the vile wind, ", + "slipped quickly through the glass doors ", + "of Victory Mansions, though not quickly ", + "enough to prevent a swirl of gritty dust from ", + "entering along with him." + }; + + int iter, listcap; + for (listcap = 0; listcap < 12; ++listcap) + { + for (iter = 0; iter < 512; ++iter) + { + struct buffer_list *bl = buffer_list_new(listcap); + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < SIZE(text); ++i) + buffer_list_push(bl, (unsigned char *)text[i]); + } + printf("[cap=%d i=%d] *************************\n", listcap, iter); + if (!(iter & 8)) + buffer_list_aggregate(bl, iter/2); + if (!(iter & 16)) + buffer_list_push(bl, (unsigned char *)"Even more text..."); + buffer_list_aggregate(bl, iter); + if (!(iter & 1)) + buffer_list_push(bl, (unsigned char *)"More text..."); + { + struct buffer *buf; + while ((buf = buffer_list_peek(bl))) + { + int c; + printf ("'"); + while ((c = buf_read_u8(buf)) >= 0) + putchar(c); + printf ("'\n"); + buffer_list_advance(bl, 0); + } + } + buffer_list_free(bl); + } + } + return false; + } +#endif + +#ifdef MSTATS_TEST + { + int i; + mstats_open("/dev/shm/mstats.dat"); + for (i = 0; i < 30; ++i) + { + mmap_stats->n_clients += 1; + mmap_stats->link_write_bytes += 8; + mmap_stats->link_read_bytes += 16; + sleep(1); + } + mstats_close(); + return false; + } +#endif + + return true; +} + +void +uninit_static (void) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + free_ssl_lib (); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_terminate (); +#endif + +#if PORT_SHARE + close_port_share (); +#endif + +#if defined(MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + show_tls_performance_stats (); +#endif +} + +void +init_verb_mute (struct context *c, unsigned int flags) +{ + if (flags & IVM_LEVEL_1) + { + /* set verbosity and mute levels */ + set_check_status (D_LINK_ERRORS, D_READ_WRITE); + set_debug_level (c->options.verbosity, SDL_CONSTRAIN); + set_mute_cutoff (c->options.mute); + } + + /* special D_LOG_RW mode */ + if (flags & IVM_LEVEL_2) + c->c2.log_rw = (check_debug_level (D_LOG_RW) && !check_debug_level (D_LOG_RW + 1)); +} + +/* + * Possibly set --dev based on --dev-node. + * For example, if --dev-node /tmp/foo/tun, and --dev undefined, + * set --dev to tun. + */ +void +init_options_dev (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->dev && options->dev_node) { + char *dev_node = strdup(options->dev_node); /* POSIX basename() implementaions may modify its arguments */ + options->dev = basename (dev_node); + } +} + +bool +print_openssl_info (const struct options *options) +{ + /* + * OpenSSL info print mode? + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (options->show_ciphers || options->show_digests || options->show_engines +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + || options->show_tls_ciphers +#endif + ) + { + if (options->show_ciphers) + show_available_ciphers (); + if (options->show_digests) + show_available_digests (); + if (options->show_engines) + show_available_engines (); +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + if (options->show_tls_ciphers) + show_available_tls_ciphers (); +#endif + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} + +/* + * Static pre-shared key generation mode? + */ +bool +do_genkey (const struct options * options) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (options->genkey) + { + int nbits_written; + + notnull (options->shared_secret_file, + "shared secret output file (--secret)"); + + if (options->mlock) /* should we disable paging? */ + platform_mlockall (true); + + nbits_written = write_key_file (2, options->shared_secret_file); + + msg (D_GENKEY | M_NOPREFIX, + "Randomly generated %d bit key written to %s", nbits_written, + options->shared_secret_file); + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} + +/* + * Persistent TUN/TAP device management mode? + */ +bool +do_persist_tuntap (const struct options *options) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + if (options->persist_config) + { + /* sanity check on options for --mktun or --rmtun */ + notnull (options->dev, "TUN/TAP device (--dev)"); + if (options->ce.remote || options->ifconfig_local + || options->ifconfig_remote_netmask +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + || options->shared_secret_file +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + || options->tls_server || options->tls_client +#endif +#endif + ) + msg (M_FATAL|M_OPTERR, + "options --mktun or --rmtun should only be used together with --dev"); + tuncfg (options->dev, options->dev_type, options->dev_node, + options->persist_mode, + options->username, options->groupname, &options->tuntap_options); + if (options->persist_mode && options->lladdr) + set_lladdr(options->dev, options->lladdr, NULL); + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} + +/* + * Should we become a daemon? + * Return true if we did it. + */ +static bool +possibly_become_daemon (const struct options *options, const bool first_time) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (first_time && options->daemon) + { + ASSERT (!options->inetd); + if (daemon (options->cd_dir != NULL, options->log) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "daemon() failed or unsupported"); + restore_signal_state (); + if (options->log) + set_std_files_to_null (true); + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + pkcs11_forkFixup (); +#endif + + ret = true; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Actually do UID/GID downgrade, chroot and SELinux context switching, if requested. + */ +static void +do_uid_gid_chroot (struct context *c, bool no_delay) +{ + static const char why_not[] = "will be delayed because of --client, --pull, or --up-delay"; + struct context_0 *c0 = c->c0; + + if (c->first_time && c0 && !c0->uid_gid_set) + { + /* chroot if requested */ + if (c->options.chroot_dir) + { + if (no_delay) + platform_chroot (c->options.chroot_dir); + else + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: chroot %s", why_not); + } + + /* set user and/or group that we want to setuid/setgid to */ + if (no_delay) + { + platform_group_set (&c0->platform_state_group); + platform_user_set (&c0->platform_state_user); + c0->uid_gid_set = true; + } + else if (c0->uid_gid_specified) + { + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: UID/GID downgrade %s", why_not); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + if (c->options.memstats_fn) + mstats_open(c->options.memstats_fn); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + /* Apply a SELinux context in order to restrict what OpenVPN can do + * to _only_ what it is supposed to do after initialization is complete + * (basically just network I/O operations). Doing it after chroot + * requires /proc to be mounted in the chroot (which is annoying indeed + * but doing it before requires more complex SELinux policies. + */ + if (c->options.selinux_context) + { + if (no_delay) { + if (-1 == setcon (c->options.selinux_context)) + msg (M_ERR, "setcon to '%s' failed; is /proc accessible?", c->options.selinux_context); + else + msg (M_INFO, "setcon to '%s' succeeded", c->options.selinux_context); + } + else + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: setcon %s", why_not); + } +#endif + } +} + +/* + * Return common name in a way that is formatted for + * prepending to msg() output. + */ +const char * +format_common_name (struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + buf_printf (&out, "[%s] ", tls_common_name (c->c2.tls_multi, false)); + } +#endif + return BSTR (&out); +} + +void +pre_setup (const struct options *options) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + if (options->exit_event_name) + { + win32_signal_open (&win32_signal, + WSO_FORCE_SERVICE, + options->exit_event_name, + options->exit_event_initial_state); + } + else + { + win32_signal_open (&win32_signal, + WSO_FORCE_CONSOLE, + NULL, + false); + + /* put a title on the top window bar */ + if (win32_signal.mode == WSO_MODE_CONSOLE) + { + window_title_save (&window_title); + window_title_generate (options->config); + } + } +#endif +} + +void +reset_coarse_timers (struct context *c) +{ + c->c2.coarse_timer_wakeup = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize timers + */ +static void +do_init_timers (struct context *c, bool deferred) +{ + update_time (); + reset_coarse_timers (c); + + /* initialize inactivity timeout */ + if (c->options.inactivity_timeout) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.inactivity_interval, c->options.inactivity_timeout, now); + + /* initialize pings */ + + if (c->options.ping_send_timeout) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.ping_send_interval, c->options.ping_send_timeout, 0); + + if (c->options.ping_rec_timeout) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.ping_rec_interval, c->options.ping_rec_timeout, now); + +#if P2MP + if (c->options.server_poll_timeout) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.server_poll_interval, c->options.server_poll_timeout, now); +#endif + + if (!deferred) + { + /* initialize connection establishment timer */ + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.wait_for_connect, 1, now); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* initialize occ timers */ + + if (c->options.occ + && !TLS_MODE (c) + && c->c2.options_string_local && c->c2.options_string_remote) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.occ_interval, OCC_INTERVAL_SECONDS, now); + + if (c->options.mtu_test) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval, OCC_MTU_LOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS, now); +#endif + + /* initialize packet_id persistence timer */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (c->options.packet_id_file) + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.packet_id_persist_interval, 60, now); +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + /* initialize tmp_int optimization that limits the number of times we call + tls_multi_process in the main event loop */ + interval_init (&c->c2.tmp_int, TLS_MULTI_HORIZON, TLS_MULTI_REFRESH); +#endif + } +} + +/* + * Initialize traffic shaper. + */ +static void +do_init_traffic_shaper (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + /* initialize traffic shaper (i.e. transmit bandwidth limiter) */ + if (c->options.shaper) + { + shaper_init (&c->c2.shaper, c->options.shaper); + shaper_msg (&c->c2.shaper); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Allocate a route list structure if at least one + * --route option was specified. + */ +static void +do_alloc_route_list (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->options.routes && !c->c1.route_list) + c->c1.route_list = new_route_list (c->options.max_routes, &c->gc); + if (c->options.routes_ipv6 && !c->c1.route_ipv6_list) + c->c1.route_ipv6_list = new_route_ipv6_list (c->options.max_routes, &c->gc); +} + + +/* + * Initialize the route list, resolving any DNS names in route + * options and saving routes in the environment. + */ +static void +do_init_route_list (const struct options *options, + struct route_list *route_list, + const struct link_socket_info *link_socket_info, + bool fatal, + struct env_set *es) +{ + const char *gw = NULL; + int dev = dev_type_enum (options->dev, options->dev_type); + int metric = 0; + + if (dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN && (options->topology == TOP_NET30 || options->topology == TOP_P2P)) + gw = options->ifconfig_remote_netmask; + if (options->route_default_gateway) + gw = options->route_default_gateway; + if (options->route_default_metric) + metric = options->route_default_metric; + + if (!init_route_list (route_list, + options->routes, + gw, + metric, + link_socket_current_remote (link_socket_info), + es)) + { + if (fatal) + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_ERROR); /* exit point */ + } + else + { + /* copy routes to environment */ + setenv_routes (es, route_list); + } +} + +static void +do_init_route_ipv6_list (const struct options *options, + struct route_ipv6_list *route_ipv6_list, + bool fatal, + struct env_set *es) +{ + const char *gw = NULL; + int dev = dev_type_enum (options->dev, options->dev_type); + int metric = -1; /* no metric set */ + + gw = options->ifconfig_ipv6_remote; /* default GW = remote end */ +#if 0 /* not yet done for IPv6 - TODO!*/ + if ( options->route_ipv6_default_gateway ) /* override? */ + gw = options->route_ipv6_default_gateway; +#endif + + if (options->route_default_metric) + metric = options->route_default_metric; + + if (!init_route_ipv6_list (route_ipv6_list, + options->routes_ipv6, + gw, + metric, + es)) + { + if (fatal) + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_ERROR); /* exit point */ + } + else + { + /* copy routes to environment */ + setenv_routes_ipv6 (es, route_ipv6_list); + } +} + + +/* + * Called after all initialization has been completed. + */ +void +initialization_sequence_completed (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + static const char message[] = "Initialization Sequence Completed"; + + /* Reset the unsuccessful connection counter on complete initialisation */ + c->options.unsuccessful_attempts=0; + + /* If we delayed UID/GID downgrade or chroot, do it now */ + do_uid_gid_chroot (c, true); + + /* Test if errors */ + if (flags & ISC_ERRORS) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + show_routes (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + show_adapters (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + msg (M_INFO, "%s With Errors ( see http://openvpn.net/faq.html#dhcpclientserv )", message); +#else + msg (M_INFO, "%s With Errors", message); +#endif + } + else + msg (M_INFO, "%s", message); + + /* Flag that we initialized */ + if ((flags & (ISC_ERRORS|ISC_SERVER)) == 0) + c->options.no_advance=true; + +#ifdef WIN32 + fork_register_dns_action (c->c1.tuntap); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* Tell management interface that we initialized */ + if (management) + { + in_addr_t tun_local = 0; + in_addr_t tun_remote = 0; /* FKS */ + const char *detail = "SUCCESS"; + if (c->c1.tuntap) + tun_local = c->c1.tuntap->local; + /* TODO(jjo): for ipv6 this will convert some 32bits in the ipv6 addr + * to a meaningless ipv4 address. + * In any case, is somewhat inconsistent to send local tunnel + * addr with remote _endpoint_ addr (?) + */ + tun_remote = htonl (c->c1.link_socket_addr.actual.dest.addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr); + if (flags & ISC_ERRORS) + detail = "ERROR"; + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTED, + detail, + tun_local, + tun_remote); + if (tun_local) + management_post_tunnel_open (management, tun_local); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Possibly add routes and/or call route-up script + * based on options. + */ +void +do_route (const struct options *options, + struct route_list *route_list, + struct route_ipv6_list *route_ipv6_list, + const struct tuntap *tt, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + struct env_set *es) +{ + if (!options->route_noexec && ( route_list || route_ipv6_list ) ) + { + add_routes (route_list, route_ipv6_list, tt, ROUTE_OPTION_FLAGS (options), es); + setenv_int (es, "redirect_gateway", route_did_redirect_default_gateway(route_list)); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_up_down (management, "UP", es); +#endif + + if (plugin_defined (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP)) + { + if (plugin_call (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP, NULL, NULL, es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: route-up plugin call failed"); + } + + if (options->route_script) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + setenv_str (es, "script_type", "route-up"); + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc", options->route_script); + openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, 0, "--route-up"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } + +#ifdef WIN32 + if (options->show_net_up) + { + show_routes (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + show_adapters (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + } + else if (check_debug_level (D_SHOW_NET)) + { + show_routes (D_SHOW_NET|M_NOPREFIX); + show_adapters (D_SHOW_NET|M_NOPREFIX); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Save current pulled options string in the c1 context store, so we can + * compare against it after possible future restarts. + */ +#if P2MP +static void +save_pulled_options_digest (struct context *c, const struct md5_digest *newdigest) +{ + if (newdigest) + c->c1.pulled_options_digest_save = *newdigest; + else + md5_digest_clear (&c->c1.pulled_options_digest_save); +} +#endif + +/* + * initialize tun/tap device object + */ +static void +do_init_tun (struct context *c) +{ + c->c1.tuntap = init_tun (c->options.dev, + c->options.dev_type, + c->options.topology, + c->options.ifconfig_local, + c->options.ifconfig_remote_netmask, + c->options.ifconfig_ipv6_local, + c->options.ifconfig_ipv6_netbits, + c->options.ifconfig_ipv6_remote, + c->c1.link_socket_addr.bind_local, + c->c1.link_socket_addr.remote_list, + !c->options.ifconfig_nowarn, + c->c2.es); + + /* flag tunnel for IPv6 config if --tun-ipv6 is set */ + c->c1.tuntap->ipv6 = c->options.tun_ipv6; + + init_tun_post (c->c1.tuntap, + &c->c2.frame, + &c->options.tuntap_options); + + c->c1.tuntap_owned = true; +} + +/* + * Open tun/tap device, ifconfig, call up script, etc. + */ + +static bool +do_open_tun (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + + c->c2.ipv4_tun = (!c->options.tun_ipv6 + && is_dev_type (c->options.dev, c->options.dev_type, "tun")); + +#ifndef TARGET_ANDROID + if (!c->c1.tuntap) + { +#endif + +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID + /* If we emulate persist-tun on android we still have to open a new tun and + then close the old */ + int oldtunfd=-1; + if(c->c1.tuntap) + oldtunfd = c->c1.tuntap->fd; +#endif + + /* initialize (but do not open) tun/tap object */ + do_init_tun (c); + + /* allocate route list structure */ + do_alloc_route_list (c); + + /* parse and resolve the route option list */ + if (c->options.routes && c->c1.route_list && c->c2.link_socket) + do_init_route_list (&c->options, c->c1.route_list, &c->c2.link_socket->info, false, c->c2.es); + if (c->options.routes_ipv6 && c->c1.route_ipv6_list ) + do_init_route_ipv6_list (&c->options, c->c1.route_ipv6_list, false, c->c2.es); + + /* do ifconfig */ + if (!c->options.ifconfig_noexec + && ifconfig_order () == IFCONFIG_BEFORE_TUN_OPEN) + { + /* guess actual tun/tap unit number that will be returned + by open_tun */ + const char *guess = guess_tuntap_dev (c->options.dev, + c->options.dev_type, + c->options.dev_node, + &gc); + do_ifconfig (c->c1.tuntap, guess, TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), c->c2.es); + } + + /* possibly add routes */ + if(ifconfig_order() == ROUTE_BEFORE_TUN) { + /* Ignore route_delay, would cause ROUTE_BEFORE_TUN to be ignored */ + do_route (&c->options, c->c1.route_list, c->c1.route_ipv6_list, + c->c1.tuntap, c->plugins, c->c2.es); + } + + /* open the tun device */ + open_tun (c->options.dev, c->options.dev_type, c->options.dev_node, + c->c1.tuntap); +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID + if(oldtunfd>=0) + close(oldtunfd); +#endif + /* set the hardware address */ + if (c->options.lladdr) + set_lladdr(c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, c->options.lladdr, c->c2.es); + + /* do ifconfig */ + if (!c->options.ifconfig_noexec + && ifconfig_order () == IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN) + { + do_ifconfig (c->c1.tuntap, c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), c->c2.es); + } + + /* run the up script */ + run_up_down (c->options.up_script, + c->plugins, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP, + c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, + dev_type_string (c->options.dev, c->options.dev_type), + TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + print_in_addr_t (c->c1.tuntap->local, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (c->c1.tuntap->remote_netmask, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + "init", + NULL, + "up", + c->c2.es); + + /* possibly add routes */ + if ((ifconfig_order() == ROUTE_AFTER_TUN) && (!c->options.route_delay_defined)) + do_route (&c->options, c->c1.route_list, c->c1.route_ipv6_list, + c->c1.tuntap, c->plugins, c->c2.es); + + /* + * Did tun/tap driver give us an MTU? + */ + if (c->c1.tuntap->post_open_mtu) + frame_set_mtu_dynamic (&c->c2.frame, + c->c1.tuntap->post_open_mtu, + SET_MTU_TUN | SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND); + + ret = true; + static_context = c; +#ifndef TARGET_ANDROID + } + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "Preserving previous TUN/TAP instance: %s", + c->c1.tuntap->actual_name); + + /* run the up script if user specified --up-restart */ + if (c->options.up_restart) + run_up_down (c->options.up_script, + c->plugins, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP, + c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, + dev_type_string (c->options.dev, c->options.dev_type), + TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + print_in_addr_t (c->c1.tuntap->local, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (c->c1.tuntap->remote_netmask, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + "restart", + NULL, + "up", + c->c2.es); + } +#endif + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Close TUN/TAP device + */ + +static void +do_close_tun_simple (struct context *c) +{ + msg (D_CLOSE, "Closing TUN/TAP interface"); + close_tun (c->c1.tuntap); + c->c1.tuntap = NULL; + c->c1.tuntap_owned = false; +#if P2MP + save_pulled_options_digest (c, NULL); /* delete C1-saved pulled_options_digest */ +#endif +} + +static void +do_close_tun (struct context *c, bool force) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (c->c1.tuntap && c->c1.tuntap_owned) + { + const char *tuntap_actual = string_alloc (c->c1.tuntap->actual_name, &gc); + const in_addr_t local = c->c1.tuntap->local; + const in_addr_t remote_netmask = c->c1.tuntap->remote_netmask; + + if (force || !(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && c->options.persist_tun)) + { + static_context = NULL; + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* tell management layer we are about to close the TUN/TAP device */ + if (management) + { + management_pre_tunnel_close (management); + management_up_down (management, "DOWN", c->c2.es); + } +#endif + + /* delete any routes we added */ + if (c->c1.route_list || c->c1.route_ipv6_list ) + { + run_up_down (c->options.route_predown_script, + c->plugins, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_PREDOWN, + tuntap_actual, + NULL, + TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + print_in_addr_t (local, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + "init", + signal_description (c->sig->signal_received, + c->sig->signal_text), + "route-pre-down", + c->c2.es); + + delete_routes (c->c1.route_list, c->c1.route_ipv6_list, + c->c1.tuntap, ROUTE_OPTION_FLAGS (&c->options), c->c2.es); + } + + /* actually close tun/tap device based on --down-pre flag */ + if (!c->options.down_pre) + do_close_tun_simple (c); + + /* Run the down script -- note that it will run at reduced + privilege if, for example, "--user nobody" was used. */ + run_up_down (c->options.down_script, + c->plugins, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN, + tuntap_actual, + NULL, + TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + print_in_addr_t (local, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + "init", + signal_description (c->sig->signal_received, + c->sig->signal_text), + "down", + c->c2.es); + + /* actually close tun/tap device based on --down-pre flag */ + if (c->options.down_pre) + do_close_tun_simple (c); + } + else + { + /* run the down script on this restart if --up-restart was specified */ + if (c->options.up_restart) + run_up_down (c->options.down_script, + c->plugins, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN, + tuntap_actual, + NULL, + TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame), + print_in_addr_t (local, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + "restart", + signal_description (c->sig->signal_received, + c->sig->signal_text), + "down", + c->c2.es); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +tun_abort() +{ + struct context *c = static_context; + if (c) + { + static_context = NULL; + do_close_tun (c, true); + } +} + +/* + * Handle delayed tun/tap interface bringup due to --up-delay or --pull + */ + +void +do_up (struct context *c, bool pulled_options, unsigned int option_types_found) +{ + if (!c->c2.do_up_ran) + { + reset_coarse_timers (c); + + if (pulled_options && option_types_found) + do_deferred_options (c, option_types_found); + + /* if --up-delay specified, open tun, do ifconfig, and run up script now */ + if (c->options.up_delay || PULL_DEFINED (&c->options)) + { + c->c2.did_open_tun = do_open_tun (c); + update_time (); + +#if P2MP + /* + * Was tun interface object persisted from previous restart iteration, + * and if so did pulled options string change from previous iteration? + */ + if (!c->c2.did_open_tun + && PULL_DEFINED (&c->options) + && c->c1.tuntap + && (!md5_digest_defined (&c->c1.pulled_options_digest_save) || !md5_digest_defined (&c->c2.pulled_options_digest) + || !md5_digest_equal (&c->c1.pulled_options_digest_save, &c->c2.pulled_options_digest))) + { + /* if so, close tun, delete routes, then reinitialize tun and add routes */ + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: Pulled options changed on restart, will need to close and reopen TUN/TAP device."); + do_close_tun (c, true); + openvpn_sleep (1); + c->c2.did_open_tun = do_open_tun (c); + update_time (); + } +#endif + } + + if (c->c2.did_open_tun) + { +#if P2MP + save_pulled_options_digest (c, &c->c2.pulled_options_digest); +#endif + + /* if --route-delay was specified, start timer */ + if ((ifconfig_order() == ROUTE_AFTER_TUN) && c->options.route_delay_defined) + { + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.route_wakeup, c->options.route_delay, now); + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.route_wakeup_expire, c->options.route_delay + c->options.route_delay_window, now); + if (c->c1.tuntap) + tun_standby_init (c->c1.tuntap); + } + else + { + initialization_sequence_completed (c, 0); /* client/p2p --route-delay undefined */ + } + } + else if (c->options.mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT) + { + initialization_sequence_completed (c, 0); /* client/p2p restart with --persist-tun */ + } + + c->c2.do_up_ran = true; + } +} + +/* + * These are the option categories which will be accepted by pull. + */ +unsigned int +pull_permission_mask (const struct context *c) +{ + unsigned int flags = + OPT_P_UP + | OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS + | OPT_P_SOCKBUF + | OPT_P_SOCKFLAGS + | OPT_P_SETENV + | OPT_P_SHAPER + | OPT_P_TIMER + | OPT_P_COMP + | OPT_P_PERSIST + | OPT_P_MESSAGES + | OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY + | OPT_P_ECHO + | OPT_P_PULL_MODE; + + if (!c->options.route_nopull) + flags |= (OPT_P_ROUTE | OPT_P_IPWIN32); + + return flags; +} + +/* + * Handle non-tun-related pulled options. + */ +void +do_deferred_options (struct context *c, const unsigned int found) +{ + if (found & OPT_P_MESSAGES) + { + init_verb_mute (c, IVM_LEVEL_1|IVM_LEVEL_2); + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --verb and/or --mute level changed"); + } + if (found & OPT_P_TIMER) + { + do_init_timers (c, true); + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: timers and/or timeouts modified"); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (found & OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY) + { + if (!proto_is_udp(c->options.ce.proto) && c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification) + { + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --explicit-exit-notify can only be used with --proto udp"); + c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification = 0; + } + else + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: explicit notify parm(s) modified"); + } +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + if (found & OPT_P_COMP) + { + if (lzo_defined (&c->c2.lzo_compwork)) + { + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: LZO parms modified"); + lzo_modify_flags (&c->c2.lzo_compwork, c->options.lzo); + } + } +#endif + + if (found & OPT_P_SHAPER) + { + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: traffic shaper enabled"); + do_init_traffic_shaper (c); + } + + if (found & OPT_P_SOCKBUF) + { + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --sndbuf/--rcvbuf options modified"); + link_socket_update_buffer_sizes (c->c2.link_socket, c->options.rcvbuf, c->options.sndbuf); + } + + if (found & OPT_P_SOCKFLAGS) + { + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --socket-flags option modified"); + link_socket_update_flags (c->c2.link_socket, c->options.sockflags); + } + + if (found & OPT_P_PERSIST) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --persist options modified"); + if (found & OPT_P_UP) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --ifconfig/up options modified"); + if (found & OPT_P_ROUTE) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: route options modified"); + if (found & OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: route-related options modified"); + if (found & OPT_P_IPWIN32) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: --ip-win32 and/or --dhcp-option options modified"); + if (found & OPT_P_SETENV) + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: environment modified"); +} + +/* + * Possible hold on initialization + */ +static bool +do_hold (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + /* if c is defined, daemonize before hold */ + if (c && c->options.daemon && management_should_daemonize (management)) + do_init_first_time (c); + + /* block until management hold is released */ + if (management_hold (management)) + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} + +/* + * Sleep before restart. + */ +static void +socket_restart_pause (struct context *c) +{ + bool proxy = false; + int sec = 2; + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (c->options.ce.http_proxy_options) + proxy = true; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (c->options.ce.socks_proxy_server) + proxy = true; +#endif + + switch (c->options.ce.proto) + { + case PROTO_TCP_SERVER: + sec = 1; + break; + case PROTO_UDP: + case PROTO_TCP_CLIENT: + sec = c->options.ce.connect_retry_seconds; + break; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_LEVEL (c->options.gremlin)) + sec = 0; +#endif + +#if P2MP + if (auth_retry_get () == AR_NOINTERACT) + sec = 10; + +#if 0 /* not really needed because of c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds */ + if (c->options.server_poll_timeout && sec > 1) + sec = 1; +#endif +#endif + + if (c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds > 0 && c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds > sec) + sec = c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds; + else if (c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds == -1) + sec = 0; + c->persist.restart_sleep_seconds = 0; + + /* do managment hold on context restart, i.e. second, third, fourth, etc. initialization */ + if (do_hold (NULL)) + sec = 0; + + if (sec) + { + msg (D_RESTART, "Restart pause, %d second(s)", sec); + openvpn_sleep (sec); + } +} + +/* + * Do a possible pause on context_2 initialization. + */ +static void +do_startup_pause (struct context *c) +{ + if (!c->first_time) + socket_restart_pause (c); + else + do_hold (NULL); /* do management hold on first context initialization */ +} + +/* + * Finalize MTU parameters based on command line or config file options. + */ +static void +frame_finalize_options (struct context *c, const struct options *o) +{ + if (!o) + o = &c->options; + + /* + * Set adjustment factor for buffer alignment when no + * cipher is used. + */ + if (!CIPHER_ENABLED (c)) + { + frame_align_to_extra_frame (&c->c2.frame); + frame_or_align_flags (&c->c2.frame, + FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_FRAGMENT + |FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_LINK + |FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_STREAM); + } + + frame_finalize (&c->c2.frame, + o->ce.link_mtu_defined, + o->ce.link_mtu, + o->ce.tun_mtu_defined, + o->ce.tun_mtu); +} + +/* + * Free a key schedule, including OpenSSL components. + */ +static void +key_schedule_free (struct key_schedule *ks, bool free_ssl_ctx) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + free_key_ctx_bi (&ks->static_key); +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + if (tls_ctx_initialised(&ks->ssl_ctx) && free_ssl_ctx) + { + tls_ctx_free (&ks->ssl_ctx); + free_key_ctx_bi (&ks->tls_auth_key); + } +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + CLEAR (*ks); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +static void +init_crypto_pre (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (c->options.engine) + crypto_init_lib_engine (c->options.engine); + + if (flags & CF_LOAD_PERSISTED_PACKET_ID) + { + /* load a persisted packet-id for cross-session replay-protection */ + if (c->options.packet_id_file) + packet_id_persist_load (&c->c1.pid_persist, c->options.packet_id_file); + } + + /* Initialize crypto options */ + + if (c->options.use_iv) + c->c2.crypto_options.flags |= CO_USE_IV; + + if (c->options.mute_replay_warnings) + c->c2.crypto_options.flags |= CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + if (c->options.use_prediction_resistance) + rand_ctx_enable_prediction_resistance(); +#endif + +} + +/* + * Static Key Mode (using a pre-shared key) + */ +static void +do_init_crypto_static (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + const struct options *options = &c->options; + ASSERT (options->shared_secret_file); + + init_crypto_pre (c, flags); + + /* Initialize packet ID tracking */ + if (options->replay) + { + packet_id_init (&c->c2.packet_id, + link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (options->ce.proto), + options->replay_window, + options->replay_time, + "STATIC", 0); + c->c2.crypto_options.packet_id = &c->c2.packet_id; + c->c2.crypto_options.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; + c->c2.crypto_options.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM; + packet_id_persist_load_obj (&c->c1.pid_persist, + c->c2.crypto_options.packet_id); + } + + if (!key_ctx_bi_defined (&c->c1.ks.static_key)) + { + struct key2 key2; + struct key_direction_state kds; + + /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ + init_key_type (&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, + options->ciphername_defined, options->authname, + options->authname_defined, options->keysize, + options->test_crypto, true); + + /* Read cipher and hmac keys from shared secret file */ + { + unsigned int rkf_flags = RKF_MUST_SUCCEED; + const char *rkf_file = options->shared_secret_file; + + if (options->shared_secret_file_inline) + { + rkf_file = options->shared_secret_file_inline; + rkf_flags |= RKF_INLINE; + } + read_key_file (&key2, rkf_file, rkf_flags); + } + + /* Check for and fix highly unlikely key problems */ + verify_fix_key2 (&key2, &c->c1.ks.key_type, + options->shared_secret_file); + + /* Initialize OpenSSL key objects */ + key_direction_state_init (&kds, options->key_direction); + must_have_n_keys (options->shared_secret_file, "secret", &key2, + kds.need_keys); + init_key_ctx (&c->c1.ks.static_key.encrypt, &key2.keys[kds.out_key], + &c->c1.ks.key_type, OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT, "Static Encrypt"); + init_key_ctx (&c->c1.ks.static_key.decrypt, &key2.keys[kds.in_key], + &c->c1.ks.key_type, OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT, "Static Decrypt"); + + /* Erase the temporary copy of key */ + CLEAR (key2); + } + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "Re-using pre-shared static key"); + } + + /* Get key schedule */ + c->c2.crypto_options.key_ctx_bi = &c->c1.ks.static_key; + + /* Compute MTU parameters */ + crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame, + &c->c1.ks.key_type, + options->ciphername_defined, + options->use_iv, options->replay, true); + + /* Sanity check on IV, sequence number, and cipher mode options */ + check_replay_iv_consistency (&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->replay, + options->use_iv); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + +/* + * Initialize the persistent component of OpenVPN's TLS mode, + * which is preserved across SIGUSR1 resets. + */ +static void +do_init_crypto_tls_c1 (struct context *c) +{ + const struct options *options = &c->options; + + if (!tls_ctx_initialised(&c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx)) + { + /* + * Initialize the OpenSSL library's global + * SSL context. + */ + init_ssl (options, &(c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx)); + if (!tls_ctx_initialised(&c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx)) + { +#if P2MP + switch (auth_retry_get ()) + { + case AR_NONE: + msg (M_FATAL, "Error: private key password verification failed"); + break; + case AR_INTERACT: + ssl_purge_auth (false); + case AR_NOINTERACT: + c->sig->signal_received = SIGUSR1; /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- Password failure error */ + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + c->sig->signal_text = "private-key-password-failure"; + return; +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Error: private key password verification failed"); +#endif + } + + /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ + init_key_type (&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, + options->ciphername_defined, options->authname, + options->authname_defined, options->keysize, true, true); + + /* Initialize PRNG with config-specified digest */ + prng_init (options->prng_hash, options->prng_nonce_secret_len); + + /* TLS handshake authentication (--tls-auth) */ + if (options->tls_auth_file) + { + unsigned int flags = 0; + const char *file = options->tls_auth_file; + + if (options->tls_auth_file_inline) + { + flags |= GHK_INLINE; + file = options->tls_auth_file_inline; + } + get_tls_handshake_key (&c->c1.ks.key_type, + &c->c1.ks.tls_auth_key, + file, + options->key_direction, + flags); + } + +#if 0 /* was: #if ENABLE_INLINE_FILES -- Note that enabling this code will break restarts */ + if (options->priv_key_file_inline) + { + string_clear (c->options.priv_key_file_inline); + c->options.priv_key_file_inline = NULL; + } +#endif + } + else + { + msg (D_INIT_MEDIUM, "Re-using SSL/TLS context"); + } +} + +static void +do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ + const struct options *options = &c->options; + struct tls_options to; + bool packet_id_long_form; + + ASSERT (options->tls_server || options->tls_client); + ASSERT (!options->test_crypto); + + init_crypto_pre (c, flags); + + /* Make sure we are either a TLS client or server but not both */ + ASSERT (options->tls_server == !options->tls_client); + + /* initialize persistent component */ + do_init_crypto_tls_c1 (c); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + return; + + /* Sanity check on IV, sequence number, and cipher mode options */ + check_replay_iv_consistency (&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->replay, + options->use_iv); + + /* In short form, unique datagram identifier is 32 bits, in long form 64 bits */ + packet_id_long_form = cfb_ofb_mode (&c->c1.ks.key_type); + + /* Compute MTU parameters */ + crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame, + &c->c1.ks.key_type, + options->ciphername_defined, + options->use_iv, + options->replay, packet_id_long_form); + tls_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame); + + /* Set all command-line TLS-related options */ + CLEAR (to); + + to.crypto_flags_and = ~(CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM); + if (packet_id_long_form) + to.crypto_flags_or = CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM; + + to.ssl_ctx = c->c1.ks.ssl_ctx; + to.key_type = c->c1.ks.key_type; + to.server = options->tls_server; + to.key_method = options->key_method; + to.replay = options->replay; + to.replay_window = options->replay_window; + to.replay_time = options->replay_time; + to.tcp_mode = link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (options->ce.proto); + to.transition_window = options->transition_window; + to.handshake_window = options->handshake_window; + to.packet_timeout = options->tls_timeout; + to.renegotiate_bytes = options->renegotiate_bytes; + to.renegotiate_packets = options->renegotiate_packets; + to.renegotiate_seconds = options->renegotiate_seconds; + to.single_session = options->single_session; +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + to.push_peer_info = options->push_peer_info; +#endif + + /* should we not xmit any packets until we get an initial + response from client? */ + if (to.server && options->ce.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + to.xmit_hold = true; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + to.disable_occ = !options->occ; +#endif + + to.verify_command = options->tls_verify; + to.verify_export_cert = options->tls_export_cert; + to.verify_x509name = options->tls_remote; + to.crl_file = options->crl_file; + to.ssl_flags = options->ssl_flags; + to.ns_cert_type = options->ns_cert_type; + memmove (to.remote_cert_ku, options->remote_cert_ku, sizeof (to.remote_cert_ku)); + to.remote_cert_eku = options->remote_cert_eku; + to.verify_hash = options->verify_hash; +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + to.x509_username_field = (char *) options->x509_username_field; +#else + to.x509_username_field = X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT; +#endif + to.es = c->c2.es; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + to.gremlin = c->options.gremlin; +#endif + + to.plugins = c->plugins; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + to.mda_context = &c->c2.mda_context; +#endif + +#if P2MP_SERVER + to.auth_user_pass_verify_script = options->auth_user_pass_verify_script; + to.auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file = options->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file; + to.tmp_dir = options->tmp_dir; + if (options->ccd_exclusive) + to.client_config_dir_exclusive = options->client_config_dir; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + to.x509_track = options->x509_track; +#endif + +#if P2MP +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + to.sci = &options->sc_info; +#endif +#endif + + /* TLS handshake authentication (--tls-auth) */ + if (options->tls_auth_file) + { + to.tls_auth_key = c->c1.ks.tls_auth_key; + to.tls_auth.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; + to.tls_auth.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM; + crypto_adjust_frame_parameters (&to.frame, + &c->c1.ks.key_type, + false, false, true, true); + } + + /* If we are running over TCP, allow for + length prefix */ + socket_adjust_frame_parameters (&to.frame, options->ce.proto); + + /* + * Initialize OpenVPN's master TLS-mode object. + */ + if (flags & CF_INIT_TLS_MULTI) + c->c2.tls_multi = tls_multi_init (&to); + + if (flags & CF_INIT_TLS_AUTH_STANDALONE) + c->c2.tls_auth_standalone = tls_auth_standalone_init (&to, &c->c2.gc); +} + +static void +do_init_finalize_tls_frame (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + tls_multi_init_finalize (c->c2.tls_multi, &c->c2.frame); + ASSERT (EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.tls_multi->opt.frame) <= + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame)); + frame_print (&c->c2.tls_multi->opt.frame, D_MTU_INFO, + "Control Channel MTU parms"); + } + if (c->c2.tls_auth_standalone) + { + tls_auth_standalone_finalize (c->c2.tls_auth_standalone, &c->c2.frame); + frame_print (&c->c2.tls_auth_standalone->frame, D_MTU_INFO, + "TLS-Auth MTU parms"); + } +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +/* + * No encryption or authentication. + */ +static void +do_init_crypto_none (const struct context *c) +{ + ASSERT (!c->options.test_crypto); + msg (M_WARN, + "******* WARNING *******: all encryption and authentication features disabled -- all data will be tunnelled as cleartext"); +} +#endif + +static void +do_init_crypto (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (c->options.shared_secret_file) + do_init_crypto_static (c, flags); +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + else if (c->options.tls_server || c->options.tls_client) + do_init_crypto_tls (c, flags); +#endif + else /* no encryption or authentication. */ + do_init_crypto_none (c); +#else /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + msg (M_WARN, + "******* WARNING *******: " PACKAGE_NAME + " built without OpenSSL -- encryption and authentication features disabled -- all data will be tunnelled as cleartext"); +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +} + +static void +do_init_frame (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + /* + * Initialize LZO compression library. + */ + if (c->options.lzo & LZO_SELECTED) + { + lzo_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame); + + /* + * LZO usage affects buffer alignment. + */ + if (CIPHER_ENABLED (c)) + { + frame_add_to_align_adjust (&c->c2.frame, LZO_PREFIX_LEN); + frame_or_align_flags (&c->c2.frame, + FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_FRAGMENT + |FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + lzo_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame_fragment_omit); /* omit LZO frame delta from final frame_fragment */ +#endif + } +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* + * Adjust frame size for UDP Socks support. + */ + if (c->options.ce.socks_proxy_server) + socks_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame, c->options.ce.proto); +#endif + + /* + * Adjust frame size based on the --tun-mtu-extra parameter. + */ + if (c->options.ce.tun_mtu_extra_defined) + tun_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame, c->options.ce.tun_mtu_extra); + + /* + * Adjust frame size based on link socket parameters. + * (Since TCP is a stream protocol, we need to insert + * a packet length uint16_t in the buffer.) + */ + socket_adjust_frame_parameters (&c->c2.frame, c->options.ce.proto); + + /* + * Fill in the blanks in the frame parameters structure, + * make sure values are rational, etc. + */ + frame_finalize_options (c, NULL); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* + * Set frame parameter for fragment code. This is necessary because + * the fragmentation code deals with payloads which have already been + * passed through the compression code. + */ + c->c2.frame_fragment = c->c2.frame; + frame_subtract_extra (&c->c2.frame_fragment, &c->c2.frame_fragment_omit); +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_FRAGMENT) && defined(ENABLE_OCC) + /* + * MTU advisories + */ + if (c->options.ce.fragment && c->options.mtu_test) + msg (M_WARN, + "WARNING: using --fragment and --mtu-test together may produce an inaccurate MTU test result"); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if ((c->options.ce.mssfix || c->options.ce.fragment) + && TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame_fragment) != ETHERNET_MTU) + msg (M_WARN, + "WARNING: normally if you use --mssfix and/or --fragment, you should also set --tun-mtu %d (currently it is %d)", + ETHERNET_MTU, TUN_MTU_SIZE (&c->c2.frame_fragment)); +#endif +} + +static void +do_option_warnings (struct context *c) +{ + const struct options *o = &c->options; + + if (o->ping_send_timeout && !o->ping_rec_timeout) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: --ping should normally be used with --ping-restart or --ping-exit"); + + if (o->username || o->groupname || o->chroot_dir +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + || o->selinux_context +#endif + ) + { + if (!o->persist_tun) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: you are using user/group/chroot/setcon without persist-tun -- this may cause restarts to fail"); + if (!o->persist_key +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + && !o->pkcs11_id +#endif + ) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: you are using user/group/chroot/setcon without persist-key -- this may cause restarts to fail"); + } + + if (o->chroot_dir && !(o->username && o->groupname)) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: you are using chroot without specifying user and group -- this may cause the chroot jail to be insecure"); + +#if P2MP + if (o->pull && o->ifconfig_local && c->first_time) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: using --pull/--client and --ifconfig together is probably not what you want"); + +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (o->server_bridge_defined | o->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: when bridging your LAN adapter with the TAP adapter, note that the new bridge adapter will often take on its own IP address that is different from what the LAN adapter was previously set to"); + + if (o->mode == MODE_SERVER) + { + if (o->duplicate_cn && o->client_config_dir) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: using --duplicate-cn and --client-config-dir together is probably not what you want"); + if (o->duplicate_cn && o->ifconfig_pool_persist_filename) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: --ifconfig-pool-persist will not work with --duplicate-cn"); + if (!o->keepalive_ping || !o->keepalive_timeout) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: --keepalive option is missing from server config"); + } +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (!o->replay) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: You have disabled Replay Protection (--no-replay) which may make " PACKAGE_NAME " less secure"); + if (!o->use_iv) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: You have disabled Crypto IVs (--no-iv) which may make " PACKAGE_NAME " less secure"); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + if (o->tls_server) + warn_on_use_of_common_subnets (); + if (o->tls_client + && !o->tls_verify + && !o->tls_remote + && !(o->ns_cert_type & NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER) + && !o->remote_cert_eku) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: No server certificate verification method has been enabled. See http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm for more info."); + if (o->tls_remote) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Make sure you understand the semantics of --tls-remote before using it (see the man page)."); +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef CONNECT_NONBLOCK + if (o->ce.connect_timeout_defined) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: --connect-timeout option is not supported on this OS"); +#endif + +} + +static void +do_init_frame_tls (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + do_init_finalize_tls_frame (c); +#endif +} + +struct context_buffers * +init_context_buffers (const struct frame *frame) +{ + struct context_buffers *b; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (b, struct context_buffers); + + b->read_link_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + b->read_tun_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + + b->aux_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + b->encrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + b->decrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + b->lzo_compress_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + b->lzo_decompress_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); +#endif + + return b; +} + +void +free_context_buffers (struct context_buffers *b) +{ + if (b) + { + free_buf (&b->read_link_buf); + free_buf (&b->read_tun_buf); + free_buf (&b->aux_buf); + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + free_buf (&b->lzo_compress_buf); + free_buf (&b->lzo_decompress_buf); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + free_buf (&b->encrypt_buf); + free_buf (&b->decrypt_buf); +#endif + + free (b); + } +} + +/* + * Now that we know all frame parameters, initialize + * our buffers. + */ +static void +do_init_buffers (struct context *c) +{ + c->c2.buffers = init_context_buffers (&c->c2.frame); + c->c2.buffers_owned = true; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT +/* + * Fragmenting code has buffers to initialize + * once frame parameters are known. + */ +static void +do_init_fragment (struct context *c) +{ + ASSERT (c->options.ce.fragment); + frame_set_mtu_dynamic (&c->c2.frame_fragment, + c->options.ce.fragment, SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND); + fragment_frame_init (c->c2.fragment, &c->c2.frame_fragment); +} +#endif + +/* + * Set the --mssfix option. + */ +static void +do_init_mssfix (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->options.ce.mssfix) + { + frame_set_mtu_dynamic (&c->c2.frame, + c->options.ce.mssfix, SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate our socket object. + */ +static void +do_link_socket_new (struct context *c) +{ + ASSERT (!c->c2.link_socket); + c->c2.link_socket = link_socket_new (); + c->c2.link_socket_owned = true; +} + +/* + * bind the TCP/UDP socket + */ +static void +do_init_socket_1 (struct context *c, const int mode) +{ + unsigned int sockflags = c->options.sockflags; + +#if PORT_SHARE + if (c->options.port_share_host && c->options.port_share_port) + sockflags |= SF_PORT_SHARE; +#endif + + link_socket_init_phase1 (c->c2.link_socket, + c->options.ce.local, + c->options.ce.local_port, + c->options.ce.remote, + c->options.ce.remote_port, + c->options.ce.proto, + c->options.ce.af, + mode, + c->c2.accept_from, +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + c->c1.http_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + c->c1.socks_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + c->options.gremlin, +#endif + c->options.ce.bind_local, + c->options.ce.remote_float, + c->options.inetd, + &c->c1.link_socket_addr, + c->options.ipchange, + c->plugins, + c->options.resolve_retry_seconds, + c->options.ce.connect_timeout, + c->options.ce.mtu_discover_type, + c->options.rcvbuf, + c->options.sndbuf, + c->options.mark, + sockflags); +} + +/* + * finalize the TCP/UDP socket + */ +static void +do_init_socket_2 (struct context *c) +{ + link_socket_init_phase2 (c->c2.link_socket, &c->c2.frame, + c->sig); +} + +/* + * Print MTU INFO + */ +static void +do_print_data_channel_mtu_parms (struct context *c) +{ + frame_print (&c->c2.frame, D_MTU_INFO, "Data Channel MTU parms"); +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (c->c2.fragment) + frame_print (&c->c2.frame_fragment, D_MTU_INFO, + "Fragmentation MTU parms"); +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC +/* + * Get local and remote options compatibility strings. + */ +static void +do_compute_occ_strings (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + c->c2.options_string_local = + options_string (&c->options, &c->c2.frame, c->c1.tuntap, false, &gc); + c->c2.options_string_remote = + options_string (&c->options, &c->c2.frame, c->c1.tuntap, true, &gc); + + msg (D_SHOW_OCC, "Local Options String: '%s'", c->c2.options_string_local); + msg (D_SHOW_OCC, "Expected Remote Options String: '%s'", + c->c2.options_string_remote); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + msg (D_SHOW_OCC_HASH, "Local Options hash (VER=%s): '%s'", + options_string_version (c->c2.options_string_local, &gc), + md5sum ((uint8_t*)c->c2.options_string_local, + strlen (c->c2.options_string_local), 9, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_OCC_HASH, "Expected Remote Options hash (VER=%s): '%s'", + options_string_version (c->c2.options_string_remote, &gc), + md5sum ((uint8_t*)c->c2.options_string_remote, + strlen (c->c2.options_string_remote), 9, &gc)); +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + tls_multi_init_set_options (c->c2.tls_multi, + c->c2.options_string_local, + c->c2.options_string_remote); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); +} +#endif + +/* + * These things can only be executed once per program instantiation. + * Set up for possible UID/GID downgrade, but don't do it yet. + * Daemonize if requested. + */ +static void +do_init_first_time (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->first_time && !c->did_we_daemonize && !c->c0) + { + struct context_0 *c0; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (c->c0, struct context_0, &c->gc); + c0 = c->c0; + + /* get user and/or group that we want to setuid/setgid to */ + c0->uid_gid_specified = + platform_group_get (c->options.groupname, &c0->platform_state_group) | + platform_user_get (c->options.username, &c0->platform_state_user); + + /* get --writepid file descriptor */ + get_pid_file (c->options.writepid, &c0->pid_state); + + /* become a daemon if --daemon */ + c->did_we_daemonize = possibly_become_daemon (&c->options, c->first_time); + + /* should we disable paging? */ + if (c->options.mlock && c->did_we_daemonize) + platform_mlockall (true); /* call again in case we daemonized */ + + /* save process ID in a file */ + write_pid (&c0->pid_state); + + /* should we change scheduling priority? */ + platform_nice (c->options.nice); + } +} + +/* + * If xinetd/inetd mode, don't allow restart. + */ +static void +do_close_check_if_restart_permitted (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->options.inetd + && (c->sig->signal_received == SIGHUP + || c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1)) + { + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; + msg (M_INFO, + PACKAGE_NAME + " started by inetd/xinetd cannot restart... Exiting."); + } +} + +/* + * free buffers + */ +static void +do_close_free_buf (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.buffers_owned) + { + free_context_buffers (c->c2.buffers); + c->c2.buffers = NULL; + c->c2.buffers_owned = false; + } +} + +/* + * close TLS + */ +static void +do_close_tls (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (c->c2.tls_multi) + { + tls_multi_free (c->c2.tls_multi, true); + c->c2.tls_multi = NULL; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* free options compatibility strings */ + if (c->c2.options_string_local) + free (c->c2.options_string_local); + if (c->c2.options_string_remote) + free (c->c2.options_string_remote); + c->c2.options_string_local = c->c2.options_string_remote = NULL; +#endif +#endif +} + +/* + * Free key schedules + */ +static void +do_close_free_key_schedule (struct context *c, bool free_ssl_ctx) +{ + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && c->options.persist_key)) + key_schedule_free (&c->c1.ks, free_ssl_ctx); +} + +/* + * Close TCP/UDP connection + */ +static void +do_close_link_socket (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.link_socket && c->c2.link_socket_owned) + { + link_socket_close (c->c2.link_socket); + c->c2.link_socket = NULL; + } + + + /* Preserve the resolved list of remote if the user request to or if we want + * reconnect to the same host again or there are still addresses that need + * to be tried */ + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && + ( (c->options.persist_remote_ip) + || + ( c->sig->source != SIG_SOURCE_HARD && + ((c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote && c->c1.link_socket_addr.current_remote->ai_next) + || c->options.no_advance)) + ))) + { + clear_remote_addrlist(&c->c1.link_socket_addr); + } + + /* Clear the remote actual address when persist_remote_ip is not in use */ + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && c->options.persist_remote_ip)) + CLEAR (c->c1.link_socket_addr.actual); + + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && c->options.persist_local_ip)) { + if (c->c1.link_socket_addr.bind_local) + freeaddrinfo(c->c1.link_socket_addr.bind_local); + c->c1.link_socket_addr.bind_local=NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Close packet-id persistance file + */ +static void +do_close_packet_id (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + packet_id_free (&c->c2.packet_id); + packet_id_persist_save (&c->c1.pid_persist); + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1)) + packet_id_persist_close (&c->c1.pid_persist); +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT +/* + * Close fragmentation handler. + */ +static void +do_close_fragment (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.fragment) + { + fragment_free (c->c2.fragment); + c->c2.fragment = NULL; + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Open and close our event objects. + */ + +static void +do_event_set_init (struct context *c, + bool need_us_timeout) +{ + unsigned int flags = 0; + + c->c2.event_set_max = BASE_N_EVENTS; + + flags |= EVENT_METHOD_FAST; + + if (need_us_timeout) + flags |= EVENT_METHOD_US_TIMEOUT; + + c->c2.event_set = event_set_init (&c->c2.event_set_max, flags); + c->c2.event_set_owned = true; +} + +static void +do_close_event_set (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.event_set && c->c2.event_set_owned) + { + event_free (c->c2.event_set); + c->c2.event_set = NULL; + c->c2.event_set_owned = false; + } +} + +/* + * Open and close --status file + */ + +static void +do_open_status_output (struct context *c) +{ + if (!c->c1.status_output) + { + c->c1.status_output = status_open (c->options.status_file, + c->options.status_file_update_freq, + -1, + NULL, + STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); + c->c1.status_output_owned = true; + } +} + +static void +do_close_status_output (struct context *c) +{ + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1)) + { + if (c->c1.status_output_owned && c->c1.status_output) + { + status_close (c->c1.status_output); + c->c1.status_output = NULL; + c->c1.status_output_owned = false; + } + } +} + +/* + * Handle ifconfig-pool persistance object. + */ +static void +do_open_ifconfig_pool_persist (struct context *c) +{ +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (!c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist && c->options.ifconfig_pool_persist_filename) + { + c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist = ifconfig_pool_persist_init (c->options.ifconfig_pool_persist_filename, + c->options.ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq); + c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist_owned = true; + } +#endif +} + +static void +do_close_ifconfig_pool_persist (struct context *c) +{ +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (!(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1)) + { + if (c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist && c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist_owned) + { + ifconfig_pool_persist_close (c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist); + c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist = NULL; + c->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist_owned = false; + } + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Inherit environmental variables + */ + +static void +do_inherit_env (struct context *c, const struct env_set *src) +{ + c->c2.es = env_set_create (&c->c2.gc); + c->c2.es_owned = true; + env_set_inherit (c->c2.es, src); +} + +static void +do_env_set_destroy (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->c2.es && c->c2.es_owned) + { + env_set_destroy (c->c2.es); + c->c2.es = NULL; + c->c2.es_owned = false; + } +} + +/* + * Fast I/O setup. Fast I/O is an optimization which only works + * if all of the following are true: + * + * (1) The platform is not Windows + * (2) --proto udp is enabled + * (3) --shaper is disabled + */ +static void +do_setup_fast_io (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->options.fast_io) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: --fast-io is disabled since we are running on Windows"); +#else + if (!proto_is_udp(c->options.ce.proto)) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: --fast-io is disabled since we are not using UDP"); + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + if (c->options.shaper) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: --fast-io is disabled since we are using --shaper"); + else +#endif + { + c->c2.fast_io = true; + } + } +#endif + } +} + +static void +do_signal_on_tls_errors (struct context *c) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (c->options.tls_exit) + c->c2.tls_exit_signal = SIGTERM; + else + c->c2.tls_exit_signal = SIGUSR1; +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + +void +init_plugins (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->options.plugin_list && !c->plugins) + { + c->plugins = plugin_list_init (c->options.plugin_list); + c->plugins_owned = true; + } +} + +void +open_plugins (struct context *c, const bool import_options, int init_point) +{ + if (c->plugins && c->plugins_owned) + { + if (import_options) + { + struct plugin_return pr, config; + plugin_return_init (&pr); + plugin_list_open (c->plugins, c->options.plugin_list, &pr, c->c2.es, init_point); + plugin_return_get_column (&pr, &config, "config"); + if (plugin_return_defined (&config)) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < config.n; ++i) + { + unsigned int option_types_found = 0; + if (config.list[i] && config.list[i]->value) + options_string_import (&c->options, + config.list[i]->value, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + OPT_P_DEFAULT & ~OPT_P_PLUGIN, + &option_types_found, + c->es); + } + } + plugin_return_free (&pr); + } + else + { + plugin_list_open (c->plugins, c->options.plugin_list, NULL, c->c2.es, init_point); + } + } +} + +static void +do_close_plugins (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->plugins && c->plugins_owned && !(c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1)) + { + plugin_list_close (c->plugins); + c->plugins = NULL; + c->plugins_owned = false; + } +} + +static void +do_inherit_plugins (struct context *c, const struct context *src) +{ + if (!c->plugins && src->plugins) + { + c->plugins = plugin_list_inherit (src->plugins); + c->plugins_owned = true; + } +} + +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +static void +management_callback_status_p2p (void *arg, const int version, struct status_output *so) +{ + struct context *c = (struct context *) arg; + print_status (c, so); +} + +void +management_show_net_callback (void *arg, const int msglevel) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + show_routes (msglevel); + show_adapters (msglevel); + msg (msglevel, "END"); +#else + msg (msglevel, "ERROR: Sorry, this command is currently only implemented on Windows"); +#endif +} + +#endif + +void +init_management_callback_p2p (struct context *c) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + struct management_callback cb; + CLEAR (cb); + cb.arg = c; + cb.status = management_callback_status_p2p; + cb.show_net = management_show_net_callback; + cb.proxy_cmd = management_callback_proxy_cmd; + cb.remote_cmd = management_callback_remote_cmd; + management_set_callback (management, &cb); + } +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +void +init_management (struct context *c) +{ + if (!management) + management = management_init (); +} + +bool +open_management (struct context *c) +{ + /* initialize management layer */ + if (management) + { + if (c->options.management_addr) + { + unsigned int flags = c->options.management_flags; + if (c->options.mode == MODE_SERVER) + flags |= MF_SERVER; + if (management_open (management, + c->options.management_addr, + c->options.management_port, + c->options.management_user_pass, + c->options.management_client_user, + c->options.management_client_group, + c->options.management_log_history_cache, + c->options.management_echo_buffer_size, + c->options.management_state_buffer_size, + c->options.management_write_peer_info_file, + c->options.remap_sigusr1, + flags)) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTING, + NULL, + (in_addr_t)0, + (in_addr_t)0); + } + + /* initial management hold, called early, before first context initialization */ + do_hold (c); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Signal received from management interface, exiting"); + return false; + } + } + else + close_management (); + } + return true; +} + +void +close_management (void) +{ + if (management) + { + management_close (management); + management = NULL; + } +} + +#endif + + +void +uninit_management_callback (void) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_clear_callback (management); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize a tunnel instance, handle pre and post-init + * signal settings. + */ +void +init_instance_handle_signals (struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int flags) +{ + pre_init_signal_catch (); + init_instance (c, env, flags); + post_init_signal_catch (); + + /* + * This is done so that signals thrown during + * initialization can bring us back to + * a management hold. + */ + if (IS_SIG (c)) + { + remap_signal (c); + uninit_management_callback (); + } +} + +/* + * Initialize a tunnel instance. + */ +void +init_instance (struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int flags) +{ + const struct options *options = &c->options; + const bool child = (c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP || c->mode == CM_CHILD_UDP); + int link_socket_mode = LS_MODE_DEFAULT; + + /* init garbage collection level */ + gc_init (&c->c2.gc); + + /* signals caught here will abort */ + c->sig->signal_received = 0; + c->sig->signal_text = NULL; + c->sig->source = SIG_SOURCE_SOFT; + + if (c->mode == CM_P2P) + init_management_callback_p2p (c); + + /* possible sleep or management hold if restart */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + { + do_startup_pause (c); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + goto sig; + } + + /* map in current connection entry */ + next_connection_entry (c); + + /* link_socket_mode allows CM_CHILD_TCP + instances to inherit acceptable fds + from a top-level parent */ + if (c->options.ce.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + { + if (c->mode == CM_TOP) + link_socket_mode = LS_MODE_TCP_LISTEN; + else if (c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + link_socket_mode = LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM; + } + + /* should we disable paging? */ + if (c->first_time && options->mlock) + platform_mlockall (true); + +#if P2MP + /* get passwords if undefined */ + if (auth_retry_get () == AR_INTERACT) + init_query_passwords (c); +#endif + + /* initialize context level 2 --verb/--mute parms */ + init_verb_mute (c, IVM_LEVEL_2); + + /* set error message delay for non-server modes */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P) + set_check_status_error_delay (P2P_ERROR_DELAY_MS); + + /* warn about inconsistent options */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + do_option_warnings (c); + + /* inherit environmental variables */ + if (env) + do_inherit_env (c, env); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* initialize plugins */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + open_plugins (c, false, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_DAEMON); +#endif + + /* should we enable fast I/O? */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + do_setup_fast_io (c); + + /* should we throw a signal on TLS errors? */ + do_signal_on_tls_errors (c); + + /* open --status file */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + do_open_status_output (c); + + /* open --ifconfig-pool-persist file */ + if (c->mode == CM_TOP) + do_open_ifconfig_pool_persist (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* reset OCC state */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || child) + c->c2.occ_op = occ_reset_op (); +#endif + + /* our wait-for-i/o objects, different for posix vs. win32 */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P) + do_event_set_init (c, SHAPER_DEFINED (&c->options)); + else if (c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + do_event_set_init (c, false); + + /* initialize HTTP or SOCKS proxy object at scope level 2 */ + init_proxy (c); + + /* allocate our socket object */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP || c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + do_link_socket_new (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* initialize internal fragmentation object */ + if (options->ce.fragment && (c->mode == CM_P2P || child)) + c->c2.fragment = fragment_init (&c->c2.frame); +#endif + + /* init crypto layer */ + { + unsigned int crypto_flags = 0; + if (c->mode == CM_TOP) + crypto_flags = CF_INIT_TLS_AUTH_STANDALONE; + else if (c->mode == CM_P2P) + crypto_flags = CF_LOAD_PERSISTED_PACKET_ID | CF_INIT_TLS_MULTI; + else if (child) + crypto_flags = CF_INIT_TLS_MULTI; + do_init_crypto (c, crypto_flags); + if (IS_SIG (c) && !child) + goto sig; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + /* initialize LZO compression library. */ + if ((options->lzo & LZO_SELECTED) && (c->mode == CM_P2P || child)) + lzo_compress_init (&c->c2.lzo_compwork, options->lzo); +#endif + + /* initialize MTU variables */ + do_init_frame (c); + + /* initialize TLS MTU variables */ + do_init_frame_tls (c); + + /* init workspace buffers whose size is derived from frame size */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + do_init_buffers (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* initialize internal fragmentation capability with known frame size */ + if (options->ce.fragment && (c->mode == CM_P2P || child)) + do_init_fragment (c); +#endif + + /* initialize dynamic MTU variable */ + do_init_mssfix (c); + + /* bind the TCP/UDP socket */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP || c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + do_init_socket_1 (c, link_socket_mode); + + /* initialize tun/tap device object, + open tun/tap device, ifconfig, run up script, etc. */ + if (!(options->up_delay || PULL_DEFINED (options)) && (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP)) + c->c2.did_open_tun = do_open_tun (c); + + /* print MTU info */ + do_print_data_channel_mtu_parms (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* get local and remote options compatibility strings */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || child) + do_compute_occ_strings (c); +#endif + + /* initialize output speed limiter */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P) + do_init_traffic_shaper (c); + + /* do one-time inits, and possibily become a daemon here */ + do_init_first_time (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* initialize plugins */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + open_plugins (c, false, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_POST_DAEMON); +#endif + + /* + * Actually do UID/GID downgrade, and chroot, if requested. + * May be delayed by --client, --pull, or --up-delay. + */ + do_uid_gid_chroot (c, c->c2.did_open_tun); + + /* finalize the TCP/UDP socket */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP || c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + do_init_socket_2 (c); + + /* initialize timers */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || child) + do_init_timers (c, false); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* initialize plugins */ + if (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP) + open_plugins (c, false, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_POST_UID_CHANGE); +#endif + +#if PORT_SHARE + /* share OpenVPN port with foreign (such as HTTPS) server */ + if (c->first_time && (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP)) + init_port_share (c); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (child) + pf_init_context (c); +#endif + + /* Check for signals */ + if (IS_SIG (c)) + goto sig; + + return; + + sig: + if (!c->sig->signal_text) + c->sig->signal_text = "init_instance"; + close_context (c, -1, flags); + return; +} + +/* + * Close a tunnel instance. + */ +void +close_instance (struct context *c) +{ + /* close event objects */ + do_close_event_set (c); + + if (c->mode == CM_P2P + || c->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP + || c->mode == CM_CHILD_UDP + || c->mode == CM_TOP) + { + /* if xinetd/inetd mode, don't allow restart */ + do_close_check_if_restart_permitted (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + if (lzo_defined (&c->c2.lzo_compwork)) + lzo_compress_uninit (&c->c2.lzo_compwork); +#endif + + /* free buffers */ + do_close_free_buf (c); + + /* close TLS */ + do_close_tls (c); + + /* free key schedules */ + do_close_free_key_schedule (c, (c->mode == CM_P2P || c->mode == CM_TOP)); + + /* close TCP/UDP connection */ + do_close_link_socket (c); + + /* close TUN/TAP device */ + do_close_tun (c, false); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (management) + management_notify_client_close (management, &c->c2.mda_context, NULL); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + pf_destroy_context (&c->c2.pf); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* call plugin close functions and unload */ + do_close_plugins (c); +#endif + + /* close packet-id persistance file */ + do_close_packet_id (c); + + /* close --status file */ + do_close_status_output (c); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* close fragmentation handler */ + do_close_fragment (c); +#endif + + /* close --ifconfig-pool-persist obj */ + do_close_ifconfig_pool_persist (c); + + /* free up environmental variable store */ + do_env_set_destroy (c); + + /* close HTTP or SOCKS proxy */ + uninit_proxy (c); + + /* garbage collect */ + gc_free (&c->c2.gc); + } +} + +void +inherit_context_child (struct context *dest, + const struct context *src) +{ + CLEAR (*dest); + + /* proto_is_dgram will ASSERT(0) if proto is invalid */ + dest->mode = proto_is_dgram(src->options.ce.proto)? CM_CHILD_UDP : CM_CHILD_TCP; + + dest->gc = gc_new (); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (dest->sig, struct signal_info, &dest->gc); + + /* c1 init */ + packet_id_persist_init (&dest->c1.pid_persist); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + dest->c1.ks.key_type = src->c1.ks.key_type; +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* inherit SSL context */ + dest->c1.ks.ssl_ctx = src->c1.ks.ssl_ctx; + dest->c1.ks.tls_auth_key = src->c1.ks.tls_auth_key; +#endif +#endif + + /* options */ + dest->options = src->options; + options_detach (&dest->options); + + if (dest->mode == CM_CHILD_TCP) + { + /* + * The CM_TOP context does the socket listen(), + * and the CM_CHILD_TCP context does the accept(). + */ + dest->c2.accept_from = src->c2.link_socket; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* inherit plugins */ + do_inherit_plugins (dest, src); +#endif + + /* context init */ + init_instance (dest, src->c2.es, CC_NO_CLOSE | CC_USR1_TO_HUP); + if (IS_SIG (dest)) + return; + + /* inherit tun/tap interface object */ + dest->c1.tuntap = src->c1.tuntap; + + /* UDP inherits some extra things which TCP does not */ + if (dest->mode == CM_CHILD_UDP) + { + /* inherit buffers */ + dest->c2.buffers = src->c2.buffers; + + /* inherit parent link_socket and tuntap */ + dest->c2.link_socket = src->c2.link_socket; + + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (dest->c2.link_socket_info, struct link_socket_info, &dest->gc); + *dest->c2.link_socket_info = src->c2.link_socket->info; + + /* locally override some link_socket_info fields */ + dest->c2.link_socket_info->lsa = &dest->c1.link_socket_addr; + dest->c2.link_socket_info->connection_established = false; + } +} + +void +inherit_context_top (struct context *dest, + const struct context *src) +{ + /* copy parent */ + *dest = *src; + + /* + * CM_TOP_CLONE will prevent close_instance from freeing or closing + * resources owned by the parent. + * + * Also note that CM_TOP_CLONE context objects are + * closed by multi_top_free in multi.c. + */ + dest->mode = CM_TOP_CLONE; + + dest->first_time = false; + dest->c0 = NULL; + + options_detach (&dest->options); + gc_detach (&dest->gc); + gc_detach (&dest->c2.gc); + + /* detach plugins */ + dest->plugins_owned = false; + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + dest->c2.tls_multi = NULL; +#endif + + /* detach c1 ownership */ + dest->c1.tuntap_owned = false; + dest->c1.status_output_owned = false; +#if P2MP_SERVER + dest->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist_owned = false; +#endif + + /* detach c2 ownership */ + dest->c2.event_set_owned = false; + dest->c2.link_socket_owned = false; + dest->c2.buffers_owned = false; + dest->c2.es_owned = false; + + dest->c2.event_set = NULL; + if (proto_is_dgram(src->options.ce.proto)) + do_event_set_init (dest, false); +} + +void +close_context (struct context *c, int sig, unsigned int flags) +{ + ASSERT (c); + ASSERT (c->sig); + + if (sig >= 0) + c->sig->signal_received = sig; + + if (c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1) + { + if ((flags & CC_USR1_TO_HUP) + || (c->sig->source == SIG_SOURCE_HARD && (flags & CC_HARD_USR1_TO_HUP))) + { + c->sig->signal_received = SIGHUP; + c->sig->signal_text = "close_context usr1 to hup"; + } + } + + if (!(flags & CC_NO_CLOSE)) + close_instance (c); + + if (flags & CC_GC_FREE) + context_gc_free (c); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +/* + * Do a loopback test + * on the crypto subsystem. + */ +static void * +test_crypto_thread (void *arg) +{ + struct context *c = (struct context *) arg; + const struct options *options = &c->options; + + ASSERT (options->test_crypto); + init_verb_mute (c, IVM_LEVEL_1); + context_init_1 (c); + do_init_crypto_static (c, 0); + + frame_finalize_options (c, options); + + test_crypto (&c->c2.crypto_options, &c->c2.frame); + + key_schedule_free (&c->c1.ks, true); + packet_id_free (&c->c2.packet_id); + + context_gc_free (c); + return NULL; +} + +#endif + +bool +do_test_crypto (const struct options *o) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (o->test_crypto) + { + struct context c; + + /* print version number */ + msg (M_INFO, "%s", title_string); + + context_clear (&c); + c.options = *o; + options_detach (&c.options); + c.first_time = true; + test_crypto_thread ((void *) &c); + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a1d1dcf --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/init.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef INIT_H +#define INIT_H + +#include "openvpn.h" + +/* + * Baseline maximum number of events + * to wait for. + */ +#define BASE_N_EVENTS 4 + +void context_clear (struct context *c); +void context_clear_1 (struct context *c); +void context_clear_2 (struct context *c); +void context_init_1 (struct context *c); +void context_clear_all_except_first_time (struct context *c); + +bool init_static (void); + +void uninit_static (void); + +#define IVM_LEVEL_1 (1<<0) +#define IVM_LEVEL_2 (1<<1) +void init_verb_mute (struct context *c, unsigned int flags); + +void init_options_dev (struct options *options); + +bool print_openssl_info (const struct options *options); + +bool do_genkey (const struct options *options); + +bool do_persist_tuntap (const struct options *options); + +void pre_setup (const struct options *options); + +void init_instance_handle_signals (struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int flags); + +void init_instance (struct context *c, const struct env_set *env, const unsigned int flags); + +void do_route (const struct options *options, + struct route_list *route_list, + struct route_ipv6_list *route_ipv6_list, + const struct tuntap *tt, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + struct env_set *es); + +void close_instance (struct context *c); + +bool do_test_crypto (const struct options *o); + +void context_gc_free (struct context *c); + +void do_up (struct context *c, + bool pulled_options, + unsigned int option_types_found); + +unsigned int pull_permission_mask (const struct context *c); + +const char *format_common_name (struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc); + +void reset_coarse_timers (struct context *c); + +void do_deferred_options (struct context *c, const unsigned int found); + +void inherit_context_child (struct context *dest, + const struct context *src); + +void inherit_context_top (struct context *dest, + const struct context *src); + +#define CC_GC_FREE (1<<0) +#define CC_USR1_TO_HUP (1<<1) +#define CC_HARD_USR1_TO_HUP (1<<2) +#define CC_NO_CLOSE (1<<3) + +void close_context (struct context *c, int sig, unsigned int flags); + +struct context_buffers *init_context_buffers (const struct frame *frame); + +void free_context_buffers (struct context_buffers *b); + +#define ISC_ERRORS (1<<0) +#define ISC_SERVER (1<<1) +void initialization_sequence_completed (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +void init_management (struct context *c); +bool open_management (struct context *c); +void close_management (void); + +void management_show_net_callback (void *arg, const int msglevel); + +#endif + +void init_management_callback_p2p (struct context *c); +void uninit_management_callback (void); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN +void init_plugins (struct context *c); +void open_plugins (struct context *c, const bool import_options, int init_point); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/integer.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/integer.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0fc196e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/integer.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef INTEGER_H +#define INTEGER_H + +#include "error.h" + +/* + * min/max functions + */ + +static inline int +max_int (int x, int y) +{ + if (x > y) + return x; + else + return y; +} + +static inline int +min_int (int x, int y) +{ + if (x < y) + return x; + else + return y; +} + +static inline int +constrain_int (int x, int min, int max) +{ + if (min > max) + return min; + if (x < min) + return min; + else if (x > max) + return max; + else + return x; +} + +/* + * Functions used for circular buffer index arithmetic. + */ + +/* + * Return x - y on a circle of circumference mod by shortest path. + * + * 0 <= x < mod + * 0 <= y < mod + */ +static inline int +modulo_subtract(int x, int y, int mod) +{ + const int d1 = x - y; + const int d2 = (x > y ? -mod : mod) + d1; + ASSERT (0 <= x && x < mod && 0 <= y && y < mod); + return abs(d1) > abs(d2) ? d2 : d1; +} + +/* + * Return x + y on a circle of circumference mod. + * + * 0 <= x < mod + * -mod <= y <= mod + */ +static inline int +modulo_add(int x, int y, int mod) +{ + int sum = x + y; + ASSERT (0 <= x && x < mod && -mod <= y && y <= mod); + if (sum >= mod) + sum -= mod; + if (sum < 0) + sum += mod; + return sum; +} + +static inline int +index_verify (int index, int size, const char *file, int line) +{ + if (index < 0 || index >= size) + msg (M_FATAL, "Assertion Failed: Array index=%d out of bounds for array size=%d in %s:%d", + index, + size, + file, + line); + return index; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64494f1b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "interval.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +void +interval_init (struct interval *top, int horizon, int refresh) +{ + CLEAR (*top); + top->refresh = refresh; + top->horizon = horizon; +} + +bool +event_timeout_trigger (struct event_timeout *et, + struct timeval *tv, + const int et_const_retry) +{ + bool ret = false; + const time_t local_now = now; + + if (et->defined) + { + int wakeup = (int) et->last + et->n - local_now; + if (wakeup <= 0) + { +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "EVENT event_timeout_trigger (%d) etcr=%d", et->n, et_const_retry); +#endif + if (et_const_retry < 0) + { + et->last = local_now; + wakeup = et->n; + ret = true; + } + else + { + wakeup = et_const_retry; + } + } + + if (tv && wakeup < tv->tv_sec) + { +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "EVENT event_timeout_wakeup (%d/%d) etcr=%d", wakeup, et->n, et_const_retry); +#endif + tv->tv_sec = wakeup; + tv->tv_usec = 0; + } + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4814ec92 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/interval.h @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * The interval_ routines are designed to optimize the calling of a routine + * (normally tls_multi_process()) which can be called less frequently + * between triggers. + */ + +#ifndef INTERVAL_H +#define INTERVAL_H + +#include "otime.h" + +#define INTERVAL_DEBUG 0 + +/* + * Designed to limit calls to expensive functions that need to be called + * regularly. + */ + +struct interval +{ + interval_t refresh; + interval_t horizon; + time_t future_trigger; + time_t last_action; + time_t last_test_true; +}; + +void interval_init (struct interval *top, int horizon, int refresh); + +/* + * IF + * last_action less than horizon seconds ago + * OR last_test_true more than refresh seconds ago + * OR hit future_trigger + * THEN + * return true + * ELSE + * set wakeup to the number of seconds until a true return + * return false + */ + +static inline bool +interval_test (struct interval* top) +{ + bool trigger = false; + const time_t local_now = now; + + if (top->future_trigger && local_now >= top->future_trigger) + { + trigger = true; + top->future_trigger = 0; + } + + if (top->last_action + top->horizon > local_now || + top->last_test_true + top->refresh <= local_now || + trigger) + { + top->last_test_true = local_now; +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "INTERVAL interval_test true"); +#endif + return true; + } + else + { + return false; + } +} + +static inline void +interval_schedule_wakeup (struct interval* top, interval_t *wakeup) +{ + const time_t local_now = now; + interval_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, top->last_test_true + top->refresh, local_now); + interval_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, top->future_trigger, local_now); +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "INTERVAL interval_schedule wakeup=%d", (int)*wakeup); +#endif +} + +/* + * In wakeup seconds, interval_test will return true once. + */ +static inline void +interval_future_trigger (struct interval* top, interval_t wakeup) { + if (wakeup) + { +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "INTERVAL interval_future_trigger %d", (int)wakeup); +#endif + top->future_trigger = now + wakeup; + } +} + +/* + * Once an action is triggered, interval_test will remain true for + * horizon seconds. + */ +static inline void +interval_action (struct interval* top) +{ +#if INTERVAL_DEBUG + dmsg (D_INTERVAL, "INTERVAL action"); +#endif + top->last_action = now; +} + +/* + * Measure when n seconds beyond an event have elapsed + */ + +struct event_timeout +{ + bool defined; + interval_t n; + time_t last; /* time of last event */ +}; + +static inline bool +event_timeout_defined (const struct event_timeout* et) +{ + return et->defined; +} + +static inline void +event_timeout_clear (struct event_timeout* et) +{ + et->defined = false; + et->n = 0; + et->last = 0; +} + +static inline struct event_timeout +event_timeout_clear_ret () +{ + struct event_timeout ret; + event_timeout_clear (&ret); + return ret; +} + +static inline void +event_timeout_init (struct event_timeout* et, interval_t n, const time_t local_now) +{ + et->defined = true; + et->n = (n >= 0) ? n : 0; + et->last = local_now; +} + +static inline void +event_timeout_reset (struct event_timeout* et) +{ + if (et->defined) + et->last = now; +} + +static inline void +event_timeout_modify_wakeup (struct event_timeout* et, interval_t n) +{ + /* note that you might need to call reset_coarse_timers after this */ + if (et->defined) + et->n = (n >= 0) ? n : 0; +} + +/* + * This is the principal function for testing and triggering recurring + * timers and will return true on a timer signal event. + * If et_const_retry == ETT_DEFAULT and a signal occurs, + * the function will return true and *et will be armed for the + * next event. If et_const_retry >= 0 and a signal occurs, + * *et will not be touched, but *tv will be set to + * minimum (*tv, et_const_retry) for a future re-test, + * and the function will return true. + */ + +#define ETT_DEFAULT (-1) + +bool event_timeout_trigger (struct event_timeout *et, + struct timeval *tv, + const int et_const_retry); + +/* + * Measure time intervals in microseconds + */ + +#define USEC_TIMER_MAX 60 /* maximum interval size in seconds */ + +#define USEC_TIMER_MAX_USEC (USEC_TIMER_MAX * 1000000) + +struct usec_timer { + struct timeval start; + struct timeval end; +}; + +#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +static inline void +usec_timer_start (struct usec_timer *obj) +{ + CLEAR (*obj); + openvpn_gettimeofday (&obj->start, NULL); +} + +static inline void +usec_timer_end (struct usec_timer *obj) +{ + openvpn_gettimeofday (&obj->end, NULL); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY */ + +static inline bool +usec_timer_interval_defined (struct usec_timer *obj) +{ + return obj->start.tv_sec && obj->end.tv_sec; +} + +static inline int +usec_timer_interval (struct usec_timer *obj) +{ + return tv_subtract (&obj->end, &obj->start, USEC_TIMER_MAX); +} + +#endif /* INTERVAL_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ea6bd74b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.c @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "list.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +struct hash * +hash_init (const int n_buckets, + const uint32_t iv, + uint32_t (*hash_function)(const void *key, uint32_t iv), + bool (*compare_function)(const void *key1, const void *key2)) +{ + struct hash *h; + int i; + + ASSERT (n_buckets > 0); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (h, struct hash); + h->n_buckets = (int) adjust_power_of_2 (n_buckets); + h->mask = h->n_buckets - 1; + h->hash_function = hash_function; + h->compare_function = compare_function; + h->iv = iv; + ALLOC_ARRAY (h->buckets, struct hash_bucket, h->n_buckets); + for (i = 0; i < h->n_buckets; ++i) + { + struct hash_bucket *b = &h->buckets[i]; + b->list = NULL; + } + return h; +} + +void +hash_free (struct hash *hash) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < hash->n_buckets; ++i) + { + struct hash_bucket *b = &hash->buckets[i]; + struct hash_element *he = b->list; + + while (he) + { + struct hash_element *next = he->next; + free (he); + he = next; + } + } + free (hash->buckets); + free (hash); +} + +struct hash_element * +hash_lookup_fast (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_bucket *bucket, + const void *key, + uint32_t hv) +{ + struct hash_element *he; + struct hash_element *prev = NULL; + + he = bucket->list; + + while (he) + { + if (hv == he->hash_value && (*hash->compare_function)(key, he->key)) + { + /* move to head of list */ + if (prev) + { + prev->next = he->next; + he->next = bucket->list; + bucket->list = he; + } + return he; + } + prev = he; + he = he->next; + } + + return NULL; +} + +bool +hash_remove_fast (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_bucket *bucket, + const void *key, + uint32_t hv) +{ + struct hash_element *he; + struct hash_element *prev = NULL; + + he = bucket->list; + + while (he) + { + if (hv == he->hash_value && (*hash->compare_function)(key, he->key)) + { + if (prev) + prev->next = he->next; + else + bucket->list = he->next; + free (he); + --hash->n_elements; + return true; + } + prev = he; + he = he->next; + } + return false; +} + +bool +hash_add (struct hash *hash, const void *key, void *value, bool replace) +{ + uint32_t hv; + struct hash_bucket *bucket; + struct hash_element *he; + bool ret = false; + + hv = hash_value (hash, key); + bucket = &hash->buckets[hv & hash->mask]; + + if ((he = hash_lookup_fast (hash, bucket, key, hv))) /* already exists? */ + { + if (replace) + { + he->value = value; + ret = true; + } + } + else + { + hash_add_fast (hash, bucket, key, hv, value); + ret = true; + } + + return ret; +} + +void +hash_remove_by_value (struct hash *hash, void *value) +{ + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + + hash_iterator_init (hash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + if (he->value == value) + hash_iterator_delete_element (&hi); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); +} + +static void +hash_remove_marked (struct hash *hash, struct hash_bucket *bucket) +{ + struct hash_element *prev = NULL; + struct hash_element *he = bucket->list; + + while (he) + { + if (!he->key) /* marked? */ + { + struct hash_element *newhe; + if (prev) + newhe = prev->next = he->next; + else + newhe = bucket->list = he->next; + free (he); + --hash->n_elements; + he = newhe; + } + else + { + prev = he; + he = he->next; + } + } +} + +uint32_t +void_ptr_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv) +{ + return hash_func ((const void *)&key, sizeof (key), iv); +} + +bool +void_ptr_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2) +{ + return key1 == key2; +} + +void +hash_iterator_init_range (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_iterator *hi, + int start_bucket, + int end_bucket) +{ + if (end_bucket > hash->n_buckets) + end_bucket = hash->n_buckets; + + ASSERT (start_bucket >= 0 && start_bucket <= end_bucket); + + hi->hash = hash; + hi->elem = NULL; + hi->bucket = NULL; + hi->last = NULL; + hi->bucket_marked = false; + hi->bucket_index_start = start_bucket; + hi->bucket_index_end = end_bucket; + hi->bucket_index = hi->bucket_index_start - 1; +} + +void +hash_iterator_init (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + hash_iterator_init_range (hash, hi, 0, hash->n_buckets); +} + +static inline void +hash_iterator_lock (struct hash_iterator *hi, struct hash_bucket *b) +{ + hi->bucket = b; + hi->last = NULL; + hi->bucket_marked = false; +} + +static inline void +hash_iterator_unlock (struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + if (hi->bucket) + { + if (hi->bucket_marked) + { + hash_remove_marked (hi->hash, hi->bucket); + hi->bucket_marked = false; + } + hi->bucket = NULL; + hi->last = NULL; + } +} + +static inline void +hash_iterator_advance (struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + hi->last = hi->elem; + hi->elem = hi->elem->next; +} + +void +hash_iterator_free (struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + hash_iterator_unlock (hi); +} + +struct hash_element * +hash_iterator_next (struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + struct hash_element *ret = NULL; + if (hi->elem) + { + ret = hi->elem; + hash_iterator_advance (hi); + } + else + { + while (++hi->bucket_index < hi->bucket_index_end) + { + struct hash_bucket *b; + hash_iterator_unlock (hi); + b = &hi->hash->buckets[hi->bucket_index]; + if (b->list) + { + hash_iterator_lock (hi, b); + hi->elem = b->list; + if (hi->elem) + { + ret = hi->elem; + hash_iterator_advance (hi); + break; + } + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +hash_iterator_delete_element (struct hash_iterator *hi) +{ + ASSERT (hi->last); + hi->last->key = NULL; + hi->bucket_marked = true; +} + + +#ifdef LIST_TEST + +/* + * Test the hash code by implementing a simple + * word frequency algorithm. + */ + +struct word +{ + const char *word; + int n; +}; + +static uint32_t +word_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv) +{ + const char *str = (const char *) key; + const int len = strlen (str); + return hash_func ((const uint8_t *)str, len, iv); +} + +static bool +word_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2) +{ + return strcmp ((const char *)key1, (const char *)key2) == 0; +} + +static void +print_nhash (struct hash *hash) +{ + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + int count = 0; + + hash_iterator_init (hash, &hi, true); + + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + printf ("%d ", (int) he->value); + ++count; + } + printf ("\n"); + + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + ASSERT (count == hash_n_elements (hash)); +} + +static void +rmhash (struct hash *hash, const char *word) +{ + hash_remove (hash, word); +} + +void +list_test (void) +{ + openvpn_thread_init (); + + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct hash *hash = hash_init (10000, get_random (), word_hash_function, word_compare_function); + struct hash *nhash = hash_init (256, get_random (), word_hash_function, word_compare_function); + + printf ("hash_init n_buckets=%d mask=0x%08x\n", hash->n_buckets, hash->mask); + + /* parse words from stdin */ + while (true) + { + char buf[256]; + char wordbuf[256]; + int wbi; + int bi; + char c; + + if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) + break; + + bi = wbi = 0; + do + { + c = buf[bi++]; + if (isalnum (c) || c == '_') + { + ASSERT (wbi < (int) sizeof (wordbuf)); + wordbuf[wbi++] = c; + } + else + { + if (wbi) + { + struct word *w; + ASSERT (wbi < (int) sizeof (wordbuf)); + wordbuf[wbi++] = '\0'; + + /* word is parsed from stdin */ + + /* does it already exist in table? */ + w = (struct word *) hash_lookup (hash, wordbuf); + + if (w) + { + /* yes, increment count */ + ++w->n; + } + else + { + /* no, make a new object */ + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (w, struct word, &gc); + w->word = string_alloc (wordbuf, &gc); + w->n = 1; + ASSERT (hash_add (hash, w->word, w, false)); + ASSERT (hash_add (nhash, w->word, (void*) ((random() & 0x0F) + 1), false)); + } + } + wbi = 0; + } + } while (c); + } + +#if 1 + /* remove some words from the table */ + { + rmhash (hash, "true"); + rmhash (hash, "false"); + } +#endif + + /* output contents of hash table */ + { + int base; + int inc = 0; + int count = 0; + + for (base = 0; base < hash_n_buckets (hash); base += inc) { + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + inc = (get_random () % 3) + 1; + hash_iterator_init_range (hash, &hi, true, base, base + inc); + + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct word *w = (struct word *) he->value; + printf ("%6d '%s'\n", w->n, w->word); + ++count; + } + + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + } + ASSERT (count == hash_n_elements (hash)); + } + +#if 1 + /* test hash_remove_by_value function */ + { + int i; + for (i = 1; i <= 16; ++i) + { + printf ("[%d] ***********************************\n", i); + print_nhash (nhash); + hash_remove_by_value (nhash, (void *) i, true); + } + printf ("FINAL **************************\n"); + print_nhash (nhash); + } +#endif + + hash_free (hash); + hash_free (nhash); + gc_free (&gc); + } + + openvpn_thread_cleanup (); +} + +#endif + +/* +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +hash() -- hash a variable-length key into a 32-bit value + k : the key (the unaligned variable-length array of bytes) + len : the length of the key, counting by bytes + level : can be any 4-byte value +Returns a 32-bit value. Every bit of the key affects every bit of +the return value. Every 1-bit and 2-bit delta achieves avalanche. +About 36+6len instructions. + +The best hash table sizes are powers of 2. There is no need to do +mod a prime (mod is sooo slow!). If you need less than 32 bits, +use a bitmask. For example, if you need only 10 bits, do + h = (h & hashmask(10)); +In which case, the hash table should have hashsize(10) elements. + +If you are hashing n strings (uint8_t **)k, do it like this: + for (i=0, h=0; i>13); + b -= c; a ^= x; + b -= a; x = (a<<8); + c -= a; b ^= x; + c -= b; x = (b>>13); + ... + Unfortunately, superscalar Pentiums and Sparcs can't take advantage + of that parallelism. They've also turned some of those single-cycle + latency instructions into multi-cycle latency instructions. Still, + this is the fastest good hash I could find. There were about 2^^68 + to choose from. I only looked at a billion or so. + +James Yonan Notes: + +* This function is faster than it looks, and appears to be + appropriate for our usage in OpenVPN which is primarily + for hash-table based address lookup (IPv4, IPv6, and Ethernet MAC). + NOTE: This function is never used for cryptographic purposes, only + to produce evenly-distributed indexes into hash tables. + +* Benchmark results: 11.39 machine cycles per byte on a P2 266Mhz, + and 12.1 machine cycles per byte on a + 2.2 Ghz P4 when hashing a 6 byte string. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +*/ + +#define mix(a,b,c) \ +{ \ + a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c>>13); \ + b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a<<8); \ + c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b>>13); \ + a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c>>12); \ + b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a<<16); \ + c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b>>5); \ + a -= b; a -= c; a ^= (c>>3); \ + b -= c; b -= a; b ^= (a<<10); \ + c -= a; c -= b; c ^= (b>>15); \ +} + +uint32_t +hash_func (const uint8_t *k, uint32_t length, uint32_t initval) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, len; + + /* Set up the internal state */ + len = length; + a = b = 0x9e3779b9; /* the golden ratio; an arbitrary value */ + c = initval; /* the previous hash value */ + + /*---------------------------------------- handle most of the key */ + while (len >= 12) + { + a += (k[0] + ((uint32_t) k[1] << 8) + + ((uint32_t) k[2] << 16) + + ((uint32_t) k[3] << 24)); + b += (k[4] + ((uint32_t) k[5] << 8) + + ((uint32_t) k[6] << 16) + + ((uint32_t) k[7] << 24)); + c += (k[8] + ((uint32_t) k[9] << 8) + + ((uint32_t) k[10] << 16) + + ((uint32_t) k[11] << 24)); + mix (a, b, c); + k += 12; + len -= 12; + } + + /*------------------------------------- handle the last 11 bytes */ + c += length; + switch (len) /* all the case statements fall through */ + { + case 11: + c += ((uint32_t) k[10] << 24); + case 10: + c += ((uint32_t) k[9] << 16); + case 9: + c += ((uint32_t) k[8] << 8); + /* the first byte of c is reserved for the length */ + case 8: + b += ((uint32_t) k[7] << 24); + case 7: + b += ((uint32_t) k[6] << 16); + case 6: + b += ((uint32_t) k[5] << 8); + case 5: + b += k[4]; + case 4: + a += ((uint32_t) k[3] << 24); + case 3: + a += ((uint32_t) k[2] << 16); + case 2: + a += ((uint32_t) k[1] << 8); + case 1: + a += k[0]; + /* case 0: nothing left to add */ + } + mix (a, b, c); + /*-------------------------------------- report the result */ + return c; +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..adde36b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/list.h @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef LIST_H +#define LIST_H + +/* + * This code is a fairly straightforward hash + * table implementation using Bob Jenkins' + * hash function. + * + * Hash tables are used in OpenVPN to keep track of + * client instances over various key spaces. + */ + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +/* define this to enable special list test mode */ +/*#define LIST_TEST*/ + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" + +#define hashsize(n) ((uint32_t)1<<(n)) +#define hashmask(n) (hashsize(n)-1) + +struct hash_element +{ + void *value; + const void *key; + unsigned int hash_value; + struct hash_element *next; +}; + +struct hash_bucket +{ + struct hash_element *list; +}; + +struct hash +{ + int n_buckets; + int n_elements; + int mask; + uint32_t iv; + uint32_t (*hash_function)(const void *key, uint32_t iv); + bool (*compare_function)(const void *key1, const void *key2); /* return true if equal */ + struct hash_bucket *buckets; +}; + +struct hash *hash_init (const int n_buckets, + const uint32_t iv, + uint32_t (*hash_function)(const void *key, uint32_t iv), + bool (*compare_function)(const void *key1, const void *key2)); + +void hash_free (struct hash *hash); + +bool hash_add (struct hash *hash, const void *key, void *value, bool replace); + +struct hash_element *hash_lookup_fast (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_bucket *bucket, + const void *key, + uint32_t hv); + +bool hash_remove_fast (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_bucket *bucket, + const void *key, + uint32_t hv); + +void hash_remove_by_value (struct hash *hash, void *value); + +struct hash_iterator +{ + struct hash *hash; + int bucket_index; + struct hash_bucket *bucket; + struct hash_element *elem; + struct hash_element *last; + bool bucket_marked; + int bucket_index_start; + int bucket_index_end; +}; + +void hash_iterator_init_range (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_iterator *hi, + int start_bucket, + int end_bucket); + +void hash_iterator_init (struct hash *hash, struct hash_iterator *iter); +struct hash_element *hash_iterator_next (struct hash_iterator *hi); +void hash_iterator_delete_element (struct hash_iterator *hi); +void hash_iterator_free (struct hash_iterator *hi); + +uint32_t hash_func (const uint8_t *k, uint32_t length, uint32_t initval); + +uint32_t void_ptr_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv); +bool void_ptr_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2); + +#ifdef LIST_TEST +void list_test (void); +#endif + +static inline uint32_t +hash_value (const struct hash *hash, const void *key) +{ + return (*hash->hash_function)(key, hash->iv); +} + +static inline int +hash_n_elements (const struct hash *hash) +{ + return hash->n_elements; +} + +static inline int +hash_n_buckets (const struct hash *hash) +{ + return hash->n_buckets; +} + +static inline struct hash_bucket * +hash_bucket (struct hash *hash, uint32_t hv) +{ + return &hash->buckets[hv & hash->mask]; +} + +static inline void * +hash_lookup (struct hash *hash, const void *key) +{ + void *ret = NULL; + struct hash_element *he; + uint32_t hv = hash_value (hash, key); + struct hash_bucket *bucket = &hash->buckets[hv & hash->mask]; + + he = hash_lookup_fast (hash, bucket, key, hv); + if (he) + ret = he->value; + + return ret; +} + +/* NOTE: assumes that key is not a duplicate */ +static inline void +hash_add_fast (struct hash *hash, + struct hash_bucket *bucket, + const void *key, + uint32_t hv, + void *value) +{ + struct hash_element *he; + + ALLOC_OBJ (he, struct hash_element); + he->value = value; + he->key = key; + he->hash_value = hv; + he->next = bucket->list; + bucket->list = he; + ++hash->n_elements; +} + +static inline bool +hash_remove (struct hash *hash, const void *key) +{ + uint32_t hv; + struct hash_bucket *bucket; + bool ret; + + hv = hash_value (hash, key); + bucket = &hash->buckets[hv & hash->mask]; + ret = hash_remove_fast (hash, bucket, key, hv); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ +#endif /* LIST */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..57f447b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Support routine for configuring link layer address + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "misc.h" + +int set_lladdr(const char *ifname, const char *lladdr, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + int r; + + if (!ifname || !lladdr) + return -1; + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s link set addr %s dev %s", + iproute_path, lladdr, ifname); +#else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s hw ether %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + ifname, lladdr); +#endif +#elif defined(TARGET_SOLARIS) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s ether %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + ifname, lladdr); +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s lladdr %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + ifname, lladdr); +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s lladdr %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + ifname, lladdr); +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s ether %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + ifname, lladdr); +#else + msg (M_WARN, "Sorry, but I don't know how to configure link layer addresses on this operating system."); + return -1; +#endif + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + r = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, M_WARN, "ERROR: Unable to set link layer address."); + if (r) + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP link layer address set to %s", lladdr); + + argv_reset (&argv); + return r; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6c42562 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lladdr.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* + * Support routine for configuring link layer address + */ + +#include "misc.h" + +int set_lladdr(const char *ifname, const char *lladdr, + const struct env_set *es); diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..195b8194 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Data Channel Compression module function definitions. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + +#include "lzo.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "otime.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB +/** + * Perform adaptive compression housekeeping. + * + * @param ac the adaptive compression state structure. + * + * @return + */ +static bool +lzo_adaptive_compress_test (struct lzo_adaptive_compress *ac) +{ + const bool save = ac->compress_state; + const time_t local_now = now; + + if (!ac->compress_state) + { + if (local_now >= ac->next) + { + if (ac->n_total > AC_MIN_BYTES + && (ac->n_total - ac->n_comp) < (ac->n_total / (100 / AC_SAVE_PCT))) + { + ac->compress_state = true; + ac->next = local_now + AC_OFF_SEC; + } + else + { + ac->next = local_now + AC_SAMP_SEC; + } + dmsg (D_COMP, "lzo_adaptive_compress_test: comp=%d total=%d", ac->n_comp, ac->n_total); + ac->n_total = ac->n_comp = 0; + } + } + else + { + if (local_now >= ac->next) + { + ac->next = local_now + AC_SAMP_SEC; + ac->n_total = ac->n_comp = 0; + ac->compress_state = false; + } + } + + if (ac->compress_state != save) + dmsg (D_COMP_LOW, "Adaptive compression state %s", (ac->compress_state ? "OFF" : "ON")); + + return !ac->compress_state; +} + +static inline void +lzo_adaptive_compress_data (struct lzo_adaptive_compress *ac, int n_total, int n_comp) +{ + ac->n_total += n_total; + ac->n_comp += n_comp; +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO_STUB */ + +void lzo_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame *frame) +{ + /* Leave room for our one-byte compressed/didn't-compress prefix byte. */ + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, LZO_PREFIX_LEN); + + /* Leave room for compression buffer to expand in worst case scenario + where data is totally uncompressible */ + frame_add_to_extra_buffer (frame, LZO_EXTRA_BUFFER (EXPANDED_SIZE(frame))); +} + +void +lzo_compress_init (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, unsigned int flags) +{ + CLEAR (*lzowork); + + lzowork->flags = flags; +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + lzowork->wmem_size = LZO_WORKSPACE; + + if (lzo_init () != LZO_E_OK) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot initialize LZO compression library"); + lzowork->wmem = (lzo_voidp) lzo_malloc (lzowork->wmem_size); + check_malloc_return (lzowork->wmem); + msg (D_INIT_MEDIUM, "LZO compression initialized"); +#else + msg (D_INIT_MEDIUM, "LZO stub compression initialized"); +#endif + lzowork->defined = true; +} + +void +lzo_compress_uninit (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork) +{ + if (lzowork) + { + ASSERT (lzowork->defined); +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + lzo_free (lzowork->wmem); + lzowork->wmem = NULL; +#endif + lzowork->defined = false; + } +} + +static inline bool +lzo_compression_enabled (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork) +{ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + if ((lzowork->flags & (LZO_SELECTED|LZO_ON)) == (LZO_SELECTED|LZO_ON)) + { + if (lzowork->flags & LZO_ADAPTIVE) + return lzo_adaptive_compress_test (&lzowork->ac); + else + return true; + } +#endif + return false; +} + +void +lzo_compress (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, + const struct frame* frame) +{ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + lzo_uint zlen = 0; + int err; + bool compressed = false; +#endif + + ASSERT (lzowork->defined); + + if (buf->len <= 0) + return; + +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + /* + * In order to attempt compression, length must be at least COMPRESS_THRESHOLD, + * and our adaptive level must give the OK. + */ + if (buf->len >= COMPRESS_THRESHOLD && lzo_compression_enabled (lzowork)) + { + ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + ASSERT (buf_safe (&work, LZO_EXTRA_BUFFER (PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame)))); + + if (!(buf->len <= PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame))) + { + dmsg (D_COMP_ERRORS, "LZO compression buffer overflow"); + buf->len = 0; + return; + } + + err = LZO_COMPRESS (BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), BPTR (&work), &zlen, lzowork->wmem); + if (err != LZO_E_OK) + { + dmsg (D_COMP_ERRORS, "LZO compression error: %d", err); + buf->len = 0; + return; + } + + ASSERT (buf_safe (&work, zlen)); + work.len = zlen; + compressed = true; + + dmsg (D_COMP, "compress %d -> %d", buf->len, work.len); + lzowork->pre_compress += buf->len; + lzowork->post_compress += work.len; + + /* tell adaptive level about our success or lack thereof in getting any size reduction */ + if (lzowork->flags & LZO_ADAPTIVE) + lzo_adaptive_compress_data (&lzowork->ac, buf->len, work.len); + } + + /* did compression save us anything ? */ + if (compressed && work.len < buf->len) + { + uint8_t *header = buf_prepend (&work, 1); + *header = YES_COMPRESS; + *buf = work; + } + else +#endif + { + uint8_t *header = buf_prepend (buf, 1); + *header = NO_COMPRESS; + } +} + +void +lzo_decompress (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, + const struct frame* frame) +{ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + lzo_uint zlen = EXPANDED_SIZE (frame); + int err; +#endif + uint8_t c; /* flag indicating whether or not our peer compressed */ + + ASSERT (lzowork->defined); + + if (buf->len <= 0) + return; + + ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM (frame))); + + c = *BPTR (buf); + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, 1)); + + if (c == YES_COMPRESS) /* packet was compressed */ + { +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + ASSERT (buf_safe (&work, zlen)); + err = LZO_DECOMPRESS (BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), BPTR (&work), &zlen, + lzowork->wmem); + if (err != LZO_E_OK) + { + dmsg (D_COMP_ERRORS, "LZO decompression error: %d", err); + buf->len = 0; + return; + } + + ASSERT (buf_safe (&work, zlen)); + work.len = zlen; + + dmsg (D_COMP, "decompress %d -> %d", buf->len, work.len); + lzowork->pre_decompress += buf->len; + lzowork->post_decompress += work.len; + + *buf = work; +#else + dmsg (D_COMP_ERRORS, "LZO decompression error: LZO capability not compiled"); + buf->len = 0; + return; +#endif + } + else if (c == NO_COMPRESS) /* packet was not compressed */ + { + ; + } + else + { + dmsg (D_COMP_ERRORS, "Bad LZO decompression header byte: %d", c); + buf->len = 0; + } +} + +void +lzo_modify_flags (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, unsigned int flags) +{ + ASSERT (lzowork->defined); + lzowork->flags = flags; +} + +void lzo_print_stats (const struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzo_compwork, struct status_output *so) +{ + ASSERT (lzo_compwork->defined); + +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + status_printf (so, "pre-compress bytes," counter_format, lzo_compwork->pre_compress); + status_printf (so, "post-compress bytes," counter_format, lzo_compwork->post_compress); + status_printf (so, "pre-decompress bytes," counter_format, lzo_compwork->pre_decompress); + status_printf (so, "post-decompress bytes," counter_format, lzo_compwork->post_decompress); +#endif +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..472204d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/lzo.h @@ -0,0 +1,347 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_LZO_H +#define OPENVPN_LZO_H + + +/** + * @file + * Data Channel Compression module header file. + */ + + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + +/** + * @addtogroup compression + * @{ + */ + +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB +#if defined(HAVE_LZO_LZOUTIL_H) +#include "lzo/lzoutil.h" +#elif defined(HAVE_LZOUTIL_H) +#include "lzoutil.h" +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_LZO_LZO1X_H) +#include "lzo/lzo1x.h" +#elif defined(HAVE_LZO1X_H) +#include "lzo1x.h" +#endif +#endif + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "status.h" + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Bit-flags which control data channel packet compression *//******/ +/** @{ */ +#define LZO_SELECTED (1<<0) /**< Bit-flag indicating that compression + * of data channel packets is enabled. */ +#define LZO_ON (1<<1) /**< Bit-flag indicating that compression + * of data channel packets is active. */ +#define LZO_ADAPTIVE (1<<2) /**< Bit-flag indicating that adaptive + * compression of data channel packets + * has been selected. */ +/** @} name Bit-flags which control data channel packet compression *//****/ + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name LZO library interface defines *//** @{ *//***********************/ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB +#define LZO_COMPRESS lzo1x_1_15_compress + /**< LZO library compression function. + * + * Use \c lzo1x_1_15_compress because it + * is described as faster than the + * standard routine, although it does + * need a bit more memory. */ +#define LZO_WORKSPACE LZO1X_1_15_MEM_COMPRESS + /**< The size in bytes of the memory + * %buffer required by the LZO library + * compression algorithm. */ +#define LZO_DECOMPRESS lzo1x_decompress_safe + /**< LZO library decompression function. + * + * Use safe decompress because it + * includes checks for possible %buffer + * overflows. If speed is essential and + * you will always be using a MAC to + * verify the integrity of incoming + * packets, you might want to consider + * using the non-safe version. */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO_STUB */ +/** @} name LZO library interface *//**************************************/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Miscellaneous compression defines *//** @{ *//*******************/ +#define LZO_EXTRA_BUFFER(len) ((len)/8 + 128 + 3) + /**< LZO 2.0 worst-case size expansion. */ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB +#define COMPRESS_THRESHOLD 100 /**< Minimum packet size to attempt + * compression. */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO_STUB */ +/** @} name Miscellaneous compression defines *//**************************/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Compression header defines *//** @{ *//**************************/ +#define LZO_PREFIX_LEN 1 /**< Length in bytes of prepended + * compression header. */ +#define YES_COMPRESS 0x66 /**< Single-byte compression header + * indicating this packet has been + * compressed. */ +#define NO_COMPRESS 0xFA /**< Single-byte compression header + * indicating this packet has not been + * compressed. */ +/** @} name Compression header defines *//*********************************/ + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Adaptive compression defines *//** @{ *//************************/ +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB +#define AC_SAMP_SEC 2 /**< Number of seconds in a sample period. */ +#define AC_MIN_BYTES 1000 /**< Minimum number of bytes a sample + * period must contain for it to be + * evaluated. */ +#define AC_SAVE_PCT 5 /**< Minimum size reduction percentage + * below which compression will be + * turned off. */ +#define AC_OFF_SEC 60 /**< Seconds to wait after compression has + * been turned off before retesting. */ +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO_STUB */ +/** @} name Adaptive compression defines *//*******************************/ + +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + +/** + * Adaptive compression state. + */ +struct lzo_adaptive_compress { + bool compress_state; + time_t next; + int n_total; + int n_comp; +}; + +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO_STUB */ + + +/** + * State for the compression and decompression routines. + * + * This structure contains compression module state, such as whether + * compression is enabled and the status of the adaptive compression + * routines. It also contains an allocated working buffer. + * + * One of these compression workspace structures is maintained for each + * VPN tunnel. + */ +struct lzo_compress_workspace +{ + bool defined; + unsigned int flags; +#ifndef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + lzo_voidp wmem; + int wmem_size; + struct lzo_adaptive_compress ac; + + /* statistics */ + counter_type pre_decompress; + counter_type post_decompress; + counter_type pre_compress; + counter_type post_compress; +#endif +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup *//** @{ *//************/ + +/** + * Adjust %frame parameters for data channel payload compression. + * + * Data channel packet compression requires a single-byte header to + * indicate whether a packet has been compressed or not. The packet + * handling buffers must also allow for worst-case payload compression + * where the compressed content size is actually larger than the original + * content size. This function adjusts the parameters of a given frame + * structure to include the header and allow for worst-case compression + * expansion. + * + * @param frame - The frame structure to adjust. + */ +void lzo_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame); + +/** + * Initialize a compression workspace structure. + * + * This function initializes the given workspace structure \a lzowork. + * This includes allocating a work buffer for internal use and setting its + * flags to the given value of \a flags. + * + * This function also initializes the lzo library. + * + * @param lzowork - A pointer to the workspace structure to + * initialize. + * @param flags - The initial flags to set in the workspace + * structure. + */ +void lzo_compress_init (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, unsigned int flags); + +/** + * Cleanup a compression workspace structure. + * + * This function cleans up the given workspace structure \a lzowork. This + * includes freeing the structure's internal work buffer. + * + * @param lzowork - A pointer to the workspace structure to clean up. + */ +void lzo_compress_uninit (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork); + +/** + * Set a workspace structure's flags. + * + * @param lzowork - The workspace structure of which to modify the + * flags. + * @param flags - The new value to assign to the workspace + * structure's flags. + */ +void lzo_modify_flags (struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, unsigned int flags); + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup *//*******************/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Function for packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer *//*****/ +/** @{ */ + +/** + * Process an outgoing packet according to a VPN tunnel's settings. + * @ingroup compression + * + * This function processes the packet contained in \a buf. Its behavior + * depends on the settings contained within \a lzowork. If compression is + * enabled and active, this function compresses the packet. After + * compression, the size of the uncompressed and compressed packets are + * compared, and the smallest is used. + * + * This function prepends a one-byte header indicating whether the packet + * was or was not compressed, so as to let the peer know how to handle the + * packet. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, an error message is logged and + * the length of \a buf is set to zero. + * + * @param buf - A pointer to the buffer containing the outgoing + * packet. This pointer will be modified to point + * to the processed packet on return. + * @param work - A preallocated working buffer. + * @param lzowork - The compression workspace structure associated + * with this VPN tunnel. + * @param frame - The frame parameters of this tunnel. + * + * @return Void.\n On return, \a buf will point to a buffer containing + * the processed, possibly compressed, packet data with a compression + * header prepended. + */ +void lzo_compress (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** @} name Function for packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer *//***/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Function for packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer *//*****/ +/** @{ */ + +/** + * Inspect an incoming packet and decompress if it is compressed. + * + * This function inspects the incoming packet contained in \a buf. If its + * one-byte compression header indicates that it was compressed (i.e. \c + * YES_COMPRESS), then it will be decompressed. If its header indicates + * that it was not compressed (i.e. \c NO_COMPRESS), then the buffer is + * not modified except for removing the compression header. + * + * If an error occurs during processing, for example if the compression + * header has a value other than \c YES_COMPRESS or \c NO_COMPRESS, then + * the error is logged and the length of \a buf is set to zero. + * + * @param buf - A pointer to the buffer containing the incoming + * packet. This pointer will be modified to point + * to the processed packet on return. + * @param work - A preallocated working buffer. + * @param lzowork - The compression workspace structure associated + * with this VPN tunnel. + * @param frame - The frame parameters of this tunnel. + * + * @return Void.\n On return, \a buf will point to a buffer containing + * the uncompressed packet data and the one-byte compression header + * will have been removed. + */ +void lzo_decompress (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work, + struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork, + const struct frame* frame); + +/** @} name Function for packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer *//***/ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Utility functions *//** @{ *//***********************************/ + +/** + * Print statistics on compression and decompression performance. + * + * @param lzo_compwork - The workspace structure from which to get the + * statistics. + * @param so - The status output structure to which to write the + * statistics. + */ +void lzo_print_stats (const struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzo_compwork, struct status_output *so); + +/** + * Check whether compression is enabled for a workspace structure. + * + * @param lzowork - The workspace structure to check. + * + * @return true if compression is enabled; false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool +lzo_defined (const struct lzo_compress_workspace *lzowork) +{ + return lzowork->defined; +} + +/** @} name Utility functions *//******************************************/ + + +/** @} addtogroup compression */ + + +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO */ +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4e834b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.c @@ -0,0 +1,3422 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +#include "error.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "manage.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "pkcs11.h" +#endif + +#define MANAGEMENT_ECHO_PULL_INFO 0 + +#if MANAGEMENT_ECHO_PULL_INFO +#define MANAGEMENT_ECHO_FLAGS LOG_PRINT_INTVAL +#else +#define MANAGEMENT_ECHO_FLAGS 0 +#endif + +/* tag for blank username/password */ +static const char blank_up[] = "[[BLANK]]"; + +struct management *management; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* static forward declarations */ +static void man_output_standalone (struct management *man, volatile int *signal_received); +static void man_reset_client_socket (struct management *man, const bool exiting); + +static void +man_help () +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, "Management Interface for %s", title_string); + msg (M_CLIENT, "Commands:"); + msg (M_CLIENT, "auth-retry t : Auth failure retry mode (none,interact,nointeract)."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "bytecount n : Show bytes in/out, update every n secs (0=off)."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "echo [on|off] [N|all] : Like log, but only show messages in echo buffer."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "exit|quit : Close management session."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "forget-passwords : Forget passwords entered so far."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "help : Print this message."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "hold [on|off|release] : Set/show hold flag to on/off state, or"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " release current hold and start tunnel."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "kill cn : Kill the client instance(s) having common name cn."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "kill IP:port : Kill the client instance connecting from IP:port."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "load-stats : Show global server load stats."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "log [on|off] [N|all] : Turn on/off realtime log display"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " + show last N lines or 'all' for entire history."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "mute [n] : Set log mute level to n, or show level if n is absent."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "needok type action : Enter confirmation for NEED-OK request of 'type',"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " where action = 'ok' or 'cancel'."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "needstr type action : Enter confirmation for NEED-STR request of 'type',"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " where action is reply string."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "net : (Windows only) Show network info and routing table."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "password type p : Enter password p for a queried OpenVPN password."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "remote type [host port] : Override remote directive, type=ACCEPT|MOD|SKIP."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "proxy type [host port flags] : Enter dynamic proxy server info."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "pid : Show process ID of the current OpenVPN process."); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + msg (M_CLIENT, "pkcs11-id-count : Get number of available PKCS#11 identities."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "pkcs11-id-get index : Get PKCS#11 identity at index."); +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + msg (M_CLIENT, "client-auth CID KID : Authenticate client-id/key-id CID/KID (MULTILINE)"); + msg (M_CLIENT, "client-auth-nt CID KID : Authenticate client-id/key-id CID/KID"); + msg (M_CLIENT, "client-deny CID KID R [CR] : Deny auth client-id/key-id CID/KID with log reason"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " text R and optional client reason text CR"); + msg (M_CLIENT, "client-kill CID [M] : Kill client instance CID with message M (def=RESTART)"); + msg (M_CLIENT, "env-filter [level] : Set env-var filter level"); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + msg (M_CLIENT, "client-pf CID : Define packet filter for client CID (MULTILINE)"); +#endif +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + msg (M_CLIENT, "rsa-sig : Enter an RSA signature in response to >RSA_SIGN challenge"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " Enter signature base64 on subsequent lines followed by END"); +#endif + msg (M_CLIENT, "signal s : Send signal s to daemon,"); + msg (M_CLIENT, " s = SIGHUP|SIGTERM|SIGUSR1|SIGUSR2."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "state [on|off] [N|all] : Like log, but show state history."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "status [n] : Show current daemon status info using format #n."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "test n : Produce n lines of output for testing/debugging."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "username type u : Enter username u for a queried OpenVPN username."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "verb [n] : Set log verbosity level to n, or show if n is absent."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "version : Show current version number."); + msg (M_CLIENT, "END"); +} + +static const char * +man_state_name (const int state) +{ + switch (state) + { + case OPENVPN_STATE_INITIAL: + return "INITIAL"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTING: + return "CONNECTING"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_WAIT: + return "WAIT"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH: + return "AUTH"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_GET_CONFIG: + return "GET_CONFIG"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_ASSIGN_IP: + return "ASSIGN_IP"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_ADD_ROUTES: + return "ADD_ROUTES"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTED: + return "CONNECTED"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_RECONNECTING: + return "RECONNECTING"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_EXITING: + return "EXITING"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_RESOLVE: + return "RESOLVE"; + case OPENVPN_STATE_TCP_CONNECT: + return "TCP_CONNECT"; + default: + return "?"; + } +} + +static void +man_welcome (struct management *man) +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, ">INFO:OpenVPN Management Interface Version %d -- type 'help' for more info", + MANAGEMENT_VERSION); + if (man->persist.special_state_msg) + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", man->persist.special_state_msg); +} + +static inline bool +man_password_needed (struct management *man) +{ + return man->settings.up.defined && !man->connection.password_verified; +} + +static void +man_check_password (struct management *man, const char *line) +{ + if (man_password_needed (man)) + { + if (streq (line, man->settings.up.password)) + { + man->connection.password_verified = true; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: password is correct"); + man_welcome (man); + } + else + { + man->connection.password_verified = false; + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: bad password"); + if (++man->connection.password_tries >= MANAGEMENT_N_PASSWORD_RETRIES) + { + msg (M_WARN, "MAN: client connection rejected after %d failed password attempts", + MANAGEMENT_N_PASSWORD_RETRIES); + man->connection.halt = true; + } + } + } +} + +static void +man_update_io_state (struct management *man) +{ + if (socket_defined (man->connection.sd_cli)) + { + if (buffer_list_defined (man->connection.out)) + { + man->connection.state = MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE; + } + else + { + man->connection.state = MS_CC_WAIT_READ; + } + } +} + +static void +man_output_list_push_finalize (struct management *man) +{ + if (management_connected (man)) + { + man_update_io_state (man); + if (!man->persist.standalone_disabled) + { + volatile int signal_received = 0; + man_output_standalone (man, &signal_received); + } + } +} + +static void +man_output_list_push_str (struct management *man, const char *str) +{ + if (management_connected (man) && str) + { + buffer_list_push (man->connection.out, (const unsigned char *) str); + } +} + +static void +man_output_list_push (struct management *man, const char *str) +{ + man_output_list_push_str (man, str); + man_output_list_push_finalize (man); +} + +static void +man_prompt (struct management *man) +{ + if (man_password_needed (man)) + man_output_list_push (man, "ENTER PASSWORD:"); +#if 0 /* should we use prompt? */ + else + man_output_list_push (man, ">"); +#endif +} + +static void +man_delete_unix_socket (struct management *man) +{ +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if ((man->settings.flags & (MF_UNIX_SOCK|MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT)) == MF_UNIX_SOCK) + socket_delete_unix (&man->settings.local_unix); +#endif +} + +static void +man_close_socket (struct management *man, const socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ +#ifndef WIN32 + /* + * Windows doesn't need this because the ne32 event is permanently + * enabled at struct management scope. + */ + if (man->persist.callback.delete_event) + (*man->persist.callback.delete_event) (man->persist.callback.arg, sd); +#endif + openvpn_close_socket (sd); +} + +static void +virtual_output_callback_func (void *arg, const unsigned int flags, const char *str) +{ + struct management *man = (struct management *) arg; + static int recursive_level = 0; /* GLOBAL */ + +# define AF_DID_PUSH (1<<0) +# define AF_DID_RESET (1<<1) + + if (!recursive_level) /* don't allow recursion */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct log_entry e; + const char *out = NULL; + unsigned int action_flags = 0; + + ++recursive_level; + + CLEAR (e); + update_time (); + e.timestamp = now; + e.u.msg_flags = flags; + e.string = str; + + if (flags & M_FATAL) + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; + + if (flags != M_CLIENT) + log_history_add (man->persist.log, &e); + + if (!man_password_needed (man)) + { + if (flags == M_CLIENT) + out = log_entry_print (&e, LOG_PRINT_CRLF, &gc); + else if (man->connection.log_realtime) + out = log_entry_print (&e, LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE + | LOG_PRINT_MSG_FLAGS + | LOG_PRINT_LOG_PREFIX + | LOG_PRINT_CRLF, &gc); + if (out) + { + man_output_list_push_str (man, out); + action_flags |= AF_DID_PUSH; + } + if (flags & M_FATAL) + { + out = log_entry_print (&e, LOG_FATAL_NOTIFY|LOG_PRINT_CRLF, &gc); + if (out) + { + man_output_list_push_str (man, out); + action_flags |= (AF_DID_PUSH|AF_DID_RESET); + } + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); + + if (action_flags & AF_DID_PUSH) + man_output_list_push_finalize (man); + if (action_flags & AF_DID_RESET) + man_reset_client_socket (man, true); + + --recursive_level; + } +} + +/* + * Given a signal, return the signal with possible remapping applied, + * or -1 if the signal should be ignored. + */ +static int +man_mod_signal (const struct management *man, const int signum) +{ + const unsigned int flags = man->settings.mansig; + int s = signum; + if (s == SIGUSR1) + { + if (flags & MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_HUP) + s = SIGHUP; + if (flags & MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_TERM) + s = SIGTERM; + } + if (flags & MANSIG_IGNORE_USR1_HUP) + { + if (s == SIGHUP || s == SIGUSR1) + s = -1; + } + return s; +} + +static void +man_signal (struct management *man, const char *name) +{ + const int sig = parse_signal (name); + if (sig >= 0) + { + const int sig_mod = man_mod_signal (man, sig); + if (sig_mod >= 0) + { + throw_signal (sig_mod); + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: signal %s thrown", signal_name (sig_mod, true)); + } + else + { + if (man->persist.special_state_msg) + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", man->persist.special_state_msg); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: signal '%s' is currently ignored", name); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: signal '%s' is not a known signal type", name); + } +} + +static void +man_status (struct management *man, const int version, struct status_output *so) +{ + if (man->persist.callback.status) + { + (*man->persist.callback.status) (man->persist.callback.arg, version, so); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The 'status' command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } +} + +static void +man_bytecount (struct management *man, const int update_seconds) +{ + if (update_seconds >= 0) + man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds = update_seconds; + else + man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds = 0; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: bytecount interval changed"); +} + +void +man_bytecount_output_client (struct management *man) +{ + char in[32]; + char out[32]; + /* do in a roundabout way to work around possible mingw or mingw-glibc bug */ + openvpn_snprintf (in, sizeof (in), counter_format, man->persist.bytes_in); + openvpn_snprintf (out, sizeof (out), counter_format, man->persist.bytes_out); + msg (M_CLIENT, ">BYTECOUNT:%s,%s", in, out); + man->connection.bytecount_last_update = now; +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +void +man_bytecount_output_server (struct management *man, + const counter_type *bytes_in_total, + const counter_type *bytes_out_total, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac) +{ + char in[32]; + char out[32]; + /* do in a roundabout way to work around possible mingw or mingw-glibc bug */ + openvpn_snprintf (in, sizeof (in), counter_format, *bytes_in_total); + openvpn_snprintf (out, sizeof (out), counter_format, *bytes_out_total); + msg (M_CLIENT, ">BYTECOUNT_CLI:%lu,%s,%s", mdac->cid, in, out); + mdac->bytecount_last_update = now; +} + +#endif + +static void +man_kill (struct management *man, const char *victim) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (man->persist.callback.kill_by_cn && man->persist.callback.kill_by_addr) + { + struct buffer buf; + char p1[128]; + char p2[128]; + int n_killed; + + buf_set_read (&buf, (uint8_t*) victim, strlen (victim) + 1); + buf_parse (&buf, ':', p1, sizeof (p1)); + buf_parse (&buf, ':', p2, sizeof (p2)); + + if (strlen (p1) && strlen (p2)) + { + /* IP:port specified */ + bool status; + const in_addr_t addr = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_MSG_VIRT_OUT, p1, 0, &status, NULL); + if (status) + { + const int port = atoi (p2); + if (port > 0 && port < 65536) + { + n_killed = (*man->persist.callback.kill_by_addr) (man->persist.callback.arg, addr, port); + if (n_killed > 0) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: %d client(s) at address %s:%d killed", + n_killed, + print_in_addr_t (addr, 0, &gc), + port); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: client at address %s:%d not found", + print_in_addr_t (addr, 0, &gc), + port); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: port number is out of range: %s", p2); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: error parsing IP address: %s", p1); + } + } + else if (strlen (p1)) + { + /* common name specified */ + n_killed = (*man->persist.callback.kill_by_cn) (man->persist.callback.arg, p1); + if (n_killed > 0) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: common name '%s' found, %d client(s) killed", p1, n_killed); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: common name '%s' not found", p1); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: kill parse"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The 'kill' command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * General-purpose history command handler + * for the log and echo commands. + */ +static void +man_history (struct management *man, + const char *parm, + const char *type, + struct log_history *log, + bool *realtime, + const unsigned int lep_flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int n = 0; + + if (streq (parm, "on")) + { + *realtime = true; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: real-time %s notification set to ON", type); + } + else if (streq (parm, "off")) + { + *realtime = false; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: real-time %s notification set to OFF", type); + } + else if (streq (parm, "all") || (n = atoi (parm)) > 0) + { + const int size = log_history_size (log); + const int start = (n ? n : size) - 1; + int i; + + for (i = start; i >= 0; --i) + { + const struct log_entry *e = log_history_ref (log, i); + if (e) + { + const char *out = log_entry_print (e, lep_flags, &gc); + virtual_output_callback_func (man, M_CLIENT, out); + } + } + msg (M_CLIENT, "END"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: %s parameter must be 'on' or 'off' or some number n or 'all'", type); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +man_log (struct management *man, const char *parm) +{ + man_history (man, + parm, + "log", + man->persist.log, + &man->connection.log_realtime, + LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE|LOG_PRINT_MSG_FLAGS); +} + +static void +man_echo (struct management *man, const char *parm) +{ + man_history (man, + parm, + "echo", + man->persist.echo, + &man->connection.echo_realtime, + LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE|MANAGEMENT_ECHO_FLAGS); +} + +static void +man_state (struct management *man, const char *parm) +{ + man_history (man, + parm, + "state", + man->persist.state, + &man->connection.state_realtime, + LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE|LOG_PRINT_STATE| + LOG_PRINT_LOCAL_IP|LOG_PRINT_REMOTE_IP); +} + +static void +man_up_finalize (struct management *man) +{ + switch (man->connection.up_query_mode) + { + case UP_QUERY_USER_PASS: + if (!strlen (man->connection.up_query.username)) + break; + /* fall through */ + case UP_QUERY_PASS: + case UP_QUERY_NEED_OK: + case UP_QUERY_NEED_STR: + if (strlen (man->connection.up_query.password)) + man->connection.up_query.defined = true; + break; + case UP_QUERY_DISABLED: + man->connection.up_query.defined = false; + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +} + +static void +man_query_user_pass (struct management *man, + const char *type, + const char *string, + const bool needed, + const char *prompt, + char *dest, + int len) +{ + if (needed) + { + ASSERT (man->connection.up_query_type); + if (streq (man->connection.up_query_type, type)) + { + strncpynt (dest, string, len); + man_up_finalize (man); + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: '%s' %s entered, but not yet verified", + type, + prompt); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: %s of type '%s' entered, but we need one of type '%s'", + prompt, + type, + man->connection.up_query_type); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: no %s is currently needed at this time", prompt); + } +} + +static void +man_query_username (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *string) +{ + const bool needed = ((man->connection.up_query_mode == UP_QUERY_USER_PASS + ) && man->connection.up_query_type); + man_query_user_pass (man, type, string, needed, "username", man->connection.up_query.username, USER_PASS_LEN); +} + +static void +man_query_password (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *string) +{ + const bool needed = ((man->connection.up_query_mode == UP_QUERY_PASS + || man->connection.up_query_mode == UP_QUERY_USER_PASS + ) && man->connection.up_query_type); + if (!string[0]) /* allow blank passwords to be passed through using the blank_up tag */ + string = blank_up; + man_query_user_pass (man, type, string, needed, "password", man->connection.up_query.password, USER_PASS_LEN); +} + +static void +man_query_need_ok (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *action) +{ + const bool needed = ((man->connection.up_query_mode == UP_QUERY_NEED_OK) && man->connection.up_query_type); + man_query_user_pass (man, type, action, needed, "needok-confirmation", man->connection.up_query.password, USER_PASS_LEN); +} + +static void +man_query_need_str (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *action) +{ + const bool needed = ((man->connection.up_query_mode == UP_QUERY_NEED_STR) && man->connection.up_query_type); + man_query_user_pass (man, type, action, needed, "needstr-string", man->connection.up_query.password, USER_PASS_LEN); +} + +static void +man_forget_passwords (struct management *man) +{ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + ssl_purge_auth (false); + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: Passwords were forgotten"); +#endif +} + +static void +man_net (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->persist.callback.show_net) + { + (*man->persist.callback.show_net) (man->persist.callback.arg, M_CLIENT); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The 'net' command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + +static void +man_pkcs11_id_count (struct management *man) +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PKCS11ID-COUNT:%d", pkcs11_management_id_count ()); +} + +static void +man_pkcs11_id_get (struct management *man, const int index) +{ + char *id = NULL; + char *base64 = NULL; + + if (pkcs11_management_id_get (index, &id, &base64)) + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PKCS11ID-ENTRY:'%d', ID:'%s', BLOB:'%s'", index, id, base64); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PKCS11ID-ENTRY:'%d'", index); + + if (id != NULL) + free (id); + if (base64 != NULL) + free (base64); +} + +#endif + +static void +man_hold (struct management *man, const char *cmd) +{ + if (cmd) + { + if (streq (cmd, "on")) + { + man->settings.flags |= MF_HOLD; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: hold flag set to ON"); + } + else if (streq (cmd, "off")) + { + man->settings.flags &= ~MF_HOLD; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: hold flag set to OFF"); + } + else if (streq (cmd, "release")) + { + man->persist.hold_release = true; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: hold release succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: bad hold command parameter"); + } + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: hold=%d", BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_HOLD)); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA + +#define IER_RESET 0 +#define IER_NEW 1 + +static void +in_extra_reset (struct man_connection *mc, const int mode) +{ + if (mc) + { + if (mode != IER_NEW) + { + mc->in_extra_cmd = IEC_UNDEF; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + mc->in_extra_cid = 0; + mc->in_extra_kid = 0; +#endif + } + if (mc->in_extra) + { + buffer_list_free (mc->in_extra); + mc->in_extra = NULL; + } + if (mode == IER_NEW) + mc->in_extra = buffer_list_new (0); + } +} + +static void +in_extra_dispatch (struct management *man) +{ + switch (man->connection.in_extra_cmd) + { +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + case IEC_CLIENT_AUTH: + if (man->persist.callback.client_auth) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.client_auth) + (man->persist.callback.arg, + man->connection.in_extra_cid, + man->connection.in_extra_kid, + true, + NULL, + NULL, + man->connection.in_extra); + man->connection.in_extra = NULL; + if (status) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: client-auth command succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: client-auth command failed"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The client-auth command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + case IEC_CLIENT_PF: + if (man->persist.callback.client_pf) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.client_pf) + (man->persist.callback.arg, + man->connection.in_extra_cid, + man->connection.in_extra); + man->connection.in_extra = NULL; + if (status) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: client-pf command succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: client-pf command failed"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The client-pf command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } + break; +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + case IEC_RSA_SIGN: + man->connection.ext_key_state = EKS_READY; + buffer_list_free (man->connection.ext_key_input); + man->connection.ext_key_input = man->connection.in_extra; + man->connection.in_extra = NULL; + return; +#endif + } + in_extra_reset (&man->connection, IER_RESET); +} + +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA */ + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +static bool +parse_cid (const char *str, unsigned long *cid) +{ + if (sscanf (str, "%lu", cid) == 1) + return true; + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: cannot parse CID"); + return false; + } +} + +static bool +parse_kid (const char *str, unsigned int *kid) +{ + if (sscanf (str, "%u", kid) == 1) + return true; + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: cannot parse KID"); + return false; + } +} + +static void +man_client_auth (struct management *man, const char *cid_str, const char *kid_str, const bool extra) +{ + struct man_connection *mc = &man->connection; + mc->in_extra_cid = 0; + mc->in_extra_kid = 0; + if (parse_cid (cid_str, &mc->in_extra_cid) + && parse_kid (kid_str, &mc->in_extra_kid)) + { + mc->in_extra_cmd = IEC_CLIENT_AUTH; + in_extra_reset (mc, IER_NEW); + if (!extra) + in_extra_dispatch (man); + } +} + +static void +man_client_deny (struct management *man, const char *cid_str, const char *kid_str, const char *reason, const char *client_reason) +{ + unsigned long cid = 0; + unsigned int kid = 0; + if (parse_cid (cid_str, &cid) && parse_kid (kid_str, &kid)) + { + if (man->persist.callback.client_auth) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.client_auth) + (man->persist.callback.arg, + cid, + kid, + false, + reason, + client_reason, + NULL); + if (status) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: client-deny command succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: client-deny command failed"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The client-deny command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } + } +} + +static void +man_client_kill (struct management *man, const char *cid_str, const char *kill_msg) +{ + unsigned long cid = 0; + if (parse_cid (cid_str, &cid)) + { + if (man->persist.callback.kill_by_cid) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.kill_by_cid) (man->persist.callback.arg, cid, kill_msg); + if (status) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: client-kill command succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: client-kill command failed"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The client-kill command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } + } +} + +static void +man_client_n_clients (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->persist.callback.n_clients) + { + const int nclients = (*man->persist.callback.n_clients) (man->persist.callback.arg); + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: nclients=%d", nclients); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The nclients command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } +} + +static void +man_env_filter (struct management *man, const int level) +{ + man->connection.env_filter_level = level; + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: env_filter_level=%d", level); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + +static void +man_client_pf (struct management *man, const char *cid_str) +{ + struct man_connection *mc = &man->connection; + mc->in_extra_cid = 0; + mc->in_extra_kid = 0; + if (parse_cid (cid_str, &mc->in_extra_cid)) + { + mc->in_extra_cmd = IEC_CLIENT_PF; + in_extra_reset (mc, IER_NEW); + } +} + +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_PF */ +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +static void +man_rsa_sig (struct management *man) +{ + struct man_connection *mc = &man->connection; + if (mc->ext_key_state == EKS_SOLICIT) + { + mc->ext_key_state = EKS_INPUT; + mc->in_extra_cmd = IEC_RSA_SIGN; + in_extra_reset (mc, IER_NEW); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The rsa-sig command is not currently available"); +} + +#endif + +static void +man_load_stats (struct management *man) +{ + extern counter_type link_read_bytes_global; + extern counter_type link_write_bytes_global; + int nclients = 0; + + if (man->persist.callback.n_clients) + nclients = (*man->persist.callback.n_clients) (man->persist.callback.arg); + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: nclients=%d,bytesin=" counter_format ",bytesout=" counter_format, + nclients, + link_read_bytes_global, + link_write_bytes_global); +} + +#define MN_AT_LEAST (1<<0) + +static bool +man_need (struct management *man, const char **p, const int n, unsigned int flags) +{ + int i; + ASSERT (p[0]); + for (i = 1; i <= n; ++i) + { + if (!p[i]) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: the '%s' command requires %s%d parameter%s", + p[0], + (flags & MN_AT_LEAST) ? "at least " : "", + n, + n > 1 ? "s" : ""); + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +static void +man_proxy (struct management *man, const char **p) +{ + if (man->persist.callback.proxy_cmd) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.proxy_cmd)(man->persist.callback.arg, p); + if (status) + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: proxy command succeeded"); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: proxy command failed"); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The proxy command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); +} + +static void +man_remote (struct management *man, const char **p) +{ + if (man->persist.callback.remote_cmd) + { + const bool status = (*man->persist.callback.remote_cmd)(man->persist.callback.arg, p); + if (status) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: remote command succeeded"); + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: remote command failed"); + } + } + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: The remote command is not supported by the current daemon mode"); + } +} + +static void +man_dispatch_command (struct management *man, struct status_output *so, const char **p, const int nparms) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + ASSERT (p[0]); + if (streq (p[0], "exit") || streq (p[0], "quit")) + { + man->connection.halt = true; + goto done; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "help")) + { + man_help (); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "version")) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "OpenVPN Version: %s", title_string); + msg (M_CLIENT, "Management Version: %d", MANAGEMENT_VERSION); + msg (M_CLIENT, "END"); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pid")) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: pid=%d", platform_getpid ()); + } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + else if (streq (p[0], "nclients")) + { + man_client_n_clients (man); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "env-filter")) + { + int level = 0; + if (p[1]) + level = atoi (p[1]); + man_env_filter (man, level); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "signal")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + man_signal (man, p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "load-stats")) + { + man_load_stats (man); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "status")) + { + int version = 0; + if (p[1]) + version = atoi (p[1]); + man_status (man, version, so); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "kill")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + man_kill (man, p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "verb")) + { + if (p[1]) + { + const int level = atoi(p[1]); + if (set_debug_level (level, 0)) + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: verb level changed"); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: verb level is out of range"); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: verb=%d", get_debug_level ()); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mute")) + { + if (p[1]) + { + const int level = atoi(p[1]); + if (set_mute_cutoff (level)) + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: mute level changed"); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: mute level is out of range"); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: mute=%d", get_mute_cutoff ()); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-retry")) + { +#if P2MP + if (p[1]) + { + if (auth_retry_set (M_CLIENT, p[1])) + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: auth-retry parameter changed"); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: bad auth-retry parameter"); + } + else + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: auth-retry=%s", auth_retry_print ()); +#else + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: auth-retry feature is unavailable"); +#endif + } + else if (streq (p[0], "state")) + { + if (!p[1]) + { + man_state (man, "1"); + } + else + { + if (p[1]) + man_state (man, p[1]); + if (p[2]) + man_state (man, p[2]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "log")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, MN_AT_LEAST)) + { + if (p[1]) + man_log (man, p[1]); + if (p[2]) + man_log (man, p[2]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "echo")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, MN_AT_LEAST)) + { + if (p[1]) + man_echo (man, p[1]); + if (p[2]) + man_echo (man, p[2]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "username")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_query_username (man, p[1], p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "password")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_query_password (man, p[1], p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "forget-passwords")) + { + man_forget_passwords (man); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "needok")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_query_need_ok (man, p[1], p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "needstr")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_query_need_str (man, p[1], p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "net")) + { + man_net (man); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "hold")) + { + man_hold (man, p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "bytecount")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + man_bytecount (man, atoi(p[1])); + } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + else if (streq (p[0], "client-kill")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, MN_AT_LEAST)) + man_client_kill (man, p[1], p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-deny")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 3, MN_AT_LEAST)) + man_client_deny (man, p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-auth-nt")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_client_auth (man, p[1], p[2], false); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-auth")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 2, 0)) + man_client_auth (man, p[1], p[2], true); + } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + else if (streq (p[0], "client-pf")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + man_client_pf (man, p[1]); + } +#endif +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + else if (streq (p[0], "rsa-sig")) + { + man_rsa_sig (man); + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-id-count")) + { + man_pkcs11_id_count (man); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-id-get")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + man_pkcs11_id_get (man, atoi(p[1])); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "proxy")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, MN_AT_LEAST)) + man_proxy (man, p); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remote")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, MN_AT_LEAST)) + man_remote (man, p); + } +#if 1 + else if (streq (p[0], "test")) + { + if (man_need (man, p, 1, 0)) + { + int i; + const int n = atoi (p[1]); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "[%d] The purpose of this command is to generate large amounts of output.", i); + } + } + } +#endif + else + { + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: unknown command, enter 'help' for more options"); + } + + done: + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static void +man_start_ne32 (struct management *man) +{ + switch (man->connection.state) + { + case MS_LISTEN: + net_event_win32_start (&man->connection.ne32, FD_ACCEPT, man->connection.sd_top); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_READ: + case MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE: + net_event_win32_start (&man->connection.ne32, FD_READ|FD_WRITE|FD_CLOSE, man->connection.sd_cli); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +} + +static void +man_stop_ne32 (struct management *man) +{ + net_event_win32_stop (&man->connection.ne32); +} + +#endif + +static void +man_record_peer_info (struct management *man) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (man->settings.write_peer_info_file) + { + bool success = false; +#ifdef HAVE_GETSOCKNAME + if (socket_defined (man->connection.sd_cli)) + { + struct sockaddr_in addr; + socklen_t addrlen = sizeof (addr); + int status; + + CLEAR (addr); + status = getsockname (man->connection.sd_cli, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (!status && addrlen == sizeof (addr)) + { + const in_addr_t a = ntohl (addr.sin_addr.s_addr); + const int p = ntohs (addr.sin_port); + FILE *fp = platform_fopen (man->settings.write_peer_info_file, "w"); + if (fp) + { + fprintf (fp, "%s\n%d\n", print_in_addr_t (a, 0, &gc), p); + if (!fclose (fp)) + success = true; + } + } + } +#endif + if (!success) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: failed to write peer info to file %s", + man->settings.write_peer_info_file); + throw_signal_soft (SIGTERM, "management-connect-failed"); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +man_connection_settings_reset (struct management *man) +{ + man->connection.state_realtime = false; + man->connection.log_realtime = false; + man->connection.echo_realtime = false; + man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds = 0; + man->connection.password_verified = false; + man->connection.password_tries = 0; + man->connection.halt = false; + man->connection.state = MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE; +} + +static void +man_new_connection_post (struct management *man, const char *description) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + set_nonblock (man->connection.sd_cli); + set_cloexec (man->connection.sd_cli); + + man_connection_settings_reset (man); + +#ifdef WIN32 + man_start_ne32 (man); +#endif + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: %s %s", + description, + sockaddr_unix_name (&man->settings.local_unix, "NULL")); + } + else +#endif + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: %s %s", + description, + print_sockaddr (man->settings.local->ai_addr, &gc)); + + buffer_list_reset (man->connection.out); + + if (!man_password_needed (man)) + man_welcome (man); + man_prompt (man); + man_update_io_state (man); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT +static bool +man_verify_unix_peer_uid_gid (struct management *man, const socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + if (socket_defined (sd) && (man->settings.client_uid != -1 || man->settings.client_gid != -1)) + { + static const char err_prefix[] = "MANAGEMENT: unix domain socket client connection rejected --"; + int uid, gid; + if (unix_socket_get_peer_uid_gid (man->connection.sd_cli, &uid, &gid)) + { + if (man->settings.client_uid != -1 && man->settings.client_uid != uid) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "%s UID of socket peer (%d) doesn't match required value (%d) as given by --management-client-user", + err_prefix, uid, man->settings.client_uid); + return false; + } + if (man->settings.client_gid != -1 && man->settings.client_gid != gid) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "%s GID of socket peer (%d) doesn't match required value (%d) as given by --management-client-group", + err_prefix, gid, man->settings.client_gid); + return false; + } + } + else + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "%s cannot get UID/GID of socket peer", err_prefix); + return false; + } + } + return true; +} +#endif + +static void +man_accept (struct management *man) +{ + struct link_socket_actual act; + CLEAR (act); + + /* + * Accept the TCP or Unix domain socket client. + */ +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + struct sockaddr_un remote; + man->connection.sd_cli = socket_accept_unix (man->connection.sd_top, &remote); + if (!man_verify_unix_peer_uid_gid (man, man->connection.sd_cli)) + sd_close (&man->connection.sd_cli); + } + else +#endif + man->connection.sd_cli = socket_do_accept (man->connection.sd_top, &act, false); + + if (socket_defined (man->connection.sd_cli)) + { + man->connection.remote = act.dest; + + if (socket_defined (man->connection.sd_top)) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + man_stop_ne32 (man); +#endif + } + + man_new_connection_post (man, "Client connected from"); + } +} + +static void +man_listen (struct management *man) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* + * Initialize state + */ + man->connection.state = MS_LISTEN; + man->connection.sd_cli = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + + /* + * Initialize listening socket + */ + if (man->connection.sd_top == SOCKET_UNDEFINED) + { +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + man_delete_unix_socket (man); + man->connection.sd_top = create_socket_unix (); + socket_bind_unix (man->connection.sd_top, &man->settings.local_unix, "MANAGEMENT"); + } + else +#endif + { + man->connection.sd_top = create_socket_tcp (AF_INET); + socket_bind (man->connection.sd_top, man->settings.local, + AF_INET, "MANAGEMENT"); + } + + /* + * Listen for connection + */ + if (listen (man->connection.sd_top, 1)) + msg (M_ERR, "MANAGEMENT: listen() failed"); + + /* + * Set misc socket properties + */ + set_nonblock (man->connection.sd_top); + set_cloexec (man->connection.sd_top); + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: unix domain socket listening on %s", + sockaddr_unix_name (&man->settings.local_unix, "NULL")); + } + else +#endif + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: TCP Socket listening on %s", + print_sockaddr (man->settings.local->ai_addr, &gc)); + } + +#ifdef WIN32 + man_start_ne32 (man); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +man_connect (struct management *man) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int status; + int signal_received = 0; + + /* + * Initialize state + */ + man->connection.state = MS_INITIAL; + man->connection.sd_top = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + man->connection.sd_cli = create_socket_unix (); + status = socket_connect_unix (man->connection.sd_cli, &man->settings.local_unix); + if (!status && !man_verify_unix_peer_uid_gid (man, man->connection.sd_cli)) + { +#ifdef EPERM + status = EPERM; +#else + status = 1; +#endif + sd_close (&man->connection.sd_cli); + } + } + else +#endif + { + man->connection.sd_cli = create_socket_tcp (AF_INET); + status = openvpn_connect (man->connection.sd_cli, + man->settings.local->ai_addr, + 5, + &signal_received); + } + + if (signal_received) + { + throw_signal (signal_received); + goto done; + } + + if (status) + { +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "MANAGEMENT: connect to unix socket %s failed: %s", + sockaddr_unix_name (&man->settings.local_unix, "NULL"), + strerror_ts (status, &gc)); + } + else +#endif + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "MANAGEMENT: connect to %s failed: %s", + print_sockaddr (man->settings.local->ai_addr, &gc), + strerror_ts (status, &gc)); + throw_signal_soft (SIGTERM, "management-connect-failed"); + goto done; + } + + man_record_peer_info (man); + man_new_connection_post (man, "Connected to management server at"); + + done: + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +man_reset_client_socket (struct management *man, const bool exiting) +{ + if (socket_defined (man->connection.sd_cli)) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + man_stop_ne32 (man); +#endif + man_close_socket (man, man->connection.sd_cli); + man->connection.sd_cli = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + man->connection.state = MS_INITIAL; + command_line_reset (man->connection.in); + buffer_list_reset (man->connection.out); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA + in_extra_reset (&man->connection, IER_RESET); +#endif + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: Client disconnected"); + } + if (!exiting) + { +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + if (man->settings.flags & MF_FORGET_DISCONNECT) + ssl_purge_auth (false); +#endif + if (man->settings.flags & MF_SIGNAL) { + int mysig = man_mod_signal (man, SIGUSR1); + if (mysig >= 0) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: Triggering management signal"); + throw_signal_soft (mysig, "management-disconnect"); + } + } + + if (man->settings.flags & MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT) + { + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: Triggering management exit"); + throw_signal_soft (SIGTERM, "management-exit"); + } + else + man_listen (man); + } +} + +static void +man_process_command (struct management *man, const char *line) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct status_output *so; + int nparms; + char *parms[MAX_PARMS+1]; + + CLEAR (parms); + so = status_open (NULL, 0, -1, &man->persist.vout, 0); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA + in_extra_reset (&man->connection, IER_RESET); +#endif + + if (man_password_needed (man)) + { + man_check_password (man, line); + } + else + { + nparms = parse_line (line, parms, MAX_PARMS, "TCP", 0, M_CLIENT, &gc); + if (parms[0] && streq (parms[0], "password")) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT_DEBUG, "MANAGEMENT: CMD 'password [...]'"); + else if (!streq (line, "load-stats")) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT_DEBUG, "MANAGEMENT: CMD '%s'", line); + +#if 0 + /* DEBUGGING -- print args */ + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < nparms; ++i) + msg (M_INFO, "[%d] '%s'", i, parms[i]); + } +#endif + + if (nparms > 0) + man_dispatch_command (man, so, (const char **)parms, nparms); + } + + CLEAR (parms); + status_close (so); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static bool +man_io_error (struct management *man, const char *prefix) +{ + const int err = openvpn_errno (); + + if (!ignore_sys_error (err)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: TCP %s error: %s", + prefix, + strerror_ts (err, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID +static ssize_t write_fd (int fd, void *ptr, size_t nbytes, int flags, int sendfd) +{ + struct msghdr msg; + struct iovec iov[1]; + + union { + struct cmsghdr cm; + char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; + } control_un; + struct cmsghdr *cmptr; + + msg.msg_control = control_un.control; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_un.control); + + cmptr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + cmptr->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); + cmptr->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + cmptr->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + *((int *) CMSG_DATA(cmptr)) = sendfd; + + msg.msg_name = NULL; + msg.msg_namelen = 0; + + iov[0].iov_base = ptr; + iov[0].iov_len = nbytes; + msg.msg_iov = iov; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + + return (sendmsg(fd, &msg, flags)); +} + +static ssize_t read_fd(int fd, void *ptr, size_t nbytes, int flags, int *recvfd) +{ + struct msghdr msghdr; + struct iovec iov[1]; + ssize_t n; + + union { + struct cmsghdr cm; + char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof (int))]; + } control_un; + struct cmsghdr *cmptr; + + msghdr.msg_control = control_un.control; + msghdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_un.control); + + msghdr.msg_name = NULL; + msghdr.msg_namelen = 0; + + iov[0].iov_base = ptr; + iov[0].iov_len = nbytes; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = 1; + + if ( (n = recvmsg(fd, &msghdr, flags)) <= 0) + return (n); + + if ( (cmptr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msghdr)) != NULL && + cmptr->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int))) { + if (cmptr->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET) + msg (M_ERR, "control level != SOL_SOCKET"); + if (cmptr->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) + msg (M_ERR, "control type != SCM_RIGHTS"); + *recvfd = *((int *) CMSG_DATA(cmptr)); + } else + *recvfd = -1; /* descriptor was not passed */ + + return (n); +} +#endif + + +static int +man_read (struct management *man) +{ + /* + * read command line from socket + */ + unsigned char buf[256]; + int len = 0; + +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID + int fd; + len = read_fd (man->connection.sd_cli, buf, sizeof (buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL, &fd); + if(fd >= 0) + man->connection.lastfdreceived = fd; +#else + len = recv (man->connection.sd_cli, buf, sizeof (buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL); +#endif + + if (len == 0) + { + man_reset_client_socket (man, false); + } + else if (len > 0) + { + bool processed_command = false; + + ASSERT (len <= (int) sizeof (buf)); + command_line_add (man->connection.in, buf, len); + + /* + * Reset output object + */ + buffer_list_reset (man->connection.out); + + /* + * process command line if complete + */ + { + const unsigned char *line; + while ((line = command_line_get (man->connection.in))) + { +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA + if (man->connection.in_extra) + { + if (!strcmp ((char *)line, "END")) + in_extra_dispatch (man); + else + buffer_list_push (man->connection.in_extra, line); + } + else +#endif + man_process_command (man, (char *) line); + if (man->connection.halt) + break; + command_line_next (man->connection.in); + processed_command = true; + } + } + + /* + * Reset output state to MS_CC_WAIT_(READ|WRITE) + */ + if (man->connection.halt) + { + man_reset_client_socket (man, false); + len = 0; + } + else + { + if (processed_command) + man_prompt (man); + man_update_io_state (man); + } + } + else /* len < 0 */ + { + if (man_io_error (man, "recv")) + man_reset_client_socket (man, false); + } + return len; +} + +static int +man_write (struct management *man) +{ + const int size_hint = 1024; + int sent = 0; + const struct buffer *buf; + + buffer_list_aggregate(man->connection.out, size_hint); + buf = buffer_list_peek (man->connection.out); + if (buf && BLEN (buf)) + { + const int len = min_int (size_hint, BLEN (buf)); +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID + if (man->connection.fdtosend > 0) + { + sent = write_fd (man->connection.sd_cli, BPTR (buf), len, MSG_NOSIGNAL,man->connection.fdtosend); + man->connection.fdtosend = -1; + } else +#endif + sent = send (man->connection.sd_cli, BPTR (buf), len, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (sent >= 0) + { + buffer_list_advance (man->connection.out, sent); + } + else if (sent < 0) + { + if (man_io_error (man, "send")) + man_reset_client_socket (man, false); + } + } + + /* + * Reset output state to MS_CC_WAIT_(READ|WRITE) + */ + man_update_io_state (man); + + return sent; +} + +static void +man_connection_clear (struct man_connection *mc) +{ + CLEAR (*mc); + + /* set initial state */ + mc->state = MS_INITIAL; + + /* clear socket descriptors */ + mc->sd_top = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + mc->sd_cli = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +} + +static void +man_persist_init (struct management *man, + const int log_history_cache, + const int echo_buffer_size, + const int state_buffer_size) +{ + struct man_persist *mp = &man->persist; + if (!mp->defined) + { + CLEAR (*mp); + + /* initialize log history store */ + mp->log = log_history_init (log_history_cache); + + /* + * Initialize virtual output object, so that functions + * which write to a virtual_output object can be redirected + * here to the management object. + */ + mp->vout.func = virtual_output_callback_func; + mp->vout.arg = man; + mp->vout.flags_default = M_CLIENT; + msg_set_virtual_output (&mp->vout); + + /* + * Initialize --echo list + */ + man->persist.echo = log_history_init (echo_buffer_size); + + /* + * Initialize --state list + */ + man->persist.state = log_history_init (state_buffer_size); + + mp->defined = true; + } +} + +static void +man_persist_close (struct man_persist *mp) +{ + if (mp->log) + { + msg_set_virtual_output (NULL); + log_history_close (mp->log); + } + + if (mp->echo) + log_history_close (mp->echo); + + if (mp->state) + log_history_close (mp->state); + + CLEAR (*mp); +} + +static void +man_settings_init (struct man_settings *ms, + const char *addr, + const char *port, + const char *pass_file, + const char *client_user, + const char *client_group, + const int log_history_cache, + const int echo_buffer_size, + const int state_buffer_size, + const char *write_peer_info_file, + const int remap_sigusr1, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (!ms->defined) + { + CLEAR (*ms); + + ms->flags = flags; + ms->client_uid = -1; + ms->client_gid = -1; + + /* + * Get username/password + */ + if (pass_file) + get_user_pass (&ms->up, pass_file, "Management", GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY); + + /* + * lookup client UID/GID if specified + */ + if (client_user) + { + struct platform_state_user s; + platform_user_get (client_user, &s); + ms->client_uid = platform_state_user_uid (&s); + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: client_uid=%d", ms->client_uid); + ASSERT (ms->client_uid >= 0); + } + if (client_group) + { + struct platform_state_group s; + platform_group_get (client_group, &s); + ms->client_gid = platform_state_group_gid (&s); + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: client_gid=%d", ms->client_gid); + ASSERT (ms->client_gid >= 0); + } + + ms->write_peer_info_file = string_alloc (write_peer_info_file, NULL); + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + if (ms->flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK) + sockaddr_unix_init (&ms->local_unix, addr); + else +#endif + { + + /* + * Run management over tunnel, or + * separate channel? + */ + if (streq (addr, "tunnel") && !(flags & MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT)) + { + ms->management_over_tunnel = true; + } + else + { + int status = openvpn_getaddrinfo(GETADDR_RESOLVE|GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL|GETADDR_FATAL, + addr, port, 0, NULL, AF_INET, &ms->local); + ASSERT(status==0); + } + } + + /* + * Log history and echo buffer may need to be resized + */ + ms->log_history_cache = log_history_cache; + ms->echo_buffer_size = echo_buffer_size; + ms->state_buffer_size = state_buffer_size; + + /* + * Set remap sigusr1 flags + */ + if (remap_sigusr1 == SIGHUP) + ms->mansig |= MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_HUP; + else if (remap_sigusr1 == SIGTERM) + ms->mansig |= MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_TERM; + + ms->defined = true; + } +} + +static void +man_settings_close (struct man_settings *ms) +{ + free (ms->write_peer_info_file); + CLEAR (*ms); +} + + +static void +man_connection_init (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->connection.state == MS_INITIAL) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + /* + * This object is a sort of TCP/IP helper + * for Windows. + */ + net_event_win32_init (&man->connection.ne32); +#endif + + /* + * Allocate helper objects for command line input and + * command output from/to the socket. + */ + man->connection.in = command_line_new (1024); + man->connection.out = buffer_list_new (0); + + /* + * Initialize event set for standalone usage, when we are + * running outside of the primary event loop. + */ + { + int maxevents = 1; + man->connection.es = event_set_init (&maxevents, EVENT_METHOD_FAST); + } + + /* + * Listen/connect socket + */ + if (man->settings.flags & MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT) + man_connect (man); + else + man_listen (man); + } +} + +static void +man_connection_close (struct management *man) +{ + struct man_connection *mc = &man->connection; + + if (mc->es) + event_free (mc->es); +#ifdef WIN32 + net_event_win32_close (&mc->ne32); +#endif + if (socket_defined (mc->sd_top)) + { + man_close_socket (man, mc->sd_top); + man_delete_unix_socket (man); + } + if (socket_defined (mc->sd_cli)) + man_close_socket (man, mc->sd_cli); + if (mc->in) + command_line_free (mc->in); + if (mc->out) + buffer_list_free (mc->out); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA + in_extra_reset (&man->connection, IER_RESET); +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + buffer_list_free (mc->ext_key_input); +#endif + man_connection_clear (mc); +} + +struct management * +management_init (void) +{ + struct management *man; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (man, struct management); + + man_persist_init (man, + MANAGEMENT_LOG_HISTORY_INITIAL_SIZE, + MANAGEMENT_ECHO_BUFFER_SIZE, + MANAGEMENT_STATE_BUFFER_SIZE); + + man_connection_clear (&man->connection); + + return man; +} + +bool +management_open (struct management *man, + const char *addr, + const char *port, + const char *pass_file, + const char *client_user, + const char *client_group, + const int log_history_cache, + const int echo_buffer_size, + const int state_buffer_size, + const char *write_peer_info_file, + const int remap_sigusr1, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + bool ret = false; + + /* + * Save the settings only if they have not + * been saved before. + */ + man_settings_init (&man->settings, + addr, + port, + pass_file, + client_user, + client_group, + log_history_cache, + echo_buffer_size, + state_buffer_size, + write_peer_info_file, + remap_sigusr1, + flags); + + /* + * The log is initially sized to MANAGEMENT_LOG_HISTORY_INITIAL_SIZE, + * but may be changed here. Ditto for echo and state buffers. + */ + log_history_resize (man->persist.log, man->settings.log_history_cache); + log_history_resize (man->persist.echo, man->settings.echo_buffer_size); + log_history_resize (man->persist.state, man->settings.state_buffer_size); + + /* + * If connection object is uninitialized and we are not doing + * over-the-tunnel management, then open (listening) connection. + */ + if (man->connection.state == MS_INITIAL) + { + if (!man->settings.management_over_tunnel) + { + man_connection_init (man); + ret = true; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +void +management_close (struct management *man) +{ + man_output_list_push_finalize (man); /* flush output queue */ + man_connection_close (man); + man_settings_close (&man->settings); + man_persist_close (&man->persist); + free (man); +} + +void +management_set_callback (struct management *man, + const struct management_callback *cb) +{ + man->persist.standalone_disabled = true; + man->persist.callback = *cb; +} + +void +management_clear_callback (struct management *man) +{ + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; + man->persist.hold_release = false; + CLEAR (man->persist.callback); + man_output_list_push_finalize (man); /* flush output queue */ +} + +void +management_set_state (struct management *man, + const int state, + const char *detail, + const in_addr_t tun_local_ip, + const in_addr_t tun_remote_ip) +{ + if (man->persist.state && (!(man->settings.flags & MF_SERVER) || state < OPENVPN_STATE_CLIENT_BASE)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct log_entry e; + const char *out = NULL; + + update_time (); + CLEAR (e); + e.timestamp = now; + e.u.state = state; + e.string = detail; + e.local_ip = tun_local_ip; + e.remote_ip = tun_remote_ip; + + log_history_add (man->persist.state, &e); + + if (man->connection.state_realtime) + out = log_entry_print (&e, LOG_PRINT_STATE_PREFIX + | LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE + | LOG_PRINT_STATE + | LOG_PRINT_LOCAL_IP + | LOG_PRINT_REMOTE_IP + | LOG_PRINT_CRLF + | LOG_ECHO_TO_LOG, &gc); + + if (out) + man_output_list_push (man, out); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static bool +env_filter_match (const char *env_str, const int env_filter_level) +{ + static const char *env_names[] = { + "username=", + "password=", + "X509_0_CN=", + "tls_serial_", + "untrusted_ip=", + "ifconfig_local=", + "ifconfig_netmask=", + "daemon_start_time=", + "daemon_pid=", + "dev=", + "ifconfig_pool_remote_ip=", + "ifconfig_pool_netmask=", + "time_duration=", + "bytes_sent=", + "bytes_received=" + }; + + if (env_filter_level == 0) + return true; + else if (env_filter_level <= 1 && !strncmp(env_str, "X509_", 5)) + return true; + else if (env_filter_level <= 2) + { + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < SIZE(env_names); ++i) + { + const char *en = env_names[i]; + const size_t len = strlen(en); + if (!strncmp(env_str, en, len)) + return true; + } + return false; + } + return false; +} + +static void +man_output_env (const struct env_set *es, const bool tail, const int env_filter_level, const char *prefix) +{ + if (es) + { + struct env_item *e; + for (e = es->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + { + if (e->string && (!env_filter_level || env_filter_match(e->string, env_filter_level))) + msg (M_CLIENT, ">%s:ENV,%s", prefix, e->string); + } + } + if (tail) + msg (M_CLIENT, ">%s:ENV,END", prefix); +} + +static void +man_output_extra_env (struct management *man, const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct env_set *es = env_set_create (&gc); + if (man->persist.callback.n_clients) + { + const int nclients = (*man->persist.callback.n_clients) (man->persist.callback.arg); + setenv_int (es, "n_clients", nclients); + } + man_output_env (es, false, man->connection.env_filter_level, prefix); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +management_up_down(struct management *man, const char *updown, const struct env_set *es) +{ + if (man->settings.flags & MF_UP_DOWN) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, ">UPDOWN:%s", updown); + man_output_env (es, true, 0, "UPDOWN"); + } +} + +void +management_notify(struct management *man, const char *severity, const char *type, const char *text) +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, ">NOTIFY:%s,%s,%s", severity, type, text); +} + +void +management_notify_generic (struct management *man, const char *str) +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", str); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +static bool +validate_peer_info_line(const char *line) +{ + uint8_t c; + int state = 0; + while ((c=*line++)) + { + switch (state) + { + case 0: + case 1: + if (c == '=' && state == 1) + state = 2; + else if (isalnum(c) || c == '_') + state = 1; + else + return false; + case 2: + if (isprint(c)) + ; + else + return false; + } + } + return (state == 2); +} + +static void +man_output_peer_info_env (struct management *man, struct man_def_auth_context *mdac) +{ + char line[256]; + if (man->persist.callback.get_peer_info) + { + const char *peer_info = (*man->persist.callback.get_peer_info) (man->persist.callback.arg, mdac->cid); + if (peer_info) + { + struct buffer buf; + buf_set_read (&buf, (const uint8_t *) peer_info, strlen(peer_info)); + while (buf_parse (&buf, '\n', line, sizeof (line))) + { + chomp (line); + if (validate_peer_info_line(line)) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:ENV,%s", line); + } + else + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "validation failed on peer_info line received from client"); + } + } + } +} + +void +management_notify_client_needing_auth (struct management *management, + const unsigned int mda_key_id, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + if (!(mdac->flags & DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED)) + { + const char *mode = "CONNECT"; + if (mdac->flags & DAF_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED) + mode = "REAUTH"; + msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:%s,%lu,%u", mode, mdac->cid, mda_key_id); + man_output_extra_env (management, "CLIENT"); + man_output_peer_info_env(management, mdac); + man_output_env (es, true, management->connection.env_filter_level, "CLIENT"); + mdac->flags |= DAF_INITIAL_AUTH; + } +} + +void +management_connection_established (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + mdac->flags |= DAF_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED; + msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:ESTABLISHED,%lu", mdac->cid); + man_output_extra_env (management, "CLIENT"); + man_output_env (es, true, management->connection.env_filter_level, "CLIENT"); +} + +void +management_notify_client_close (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + if ((mdac->flags & DAF_INITIAL_AUTH) && !(mdac->flags & DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED)) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:DISCONNECT,%lu", mdac->cid); + man_output_env (es, true, management->connection.env_filter_level, "CLIENT"); + mdac->flags |= DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED; + } +} + +void +management_learn_addr (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct mroute_addr *addr, + const bool primary) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if ((mdac->flags & DAF_INITIAL_AUTH) && !(mdac->flags & DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED)) + { + msg (M_CLIENT, ">CLIENT:ADDRESS,%lu,%s,%d", + mdac->cid, + mroute_addr_print_ex (addr, MAPF_SUBNET, &gc), + BOOL_CAST (primary)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ + +void +management_echo (struct management *man, const char *string, const bool pull) +{ + if (man->persist.echo) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct log_entry e; + const char *out = NULL; + + update_time (); + CLEAR (e); + e.timestamp = now; + e.string = string; + e.u.intval = BOOL_CAST (pull); + + log_history_add (man->persist.echo, &e); + + if (man->connection.echo_realtime) + out = log_entry_print (&e, LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE|LOG_PRINT_ECHO_PREFIX|LOG_PRINT_CRLF|MANAGEMENT_ECHO_FLAGS, &gc); + + if (out) + man_output_list_push (man, out); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +void +management_post_tunnel_open (struct management *man, const in_addr_t tun_local_ip) +{ + /* + * If we are running management over the tunnel, + * this is the place to initialize the connection. + */ + if (man->settings.management_over_tunnel + && man->connection.state == MS_INITIAL) + { + /* listen on our local TUN/TAP IP address */ + struct in_addr ia; + int ret; + + ia.s_addr = htonl(tun_local_ip); + ret = openvpn_getaddrinfo(0, inet_ntoa(ia), NULL, 0, NULL, + AF_INET, &man->settings.local); + ASSERT (ret==0); + man_connection_init (man); + } + +} + +void +management_pre_tunnel_close (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->settings.management_over_tunnel) + man_connection_close (man); +} + +void +management_auth_failure (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *reason) +{ + if (reason) + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PASSWORD:Verification Failed: '%s' ['%s']", type, reason); + else + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PASSWORD:Verification Failed: '%s'", type); +} + +void +management_auth_token (struct management *man, const char *token) +{ + msg (M_CLIENT, ">PASSWORD:Auth-Token:%s", token); +} + +static inline bool +man_persist_state (unsigned int *persistent, const int n) +{ + if (persistent) + { + if (*persistent == (unsigned int)n) + return false; + *persistent = n; + } + return true; +} + +#ifdef WIN32 + +void +management_socket_set (struct management *man, + struct event_set *es, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent) +{ + if (man->connection.state != MS_INITIAL) + { + event_t ev = net_event_win32_get_event (&man->connection.ne32); + net_event_win32_reset_write (&man->connection.ne32); + + switch (man->connection.state) + { + case MS_LISTEN: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 1)) + event_ctl (es, ev, EVENT_READ, arg); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_READ: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 2)) + event_ctl (es, ev, EVENT_READ, arg); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 3)) + event_ctl (es, ev, EVENT_READ|EVENT_WRITE, arg); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + } +} + +void +management_io (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->connection.state != MS_INITIAL) + { + long net_events; + net_event_win32_reset (&man->connection.ne32); + net_events = net_event_win32_get_event_mask (&man->connection.ne32); + + if (net_events & FD_CLOSE) + { + man_reset_client_socket (man, false); + } + else + { + if (man->connection.state == MS_LISTEN) + { + if (net_events & FD_ACCEPT) + { + man_accept (man); + net_event_win32_clear_selected_events (&man->connection.ne32, FD_ACCEPT); + } + } + else if (man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_READ || man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE) + { + if (net_events & FD_READ) + { + while (man_read (man) > 0) + ; + net_event_win32_clear_selected_events (&man->connection.ne32, FD_READ); + } + + if (net_events & FD_WRITE) + { + int status; + status = man_write (man); + if (status < 0 && WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) + { + net_event_win32_clear_selected_events (&man->connection.ne32, FD_WRITE); + } + } + } + } + } +} + +#else + +void +management_socket_set (struct management *man, + struct event_set *es, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent) +{ + switch (man->connection.state) + { + case MS_LISTEN: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 1)) + event_ctl (es, man->connection.sd_top, EVENT_READ, arg); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_READ: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 2)) + event_ctl (es, man->connection.sd_cli, EVENT_READ, arg); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE: + if (man_persist_state (persistent, 3)) + event_ctl (es, man->connection.sd_cli, EVENT_WRITE, arg); + break; + case MS_INITIAL: + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +} + +void +management_io (struct management *man) +{ + switch (man->connection.state) + { + case MS_LISTEN: + man_accept (man); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_READ: + man_read (man); + break; + case MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE: + man_write (man); + break; + case MS_INITIAL: + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +} + +#endif + +static inline bool +man_standalone_ok (const struct management *man) +{ + return !man->settings.management_over_tunnel && man->connection.state != MS_INITIAL; +} + +static bool +man_check_for_signals (volatile int *signal_received) +{ + if (signal_received) + { + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* + * Wait for socket I/O when outside primary event loop + */ +static int +man_block (struct management *man, volatile int *signal_received, const time_t expire) +{ + struct timeval tv; + struct event_set_return esr; + int status = -1; + + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + while (true) + { + event_reset (man->connection.es); + management_socket_set (man, man->connection.es, NULL, NULL); + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tv.tv_sec = 1; + if (man_check_for_signals (signal_received)) + { + status = -1; + break; + } + status = event_wait (man->connection.es, &tv, &esr, 1); + update_time (); + if (man_check_for_signals (signal_received)) + { + status = -1; + break; + } + + if (status > 0) + break; + else if (expire && now >= expire) + { + /* set SIGINT signal if expiration time exceeded */ + status = 0; + if (signal_received) + *signal_received = SIGINT; + break; + } + } + } + return status; +} + +/* + * Perform management socket output outside primary event loop + */ +static void +man_output_standalone (struct management *man, volatile int *signal_received) +{ + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + while (man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE) + { + management_io (man); + if (man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE) + man_block (man, signal_received, 0); + if (signal_received && *signal_received) + break; + } + } +} + +/* + * Process management event loop outside primary event loop + */ +static int +man_standalone_event_loop (struct management *man, volatile int *signal_received, const time_t expire) +{ + int status = -1; + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + status = man_block (man, signal_received, expire); + if (status > 0) + management_io (man); + } + return status; +} + +#define MWCC_PASSWORD_WAIT (1<<0) +#define MWCC_HOLD_WAIT (1<<1) +#define MWCC_OTHER_WAIT (1<<2) + +/* + * Block until client connects + */ +static void +man_wait_for_client_connection (struct management *man, + volatile int *signal_received, + const time_t expire, + unsigned int flags) +{ + ASSERT (man_standalone_ok (man)); + if (man->connection.state == MS_LISTEN) + { + if (flags & MWCC_PASSWORD_WAIT) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "Need password(s) from management interface, waiting..."); + if (flags & MWCC_HOLD_WAIT) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "Need hold release from management interface, waiting..."); + if (flags & MWCC_OTHER_WAIT) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "Need information from management interface, waiting..."); + do { + man_standalone_event_loop (man, signal_received, expire); + if (signal_received && *signal_received) + break; + } while (man->connection.state == MS_LISTEN || man_password_needed (man)); + } +} + +/* + * Process the management event loop for sec seconds + */ +void +management_event_loop_n_seconds (struct management *man, int sec) +{ + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + volatile int signal_received = 0; + const bool standalone_disabled_save = man->persist.standalone_disabled; + time_t expire = 0; + + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; /* This is so M_CLIENT messages will be correctly passed through msg() */ + + /* set expire time */ + update_time (); + if (sec) + expire = now + sec; + + /* if no client connection, wait for one */ + man_wait_for_client_connection (man, &signal_received, expire, 0); + if (signal_received) + return; + + /* run command processing event loop */ + do + { + man_standalone_event_loop (man, &signal_received, expire); + if (!signal_received) + man_check_for_signals (&signal_received); + if (signal_received) + return; + } while (expire); + + /* revert state */ + man->persist.standalone_disabled = standalone_disabled_save; + } + else + { + sleep (sec); + } +} + +/* + * Get a username/password from management channel in standalone mode. + */ +bool +management_query_user_pass (struct management *man, + struct user_pass *up, + const char *type, + const unsigned int flags, + const char *static_challenge) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + volatile int signal_received = 0; + const bool standalone_disabled_save = man->persist.standalone_disabled; + struct buffer alert_msg = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + const char *alert_type = NULL; + const char *prefix = NULL; + unsigned int up_query_mode = 0; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + const char *sc = NULL; +#endif + ret = true; + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; /* This is so M_CLIENT messages will be correctly passed through msg() */ + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + + CLEAR (man->connection.up_query); + + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK) + { + up_query_mode = UP_QUERY_NEED_OK; + prefix= "NEED-OK"; + alert_type = "confirmation"; + } + else if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_NEED_STR) + { + up_query_mode = UP_QUERY_NEED_STR; + prefix= "NEED-STR"; + alert_type = "string"; + } + else if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY) + { + up_query_mode = UP_QUERY_PASS; + prefix = "PASSWORD"; + alert_type = "password"; + } + else + { + up_query_mode = UP_QUERY_USER_PASS; + prefix = "PASSWORD"; + alert_type = "username/password"; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (static_challenge) + sc = static_challenge; +#endif + } + buf_printf (&alert_msg, ">%s:Need '%s' %s", + prefix, + type, + alert_type); + + if (flags & (GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK | GET_USER_PASS_NEED_STR)) + buf_printf (&alert_msg, " MSG:%s", up->username); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (sc) + buf_printf (&alert_msg, " SC:%d,%s", + BOOL_CAST(flags & GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE_ECHO), + sc); +#endif + + man_wait_for_client_connection (man, &signal_received, 0, MWCC_PASSWORD_WAIT); + if (signal_received) + ret = false; + + if (ret) + { + man->persist.special_state_msg = BSTR (&alert_msg); + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", man->persist.special_state_msg); + + /* tell command line parser which info we need */ + man->connection.up_query_mode = up_query_mode; + man->connection.up_query_type = type; + + /* run command processing event loop until we get our username/password/response */ + do + { + man_standalone_event_loop (man, &signal_received, 0); + if (!signal_received) + man_check_for_signals (&signal_received); + if (signal_received) + { + ret = false; + break; + } + } while (!man->connection.up_query.defined); + } + + /* revert state */ + man->connection.up_query_mode = UP_QUERY_DISABLED; + man->connection.up_query_type = NULL; + man->persist.standalone_disabled = standalone_disabled_save; + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + + /* pass through blank passwords */ + if (!strcmp (man->connection.up_query.password, blank_up)) + CLEAR (man->connection.up_query.password); + + /* + * Transfer u/p to return object, zero any record + * we hold in the management object. + */ + if (ret) + { + man->connection.up_query.nocache = up->nocache; /* preserve caller's nocache setting */ + *up = man->connection.up_query; + } + CLEAR (man->connection.up_query); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +char * /* returns allocated base64 signature */ +management_query_rsa_sig (struct management *man, + const char *b64_data) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *ret = NULL; + volatile int signal_received = 0; + struct buffer alert_msg = clear_buf(); + struct buffer *buf; + const bool standalone_disabled_save = man->persist.standalone_disabled; + struct man_connection *mc = &man->connection; + + if (man_standalone_ok (man)) + { + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; /* This is so M_CLIENT messages will be correctly passed through msg() */ + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + + mc->ext_key_state = EKS_SOLICIT; + + alert_msg = alloc_buf_gc (strlen(b64_data)+64, &gc); + buf_printf (&alert_msg, ">RSA_SIGN:%s", b64_data); + + man_wait_for_client_connection (man, &signal_received, 0, MWCC_OTHER_WAIT); + + if (signal_received) + goto done; + + man->persist.special_state_msg = BSTR (&alert_msg); + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", man->persist.special_state_msg); + + /* run command processing event loop until we get our signature */ + do + { + man_standalone_event_loop (man, &signal_received, 0); + if (!signal_received) + man_check_for_signals (&signal_received); + if (signal_received) + goto done; + } while (mc->ext_key_state != EKS_READY); + + if (buffer_list_defined(mc->ext_key_input)) + { + buffer_list_aggregate (mc->ext_key_input, 2048); + buf = buffer_list_peek (mc->ext_key_input); + if (buf && BLEN(buf) > 0) + { + ret = (char *) malloc(BLEN(buf)+1); + check_malloc_return(ret); + memcpy(ret, buf->data, BLEN(buf)); + ret[BLEN(buf)] = '\0'; + } + } + } + + done: + if (mc->ext_key_state == EKS_READY && ret) + msg (M_CLIENT, "SUCCESS: rsa-sig command succeeded"); + else if (mc->ext_key_state == EKS_INPUT || mc->ext_key_state == EKS_READY) + msg (M_CLIENT, "ERROR: rsa-sig command failed"); + + /* revert state */ + man->persist.standalone_disabled = standalone_disabled_save; + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + in_extra_reset (mc, IER_RESET); + mc->ext_key_state = EKS_UNDEF; + buffer_list_free (mc->ext_key_input); + mc->ext_key_input = NULL; + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +#endif + +/* + * Return true if management_hold() would block + */ +bool +management_would_hold (struct management *man) +{ + return (man->settings.flags & MF_HOLD) && !man->persist.hold_release && man_standalone_ok (man); +} + +/* + * Return true if (from the management interface's perspective) OpenVPN should + * daemonize. + */ +bool +management_should_daemonize (struct management *man) +{ + return management_would_hold (man) || (man->settings.flags & MF_QUERY_PASSWORDS); +} + +/* + * If the hold flag is enabled, hibernate until a management client releases the hold. + * Return true if the caller should not sleep for an additional time interval. + */ +bool +management_hold (struct management *man) +{ + if (management_would_hold (man)) + { + volatile int signal_received = 0; + const bool standalone_disabled_save = man->persist.standalone_disabled; + + man->persist.standalone_disabled = false; /* This is so M_CLIENT messages will be correctly passed through msg() */ + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + man->settings.mansig |= MANSIG_IGNORE_USR1_HUP; + + man_wait_for_client_connection (man, &signal_received, 0, MWCC_HOLD_WAIT); + + if (!signal_received) + { + man->persist.special_state_msg = ">HOLD:Waiting for hold release"; + msg (M_CLIENT, "%s", man->persist.special_state_msg); + + /* run command processing event loop until we get our username/password */ + do + { + man_standalone_event_loop (man, &signal_received, 0); + if (!signal_received) + man_check_for_signals (&signal_received); + if (signal_received) + break; + } while (!man->persist.hold_release); + } + + /* revert state */ + man->persist.standalone_disabled = standalone_disabled_save; + man->persist.special_state_msg = NULL; + man->settings.mansig &= ~MANSIG_IGNORE_USR1_HUP; + + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* + * struct command_line + */ + +struct command_line * +command_line_new (const int buf_len) +{ + struct command_line *cl; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (cl, struct command_line); + cl->buf = alloc_buf (buf_len); + cl->residual = alloc_buf (buf_len); + return cl; +} + +void +command_line_reset (struct command_line *cl) +{ + buf_clear (&cl->buf); + buf_clear (&cl->residual); +} + +void +command_line_free (struct command_line *cl) +{ + command_line_reset (cl); + free_buf (&cl->buf); + free_buf (&cl->residual); + free (cl); +} + +void +command_line_add (struct command_line *cl, const unsigned char *buf, const int len) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + { + if (buf[i] && char_class(buf[i], (CC_PRINT|CC_NEWLINE))) + { + if (!buf_write_u8 (&cl->buf, buf[i])) + buf_clear (&cl->buf); + } + } +} + +const unsigned char * +command_line_get (struct command_line *cl) +{ + int i; + const unsigned char *ret = NULL; + + i = buf_substring_len (&cl->buf, '\n'); + if (i >= 0) + { + buf_copy_excess (&cl->residual, &cl->buf, i); + buf_chomp (&cl->buf); + ret = (const unsigned char *) BSTR (&cl->buf); + } + return ret; +} + +void +command_line_next (struct command_line *cl) +{ + buf_clear (&cl->buf); + buf_copy (&cl->buf, &cl->residual); + buf_clear (&cl->residual); +} + +/* + * struct log_entry + */ + +const char * +log_entry_print (const struct log_entry *e, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (ERR_BUF_SIZE, gc); + if (flags & LOG_FATAL_NOTIFY) + buf_printf (&out, ">FATAL:"); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_LOG_PREFIX) + buf_printf (&out, ">LOG:"); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_ECHO_PREFIX) + buf_printf (&out, ">ECHO:"); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_STATE_PREFIX) + buf_printf (&out, ">STATE:"); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE) + buf_printf (&out, "%u,", (unsigned int)e->timestamp); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_MSG_FLAGS) + buf_printf (&out, "%s,", msg_flags_string (e->u.msg_flags, gc)); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_STATE) + buf_printf (&out, "%s,", man_state_name (e->u.state)); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_INTVAL) + buf_printf (&out, "%d,", e->u.intval); + if (e->string) + buf_printf (&out, "%s", e->string); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_LOCAL_IP) + buf_printf (&out, ",%s", print_in_addr_t (e->local_ip, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, gc)); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_REMOTE_IP) + buf_printf (&out, ",%s", print_in_addr_t (e->remote_ip, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, gc)); + if (flags & LOG_ECHO_TO_LOG) + msg (D_MANAGEMENT, "MANAGEMENT: %s", BSTR (&out)); + if (flags & LOG_PRINT_CRLF) + buf_printf (&out, "\r\n"); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static void +log_entry_free_contents (struct log_entry *e) +{ + if (e->string) + free ((char *)e->string); + CLEAR (*e); +} + +/* + * struct log_history + */ + +static inline int +log_index (const struct log_history *h, int i) +{ + return modulo_add (h->base, i, h->capacity); +} + +static void +log_history_obj_init (struct log_history *h, int capacity) +{ + CLEAR (*h); + h->capacity = capacity; + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (h->array, struct log_entry, capacity); +} + +struct log_history * +log_history_init (const int capacity) +{ + struct log_history *h; + ASSERT (capacity > 0); + ALLOC_OBJ (h, struct log_history); + log_history_obj_init (h, capacity); + return h; +} + +static void +log_history_free_contents (struct log_history *h) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < h->size; ++i) + log_entry_free_contents (&h->array[log_index(h, i)]); + free (h->array); +} + +void +log_history_close (struct log_history *h) +{ + log_history_free_contents (h); + free (h); +} + +void +log_history_add (struct log_history *h, const struct log_entry *le) +{ + struct log_entry *e; + ASSERT (h->size >= 0 && h->size <= h->capacity); + if (h->size == h->capacity) + { + e = &h->array[h->base]; + log_entry_free_contents (e); + h->base = log_index (h, 1); + } + else + { + e = &h->array[log_index(h, h->size)]; + ++h->size; + } + + *e = *le; + e->string = string_alloc (le->string, NULL); +} + +void +log_history_resize (struct log_history *h, const int capacity) +{ + if (capacity != h->capacity) + { + struct log_history newlog; + int i; + + ASSERT (capacity > 0); + log_history_obj_init (&newlog, capacity); + + for (i = 0; i < h->size; ++i) + log_history_add (&newlog, &h->array[log_index(h, i)]); + + log_history_free_contents (h); + *h = newlog; + } +} + +const struct log_entry * +log_history_ref (const struct log_history *h, const int index) +{ + if (index >= 0 && index < h->size) + return &h->array[log_index(h, (h->size - 1) - index)]; + else + return NULL; +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_MANAGEMENT */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d2790dd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/manage.h @@ -0,0 +1,567 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MANAGE_H +#define MANAGE_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +#include "misc.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "mroute.h" + +#define MANAGEMENT_VERSION 1 +#define MANAGEMENT_N_PASSWORD_RETRIES 3 +#define MANAGEMENT_LOG_HISTORY_INITIAL_SIZE 100 +#define MANAGEMENT_ECHO_BUFFER_SIZE 100 +#define MANAGEMENT_STATE_BUFFER_SIZE 100 + +/* + * Management-interface-based deferred authentication + */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +struct man_def_auth_context { + unsigned long cid; + +#define DAF_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED (1<<0) +#define DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED (1<<1) +#define DAF_INITIAL_AUTH (1<<2) + unsigned int flags; + + unsigned int mda_key_id_counter; + + time_t bytecount_last_update; +}; +#endif + +/* + * Manage build-up of command line + */ +struct command_line +{ + struct buffer buf; + struct buffer residual; +}; + +struct command_line *command_line_new (const int buf_len); +void command_line_free (struct command_line *cl); + +void command_line_add (struct command_line *cl, const unsigned char *buf, const int len); +const unsigned char *command_line_get (struct command_line *cl); +void command_line_reset (struct command_line *cl); +void command_line_next (struct command_line *cl); + +/* + * Manage log file history + */ + +union log_entry_union { + unsigned int msg_flags; + int state; + int intval; +}; + +struct log_entry +{ + time_t timestamp; + const char *string; + in_addr_t local_ip; + in_addr_t remote_ip; + union log_entry_union u; +}; + +#define LOG_PRINT_LOG_PREFIX (1<<0) +#define LOG_PRINT_ECHO_PREFIX (1<<1) +#define LOG_PRINT_STATE_PREFIX (1<<2) + +#define LOG_PRINT_INT_DATE (1<<3) +#define LOG_PRINT_MSG_FLAGS (1<<4) +#define LOG_PRINT_STATE (1<<5) +#define LOG_PRINT_LOCAL_IP (1<<6) + +#define LOG_PRINT_CRLF (1<<7) +#define LOG_FATAL_NOTIFY (1<<8) + +#define LOG_PRINT_INTVAL (1<<9) + +#define LOG_PRINT_REMOTE_IP (1<<10) + +#define LOG_ECHO_TO_LOG (1<<11) + +const char *log_entry_print (const struct log_entry *e, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc); + +struct log_history +{ + int base; + int size; + int capacity; + struct log_entry *array; +}; + +struct log_history *log_history_init (const int capacity); +void log_history_close (struct log_history *h); +void log_history_add (struct log_history *h, const struct log_entry *le); +void log_history_resize (struct log_history *h, const int capacity); +const struct log_entry *log_history_ref (const struct log_history *h, const int index); + +static inline int +log_history_size (const struct log_history *h) +{ + return h->size; +} + +static inline int +log_history_capacity (const struct log_history *h) +{ + return h->capacity; +} + +/* + * Callbacks for 'status' and 'kill' commands. + * Also for management-based deferred authentication and packet filter. + */ +struct management_callback +{ + void *arg; + +# define MCF_SERVER (1<<0) /* is OpenVPN being run as a server? */ + unsigned int flags; + + void (*status) (void *arg, const int version, struct status_output *so); + void (*show_net) (void *arg, const int msglevel); + int (*kill_by_cn) (void *arg, const char *common_name); + int (*kill_by_addr) (void *arg, const in_addr_t addr, const int port); + void (*delete_event) (void *arg, event_t event); + int (*n_clients) (void *arg); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + bool (*kill_by_cid) (void *arg, const unsigned long cid, const char *kill_msg); + bool (*client_auth) (void *arg, + const unsigned long cid, + const unsigned int mda_key_id, + const bool auth, + const char *reason, + const char *client_reason, + struct buffer_list *cc_config); /* ownership transferred */ + char *(*get_peer_info) (void *arg, const unsigned long cid); +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + bool (*client_pf) (void *arg, + const unsigned long cid, + struct buffer_list *pf_config); /* ownership transferred */ +#endif + bool (*proxy_cmd) (void *arg, const char **p); + bool (*remote_cmd) (void *arg, const char **p); +}; + +/* + * Management object, split into three components: + * + * struct man_persist : Data elements which are persistent across + * man_connection open and close. + * + * struct man_settings : management parameters. + * + * struct man_connection : created on socket binding and listen, + * deleted on socket unbind, may + * handle multiple sequential client + * connections. + */ + +struct man_persist { + bool defined; + + struct log_history *log; + struct virtual_output vout; + + bool standalone_disabled; + struct management_callback callback; + + struct log_history *echo; /* saved --echo strings */ + struct log_history *state; + + bool hold_release; + + const char *special_state_msg; + + counter_type bytes_in; + counter_type bytes_out; +}; + +struct man_settings { + bool defined; + unsigned int flags; /* MF_x flags */ + struct addrinfo* local; +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + struct sockaddr_un local_unix; +#endif + bool management_over_tunnel; + struct user_pass up; + int log_history_cache; + int echo_buffer_size; + int state_buffer_size; + char *write_peer_info_file; + int client_uid; + int client_gid; + +/* flags for handling the management interface "signal" command */ +# define MANSIG_IGNORE_USR1_HUP (1<<0) +# define MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_HUP (1<<1) +# define MANSIG_MAP_USR1_TO_TERM (1<<2) + unsigned int mansig; +}; + +/* up_query modes */ +#define UP_QUERY_DISABLED 0 +#define UP_QUERY_USER_PASS 1 +#define UP_QUERY_PASS 2 +#define UP_QUERY_NEED_OK 3 +#define UP_QUERY_NEED_STR 4 + +/* states */ +#define MS_INITIAL 0 /* all sockets are closed */ +#define MS_LISTEN 1 /* no client is connected */ +#define MS_CC_WAIT_READ 2 /* client is connected, waiting for read on socket */ +#define MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE 3 /* client is connected, waiting for ability to write to socket */ + +struct man_connection { + int state; + + socket_descriptor_t sd_top; + socket_descriptor_t sd_cli; + struct openvpn_sockaddr remote; + +#ifdef WIN32 + struct net_event_win32 ne32; +#endif + + bool halt; + bool password_verified; + int password_tries; + + struct command_line *in; + struct buffer_list *out; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA +# define IEC_UNDEF 0 +# define IEC_CLIENT_AUTH 1 +# define IEC_CLIENT_PF 2 +# define IEC_RSA_SIGN 3 + int in_extra_cmd; + struct buffer_list *in_extra; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + unsigned long in_extra_cid; + unsigned int in_extra_kid; +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY +# define EKS_UNDEF 0 +# define EKS_SOLICIT 1 +# define EKS_INPUT 2 +# define EKS_READY 3 + int ext_key_state; + struct buffer_list *ext_key_input; +#endif +#endif + struct event_set *es; + int env_filter_level; + + bool state_realtime; + bool log_realtime; + bool echo_realtime; + int bytecount_update_seconds; + time_t bytecount_last_update; + + const char *up_query_type; + int up_query_mode; + struct user_pass up_query; + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + struct buffer_list *rsa_sig; +#endif +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID + int fdtosend; + int lastfdreceived; +#endif +}; + +struct management +{ + struct man_persist persist; + struct man_settings settings; + struct man_connection connection; +}; + +extern struct management *management; + +struct user_pass; + +struct management *management_init (void); + +/* management_open flags */ +# define MF_SERVER (1<<0) +# define MF_QUERY_PASSWORDS (1<<1) +# define MF_HOLD (1<<2) +# define MF_SIGNAL (1<<3) +# define MF_FORGET_DISCONNECT (1<<4) +# define MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT (1<<5) +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +# define MF_CLIENT_AUTH (1<<6) +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF +# define MF_CLIENT_PF (1<<7) +#endif +# define MF_UNIX_SOCK (1<<8) +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY +# define MF_EXTERNAL_KEY (1<<9) +#endif +#define MF_UP_DOWN (1<<10) +#define MF_QUERY_REMOTE (1<<11) +#define MF_QUERY_PROXY (1<<12) + +bool management_open (struct management *man, + const char *addr, + const char *port, + const char *pass_file, + const char *client_user, + const char *client_group, + const int log_history_cache, + const int echo_buffer_size, + const int state_buffer_size, + const char *write_peer_info_file, + const int remap_sigusr1, + const unsigned int flags); + +void management_close (struct management *man); + +void management_post_tunnel_open (struct management *man, const in_addr_t tun_local_ip); + +void management_pre_tunnel_close (struct management *man); + +void management_socket_set (struct management *man, + struct event_set *es, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent); + +void management_io (struct management *man); + +void management_set_callback (struct management *man, + const struct management_callback *cb); + +void management_clear_callback (struct management *man); + +bool management_query_user_pass (struct management *man, + struct user_pass *up, + const char *type, + const unsigned int flags, + const char *static_challenge); + +bool management_should_daemonize (struct management *man); +bool management_would_hold (struct management *man); +bool management_hold (struct management *man); + +void management_event_loop_n_seconds (struct management *man, int sec); + +void management_up_down(struct management *man, const char *updown, const struct env_set *es); + +void management_notify(struct management *man, const char *severity, const char *type, const char *text); + +void management_notify_generic (struct management *man, const char *str); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +void management_notify_client_needing_auth (struct management *management, + const unsigned int auth_id, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es); + +void management_connection_established (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es); + +void management_notify_client_close (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct env_set *es); + +void management_learn_addr (struct management *management, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac, + const struct mroute_addr *addr, + const bool primary); +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +char *management_query_rsa_sig (struct management *man, const char *b64_data); + +#endif + +static inline bool +management_connected (const struct management *man) +{ + return man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_READ || man->connection.state == MS_CC_WAIT_WRITE; +} + +static inline bool +management_query_user_pass_enabled (const struct management *man) +{ + return BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_QUERY_PASSWORDS); +} + +static inline bool +management_query_remote_enabled (const struct management *man) +{ + return BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_QUERY_REMOTE); +} + +static inline bool +management_query_proxy_enabled (const struct management *man) +{ + return BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_QUERY_PROXY); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF +static inline bool +management_enable_pf (const struct management *man) +{ + return man && BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_CLIENT_PF); +} +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +static inline bool +management_enable_def_auth (const struct management *man) +{ + return man && BOOL_CAST(man->settings.flags & MF_CLIENT_AUTH); +} +#endif + +/* + * OpenVPN tells the management layer what state it's in + */ + +/* client/server states */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_INITIAL 0 /* Initial, undefined state */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTING 1 /* Management interface has been initialized */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_ASSIGN_IP 2 /* Assigning IP address to virtual network interface */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_ADD_ROUTES 3 /* Adding routes to system */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_CONNECTED 4 /* Initialization sequence completed */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_RECONNECTING 5 /* Restart */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_EXITING 6 /* Exit */ + +/* client-only states */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_WAIT 7 /* Waiting for initial response from server */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH 8 /* Authenticating with server */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_GET_CONFIG 9 /* Downloading configuration from server */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_RESOLVE 10 /* DNS lookup */ +#define OPENVPN_STATE_TCP_CONNECT 11 /* Connecting to TCP server */ + +#define OPENVPN_STATE_CLIENT_BASE 7 /* Base index of client-only states */ + +void management_set_state (struct management *man, + const int state, + const char *detail, + const in_addr_t tun_local_ip, + const in_addr_t tun_remote_ip); + +/* + * The management object keeps track of OpenVPN --echo + * parameters. + */ +void management_echo (struct management *man, const char *string, const bool pull); + +/* + * OpenVPN calls here to indicate a password failure + */ + +void management_auth_failure (struct management *man, const char *type, const char *reason); + +/* + * Echo an authentication token to management interface + */ +void management_auth_token (struct management *man, const char *token); + +/* + * These functions drive the bytecount in/out counters. + */ + +void man_bytecount_output_client (struct management *man); + +static inline void +man_bytecount_possible_output_client (struct management *man) +{ + if (man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds > 0 + && now >= man->connection.bytecount_last_update + + man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds) + man_bytecount_output_client (man); +} + +static inline void +management_bytes_out_client (struct management *man, const int size) +{ + man->persist.bytes_out += size; + man_bytecount_possible_output_client (man); +} + +static inline void +management_bytes_in_client (struct management *man, const int size) +{ + man->persist.bytes_in += size; + man_bytecount_possible_output_client (man); +} + +static inline void +management_bytes_out (struct management *man, const int size) +{ + if (!(man->persist.callback.flags & MCF_SERVER)) + management_bytes_out_client (man, size); +} + +static inline void +management_bytes_in (struct management *man, const int size) +{ + if (!(man->persist.callback.flags & MCF_SERVER)) + management_bytes_in_client (man, size); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +static inline void +management_bytes_server (struct management *man, + const counter_type *bytes_in_total, + const counter_type *bytes_out_total, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac) +{ + void man_bytecount_output_server (struct management *man, + const counter_type *bytes_in_total, + const counter_type *bytes_out_total, + struct man_def_auth_context *mdac); + + if (man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds > 0 + && now >= mdac->bytecount_last_update + man->connection.bytecount_update_seconds + && (mdac->flags & (DAF_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED|DAF_CONNECTION_CLOSED)) == DAF_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED) + man_bytecount_output_server (man, bytes_in_total, bytes_out_total, mdac); +} + +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82f23888 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "mbuf.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +struct mbuf_set * +mbuf_init (unsigned int size) +{ + struct mbuf_set *ret; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ret, struct mbuf_set); + ret->capacity = adjust_power_of_2 (size); + ALLOC_ARRAY (ret->array, struct mbuf_item, ret->capacity); + return ret; +} + +void +mbuf_free (struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + if (ms) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < (int) ms->len; ++i) + { + struct mbuf_item *item = &ms->array[MBUF_INDEX(ms->head, i, ms->capacity)]; + mbuf_free_buf (item->buffer); + } + free (ms->array); + free (ms); + } +} + +struct mbuf_buffer * +mbuf_alloc_buf (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + struct mbuf_buffer *ret; + ALLOC_OBJ (ret, struct mbuf_buffer); + ret->buf = clone_buf (buf); + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->flags = 0; + return ret; +} + +void +mbuf_free_buf (struct mbuf_buffer *mb) +{ + if (mb) + { + if (--mb->refcount <= 0) + { + free_buf (&mb->buf); + free (mb); + } + } +} + +void +mbuf_add_item (struct mbuf_set *ms, const struct mbuf_item *item) +{ + ASSERT (ms); + if (ms->len == ms->capacity) + { + struct mbuf_item rm; + ASSERT (mbuf_extract_item (ms, &rm)); + mbuf_free_buf (rm.buffer); + msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED, "MBUF: mbuf packet dropped"); + } + + ASSERT (ms->len < ms->capacity); + + ms->array[MBUF_INDEX(ms->head, ms->len, ms->capacity)] = *item; + if (++ms->len > ms->max_queued) + ms->max_queued = ms->len; + ++item->buffer->refcount; +} + +bool +mbuf_extract_item (struct mbuf_set *ms, struct mbuf_item *item) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (ms) + { + while (ms->len) + { + *item = ms->array[ms->head]; + ms->head = MBUF_INDEX(ms->head, 1, ms->capacity); + --ms->len; + if (item->instance) /* ignore dereferenced instances */ + { + ret = true; + break; + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +struct multi_instance * +mbuf_peek_dowork (struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + struct multi_instance *ret = NULL; + if (ms) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < (int) ms->len; ++i) + { + struct mbuf_item *item = &ms->array[MBUF_INDEX(ms->head, i, ms->capacity)]; + if (item->instance) + { + ret = item->instance; + break; + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +mbuf_dereference_instance (struct mbuf_set *ms, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (ms) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < (int) ms->len; ++i) + { + struct mbuf_item *item = &ms->array[MBUF_INDEX(ms->head, i, ms->capacity)]; + if (item->instance == mi) + { + mbuf_free_buf (item->buffer); + item->buffer = NULL; + item->instance = NULL; + msg (D_MBUF, "MBUF: dereferenced queued packet"); + } + } + } +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* P2MP */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0de679d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mbuf.h @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MBUF_H +#define MBUF_H + +/* + * Handle both multicast and broadcast functions. + */ + +#if P2MP + +/* define this to enable special test mode */ +/*#define MBUF_TEST*/ + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" + +struct multi_instance; + +#define MBUF_INDEX(head, offset, size) (((head) + (offset)) & ((size)-1)) + +struct mbuf_buffer +{ + struct buffer buf; + int refcount; + +# define MF_UNICAST (1<<0) + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct mbuf_item +{ + struct mbuf_buffer *buffer; + struct multi_instance *instance; +}; + +struct mbuf_set +{ + unsigned int head; + unsigned int len; + unsigned int capacity; + unsigned int max_queued; + struct mbuf_item *array; +}; + +struct mbuf_set *mbuf_init (unsigned int size); +void mbuf_free (struct mbuf_set *ms); + +struct mbuf_buffer *mbuf_alloc_buf (const struct buffer *buf); +void mbuf_free_buf (struct mbuf_buffer *mb); + +void mbuf_add_item (struct mbuf_set *ms, const struct mbuf_item *item); + +bool mbuf_extract_item (struct mbuf_set *ms, struct mbuf_item *item); + +void mbuf_dereference_instance (struct mbuf_set *ms, struct multi_instance *mi); + +static inline bool +mbuf_defined (const struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + return ms && ms->len; +} + +static inline bool +mbuf_len (const struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + return ms->len; +} + +static inline int +mbuf_maximum_queued (const struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + return (int) ms->max_queued; +} + +static inline struct multi_instance * +mbuf_peek (struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + struct multi_instance *mbuf_peek_dowork (struct mbuf_set *ms); + if (mbuf_defined (ms)) + return mbuf_peek_dowork (ms); + else + return NULL; +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/memdbg.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/memdbg.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1f6bb676 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/memdbg.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MEMDBG_H +#define MEMDBG_H + +/* + * Valgrind debugging support. + * + * Valgrind is a great tool for debugging memory issues, + * though it seems to generate a lot of warnings in OpenSSL + * about uninitialized data. To silence these warnings, + * I've put together a suppressions file + * in debug/valgrind-suppress. + * + * Also, grep for VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE in the OpenVPN source. + * Because valgrind thinks that some of the data passed from + * OpenSSL back to OpenVPN is tainted due to being sourced + * from uninitialized data, we need to untaint it before use -- + * otherwise we will get a lot of useless warnings. + * + * valgrind --tool=memcheck --error-limit=no --suppressions=debug/valgrind-suppress --gen-suppressions=yes ./openvpn ... + */ + +#ifdef USE_VALGRIND + +#include "valgrind/memcheck.h" + +#define VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE(addr, len) + +#else + +#define VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE(addr, len) + +#endif + +#ifdef DMALLOC /* see ./configure options to enable */ + +/* + * See ./configure options to enable dmalloc + * support for memory leak checking. + * + * The dmalloc package can be downloaded from: + * + * http://dmalloc.com/ + * + * When dmalloc is installed and enabled, + * use this command prior to running openvpn: + * + * dmalloc -l dlog -i 100 low -p log-unknown + * + * Also, put this in your .bashrc file: + * + * function dmalloc { eval `command dmalloc -b $*`; } + * + * Or take a more low-level approach: + * + * export DMALLOC_OPTIONS="debug=0x4e48503,inter=100,log=dlog" + * + * NOTE: When building dmalloc you need to add something + * like this to dmalloc's settings.h -- it will allocate a static + * buffer to be used as the malloc arena: + * + * #define INTERNAL_MEMORY_SPACE (1024 * 1024 * 50) + */ + +#include "dmalloc.h" + +#define openvpn_dmalloc(file, line, size) dmalloc_malloc((file), (line), (size), DMALLOC_FUNC_MALLOC, 0, 0) + +/* + * This #define will put the line number of the log + * file position where leaked memory was allocated instead + * of the source code file and line number. Make sure + * to increase the size of dmalloc's info tables, + * (MEMORY_TABLE_SIZE in settings.h) + * otherwise it might get overwhelmed by the large + * number of unique file/line combinations. + */ +#if 0 +#undef malloc +#define malloc(size) openvpn_dmalloc("logfile", x_msg_line_num, (size)) +#endif + +#endif /* DMALLOC */ + +/* + * Force buffers to be zeroed after allocation. + * For debugging only. + */ +/*#define ZERO_BUFFER_ON_ALLOC*/ + +#endif /* MEMDBG_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fcc85526 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,2089 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "tun.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "plugin.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "route.h" +#include "console.h" +#include "win32.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE +const char *iproute_path = IPROUTE_PATH; /* GLOBAL */ +#endif + +/* contains an SSEC_x value defined in misc.h */ +int script_security = SSEC_BUILT_IN; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Pass tunnel endpoint and MTU parms to a user-supplied script. + * Used to execute the up/down script/plugins. + */ +void +run_up_down (const char *command, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + int plugin_type, + const char *arg, + const char *dev_type, + int tun_mtu, + int link_mtu, + const char *ifconfig_local, + const char* ifconfig_remote, + const char *context, + const char *signal_text, + const char *script_type, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (signal_text) + setenv_str (es, "signal", signal_text); + setenv_str (es, "script_context", context); + setenv_int (es, "tun_mtu", tun_mtu); + setenv_int (es, "link_mtu", link_mtu); + setenv_str (es, "dev", arg); + if (dev_type) + setenv_str (es, "dev_type", dev_type); + + if (!ifconfig_local) + ifconfig_local = ""; + if (!ifconfig_remote) + ifconfig_remote = ""; + if (!context) + context = ""; + + if (plugin_defined (plugins, plugin_type)) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + ASSERT (arg); + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %d %d %s %s %s", + arg, + tun_mtu, link_mtu, + ifconfig_local, ifconfig_remote, + context); + + if (plugin_call (plugins, plugin_type, &argv, NULL, es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: up/down plugin call failed"); + + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + if (command) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + ASSERT (arg); + setenv_str (es, "script_type", script_type); + argv_printf (&argv, + "%sc %s %d %d %s %s %s", + command, + arg, + tun_mtu, link_mtu, + ifconfig_local, ifconfig_remote, + context); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "--up/--down"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* Get the file we will later write our process ID to */ +void +get_pid_file (const char* filename, struct pid_state *state) +{ + CLEAR (*state); + if (filename) + { + state->fp = platform_fopen (filename, "w"); + if (!state->fp) + msg (M_ERR, "Open error on pid file %s", filename); + state->filename = filename; + } +} + +/* Write our PID to a file */ +void +write_pid (const struct pid_state *state) +{ + if (state->filename && state->fp) + { + unsigned int pid = platform_getpid (); + fprintf(state->fp, "%u\n", pid); + if (fclose (state->fp)) + msg (M_ERR, "Close error on pid file %s", state->filename); + } +} + +/* + * Set standard file descriptors to /dev/null + */ +void +set_std_files_to_null (bool stdin_only) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_DUP) && defined(HAVE_DUP2) + int fd; + if ((fd = open ("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) + { + dup2 (fd, 0); + if (!stdin_only) + { + dup2 (fd, 1); + dup2 (fd, 2); + } + if (fd > 2) + close (fd); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * dup inetd/xinetd socket descriptor and save + */ + +int inetd_socket_descriptor = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +save_inetd_socket_descriptor (void) +{ + inetd_socket_descriptor = INETD_SOCKET_DESCRIPTOR; +#if defined(HAVE_DUP) && defined(HAVE_DUP2) + /* use handle passed by inetd/xinetd */ + if ((inetd_socket_descriptor = dup (INETD_SOCKET_DESCRIPTOR)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "INETD_SOCKET_DESCRIPTOR dup(%d) failed", INETD_SOCKET_DESCRIPTOR); + set_std_files_to_null (true); +#endif +} + +/* + * Warn if a given file is group/others accessible. + */ +void +warn_if_group_others_accessible (const char* filename) +{ +#ifndef WIN32 +#ifdef HAVE_STAT + if (strcmp (filename, INLINE_FILE_TAG)) + { + struct stat st; + if (stat (filename, &st)) + { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "WARNING: cannot stat file '%s'", filename); + } + else + { + if (st.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: file '%s' is group or others accessible", filename); + } + } +#endif +#endif +} + +/* + * Print an error message based on the status code returned by system(). + */ +const char * +system_error_message (int stat, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); +#ifdef WIN32 + if (stat == -1) + buf_printf (&out, "external program did not execute -- "); + buf_printf (&out, "returned error code %d", stat); +#else + if (stat == -1) + buf_printf (&out, "external program fork failed"); + else if (!WIFEXITED (stat)) + buf_printf (&out, "external program did not exit normally"); + else + { + const int cmd_ret = WEXITSTATUS (stat); + if (!cmd_ret) + buf_printf (&out, "external program exited normally"); + else if (cmd_ret == 127) + buf_printf (&out, "could not execute external program"); + else + buf_printf (&out, "external program exited with error status: %d", cmd_ret); + } +#endif + return (const char *)out.data; +} + +/* + * Wrapper around openvpn_execve + */ +bool +openvpn_execve_check (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags, const char *error_message) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const int stat = openvpn_execve (a, es, flags); + int ret = false; + + if (platform_system_ok (stat)) + ret = true; + else + { + if (error_message) + msg (((flags & S_FATAL) ? M_FATAL : M_WARN), "%s: %s", + error_message, + system_error_message (stat, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +bool +openvpn_execve_allowed (const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (flags & S_SCRIPT) + return script_security >= SSEC_SCRIPTS; + else + return script_security >= SSEC_BUILT_IN; +} + + +#ifndef WIN32 +/* + * Run execve() inside a fork(). Designed to replicate the semantics of system() but + * in a safer way that doesn't require the invocation of a shell or the risks + * assocated with formatting and parsing a command line. + */ +int +openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int ret = -1; + static bool warn_shown = false; + + if (a && a->argv[0]) + { +#if defined(ENABLE_FEATURE_EXECVE) + if (openvpn_execve_allowed (flags)) + { + const char *cmd = a->argv[0]; + char *const *argv = a->argv; + char *const *envp = (char *const *)make_env_array (es, true, &gc); + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork (); + if (pid == (pid_t)0) /* child side */ + { + execve (cmd, argv, envp); + exit (127); + } + else if (pid < (pid_t)0) /* fork failed */ + msg (M_ERR, "openvpn_execve: unable to fork"); + else /* parent side */ + { + if (waitpid (pid, &ret, 0) != pid) + ret = -1; + } + } + else if (!warn_shown && (script_security < SSEC_SCRIPTS)) + { + msg (M_WARN, SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING); + warn_shown = true; + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "openvpn_execve: execve function not available"); +#endif + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, "openvpn_execve: called with empty argv"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} +#endif + +/* + * Run execve() inside a fork(), duping stdout. Designed to replicate the semantics of popen() but + * in a safer way that doesn't require the invocation of a shell or the risks + * assocated with formatting and parsing a command line. + */ +int +openvpn_popen (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int ret = -1; + static bool warn_shown = false; + + if (a && a->argv[0]) + { +#if defined(ENABLE_FEATURE_EXECVE) + if (script_security >= SSEC_BUILT_IN) + { + const char *cmd = a->argv[0]; + char *const *argv = a->argv; + char *const *envp = (char *const *)make_env_array (es, true, &gc); + pid_t pid; + int pipe_stdout[2]; + + if (pipe (pipe_stdout) == 0) { + pid = fork (); + if (pid == (pid_t)0) /* child side */ + { + close (pipe_stdout[0]); + dup2 (pipe_stdout[1],1); + execve (cmd, argv, envp); + exit (127); + } + else if (pid < (pid_t)0) /* fork failed */ + { + msg (M_ERR, "openvpn_popen: unable to fork"); + } + else /* parent side */ + { + ret=pipe_stdout[0]; + close (pipe_stdout[1]); + } + } + else { + msg (M_WARN, "openvpn_popen: unable to create stdout pipe"); + ret = -1; + } + } + else if (!warn_shown && (script_security < SSEC_SCRIPTS)) + { + msg (M_WARN, SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING); + warn_shown = true; + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "openvpn_popen: execve function not available"); +#endif + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, "openvpn_popen: called with empty argv"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + + + +/* + * Initialize random number seed. random() is only used + * when "weak" random numbers are acceptable. + * OpenSSL routines are always used when cryptographically + * strong random numbers are required. + */ + +void +init_random_seed(void) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + if (!gettimeofday (&tv, NULL)) + { + const unsigned int seed = (unsigned int) tv.tv_sec ^ tv.tv_usec; + srandom (seed); + } +} + +/* thread-safe strerror */ + +const char * +strerror_ts (int errnum, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s", openvpn_strerror (errnum, gc)); + return BSTR (&out); +#else + return "[error string unavailable]"; +#endif +} + +/* + * Set environmental variable (int or string). + * + * On Posix, we use putenv for portability, + * and put up with its painful semantics + * that require all the support code below. + */ + +/* General-purpose environmental variable set functions */ + +static char * +construct_name_value (const char *name, const char *value, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out; + + ASSERT (name); + if (!value) + value = ""; + out = alloc_buf_gc (strlen (name) + strlen (value) + 2, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "%s=%s", name, value); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +bool +deconstruct_name_value (const char *str, const char **name, const char **value, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char *cp; + + ASSERT (str); + ASSERT (name && value); + + *name = cp = string_alloc (str, gc); + *value = NULL; + + while ((*cp)) + { + if (*cp == '=' && !*value) + { + *cp = 0; + *value = cp + 1; + } + ++cp; + } + return *name && *value; +} + +static bool +env_string_equal (const char *s1, const char *s2) +{ + int c1, c2; + ASSERT (s1); + ASSERT (s2); + + while (true) + { + c1 = *s1++; + c2 = *s2++; + if (c1 == '=') + c1 = 0; + if (c2 == '=') + c2 = 0; + if (!c1 && !c2) + return true; + if (c1 != c2) + break; + } + return false; +} + +static bool +remove_env_item (const char *str, const bool do_free, struct env_item **list) +{ + struct env_item *current, *prev; + + ASSERT (str); + ASSERT (list); + + for (current = *list, prev = NULL; current != NULL; current = current->next) + { + if (env_string_equal (current->string, str)) + { + if (prev) + prev->next = current->next; + else + *list = current->next; + if (do_free) + { + memset (current->string, 0, strlen (current->string)); + free (current->string); + free (current); + } + return true; + } + prev = current; + } + return false; +} + +static void +add_env_item (char *str, const bool do_alloc, struct env_item **list, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct env_item *item; + + ASSERT (str); + ASSERT (list); + + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (item, struct env_item, gc); + item->string = do_alloc ? string_alloc (str, gc): str; + item->next = *list; + *list = item; +} + +/* struct env_set functions */ + +static bool +env_set_del_nolock (struct env_set *es, const char *str) +{ + return remove_env_item (str, es->gc == NULL, &es->list); +} + +static void +env_set_add_nolock (struct env_set *es, const char *str) +{ + remove_env_item (str, es->gc == NULL, &es->list); + add_env_item ((char *)str, true, &es->list, es->gc); +} + +struct env_set * +env_set_create (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct env_set *es; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (es, struct env_set, gc); + es->list = NULL; + es->gc = gc; + return es; +} + +void +env_set_destroy (struct env_set *es) +{ + if (es && es->gc == NULL) + { + struct env_item *e = es->list; + while (e) + { + struct env_item *next = e->next; + free (e->string); + free (e); + e = next; + } + free (es); + } +} + +bool +env_set_del (struct env_set *es, const char *str) +{ + bool ret; + ASSERT (es); + ASSERT (str); + ret = env_set_del_nolock (es, str); + return ret; +} + +void +env_set_add (struct env_set *es, const char *str) +{ + ASSERT (es); + ASSERT (str); + env_set_add_nolock (es, str); +} + +void +env_set_print (int msglevel, const struct env_set *es) +{ + if (check_debug_level (msglevel)) + { + const struct env_item *e; + int i; + + if (es) + { + e = es->list; + i = 0; + + while (e) + { + if (env_safe_to_print (e->string)) + msg (msglevel, "ENV [%d] '%s'", i, e->string); + ++i; + e = e->next; + } + } + } +} + +void +env_set_inherit (struct env_set *es, const struct env_set *src) +{ + const struct env_item *e; + + ASSERT (es); + + if (src) + { + e = src->list; + while (e) + { + env_set_add_nolock (es, e->string); + e = e->next; + } + } +} + +void +env_set_add_to_environment (const struct env_set *es) +{ + if (es) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct env_item *e; + + e = es->list; + + while (e) + { + const char *name; + const char *value; + + if (deconstruct_name_value (e->string, &name, &value, &gc)) + setenv_str (NULL, name, value); + + e = e->next; + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +void +env_set_remove_from_environment (const struct env_set *es) +{ + if (es) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct env_item *e; + + e = es->list; + + while (e) + { + const char *name; + const char *value; + + if (deconstruct_name_value (e->string, &name, &value, &gc)) + setenv_del (NULL, name); + + e = e->next; + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_PUTENV + +/* companion functions to putenv */ + +static struct env_item *global_env = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +manage_env (char *str) +{ + remove_env_item (str, true, &global_env); + add_env_item (str, false, &global_env, NULL); +} + +#endif + +/* add/modify/delete environmental strings */ + +void +setenv_counter (struct env_set *es, const char *name, counter_type value) +{ + char buf[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), counter_format, value); + setenv_str (es, name, buf); +} + +void +setenv_int (struct env_set *es, const char *name, int value) +{ + char buf[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", value); + setenv_str (es, name, buf); +} + +void +setenv_unsigned (struct env_set *es, const char *name, unsigned int value) +{ + char buf[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", value); + setenv_str (es, name, buf); +} + +void +setenv_str (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + setenv_str_ex (es, name, value, CC_NAME, 0, 0, CC_PRINT, 0, 0); +} + +void +setenv_str_safe (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + uint8_t b[64]; + struct buffer buf; + buf_set_write (&buf, b, sizeof (b)); + if (buf_printf (&buf, "OPENVPN_%s", name)) + setenv_str (es, BSTR(&buf), value); + else + msg (M_WARN, "setenv_str_safe: name overflow"); +} + +void +setenv_del (struct env_set *es, const char *name) +{ + ASSERT (name); + setenv_str (es, name, NULL); +} + +void +setenv_str_ex (struct env_set *es, + const char *name, + const char *value, + const unsigned int name_include, + const unsigned int name_exclude, + const char name_replace, + const unsigned int value_include, + const unsigned int value_exclude, + const char value_replace) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *name_tmp; + const char *val_tmp = NULL; + + ASSERT (name && strlen (name) > 1); + + name_tmp = string_mod_const (name, name_include, name_exclude, name_replace, &gc); + + if (value) + val_tmp = string_mod_const (value, value_include, value_exclude, value_replace, &gc); + + if (es) + { + if (val_tmp) + { + const char *str = construct_name_value (name_tmp, val_tmp, &gc); + env_set_add (es, str); +#if DEBUG_VERBOSE_SETENV + msg (M_INFO, "SETENV_ES '%s'", str); +#endif + } + else + env_set_del (es, name_tmp); + } + else + { + char *str = construct_name_value (name_tmp, val_tmp, NULL); + if (platform_putenv(str)) + { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "putenv('%s') failed", str); + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Setenv functions that append an integer index to the name + */ +static const char * +setenv_format_indexed_name (const char *name, const int i, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (strlen (name) + 16, gc); + if (i >= 0) + buf_printf (&out, "%s_%d", name, i); + else + buf_printf (&out, "%s", name); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +void +setenv_int_i (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const int value, const int i) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *name_str = setenv_format_indexed_name (name, i, &gc); + setenv_int (es, name_str, value); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +setenv_str_i (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value, const int i) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *name_str = setenv_format_indexed_name (name, i, &gc); + setenv_str (es, name_str, value); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * taken from busybox networking/ifupdown.c + */ +unsigned int +count_bits(unsigned int a) +{ + unsigned int result; + result = (a & 0x55) + ((a >> 1) & 0x55); + result = (result & 0x33) + ((result >> 2) & 0x33); + return((result & 0x0F) + ((result >> 4) & 0x0F)); +} + +int +count_netmask_bits(const char *dotted_quad) +{ + unsigned int result, a, b, c, d; + /* Found a netmask... Check if it is dotted quad */ + if (sscanf(dotted_quad, "%u.%u.%u.%u", &a, &b, &c, &d) != 4) + return -1; + result = count_bits(a); + result += count_bits(b); + result += count_bits(c); + result += count_bits(d); + return ((int)result); +} + +/* return true if filename can be opened for read */ +bool +test_file (const char *filename) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (filename) + { + FILE *fp = platform_fopen (filename, "r"); + if (fp) + { + fclose (fp); + ret = true; + } + } + + dmsg (D_TEST_FILE, "TEST FILE '%s' [%d]", + filename ? filename : "UNDEF", + ret); + + return ret; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +/* create a temporary filename in directory */ +const char * +create_temp_file (const char *directory, const char *prefix, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + static unsigned int counter; + struct buffer fname = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + int fd; + const char *retfname = NULL; + unsigned int attempts = 0; + + do + { + uint8_t rndbytes[16]; + const char *rndstr; + + ++attempts; + ++counter; + + prng_bytes (rndbytes, sizeof rndbytes); + rndstr = format_hex_ex (rndbytes, sizeof rndbytes, 40, 0, NULL, gc); + buf_printf (&fname, PACKAGE "_%s_%s.tmp", prefix, rndstr); + + retfname = gen_path (directory, BSTR (&fname), gc); + if (!retfname) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "Failed to create temporary filename and path"); + return NULL; + } + + /* Atomically create the file. Errors out if the file already + exists. */ + fd = platform_open (retfname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + if (fd != -1) + { + close (fd); + return retfname; + } + else if (fd == -1 && errno != EEXIST) + { + /* Something else went wrong, no need to retry. */ + struct gc_arena gcerr = gc_new (); + msg (M_FATAL, "Could not create temporary file '%s': %s", + retfname, strerror_ts (errno, &gcerr)); + gc_free (&gcerr); + return NULL; + } + } + while (attempts < 6); + + msg (M_FATAL, "Failed to create temporary file after %i attempts", attempts); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Add a random string to first DNS label of hostname to prevent DNS caching. + * For example, foo.bar.gov would be modified to .foo.bar.gov. + * Of course, this requires explicit support in the DNS server. + */ +const char * +hostname_randomize(const char *hostname, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ +# define n_rnd_bytes 6 + + char *hst = string_alloc(hostname, gc); + char *dot = strchr(hst, '.'); + + if (dot) + { + uint8_t rnd_bytes[n_rnd_bytes]; + const char *rnd_str; + struct buffer hname = alloc_buf_gc (strlen(hostname)+sizeof(rnd_bytes)*2+4, gc); + + *dot++ = '\0'; + prng_bytes (rnd_bytes, sizeof (rnd_bytes)); + rnd_str = format_hex_ex (rnd_bytes, sizeof (rnd_bytes), 40, 0, NULL, gc); + buf_printf(&hname, "%s-0x%s.%s", hst, rnd_str, dot); + return BSTR(&hname); + } + else + return hostname; +# undef n_rnd_bytes +} + +#else + +const char * +hostname_randomize(const char *hostname, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: hostname randomization disabled when crypto support is not compiled"); + return hostname; +} + +#endif + +/* + * Put a directory and filename together. + */ +const char * +gen_path (const char *directory, const char *filename, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ +#if WIN32 + const int CC_PATH_RESERVED = CC_LESS_THAN|CC_GREATER_THAN|CC_COLON| + CC_DOUBLE_QUOTE|CC_SLASH|CC_BACKSLASH|CC_PIPE|CC_QUESTION_MARK|CC_ASTERISK; +#else + const int CC_PATH_RESERVED = CC_SLASH; +#endif + const char *safe_filename = string_mod_const (filename, CC_PRINT, CC_PATH_RESERVED, '_', gc); + + if (safe_filename + && strcmp (safe_filename, ".") + && strcmp (safe_filename, "..") +#ifdef WIN32 + && win_safe_filename (safe_filename) +#endif + ) + { + const size_t outsize = strlen(safe_filename) + (directory ? strlen (directory) : 0) + 16; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (outsize, gc); + char dirsep[2]; + + dirsep[0] = OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP; + dirsep[1] = '\0'; + + if (directory) + buf_printf (&out, "%s%s", directory, dirsep); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", safe_filename); + + return BSTR (&out); + } + else + return NULL; +} + +bool +absolute_pathname (const char *pathname) +{ + if (pathname) + { + const int c = pathname[0]; +#ifdef WIN32 + return c == '\\' || (isalpha(c) && pathname[1] == ':' && pathname[2] == '\\'); +#else + return c == '/'; +#endif + } + else + return false; +} + +/* + * Get and store a username/password + */ + +bool +get_user_pass_cr (struct user_pass *up, + const char *auth_file, + const char *prefix, + const unsigned int flags, + const char *auth_challenge) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (!up->defined) + { + const bool from_stdin = (!auth_file || !strcmp (auth_file, "stdin")); + + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_PREVIOUS_CREDS_FAILED) + msg (M_WARN, "Note: previous '%s' credentials failed", prefix); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* + * Get username/password from management interface? + */ + if (management + && ((auth_file && streq (auth_file, "management")) || (from_stdin && (flags & GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT))) + && management_query_user_pass_enabled (management)) + { + const char *sc = NULL; + + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_PREVIOUS_CREDS_FAILED) + management_auth_failure (management, prefix, "previous auth credentials failed"); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (auth_challenge && (flags & GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE)) + sc = auth_challenge; +#endif + if (!management_query_user_pass (management, up, prefix, flags, sc)) + { + if ((flags & GET_USER_PASS_NOFATAL) != 0) + return false; + else + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not read %s username/password/ok/string from management interface", prefix); + } + } + else +#endif + /* + * Get NEED_OK confirmation from the console + */ + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK) + { + struct buffer user_prompt = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + + buf_printf (&user_prompt, "NEED-OK|%s|%s:", prefix, up->username); + + if (!get_console_input (BSTR (&user_prompt), true, up->password, USER_PASS_LEN)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not read %s ok-confirmation from stdin", prefix); + + if (!strlen (up->password)) + strcpy (up->password, "ok"); + } + + /* + * Get username/password from standard input? + */ + else if (from_stdin) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (auth_challenge && (flags & GET_USER_PASS_DYNAMIC_CHALLENGE)) + { + struct auth_challenge_info *ac = get_auth_challenge (auth_challenge, &gc); + if (ac) + { + char *response = (char *) gc_malloc (USER_PASS_LEN, false, &gc); + struct buffer packed_resp; + + buf_set_write (&packed_resp, (uint8_t*)up->password, USER_PASS_LEN); + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "CHALLENGE: %s", ac->challenge_text); + if (!get_console_input ("Response:", BOOL_CAST(ac->flags&CR_ECHO), response, USER_PASS_LEN)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not read challenge response from stdin"); + strncpynt (up->username, ac->user, USER_PASS_LEN); + buf_printf (&packed_resp, "CRV1::%s::%s", ac->state_id, response); + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: received malformed challenge request from server"); + } + } + else +#endif + { + struct buffer user_prompt = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + struct buffer pass_prompt = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + + buf_printf (&user_prompt, "Enter %s Username:", prefix); + buf_printf (&pass_prompt, "Enter %s Password:", prefix); + + if (!(flags & GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY)) + { + if (!get_console_input (BSTR (&user_prompt), true, up->username, USER_PASS_LEN)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not read %s username from stdin", prefix); + if (strlen (up->username) == 0) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: %s username is empty", prefix); + } + + if (!get_console_input (BSTR (&pass_prompt), false, up->password, USER_PASS_LEN)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not not read %s password from stdin", prefix); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (auth_challenge && (flags & GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE)) + { + char *response = (char *) gc_malloc (USER_PASS_LEN, false, &gc); + struct buffer packed_resp; + char *pw64=NULL, *resp64=NULL; + + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "CHALLENGE: %s", auth_challenge); + if (!get_console_input ("Response:", BOOL_CAST(flags & GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE_ECHO), response, USER_PASS_LEN)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not read static challenge response from stdin"); + if (openvpn_base64_encode(up->password, strlen(up->password), &pw64) == -1 + || openvpn_base64_encode(response, strlen(response), &resp64) == -1) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: could not base64-encode password/static_response"); + buf_set_write (&packed_resp, (uint8_t*)up->password, USER_PASS_LEN); + buf_printf (&packed_resp, "SCRV1:%s:%s", pw64, resp64); + string_clear(pw64); + free(pw64); + string_clear(resp64); + free(resp64); + } +#endif + } + } + else + { + /* + * Get username/password from a file. + */ + FILE *fp; + +#ifndef ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE + /* + * Unless ENABLE_PASSWORD_SAVE is defined, don't allow sensitive passwords + * to be read from a file. + */ + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE) + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, '%s' password cannot be read from a file", prefix); +#endif + + warn_if_group_others_accessible (auth_file); + + fp = platform_fopen (auth_file, "r"); + if (!fp) + msg (M_ERR, "Error opening '%s' auth file: %s", prefix, auth_file); + + if (flags & GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY) + { + if (fgets (up->password, USER_PASS_LEN, fp) == NULL) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error reading password from %s authfile: %s", + prefix, + auth_file); + } + else + { + if (fgets (up->username, USER_PASS_LEN, fp) == NULL + || fgets (up->password, USER_PASS_LEN, fp) == NULL) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error reading username and password (must be on two consecutive lines) from %s authfile: %s", + prefix, + auth_file); + } + + fclose (fp); + + chomp (up->username); + chomp (up->password); + + if (!(flags & GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY) && strlen (up->username) == 0) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: username from %s authfile '%s' is empty", prefix, auth_file); + } + + string_mod (up->username, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, 0); + string_mod (up->password, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, 0); + + up->defined = true; + } + +#if 0 + msg (M_INFO, "GET_USER_PASS %s u='%s' p='%s'", prefix, up->username, up->password); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); + + return true; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + +/* + * See management/management-notes.txt for more info on the + * the dynamic challenge/response protocol implemented here. + */ +struct auth_challenge_info * +get_auth_challenge (const char *auth_challenge, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (auth_challenge) + { + struct auth_challenge_info *ac; + const int len = strlen (auth_challenge); + char *work = (char *) gc_malloc (len+1, false, gc); + char *cp; + + struct buffer b; + buf_set_read (&b, (const uint8_t *)auth_challenge, len); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (ac, struct auth_challenge_info, gc); + + /* parse prefix */ + if (!buf_parse(&b, ':', work, len)) + return NULL; + if (strcmp(work, "CRV1")) + return NULL; + + /* parse flags */ + if (!buf_parse(&b, ':', work, len)) + return NULL; + for (cp = work; *cp != '\0'; ++cp) + { + const char c = *cp; + if (c == 'E') + ac->flags |= CR_ECHO; + else if (c == 'R') + ac->flags |= CR_RESPONSE; + } + + /* parse state ID */ + if (!buf_parse(&b, ':', work, len)) + return NULL; + ac->state_id = string_alloc(work, gc); + + /* parse user name */ + if (!buf_parse(&b, ':', work, len)) + return NULL; + ac->user = (char *) gc_malloc (strlen(work)+1, true, gc); + openvpn_base64_decode(work, (void*)ac->user, -1); + + /* parse challenge text */ + ac->challenge_text = string_alloc(BSTR(&b), gc); + + return ac; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +#endif + +#if AUTO_USERID + +void +get_user_pass_auto_userid (struct user_pass *up, const char *tag) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer buf; + uint8_t macaddr[6]; + static uint8_t digest [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + static const uint8_t hashprefix[] = "AUTO_USERID_DIGEST"; + + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + md_ctx_t ctx; + + CLEAR (*up); + buf_set_write (&buf, (uint8_t*)up->username, USER_PASS_LEN); + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", TARGET_PREFIX); + if (get_default_gateway_mac_addr (macaddr)) + { + dmsg (D_AUTO_USERID, "GUPAU: macaddr=%s", format_hex_ex (macaddr, sizeof (macaddr), 0, 1, ":", &gc)); + md_ctx_init(&ctx, md5_kt); + md_ctx_update(&ctx, hashprefix, sizeof (hashprefix) - 1); + md_ctx_update(&ctx, macaddr, sizeof (macaddr)); + md_ctx_final(&ctx, digest); + md_ctx_cleanup(&ctx) + buf_printf(&buf, "%s", format_hex_ex (digest, sizeof (digest), 0, 256, " ", &gc)); + } + else + { + buf_printf (&buf, "UNKNOWN"); + } + if (tag && strcmp (tag, "stdin")) + buf_printf (&buf, "-%s", tag); + up->defined = true; + gc_free (&gc); + + dmsg (D_AUTO_USERID, "GUPAU: AUTO_USERID: '%s'", up->username); +} + +#endif + +void +purge_user_pass (struct user_pass *up, const bool force) +{ + const bool nocache = up->nocache; + static bool warn_shown = false; + if (nocache || force) + { + CLEAR (*up); + up->nocache = nocache; + } + else if (!warn_shown) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: this configuration may cache passwords in memory -- use the auth-nocache option to prevent this"); + warn_shown = true; + } +} + +void +set_auth_token (struct user_pass *up, const char *token) +{ + if (token && strlen(token) && up && up->defined && !up->nocache) + { + CLEAR (up->password); + strncpynt (up->password, token, USER_PASS_LEN); + } +} + +/* + * Process string received by untrusted peer before + * printing to console or log file. + * + * Assumes that string has been null terminated. + */ +const char * +safe_print (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return string_mod_const (str, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '.', gc); +} + +static bool +is_password_env_var (const char *str) +{ + return (strncmp (str, "password", 8) == 0); +} + +bool +env_allowed (const char *str) +{ + return (script_security >= SSEC_PW_ENV || !is_password_env_var (str)); +} + +bool +env_safe_to_print (const char *str) +{ +#ifndef UNSAFE_DEBUG + if (is_password_env_var (str)) + return false; +#endif + return true; +} + +/* Make arrays of strings */ + +const char ** +make_env_array (const struct env_set *es, + const bool check_allowed, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char **ret = NULL; + struct env_item *e = NULL; + int i = 0, n = 0; + + /* figure length of es */ + if (es) + { + for (e = es->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + ++n; + } + + /* alloc return array */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, char *, n+1, gc); + + /* fill return array */ + if (es) + { + i = 0; + for (e = es->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + { + if (!check_allowed || env_allowed (e->string)) + { + ASSERT (i < n); + ret[i++] = e->string; + } + } + } + + ret[i] = NULL; + return (const char **)ret; +} + +const char ** +make_arg_array (const char *first, const char *parms, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char **ret = NULL; + int base = 0; + const int max_parms = MAX_PARMS + 2; + int n = 0; + + /* alloc return array */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, char *, max_parms, gc); + + /* process first parameter, if provided */ + if (first) + { + ret[base++] = string_alloc (first, gc); + } + + if (parms) + { + n = parse_line (parms, &ret[base], max_parms - base - 1, "make_arg_array", 0, M_WARN, gc); + ASSERT (n >= 0 && n + base + 1 <= max_parms); + } + ret[base + n] = NULL; + + return (const char **)ret; +} + +static const char ** +make_inline_array (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char line[OPTION_LINE_SIZE]; + struct buffer buf; + int len = 0; + char **ret = NULL; + int i = 0; + + buf_set_read (&buf, (const uint8_t *) str, strlen (str)); + while (buf_parse (&buf, '\n', line, sizeof (line))) + ++len; + + /* alloc return array */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, char *, len + 1, gc); + + buf_set_read (&buf, (const uint8_t *) str, strlen(str)); + while (buf_parse (&buf, '\n', line, sizeof (line))) + { + chomp (line); + ASSERT (i < len); + ret[i] = string_alloc (skip_leading_whitespace (line), gc); + ++i; + } + ASSERT (i <= len); + ret[i] = NULL; + return (const char **)ret; +} + +static const char ** +make_arg_copy (char **p, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char **ret = NULL; + const int len = string_array_len ((const char **)p); + const int max_parms = len + 1; + int i; + + /* alloc return array */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, char *, max_parms, gc); + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + ret[i] = p[i]; + + return (const char **)ret; +} + +const char ** +make_extended_arg_array (char **p, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const int argc = string_array_len ((const char **)p); + if (!strcmp (p[0], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && argc == 2) + return make_inline_array (p[1], gc); + else + if (argc == 0) + return make_arg_array (NULL, NULL, gc); + else if (argc == 1) + return make_arg_array (p[0], NULL, gc); + else if (argc == 2) + return make_arg_array (p[0], p[1], gc); + else + return make_arg_copy (p, gc); +} + +void +openvpn_sleep (const int n) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_event_loop_n_seconds (management, n); + return; + } +#endif + sleep (n); +} + +/* + * Return the next largest power of 2 + * or u if u is a power of 2. + */ +size_t +adjust_power_of_2 (size_t u) +{ + size_t ret = 1; + + while (ret < u) + { + ret <<= 1; + ASSERT (ret > 0); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * A printf-like function (that only recognizes a subset of standard printf + * format operators) that prints arguments to an argv list instead + * of a standard string. This is used to build up argv arrays for passing + * to execve. + */ + +void +argv_init (struct argv *a) +{ + a->capacity = 0; + a->argc = 0; + a->argv = NULL; + a->system_str = NULL; +} + +struct argv +argv_new (void) +{ + struct argv ret; + argv_init (&ret); + return ret; +} + +void +argv_reset (struct argv *a) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < a->argc; ++i) + free (a->argv[i]); + free (a->argv); + free (a->system_str); + argv_init (a); +} + +static void +argv_extend (struct argv *a, const size_t newcap) +{ + if (newcap > a->capacity) + { + char **newargv; + size_t i; + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (newargv, char *, newcap); + for (i = 0; i < a->argc; ++i) + newargv[i] = a->argv[i]; + free (a->argv); + a->argv = newargv; + a->capacity = newcap; + } +} + +static void +argv_grow (struct argv *a, const size_t add) +{ + const size_t newargc = a->argc + add + 1; + ASSERT (newargc > a->argc); + argv_extend (a, adjust_power_of_2 (newargc)); +} + +static void +argv_append (struct argv *a, char *str) /* str must have been malloced or be NULL */ +{ + argv_grow (a, 1); + a->argv[a->argc++] = str; +} + +static void +argv_system_str_append (struct argv *a, const char *str, const bool enquote) +{ + if (str) + { + char *newstr; + + /* compute length of new system_str */ + size_t l = strlen (str) + 1; /* space for new string plus trailing '\0' */ + if (a->system_str) + l += strlen (a->system_str) + 1; /* space for existing string + space (" ") separator */ + if (enquote) + l += 2; /* space for two quotes */ + + /* build new system_str */ + newstr = (char *) malloc (l); + newstr[0] = '\0'; + check_malloc_return (newstr); + if (a->system_str) + { + strcpy (newstr, a->system_str); + strcat (newstr, " "); + } + if (enquote) + strcat (newstr, "\""); + strcat (newstr, str); + if (enquote) + strcat (newstr, "\""); + free (a->system_str); + a->system_str = newstr; + } +} + +static char * +argv_extract_cmd_name (const char *path) +{ + if (path) + { + char *path_cp = strdup(path); /* POSIX basename() implementaions may modify its arguments */ + const char *bn = basename (path_cp); + if (bn) + { + char *ret = string_alloc (bn, NULL); + char *dot = strrchr (ret, '.'); + if (dot) + *dot = '\0'; + free(path_cp); + if (ret[0] != '\0') + return ret; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const char * +argv_system_str (const struct argv *a) +{ + return a->system_str; +} + +struct argv +argv_clone (const struct argv *a, const size_t headroom) +{ + struct argv r; + size_t i; + + argv_init (&r); + for (i = 0; i < headroom; ++i) + argv_append (&r, NULL); + if (a) + { + for (i = 0; i < a->argc; ++i) + argv_append (&r, string_alloc (a->argv[i], NULL)); + r.system_str = string_alloc (a->system_str, NULL); + } + return r; +} + +struct argv +argv_insert_head (const struct argv *a, const char *head) +{ + struct argv r; + char *s; + + r = argv_clone (a, 1); + r.argv[0] = string_alloc (head, NULL); + s = r.system_str; + r.system_str = string_alloc (head, NULL); + if (s) + { + argv_system_str_append (&r, s, false); + free (s); + } + return r; +} + +char * +argv_term (const char **f) +{ + const char *p = *f; + const char *term = NULL; + size_t termlen = 0; + + if (*p == '\0') + return NULL; + + while (true) + { + const int c = *p; + if (c == '\0') + break; + if (term) + { + if (!isspace (c)) + ++termlen; + else + break; + } + else + { + if (!isspace (c)) + { + term = p; + termlen = 1; + } + } + ++p; + } + *f = p; + + if (term) + { + char *ret; + ASSERT (termlen > 0); + ret = malloc (termlen + 1); + check_malloc_return (ret); + memcpy (ret, term, termlen); + ret[termlen] = '\0'; + return ret; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +const char * +argv_str (const struct argv *a, struct gc_arena *gc, const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (a->argv) + return print_argv ((const char **)a->argv, gc, flags); + else + return ""; +} + +void +argv_msg (const int msglev, const struct argv *a) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (msglev, "%s", argv_str (a, &gc, 0)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +argv_msg_prefix (const int msglev, const struct argv *a, const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (msglev, "%s: %s", prefix, argv_str (a, &gc, 0)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +argv_printf (struct argv *a, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + va_start (arglist, format); + argv_printf_arglist (a, format, 0, arglist); + va_end (arglist); + } + +void +argv_printf_cat (struct argv *a, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + va_start (arglist, format); + argv_printf_arglist (a, format, APA_CAT, arglist); + va_end (arglist); +} + +void +argv_printf_arglist (struct argv *a, const char *format, const unsigned int flags, va_list arglist) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *term; + const char *f = format; + + if (!(flags & APA_CAT)) + argv_reset (a); + argv_extend (a, 1); /* ensure trailing NULL */ + + while ((term = argv_term (&f)) != NULL) + { + if (term[0] == '%') + { + if (!strcmp (term, "%s")) + { + char *s = va_arg (arglist, char *); + if (!s) + s = ""; + argv_append (a, string_alloc (s, NULL)); + argv_system_str_append (a, s, true); + } + else if (!strcmp (term, "%sc")) + { + char *s = va_arg (arglist, char *); + if (s) + { + int nparms; + char *parms[MAX_PARMS+1]; + int i; + + nparms = parse_line (s, parms, MAX_PARMS, "SCRIPT-ARGV", 0, D_ARGV_PARSE_CMD, &gc); + if (nparms) + { + for (i = 0; i < nparms; ++i) + argv_append (a, string_alloc (parms[i], NULL)); + } + else + argv_append (a, string_alloc (s, NULL)); + + argv_system_str_append (a, s, false); + } + else + { + argv_append (a, string_alloc ("", NULL)); + argv_system_str_append (a, "echo", false); + } + } + else if (!strcmp (term, "%d")) + { + char numstr[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (numstr, sizeof (numstr), "%d", va_arg (arglist, int)); + argv_append (a, string_alloc (numstr, NULL)); + argv_system_str_append (a, numstr, false); + } + else if (!strcmp (term, "%u")) + { + char numstr[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (numstr, sizeof (numstr), "%u", va_arg (arglist, unsigned int)); + argv_append (a, string_alloc (numstr, NULL)); + argv_system_str_append (a, numstr, false); + } + else if (!strcmp (term, "%s/%d")) + { + char numstr[64]; + char *s = va_arg (arglist, char *); + + if (!s) + s = ""; + + openvpn_snprintf (numstr, sizeof (numstr), "%d", va_arg (arglist, int)); + + { + const size_t len = strlen(s) + strlen(numstr) + 2; + char *combined = (char *) malloc (len); + check_malloc_return (combined); + + strcpy (combined, s); + strcat (combined, "/"); + strcat (combined, numstr); + argv_append (a, combined); + argv_system_str_append (a, combined, false); + } + } + else if (!strcmp (term, "%s%sc")) + { + char *s1 = va_arg (arglist, char *); + char *s2 = va_arg (arglist, char *); + char *combined; + char *cmd_name; + + if (!s1) s1 = ""; + if (!s2) s2 = ""; + combined = (char *) malloc (strlen(s1) + strlen(s2) + 1); + check_malloc_return (combined); + strcpy (combined, s1); + strcat (combined, s2); + argv_append (a, combined); + + cmd_name = argv_extract_cmd_name (combined); + if (cmd_name) + { + argv_system_str_append (a, cmd_name, false); + free (cmd_name); + } + } + else + ASSERT (0); + free (term); + } + else + { + argv_append (a, term); + argv_system_str_append (a, term, false); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#ifdef ARGV_TEST +void +argv_test (void) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *s; + + struct argv a; + + argv_init (&a); + argv_printf (&a, "%sc foo bar %s", "c:\\\\src\\\\test\\\\jyargs.exe", "foo bar"); + argv_msg_prefix (M_INFO, &a, "ARGV"); + msg (M_INFO, "ARGV-S: %s", argv_system_str(&a)); + /*openvpn_execve_check (&a, NULL, 0, "command failed");*/ + + argv_printf (&a, "%sc %s %s", "c:\\\\src\\\\test files\\\\batargs.bat", "foo", "bar"); + argv_msg_prefix (M_INFO, &a, "ARGV"); + msg (M_INFO, "ARGV-S: %s", argv_system_str(&a)); + /*openvpn_execve_check (&a, NULL, 0, "command failed");*/ + + argv_printf (&a, "%s%sc foo bar %s %s/%d %d %u", "/foo", "/bar.exe", "one two", "1.2.3.4", 24, -69, 96); + argv_msg_prefix (M_INFO, &a, "ARGV"); + msg (M_INFO, "ARGV-S: %s", argv_system_str(&a)); + /*openvpn_execve_check (&a, NULL, 0, "command failed");*/ + + argv_printf (&a, "this is a %s test of int %d unsigned %u", "FOO", -69, 42); + s = argv_str (&a, &gc, PA_BRACKET); + printf ("PF: %s\n", s); + printf ("PF-S: %s\n", argv_system_str(&a)); + + { + struct argv b = argv_insert_head (&a, "MARK"); + s = argv_str (&b, &gc, PA_BRACKET); + printf ("PF: %s\n", s); + printf ("PF-S: %s\n", argv_system_str(&b)); + argv_reset (&b); + } + + argv_printf (&a, "%sc foo bar %d", "\"multi term\" command following \\\"spaces", 99); + s = argv_str (&a, &gc, PA_BRACKET); + printf ("PF: %s\n", s); + printf ("PF-S: %s\n", argv_system_str(&a)); + argv_reset (&a); + + s = argv_str (&a, &gc, PA_BRACKET); + printf ("PF: %s\n", s); + printf ("PF-S: %s\n", argv_system_str(&a)); + argv_reset (&a); + + argv_printf (&a, "foo bar %d", 99); + argv_printf_cat (&a, "bar %d foo %sc", 42, "nonesuch"); + argv_printf_cat (&a, "cool %s %d u %s/%d end", "frood", 4, "hello", 7); + s = argv_str (&a, &gc, PA_BRACKET); + printf ("PF: %s\n", s); + printf ("PF-S: %s\n", argv_system_str(&a)); + argv_reset (&a); + +#if 0 + { + char line[512]; + while (fgets (line, sizeof(line), stdin) != NULL) + { + char *term; + const char *f = line; + int i = 0; + + while ((term = argv_term (&f)) != NULL) + { + printf ("[%d] '%s'\n", i, term); + ++i; + free (term); + } + } + } +#endif + + argv_reset (&a); + gc_free (&gc); +} +#endif + +/* + * Remove security-sensitive strings from control message + * so that they will not be output to log file. + */ +const char * +sanitize_control_message(const char *src, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char *ret = gc_malloc (strlen(src)+1, false, gc); + char *dest = ret; + bool redact = false; + int skip = 0; + + for (;;) + { + const char c = *src; + if (c == '\0') + break; + if (c == 'S' && !strncmp(src, "SESS_ID_", 8)) + { + skip = 7; + redact = true; + } + else if (c == 'e' && !strncmp(src, "echo ", 5)) + { + skip = 4; + redact = true; + } + + if (c == ',') /* end of redacted item? */ + { + skip = 0; + redact = false; + } + + if (redact) + { + if (skip > 0) + { + --skip; + *dest++ = c; + } + } + else + *dest++ = c; + + ++src; + } + *dest = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +/** + * Will set or query for a global compat flag. To modify the compat flags + * the COMPAT_FLAG_SET must be bitwise ORed together with the flag to set. + * If no "operator" flag is given it defaults to COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY, + * which returns the flag state. + * + * @param flag Flag to be set/queried for bitwise ORed with the operator flag + * @return Returns 0 if the flag is not set, otherwise the 'flag' value is returned + */ +bool +compat_flag (unsigned int flag) +{ + static unsigned int compat_flags = 0; + + if (flag & COMPAT_FLAG_SET) + compat_flags |= (flag >> 1); + + return (compat_flags & (flag >> 1)); + +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..183898e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MISC_H +#define MISC_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "platform.h" + +/* socket descriptor passed by inetd/xinetd server to us */ +#define INETD_SOCKET_DESCRIPTOR 0 + +/* forward declarations */ +struct plugin_list; + +/* used by argv_x functions */ +struct argv { + size_t capacity; + size_t argc; + char **argv; + char *system_str; +}; + +/* + * Handle environmental variable lists + */ + +struct env_item { + char *string; + struct env_item *next; +}; + +struct env_set { + struct gc_arena *gc; + struct env_item *list; +}; + +void run_up_down (const char *command, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + int plugin_type, + const char *arg, + const char *dev_type, + int tun_mtu, + int link_mtu, + const char *ifconfig_local, + const char* ifconfig_remote, + const char *context, + const char *signal_text, + const char *script_type, + struct env_set *es); + +/* workspace for get_pid_file/write_pid */ +struct pid_state { + FILE *fp; + const char *filename; +}; + +void get_pid_file (const char* filename, struct pid_state *state); +void write_pid (const struct pid_state *state); + +/* check file protections */ +void warn_if_group_others_accessible(const char* filename); + +/* system flags */ +#define S_SCRIPT (1<<0) +#define S_FATAL (1<<1) + +const char *system_error_message (int, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* wrapper around the execve() call */ +int openvpn_popen (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es); +int openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags); +bool openvpn_execve_check (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags, const char *error_message); +bool openvpn_execve_allowed (const unsigned int flags); + +static inline bool +openvpn_run_script (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags, const char *hook) +{ + char msg[256]; + + openvpn_snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "WARNING: Failed running command (%s)", hook); + return openvpn_execve_check(a, es, flags | S_SCRIPT, msg); +} + + +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR +/* a thread-safe version of strerror */ +const char* strerror_ts (int errnum, struct gc_arena *gc); +#endif + +/* Set standard file descriptors to /dev/null */ +void set_std_files_to_null (bool stdin_only); + +/* dup inetd/xinetd socket descriptor and save */ +extern int inetd_socket_descriptor; +void save_inetd_socket_descriptor (void); + +/* init random() function, only used as source for weak random numbers, when !ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +void init_random_seed(void); + +/* set/delete environmental variable */ +void setenv_str_ex (struct env_set *es, + const char *name, + const char *value, + const unsigned int name_include, + const unsigned int name_exclude, + const char name_replace, + const unsigned int value_include, + const unsigned int value_exclude, + const char value_replace); + +void setenv_counter (struct env_set *es, const char *name, counter_type value); +void setenv_int (struct env_set *es, const char *name, int value); +void setenv_unsigned (struct env_set *es, const char *name, unsigned int value); +void setenv_str (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value); +void setenv_str_safe (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value); +void setenv_del (struct env_set *es, const char *name); + +void setenv_int_i (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const int value, const int i); +void setenv_str_i (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value, const int i); + +/* struct env_set functions */ + +struct env_set *env_set_create (struct gc_arena *gc); +void env_set_destroy (struct env_set *es); +bool env_set_del (struct env_set *es, const char *str); +void env_set_add (struct env_set *es, const char *str); + +void env_set_print (int msglevel, const struct env_set *es); + +void env_set_inherit (struct env_set *es, const struct env_set *src); + +void env_set_add_to_environment (const struct env_set *es); +void env_set_remove_from_environment (const struct env_set *es); + +/* Make arrays of strings */ + +const char **make_env_array (const struct env_set *es, + const bool check_allowed, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +const char **make_arg_array (const char *first, const char *parms, struct gc_arena *gc); +const char **make_extended_arg_array (char **p, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* convert netmasks for iproute2 */ +int count_netmask_bits(const char *); +unsigned int count_bits(unsigned int ); + +/* an analogue to the random() function, but use OpenSSL functions if available */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +long int get_random(void); +#else +#define get_random random +#endif + +/* return true if filename can be opened for read */ +bool test_file (const char *filename); + +/* create a temporary file in directory, returns the filename of the created file */ +const char *create_temp_file (const char *directory, const char *prefix, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* put a directory and filename together */ +const char *gen_path (const char *directory, const char *filename, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* return true if pathname is absolute */ +bool absolute_pathname (const char *pathname); + +/* prepend a random prefix to hostname (need ENABLE_CRYPTO) */ +const char *hostname_randomize(const char *hostname, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Get and store a username/password + */ + +struct user_pass +{ + bool defined; + bool nocache; + +/* max length of username/password */ +# ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +# define USER_PASS_LEN 4096 +# else +# define USER_PASS_LEN 128 +# endif + char username[USER_PASS_LEN]; + char password[USER_PASS_LEN]; +}; + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR +/* + * Challenge response info on client as pushed by server. + */ +struct auth_challenge_info { +# define CR_ECHO (1<<0) /* echo response when typed by user */ +# define CR_RESPONSE (1<<1) /* response needed */ + unsigned int flags; + + const char *user; + const char *state_id; + const char *challenge_text; +}; + +struct auth_challenge_info *get_auth_challenge (const char *auth_challenge, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Challenge response info on client as pushed by server. + */ +struct static_challenge_info { +# define SC_ECHO (1<<0) /* echo response when typed by user */ + unsigned int flags; + + const char *challenge_text; +}; + +#else +struct auth_challenge_info {}; +struct static_challenge_info {}; +#endif + +/* + * Flags for get_user_pass and management_query_user_pass + */ +#define GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT (1<<0) +#define GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE (1<<1) +#define GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY (1<<2) +#define GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK (1<<3) +#define GET_USER_PASS_NOFATAL (1<<4) +#define GET_USER_PASS_NEED_STR (1<<5) +#define GET_USER_PASS_PREVIOUS_CREDS_FAILED (1<<6) + +#define GET_USER_PASS_DYNAMIC_CHALLENGE (1<<7) /* CRV1 protocol -- dynamic challenge */ +#define GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE (1<<8) /* SCRV1 protocol -- static challenge */ +#define GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE_ECHO (1<<9) /* SCRV1 protocol -- echo response */ + +bool get_user_pass_cr (struct user_pass *up, + const char *auth_file, + const char *prefix, + const unsigned int flags, + const char *auth_challenge); + +static inline bool +get_user_pass (struct user_pass *up, + const char *auth_file, + const char *prefix, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + return get_user_pass_cr (up, auth_file, prefix, flags, NULL); +} + +void fail_user_pass (const char *prefix, + const unsigned int flags, + const char *reason); + +void purge_user_pass (struct user_pass *up, const bool force); + +void set_auth_token (struct user_pass *up, const char *token); + +/* + * Process string received by untrusted peer before + * printing to console or log file. + * Assumes that string has been null terminated. + */ +const char *safe_print (const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* returns true if environmental variable safe to print to log */ +bool env_safe_to_print (const char *str); + +/* returns true if environmental variable may be passed to an external program */ +bool env_allowed (const char *str); + +/* + * A sleep function that services the management layer for n + * seconds rather than doing nothing. + */ +void openvpn_sleep (const int n); + +void configure_path (void); + +const char *sanitize_control_message(const char *str, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#if AUTO_USERID +void get_user_pass_auto_userid (struct user_pass *up, const char *tag); +#endif + +/* + * /sbin/ip path, may be overridden + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE +extern const char *iproute_path; +#endif + +/* Script security */ +#define SSEC_NONE 0 /* strictly no calling of external programs */ +#define SSEC_BUILT_IN 1 /* only call built-in programs such as ifconfig, route, netsh, etc.*/ +#define SSEC_SCRIPTS 2 /* allow calling of built-in programs and user-defined scripts */ +#define SSEC_PW_ENV 3 /* allow calling of built-in programs and user-defined scripts that may receive a password as an environmental variable */ +extern int script_security; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* return the next largest power of 2 */ +size_t adjust_power_of_2 (size_t u); + +/* + * A printf-like function (that only recognizes a subset of standard printf + * format operators) that prints arguments to an argv list instead + * of a standard string. This is used to build up argv arrays for passing + * to execve. + */ +void argv_init (struct argv *a); +struct argv argv_new (void); +void argv_reset (struct argv *a); +char *argv_term (const char **f); +const char *argv_str (const struct argv *a, struct gc_arena *gc, const unsigned int flags); +struct argv argv_insert_head (const struct argv *a, const char *head); +void argv_msg (const int msglev, const struct argv *a); +void argv_msg_prefix (const int msglev, const struct argv *a, const char *prefix); +const char *argv_system_str (const struct argv *a); + +#define APA_CAT (1<<0) /* concatentate onto existing struct argv list */ +void argv_printf_arglist (struct argv *a, const char *format, const unsigned int flags, va_list arglist); + +void argv_printf (struct argv *a, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 2, 3))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 2, 3))) +#endif +#endif + ; + +void argv_printf_cat (struct argv *a, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 2, 3))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 2, 3))) +#endif +#endif + ; + +#define COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY 0 /** compat_flags operator: Query for a flag */ +#define COMPAT_FLAG_SET (1<<0) /** compat_flags operator: Set a compat flag */ +#define COMPAT_NAMES (1<<1) /** compat flag: --compat-names set */ +#define COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING (1<<2) /** compat flag: --compat-names without char remapping */ +bool compat_flag (unsigned int flag); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..850e3363 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.c @@ -0,0 +1,558 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "mroute.h" +#include "proto.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "socket.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +void +mroute_addr_init (struct mroute_addr *addr) +{ + CLEAR (*addr); +} + +/* + * Ethernet multicast addresses. + */ + +static inline bool +is_mac_mcast_addr (const uint8_t *mac) +{ + return (bool) (mac[0] & 1); +} + +static inline bool +is_mac_mcast_maddr (const struct mroute_addr *addr) +{ + return (addr->type & MR_ADDR_MASK) == MR_ADDR_ETHER && is_mac_mcast_addr (addr->addr); +} + +/* + * Don't learn certain addresses. + */ +bool +mroute_learnable_address (const struct mroute_addr *addr) +{ + int i; + bool not_all_zeros = false; + bool not_all_ones = false; + + for (i = 0; i < addr->len; ++i) + { + int b = addr->addr[i]; + if (b != 0x00) + not_all_zeros = true; + if (b != 0xFF) + not_all_ones = true; + } + return not_all_zeros && not_all_ones && !is_mac_mcast_maddr (addr); +} + +static inline void +mroute_get_in_addr_t (struct mroute_addr *ma, const in_addr_t src, unsigned int mask) +{ + if (ma) + { + ma->type = MR_ADDR_IPV4 | mask; + ma->netbits = 0; + ma->len = 4; + *(in_addr_t*)ma->addr = src; + } +} + +static inline void +mroute_get_in6_addr (struct mroute_addr *ma, const struct in6_addr src, unsigned int mask) +{ + if (ma) + { + ma->type = MR_ADDR_IPV6 | mask; + ma->netbits = 0; + ma->len = 16; + *(struct in6_addr *)ma->addr = src; + } +} + +static inline bool +mroute_is_mcast (const in_addr_t addr) +{ + return ((addr & htonl(IP_MCAST_SUBNET_MASK)) == htonl(IP_MCAST_NETWORK)); +} + +/* RFC 4291, 2.7, "binary 11111111 at the start of an address identifies + * the address as being a multicast address" + */ +static inline bool +mroute_is_mcast_ipv6 (const struct in6_addr addr) +{ + return (addr.s6_addr[0] == 0xff); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + +static unsigned int +mroute_extract_addr_arp (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + const struct buffer *buf) +{ + unsigned int ret = 0; + if (BLEN (buf) >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_arp)) + { + const struct openvpn_arp *arp = (const struct openvpn_arp *) BPTR (buf); + if (arp->mac_addr_type == htons(0x0001) + && arp->proto_addr_type == htons(0x0800) + && arp->mac_addr_size == 0x06 + && arp->proto_addr_size == 0x04) + { + mroute_get_in_addr_t (src, arp->ip_src, MR_ARP); + mroute_get_in_addr_t (dest, arp->ip_dest, MR_ARP); + + /* multicast packet? */ + if (mroute_is_mcast (arp->ip_dest)) + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST; + + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED; + } + } + return ret; +} + +#endif + +unsigned int +mroute_extract_addr_ipv4 (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + const struct buffer *buf) +{ + unsigned int ret = 0; + if (BLEN (buf) >= 1) + { + switch (OPENVPN_IPH_GET_VER (*BPTR(buf))) + { + case 4: + if (BLEN (buf) >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr)) + { + const struct openvpn_iphdr *ip = (const struct openvpn_iphdr *) BPTR (buf); + + mroute_get_in_addr_t (src, ip->saddr, 0); + mroute_get_in_addr_t (dest, ip->daddr, 0); + + /* multicast packet? */ + if (mroute_is_mcast (ip->daddr)) + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST; + + /* IGMP message? */ + if (ip->protocol == OPENVPN_IPPROTO_IGMP) + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_IGMP; + + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED; + } + break; + case 6: + if (BLEN (buf) >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_ipv6hdr)) + { + const struct openvpn_ipv6hdr *ipv6 = (const struct openvpn_ipv6hdr *) BPTR (buf); +#if 0 /* very basic debug */ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg( M_INFO, "IPv6 packet! src=%s, dst=%s", + print_in6_addr( ipv6->saddr, 0, &gc ), + print_in6_addr( ipv6->daddr, 0, &gc )); + gc_free (&gc); +#endif + + mroute_get_in6_addr (src, ipv6->saddr, 0); + mroute_get_in6_addr (dest, ipv6->daddr, 0); + + if (mroute_is_mcast_ipv6 (ipv6->daddr)) + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST; + + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED; + } + break; + default: + msg (M_WARN, "IP packet with unknown IP version=%d seen", + OPENVPN_IPH_GET_VER (*BPTR(buf))); + } + } + return ret; +} + +unsigned int +mroute_extract_addr_ether (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + struct mroute_addr *esrc, + struct mroute_addr *edest, + const struct buffer *buf) +{ + unsigned int ret = 0; + if (BLEN (buf) >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_ethhdr)) + { + const struct openvpn_ethhdr *eth = (const struct openvpn_ethhdr *) BPTR (buf); + if (src) + { + src->type = MR_ADDR_ETHER; + src->netbits = 0; + src->len = 6; + memcpy (src->addr, eth->source, 6); + } + if (dest) + { + dest->type = MR_ADDR_ETHER; + dest->netbits = 0; + dest->len = 6; + memcpy (dest->addr, eth->dest, 6); + + /* ethernet broadcast/multicast packet? */ + if (is_mac_mcast_addr (eth->dest)) + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_BCAST; + } + + ret |= MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (esrc || edest) + { + struct buffer b = *buf; + if (buf_advance (&b, sizeof (struct openvpn_ethhdr))) + { + switch (ntohs (eth->proto)) + { + case OPENVPN_ETH_P_IPV4: + ret |= (mroute_extract_addr_ipv4 (esrc, edest, &b) << MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT); + break; + case OPENVPN_ETH_P_ARP: + ret |= (mroute_extract_addr_arp (esrc, edest, &b) << MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT); + break; + } + } + } +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Translate a struct openvpn_sockaddr (osaddr) + * to a struct mroute_addr (addr). + */ +bool mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (struct mroute_addr *addr, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *osaddr, + bool use_port) +{ + switch (osaddr->addr.sa.sa_family) + { + case AF_INET: + { + if (use_port) + { + addr->type = MR_ADDR_IPV4 | MR_WITH_PORT; + addr->netbits = 0; + addr->len = 6; + memcpy (addr->addr, &osaddr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr, 4); + memcpy (addr->addr + 4, &osaddr->addr.in4.sin_port, 2); + } + else + { + addr->type = MR_ADDR_IPV4; + addr->netbits = 0; + addr->len = 4; + memcpy (addr->addr, &osaddr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr, 4); + } + return true; + } + case AF_INET6: + if (use_port) + { + addr->type = MR_ADDR_IPV6 | MR_WITH_PORT; + addr->netbits = 0; + addr->len = 18; + memcpy (addr->addr, &osaddr->addr.in6.sin6_addr, 16); + memcpy (addr->addr + 16, &osaddr->addr.in6.sin6_port, 2); + } + else + { + addr->type = MR_ADDR_IPV6; + addr->netbits = 0; + addr->len = 16; + memcpy (addr->addr, &osaddr->addr.in6.sin6_addr, 16); + } + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* + * Zero off the host bits in an address, leaving + * only the network bits, using the netbits member of + * struct mroute_addr as the controlling parameter. + * + * TODO: this is called for route-lookup for every yet-unhashed + * destination address, so for lots of active net-iroutes, this + * might benefit from some "zeroize 32 bit at a time" improvements + */ +void +mroute_addr_mask_host_bits (struct mroute_addr *ma) +{ + in_addr_t addr = ntohl(*(in_addr_t*)ma->addr); + if ((ma->type & MR_ADDR_MASK) == MR_ADDR_IPV4) + { + addr &= netbits_to_netmask (ma->netbits); + *(in_addr_t*)ma->addr = htonl (addr); + } + else if ((ma->type & MR_ADDR_MASK) == MR_ADDR_IPV6) + { + int byte = ma->len-1; /* rightmost byte in address */ + int bits_to_clear = 128 - ma->netbits; + + while( byte >= 0 && bits_to_clear > 0 ) + { + if ( bits_to_clear >= 8 ) + { ma->addr[byte--] = 0; bits_to_clear -= 8; } + else + { ma->addr[byte--] &= (IPV4_NETMASK_HOST << bits_to_clear); bits_to_clear = 0; } + } + ASSERT( bits_to_clear == 0 ); + } + else + ASSERT(0); +} + +/* + * The mroute_addr hash function takes into account the + * address type, number of bits in the network address, + * and the actual address. + */ +uint32_t +mroute_addr_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv) +{ + return hash_func (mroute_addr_hash_ptr ((const struct mroute_addr *) key), + mroute_addr_hash_len ((const struct mroute_addr *) key), + iv); +} + +bool +mroute_addr_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2) +{ + return mroute_addr_equal ((const struct mroute_addr *) key1, + (const struct mroute_addr *) key2); +} + +const char * +mroute_addr_print (const struct mroute_addr *ma, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return mroute_addr_print_ex (ma, MAPF_IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, gc); +} + +const char * +mroute_addr_print_ex (const struct mroute_addr *ma, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + if (ma) + { + struct mroute_addr maddr = *ma; + + switch (maddr.type & MR_ADDR_MASK) + { + case MR_ADDR_ETHER: + buf_printf (&out, "%s", format_hex_ex (ma->addr, 6, 0, 1, ":", gc)); + break; + case MR_ADDR_IPV4: + { + struct buffer buf; + in_addr_t addr; + int port; + bool status; + buf_set_read (&buf, maddr.addr, maddr.len); + addr = buf_read_u32 (&buf, &status); + if (status) + { + if ((flags & MAPF_SHOW_ARP) && (maddr.type & MR_ARP)) + buf_printf (&out, "ARP/"); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", print_in_addr_t (addr, (flags & MAPF_IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF) ? IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF : 0, gc)); + if (maddr.type & MR_WITH_NETBITS) + { + if (flags & MAPF_SUBNET) + { + const in_addr_t netmask = netbits_to_netmask (maddr.netbits); + buf_printf (&out, "/%s", print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, gc)); + } + else + buf_printf (&out, "/%d", maddr.netbits); + } + } + if (maddr.type & MR_WITH_PORT) + { + port = buf_read_u16 (&buf); + if (port >= 0) + buf_printf (&out, ":%d", port); + } + } + break; + case MR_ADDR_IPV6: + { + buf_printf (&out, "%s", + print_in6_addr( *(struct in6_addr*)&maddr.addr, 0, gc)); + if (maddr.type & MR_WITH_NETBITS) + { + buf_printf (&out, "/%d", maddr.netbits); + } + } + break; + default: + buf_printf (&out, "UNKNOWN"); + break; + } + return BSTR (&out); + } + else + return "[NULL]"; + } + +/* + * mroute_helper's main job is keeping track of + * currently used CIDR netlengths, so we don't + * have to cycle through all 33. + */ + +struct mroute_helper * +mroute_helper_init (int ageable_ttl_secs) +{ + struct mroute_helper *mh; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (mh, struct mroute_helper); + mh->ageable_ttl_secs = ageable_ttl_secs; + return mh; +} + +static void +mroute_helper_regenerate (struct mroute_helper *mh) +{ + int i, j = 0; + for (i = MR_HELPER_NET_LEN - 1; i >= 0; --i) + { + if (mh->net_len_refcount[i] > 0) + mh->net_len[j++] = (uint8_t) i; + } + mh->n_net_len = j; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_MULTI_DEBUG)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + buf_printf (&out, "MROUTE CIDR netlen:"); + for (i = 0; i < mh->n_net_len; ++i) + { + buf_printf (&out, " /%d", mh->net_len[i]); + } + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "%s", BSTR (&out)); + gc_free (&gc); + } +#endif +} + +void +mroute_helper_add_iroute (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute *ir) +{ + if (ir->netbits >= 0) + { + ASSERT (ir->netbits < MR_HELPER_NET_LEN); + ++mh->cache_generation; + ++mh->net_len_refcount[ir->netbits]; + if (mh->net_len_refcount[ir->netbits] == 1) + mroute_helper_regenerate (mh); + } +} + +void +mroute_helper_del_iroute (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute *ir) +{ + if (ir->netbits >= 0) + { + ASSERT (ir->netbits < MR_HELPER_NET_LEN); + ++mh->cache_generation; + --mh->net_len_refcount[ir->netbits]; + ASSERT (mh->net_len_refcount[ir->netbits] >= 0); + if (!mh->net_len_refcount[ir->netbits]) + mroute_helper_regenerate (mh); + } +} + +/* this is a bit inelegant, we really should have a helper to that + * is only passed the netbits value, and not the whole struct iroute * + * - thus one helper could do IPv4 and IPv6. For the sake of "not change + * code unrelated to IPv4" this is left for later cleanup, for now. + */ +void +mroute_helper_add_iroute6 (struct mroute_helper *mh, + const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6) +{ + if (ir6->netbits >= 0) + { + ASSERT (ir6->netbits < MR_HELPER_NET_LEN); + ++mh->cache_generation; + ++mh->net_len_refcount[ir6->netbits]; + if (mh->net_len_refcount[ir6->netbits] == 1) + mroute_helper_regenerate (mh); + } +} + +void +mroute_helper_del_iroute6 (struct mroute_helper *mh, + const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6) +{ + if (ir6->netbits >= 0) + { + ASSERT (ir6->netbits < MR_HELPER_NET_LEN); + ++mh->cache_generation; + --mh->net_len_refcount[ir6->netbits]; + ASSERT (mh->net_len_refcount[ir6->netbits] >= 0); + if (!mh->net_len_refcount[ir6->netbits]) + mroute_helper_regenerate (mh); + } +} + +void +mroute_helper_free (struct mroute_helper *mh) +{ + free (mh); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b72b5ffc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mroute.h @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MROUTE_H +#define MROUTE_H + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "list.h" +#include "route.h" + +#define IP_MCAST_SUBNET_MASK ((in_addr_t)240<<24) +#define IP_MCAST_NETWORK ((in_addr_t)224<<24) + +/* Return status values for mroute_extract_addr_from_packet */ + +#define MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED (1<<0) +#define MROUTE_EXTRACT_BCAST (1<<1) +#define MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST (1<<2) +#define MROUTE_EXTRACT_IGMP (1<<3) + +#define MROUTE_SEC_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED (1<<(0+MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT)) +#define MROUTE_SEC_EXTRACT_BCAST (1<<(1+MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT)) +#define MROUTE_SEC_EXTRACT_MCAST (1<<(2+MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT)) +#define MROUTE_SEC_EXTRACT_IGMP (1<<(3+MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT)) + +#define MROUTE_SEC_SHIFT 4 + +/* + * Choose the largest address possible with + * any of our supported types, which is IPv6 + * with port number. + */ +#define MR_MAX_ADDR_LEN 20 + +/* + * Address Types + */ +#define MR_ADDR_NONE 0 +#define MR_ADDR_ETHER 1 +#define MR_ADDR_IPV4 2 +#define MR_ADDR_IPV6 3 +#define MR_ADDR_MASK 3 + +/* Address type mask indicating that port # is part of address */ +#define MR_WITH_PORT 4 + +/* Address type mask indicating that netbits is part of address */ +#define MR_WITH_NETBITS 8 + +/* Indicates than IPv4 addr was extracted from ARP packet */ +#define MR_ARP 16 + +struct mroute_addr { + uint8_t len; /* length of address */ + uint8_t unused; + uint8_t type; /* MR_ADDR/MR_WITH flags */ + uint8_t netbits; /* number of bits in network part of address, + valid if MR_WITH_NETBITS is set */ + uint8_t addr[MR_MAX_ADDR_LEN]; /* actual address */ +}; + +/* + * Number of bits in an address. Should be raised for IPv6. + */ +#define MR_HELPER_NET_LEN 129 + +/* + * Used to help maintain CIDR routing table. + */ +struct mroute_helper { + unsigned int cache_generation; /* incremented when route added */ + int ageable_ttl_secs; /* host route cache entry time-to-live*/ + int n_net_len; /* length of net_len array */ + uint8_t net_len[MR_HELPER_NET_LEN]; /* CIDR netlengths in descending order */ + int net_len_refcount[MR_HELPER_NET_LEN]; /* refcount of each netlength */ +}; + +struct openvpn_sockaddr; + +bool mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (struct mroute_addr *addr, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *osaddr, + bool use_port); + +bool mroute_learnable_address (const struct mroute_addr *addr); + +uint32_t mroute_addr_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv); +bool mroute_addr_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2); + +void mroute_addr_init (struct mroute_addr *addr); + +const char *mroute_addr_print (const struct mroute_addr *ma, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +#define MAPF_SUBNET (1<<0) +#define MAPF_IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF (1<<1) +#define MAPF_SHOW_ARP (1<<2) +const char *mroute_addr_print_ex (const struct mroute_addr *ma, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +void mroute_addr_mask_host_bits (struct mroute_addr *ma); + +struct mroute_helper *mroute_helper_init (int ageable_ttl_secs); +void mroute_helper_free (struct mroute_helper *mh); +void mroute_helper_add_iroute (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute *ir); +void mroute_helper_del_iroute (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute *ir); +void mroute_helper_add_iroute6 (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6); +void mroute_helper_del_iroute6 (struct mroute_helper *mh, const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6); + +/* + * Given a raw packet in buf, return the src and dest + * addresses of the packet. + */ +static inline unsigned int +mroute_extract_addr_from_packet (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + struct mroute_addr *esrc, + struct mroute_addr *edest, + const struct buffer *buf, + int tunnel_type) +{ + unsigned int mroute_extract_addr_ipv4 (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + const struct buffer *buf); + + unsigned int mroute_extract_addr_ether (struct mroute_addr *src, + struct mroute_addr *dest, + struct mroute_addr *esrc, + struct mroute_addr *edest, + const struct buffer *buf); + unsigned int ret = 0; + verify_align_4 (buf); + if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + ret = mroute_extract_addr_ipv4 (src, dest, buf); + else if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + ret = mroute_extract_addr_ether (src, dest, esrc, edest, buf); + return ret; +} + +static inline bool +mroute_addr_equal (const struct mroute_addr *a1, const struct mroute_addr *a2) +{ + if (a1->type != a2->type) + return false; + if (a1->netbits != a2->netbits) + return false; + if (a1->len != a2->len) + return false; + return memcmp (a1->addr, a2->addr, a1->len) == 0; +} + +static inline const uint8_t * +mroute_addr_hash_ptr (const struct mroute_addr *a) +{ + /* NOTE: depends on ordering of struct mroute_addr */ + return (uint8_t *) &a->type; +} + +static inline uint32_t +mroute_addr_hash_len (const struct mroute_addr *a) +{ + return (uint32_t) a->len + 2; +} + +static inline void +mroute_extract_in_addr_t (struct mroute_addr *dest, const in_addr_t src) +{ + dest->type = MR_ADDR_IPV4; + dest->netbits = 0; + dest->len = 4; + *(in_addr_t*)dest->addr = htonl (src); +} + +static inline in_addr_t +in_addr_t_from_mroute_addr (const struct mroute_addr *addr) +{ + if ((addr->type & MR_ADDR_MASK) == MR_ADDR_IPV4 && addr->netbits == 0 && addr->len == 4) + return ntohl(*(in_addr_t*)addr->addr); + else + return 0; +} + +static inline void +mroute_addr_reset (struct mroute_addr *ma) +{ + ma->len = 0; + ma->type = MR_ADDR_NONE; +} + +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ +#endif /* MROUTE_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64fd722f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "mss.h" +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Lower MSS on TCP SYN packets to fix MTU + * problems which arise from protocol + * encapsulation. + */ + +/* + * IPv4 packet: find TCP header, check flags for "SYN" + * if yes, hand to mss_fixup_dowork() + */ +void +mss_fixup_ipv4 (struct buffer *buf, int maxmss) +{ + const struct openvpn_iphdr *pip; + int hlen; + + if (BLEN (buf) < (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr)) + return; + + verify_align_4 (buf); + pip = (struct openvpn_iphdr *) BPTR (buf); + + hlen = OPENVPN_IPH_GET_LEN (pip->version_len); + + if (pip->protocol == OPENVPN_IPPROTO_TCP + && ntohs (pip->tot_len) == BLEN (buf) + && (ntohs (pip->frag_off) & OPENVPN_IP_OFFMASK) == 0 + && hlen <= BLEN (buf) + && BLEN (buf) - hlen + >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_tcphdr)) + { + struct buffer newbuf = *buf; + if (buf_advance (&newbuf, hlen)) + { + struct openvpn_tcphdr *tc = (struct openvpn_tcphdr *) BPTR (&newbuf); + if (tc->flags & OPENVPN_TCPH_SYN_MASK) + mss_fixup_dowork (&newbuf, (uint16_t) maxmss); + } + } +} + +/* + * IPv6 packet: find TCP header, check flags for "SYN" + * if yes, hand to mss_fixup_dowork() + * (IPv6 header structure is sufficiently different from IPv4...) + */ +void +mss_fixup_ipv6 (struct buffer *buf, int maxmss) +{ + const struct openvpn_ipv6hdr *pip6; + struct buffer newbuf; + + if (BLEN (buf) < (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_ipv6hdr)) + return; + + verify_align_4 (buf); + pip6 = (struct openvpn_ipv6hdr *) BPTR (buf); + + /* do we have the full IPv6 packet? + * "payload_len" does not include IPv6 header (+40 bytes) + */ + if (BLEN (buf) != (int) ntohs(pip6->payload_len)+40 ) + return; + + /* follow header chain until we reach final header, then check for TCP + * + * An IPv6 packet could, theoretically, have a chain of multiple headers + * before the final header (TCP, UDP, ...), so we'd need to walk that + * chain (see RFC 2460 and RFC 6564 for details). + * + * In practice, "most typically used" extention headers (AH, routing, + * fragment, mobility) are very unlikely to be seen inside an OpenVPN + * tun, so for now, we only handle the case of "single next header = TCP" + */ + if ( pip6->nexthdr != OPENVPN_IPPROTO_TCP ) + return; + + newbuf = *buf; + if ( buf_advance( &newbuf, 40 ) ) + { + struct openvpn_tcphdr *tc = (struct openvpn_tcphdr *) BPTR (&newbuf); + if (tc->flags & OPENVPN_TCPH_SYN_MASK) + mss_fixup_dowork (&newbuf, (uint16_t) maxmss-20); + } +} + +/* + * change TCP MSS option in SYN/SYN-ACK packets, if present + * this is generic for IPv4 and IPv6, as the TCP header is the same + */ + +void +mss_fixup_dowork (struct buffer *buf, uint16_t maxmss) +{ + int hlen, olen, optlen; + uint8_t *opt; + uint16_t *mss; + int accumulate; + struct openvpn_tcphdr *tc; + + ASSERT (BLEN (buf) >= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_tcphdr)); + + verify_align_4 (buf); + tc = (struct openvpn_tcphdr *) BPTR (buf); + hlen = OPENVPN_TCPH_GET_DOFF (tc->doff_res); + + /* Invalid header length or header without options. */ + if (hlen <= (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_tcphdr) + || hlen > BLEN (buf)) + return; + + for (olen = hlen - sizeof (struct openvpn_tcphdr), + opt = (uint8_t *)(tc + 1); + olen > 0; + olen -= optlen, opt += optlen) { + if (*opt == OPENVPN_TCPOPT_EOL) + break; + else if (*opt == OPENVPN_TCPOPT_NOP) + optlen = 1; + else { + optlen = *(opt + 1); + if (optlen <= 0 || optlen > olen) + break; + if (*opt == OPENVPN_TCPOPT_MAXSEG) { + if (optlen != OPENVPN_TCPOLEN_MAXSEG) + continue; + mss = (uint16_t *)(opt + 2); + if (ntohs (*mss) > maxmss) { + dmsg (D_MSS, "MSS: %d -> %d", + (int) ntohs (*mss), + (int) maxmss); + accumulate = *mss; + *mss = htons (maxmss); + accumulate -= *mss; + ADJUST_CHECKSUM (accumulate, tc->check); + } + } + } + } +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d329432 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mss.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MSS_H +#define MSS_H + +#include "proto.h" +#include "error.h" + +void mss_fixup_ipv4 (struct buffer *buf, int maxmss); +void mss_fixup_ipv6 (struct buffer *buf, int maxmss); +void mss_fixup_dowork (struct buffer *buf, uint16_t maxmss); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3be493cd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2011 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Maintain usage stats in a memory-mapped file + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_MEMSTATS) + +#include + +#include "error.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "mstats.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +volatile struct mmap_stats *mmap_stats = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ +static char mmap_fn[128]; + +void +mstats_open(const char *fn) +{ + void *data; + ssize_t stat; + int fd; + struct mmap_stats ms; + + if (mmap_stats) /* already called? */ + return; + + /* verify that filename is not too long */ + if (strlen(fn) >= sizeof(mmap_fn)) + msg (M_FATAL, "mstats_open: filename too long"); + + /* create file that will be memory mapped */ + fd = open (fn, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_RDWR, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + if (fd < 0) + { + msg (M_ERR, "mstats_open: cannot open: %s", fn); + return; + } + + /* set the file to the correct size to contain a + struct mmap_stats, and zero it */ + CLEAR(ms); + ms.state = MSTATS_ACTIVE; + stat = write(fd, &ms, sizeof(ms)); + if (stat != sizeof(ms)) + { + msg (M_ERR, "mstats_open: write error: %s", fn); + close(fd); + return; + } + + /* mmap the file */ + data = mmap(NULL, sizeof(struct mmap_stats), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); + if (data == MAP_FAILED) + { + msg (M_ERR, "mstats_open: write error: %s", fn); + close(fd); + return; + } + + /* close the fd (mmap now controls the file) */ + if (close(fd)) + { + msg (M_ERR, "mstats_open: close error: %s", fn); + } + + /* save filename so we can delete it later */ + strcpy(mmap_fn, fn); + + /* save a global pointer to memory-mapped region */ + mmap_stats = (struct mmap_stats *)data; + + msg (M_INFO, "memstats data will be written to %s", fn); +} + +void +mstats_close(void) +{ + if (mmap_stats) + { + mmap_stats->state = MSTATS_EXPIRED; + if (munmap((void *)mmap_stats, sizeof(struct mmap_stats))) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "mstats_close: munmap error"); + platform_unlink(mmap_fn); + mmap_stats = NULL; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dab05fe9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mstats.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2011 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Maintain usage stats in a memory-mapped file + */ + +#if !defined(OPENVPN_MEMSTATS_H) && defined(ENABLE_MEMSTATS) +#define OPENVPN_MEMSTATS_H + +#include "basic.h" + +/* this struct is mapped to the file */ +struct mmap_stats { + counter_type link_read_bytes; /* counter_type can be assumed to be a uint64_t */ + counter_type link_write_bytes; + int n_clients; + +# define MSTATS_UNDEF 0 +# define MSTATS_ACTIVE 1 +# define MSTATS_EXPIRED 2 + int state; +}; + +extern volatile struct mmap_stats *mmap_stats; /* GLOBAL */ + +void mstats_open(const char *fn); +void mstats_close(void); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dc15f092 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "multi.h" +#include "forward-inline.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * TCP States + */ +#define TA_UNDEF 0 +#define TA_SOCKET_READ 1 +#define TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL 2 +#define TA_SOCKET_WRITE 3 +#define TA_SOCKET_WRITE_READY 4 +#define TA_SOCKET_WRITE_DEFERRED 5 +#define TA_TUN_READ 6 +#define TA_TUN_WRITE 7 +#define TA_INITIAL 8 +#define TA_TIMEOUT 9 +#define TA_TUN_WRITE_TIMEOUT 10 + +/* + * Special tags passed to event.[ch] functions + */ +#define MTCP_SOCKET ((void*)1) +#define MTCP_TUN ((void*)2) +#define MTCP_SIG ((void*)3) /* Only on Windows */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT +# define MTCP_MANAGEMENT ((void*)4) +#endif + +#define MTCP_N ((void*)16) /* upper bound on MTCP_x */ + +struct ta_iow_flags +{ + unsigned int flags; + unsigned int ret; + unsigned int tun; + unsigned int sock; +}; + +static const char * +pract (int action) +{ + switch (action) + { + case TA_UNDEF: + return "TA_UNDEF"; + case TA_SOCKET_READ: + return "TA_SOCKET_READ"; + case TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL: + return "TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL"; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE: + return "TA_SOCKET_WRITE"; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE_READY: + return "TA_SOCKET_WRITE_READY"; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE_DEFERRED: + return "TA_SOCKET_WRITE_DEFERRED"; + case TA_TUN_READ: + return "TA_TUN_READ"; + case TA_TUN_WRITE: + return "TA_TUN_WRITE"; + case TA_INITIAL: + return "TA_INITIAL"; + case TA_TIMEOUT: + return "TA_TIMEOUT"; + case TA_TUN_WRITE_TIMEOUT: + return "TA_TUN_WRITE_TIMEOUT"; + default: + return "?"; + } +} + +static struct multi_instance * +multi_create_instance_tcp (struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct multi_instance *mi = NULL; + struct hash *hash = m->hash; + + mi = multi_create_instance (m, NULL); + if (mi) + { + struct hash_element *he; + const uint32_t hv = hash_value (hash, &mi->real); + struct hash_bucket *bucket = hash_bucket (hash, hv); + + he = hash_lookup_fast (hash, bucket, &mi->real, hv); + + if (he) + { + struct multi_instance *oldmi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI TCP: new incoming client address matches existing client address -- new client takes precedence"); + oldmi->did_real_hash = false; + multi_close_instance (m, oldmi, false); + he->key = &mi->real; + he->value = mi; + } + else + hash_add_fast (hash, bucket, &mi->real, hv, mi); + + mi->did_real_hash = true; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (mi) + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: instance added: %s", mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc)); + else + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: new client instance failed"); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); + ASSERT (!(mi && mi->halt)); + return mi; +} + +bool +multi_tcp_instance_specific_init (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + /* buffer for queued TCP socket output packets */ + mi->tcp_link_out_deferred = mbuf_init (m->top.options.n_bcast_buf); + + ASSERT (mi->context.c2.link_socket); + ASSERT (mi->context.c2.link_socket->info.lsa); + ASSERT (mi->context.c2.link_socket->mode == LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM); + ASSERT (mi->context.c2.link_socket->info.lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET + || mi->context.c2.link_socket->info.lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 + ); + if (!mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (&mi->real, &mi->context.c2.link_socket->info.lsa->actual.dest, true)) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI TCP: TCP client address is undefined"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +void +multi_tcp_instance_specific_free (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + mbuf_free (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred); +} + +struct multi_tcp * +multi_tcp_init (int maxevents, int *maxclients) +{ + struct multi_tcp *mtcp; + const int extra_events = BASE_N_EVENTS; + + ASSERT (maxevents >= 1); + ASSERT (maxclients); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (mtcp, struct multi_tcp); + mtcp->maxevents = maxevents + extra_events; + mtcp->es = event_set_init (&mtcp->maxevents, 0); + wait_signal (mtcp->es, MTCP_SIG); + ALLOC_ARRAY (mtcp->esr, struct event_set_return, mtcp->maxevents); + *maxclients = max_int (min_int (mtcp->maxevents - extra_events, *maxclients), 1); + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: TCP INIT maxclients=%d maxevents=%d", *maxclients, mtcp->maxevents); + return mtcp; +} + +void +multi_tcp_delete_event (struct multi_tcp *mtcp, event_t event) +{ + if (mtcp && mtcp->es) + event_del (mtcp->es, event); +} + +void +multi_tcp_free (struct multi_tcp *mtcp) +{ + if (mtcp) + { + event_free (mtcp->es); + if (mtcp->esr) + free (mtcp->esr); + free (mtcp); + } +} + +void +multi_tcp_dereference_instance (struct multi_tcp *mtcp, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct link_socket *ls = mi->context.c2.link_socket; + if (ls && mi->socket_set_called) + event_del (mtcp->es, socket_event_handle (ls)); + mtcp->n_esr = 0; +} + +static inline void +multi_tcp_set_global_rw_flags (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi) + { + mi->socket_set_called = true; + socket_set (mi->context.c2.link_socket, + m->mtcp->es, + mbuf_defined (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred) ? EVENT_WRITE : EVENT_READ, + mi, + &mi->tcp_rwflags); + } +} + +static inline int +multi_tcp_wait (const struct context *c, + struct multi_tcp *mtcp) +{ + int status; + socket_set_listen_persistent (c->c2.link_socket, mtcp->es, MTCP_SOCKET); + tun_set (c->c1.tuntap, mtcp->es, EVENT_READ, MTCP_TUN, &mtcp->tun_rwflags); +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_socket_set (management, mtcp->es, MTCP_MANAGEMENT, &mtcp->management_persist_flags); +#endif + status = event_wait (mtcp->es, &c->c2.timeval, mtcp->esr, mtcp->maxevents); + update_time (); + mtcp->n_esr = 0; + if (status > 0) + mtcp->n_esr = status; + return status; +} + +static inline struct context * +multi_tcp_context (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi) + return &mi->context; + else + return &m->top; +} + +static bool +multi_tcp_process_outgoing_link_ready (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct mbuf_item item; + bool ret = true; + ASSERT (mi); + + /* extract from queue */ + if (mbuf_extract_item (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred, &item)) /* ciphertext IP packet */ + { + dmsg (D_MULTI_TCP, "MULTI TCP: transmitting previously deferred packet"); + + ASSERT (mi == item.instance); + mi->context.c2.to_link = item.buffer->buf; + ret = multi_process_outgoing_link_dowork (m, mi, mpp_flags); + if (!ret) + mi = NULL; + mbuf_free_buf (item.buffer); + } + return ret; +} + +static bool +multi_tcp_process_outgoing_link (struct multi_context *m, bool defer, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = multi_process_outgoing_link_pre (m); + bool ret = true; + + if (mi) + { + if (defer || mbuf_defined (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred)) + { + /* save to queue */ + struct buffer *buf = &mi->context.c2.to_link; + if (BLEN (buf) > 0) + { + struct mbuf_buffer *mb = mbuf_alloc_buf (buf); + struct mbuf_item item; + + set_prefix (mi); + dmsg (D_MULTI_TCP, "MULTI TCP: queuing deferred packet"); + item.buffer = mb; + item.instance = mi; + mbuf_add_item (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred, &item); + mbuf_free_buf (mb); + buf_reset (buf); + ret = multi_process_post (m, mi, mpp_flags); + if (!ret) + mi = NULL; + clear_prefix (); + } + } + else + { + ret = multi_process_outgoing_link_dowork (m, mi, mpp_flags); + if (!ret) + mi = NULL; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static int +multi_tcp_wait_lite (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const int action, bool *tun_input_pending) +{ + struct context *c = multi_tcp_context (m, mi); + unsigned int looking_for = 0; + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_wait_lite a=%s mi=" ptr_format, + pract(action), + (ptr_type)mi); + + tv_clear (&c->c2.timeval); /* ZERO-TIMEOUT */ + + switch (action) + { + case TA_TUN_READ: + looking_for = TUN_READ; + tun_input_pending = NULL; + io_wait (c, IOW_READ_TUN); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_READ: + looking_for = SOCKET_READ; + tun_input_pending = NULL; + io_wait (c, IOW_READ_LINK); + break; + case TA_TUN_WRITE: + looking_for = TUN_WRITE; + tun_input_pending = NULL; + c->c2.timeval.tv_sec = 1; /* For some reason, the Linux 2.2 TUN/TAP driver hits this timeout */ + perf_push (PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN_MTCP); + io_wait (c, IOW_TO_TUN); + perf_pop (); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE: + looking_for = SOCKET_WRITE; + io_wait (c, IOW_TO_LINK|IOW_READ_TUN_FORCE); + break; + default: + msg (M_FATAL, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_wait_lite, unhandled action=%d", action); + } + + if (tun_input_pending && (c->c2.event_set_status & TUN_READ)) + *tun_input_pending = true; + + if (c->c2.event_set_status & looking_for) + { + return action; + } + else + { + switch (action) + { + /* TCP socket output buffer is full */ + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE: + return TA_SOCKET_WRITE_DEFERRED; + + /* TUN device timed out on accepting write */ + case TA_TUN_WRITE: + return TA_TUN_WRITE_TIMEOUT; + } + + return TA_UNDEF; + } +} + +static struct multi_instance * +multi_tcp_dispatch (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const int action) +{ + const unsigned int mpp_flags = MPP_PRE_SELECT|MPP_RECORD_TOUCH; + struct multi_instance *touched = mi; + m->mpp_touched = &touched; + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_dispatch a=%s mi=" ptr_format, + pract(action), + (ptr_type)mi); + + switch (action) + { + case TA_TUN_READ: + read_incoming_tun (&m->top); + if (!IS_SIG (&m->top)) + multi_process_incoming_tun (m, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_READ: + case TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL: + ASSERT (mi); + ASSERT (mi->context.c2.link_socket); + set_prefix (mi); + read_incoming_link (&mi->context); + clear_prefix (); + if (!IS_SIG (&mi->context)) + { + multi_process_incoming_link (m, mi, mpp_flags); + if (!IS_SIG (&mi->context)) + stream_buf_read_setup (mi->context.c2.link_socket); + } + break; + case TA_TIMEOUT: + multi_process_timeout (m, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_TUN_WRITE: + multi_process_outgoing_tun (m, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_TUN_WRITE_TIMEOUT: + multi_process_drop_outgoing_tun (m, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE_READY: + ASSERT (mi); + multi_tcp_process_outgoing_link_ready (m, mi, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE: + multi_tcp_process_outgoing_link (m, false, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_SOCKET_WRITE_DEFERRED: + multi_tcp_process_outgoing_link (m, true, mpp_flags); + break; + case TA_INITIAL: + ASSERT (mi); + multi_tcp_set_global_rw_flags (m, mi); + multi_process_post (m, mi, mpp_flags); + break; + default: + msg (M_FATAL, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_dispatch, unhandled action=%d", action); + } + + m->mpp_touched = NULL; + return touched; +} + +int +multi_tcp_post (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const int action) +{ + struct context *c = multi_tcp_context (m, mi); + int newaction = TA_UNDEF; + +# define MTP_NONE 0 +# define MTP_TUN_OUT (1<<0) +# define MTP_LINK_OUT (1<<1) + unsigned int flags = MTP_NONE; + + if (TUN_OUT(c)) + flags |= MTP_TUN_OUT; + if (LINK_OUT(c)) + flags |= MTP_LINK_OUT; + + switch (flags) + { + case MTP_TUN_OUT|MTP_LINK_OUT: + case MTP_TUN_OUT: + newaction = TA_TUN_WRITE; + break; + case MTP_LINK_OUT: + newaction = TA_SOCKET_WRITE; + break; + case MTP_NONE: + if (mi && socket_read_residual (c->c2.link_socket)) + newaction = TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL; + else + multi_tcp_set_global_rw_flags (m, mi); + break; + default: + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (M_FATAL, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_post bad state, mi=%s flags=%d", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc), + flags); + gc_free (&gc); + break; + } + } + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_post %s -> %s", + pract(action), + pract(newaction)); + + return newaction; +} + +static void +multi_tcp_action (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, int action, bool poll) +{ + bool tun_input_pending = false; + + do { + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI TCP: multi_tcp_action a=%s p=%d", + pract(action), + poll); + + /* + * If TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL, it means we still have pending + * input packets which were read by a prior TCP recv. + * + * Otherwise do a "lite" wait, which means we wait with 0 timeout + * on I/O events only related to the current instance, not + * the big list of events. + * + * On our first pass, poll will be false because we already know + * that input is available, and to call io_wait would be redundant. + */ + if (poll && action != TA_SOCKET_READ_RESIDUAL) + { + const int orig_action = action; + action = multi_tcp_wait_lite (m, mi, action, &tun_input_pending); + if (action == TA_UNDEF) + msg (M_FATAL, "MULTI TCP: I/O wait required blocking in multi_tcp_action, action=%d", orig_action); + } + + /* + * Dispatch the action + */ + { + struct multi_instance *touched = multi_tcp_dispatch (m, mi, action); + + /* + * Signal received or TCP connection + * reset by peer? + */ + if (touched && IS_SIG (&touched->context)) + { + if (mi == touched) + mi = NULL; + multi_close_instance_on_signal (m, touched); + } + } + + /* + * If dispatch produced any pending output + * for a particular instance, point to + * that instance. + */ + if (m->pending) + mi = m->pending; + + /* + * Based on the effects of the action, + * such as generating pending output, + * possibly transition to a new action state. + */ + action = multi_tcp_post (m, mi, action); + + /* + * If we are finished processing the original action, + * check if we have any TUN input. If so, transition + * our action state to processing this input. + */ + if (tun_input_pending && action == TA_UNDEF) + { + action = TA_TUN_READ; + mi = NULL; + tun_input_pending = false; + poll = false; + } + else + poll = true; + + } while (action != TA_UNDEF); +} + +static void +multi_tcp_process_io (struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct multi_tcp *mtcp = m->mtcp; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < mtcp->n_esr; ++i) + { + struct event_set_return *e = &mtcp->esr[i]; + + /* incoming data for instance? */ + if (e->arg >= MTCP_N) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) e->arg; + if (mi) + { + if (e->rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + multi_tcp_action (m, mi, TA_SOCKET_WRITE_READY, false); + else if (e->rwflags & EVENT_READ) + multi_tcp_action (m, mi, TA_SOCKET_READ, false); + } + } + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (e->arg == MTCP_MANAGEMENT) + { + ASSERT (management); + management_io (management); + } + else +#endif + /* incoming data on TUN? */ + if (e->arg == MTCP_TUN) + { + if (e->rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + multi_tcp_action (m, NULL, TA_TUN_WRITE, false); + else if (e->rwflags & EVENT_READ) + multi_tcp_action (m, NULL, TA_TUN_READ, false); + } + /* new incoming TCP client attempting to connect? */ + else if (e->arg == MTCP_SOCKET) + { + struct multi_instance *mi; + ASSERT (m->top.c2.link_socket); + socket_reset_listen_persistent (m->top.c2.link_socket); + mi = multi_create_instance_tcp (m); + if (mi) + multi_tcp_action (m, mi, TA_INITIAL, false); + } + /* signal received? */ + else if (e->arg == MTCP_SIG) + { + get_signal (&m->top.sig->signal_received); + } + } + if (IS_SIG (&m->top)) + break; + } + mtcp->n_esr = 0; + + /* + * Process queued mbuf packets destined for TCP socket + */ + { + struct multi_instance *mi; + while (!IS_SIG (&m->top) && (mi = mbuf_peek (m->mbuf)) != NULL) + { + multi_tcp_action (m, mi, TA_SOCKET_WRITE, true); + } + } +} + +/* + * Top level event loop for single-threaded operation. + * TCP mode. + */ +void +tunnel_server_tcp (struct context *top) +{ + struct multi_context multi; + int status; + + top->mode = CM_TOP; + context_clear_2 (top); + + /* initialize top-tunnel instance */ + init_instance_handle_signals (top, top->es, CC_HARD_USR1_TO_HUP); + if (IS_SIG (top)) + return; + + /* initialize global multi_context object */ + multi_init (&multi, top, true, MC_SINGLE_THREADED); + + /* initialize our cloned top object */ + multi_top_init (&multi, top, true); + + /* initialize management interface */ + init_management_callback_multi (&multi); + + /* finished with initialization */ + initialization_sequence_completed (top, ISC_SERVER); /* --mode server --proto tcp-server */ + + /* per-packet event loop */ + while (true) + { + perf_push (PERF_EVENT_LOOP); + + /* wait on tun/socket list */ + multi_get_timeout (&multi, &multi.top.c2.timeval); + status = multi_tcp_wait (&multi.top, multi.mtcp); + MULTI_CHECK_SIG (&multi); + + /* check on status of coarse timers */ + multi_process_per_second_timers (&multi); + + /* timeout? */ + if (status > 0) + { + /* process the I/O which triggered select */ + multi_tcp_process_io (&multi); + MULTI_CHECK_SIG (&multi); + } + else if (status == 0) + { + multi_tcp_action (&multi, NULL, TA_TIMEOUT, false); + } + + perf_pop (); + } + + /* shut down management interface */ + uninit_management_callback_multi (&multi); + + /* save ifconfig-pool */ + multi_ifconfig_pool_persist (&multi, true); + + /* tear down tunnel instance (unless --persist-tun) */ + multi_uninit (&multi); + multi_top_free (&multi); + close_instance (top); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b677b48a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * TCP specific code for --mode server + */ + +#ifndef MTCP_H +#define MTCP_H + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "event.h" + +/* + * Extra state info needed for TCP mode + */ +struct multi_tcp +{ + struct event_set *es; + struct event_set_return *esr; + int n_esr; + int maxevents; + unsigned int tun_rwflags; +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + unsigned int management_persist_flags; +#endif +}; + +struct multi_instance; +struct context; + +struct multi_tcp *multi_tcp_init (int maxevents, int *maxclients); +void multi_tcp_free (struct multi_tcp *mtcp); +void multi_tcp_dereference_instance (struct multi_tcp *mtcp, struct multi_instance *mi); + +bool multi_tcp_instance_specific_init (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi); +void multi_tcp_instance_specific_free (struct multi_instance *mi); + +void multi_tcp_link_out_deferred (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Main event loop for OpenVPN in TCP server mode. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * @param top - Top-level context structure. + */ +void tunnel_server_tcp (struct context *top); + + +void multi_tcp_delete_event (struct multi_tcp *mtcp, event_t event); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13f3f6c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.c @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "mtu.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* allocate a buffer for socket or tun layer */ +void +alloc_buf_sock_tun (struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame *frame, + const bool tuntap_buffer, + const unsigned int align_mask) +{ + /* allocate buffer for overlapped I/O */ + *buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame)); + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, align_mask))); + buf->len = tuntap_buffer ? MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (frame) : MAX_RW_SIZE_LINK (frame); + ASSERT (buf_safe (buf, 0)); +} + +void +frame_finalize (struct frame *frame, + bool link_mtu_defined, + int link_mtu, + bool tun_mtu_defined, + int tun_mtu) +{ + /* Set link_mtu based on command line options */ + if (tun_mtu_defined) + { + ASSERT (!link_mtu_defined); + frame->link_mtu = tun_mtu + TUN_LINK_DELTA (frame); + } + else + { + ASSERT (link_mtu_defined); + frame->link_mtu = link_mtu; + } + + if (TUN_MTU_SIZE (frame) < TUN_MTU_MIN) + { + msg (M_WARN, "TUN MTU value (%d) must be at least %d", TUN_MTU_SIZE (frame), TUN_MTU_MIN); + frame_print (frame, M_FATAL, "MTU is too small"); + } + + frame->link_mtu_dynamic = frame->link_mtu; + + frame->extra_buffer += PAYLOAD_ALIGN; +} + +/* + * Set the tun MTU dynamically. + */ +void +frame_set_mtu_dynamic (struct frame *frame, int mtu, unsigned int flags) +{ + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + const int orig_mtu = mtu; + const int orig_link_mtu_dynamic = frame->link_mtu_dynamic; +#endif + + ASSERT (mtu >= 0); + + if (flags & SET_MTU_TUN) + mtu += TUN_LINK_DELTA (frame); + + if (!(flags & SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND) || mtu < frame->link_mtu_dynamic) + { + frame->link_mtu_dynamic = constrain_int ( + mtu, + EXPANDED_SIZE_MIN (frame), + EXPANDED_SIZE (frame)); + } + + dmsg (D_MTU_DEBUG, "MTU DYNAMIC mtu=%d, flags=%u, %d -> %d", + orig_mtu, + flags, + orig_link_mtu_dynamic, + frame->link_mtu_dynamic); +} + +/* + * Move extra_frame octets into extra_tun. Used by fragmenting code + * to adjust frame relative to its position in the buffer processing + * queue. + */ +void +frame_subtract_extra (struct frame *frame, const struct frame *src) +{ + frame->extra_frame -= src->extra_frame; + frame->extra_tun += src->extra_frame; +} + +void +frame_print (const struct frame *frame, + int level, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + if (prefix) + buf_printf (&out, "%s ", prefix); + buf_printf (&out, "["); + buf_printf (&out, " L:%d", frame->link_mtu); + buf_printf (&out, " D:%d", frame->link_mtu_dynamic); + buf_printf (&out, " EF:%d", frame->extra_frame); + buf_printf (&out, " EB:%d", frame->extra_buffer); + buf_printf (&out, " ET:%d", frame->extra_tun); + buf_printf (&out, " EL:%d", frame->extra_link); + if (frame->align_flags && frame->align_adjust) + buf_printf (&out, " AF:%u/%d", frame->align_flags, frame->align_adjust); + buf_printf (&out, " ]"); + + msg (level, "%s", out.data); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#define MTUDISC_NOT_SUPPORTED_MSG "--mtu-disc is not supported on this OS" + +void +set_mtu_discover_type (int sd, int mtu_type) +{ + if (mtu_type >= 0) + { +#if defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_IP) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) + if (setsockopt + (sd, SOL_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER, &mtu_type, sizeof (mtu_type))) + msg (M_ERR, "Error setting IP_MTU_DISCOVER type=%d on TCP/UDP socket", + mtu_type); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, MTUDISC_NOT_SUPPORTED_MSG); +#endif + } +} + +int +translate_mtu_discover_type_name (const char *name) +{ +#if defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DONT) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_WANT) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO) + if (!strcmp (name, "yes")) + return IP_PMTUDISC_DO; + if (!strcmp (name, "maybe")) + return IP_PMTUDISC_WANT; + if (!strcmp (name, "no")) + return IP_PMTUDISC_DONT; + msg (M_FATAL, + "invalid --mtu-disc type: '%s' -- valid types are 'yes', 'maybe', or 'no'", + name); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, MTUDISC_NOT_SUPPORTED_MSG); +#endif + return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#if EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY + +struct probehdr +{ + uint32_t ttl; + struct timeval tv; +}; + +const char * +format_extended_socket_error (int fd, int *mtu, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int res; + struct probehdr rcvbuf; + struct iovec iov; + struct msghdr msg; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + struct sock_extended_err *e; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + char *cbuf = (char *) gc_malloc (256, false, gc); + + *mtu = 0; + + while (true) + { + memset (&rcvbuf, -1, sizeof (rcvbuf)); + iov.iov_base = &rcvbuf; + iov.iov_len = sizeof (rcvbuf); + msg.msg_name = (uint8_t *) &addr; + msg.msg_namelen = sizeof (addr); + msg.msg_iov = &iov; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + msg.msg_flags = 0; + msg.msg_control = cbuf; + msg.msg_controllen = 256; /* size of cbuf */ + + res = recvmsg (fd, &msg, MSG_ERRQUEUE); + if (res < 0) + goto exit; + + e = NULL; + + for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR (&msg, cmsg)) + { + if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_IP) + { + if (cmsg->cmsg_type == IP_RECVERR) + { + e = (struct sock_extended_err *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); + } + else + { + buf_printf (&out ,"CMSG=%d|", cmsg->cmsg_type); + } + } + } + if (e == NULL) + { + buf_printf (&out, "NO-INFO|"); + goto exit; + } + + switch (e->ee_errno) + { + case ETIMEDOUT: + buf_printf (&out, "ETIMEDOUT|"); + break; + case EMSGSIZE: + buf_printf (&out, "EMSGSIZE Path-MTU=%d|", e->ee_info); + *mtu = e->ee_info; + break; + case ECONNREFUSED: + buf_printf (&out, "ECONNREFUSED|"); + break; + case EPROTO: + buf_printf (&out, "EPROTO|"); + break; + case EHOSTUNREACH: + buf_printf (&out, "EHOSTUNREACH|"); + break; + case ENETUNREACH: + buf_printf (&out, "ENETUNREACH|"); + break; + case EACCES: + buf_printf (&out, "EACCES|"); + break; + default: + buf_printf (&out, "UNKNOWN|"); + break; + } + } + + exit: + buf_rmtail (&out, '|'); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +void +set_sock_extended_error_passing (int sd) +{ + int on = 1; + if (setsockopt (sd, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR, &on, sizeof (on))) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, + "Note: enable extended error passing on TCP/UDP socket failed (IP_RECVERR)"); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29ec21fd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mtu.h @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef MTU_H +#define MTU_H + +#include "buffer.h" + +/* + * + * Packet maninipulation routes such as encrypt, decrypt, compress, decompress + * are passed a frame buffer that looks like this: + * + * [extra_frame bytes] [mtu bytes] [extra_frame_bytes] [compression overflow bytes] + * ^ + * Pointer passed to function points here so that routine + * can make use of extra_frame bytes before pointer + * to prepend headers, etc. + * + * extra_frame bytes is large enough for all encryption related overhead. + * + * mtu bytes will be the MTU size set in the ifconfig statement that configures + * the TUN or TAP device such as: + * + * ifconfig $1 10.1.0.2 pointopoint 10.1.0.1 mtu 1450 + * + * Compression overflow bytes is the worst-case size expansion that would be + * expected if we tried to compress mtu + extra_frame bytes of uncompressible data. + */ + +/* + * Standard ethernet MTU + */ +#define ETHERNET_MTU 1500 + +/* + * It is a fatal error if mtu is less than + * this value for tun device. + */ +#define TUN_MTU_MIN 100 + +/* + * Default MTU of network over which tunnel data will pass by TCP/UDP. + */ +#define LINK_MTU_DEFAULT 1500 + +/* + * Default MTU of tunnel device. + */ +#define TUN_MTU_DEFAULT 1500 + +/* + * MTU Defaults for TAP devices + */ +#define TAP_MTU_EXTRA_DEFAULT 32 + +/* + * Default MSSFIX value, used for reducing TCP MTU size + */ +#define MSSFIX_DEFAULT 1450 + +/* + * Alignment of payload data such as IP packet or + * ethernet frame. + */ +#define PAYLOAD_ALIGN 4 + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Packet geometry parameters. + */ +struct frame { + int link_mtu; /**< Maximum packet size to be sent over + * the external network interface. */ + + int link_mtu_dynamic; /**< Dynamic MTU value for the external + * network interface. */ + + int extra_frame; /**< Maximum number of bytes that all + * processing steps together could add. + * @code + * frame.link_mtu = "socket MTU" - extra_frame; + * @endcode + */ + + int extra_buffer; /**< Maximum number of bytes that + * processing steps could expand the + * internal work buffer. + * + * This is used by the \link compression + * Data Channel Compression + * module\endlink to give enough working + * space for worst-case expansion of + * incompressible content. */ + + int extra_tun; /**< Maximum number of bytes in excess of + * the tun/tap MTU that might be read + * from or written to the virtual + * tun/tap network interface. */ + + int extra_link; /**< Maximum number of bytes in excess of + * external network interface's MTU that + * might be read from or written to it. */ + + /* + * Alignment control + */ +# define FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT (1<<0) +# define FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_FRAGMENT (1<<1) +# define FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_LINK (1<<2) +# define FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_STREAM (1<<3) + unsigned int align_flags; + int align_adjust; +}; + +/* Routines which read struct frame should use the macros below */ + +/* + * Overhead added to packet payload due to encapsulation + */ +#define EXTRA_FRAME(f) ((f)->extra_frame) + +/* + * Delta between tun payload size and final TCP/UDP datagram size + * (not including extra_link additions) + */ +#define TUN_LINK_DELTA(f) ((f)->extra_frame + (f)->extra_tun) + +/* + * This is the size to "ifconfig" the tun or tap device. + */ +#define TUN_MTU_SIZE(f) ((f)->link_mtu - TUN_LINK_DELTA(f)) +#define TUN_MTU_SIZE_DYNAMIC(f) ((f)->link_mtu_dynamic - TUN_LINK_DELTA(f)) + +/* + * This is the maximum packet size that we need to be able to + * read from or write to a tun or tap device. For example, + * a tap device ifconfiged to an MTU of 1200 might actually want + * to return a packet size of 1214 on a read(). + */ +#define PAYLOAD_SIZE(f) ((f)->link_mtu - (f)->extra_frame) +#define PAYLOAD_SIZE_DYNAMIC(f) ((f)->link_mtu_dynamic - (f)->extra_frame) + +/* + * Max size of a payload packet after encryption, compression, etc. + * overhead is added. + */ +#define EXPANDED_SIZE(f) ((f)->link_mtu) +#define EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC(f) ((f)->link_mtu_dynamic) +#define EXPANDED_SIZE_MIN(f) (TUN_MTU_MIN + TUN_LINK_DELTA(f)) + +/* + * These values are used as maximum size constraints + * on read() or write() from TUN/TAP device or TCP/UDP port. + */ +#define MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN(f) (PAYLOAD_SIZE(f)) +#define MAX_RW_SIZE_LINK(f) (EXPANDED_SIZE(f) + (f)->extra_link) + +/* + * Control buffer headroom allocations to allow for efficient prepending. + */ +#define FRAME_HEADROOM_BASE(f) (TUN_LINK_DELTA(f) + (f)->extra_buffer + (f)->extra_link) +#define FRAME_HEADROOM(f) frame_headroom(f, 0) +#define FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ(f, fm) frame_headroom(f, fm) + +/* + * Max size of a buffer used to build a packet for output to + * the TCP/UDP port. + */ +#define BUF_SIZE(f) (TUN_MTU_SIZE(f) + FRAME_HEADROOM_BASE(f) * 2) + +/* + * Function prototypes. + */ + +void frame_finalize (struct frame *frame, + bool link_mtu_defined, + int link_mtu, + bool tun_mtu_defined, + int tun_mtu); + +void frame_subtract_extra (struct frame *frame, const struct frame *src); + +void frame_print (const struct frame *frame, + int level, + const char *prefix); + +void set_mtu_discover_type (int sd, int mtu_type); +int translate_mtu_discover_type_name (const char *name); + +/* + * frame_set_mtu_dynamic and flags + */ + +#define SET_MTU_TUN (1<<0) /* use tun/tap rather than link sizing */ +#define SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND (1<<1) /* only decrease dynamic MTU */ + +void frame_set_mtu_dynamic (struct frame *frame, int mtu, unsigned int flags); + +/* + * allocate a buffer for socket or tun layer + */ +void alloc_buf_sock_tun (struct buffer *buf, + const struct frame *frame, + const bool tuntap_buffer, + const unsigned int align_mask); + +/* + * EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY functions -- print extra error info + * on socket errors, such as PMTU size. As of 2003.05.11, only works + * on Linux 2.4+. + */ + +#if EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY + +void set_sock_extended_error_passing (int sd); +const char *format_extended_socket_error (int fd, int *mtu, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif + +/* + * Calculate a starting offset into a buffer object, dealing with + * headroom and alignment issues. + */ +static inline int +frame_headroom (const struct frame *f, const unsigned int flag_mask) +{ + const int offset = FRAME_HEADROOM_BASE (f); + const int adjust = (flag_mask & f->align_flags) ? f->align_adjust : 0; + const int delta = ((PAYLOAD_ALIGN << 24) - (offset + adjust)) & (PAYLOAD_ALIGN - 1); + return offset + delta; +} + +/* + * frame member adjustment functions + */ + +static inline void +frame_add_to_extra_frame (struct frame *frame, const int increment) +{ + frame->extra_frame += increment; +} + +static inline void +frame_add_to_extra_tun (struct frame *frame, const int increment) +{ + frame->extra_tun += increment; +} + +static inline void +frame_add_to_extra_link (struct frame *frame, const int increment) +{ + frame->extra_link += increment; +} + +static inline void +frame_add_to_extra_buffer (struct frame *frame, const int increment) +{ + frame->extra_buffer += increment; +} + +static inline void +frame_add_to_align_adjust (struct frame *frame, const int increment) +{ + frame->align_adjust += increment; +} + +static inline void +frame_align_to_extra_frame (struct frame *frame) +{ + frame->align_adjust = frame->extra_frame + frame->extra_link; +} + +static inline void +frame_or_align_flags (struct frame *frame, const unsigned int flag_mask) +{ + frame->align_flags |= flag_mask; +} + +static inline bool +frame_defined (const struct frame *frame) +{ + return frame->link_mtu > 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3468dab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "multi.h" +#include "forward-inline.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Get a client instance based on real address. If + * the instance doesn't exist, create it while + * maintaining real address hash table atomicity. + */ + +struct multi_instance * +multi_get_create_instance_udp (struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct mroute_addr real; + struct multi_instance *mi = NULL; + struct hash *hash = m->hash; + + if (mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (&real, &m->top.c2.from.dest, true)) + { + struct hash_element *he; + const uint32_t hv = hash_value (hash, &real); + struct hash_bucket *bucket = hash_bucket (hash, hv); + + he = hash_lookup_fast (hash, bucket, &real, hv); + + if (he) + { + mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + } + else + { + if (!m->top.c2.tls_auth_standalone + || tls_pre_decrypt_lite (m->top.c2.tls_auth_standalone, &m->top.c2.from, &m->top.c2.buf)) + { + if (frequency_limit_event_allowed (m->new_connection_limiter)) + { + mi = multi_create_instance (m, &real); + if (mi) + { + hash_add_fast (hash, bucket, &mi->real, hv, mi); + mi->did_real_hash = true; + } + } + else + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, + "MULTI: Connection from %s would exceed new connection frequency limit as controlled by --connect-freq", + mroute_addr_print (&real, &gc)); + } + } + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_MULTI_DEBUG)) + { + const char *status; + + if (he && mi) + status = "[succeeded]"; + else if (!he && mi) + status = "[created]"; + else + status = "[failed]"; + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "GET INST BY REAL: %s %s", + mroute_addr_print (&real, &gc), + status); + } +#endif + } + + gc_free (&gc); + ASSERT (!(mi && mi->halt)); + return mi; +} + +/* + * Send a packet to TCP/UDP socket. + */ +static inline void +multi_process_outgoing_link (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = multi_process_outgoing_link_pre (m); + if (mi) + multi_process_outgoing_link_dowork (m, mi, mpp_flags); +} + +/* + * Process an I/O event. + */ +static void +multi_process_io_udp (struct multi_context *m) +{ + const unsigned int status = m->top.c2.event_set_status; + const unsigned int mpp_flags = m->top.c2.fast_io + ? (MPP_CONDITIONAL_PRE_SELECT | MPP_CLOSE_ON_SIGNAL) + : (MPP_PRE_SELECT | MPP_CLOSE_ON_SIGNAL); + +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + char buf[16]; + buf[0] = 0; + if (status & SOCKET_READ) + strcat (buf, "SR/"); + else if (status & SOCKET_WRITE) + strcat (buf, "SW/"); + else if (status & TUN_READ) + strcat (buf, "TR/"); + else if (status & TUN_WRITE) + strcat (buf, "TW/"); + printf ("IO %s\n", buf); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (status & (MANAGEMENT_READ|MANAGEMENT_WRITE)) + { + ASSERT (management); + management_io (management); + } +#endif + + /* UDP port ready to accept write */ + if (status & SOCKET_WRITE) + { + multi_process_outgoing_link (m, mpp_flags); + } + /* TUN device ready to accept write */ + else if (status & TUN_WRITE) + { + multi_process_outgoing_tun (m, mpp_flags); + } + /* Incoming data on UDP port */ + else if (status & SOCKET_READ) + { + read_incoming_link (&m->top); + multi_release_io_lock (m); + if (!IS_SIG (&m->top)) + multi_process_incoming_link (m, NULL, mpp_flags); + } + /* Incoming data on TUN device */ + else if (status & TUN_READ) + { + read_incoming_tun (&m->top); + multi_release_io_lock (m); + if (!IS_SIG (&m->top)) + multi_process_incoming_tun (m, mpp_flags); + } +} + +/* + * Return the io_wait() flags appropriate for + * a point-to-multipoint tunnel. + */ +static inline unsigned int +p2mp_iow_flags (const struct multi_context *m) +{ + unsigned int flags = IOW_WAIT_SIGNAL; + if (m->pending) + { + if (TUN_OUT (&m->pending->context)) + flags |= IOW_TO_TUN; + if (LINK_OUT (&m->pending->context)) + flags |= IOW_TO_LINK; + } + else if (mbuf_defined (m->mbuf)) + flags |= IOW_MBUF; + else + flags |= IOW_READ; + + return flags; +} + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Main event loop for OpenVPN in UDP server mode. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * This function implements OpenVPN's main event loop for UDP server mode. + * At this time, OpenVPN does not yet support multithreading. This + * function's name is therefore slightly misleading. + * + * @param top - Top-level context structure. + */ +static void +tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded (struct context *top) +{ + struct multi_context multi; + + top->mode = CM_TOP; + context_clear_2 (top); + + /* initialize top-tunnel instance */ + init_instance_handle_signals (top, top->es, CC_HARD_USR1_TO_HUP); + if (IS_SIG (top)) + return; + + /* initialize global multi_context object */ + multi_init (&multi, top, false, MC_SINGLE_THREADED); + + /* initialize our cloned top object */ + multi_top_init (&multi, top, true); + + /* initialize management interface */ + init_management_callback_multi (&multi); + + /* finished with initialization */ + initialization_sequence_completed (top, ISC_SERVER); /* --mode server --proto udp */ + + /* per-packet event loop */ + while (true) + { + perf_push (PERF_EVENT_LOOP); + + /* set up and do the io_wait() */ + multi_get_timeout (&multi, &multi.top.c2.timeval); + io_wait (&multi.top, p2mp_iow_flags (&multi)); + MULTI_CHECK_SIG (&multi); + + /* check on status of coarse timers */ + multi_process_per_second_timers (&multi); + + /* timeout? */ + if (multi.top.c2.event_set_status == ES_TIMEOUT) + { + multi_process_timeout (&multi, MPP_PRE_SELECT|MPP_CLOSE_ON_SIGNAL); + } + else + { + /* process I/O */ + multi_process_io_udp (&multi); + MULTI_CHECK_SIG (&multi); + } + + perf_pop (); + } + + /* shut down management interface */ + uninit_management_callback_multi (&multi); + + /* save ifconfig-pool */ + multi_ifconfig_pool_persist (&multi, true); + + /* tear down tunnel instance (unless --persist-tun) */ + multi_uninit (&multi); + multi_top_free (&multi); + close_instance (top); +} + +void +tunnel_server_udp (struct context *top) +{ + tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded (top); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97f961b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/mudp.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * UDP specific code for --mode server + */ + +#ifndef MUDP_H +#define MUDP_H + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +struct context; +struct multi_context; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Main event loop wrapper function for OpenVPN in UDP server mode. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * This function simply calls \c tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded(). + * + * @param top - Top-level context structure. + */ +void tunnel_server_udp (struct context *top); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Get, and if necessary create, the multi_instance associated with a + * packet's source address. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * This function extracts the source address of a recently read packet + * from \c m->top.c2.from and uses that source address as a hash key for + * the hash table \c m->hash. If an entry exists, this function returns + * it. If no entry exists, this function handles its creation, and if + * successful, returns the newly created instance. + * + * @param m - The single multi_context structure. + * + * @return A pointer to a multi_instance if one already existed for the + * packet's source address or if one was a newly created successfully. + * NULL if one did not yet exist and a new one was not created. + */ +struct multi_instance *multi_get_create_instance_udp (struct multi_context *m); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab3f10cb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.c @@ -0,0 +1,2867 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "multi.h" +#include "push.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "gremlin.h" +#include "mstats.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "forward-inline.h" +#include "pf-inline.h" + +/*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/ + +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP +static const char * +id (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi) + return tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false); + else + return "NULL"; +} +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +static void +set_cc_config (struct multi_instance *mi, struct buffer_list *cc_config) +{ + if (mi->cc_config) + buffer_list_free (mi->cc_config); + mi->cc_config = cc_config; +} +#endif + +static inline void +update_mstat_n_clients(const int n_clients) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + if (mmap_stats) + mmap_stats->n_clients = n_clients; +#endif +} + +static bool +learn_address_script (const struct multi_context *m, + const struct multi_instance *mi, + const char *op, + const struct mroute_addr *addr) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct env_set *es; + bool ret = true; + struct plugin_list *plugins; + + /* get environmental variable source */ + if (mi && mi->context.c2.es) + es = mi->context.c2.es; + else + es = env_set_create (&gc); + + /* get plugin source */ + if (mi) + plugins = mi->context.plugins; + else + plugins = m->top.plugins; + + if (plugin_defined (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS)) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s", + op, + mroute_addr_print (addr, &gc)); + if (mi) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false)); + if (plugin_call (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS, &argv, NULL, es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: learn-address plugin call failed"); + ret = false; + } + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + if (m->top.options.learn_address_script) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + setenv_str (es, "script_type", "learn-address"); + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %s %s", + m->top.options.learn_address_script, + op, + mroute_addr_print (addr, &gc)); + if (mi) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false)); + if (!openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, 0, "--learn-address")) + ret = false; + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +void +multi_ifconfig_pool_persist (struct multi_context *m, bool force) +{ + /* write pool data to file */ + if (m->ifconfig_pool + && m->top.c1.ifconfig_pool_persist + && (force || ifconfig_pool_write_trigger (m->top.c1.ifconfig_pool_persist))) + { + ifconfig_pool_write (m->top.c1.ifconfig_pool_persist, m->ifconfig_pool); + } +} + +static void +multi_reap_range (const struct multi_context *m, + int start_bucket, + int end_bucket) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + + if (start_bucket < 0) + { + start_bucket = 0; + end_bucket = hash_n_buckets (m->vhash); + } + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: REAP range %d -> %d", start_bucket, end_bucket); + hash_iterator_init_range (m->vhash, &hi, start_bucket, end_bucket); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi)) != NULL) + { + struct multi_route *r = (struct multi_route *) he->value; + if (!multi_route_defined (m, r)) + { + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: REAP DEL %s", + mroute_addr_print (&r->addr, &gc)); + learn_address_script (m, NULL, "delete", &r->addr); + multi_route_del (r); + hash_iterator_delete_element (&hi); + } + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +multi_reap_all (const struct multi_context *m) +{ + multi_reap_range (m, -1, 0); +} + +static struct multi_reap * +multi_reap_new (int buckets_per_pass) +{ + struct multi_reap *mr; + ALLOC_OBJ (mr, struct multi_reap); + mr->bucket_base = 0; + mr->buckets_per_pass = buckets_per_pass; + mr->last_call = now; + return mr; +} + +void +multi_reap_process_dowork (const struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct multi_reap *mr = m->reaper; + if (mr->bucket_base >= hash_n_buckets (m->vhash)) + mr->bucket_base = 0; + multi_reap_range (m, mr->bucket_base, mr->bucket_base + mr->buckets_per_pass); + mr->bucket_base += mr->buckets_per_pass; + mr->last_call = now; +} + +static void +multi_reap_free (struct multi_reap *mr) +{ + free (mr); +} + +/* + * How many buckets in vhash to reap per pass. + */ +static int +reap_buckets_per_pass (int n_buckets) +{ + return constrain_int (n_buckets / REAP_DIVISOR, REAP_MIN, REAP_MAX); +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +static uint32_t +cid_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv) +{ + const unsigned long *k = (const unsigned long *)key; + return (uint32_t) *k; +} + +static bool +cid_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2) +{ + const unsigned long *k1 = (const unsigned long *)key1; + const unsigned long *k2 = (const unsigned long *)key2; + return *k1 == *k2; +} + +#endif + +/* + * Main initialization function, init multi_context object. + */ +void +multi_init (struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode, int thread_mode) +{ + int dev = DEV_TYPE_UNDEF; + + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: multi_init called, r=%d v=%d", + t->options.real_hash_size, + t->options.virtual_hash_size); + + /* + * Get tun/tap/null device type + */ + dev = dev_type_enum (t->options.dev, t->options.dev_type); + + /* + * Init our multi_context object. + */ + CLEAR (*m); + + m->thread_mode = thread_mode; + + /* + * Real address hash table (source port number is + * considered to be part of the address). Used + * to determine which client sent an incoming packet + * which is seen on the TCP/UDP socket. + */ + m->hash = hash_init (t->options.real_hash_size, + get_random (), + mroute_addr_hash_function, + mroute_addr_compare_function); + + /* + * Virtual address hash table. Used to determine + * which client to route a packet to. + */ + m->vhash = hash_init (t->options.virtual_hash_size, + get_random (), + mroute_addr_hash_function, + mroute_addr_compare_function); + + /* + * This hash table is a clone of m->hash but with a + * bucket size of one so that it can be used + * for fast iteration through the list. + */ + m->iter = hash_init (1, + get_random (), + mroute_addr_hash_function, + mroute_addr_compare_function); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + m->cid_hash = hash_init (t->options.real_hash_size, + 0, + cid_hash_function, + cid_compare_function); +#endif + + /* + * This is our scheduler, for time-based wakeup + * events. + */ + m->schedule = schedule_init (); + + /* + * Limit frequency of incoming connections to control + * DoS. + */ + m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init (t->options.cf_max, + t->options.cf_per); + + /* + * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list + */ + m->mbuf = mbuf_init (t->options.n_bcast_buf); + + /* + * Different status file format options are available + */ + m->status_file_version = t->options.status_file_version; + + /* + * Possibly allocate an ifconfig pool, do it + * differently based on whether a tun or tap style + * tunnel. + */ + if (t->options.ifconfig_pool_defined) + { + int pool_type = IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV; + + if ( dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN && t->options.topology == TOP_NET30 ) + pool_type = IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET; + + m->ifconfig_pool = ifconfig_pool_init (pool_type, + t->options.ifconfig_pool_start, + t->options.ifconfig_pool_end, + t->options.duplicate_cn, + t->options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined, + t->options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base, + t->options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits ); + + /* reload pool data from file */ + if (t->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist) + ifconfig_pool_read (t->c1.ifconfig_pool_persist, m->ifconfig_pool); + } + + /* + * Help us keep track of routing table. + */ + m->route_helper = mroute_helper_init (MULTI_CACHE_ROUTE_TTL); + + /* + * Initialize route and instance reaper. + */ + m->reaper = multi_reap_new (reap_buckets_per_pass (t->options.virtual_hash_size)); + + /* + * Get local ifconfig address + */ + CLEAR (m->local); + ASSERT (t->c1.tuntap); + mroute_extract_in_addr_t (&m->local, t->c1.tuntap->local); + + /* + * Per-client limits + */ + m->max_clients = t->options.max_clients; + + /* + * Initialize multi-socket TCP I/O wait object + */ + if (tcp_mode) + m->mtcp = multi_tcp_init (t->options.max_clients, &m->max_clients); + m->tcp_queue_limit = t->options.tcp_queue_limit; + + /* + * Allow client <-> client communication, without going through + * tun/tap interface and network stack? + */ + m->enable_c2c = t->options.enable_c2c; + + /* initialize stale routes check timer */ + if (t->options.stale_routes_check_interval > 0) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Initializing stale route check timer to run every %i seconds and to removing routes with activity timeout older than %i seconds", + t->options.stale_routes_check_interval, t->options.stale_routes_ageing_time); + event_timeout_init (&m->stale_routes_check_et, t->options.stale_routes_check_interval, 0); + } +} + +const char * +multi_instance_string (const struct multi_instance *mi, bool null, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (mi) + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + const char *cn = tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, true); + + if (cn) + buf_printf (&out, "%s/", cn); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, gc)); + return BSTR (&out); + } + else if (null) + return NULL; + else + return "UNDEF"; +} + +void +generate_prefix (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + mi->msg_prefix = multi_instance_string (mi, true, &mi->gc); + set_prefix (mi); +} + +void +ungenerate_prefix (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + mi->msg_prefix = NULL; + set_prefix (mi); +} + +static const char * +mi_prefix (const struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi && mi->msg_prefix) + return mi->msg_prefix; + else + return "UNDEF_I"; +} + +/* + * Tell the route helper about deleted iroutes so + * that it can update its mask of currently used + * CIDR netlengths. + */ +static void +multi_del_iroutes (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + const struct iroute *ir; + const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6; + if (TUNNEL_TYPE (mi->context.c1.tuntap) == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + for (ir = mi->context.options.iroutes; ir != NULL; ir = ir->next) + mroute_helper_del_iroute (m->route_helper, ir); + + for ( ir6 = mi->context.options.iroutes_ipv6; ir6 != NULL; ir6 = ir6->next ) + mroute_helper_del_iroute6 (m->route_helper, ir6); + } +} + +static void +setenv_stats (struct context *c) +{ + setenv_counter (c->c2.es, "bytes_received", c->c2.link_read_bytes); + setenv_counter (c->c2.es, "bytes_sent", c->c2.link_write_bytes); +} + +static void +multi_client_disconnect_setenv (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + /* setenv client real IP address */ + setenv_trusted (mi->context.c2.es, get_link_socket_info (&mi->context)); + + /* setenv stats */ + setenv_stats (&mi->context); + + /* setenv connection duration */ + { + const unsigned int duration = (unsigned int) now - mi->created; + setenv_unsigned (mi->context.c2.es, "time_duration", duration); + } +} + +static void +multi_client_disconnect_script (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if ((mi->context.c2.context_auth == CAS_SUCCEEDED && mi->connection_established_flag) + || mi->context.c2.context_auth == CAS_PARTIAL) + { + multi_client_disconnect_setenv (m, mi); + + if (plugin_defined (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT)) + { + if (plugin_call (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT, NULL, NULL, mi->context.c2.es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: client-disconnect plugin call failed"); + } + + if (mi->context.options.client_disconnect_script) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + setenv_str (mi->context.c2.es, "script_type", "client-disconnect"); + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc", mi->context.options.client_disconnect_script); + openvpn_run_script (&argv, mi->context.c2.es, 0, "--client-disconnect"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (management) + management_notify_client_close (management, &mi->context.c2.mda_context, mi->context.c2.es); +#endif + + } +} + +void +multi_close_instance (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + bool shutdown) +{ + perf_push (PERF_MULTI_CLOSE_INSTANCE); + + ASSERT (!mi->halt); + mi->halt = true; + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: multi_close_instance called"); + + /* adjust current client connection count */ + m->n_clients += mi->n_clients_delta; + update_mstat_n_clients(m->n_clients); + mi->n_clients_delta = 0; + + /* prevent dangling pointers */ + if (m->pending == mi) + multi_set_pending (m, NULL); + if (m->earliest_wakeup == mi) + m->earliest_wakeup = NULL; + + if (!shutdown) + { + if (mi->did_real_hash) + { + ASSERT (hash_remove (m->hash, &mi->real)); + } + if (mi->did_iter) + { + ASSERT (hash_remove (m->iter, &mi->real)); + } +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (mi->did_cid_hash) + { + ASSERT (hash_remove (m->cid_hash, &mi->context.c2.mda_context.cid)); + } +#endif + + schedule_remove_entry (m->schedule, (struct schedule_entry *) mi); + + ifconfig_pool_release (m->ifconfig_pool, mi->vaddr_handle, false); + + if (mi->did_iroutes) + { + multi_del_iroutes (m, mi); + mi->did_iroutes = false; + } + + if (m->mtcp) + multi_tcp_dereference_instance (m->mtcp, mi); + + mbuf_dereference_instance (m->mbuf, mi); + } + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + set_cc_config (mi, NULL); +#endif + + multi_client_disconnect_script (m, mi); + + if (mi->did_open_context) + close_context (&mi->context, SIGTERM, CC_GC_FREE); + + multi_tcp_instance_specific_free (mi); + + ungenerate_prefix (mi); + + /* + * Don't actually delete the instance memory allocation yet, + * because virtual routes may still point to it. Let the + * vhash reaper deal with it. + */ + multi_instance_dec_refcount (mi); + + perf_pop (); +} + +/* + * Called on shutdown or restart. + */ +void +multi_uninit (struct multi_context *m) +{ + if (m->thread_mode & MC_WORK_THREAD) + { + multi_top_free (m); + m->thread_mode = MC_UNDEF; + } + else if (m->thread_mode) + { + if (m->hash) + { + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + + hash_iterator_init (m->iter, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + mi->did_iter = false; + multi_close_instance (m, mi, true); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + multi_reap_all (m); + + hash_free (m->hash); + hash_free (m->vhash); + hash_free (m->iter); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + hash_free (m->cid_hash); +#endif + m->hash = NULL; + + schedule_free (m->schedule); + mbuf_free (m->mbuf); + ifconfig_pool_free (m->ifconfig_pool); + frequency_limit_free (m->new_connection_limiter); + multi_reap_free (m->reaper); + mroute_helper_free (m->route_helper); + multi_tcp_free (m->mtcp); + m->thread_mode = MC_UNDEF; + } + } +} + +/* + * Create a client instance object for a newly connected client. + */ +struct multi_instance * +multi_create_instance (struct multi_context *m, const struct mroute_addr *real) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct multi_instance *mi; + + perf_push (PERF_MULTI_CREATE_INSTANCE); + + msg (D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "MULTI: multi_create_instance called"); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (mi, struct multi_instance); + + mi->gc = gc_new (); + multi_instance_inc_refcount (mi); + mi->vaddr_handle = -1; + mi->created = now; + mroute_addr_init (&mi->real); + + if (real) + { + mi->real = *real; + generate_prefix (mi); + } + + mi->did_open_context = true; + inherit_context_child (&mi->context, &m->top); + if (IS_SIG (&mi->context)) + goto err; + + mi->context.c2.context_auth = CAS_PENDING; + + if (hash_n_elements (m->hash) >= m->max_clients) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: new incoming connection would exceed maximum number of clients (%d)", m->max_clients); + goto err; + } + + if (!real) /* TCP mode? */ + { + if (!multi_tcp_instance_specific_init (m, mi)) + goto err; + generate_prefix (mi); + } + + if (!hash_add (m->iter, &mi->real, mi, false)) + { + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: unable to add real address [%s] to iterator hash table", + mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc)); + goto err; + } + mi->did_iter = true; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + do { + mi->context.c2.mda_context.cid = m->cid_counter++; + } while (!hash_add (m->cid_hash, &mi->context.c2.mda_context.cid, mi, false)); + mi->did_cid_hash = true; +#endif + + mi->context.c2.push_reply_deferred = true; + + if (!multi_process_post (m, mi, MPP_PRE_SELECT)) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: signal occurred during client instance initialization"); + goto err; + } + + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); + return mi; + + err: + multi_close_instance (m, mi, false); + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Dump tables -- triggered by SIGUSR2. + * If status file is defined, write to file. + * If status file is NULL, write to syslog. + */ +void +multi_print_status (struct multi_context *m, struct status_output *so, const int version) +{ + if (m->hash) + { + struct gc_arena gc_top = gc_new (); + struct hash_iterator hi; + const struct hash_element *he; + + status_reset (so); + + if (version == 1) /* WAS: m->status_file_version */ + { + /* + * Status file version 1 + */ + status_printf (so, "OpenVPN CLIENT LIST"); + status_printf (so, "Updated,%s", time_string (0, 0, false, &gc_top)); + status_printf (so, "Common Name,Real Address,Bytes Received,Bytes Sent,Connected Since"); + hash_iterator_init (m->hash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + + if (!mi->halt) + { + status_printf (so, "%s,%s," counter_format "," counter_format ",%s", + tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc), + mi->context.c2.link_read_bytes, + mi->context.c2.link_write_bytes, + time_string (mi->created, 0, false, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + status_printf (so, "ROUTING TABLE"); + status_printf (so, "Virtual Address,Common Name,Real Address,Last Ref"); + hash_iterator_init (m->vhash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct multi_route *route = (struct multi_route *) he->value; + + if (multi_route_defined (m, route)) + { + const struct multi_instance *mi = route->instance; + const struct mroute_addr *ma = &route->addr; + char flags[2] = {0, 0}; + + if (route->flags & MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE) + flags[0] = 'C'; + status_printf (so, "%s%s,%s,%s,%s", + mroute_addr_print (ma, &gc), + flags, + tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc), + time_string (route->last_reference, 0, false, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + status_printf (so, "GLOBAL STATS"); + if (m->mbuf) + status_printf (so, "Max bcast/mcast queue length,%d", + mbuf_maximum_queued (m->mbuf)); + + status_printf (so, "END"); + } + else if (version == 2 || version == 3) + { + const char sep = (version == 3) ? '\t' : ','; + + /* + * Status file version 2 and 3 + */ + status_printf (so, "TITLE%c%s", sep, title_string); + status_printf (so, "TIME%c%s%c%u", sep, time_string (now, 0, false, &gc_top), sep, (unsigned int)now); + status_printf (so, "HEADER%cCLIENT_LIST%cCommon Name%cReal Address%cVirtual Address%cBytes Received%cBytes Sent%cConnected Since%cConnected Since (time_t)%cUsername", + sep, sep, sep, sep, sep, sep, sep, sep, sep); + hash_iterator_init (m->hash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + + if (!mi->halt) + { + status_printf (so, "CLIENT_LIST%c%s%c%s%c%s%c" counter_format "%c" counter_format "%c%s%c%u%c%s", + sep, tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + sep, mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc), + sep, print_in_addr_t (mi->reporting_addr, IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF, &gc), + sep, mi->context.c2.link_read_bytes, + sep, mi->context.c2.link_write_bytes, + sep, time_string (mi->created, 0, false, &gc), + sep, (unsigned int)mi->created, + sep, tls_username (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + status_printf (so, "HEADER%cROUTING_TABLE%cVirtual Address%cCommon Name%cReal Address%cLast Ref%cLast Ref (time_t)", + sep, sep, sep, sep, sep, sep); + hash_iterator_init (m->vhash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct multi_route *route = (struct multi_route *) he->value; + + if (multi_route_defined (m, route)) + { + const struct multi_instance *mi = route->instance; + const struct mroute_addr *ma = &route->addr; + char flags[2] = {0, 0}; + + if (route->flags & MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE) + flags[0] = 'C'; + status_printf (so, "ROUTING_TABLE%c%s%s%c%s%c%s%c%s%c%u", + sep, mroute_addr_print (ma, &gc), flags, + sep, tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + sep, mroute_addr_print (&mi->real, &gc), + sep, time_string (route->last_reference, 0, false, &gc), + sep, (unsigned int)route->last_reference); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + if (m->mbuf) + status_printf (so, "GLOBAL_STATS%cMax bcast/mcast queue length%c%d", + sep, sep, mbuf_maximum_queued (m->mbuf)); + + status_printf (so, "END"); + } + else + { + status_printf (so, "ERROR: bad status format version number"); + } + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + { + status_printf (so, "HEADER,ERRORS,Common Name,TUN Read Trunc,TUN Write Trunc,Pre-encrypt Trunc,Post-decrypt Trunc"); + hash_iterator_init (m->hash, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + + if (!mi->halt) + { + status_printf (so, "ERRORS,%s," counter_format "," counter_format "," counter_format "," counter_format, + tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + m->top.c2.n_trunc_tun_read, + mi->context.c2.n_trunc_tun_write, + mi->context.c2.n_trunc_pre_encrypt, + mi->context.c2.n_trunc_post_decrypt); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + } +#endif + + status_flush (so); + gc_free (&gc_top); + } +} + +/* + * Learn a virtual address or route. + * The learn will fail if the learn address + * script/plugin fails. In this case the + * return value may be != mi. + * Return the instance which owns this route, + * or NULL if none. + */ +static struct multi_instance * +multi_learn_addr (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + const struct mroute_addr *addr, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct hash_element *he; + const uint32_t hv = hash_value (m->vhash, addr); + struct hash_bucket *bucket = hash_bucket (m->vhash, hv); + struct multi_route *oldroute = NULL; + struct multi_instance *owner = NULL; + + /* if route currently exists, get the instance which owns it */ + he = hash_lookup_fast (m->vhash, bucket, addr, hv); + if (he) + oldroute = (struct multi_route *) he->value; + if (oldroute && multi_route_defined (m, oldroute)) + owner = oldroute->instance; + + /* do we need to add address to hash table? */ + if ((!owner || owner != mi) + && mroute_learnable_address (addr) + && !mroute_addr_equal (addr, &m->local)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct multi_route *newroute; + bool learn_succeeded = false; + + ALLOC_OBJ (newroute, struct multi_route); + newroute->addr = *addr; + newroute->instance = mi; + newroute->flags = flags; + newroute->last_reference = now; + newroute->cache_generation = 0; + + /* The cache is invalidated when cache_generation is incremented */ + if (flags & MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE) + newroute->cache_generation = m->route_helper->cache_generation; + + if (oldroute) /* route already exists? */ + { + if (route_quota_test (m, mi) && learn_address_script (m, mi, "update", &newroute->addr)) + { + learn_succeeded = true; + owner = mi; + multi_instance_inc_refcount (mi); + route_quota_inc (mi); + + /* delete old route */ + multi_route_del (oldroute); + + /* modify hash table entry, replacing old route */ + he->key = &newroute->addr; + he->value = newroute; + } + } + else + { + if (route_quota_test (m, mi) && learn_address_script (m, mi, "add", &newroute->addr)) + { + learn_succeeded = true; + owner = mi; + multi_instance_inc_refcount (mi); + route_quota_inc (mi); + + /* add new route */ + hash_add_fast (m->vhash, bucket, &newroute->addr, hv, newroute); + } + } + + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: Learn%s: %s -> %s", + learn_succeeded ? "" : " FAILED", + mroute_addr_print (&newroute->addr, &gc), + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + + if (!learn_succeeded) + free (newroute); + + gc_free (&gc); + } + + return owner; +} + +/* + * Get client instance based on virtual address. + */ +static struct multi_instance * +multi_get_instance_by_virtual_addr (struct multi_context *m, + const struct mroute_addr *addr, + bool cidr_routing) +{ + struct multi_route *route; + struct multi_instance *ret = NULL; + + /* check for local address */ + if (mroute_addr_equal (addr, &m->local)) + return NULL; + + route = (struct multi_route *) hash_lookup (m->vhash, addr); + + /* does host route (possible cached) exist? */ + if (route && multi_route_defined (m, route)) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = route->instance; + route->last_reference = now; + ret = mi; + } + else if (cidr_routing) /* do we need to regenerate a host route cache entry? */ + { + struct mroute_helper *rh = m->route_helper; + struct mroute_addr tryaddr; + int i; + + /* cycle through each CIDR length */ + for (i = 0; i < rh->n_net_len; ++i) + { + tryaddr = *addr; + tryaddr.type |= MR_WITH_NETBITS; + tryaddr.netbits = rh->net_len[i]; + mroute_addr_mask_host_bits (&tryaddr); + + /* look up a possible route with netbits netmask */ + route = (struct multi_route *) hash_lookup (m->vhash, &tryaddr); + + if (route && multi_route_defined (m, route)) + { + /* found an applicable route, cache host route */ + struct multi_instance *mi = route->instance; + multi_learn_addr (m, mi, addr, MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE|MULTI_ROUTE_AGEABLE); + ret = mi; + break; + } + } + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_MULTI_DEBUG)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *addr_text = mroute_addr_print (addr, &gc); + if (ret) + { + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "GET INST BY VIRT: %s -> %s via %s", + addr_text, + multi_instance_string (ret, false, &gc), + mroute_addr_print (&route->addr, &gc)); + } + else + { + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "GET INST BY VIRT: %s [failed]", + addr_text); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +#endif + + ASSERT (!(ret && ret->halt)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Helper function to multi_learn_addr(). + */ +static struct multi_instance * +multi_learn_in_addr_t (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + in_addr_t a, + int netbits, /* -1 if host route, otherwise # of network bits in address */ + bool primary) +{ + struct openvpn_sockaddr remote_si; + struct mroute_addr addr; + + CLEAR (remote_si); + remote_si.addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; + remote_si.addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (a); + ASSERT (mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (&addr, &remote_si, false)); + + if (netbits >= 0) + { + addr.type |= MR_WITH_NETBITS; + addr.netbits = (uint8_t) netbits; + } + + { + struct multi_instance *owner = multi_learn_addr (m, mi, &addr, 0); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (management && owner) + management_learn_addr (management, &mi->context.c2.mda_context, &addr, primary); +#endif + return owner; + } +} + +static struct multi_instance * +multi_learn_in6_addr (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + struct in6_addr a6, + int netbits, /* -1 if host route, otherwise # of network bits in address */ + bool primary) +{ + struct mroute_addr addr; + + addr.len = 16; + addr.type = MR_ADDR_IPV6; + addr.netbits = 0; + memcpy( &addr.addr, &a6, sizeof(a6) ); + + if (netbits >= 0) + { + addr.type |= MR_WITH_NETBITS; + addr.netbits = (uint8_t) netbits; + mroute_addr_mask_host_bits( &addr ); + } + + { + struct multi_instance *owner = multi_learn_addr (m, mi, &addr, 0); +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (management && owner) + management_learn_addr (management, &mi->context.c2.mda_context, &addr, primary); +#endif + return owner; + } +} + +/* + * A new client has connected, add routes (server -> client) + * to internal routing table. + */ +static void +multi_add_iroutes (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct iroute *ir; + const struct iroute_ipv6 *ir6; + if (TUNNEL_TYPE (mi->context.c1.tuntap) == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + mi->did_iroutes = true; + for (ir = mi->context.options.iroutes; ir != NULL; ir = ir->next) + { + if (ir->netbits >= 0) + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: internal route %s/%d -> %s", + print_in_addr_t (ir->network, 0, &gc), + ir->netbits, + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + else + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: internal route %s -> %s", + print_in_addr_t (ir->network, 0, &gc), + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + + mroute_helper_add_iroute (m->route_helper, ir); + + multi_learn_in_addr_t (m, mi, ir->network, ir->netbits, false); + } + for ( ir6 = mi->context.options.iroutes_ipv6; ir6 != NULL; ir6 = ir6->next ) + { + if (ir6->netbits >= 0) + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: internal route %s/%d -> %s", + print_in6_addr (ir6->network, 0, &gc), + ir6->netbits, + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + else + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: internal route %s -> %s", + print_in6_addr (ir6->network, 0, &gc), + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + + mroute_helper_add_iroute6 (m->route_helper, ir6); + + multi_learn_in6_addr (m, mi, ir6->network, ir6->netbits, false); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Given an instance (new_mi), delete all other instances which use the + * same common name. + */ +static void +multi_delete_dup (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *new_mi) +{ + if (new_mi) + { + const char *new_cn = tls_common_name (new_mi->context.c2.tls_multi, true); + if (new_cn) + { + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + int count = 0; + + hash_iterator_init (m->iter, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + if (mi != new_mi && !mi->halt) + { + const char *cn = tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, true); + if (cn && !strcmp (cn, new_cn)) + { + mi->did_iter = false; + multi_close_instance (m, mi, false); + hash_iterator_delete_element (&hi); + ++count; + } + } + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + + if (count) + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: new connection by client '%s' will cause previous active sessions by this client to be dropped. Remember to use the --duplicate-cn option if you want multiple clients using the same certificate or username to concurrently connect.", new_cn); + } + } +} + +static void +check_stale_routes (struct multi_context *m) +{ + + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: Checking stale routes"); + hash_iterator_init_range (m->vhash, &hi, 0, hash_n_buckets (m->vhash)); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi)) != NULL) + { + struct multi_route *r = (struct multi_route *) he->value; + if (multi_route_defined (m, r) && difftime(now, r->last_reference) >= m->top.options.stale_routes_ageing_time) + { + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: Deleting stale route for address '%s'", + mroute_addr_print (&r->addr, &gc)); + learn_address_script (m, NULL, "delete", &r->addr); + multi_route_del (r); + hash_iterator_delete_element (&hi); + } + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Ensure that endpoint to be pushed to client + * complies with --ifconfig-push-constraint directive. + */ +static bool +ifconfig_push_constraint_satisfied (const struct context *c) +{ + const struct options *o = &c->options; + if (o->push_ifconfig_constraint_defined && c->c2.push_ifconfig_defined) + return (o->push_ifconfig_constraint_netmask & c->c2.push_ifconfig_local) == o->push_ifconfig_constraint_network; + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Select a virtual address for a new client instance. + * Use an --ifconfig-push directive, if given (static IP). + * Otherwise use an --ifconfig-pool address (dynamic IP). + */ +static void +multi_select_virtual_addr (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* + * If ifconfig addresses were set by dynamic config file, + * release pool addresses, otherwise keep them. + */ + if (mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_defined) + { + /* ifconfig addresses were set statically, + release dynamic allocation */ + if (mi->vaddr_handle >= 0) + { + ifconfig_pool_release (m->ifconfig_pool, mi->vaddr_handle, true); + mi->vaddr_handle = -1; + } + + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined = true; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local = mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_local; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local_alias = mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_local_alias; +#endif + + /* the current implementation does not allow "static IPv4, pool IPv6", + * (see below) so issue a warning if that happens - don't break the + * session, though, as we don't even know if this client WANTS IPv6 + */ + if ( mi->context.c1.tuntap->ipv6 && + mi->context.options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined && + ! mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined ) + { + msg( M_INFO, "MULTI_sva: WARNING: if --ifconfig-push is used for IPv4, automatic IPv6 assignment from --ifconfig-ipv6-pool does not work. Use --ifconfig-ipv6-push for IPv6 then." ); + } + } + else if (m->ifconfig_pool && mi->vaddr_handle < 0) /* otherwise, choose a pool address */ + { + in_addr_t local=0, remote=0; + struct in6_addr remote_ipv6; + const char *cn = NULL; + + if (!mi->context.options.duplicate_cn) + cn = tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, true); + + CLEAR(remote_ipv6); + mi->vaddr_handle = ifconfig_pool_acquire (m->ifconfig_pool, &local, &remote, &remote_ipv6, cn); + if (mi->vaddr_handle >= 0) + { + const int tunnel_type = TUNNEL_TYPE (mi->context.c1.tuntap); + const int tunnel_topology = TUNNEL_TOPOLOGY (mi->context.c1.tuntap); + + msg( M_INFO, "MULTI_sva: pool returned IPv4=%s, IPv6=%s", + print_in_addr_t( remote, 0, &gc ), + (mi->context.options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined + ? print_in6_addr( remote_ipv6, 0, &gc ) + : "(Not enabled)") ); + + /* set push_ifconfig_remote_netmask from pool ifconfig address(es) */ + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local = remote; + if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && tunnel_topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + { + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = mi->context.options.ifconfig_pool_netmask; + if (!mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask) + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = mi->context.c1.tuntap->remote_netmask; + } + else if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + if (tunnel_topology == TOP_P2P) + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = mi->context.c1.tuntap->local; + else if (tunnel_topology == TOP_NET30) + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = local; + } + + if (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask) + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined = true; + else + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: no --ifconfig-pool netmask parameter is available to push to %s", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + + if ( mi->context.options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined ) + { + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local = remote_ipv6; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote = + mi->context.c1.tuntap->local_ipv6; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits = + mi->context.options.ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined = true; + } + } + else + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: no free --ifconfig-pool addresses are available"); + } + } + + /* IPv6 push_ifconfig is a bit problematic - since IPv6 shares the + * pool handling with IPv4, the combination "static IPv4, dynamic IPv6" + * will fail (because no pool will be allocated in this case). + * OTOH, this doesn't make too much sense in reality - and the other + * way round ("dynamic IPv4, static IPv6") or "both static" makes sense + * -> and so it's implemented right now + */ + if ( mi->context.c1.tuntap->ipv6 && + mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined ) + { + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local = + mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote = + mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits = + mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits; + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined = true; + + msg( M_INFO, "MULTI_sva: push_ifconfig_ipv6 %s/%d", + print_in6_addr( mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local, 0, &gc ), + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits ); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Set virtual address environmental variables. + */ +static void +multi_set_virtual_addr_env (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + setenv_del (mi->context.c2.es, "ifconfig_pool_local_ip"); + setenv_del (mi->context.c2.es, "ifconfig_pool_remote_ip"); + setenv_del (mi->context.c2.es, "ifconfig_pool_netmask"); + + if (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined) + { + const int tunnel_type = TUNNEL_TYPE (mi->context.c1.tuntap); + const int tunnel_topology = TUNNEL_TOPOLOGY (mi->context.c1.tuntap); + + setenv_in_addr_t (mi->context.c2.es, + "ifconfig_pool_remote_ip", + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local, + SA_SET_IF_NONZERO); + + if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && tunnel_topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + { + setenv_in_addr_t (mi->context.c2.es, + "ifconfig_pool_netmask", + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask, + SA_SET_IF_NONZERO); + } + else if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + setenv_in_addr_t (mi->context.c2.es, + "ifconfig_pool_local_ip", + mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask, + SA_SET_IF_NONZERO); + } + } + + /* TODO: I'm not exactly sure what these environment variables are + * used for, but if we have them for IPv4, we should also have + * them for IPv6, no? + */ +} + +/* + * Called after client-connect script is called + */ +static void +multi_client_connect_post (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + const char *dc_file, + unsigned int option_permissions_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found) +{ + /* Did script generate a dynamic config file? */ + if (test_file (dc_file)) + { + options_server_import (&mi->context.options, + dc_file, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + option_permissions_mask, + option_types_found, + mi->context.c2.es); + + if (!platform_unlink (dc_file)) + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: problem deleting temporary file: %s", + dc_file); + + /* + * If the --client-connect script generates a config file + * with an --ifconfig-push directive, it will override any + * --ifconfig-push directive from the --client-config-dir + * directory or any --ifconfig-pool dynamic address. + */ + multi_select_virtual_addr (m, mi); + multi_set_virtual_addr_env (m, mi); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + +/* + * Called after client-connect plug-in is called + */ +static void +multi_client_connect_post_plugin (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + const struct plugin_return *pr, + unsigned int option_permissions_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found) +{ + struct plugin_return config; + + plugin_return_get_column (pr, &config, "config"); + + /* Did script generate a dynamic config file? */ + if (plugin_return_defined (&config)) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < config.n; ++i) + { + if (config.list[i] && config.list[i]->value) + options_string_import (&mi->context.options, + config.list[i]->value, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + option_permissions_mask, + option_types_found, + mi->context.c2.es); + } + + /* + * If the --client-connect script generates a config file + * with an --ifconfig-push directive, it will override any + * --ifconfig-push directive from the --client-config-dir + * directory or any --ifconfig-pool dynamic address. + */ + multi_select_virtual_addr (m, mi); + multi_set_virtual_addr_env (m, mi); + } +} + +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +/* + * Called to load management-derived client-connect config + */ +static void +multi_client_connect_mda (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + const struct buffer_list *config, + unsigned int option_permissions_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found) +{ + if (config) + { + struct buffer_entry *be; + + for (be = config->head; be != NULL; be = be->next) + { + const char *opt = BSTR(&be->buf); + options_string_import (&mi->context.options, + opt, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + option_permissions_mask, + option_types_found, + mi->context.c2.es); + } + + /* + * If the --client-connect script generates a config file + * with an --ifconfig-push directive, it will override any + * --ifconfig-push directive from the --client-config-dir + * directory or any --ifconfig-pool dynamic address. + */ + multi_select_virtual_addr (m, mi); + multi_set_virtual_addr_env (m, mi); + } +} + +#endif + +static void +multi_client_connect_setenv (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ + setenv_str (mi->context.c2.es, "common_name", tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, true)); + + /* setenv client real IP address */ + setenv_trusted (mi->context.c2.es, get_link_socket_info (&mi->context)); + + /* setenv client virtual IP address */ + multi_set_virtual_addr_env (m, mi); + + /* setenv connection time */ + { + const char *created_ascii = time_string (mi->created, 0, false, &gc); + setenv_str (mi->context.c2.es, "time_ascii", created_ascii); + setenv_unsigned (mi->context.c2.es, "time_unix", (unsigned int)mi->created); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Called as soon as the SSL/TLS connection authenticates. + * + * Instance-specific directives to be processed: + * + * iroute start-ip end-ip + * ifconfig-push local remote-netmask + * push + */ +static void +multi_connection_established (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (tls_authentication_status (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, 0) == TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + unsigned int option_types_found = 0; + + const unsigned int option_permissions_mask = + OPT_P_INSTANCE + | OPT_P_INHERIT + | OPT_P_PUSH + | OPT_P_TIMER + | OPT_P_CONFIG + | OPT_P_ECHO + | OPT_P_COMP + | OPT_P_SOCKFLAGS; + + int cc_succeeded = true; /* client connect script status */ + int cc_succeeded_count = 0; + + ASSERT (mi->context.c1.tuntap); + + /* lock down the common name and cert hashes so they can't change during future TLS renegotiations */ + tls_lock_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi); + tls_lock_cert_hash_set (mi->context.c2.tls_multi); + + /* generate a msg() prefix for this client instance */ + generate_prefix (mi); + + /* delete instances of previous clients with same common-name */ + if (!mi->context.options.duplicate_cn) + multi_delete_dup (m, mi); + + /* reset pool handle to null */ + mi->vaddr_handle = -1; + + /* + * Try to source a dynamic config file from the + * --client-config-dir directory. + */ + if (mi->context.options.client_config_dir) + { + const char *ccd_file; + + ccd_file = gen_path (mi->context.options.client_config_dir, + tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false), + &gc); + + /* try common-name file */ + if (test_file (ccd_file)) + { + options_server_import (&mi->context.options, + ccd_file, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + option_permissions_mask, + &option_types_found, + mi->context.c2.es); + } + else /* try default file */ + { + ccd_file = gen_path (mi->context.options.client_config_dir, + CCD_DEFAULT, + &gc); + + if (test_file (ccd_file)) + { + options_server_import (&mi->context.options, + ccd_file, + D_IMPORT_ERRORS|M_OPTERR, + option_permissions_mask, + &option_types_found, + mi->context.c2.es); + } + } + } + + /* + * Select a virtual address from either --ifconfig-push in --client-config-dir file + * or --ifconfig-pool. + */ + multi_select_virtual_addr (m, mi); + + /* do --client-connect setenvs */ + multi_client_connect_setenv (m, mi); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* + * Call client-connect plug-in. + */ + + /* deprecated callback, use a file for passing back return info */ + if (plugin_defined (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT)) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + const char *dc_file = create_temp_file (mi->context.options.tmp_dir, "cc", &gc); + + if( !dc_file ) { + cc_succeeded = false; + goto script_depr_failed; + } + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s", dc_file); + if (plugin_call (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT, &argv, NULL, mi->context.c2.es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: client-connect plugin call failed"); + cc_succeeded = false; + } + else + { + multi_client_connect_post (m, mi, dc_file, option_permissions_mask, &option_types_found); + ++cc_succeeded_count; + } + script_depr_failed: + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + /* V2 callback, use a plugin_return struct for passing back return info */ + if (plugin_defined (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2)) + { + struct plugin_return pr; + + plugin_return_init (&pr); + + if (plugin_call (mi->context.plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2, NULL, &pr, mi->context.c2.es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: client-connect-v2 plugin call failed"); + cc_succeeded = false; + } + else + { + multi_client_connect_post_plugin (m, mi, &pr, option_permissions_mask, &option_types_found); + ++cc_succeeded_count; + } + + plugin_return_free (&pr); + } +#endif + + /* + * Run --client-connect script. + */ + if (mi->context.options.client_connect_script && cc_succeeded) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + const char *dc_file = NULL; + + setenv_str (mi->context.c2.es, "script_type", "client-connect"); + + dc_file = create_temp_file (mi->context.options.tmp_dir, "cc", &gc); + if( !dc_file ) { + cc_succeeded = false; + goto script_failed; + } + + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %s", + mi->context.options.client_connect_script, + dc_file); + + if (openvpn_run_script (&argv, mi->context.c2.es, 0, "--client-connect")) + { + multi_client_connect_post (m, mi, dc_file, option_permissions_mask, &option_types_found); + ++cc_succeeded_count; + } + else + cc_succeeded = false; + script_failed: + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + /* + * Check for client-connect script left by management interface client + */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (cc_succeeded && mi->cc_config) + { + multi_client_connect_mda (m, mi, mi->cc_config, option_permissions_mask, &option_types_found); + ++cc_succeeded_count; + } +#endif + + /* + * Check for "disable" directive in client-config-dir file + * or config file generated by --client-connect script. + */ + if (mi->context.options.disable) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: client has been rejected due to 'disable' directive"); + cc_succeeded = false; + } + + if (cc_succeeded) + { + /* + * Process sourced options. + */ + do_deferred_options (&mi->context, option_types_found); + + /* + * make sure we got ifconfig settings from somewhere + */ + if (!mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: no dynamic or static remote --ifconfig address is available for %s", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + } + + /* + * make sure that ifconfig settings comply with constraints + */ + if (!ifconfig_push_constraint_satisfied (&mi->context)) + { + /* JYFIXME -- this should cause the connection to fail */ + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI ERROR: primary virtual IP for %s (%s) violates tunnel network/netmask constraint (%s/%s)", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_constraint_network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (mi->context.options.push_ifconfig_constraint_netmask, 0, &gc)); + } + + /* + * For routed tunnels, set up internal route to endpoint + * plus add all iroute routes. + */ + if (TUNNEL_TYPE (mi->context.c1.tuntap) == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + if (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined) + { + multi_learn_in_addr_t (m, mi, mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local, -1, true); + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: primary virtual IP for %s: %s", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local, 0, &gc)); + } + + if (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined) + { + multi_learn_in6_addr (m, mi, mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local, -1, true); + /* TODO: find out where addresses are "unlearned"!! */ + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: primary virtual IPv6 for %s: %s", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc), + print_in6_addr (mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local, 0, &gc)); + } + + /* add routes locally, pointing to new client, if + --iroute options have been specified */ + multi_add_iroutes (m, mi); + + /* + * iroutes represent subnets which are "owned" by a particular + * client. Therefore, do not actually push a route to a client + * if it matches one of the client's iroutes. + */ + remove_iroutes_from_push_route_list (&mi->context.options); + } + else if (mi->context.options.iroutes) + { + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: --iroute options rejected for %s -- iroute only works with tun-style tunnels", + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + } + + /* set our client's VPN endpoint for status reporting purposes */ + mi->reporting_addr = mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local; + + /* set context-level authentication flag */ + mi->context.c2.context_auth = CAS_SUCCEEDED; + } + else + { + /* set context-level authentication flag */ + mi->context.c2.context_auth = cc_succeeded_count ? CAS_PARTIAL : CAS_FAILED; + } + + /* set flag so we don't get called again */ + mi->connection_established_flag = true; + + /* increment number of current authenticated clients */ + ++m->n_clients; + update_mstat_n_clients(m->n_clients); + --mi->n_clients_delta; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (management) + management_connection_established (management, &mi->context.c2.mda_context, mi->context.c2.es); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); + } + + /* + * Reply now to client's PUSH_REQUEST query + */ + mi->context.c2.push_reply_deferred = false; +} + +/* + * Add a mbuf buffer to a particular + * instance. + */ +void +multi_add_mbuf (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + struct mbuf_buffer *mb) +{ + if (multi_output_queue_ready (m, mi)) + { + struct mbuf_item item; + item.buffer = mb; + item.instance = mi; + mbuf_add_item (m->mbuf, &item); + } + else + { + msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED, "MULTI: packet dropped due to output saturation (multi_add_mbuf)"); + } +} + +/* + * Add a packet to a client instance output queue. + */ +static inline void +multi_unicast (struct multi_context *m, + const struct buffer *buf, + struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct mbuf_buffer *mb; + + if (BLEN (buf) > 0) + { + mb = mbuf_alloc_buf (buf); + mb->flags = MF_UNICAST; + multi_add_mbuf (m, mi, mb); + mbuf_free_buf (mb); + } +} + +/* + * Broadcast a packet to all clients. + */ +static void +multi_bcast (struct multi_context *m, + const struct buffer *buf, + const struct multi_instance *sender_instance, + const struct mroute_addr *sender_addr) +{ + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + struct multi_instance *mi; + struct mbuf_buffer *mb; + + if (BLEN (buf) > 0) + { + perf_push (PERF_MULTI_BCAST); +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("BCAST len=%d\n", BLEN (buf)); +#endif + mb = mbuf_alloc_buf (buf); + hash_iterator_init (m->iter, &hi); + + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + if (mi != sender_instance && !mi->halt) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (sender_instance) + { + if (!pf_c2c_test (&sender_instance->context, &mi->context, "bcast_c2c")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED_BCAST, "PF: client[%s] -> client[%s] packet dropped by BCAST packet filter", + mi_prefix (sender_instance), + mi_prefix (mi)); + continue; + } + } + if (sender_addr) + { + if (!pf_addr_test (&mi->context, sender_addr, "bcast_src_addr")) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (D_PF_DROPPED_BCAST, "PF: addr[%s] -> client[%s] packet dropped by BCAST packet filter", + mroute_addr_print_ex (sender_addr, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc), + mi_prefix (mi)); + gc_free (&gc); + continue; + } + } +#endif + multi_add_mbuf (m, mi, mb); + } + } + + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + mbuf_free_buf (mb); + perf_pop (); + } +} + +/* + * Given a time delta, indicating that we wish to be + * awoken by the scheduler at time now + delta, figure + * a sigma parameter (in microseconds) that represents + * a sort of fuzz factor around delta, so that we're + * really telling the scheduler to wake us up any time + * between now + delta - sigma and now + delta + sigma. + * + * The sigma parameter helps the scheduler to run more efficiently. + * Sigma should be no larger than TV_WITHIN_SIGMA_MAX_USEC + */ +static inline unsigned int +compute_wakeup_sigma (const struct timeval *delta) +{ + if (delta->tv_sec < 1) + { + /* if < 1 sec, fuzz = # of microseconds / 8 */ + return delta->tv_usec >> 3; + } + else + { + /* if < 10 minutes, fuzz = 13.1% of timeout */ + if (delta->tv_sec < 600) + return delta->tv_sec << 17; + else + return 120000000; /* if >= 10 minutes, fuzz = 2 minutes */ + } +} + +static void +multi_schedule_context_wakeup (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + /* calculate an absolute wakeup time */ + ASSERT (!openvpn_gettimeofday (&mi->wakeup, NULL)); + tv_add (&mi->wakeup, &mi->context.c2.timeval); + + /* tell scheduler to wake us up at some point in the future */ + schedule_add_entry (m->schedule, + (struct schedule_entry *) mi, + &mi->wakeup, + compute_wakeup_sigma (&mi->context.c2.timeval)); +} + +/* + * Figure instance-specific timers, convert + * earliest to absolute time in mi->wakeup, + * call scheduler with our future wakeup time. + * + * Also close context on signal. + */ +bool +multi_process_post (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const unsigned int flags) +{ + bool ret = true; + + if (!IS_SIG (&mi->context) && ((flags & MPP_PRE_SELECT) || ((flags & MPP_CONDITIONAL_PRE_SELECT) && !ANY_OUT (&mi->context)))) + { + /* figure timeouts and fetch possible outgoing + to_link packets (such as ping or TLS control) */ + pre_select (&mi->context); + + if (!IS_SIG (&mi->context)) + { + /* tell scheduler to wake us up at some point in the future */ + multi_schedule_context_wakeup(m, mi); + + /* connection is "established" when SSL/TLS key negotiation succeeds + and (if specified) auth user/pass succeeds */ + if (!mi->connection_established_flag && CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED (&mi->context)) + multi_connection_established (m, mi); + } + } + + if (IS_SIG (&mi->context)) + { + if (flags & MPP_CLOSE_ON_SIGNAL) + { + multi_close_instance_on_signal (m, mi); + ret = false; + } + } + else + { + /* continue to pend on output? */ + multi_set_pending (m, ANY_OUT (&mi->context) ? mi : NULL); + +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("POST %s[%d] to=%d lo=%d/%d w=%d/%d\n", + id(mi), + (int) (mi == m->pending), + mi ? mi->context.c2.to_tun.len : -1, + mi ? mi->context.c2.to_link.len : -1, + (mi && mi->context.c2.fragment) ? mi->context.c2.fragment->outgoing.len : -1, + (int)mi->context.c2.timeval.tv_sec, + (int)mi->context.c2.timeval.tv_usec); +#endif + } + + if ((flags & MPP_RECORD_TOUCH) && m->mpp_touched) + *m->mpp_touched = mi; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Process packets in the TCP/UDP socket -> TUN/TAP interface direction, + * i.e. client -> server direction. + */ +bool +multi_process_incoming_link (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *instance, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + struct context *c; + struct mroute_addr src, dest; + unsigned int mroute_flags; + struct multi_instance *mi; + bool ret = true; + + if (m->pending) + return true; + + if (!instance) + { +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("TCP/UDP -> TUN [%d]\n", BLEN (&m->top.c2.buf)); +#endif + multi_set_pending (m, multi_get_create_instance_udp (m)); + } + else + multi_set_pending (m, instance); + + if (m->pending) + { + set_prefix (m->pending); + + /* get instance context */ + c = &m->pending->context; + + if (!instance) + { + /* transfer packet pointer from top-level context buffer to instance */ + c->c2.buf = m->top.c2.buf; + + /* transfer from-addr from top-level context buffer to instance */ + c->c2.from = m->top.c2.from; + } + + if (BLEN (&c->c2.buf) > 0) + { + /* decrypt in instance context */ + process_incoming_link (c); + + if (TUNNEL_TYPE (m->top.c1.tuntap) == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + /* extract packet source and dest addresses */ + mroute_flags = mroute_extract_addr_from_packet (&src, + &dest, + NULL, + NULL, + &c->c2.to_tun, + DEV_TYPE_TUN); + + /* drop packet if extract failed */ + if (!(mroute_flags & MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED)) + { + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + /* make sure that source address is associated with this client */ + else if (multi_get_instance_by_virtual_addr (m, &src, true) != m->pending) + { + msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED, "MULTI: bad source address from client [%s], packet dropped", + mroute_addr_print (&src, &gc)); + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + /* client-to-client communication enabled? */ + else if (m->enable_c2c) + { + /* multicast? */ + if (mroute_flags & MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST) + { + /* for now, treat multicast as broadcast */ + multi_bcast (m, &c->c2.to_tun, m->pending, NULL); + } + else /* possible client to client routing */ + { + ASSERT (!(mroute_flags & MROUTE_EXTRACT_BCAST)); + mi = multi_get_instance_by_virtual_addr (m, &dest, true); + + /* if dest addr is a known client, route to it */ + if (mi) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (!pf_c2c_test (c, &mi->context, "tun_c2c")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED, "PF: client -> client[%s] packet dropped by TUN packet filter", + mi_prefix (mi)); + } + else +#endif + { + multi_unicast (m, &c->c2.to_tun, mi); + register_activity (c, BLEN(&c->c2.to_tun)); + } + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + } + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (c->c2.to_tun.len && !pf_addr_test (c, &dest, "tun_dest_addr")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED, "PF: client -> addr[%s] packet dropped by TUN packet filter", + mroute_addr_print_ex (&dest, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc)); + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } +#endif + } + else if (TUNNEL_TYPE (m->top.c1.tuntap) == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + struct mroute_addr edest; + mroute_addr_reset (&edest); +#endif + /* extract packet source and dest addresses */ + mroute_flags = mroute_extract_addr_from_packet (&src, + &dest, + NULL, +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + &edest, +#else + NULL, +#endif + &c->c2.to_tun, + DEV_TYPE_TAP); + + if (mroute_flags & MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED) + { + if (multi_learn_addr (m, m->pending, &src, 0) == m->pending) + { + /* check for broadcast */ + if (m->enable_c2c) + { + if (mroute_flags & (MROUTE_EXTRACT_BCAST|MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST)) + { + multi_bcast (m, &c->c2.to_tun, m->pending, NULL); + } + else /* try client-to-client routing */ + { + mi = multi_get_instance_by_virtual_addr (m, &dest, false); + + /* if dest addr is a known client, route to it */ + if (mi) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (!pf_c2c_test (c, &mi->context, "tap_c2c")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED, "PF: client -> client[%s] packet dropped by TAP packet filter", + mi_prefix (mi)); + } + else +#endif + { + multi_unicast (m, &c->c2.to_tun, mi); + register_activity (c, BLEN(&c->c2.to_tun)); + } + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + } + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (c->c2.to_tun.len && !pf_addr_test (c, &edest, "tap_dest_addr")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED, "PF: client -> addr[%s] packet dropped by TAP packet filter", + mroute_addr_print_ex (&edest, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc)); + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } +#endif + } + else + { + msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED, "MULTI: bad source address from client [%s], packet dropped", + mroute_addr_print (&src, &gc)); + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + } + else + { + c->c2.to_tun.len = 0; + } + } + } + + /* postprocess and set wakeup */ + ret = multi_process_post (m, m->pending, mpp_flags); + + clear_prefix (); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Process packets in the TUN/TAP interface -> TCP/UDP socket direction, + * i.e. server -> client direction. + */ +bool +multi_process_incoming_tun (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = true; + + if (BLEN (&m->top.c2.buf) > 0) + { + unsigned int mroute_flags; + struct mroute_addr src, dest; + const int dev_type = TUNNEL_TYPE (m->top.c1.tuntap); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + struct mroute_addr esrc, *e1, *e2; + if (dev_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + e1 = NULL; + e2 = &src; + } + else + { + e1 = e2 = &esrc; + mroute_addr_reset (&esrc); + } +#endif + +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("TUN -> TCP/UDP [%d]\n", BLEN (&m->top.c2.buf)); +#endif + + if (m->pending) + return true; + + /* + * Route an incoming tun/tap packet to + * the appropriate multi_instance object. + */ + + mroute_flags = mroute_extract_addr_from_packet (&src, + &dest, +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + e1, +#else + NULL, +#endif + NULL, + &m->top.c2.buf, + dev_type); + + if (mroute_flags & MROUTE_EXTRACT_SUCCEEDED) + { + struct context *c; + + /* broadcast or multicast dest addr? */ + if (mroute_flags & (MROUTE_EXTRACT_BCAST|MROUTE_EXTRACT_MCAST)) + { + /* for now, treat multicast as broadcast */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + multi_bcast (m, &m->top.c2.buf, NULL, e2); +#else + multi_bcast (m, &m->top.c2.buf, NULL, NULL); +#endif + } + else + { + multi_set_pending (m, multi_get_instance_by_virtual_addr (m, &dest, dev_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN)); + + if (m->pending) + { + /* get instance context */ + c = &m->pending->context; + + set_prefix (m->pending); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + if (!pf_addr_test (c, e2, "tun_tap_src_addr")) + { + msg (D_PF_DROPPED, "PF: addr[%s] -> client packet dropped by packet filter", + mroute_addr_print_ex (&src, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc)); + buf_reset_len (&c->c2.buf); + } + else +#endif + { + if (multi_output_queue_ready (m, m->pending)) + { + /* transfer packet pointer from top-level context buffer to instance */ + c->c2.buf = m->top.c2.buf; + } + else + { + /* drop packet */ + msg (D_MULTI_DROPPED, "MULTI: packet dropped due to output saturation (multi_process_incoming_tun)"); + buf_reset_len (&c->c2.buf); + } + } + + /* encrypt in instance context */ + process_incoming_tun (c); + + /* postprocess and set wakeup */ + ret = multi_process_post (m, m->pending, mpp_flags); + + clear_prefix (); + } + } + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Process a possible client-to-client/bcast/mcast message in the + * queue. + */ +struct multi_instance * +multi_get_queue (struct mbuf_set *ms) +{ + struct mbuf_item item; + + if (mbuf_extract_item (ms, &item)) /* cleartext IP packet */ + { + unsigned int pip_flags = PIPV4_PASSTOS; + + set_prefix (item.instance); + item.instance->context.c2.buf = item.buffer->buf; + if (item.buffer->flags & MF_UNICAST) /* --mssfix doesn't make sense for broadcast or multicast */ + pip_flags |= PIP_MSSFIX; + process_ip_header (&item.instance->context, pip_flags, &item.instance->context.c2.buf); + encrypt_sign (&item.instance->context, true); + mbuf_free_buf (item.buffer); + + dmsg (D_MULTI_DEBUG, "MULTI: C2C/MCAST/BCAST"); + + clear_prefix (); + return item.instance; + } + else + { + return NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Called when an I/O wait times out. Usually means that a particular + * client instance object needs timer-based service. + */ +bool +multi_process_timeout (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + bool ret = true; + +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("%s -> TIMEOUT\n", id(m->earliest_wakeup)); +#endif + + /* instance marked for wakeup? */ + if (m->earliest_wakeup) + { + set_prefix (m->earliest_wakeup); + ret = multi_process_post (m, m->earliest_wakeup, mpp_flags); + m->earliest_wakeup = NULL; + clear_prefix (); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Drop a TUN/TAP outgoing packet.. + */ +void +multi_process_drop_outgoing_tun (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = m->pending; + + ASSERT (mi); + + set_prefix (mi); + + msg (D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: Outgoing TUN queue full, dropped packet len=%d", + mi->context.c2.to_tun.len); + + buf_reset (&mi->context.c2.to_tun); + + multi_process_post (m, mi, mpp_flags); + clear_prefix (); +} + +/* + * Per-client route quota management + */ + +void +route_quota_exceeded (const struct multi_context *m, const struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (D_ROUTE_QUOTA, "MULTI ROUTE: route quota (%d) exceeded for %s (see --max-routes-per-client option)", + mi->context.options.max_routes_per_client, + multi_instance_string (mi, false, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +/* + * Flood clients with random packets + */ +static void +gremlin_flood_clients (struct multi_context *m) +{ + const int level = GREMLIN_PACKET_FLOOD_LEVEL (m->top.options.gremlin); + if (level) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc (BUF_SIZE (&m->top.c2.frame), &gc); + struct packet_flood_parms parm = get_packet_flood_parms (level); + int i; + + ASSERT (buf_init (&buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&m->top.c2.frame))); + parm.packet_size = min_int (parm.packet_size, MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&m->top.c2.frame)); + + msg (D_GREMLIN, "GREMLIN_FLOOD_CLIENTS: flooding clients with %d packets of size %d", + parm.n_packets, + parm.packet_size); + + for (i = 0; i < parm.packet_size; ++i) + ASSERT (buf_write_u8 (&buf, get_random () & 0xFF)); + + for (i = 0; i < parm.n_packets; ++i) + multi_bcast (m, &buf, NULL, NULL); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} +#endif + +bool +stale_route_check_trigger (struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct timeval null; + CLEAR (null); + return event_timeout_trigger (&m->stale_routes_check_et, &null, ETT_DEFAULT); +} + +/* + * Process timers in the top-level context + */ +void +multi_process_per_second_timers_dowork (struct multi_context *m) +{ + /* possibly reap instances/routes in vhash */ + multi_reap_process (m); + + /* possibly print to status log */ + if (m->top.c1.status_output) + { + if (status_trigger (m->top.c1.status_output)) + multi_print_status (m, m->top.c1.status_output, m->status_file_version); + } + + /* possibly flush ifconfig-pool file */ + multi_ifconfig_pool_persist (m, false); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + gremlin_flood_clients (m); +#endif + + /* Should we check for stale routes? */ + if (m->top.options.stale_routes_check_interval && stale_route_check_trigger (m)) + check_stale_routes (m); +} + +void +multi_top_init (struct multi_context *m, const struct context *top, const bool alloc_buffers) +{ + inherit_context_top (&m->top, top); + m->top.c2.buffers = NULL; + if (alloc_buffers) + m->top.c2.buffers = init_context_buffers (&top->c2.frame); +} + +void +multi_top_free (struct multi_context *m) +{ + close_context (&m->top, -1, CC_GC_FREE); + free_context_buffers (m->top.c2.buffers); +} + +/* + * Return true if event loop should break, + * false if it should continue. + */ +bool +multi_process_signal (struct multi_context *m) +{ + if (m->top.sig->signal_received == SIGUSR2) + { + struct status_output *so = status_open (NULL, 0, M_INFO, NULL, 0); + multi_print_status (m, so, m->status_file_version); + status_close (so); + m->top.sig->signal_received = 0; + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/* + * Called when an instance should be closed due to the + * reception of a soft signal. + */ +void +multi_close_instance_on_signal (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + remap_signal (&mi->context); + set_prefix (mi); + print_signal (mi->context.sig, "client-instance", D_MULTI_LOW); + clear_prefix (); + multi_close_instance (m, mi, false); +} + +static void +multi_signal_instance (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const int sig) +{ + mi->context.sig->signal_received = sig; + multi_close_instance_on_signal (m, mi); +} + +/* + * Management subsystem callbacks + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + +static void +management_callback_status (void *arg, const int version, struct status_output *so) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + + if (!version) + multi_print_status (m, so, m->status_file_version); + else + multi_print_status (m, so, version); +} + +static int +management_callback_n_clients (void *arg) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + return m->n_clients; +} + +static int +management_callback_kill_by_cn (void *arg, const char *del_cn) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + int count = 0; + + hash_iterator_init (m->iter, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + if (!mi->halt) + { + const char *cn = tls_common_name (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, false); + if (cn && !strcmp (cn, del_cn)) + { + multi_signal_instance (m, mi, SIGTERM); + ++count; + } + } + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + return count; +} + +static int +management_callback_kill_by_addr (void *arg, const in_addr_t addr, const int port) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + struct openvpn_sockaddr saddr; + struct mroute_addr maddr; + int count = 0; + + CLEAR (saddr); + saddr.addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; + saddr.addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (addr); + saddr.addr.in4.sin_port = htons (port); + if (mroute_extract_openvpn_sockaddr (&maddr, &saddr, true)) + { + hash_iterator_init (m->iter, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) he->value; + if (!mi->halt && mroute_addr_equal (&maddr, &mi->real)) + { + multi_signal_instance (m, mi, SIGTERM); + ++count; + } + } + hash_iterator_free (&hi); + } + return count; +} + +static void +management_delete_event (void *arg, event_t event) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + if (m->mtcp) + multi_tcp_delete_event (m->mtcp, event); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + +static struct multi_instance * +lookup_by_cid (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned long cid) +{ + if (m) + { + struct multi_instance *mi = (struct multi_instance *) hash_lookup (m->cid_hash, &cid); + if (mi && !mi->halt) + return mi; + } + return NULL; +} + +static bool +management_kill_by_cid (void *arg, const unsigned long cid, const char *kill_msg) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct multi_instance *mi = lookup_by_cid (m, cid); + if (mi) + { + send_restart (&mi->context, kill_msg); /* was: multi_signal_instance (m, mi, SIGTERM); */ + multi_schedule_context_wakeup(m, mi); + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +static bool +management_client_auth (void *arg, + const unsigned long cid, + const unsigned int mda_key_id, + const bool auth, + const char *reason, + const char *client_reason, + struct buffer_list *cc_config) /* ownership transferred */ +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct multi_instance *mi = lookup_by_cid (m, cid); + bool cc_config_owned = true; + bool ret = false; + + if (mi) + { + ret = tls_authenticate_key (mi->context.c2.tls_multi, mda_key_id, auth, client_reason); + if (ret) + { + if (auth) + { + if (!mi->connection_established_flag) + { + set_cc_config (mi, cc_config); + cc_config_owned = false; + } + } + else + { + if (reason) + msg (D_MULTI_LOW, "MULTI: connection rejected: %s, CLI:%s", reason, np(client_reason)); + if (mi->connection_established_flag) + { + send_auth_failed (&mi->context, client_reason); /* mid-session reauth failed */ + multi_schedule_context_wakeup(m, mi); + } + } + } + } + if (cc_config_owned && cc_config) + buffer_list_free (cc_config); + return ret; +} + +static char * +management_get_peer_info (void *arg, const unsigned long cid) +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct multi_instance *mi = lookup_by_cid (m, cid); + char *ret = NULL; + + if (mi) + ret = tls_get_peer_info (mi->context.c2.tls_multi); + + return ret; +} + +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF +static bool +management_client_pf (void *arg, + const unsigned long cid, + struct buffer_list *pf_config) /* ownership transferred */ +{ + struct multi_context *m = (struct multi_context *) arg; + struct multi_instance *mi = lookup_by_cid (m, cid); + bool ret = false; + + if (mi && pf_config) + ret = pf_load_from_buffer_list (&mi->context, pf_config); + + if (pf_config) + buffer_list_free (pf_config); + return ret; +} +#endif + +void +init_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + struct management_callback cb; + CLEAR (cb); + cb.arg = m; + cb.flags = MCF_SERVER; + cb.status = management_callback_status; + cb.show_net = management_show_net_callback; + cb.kill_by_cn = management_callback_kill_by_cn; + cb.kill_by_addr = management_callback_kill_by_addr; + cb.delete_event = management_delete_event; + cb.n_clients = management_callback_n_clients; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + cb.kill_by_cid = management_kill_by_cid; + cb.client_auth = management_client_auth; + cb.get_peer_info = management_get_peer_info; +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + cb.client_pf = management_client_pf; +#endif + management_set_callback (management, &cb); + } +#endif +} + +void +uninit_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m) +{ + uninit_management_callback (); +} + +/* + * Top level event loop. + */ +void +tunnel_server (struct context *top) +{ + ASSERT (top->options.mode == MODE_SERVER); + + if (proto_is_dgram(top->options.ce.proto)) + tunnel_server_udp(top); + else + tunnel_server_tcp(top); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bc0c8a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/multi.h @@ -0,0 +1,582 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Header file for server-mode related structures and functions. + */ + +#ifndef MULTI_H +#define MULTI_H + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "init.h" +#include "forward.h" +#include "mroute.h" +#include "mbuf.h" +#include "list.h" +#include "schedule.h" +#include "pool.h" +#include "mudp.h" +#include "mtcp.h" +#include "perf.h" + +/* + * Walk (don't run) through the routing table, + * deleting old entries, and possibly multi_instance + * structs as well which have been marked for deletion. + */ +struct multi_reap +{ + int bucket_base; + int buckets_per_pass; + time_t last_call; +}; + + +/** + * Server-mode state structure for one single VPN tunnel. + * + * This structure is used by OpenVPN processes running in server-mode to + * store state information related to one single VPN tunnel. + * + * The @ref tunnel_state "Structure of VPN tunnel state storage" related + * page describes the role the structure plays when OpenVPN is running in + * server-mode. + */ +struct multi_instance { + struct schedule_entry se; /* this must be the first element of the structure */ + struct gc_arena gc; + bool defined; + bool halt; + int refcount; + int route_count; /* number of routes (including cached routes) owned by this instance */ + time_t created; /**< Time at which a VPN tunnel instance + * was created. This parameter is set + * by the \c multi_create_instance() + * function. */ + struct timeval wakeup; /* absolute time */ + struct mroute_addr real; /**< External network address of the + * remote peer. */ + ifconfig_pool_handle vaddr_handle; + const char *msg_prefix; + + /* queued outgoing data in Server/TCP mode */ + unsigned int tcp_rwflags; + struct mbuf_set *tcp_link_out_deferred; + bool socket_set_called; + + in_addr_t reporting_addr; /* IP address shown in status listing */ + + bool did_open_context; + bool did_real_hash; + bool did_iter; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + bool did_cid_hash; + struct buffer_list *cc_config; +#endif + bool connection_established_flag; + bool did_iroutes; + int n_clients_delta; /* added to multi_context.n_clients when instance is closed */ + + struct context context; /**< The context structure storing state + * for this VPN tunnel. */ +}; + + +/** + * Main OpenVPN server state structure. + * + * This structure is used by OpenVPN processes running in server-mode to + * store all the VPN tunnel and process-wide state. + * + * The @ref tunnel_state "Structure of VPN tunnel state storage" related + * page describes the role the structure plays when OpenVPN is running in + * server-mode. + */ +struct multi_context { +# define MC_UNDEF 0 +# define MC_SINGLE_THREADED (1<<0) +# define MC_MULTI_THREADED_MASTER (1<<1) +# define MC_MULTI_THREADED_WORKER (1<<2) +# define MC_MULTI_THREADED_SCHEDULER (1<<3) +# define MC_WORK_THREAD (MC_MULTI_THREADED_WORKER|MC_MULTI_THREADED_SCHEDULER) + int thread_mode; + + struct hash *hash; /**< VPN tunnel instances indexed by real + * address of the remote peer. */ + struct hash *vhash; /**< VPN tunnel instances indexed by + * virtual address of remote hosts. */ + struct hash *iter; /**< VPN tunnel instances indexed by real + * address of the remote peer, optimized + * for iteration. */ + struct schedule *schedule; + struct mbuf_set *mbuf; /**< Set of buffers for passing data + * channel packets between VPN tunnel + * instances. */ + struct multi_tcp *mtcp; /**< State specific to OpenVPN using TCP + * as external transport. */ + struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool; + struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter; + struct mroute_helper *route_helper; + struct multi_reap *reaper; + struct mroute_addr local; + bool enable_c2c; + int max_clients; + int tcp_queue_limit; + int status_file_version; + int n_clients; /* current number of authenticated clients */ + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + struct hash *cid_hash; + unsigned long cid_counter; +#endif + + struct multi_instance *pending; + struct multi_instance *earliest_wakeup; + struct multi_instance **mpp_touched; + struct context_buffers *context_buffers; + time_t per_second_trigger; + + struct context top; /**< Storage structure for process-wide + * configuration. */ + + /* + * Timer object for stale route check + */ + struct event_timeout stale_routes_check_et; +}; + +/* + * Host route + */ +struct multi_route +{ + struct mroute_addr addr; + struct multi_instance *instance; + +# define MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE (1<<0) +# define MULTI_ROUTE_AGEABLE (1<<1) + unsigned int flags; + + unsigned int cache_generation; + time_t last_reference; +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Main event loop for OpenVPN in server mode. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * This function calls the appropriate main event loop function depending + * on the transport protocol used: + * - \c tunnel_server_udp() + * - \c tunnel_server_tcp() + * + * @param top - Top-level context structure. + */ +void tunnel_server (struct context *top); + + +const char *multi_instance_string (const struct multi_instance *mi, bool null, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Called by mtcp.c, mudp.c, or other (to be written) protocol drivers + */ + +void multi_init (struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode, int thread_mode); +void multi_uninit (struct multi_context *m); + +void multi_top_init (struct multi_context *m, const struct context *top, const bool alloc_buffers); +void multi_top_free (struct multi_context *m); + +struct multi_instance *multi_create_instance (struct multi_context *m, const struct mroute_addr *real); +void multi_close_instance (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, bool shutdown); + +bool multi_process_timeout (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags); + +#define MPP_PRE_SELECT (1<<0) +#define MPP_CONDITIONAL_PRE_SELECT (1<<1) +#define MPP_CLOSE_ON_SIGNAL (1<<2) +#define MPP_RECORD_TOUCH (1<<3) + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Perform postprocessing of a VPN tunnel instance. + * + * After some VPN tunnel activity has taken place, the VPN tunnel's state + * may need updating and some follow-up action may be required. This + * function controls the necessary postprocessing. It is called by many + * other functions that handle VPN tunnel related activity, such as \c + * multi_process_incoming_link(), \c multi_process_outgoing_link(), \c + * multi_process_incoming_tun(), \c multi_process_outgoing_tun(), and \c + * multi_process_timeout(), among others. + * + * @param m - The single \c multi_context structure. + * @param mi - The \c multi_instance of the VPN tunnel to be + * postprocessed. + * @param flags - Fast I/O optimization flags. + * + * @return + * - True, if the VPN tunnel instance \a mi was not closed due to a + * signal during processing. + * - False, if the VPN tunnel instance \a mi was closed. + */ +bool multi_process_post (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const unsigned int flags); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Demultiplex and process a packet received over the external network + * interface. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * This function determines which VPN tunnel instance the incoming packet + * is associated with, and then calls \c process_incoming_link() to handle + * it. Afterwards, if the packet is destined for a broadcast/multicast + * address or a remote host reachable through a different VPN tunnel, this + * function takes care of sending it they are. + * + * @note This function is only used by OpenVPN processes which are running + * in server mode, and can therefore sustain multiple active VPN + * tunnels. + * + * @param m - The single \c multi_context structure. + * @param instance - The VPN tunnel state structure associated with + * the incoming packet, if known, as is the case + * when using TCP transport. Otherwise NULL, as is + * the case when using UDP transport. + * @param mpp_flags - Fast I/O optimization flags. + */ +bool multi_process_incoming_link (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *instance, const unsigned int mpp_flags); + + +/** + * Determine the destination VPN tunnel of a packet received over the + * virtual tun/tap network interface and then process it accordingly. + * @ingroup internal_multiplexer + * + * This function determines which VPN tunnel instance the packet is + * destined for, and then calls \c process_outgoing_tun() to handle it. + * + * @note This function is only used by OpenVPN processes which are running + * in server mode, and can therefore sustain multiple active VPN + * tunnels. + * + * @param m - The single \c multi_context structure. + * @param mpp_flags - Fast I/O optimization flags. + */ +bool multi_process_incoming_tun (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags); + + +void multi_process_drop_outgoing_tun (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags); + +void multi_print_status (struct multi_context *m, struct status_output *so, const int version); + +struct multi_instance *multi_get_queue (struct mbuf_set *ms); + +void multi_add_mbuf (struct multi_context *m, + struct multi_instance *mi, + struct mbuf_buffer *mb); + +void multi_ifconfig_pool_persist (struct multi_context *m, bool force); + +bool multi_process_signal (struct multi_context *m); + +void multi_close_instance_on_signal (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi); + +void init_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m); +void uninit_management_callback_multi (struct multi_context *m); + +/* + * Return true if our output queue is not full + */ +static inline bool +multi_output_queue_ready (const struct multi_context *m, + const struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred) + return mbuf_len (mi->tcp_link_out_deferred) <= m->tcp_queue_limit; + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Determine which instance has pending output + * and prepare the output for sending in + * the to_link buffer. + */ +static inline struct multi_instance * +multi_process_outgoing_link_pre (struct multi_context *m) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = NULL; + + if (m->pending) + mi = m->pending; + else if (mbuf_defined (m->mbuf)) + mi = multi_get_queue (m->mbuf); + return mi; +} + +/* + * Per-client route quota management + */ + +void route_quota_exceeded (const struct multi_context *m, const struct multi_instance *mi); + +static inline void +route_quota_inc (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + ++mi->route_count; +} + +static inline void +route_quota_dec (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + --mi->route_count; +} + +/* can we add a new route? */ +static inline bool +route_quota_test (const struct multi_context *m, const struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (mi->route_count >= mi->context.options.max_routes_per_client) + { + route_quota_exceeded (m, mi); + return false; + } + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Instance reference counting + */ + +static inline void +multi_instance_inc_refcount (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + ++mi->refcount; +} + +static inline void +multi_instance_dec_refcount (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + if (--mi->refcount <= 0) + { + gc_free (&mi->gc); + free (mi); + } +} + +static inline void +multi_route_del (struct multi_route *route) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = route->instance; + route_quota_dec (mi); + multi_instance_dec_refcount (mi); + free (route); +} + +static inline bool +multi_route_defined (const struct multi_context *m, + const struct multi_route *r) +{ + if (r->instance->halt) + return false; + else if ((r->flags & MULTI_ROUTE_CACHE) + && r->cache_generation != m->route_helper->cache_generation) + return false; + else if ((r->flags & MULTI_ROUTE_AGEABLE) + && r->last_reference + m->route_helper->ageable_ttl_secs < now) + return false; + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Set a msg() function prefix with our current client instance ID. + */ + +static inline void +set_prefix (struct multi_instance *mi) +{ +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + if (mi->msg_prefix) + printf ("[%s]\n", mi->msg_prefix); +#endif + msg_set_prefix (mi->msg_prefix); +} + +static inline void +clear_prefix (void) +{ +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("[NULL]\n"); +#endif + msg_set_prefix (NULL); +} + +/* + * Instance Reaper + * + * Reaper constants. The reaper is the process where the virtual address + * and virtual route hash table is scanned for dead entries which are + * then removed. The hash table could potentially be quite large, so we + * don't want to reap in a single pass. + */ + +#define REAP_MAX_WAKEUP 10 /* Do reap pass at least once per n seconds */ +#define REAP_DIVISOR 256 /* How many passes to cover whole hash table */ +#define REAP_MIN 16 /* Minimum number of buckets per pass */ +#define REAP_MAX 1024 /* Maximum number of buckets per pass */ + +/* + * Mark a cached host route for deletion after this + * many seconds without any references. + */ +#define MULTI_CACHE_ROUTE_TTL 60 + +static inline void +multi_reap_process (const struct multi_context *m) +{ + void multi_reap_process_dowork (const struct multi_context *m); + if (m->reaper->last_call != now) + multi_reap_process_dowork (m); +} + +static inline void +multi_process_per_second_timers (struct multi_context *m) +{ + if (m->per_second_trigger != now) + { + void multi_process_per_second_timers_dowork (struct multi_context *m); + multi_process_per_second_timers_dowork (m); + m->per_second_trigger = now; + } +} + +/* + * Compute earliest timeout expiry from the set of + * all instances. Output: + * + * m->earliest_wakeup : instance needing the earliest service. + * dest : earliest timeout as a delta in relation + * to current time. + */ +static inline void +multi_get_timeout (struct multi_context *m, struct timeval *dest) +{ + struct timeval tv, current; + + CLEAR (tv); + m->earliest_wakeup = (struct multi_instance *) schedule_get_earliest_wakeup (m->schedule, &tv); + if (m->earliest_wakeup) + { + ASSERT (!openvpn_gettimeofday (¤t, NULL)); + tv_delta (dest, ¤t, &tv); + if (dest->tv_sec >= REAP_MAX_WAKEUP) + { + m->earliest_wakeup = NULL; + dest->tv_sec = REAP_MAX_WAKEUP; + dest->tv_usec = 0; + } + } + else + { + dest->tv_sec = REAP_MAX_WAKEUP; + dest->tv_usec = 0; + } +} + + +/** + * Send a packet over the virtual tun/tap network interface to its locally + * reachable destination. + * @ingroup internal_multiplexer + * + * This function calls \c process_outgoing_tun() to perform the actual + * sending of the packet. Afterwards, it calls \c multi_process_post() to + * perform server-mode postprocessing. + * + * @param m - The single \c multi_context structure. + * @param mpp_flags - Fast I/O optimization flags. + * + * @return + * - True, if the \c multi_instance associated with the packet sent was + * not closed due to a signal during processing. + * - Falls, if the \c multi_instance was closed. + */ +static inline bool +multi_process_outgoing_tun (struct multi_context *m, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + struct multi_instance *mi = m->pending; + bool ret = true; + + ASSERT (mi); +#ifdef MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP + printf ("%s -> TUN len=%d\n", + id(mi), + mi->context.c2.to_tun.len); +#endif + set_prefix (mi); + process_outgoing_tun (&mi->context); + ret = multi_process_post (m, mi, mpp_flags); + clear_prefix (); + return ret; +} + + + +static inline bool +multi_process_outgoing_link_dowork (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi, const unsigned int mpp_flags) +{ + bool ret = true; + set_prefix (mi); + process_outgoing_link (&mi->context); + ret = multi_process_post (m, mi, mpp_flags); + clear_prefix (); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check for signals. + */ +#define MULTI_CHECK_SIG(m) EVENT_LOOP_CHECK_SIGNAL (&(m)->top, multi_process_signal, (m)) + +static inline void +multi_set_pending (struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *mi) +{ + m->pending = mi; +} + +static inline void +multi_release_io_lock (struct multi_context *m) +{ +} + +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ +#endif /* MULTI_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3390bddd --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.c @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/* + * ntlm proxy support for OpenVPN + * + * Copyright (C) 2004 William Preston + * + * *NTLMv2 support and domain name parsing by Miroslav Zajic, Nextsoft s.r.o.* + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if NTLM + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "proxy.h" +#include "ntlm.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "crypto.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + + +/* 64bit datatype macros */ +#ifdef _MSC_VER + /* MS compilers */ +# define UINTEGER64 __int64 +# define UINT64(c) c ## Ui64 +#else + /* Non MS compilers */ +# define UINTEGER64 unsigned long long +# define UINT64(c) c ## LL +#endif + + + + +static void +create_des_keys(const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *key) +{ + key[0] = hash[0]; + key[1] = ((hash[0]&1)<<7)|(hash[1]>>1); + key[2] = ((hash[1]&3)<<6)|(hash[2]>>2); + key[3] = ((hash[2]&7)<<5)|(hash[3]>>3); + key[4] = ((hash[3]&15)<<4)|(hash[4]>>4); + key[5] = ((hash[4]&31)<<3)|(hash[5]>>5); + key[6] = ((hash[5]&63)<<2)|(hash[6]>>6); + key[7] = ((hash[6]&127)<<1); + key_des_fixup(key, 8, 1); +} + +static void +gen_md4_hash (const char* data, int data_len, char *result) +{ + /* result is 16 byte md4 hash */ + const md_kt_t *md4_kt = md_kt_get("MD4"); + char md[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + md_full(md4_kt, data, data_len, md); + memcpy (result, md, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH); +} + +static void +gen_hmac_md5 (const char* data, int data_len, const char* key, int key_len,char *result) +{ + const md_kt_t *md5_kt = md_kt_get("MD5"); + hmac_ctx_t hmac_ctx; + CLEAR(hmac_ctx); + + hmac_ctx_init(&hmac_ctx, key, key_len, md5_kt); + hmac_ctx_update(&hmac_ctx, (const unsigned char *)data, data_len); + hmac_ctx_final(&hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)result); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); +} + +static void +gen_timestamp (unsigned char *timestamp) +{ + /* Copies 8 bytes long timestamp into "timestamp" buffer. + * Timestamp is Little-endian, 64-bit signed value representing the number of tenths of a microsecond since January 1, 1601. + */ + + UINTEGER64 timestamp_ull; + + timestamp_ull = openvpn_time(NULL); + timestamp_ull = (timestamp_ull + UINT64(11644473600)) * UINT64(10000000); + + /* store little endian value */ + timestamp[0]= timestamp_ull & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[1]= (timestamp_ull >> 8) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[2]= (timestamp_ull >> 16) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[3]= (timestamp_ull >> 24) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[4]= (timestamp_ull >> 32) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[5]= (timestamp_ull >> 40) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[6]= (timestamp_ull >> 48) & UINT64(0xFF); + timestamp[7]= (timestamp_ull >> 56) & UINT64(0xFF); +} + +static void +gen_nonce (unsigned char *nonce) +{ + /* Generates 8 random bytes to be used as client nonce */ + int i; + + for(i=0;i<8;i++){ + nonce[i] = (unsigned char)get_random(); + } +} + +unsigned char *my_strupr(unsigned char *str) +{ + /* converts string to uppercase in place */ + unsigned char *tmp = str;; + + do *str = toupper(*str); while (*(++str)); + return tmp; +} + +static int +unicodize (char *dst, const char *src) +{ + /* not really unicode... */ + int i = 0; + do + { + dst[i++] = *src; + dst[i++] = 0; + } + while (*src++); + + return i; +} + +static void +add_security_buffer(int sb_offset, void *data, int length, unsigned char *msg_buf, int *msg_bufpos) +{ + /* Adds security buffer data to a message and sets security buffer's offset and length */ + msg_buf[sb_offset] = (unsigned char)length; + msg_buf[sb_offset + 2] = msg_buf[sb_offset]; + msg_buf[sb_offset + 4] = (unsigned char)(*msg_bufpos & 0xff); + msg_buf[sb_offset + 5] = (unsigned char)((*msg_bufpos >> 8) & 0xff); + memcpy(&msg_buf[*msg_bufpos], data, msg_buf[sb_offset]); + *msg_bufpos += length; +} + +const char * +ntlm_phase_1 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (96, gc); + /* try a minimal NTLM handshake + * + * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html + * + * This message contains only the NTLMSSP signature, + * the NTLM message type, + * and the minimal set of flags (Negotiate NTLM and Negotiate OEM). + * + */ + buf_printf (&out, "%s", "TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAAgIAAA=="); + return (BSTR (&out)); +} + +const char * +ntlm_phase_3 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, const char *phase_2, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + /* NTLM handshake + * + * http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html + * + */ + + char pwbuf[sizeof (p->up.password) * 2]; /* for unicode password */ + char buf2[128]; /* decoded reply from proxy */ + unsigned char phase3[464]; + + char md4_hash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH+5]; + char challenge[8], ntlm_response[24]; + int i, ret_val; + + char ntlmv2_response[144]; + char userdomain_u[256]; /* for uppercase unicode username and domain */ + char userdomain[128]; /* the same as previous but ascii */ + char ntlmv2_hash[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + char ntlmv2_hmacmd5[16]; + char *ntlmv2_blob = ntlmv2_response + 16; /* inside ntlmv2_response, length: 128 */ + int ntlmv2_blob_size=0; + int phase3_bufpos = 0x40; /* offset to next security buffer data to be added */ + size_t len; + + char domain[128]; + char username[128]; + char *separator; + + bool ntlmv2_enabled = (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2); + + CLEAR (buf2); + + ASSERT (strlen (p->up.username) > 0); + ASSERT (strlen (p->up.password) > 0); + + /* username parsing */ + separator = strchr(p->up.username, '\\'); + if (separator == NULL) { + strncpy(username, p->up.username, sizeof(username)-1); + username[sizeof(username)-1]=0; + domain[0]=0; + } else { + strncpy(username, separator+1, sizeof(username)-1); + username[sizeof(username)-1]=0; + len = separator - p->up.username; + if (len > sizeof(domain) - 1) len = sizeof(domain) - 1; + strncpy(domain, p->up.username, len); + domain[len]=0; + } + + + /* fill 1st 16 bytes with md4 hash, disregard terminating null */ + gen_md4_hash (pwbuf, unicodize (pwbuf, p->up.password) - 2, md4_hash); + + /* pad to 21 bytes */ + memset(md4_hash + MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, 5); + + ret_val = openvpn_base64_decode( phase_2, (void *)buf2, -1); + if (ret_val < 0) + return NULL; + + /* we can be sure that phase_2 is less than 128 + * therefore buf2 needs to be (3/4 * 128) */ + + /* extract the challenge from bytes 24-31 */ + for (i=0; i<8; i++) + { + challenge[i] = buf2[i+24]; + } + + if (ntlmv2_enabled){ /* Generate NTLMv2 response */ + int tib_len; + + /* NTLMv2 hash */ + my_strupr((unsigned char *)strcpy(userdomain, username)); + if (strlen(username) + strlen(domain) < sizeof(userdomain)) + strcat(userdomain, domain); + else + msg (M_INFO, "Warning: Username or domain too long"); + unicodize (userdomain_u, userdomain); + gen_hmac_md5(userdomain_u, 2 * strlen(userdomain), md4_hash, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, ntlmv2_hash); + + /* NTLMv2 Blob */ + memset(ntlmv2_blob, 0, 128); /* Clear blob buffer */ + ntlmv2_blob[0x00]=1; /* Signature */ + ntlmv2_blob[0x01]=1; /* Signature */ + ntlmv2_blob[0x04]=0; /* Reserved */ + gen_timestamp((unsigned char *)&ntlmv2_blob[0x08]); /* 64-bit Timestamp */ + gen_nonce((unsigned char *)&ntlmv2_blob[0x10]); /* 64-bit Client Nonce */ + ntlmv2_blob[0x18]=0; /* Unknown, zero should work */ + + /* Add target information block to the blob */ + if (( *((long *)&buf2[0x14]) & 0x00800000) == 0x00800000){ /* Check for Target Information block */ + tib_len = buf2[0x28];/* Get Target Information block size */ + if (tib_len > 96) tib_len = 96; + { + char *tib_ptr = buf2 + buf2[0x2c]; /* Get Target Information block pointer */ + memcpy(&ntlmv2_blob[0x1c], tib_ptr, tib_len); /* Copy Target Information block into the blob */ + } + } else { + tib_len = 0; + } + + ntlmv2_blob[0x1c + tib_len] = 0; /* Unknown, zero works */ + + /* Get blob length */ + ntlmv2_blob_size = 0x20 + tib_len; + + /* Add challenge from message 2 */ + memcpy(&ntlmv2_response[8], challenge, 8); + + /* hmac-md5 */ + gen_hmac_md5(&ntlmv2_response[8], ntlmv2_blob_size + 8, ntlmv2_hash, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, ntlmv2_hmacmd5); + + /* Add hmac-md5 result to the blob */ + memcpy(ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_hmacmd5, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* Note: This overwrites challenge previously written at ntlmv2_response[8..15] */ + + } else { /* Generate NTLM response */ + unsigned char key1[DES_KEY_LENGTH], key2[DES_KEY_LENGTH], key3[DES_KEY_LENGTH]; + + create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)md4_hash, key1); + cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (key1, challenge, ntlm_response); + + create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[DES_KEY_LENGTH-1]), key2); + cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (key2, challenge, &ntlm_response[DES_KEY_LENGTH]); + + create_des_keys ((unsigned char *)&(md4_hash[2*(DES_KEY_LENGTH-1)]), key3); + cipher_des_encrypt_ecb (key3, challenge, &ntlm_response[DES_KEY_LENGTH*2]); + } + + + memset (phase3, 0, sizeof (phase3)); /* clear reply */ + + strcpy ((char *)phase3, "NTLMSSP\0"); /* signature */ + phase3[8] = 3; /* type 3 */ + + if (ntlmv2_enabled){ /* NTLMv2 response */ + add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlmv2_response, ntlmv2_blob_size + 16, phase3, &phase3_bufpos); + }else{ /* NTLM response */ + add_security_buffer(0x14, ntlm_response, 24, phase3, &phase3_bufpos); + } + + /* username in ascii */ + add_security_buffer(0x24, username, strlen (username), phase3, &phase3_bufpos); + + /* Set domain. If is empty, default domain will be used (i.e. proxy's domain) */ + add_security_buffer(0x1c, domain, strlen (domain), phase3, &phase3_bufpos); + + + /* other security buffers will be empty */ + phase3[0x10] = phase3_bufpos; /* lm not used */ + phase3[0x30] = phase3_bufpos; /* no workstation name supplied */ + phase3[0x38] = phase3_bufpos; /* no session key */ + + /* flags */ + phase3[0x3c] = 0x02; /* negotiate oem */ + phase3[0x3d] = 0x02; /* negotiate ntlm */ + + return ((const char *)make_base64_string2 ((unsigned char *)phase3, phase3_bufpos, gc)); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77903b08 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ntlm.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#ifndef NTLM_H +#define NTLM_H + +#if NTLM + +const char *ntlm_phase_1 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, struct gc_arena *gc); +const char *ntlm_phase_3 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, const char *phase_2, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ-inline.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ-inline.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..516eb4d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ-inline.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OCC_INLINE_H +#define OCC_INLINE_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + +/* + * Inline functions + */ + +static inline int +occ_reset_op () +{ + return -1; +} + +/* + * Should we send an OCC_REQUEST message? + */ +static inline void +check_send_occ_req (struct context *c) +{ + void check_send_occ_req_dowork (struct context *c); + if (event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.occ_interval) + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.occ_interval, + &c->c2.timeval, + (!TO_LINK_DEF(c) && c->c2.occ_op < 0) ? ETT_DEFAULT : 0)) + check_send_occ_req_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Should we send an MTU load test? + */ +static inline void +check_send_occ_load_test (struct context *c) +{ + void check_send_occ_load_test_dowork (struct context *c); + if (event_timeout_defined (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval) + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval, + &c->c2.timeval, + (!TO_LINK_DEF(c) && c->c2.occ_op < 0) ? ETT_DEFAULT : 0)) + check_send_occ_load_test_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Should we send an OCC message? + */ +static inline void +check_send_occ_msg (struct context *c) +{ + void check_send_occ_msg_dowork (struct context *c); + if (c->c2.occ_op >= 0) + { + if (!TO_LINK_DEF(c)) + check_send_occ_msg_dowork (c); + else + tv_clear (&c->c2.timeval); /* ZERO-TIMEOUT */ + } +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff487069 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.c @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + +#include "occ.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "forward-inline.h" +#include "occ-inline.h" + +/* + * This random string identifies an OpenVPN + * Configuration Control packet. + * It should be of sufficient length and randomness + * so as not to collide with other tunnel data. + * + * The OCC protocol is as follows: + * + * occ_magic -- (16 octets) + * + * type [OCC_REQUEST | OCC_REPLY] (1 octet) + * null terminated options string if OCC_REPLY (variable) + * + * When encryption is used, the OCC packet + * is encapsulated within the encrypted + * envelope. + * + * OCC_STRING_SIZE must be set to sizeof (occ_magic) + */ + +const uint8_t occ_magic[] = { + 0x28, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x6b, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x7a, 0x81, + 0x2d, 0x56, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x9c +}; + +static const struct mtu_load_test mtu_load_test_sequence[] = { + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -1000}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -1000}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -1000}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -1000}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -1000}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -1000}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -750}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -750}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -750}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -750}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -750}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -750}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -500}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -500}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -500}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -500}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -500}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -500}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -400}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -400}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -400}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -400}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -400}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -400}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -300}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -300}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -300}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -300}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -300}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -300}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -200}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -200}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -200}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -200}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -200}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -200}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -150}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -150}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -150}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -150}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -150}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -150}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -100}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -100}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -100}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -100}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -100}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -100}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -50}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -50}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -50}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -50}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, -50}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, -50}, + + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_LOAD, 0}, + + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + {OCC_MTU_REQUEST, 0}, + + {-1, 0} +}; + +void +check_send_occ_req_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + if (++c->c2.occ_n_tries >= OCC_N_TRIES) + { + if (c->options.ce.remote) + /* + * No OCC_REPLY from peer after repeated attempts. + * Give up. + */ + msg (D_SHOW_OCC, + "NOTE: failed to obtain options consistency info from peer -- " + "this could occur if the remote peer is running a version of " + PACKAGE_NAME + " before 1.5-beta8 or if there is a network connectivity problem, and will not necessarily prevent " + PACKAGE_NAME + " from running (" counter_format " bytes received from peer, " counter_format + " bytes authenticated data channel traffic) -- you can disable the options consistency " + "check with --disable-occ.", + c->c2.link_read_bytes, + c->c2.link_read_bytes_auth); + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.occ_interval); + } + else + { + c->c2.occ_op = OCC_REQUEST; + + /* + * If we don't hear back from peer, send another + * OCC_REQUEST in OCC_INTERVAL_SECONDS. + */ + event_timeout_reset (&c->c2.occ_interval); + } +} + +void +check_send_occ_load_test_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + if (CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED (c)) + { + const struct mtu_load_test *entry; + + if (!c->c2.occ_mtu_load_n_tries) + msg (M_INFO, + "NOTE: Beginning empirical MTU test -- results should be available in 3 to 4 minutes."); + + entry = &mtu_load_test_sequence[c->c2.occ_mtu_load_n_tries++]; + if (entry->op >= 0) + { + c->c2.occ_op = entry->op; + c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size = + EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame) + entry->delta; + } + else + { + msg (M_INFO, + "NOTE: failed to empirically measure MTU (requires " PACKAGE_NAME " 1.5 or higher at other end of connection)."); + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval); + c->c2.occ_mtu_load_n_tries = 0; + } + } +} + +void +check_send_occ_msg_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + bool doit = false; + + c->c2.buf = c->c2.buffers->aux_buf; + ASSERT (buf_init (&c->c2.buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&c->c2.frame))); + ASSERT (buf_safe (&c->c2.buf, MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame))); + ASSERT (buf_write (&c->c2.buf, occ_magic, OCC_STRING_SIZE)); + + switch (c->c2.occ_op) + { + case OCC_REQUEST: + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_REQUEST)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_REQUEST"); + doit = true; + break; + + case OCC_REPLY: + if (!c->c2.options_string_local) + break; + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_REPLY)) + break; + if (!buf_write (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.options_string_local, + strlen (c->c2.options_string_local) + 1)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_REPLY"); + doit = true; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_REQUEST: + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_MTU_REQUEST)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_MTU_REQUEST"); + doit = true; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_REPLY: + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_MTU_REPLY)) + break; + if (!buf_write_u16 (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.max_recv_size_local)) + break; + if (!buf_write_u16 (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.max_send_size_local)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_MTU_REPLY"); + doit = true; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST: + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST)) + break; + if (!buf_write_u16 (&c->c2.buf, c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST"); + doit = true; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_LOAD: + { + int need_to_add; + + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_MTU_LOAD)) + break; + need_to_add = min_int (c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size, EXPANDED_SIZE (&c->c2.frame)) + - OCC_STRING_SIZE + - sizeof (uint8_t) + - EXTRA_FRAME (&c->c2.frame); + + while (need_to_add > 0) + { + /* + * Fill the load test packet with pseudo-random bytes. + */ + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, get_random () & 0xFF)) + break; + --need_to_add; + } + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_MTU_LOAD min_int(%d-%d-%d-%d,%d) size=%d", + c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size, + OCC_STRING_SIZE, + (int) sizeof (uint8_t), + EXTRA_FRAME (&c->c2.frame), + MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame), + BLEN (&c->c2.buf)); + doit = true; + } + break; + + case OCC_EXIT: + if (!buf_write_u8 (&c->c2.buf, OCC_EXIT)) + break; + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "SENT OCC_EXIT"); + doit = true; + break; + } + + if (doit) + { + /* + * We will treat the packet like any other outgoing packet, + * compress, encrypt, sign, etc. + */ + encrypt_sign (c, true); + } + + c->c2.occ_op = -1; +} + +void +process_received_occ_msg (struct context *c) +{ + ASSERT (buf_advance (&c->c2.buf, OCC_STRING_SIZE)); + switch (buf_read_u8 (&c->c2.buf)) + { + case OCC_REQUEST: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_REQUEST"); + c->c2.occ_op = OCC_REPLY; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_REQUEST: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_MTU_REQUEST"); + c->c2.occ_op = OCC_MTU_REPLY; + break; + + case OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST"); + c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size = buf_read_u16 (&c->c2.buf); + if (c->c2.occ_mtu_load_size >= 0) + c->c2.occ_op = OCC_MTU_LOAD; + break; + + case OCC_REPLY: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_REPLY"); + if (c->options.occ && !TLS_MODE (c) && c->c2.options_string_remote) + { + if (!options_cmp_equal_safe ((char *) BPTR (&c->c2.buf), + c->c2.options_string_remote, + c->c2.buf.len)) + { + options_warning_safe ((char *) BPTR (&c->c2.buf), + c->c2.options_string_remote, + c->c2.buf.len); + } + } + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.occ_interval); + break; + + case OCC_MTU_REPLY: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_MTU_REPLY"); + c->c2.max_recv_size_remote = buf_read_u16 (&c->c2.buf); + c->c2.max_send_size_remote = buf_read_u16 (&c->c2.buf); + if (c->options.mtu_test + && c->c2.max_recv_size_remote > 0 + && c->c2.max_send_size_remote > 0) + { + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: Empirical MTU test completed [Tried,Actual] local->remote=[%d,%d] remote->local=[%d,%d]", + c->c2.max_send_size_local, + c->c2.max_recv_size_remote, + c->c2.max_send_size_remote, + c->c2.max_recv_size_local); + if (!c->options.ce.fragment + && (proto_is_dgram(c->options.ce.proto)) + && c->c2.max_send_size_local > TUN_MTU_MIN + && (c->c2.max_recv_size_remote < c->c2.max_send_size_local + || c->c2.max_recv_size_local < c->c2.max_send_size_remote)) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: This connection is unable to accomodate a UDP packet size of %d. Consider using --fragment or --mssfix options as a workaround.", + c->c2.max_send_size_local); + } + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.occ_mtu_load_test_interval); + break; + + case OCC_EXIT: + dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "RECEIVED OCC_EXIT"); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; + c->sig->signal_text = "remote-exit"; + break; + } + c->c2.buf.len = 0; /* don't pass packet on */ +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d88cc9e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/occ.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OCC_H +#define OCC_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + +#include "forward.h" + +/* OCC_STRING_SIZE must be set to sizeof (occ_magic) */ +#define OCC_STRING_SIZE 16 + +/* + * OCC (OpenVPN Configuration Control) protocol opcodes. + */ + +#define OCC_REQUEST 0 /* request options string from peer */ +#define OCC_REPLY 1 /* deliver options string to peer */ + +/* + * Send an OCC_REQUEST once every OCC_INTERVAL + * seconds until a reply is received. + * + * If we haven't received a reply after + * OCC_N_TRIES, give up. + */ +#define OCC_INTERVAL_SECONDS 10 +#define OCC_N_TRIES 12 + +/* + * Other OCC protocol opcodes used to estimate the MTU empirically. + */ +#define OCC_MTU_LOAD_REQUEST 2 /* Ask peer to send a big packet to us */ +#define OCC_MTU_LOAD 3 /* Send a big packet to peer */ +#define OCC_MTU_REQUEST 4 /* Ask peer to tell us the largest + packet it has received from us so far */ +#define OCC_MTU_REPLY 5 /* Send largest packet size to peer */ + +/* + * Process one command from mtu_load_test_sequence + * once every n seconds, if --mtu-test is specified. + */ +#define OCC_MTU_LOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS 3 + +/* + * Send an exit message to remote. + */ +#define OCC_EXIT 6 + +/* + * Used to conduct a load test command sequence + * of UDP connection for empirical MTU measurement. + */ +struct mtu_load_test +{ + int op; /* OCC opcode to send to peer */ + int delta; /* determine packet size to send by using + this delta against currently + configured MTU */ +}; + +extern const uint8_t occ_magic[]; + +static inline bool +is_occ_msg (const struct buffer* buf) +{ + return buf_string_match_head (buf, occ_magic, OCC_STRING_SIZE); +} + +void process_received_occ_msg (struct context *c); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a177d9e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.c @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "init.h" +#include "forward.h" +#include "multi.h" +#include "win32.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "forward-inline.h" + +#define P2P_CHECK_SIG() EVENT_LOOP_CHECK_SIGNAL (c, process_signal_p2p, c); + +#ifdef GOOGLE_BREAKPAD +#include "breakpad.h" +#endif + +static bool +process_signal_p2p (struct context *c) +{ + remap_signal (c); + return process_signal (c); +} + + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Main event loop for OpenVPN in client mode, where only one VPN tunnel + * is active. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * @param c - The context structure of the single active VPN tunnel. + */ +static void +tunnel_point_to_point (struct context *c) +{ + context_clear_2 (c); + + /* set point-to-point mode */ + c->mode = CM_P2P; + + /* initialize tunnel instance */ + init_instance_handle_signals (c, c->es, CC_HARD_USR1_TO_HUP); + if (IS_SIG (c)) + return; + + /* main event loop */ + while (true) + { + perf_push (PERF_EVENT_LOOP); + + /* process timers, TLS, etc. */ + pre_select (c); + P2P_CHECK_SIG(); + + /* set up and do the I/O wait */ + io_wait (c, p2p_iow_flags (c)); + P2P_CHECK_SIG(); + + /* timeout? */ + if (c->c2.event_set_status == ES_TIMEOUT) + { + perf_pop (); + continue; + } + + /* process the I/O which triggered select */ + process_io (c); + P2P_CHECK_SIG(); + + perf_pop (); + } + + uninit_management_callback (); + + /* tear down tunnel instance (unless --persist-tun) */ + close_instance (c); +} + +#undef PROCESS_SIGNAL_P2P + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * OpenVPN's main init-run-cleanup loop. + * @ingroup eventloop + * + * This function contains the two outer OpenVPN loops. Its structure is + * as follows: + * - Once-per-process initialization. + * - Outer loop, run at startup and then once per \c SIGHUP: + * - Level 1 initialization + * - Inner loop, run at startup and then once per \c SIGUSR1: + * - Call event loop function depending on client or server mode: + * - \c tunnel_point_to_point() + * - \c tunnel_server() + * - Level 1 cleanup + * - Once-per-process cleanup. + * + * @param argc - Commandline argument count. + * @param argv - Commandline argument values. + */ +static +int +openvpn_main (int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct context c; + +#if PEDANTIC + fprintf (stderr, "Sorry, I was built with --enable-pedantic and I am incapable of doing any real work!\n"); + return 1; +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + SetConsoleOutputCP (CP_UTF8); +#endif + + CLEAR (c); + + /* signify first time for components which can + only be initialized once per program instantiation. */ + c.first_time = true; + + /* initialize program-wide statics */ + if (init_static ()) + { + /* + * This loop is initially executed on startup and then + * once per SIGHUP. + */ + do + { + /* enter pre-initialization mode with regard to signal handling */ + pre_init_signal_catch (); + + /* zero context struct but leave first_time member alone */ + context_clear_all_except_first_time (&c); + + /* static signal info object */ + CLEAR (siginfo_static); + c.sig = &siginfo_static; + + /* initialize garbage collector scoped to context object */ + gc_init (&c.gc); + + /* initialize environmental variable store */ + c.es = env_set_create (&c.gc); +#ifdef WIN32 + set_win_sys_path_via_env (c.es); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* initialize management subsystem */ + init_management (&c); +#endif + + /* initialize options to default state */ + init_options (&c.options, true); + + /* parse command line options, and read configuration file */ + parse_argv (&c.options, argc, argv, M_USAGE, OPT_P_DEFAULT, NULL, c.es); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + /* plugins may contribute options configuration */ + init_verb_mute (&c, IVM_LEVEL_1); + init_plugins (&c); + open_plugins (&c, true, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_CONFIG_PARSE); +#endif + + /* init verbosity and mute levels */ + init_verb_mute (&c, IVM_LEVEL_1); + + /* set dev options */ + init_options_dev (&c.options); + + /* openssl print info? */ + if (print_openssl_info (&c.options)) + break; + + /* --genkey mode? */ + if (do_genkey (&c.options)) + break; + + /* tun/tap persist command? */ + if (do_persist_tuntap (&c.options)) + break; + + /* sanity check on options */ + options_postprocess (&c.options); + + /* show all option settings */ + show_settings (&c.options); + + /* print version number */ + msg (M_INFO, "%s", title_string); + + /* misc stuff */ + pre_setup (&c.options); + + /* test crypto? */ + if (do_test_crypto (&c.options)) + break; + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* open management subsystem */ + if (!open_management (&c)) + break; +#endif + + /* set certain options as environmental variables */ + setenv_settings (c.es, &c.options); + + /* finish context init */ + context_init_1 (&c); + + do + { + /* run tunnel depending on mode */ + switch (c.options.mode) + { + case MODE_POINT_TO_POINT: + tunnel_point_to_point (&c); + break; +#if P2MP_SERVER + case MODE_SERVER: + tunnel_server (&c); + break; +#endif + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* indicates first iteration -- has program-wide scope */ + c.first_time = false; + + /* any signals received? */ + if (IS_SIG (&c)) + print_signal (c.sig, NULL, M_INFO); + + /* pass restart status to management subsystem */ + signal_restart_status (c.sig); + } + while (c.sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1); + + uninit_options (&c.options); + gc_reset (&c.gc); + } + while (c.sig->signal_received == SIGHUP); + } + + context_gc_free (&c); + + env_set_destroy (c.es); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* close management interface */ + close_management (); +#endif + + /* uninitialize program-wide statics */ + uninit_static (); + + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#ifdef WIN32 +int +wmain (int argc, wchar_t *wargv[]) { + char **argv; + int ret; + int i; + + if ((argv = calloc(argc+1, sizeof(char*))) == NULL) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + { + int n = WideCharToMultiByte (CP_UTF8, 0, wargv[i], -1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + argv[i] = malloc (n); + WideCharToMultiByte (CP_UTF8, 0, wargv[i], -1, argv[i], n, NULL, NULL); + } + + ret = openvpn_main(argc, argv); + + for (i=0; i < argc; i++ ) + { + free (argv[i]); + } + free(argv); + + return ret; +} +#else +int +main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#ifdef GOOGLE_BREAKPAD + breakpad_setup(); +#endif + + return openvpn_main(argc, argv); +} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bdfa6852 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.h @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_H +#define OPENVPN_H + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "lzo.h" +#include "tun.h" +#include "interval.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "fragment.h" +#include "shaper.h" +#include "route.h" +#include "proxy.h" +#include "socks.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "mbuf.h" +#include "pool.h" +#include "plugin.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "pf.h" + +/* + * Our global key schedules, packaged thusly + * to facilitate --persist-key. + */ + +struct key_schedule +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + /* which cipher, HMAC digest, and key sizes are we using? */ + struct key_type key_type; + + /* pre-shared static key, read from a file */ + struct key_ctx_bi static_key; + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* our global SSL context */ + struct tls_root_ctx ssl_ctx; + + /* optional authentication HMAC key for TLS control channel */ + struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key; + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#else /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + int dummy; +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +}; + +/* + * struct packet_id_persist should be empty if we are not + * building with crypto. + */ +#ifndef PACKET_ID_H +struct packet_id_persist +{ + int dummy; +}; +static inline void +packet_id_persist_init (struct packet_id_persist *p) +{ +} +#endif + +/* + * Packet processing buffers. + */ +struct context_buffers +{ + /* miscellaneous buffer, used by ping, occ, etc. */ + struct buffer aux_buf; + + /* workspace buffers used by crypto routines */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + struct buffer encrypt_buf; + struct buffer decrypt_buf; +#endif + + /* workspace buffers for LZO compression */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + struct buffer lzo_compress_buf; + struct buffer lzo_decompress_buf; +#endif + + /* + * Buffers used to read from TUN device + * and TCP/UDP port. + */ + struct buffer read_link_buf; + struct buffer read_tun_buf; +}; + +/* + * always-persistent context variables + */ +struct context_persist +{ + int restart_sleep_seconds; +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Level 0 %context containing information related to the OpenVPN process. + * + * Level 0 state is initialized once at program startup, and then remains + * throughout the lifetime of the OpenVPN process. This structure + * contains information related to the process's PID, user, and group. + */ +struct context_0 +{ + /* workspace for get_pid_file/write_pid */ + struct pid_state pid_state; + + /* workspace for --user/--group */ + bool uid_gid_specified; + bool uid_gid_set; + struct platform_state_user platform_state_user; + struct platform_state_group platform_state_group; +}; + + +/** + * Level 1 %context containing state that persists across \c SIGUSR1 + * restarts. + * + * Level 1 state is reset on \c SIGHUP restarts. This structure is + * initialized for every iteration of the \c main() function's outer \c + * SIGHUP loop, but persists over iteration of that function's inner \c + * SIGUSR1 loop. + */ +struct context_1 +{ + struct link_socket_addr link_socket_addr; + /**< Local and remote addresses on the + * external network. */ + + /* tunnel session keys */ + struct key_schedule ks; + + /* persist crypto sequence number to/from file */ + struct packet_id_persist pid_persist; + + struct tuntap *tuntap; /**< Tun/tap virtual network interface. */ + bool tuntap_owned; /**< Whether the tun/tap interface should + * be cleaned up when this %context is + * cleaned up. */ + + struct route_list *route_list; + /**< List of routing information. See the + * \c --route command line option. */ + + /* list of --route-ipv6 directives */ + struct route_ipv6_list *route_ipv6_list; + + /* --status file */ + struct status_output *status_output; + bool status_output_owned; + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + /* HTTP proxy object */ + struct http_proxy_info *http_proxy; + bool http_proxy_owned; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* SOCKS proxy object */ + struct socks_proxy_info *socks_proxy; + bool socks_proxy_owned; +#endif + +#if P2MP + +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* persist --ifconfig-pool db to file */ + struct ifconfig_pool_persist *ifconfig_pool_persist; + bool ifconfig_pool_persist_owned; +#endif + + /* if client mode, hash of option strings we pulled from server */ + struct md5_digest pulled_options_digest_save; + /**< Hash of option strings received from the + * remote OpenVPN server. Only used in + * client-mode. */ + + struct user_pass *auth_user_pass; + /**< Username and password for + * authentication. */ +#endif +}; + +/** + * Level 2 %context containing state that is reset on both \c SIGHUP and + * \c SIGUSR1 restarts. + * + * This structure is initialized at the top of the \c + * tunnel_point_to_point(), \c tunnel_server_udp_single_threaded(), and \c + * tunnel_server_tcp() functions. In other words, it is reset for every + * iteration of the \c main() function's inner \c SIGUSR1 loop. + */ +struct context_2 +{ + struct gc_arena gc; /**< Garbage collection arena for + * allocations done in the level 2 scope + * of this context_2 structure. */ + + /* our global wait events */ + struct event_set *event_set; + int event_set_max; + bool event_set_owned; + + /* event flags returned by io_wait */ +# define SOCKET_READ (1<<0) +# define SOCKET_WRITE (1<<1) +# define TUN_READ (1<<2) +# define TUN_WRITE (1<<3) +# define ES_ERROR (1<<4) +# define ES_TIMEOUT (1<<5) +# ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT +# define MANAGEMENT_READ (1<<6) +# define MANAGEMENT_WRITE (1<<7) +# endif + + unsigned int event_set_status; + + struct link_socket *link_socket; /* socket used for TCP/UDP connection to remote */ + bool link_socket_owned; + struct link_socket_info *link_socket_info; + const struct link_socket *accept_from; /* possibly do accept() on a parent link_socket */ + + struct link_socket_actual *to_link_addr; /* IP address of remote */ + struct link_socket_actual from; /* address of incoming datagram */ + + /* MTU frame parameters */ + struct frame frame; + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + /* Object to handle advanced MTU negotiation and datagram fragmentation */ + struct fragment_master *fragment; + struct frame frame_fragment; + struct frame frame_fragment_omit; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + /* + * Traffic shaper object. + */ + struct shaper shaper; +#endif + + /* + * Statistics + */ + counter_type tun_read_bytes; + counter_type tun_write_bytes; + counter_type link_read_bytes; + counter_type link_read_bytes_auth; + counter_type link_write_bytes; +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + counter_type n_trunc_tun_read; + counter_type n_trunc_tun_write; + counter_type n_trunc_pre_encrypt; + counter_type n_trunc_post_decrypt; +#endif + + /* + * Timer objects for ping and inactivity + * timeout features. + */ + struct event_timeout wait_for_connect; + struct event_timeout ping_send_interval; + struct event_timeout ping_rec_interval; + + /* --inactive */ + struct event_timeout inactivity_interval; + int inactivity_bytes; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* the option strings must match across peers */ + char *options_string_local; + char *options_string_remote; + + int occ_op; /* INIT to -1 */ + int occ_n_tries; + struct event_timeout occ_interval; +#endif + + /* + * Keep track of maximum packet size received so far + * (of authenticated packets). + */ + int original_recv_size; /* temporary */ + int max_recv_size_local; /* max packet size received */ + int max_recv_size_remote; /* max packet size received by remote */ + int max_send_size_local; /* max packet size sent */ + int max_send_size_remote; /* max packet size sent by remote */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* remote wants us to send back a load test packet of this size */ + int occ_mtu_load_size; + + struct event_timeout occ_mtu_load_test_interval; + int occ_mtu_load_n_tries; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + + /* + * TLS-mode crypto objects. + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + + struct tls_multi *tls_multi; /**< TLS state structure for this VPN + * tunnel. */ + + struct tls_auth_standalone *tls_auth_standalone; + /**< TLS state structure required for the + * initial authentication of a client's + * connection attempt. This structure + * is used by the \c + * tls_pre_decrypt_lite() function when + * it performs the HMAC firewall check + * on the first connection packet + * received from a new client. See the + * \c --tls-auth commandline option. */ + + /* used to optimize calls to tls_multi_process */ + struct interval tmp_int; + + /* throw this signal on TLS errors */ + int tls_exit_signal; + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + + struct crypto_options crypto_options; + /**< Security parameters and crypto state + * used by the \link data_crypto Data + * Channel Crypto module\endlink to + * process data channel packet. */ + + /* used to keep track of data channel packet sequence numbers */ + struct packet_id packet_id; + struct event_timeout packet_id_persist_interval; + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + struct lzo_compress_workspace lzo_compwork; + /**< Compression workspace used by the + * \link compression Data Channel + * Compression module\endlink. */ +#endif + + /* + * Buffers used for packet processing. + */ + struct context_buffers *buffers; + bool buffers_owned; /* if true, we should free all buffers on close */ + + /* + * These buffers don't actually allocate storage, they are used + * as pointers to the allocated buffers in + * struct context_buffers. + */ + struct buffer buf; + struct buffer to_tun; + struct buffer to_link; + + /* + * IPv4 TUN device? + */ + bool ipv4_tun; + + /* should we print R|W|r|w to console on packet transfers? */ + bool log_rw; + + /* route stuff */ + struct event_timeout route_wakeup; + struct event_timeout route_wakeup_expire; + + /* did we open tun/tap dev during this cycle? */ + bool did_open_tun; + + /* + * Event loop info + */ + + /* how long to wait on link/tun read before we will need to be serviced */ + struct timeval timeval; + + /* next wakeup for processing coarse timers (>1 sec resolution) */ + time_t coarse_timer_wakeup; + + /* maintain a random delta to add to timeouts to avoid contexts + waking up simultaneously */ + time_t update_timeout_random_component; + struct timeval timeout_random_component; + + /* indicates that the do_up_delay function has run */ + bool do_up_ran; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* indicates that we have received a SIGTERM when + options->explicit_exit_notification is enabled, + but we have not exited yet */ + time_t explicit_exit_notification_time_wait; + struct event_timeout explicit_exit_notification_interval; +#endif + + /* environmental variables to pass to scripts */ + struct env_set *es; + bool es_owned; + + /* don't wait for TUN/TAP/UDP to be ready to accept write */ + bool fast_io; + +#if P2MP + +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* --ifconfig endpoints to be pushed to client */ + bool push_reply_deferred; + bool push_ifconfig_defined; + time_t sent_push_reply_expiry; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_local; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_remote_netmask; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_local_alias; +#endif + + bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined; + struct in6_addr push_ifconfig_ipv6_local; + int push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits; + struct in6_addr push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote; + + /* client authentication state, CAS_SUCCEEDED must be 0 */ +# define CAS_SUCCEEDED 0 +# define CAS_PENDING 1 +# define CAS_FAILED 2 +# define CAS_PARTIAL 3 /* at least one client-connect script/plugin + succeeded while a later one in the chain failed */ + int context_auth; +#endif + + struct event_timeout push_request_interval; + int n_sent_push_requests; + bool did_pre_pull_restore; + + /* hash of pulled options, so we can compare when options change */ + bool pulled_options_md5_init_done; + struct md5_state pulled_options_state; + struct md5_digest pulled_options_digest; + + struct event_timeout server_poll_interval; + + struct event_timeout scheduled_exit; + int scheduled_exit_signal; +#endif + + /* packet filter */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + struct pf_context pf; +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + struct man_def_auth_context mda_context; +#endif +}; + + +/** + * Contains all state information for one tunnel. + * + * This structure represents one VPN tunnel. It is used to store state + * information related to a VPN tunnel, but also includes process-wide + * data, such as configuration options. + * + * The @ref tunnel_state "Structure of VPN tunnel state storage" related + * page describes how this structure is used in client-mode and + * server-mode. + */ +struct context +{ + struct options options; /**< Options loaded from command line or + * configuration file. */ + + bool first_time; /**< True on the first iteration of + * OpenVPN's main loop. */ + + /* context modes */ +# define CM_P2P 0 /* standalone point-to-point session or client */ +# define CM_TOP 1 /* top level of a multi-client or point-to-multipoint server */ +# define CM_TOP_CLONE 2 /* clone of a CM_TOP context for one thread */ +# define CM_CHILD_UDP 3 /* child context of a CM_TOP or CM_THREAD */ +# define CM_CHILD_TCP 4 /* child context of a CM_TOP or CM_THREAD */ + int mode; /**< Role of this context within the + * OpenVPN process. Valid values are \c + * CM_P2P, \c CM_TOP, \c CM_TOP_CLONE, + * \c CM_CHILD_UDP, and \c CM_CHILD_TCP. */ + + struct gc_arena gc; /**< Garbage collection arena for + * allocations done in the scope of this + * context structure. */ + + struct env_set *es; /**< Set of environment variables. */ + + struct signal_info *sig; /**< Internal error signaling object. */ + + struct plugin_list *plugins; /**< List of plug-ins. */ + bool plugins_owned; /**< Whether the plug-ins should be + * cleaned up when this %context is + * cleaned up. */ + + bool did_we_daemonize; /**< Whether demonization has already + * taken place. */ + + struct context_persist persist; + /**< Persistent %context. */ + struct context_0 *c0; /**< Level 0 %context. */ + struct context_1 c1; /**< Level 1 %context. */ + struct context_2 c2; /**< Level 2 %context. */ +}; + +/* + * Check for a signal when inside an event loop + */ +#define EVENT_LOOP_CHECK_SIGNAL(c, func, arg) \ + if (IS_SIG (c)) \ + { \ + const int brk = func (arg); \ + perf_pop (); \ + if (brk) \ + break; \ + else \ + continue; \ + } + +/* + * Macros for referencing objects which may not + * have been compiled in. + */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) +#define TLS_MODE(c) ((c)->c2.tls_multi != NULL) +#define PROTO_DUMP_FLAGS (check_debug_level (D_LINK_RW_VERBOSE) ? (PD_SHOW_DATA|PD_VERBOSE) : 0) +#define PROTO_DUMP(buf, gc) protocol_dump((buf), \ + PROTO_DUMP_FLAGS | \ + (c->c2.tls_multi ? PD_TLS : 0) | \ + (c->options.tls_auth_file ? c->c1.ks.key_type.hmac_length : 0), \ + gc) +#else +#define TLS_MODE(c) (false) +#define PROTO_DUMP(buf, gc) format_hex (BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), 80, gc) +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#define MD5SUM(buf, len, gc) md5sum((buf), (len), 0, (gc)) +#else +#define MD5SUM(buf, len, gc) "[unavailable]" +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#define CIPHER_ENABLED(c) (c->c1.ks.key_type.cipher != NULL) +#else +#define CIPHER_ENABLED(c) (false) +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj new file mode 100755 index 00000000..452876fc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Release + Win32 + + + + {29DF226E-4D4E-440F-ADAF-5829CFD4CA94} + openvpn + Win32Proj + + + + Application + true + Unicode + + + Application + Unicode + + + + + + + + + + + + + <_ProjectFileVersion>10.0.30319.1 + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + true + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + false + + + + Disabled + $(SOURCEBASE);$(SOURCEBASE)/src/compat;$(SOURCEBASE)/include;$(TAP_WINDOWS_HOME)/include;$(OPENSSL_HOME)/include;$(LZO_HOME)/include;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/include;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;_DEBUG;_CONSOLE;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + true + EnableFastChecks + MultiThreadedDebugDLL + + + Level3 + EditAndContinue + UNICODE + + + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + + + libeay32.lib;ssleay32.lib;lzo2.lib;pkcs11-helper.dll.lib;gdi32.lib;ws2_32.lib;wininet.lib;crypt32.lib;iphlpapi.lib;winmm.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + $(OPENSSL_HOME)/lib;$(LZO_HOME)/lib;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/lib;%(AdditionalLibraryDirectories) + true + Console + MachineX86 + + + + + MaxSpeed + true + $(SOURCEBASE);$(SOURCEBASE)/src/compat;$(SOURCEBASE)/include;$(TAP_WINDOWS_HOME)/include;$(OPENSSL_HOME)/include;$(LZO_HOME)/include;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/include;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + MultiThreadedDLL + true + + + Level3 + ProgramDatabase + UNICODE + + + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + + + libeay32.lib;ssleay32.lib;lzo2.lib;pkcs11-helper.dll.lib;gdi32.lib;ws2_32.lib;wininet.lib;crypt32.lib;iphlpapi.lib;winmm.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies) + $(OPENSSL_HOME)/lib;$(LZO_HOME)/lib;$(PKCS11H_HOME)/lib;%(AdditionalLibraryDirectories) + true + Console + true + true + MachineX86 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + {8598c2c8-34c4-47a1-99b0-7c295a890615} + false + + + {4b2e2719-e661-45d7-9203-f6f456b22f19} + false + + + + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj.filters b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj.filters new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ec5e676c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj.filters @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ + + + + + {4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF} + cpp;c;cc;cxx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx + + + {93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB} + h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl;inc;xsd + + + {67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01} + rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav + + + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + Header Files + + + + + Resource Files + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn_win32_resources.rc b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn_win32_resources.rc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d092e21a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/openvpn_win32_resources.rc @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#include + +#pragma code_page(65001) /* UTF8 */ + +LANGUAGE LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_NEUTRAL + +VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO + FILEVERSION OPENVPN_VERSION_RESOURCE + PRODUCTVERSION OPENVPN_VERSION_RESOURCE + FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL +#ifdef _DEBUG + FILEFLAGS 0x1L +#else + FILEFLAGS 0x0L +#endif + FILEOS 0x40004L + FILETYPE 0x2L + FILESUBTYPE 0x0L +BEGIN + BLOCK "StringFileInfo" + BEGIN + BLOCK "040904b0" + BEGIN + VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenVPN Project" + VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenVPN Daemon" + VALUE "FileVersion", PACKAGE_VERSION ".0" + VALUE "InternalName", "OpenVPN" + VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © The OpenVPN Project" + VALUE "OriginalFilename", "openvpn.exe" + VALUE "ProductName", "OpenVPN" + VALUE "ProductVersion", PACKAGE_VERSION ".0" + END + END + BLOCK "VarFileInfo" + BEGIN + VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200 + END +END diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64c81cf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.c @@ -0,0 +1,6651 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * Additions for eurephia plugin done by: + * David Sommerseth Copyright (C) 2009 + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * 2004-01-28: Added Socks5 proxy support + * (Christof Meerwald, http://cmeerw.org) + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_VERSION_H +#include "config-version.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "shaper.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "push.h" +#include "pool.h" +#include "helper.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "forward.h" +#include + +#include "memdbg.h" + +const char title_string[] = + PACKAGE_STRING + " " TARGET_ALIAS +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + " [SSL (PolarSSL)]" +#elif defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + " [SSL (OpenSSL)]" +#else + " [SSL]" +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) */ +#else /* ! ENABLE_SSL */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + " [CRYPTO (PolarSSL)]" +#elif defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + " [CRYPTO (OpenSSL)]" +#else + " [CRYPTO]" +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) */ +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + " [LZO (STUB)]" +#else + " [LZO]" +#endif +#endif +#if EPOLL + " [EPOLL]" +#endif +#ifdef PRODUCT_TAP_DEBUG + " [TAPDBG]" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + " [PKCS11]" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_EUREPHIA + " [eurephia]" +#endif +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + " [MH]" +#endif + " [IPv6]" + " built on " __DATE__ +; + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + +static const char usage_message[] = + "%s\n" + "\n" + "General Options:\n" + "--config file : Read configuration options from file.\n" + "--help : Show options.\n" + "--version : Show copyright and version information.\n" + "\n" + "Tunnel Options:\n" + "--local host : Local host name or ip address. Implies --bind.\n" + "--remote host [port] : Remote host name or ip address.\n" + "--remote-random : If multiple --remote options specified, choose one randomly.\n" + "--remote-random-hostname : Add a random string to remote DNS name.\n" + "--mode m : Major mode, m = 'p2p' (default, point-to-point) or 'server'.\n" + "--proto p : Use protocol p for communicating with peer.\n" + " p = udp (default), tcp-server, or tcp-client\n" + "--proto-force p : only consider protocol p in list of connection profiles.\n" + " p = udp6, tcp6-server, or tcp6-client (ipv6)\n" + "--connect-retry n : For --proto tcp-client, number of seconds to wait\n" + " between connection retries (default=%d).\n" + "--connect-timeout n : For --proto tcp-client, connection timeout (in seconds).\n" + "--connect-retry-max n : Maximum connection attempt retries, default infinite.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + "--http-proxy s p [up] [auth] : Connect to remote host\n" + " through an HTTP proxy at address s and port p.\n" + " If proxy authentication is required,\n" + " up is a file containing username/password on 2 lines, or\n" + " 'stdin' to prompt from console. Add auth='ntlm' if\n" + " the proxy requires NTLM authentication.\n" + "--http-proxy s p 'auto[-nct]' : Like the above directive, but automatically\n" + " determine auth method and query for username/password\n" + " if needed. auto-nct disables weak proxy auth methods.\n" + "--http-proxy-retry : Retry indefinitely on HTTP proxy errors.\n" + "--http-proxy-timeout n : Proxy timeout in seconds, default=5.\n" + "--http-proxy-option type [parm] : Set extended HTTP proxy options.\n" + " Repeat to set multiple options.\n" + " VERSION version (default=1.0)\n" + " AGENT user-agent\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + "--socks-proxy s [p] [up] : Connect to remote host through a Socks5 proxy at\n" + " address s and port p (default port = 1080).\n" + " If proxy authentication is required,\n" + " up is a file containing username/password on 2 lines, or\n" + " 'stdin' to prompt for console.\n" + "--socks-proxy-retry : Retry indefinitely on Socks proxy errors.\n" +#endif + "--resolv-retry n: If hostname resolve fails for --remote, retry\n" + " resolve for n seconds before failing (disabled by default).\n" + " Set n=\"infinite\" to retry indefinitely.\n" + "--float : Allow remote to change its IP address/port, such as through\n" + " DHCP (this is the default if --remote is not used).\n" + "--ipchange cmd : Run command cmd on remote ip address initial\n" + " setting or change -- execute as: cmd ip-address port#\n" + "--port port : TCP/UDP port # for both local and remote.\n" + "--lport port : TCP/UDP port # for local (default=%s). Implies --bind.\n" + "--rport port : TCP/UDP port # for remote (default=%s).\n" + "--bind : Bind to local address and port. (This is the default unless\n" + " --proto tcp-client" +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + " or --http-proxy" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + " or --socks-proxy" +#endif + " is used).\n" + "--nobind : Do not bind to local address and port.\n" + "--dev tunX|tapX : tun/tap device (X can be omitted for dynamic device.\n" + "--dev-type dt : Which device type are we using? (dt = tun or tap) Use\n" + " this option only if the tun/tap device used with --dev\n" + " does not begin with \"tun\" or \"tap\".\n" + "--dev-node node : Explicitly set the device node rather than using\n" + " /dev/net/tun, /dev/tun, /dev/tap, etc.\n" + "--lladdr hw : Set the link layer address of the tap device.\n" + "--topology t : Set --dev tun topology: 'net30', 'p2p', or 'subnet'.\n" + "--tun-ipv6 : Build tun link capable of forwarding IPv6 traffic.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + "--iproute cmd : Use this command instead of default " IPROUTE_PATH ".\n" +#endif + "--ifconfig l rn : TUN: configure device to use IP address l as a local\n" + " endpoint and rn as a remote endpoint. l & rn should be\n" + " swapped on the other peer. l & rn must be private\n" + " addresses outside of the subnets used by either peer.\n" + " TAP: configure device to use IP address l as a local\n" + " endpoint and rn as a subnet mask.\n" + "--ifconfig-ipv6 l r : configure device to use IPv6 address l as local\n" + " endpoint (as a /64) and r as remote endpoint\n" + "--ifconfig-noexec : Don't actually execute ifconfig/netsh command, instead\n" + " pass --ifconfig parms by environment to scripts.\n" + "--ifconfig-nowarn : Don't warn if the --ifconfig option on this side of the\n" + " connection doesn't match the remote side.\n" + "--route network [netmask] [gateway] [metric] :\n" + " Add route to routing table after connection\n" + " is established. Multiple routes can be specified.\n" + " netmask default: 255.255.255.255\n" + " gateway default: taken from --route-gateway or --ifconfig\n" + " Specify default by leaving blank or setting to \"nil\".\n" + "--route-ipv6 network/bits [gateway] [metric] :\n" + " Add IPv6 route to routing table after connection\n" + " is established. Multiple routes can be specified.\n" + " gateway default: taken from --route-ipv6-gateway or --ifconfig\n" + "--max-routes n : Specify the maximum number of routes that may be defined\n" + " or pulled from a server.\n" + "--route-gateway gw|'dhcp' : Specify a default gateway for use with --route.\n" + "--route-metric m : Specify a default metric for use with --route.\n" + "--route-delay n [w] : Delay n seconds after connection initiation before\n" + " adding routes (may be 0). If not specified, routes will\n" + " be added immediately after tun/tap open. On Windows, wait\n" + " up to w seconds for TUN/TAP adapter to come up.\n" + "--route-up cmd : Run command cmd after routes are added.\n" + "--route-pre-down cmd : Run command cmd before routes are removed.\n" + "--route-noexec : Don't add routes automatically. Instead pass routes to\n" + " --route-up script using environmental variables.\n" + "--route-nopull : When used with --client or --pull, accept options pushed\n" + " by server EXCEPT for routes and dhcp options.\n" + "--allow-pull-fqdn : Allow client to pull DNS names from server for\n" + " --ifconfig, --route, and --route-gateway.\n" + "--redirect-gateway [flags]: Automatically execute routing\n" + " commands to redirect all outgoing IP traffic through the\n" + " VPN. Add 'local' flag if both " PACKAGE_NAME " servers are directly\n" + " connected via a common subnet, such as with WiFi.\n" + " Add 'def1' flag to set default route using using 0.0.0.0/1\n" + " and 128.0.0.0/1 rather than 0.0.0.0/0. Add 'bypass-dhcp'\n" + " flag to add a direct route to DHCP server, bypassing tunnel.\n" + " Add 'bypass-dns' flag to similarly bypass tunnel for DNS.\n" + "--redirect-private [flags]: Like --redirect-gateway, but omit actually changing\n" + " the default gateway. Useful when pushing private subnets.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + "--client-nat snat|dnat network netmask alias : on client add 1-to-1 NAT rule.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + "--push-peer-info : (client only) push client info to server.\n" +#endif + "--setenv name value : Set a custom environmental variable to pass to script.\n" + "--setenv FORWARD_COMPATIBLE 1 : Relax config file syntax checking to allow\n" + " directives for future OpenVPN versions to be ignored.\n" + "--script-security level: Where level can be:\n" + " 0 -- strictly no calling of external programs\n" + " 1 -- (default) only call built-ins such as ifconfig\n" + " 2 -- allow calling of built-ins and scripts\n" + " 3 -- allow password to be passed to scripts via env\n" + "--shaper n : Restrict output to peer to n bytes per second.\n" + "--keepalive n m : Helper option for setting timeouts in server mode. Send\n" + " ping once every n seconds, restart if ping not received\n" + " for m seconds.\n" + "--inactive n [bytes] : Exit after n seconds of activity on tun/tap device\n" + " produces a combined in/out byte count < bytes.\n" + "--ping-exit n : Exit if n seconds pass without reception of remote ping.\n" + "--ping-restart n: Restart if n seconds pass without reception of remote ping.\n" + "--ping-timer-rem: Run the --ping-exit/--ping-restart timer only if we have a\n" + " remote address.\n" + "--ping n : Ping remote once every n seconds over TCP/UDP port.\n" +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + "--multihome : Configure a multi-homed UDP server.\n" +#endif + "--fast-io : (experimental) Optimize TUN/TAP/UDP writes.\n" + "--remap-usr1 s : On SIGUSR1 signals, remap signal (s='SIGHUP' or 'SIGTERM').\n" + "--persist-tun : Keep tun/tap device open across SIGUSR1 or --ping-restart.\n" + "--persist-remote-ip : Keep remote IP address across SIGUSR1 or --ping-restart.\n" + "--persist-local-ip : Keep local IP address across SIGUSR1 or --ping-restart.\n" + "--persist-key : Don't re-read key files across SIGUSR1 or --ping-restart.\n" +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + "--passtos : TOS passthrough (applies to IPv4 only).\n" +#endif + "--tun-mtu n : Take the tun/tap device MTU to be n and derive the\n" + " TCP/UDP MTU from it (default=%d).\n" + "--tun-mtu-extra n : Assume that tun/tap device might return as many\n" + " as n bytes more than the tun-mtu size on read\n" + " (default TUN=0 TAP=%d).\n" + "--link-mtu n : Take the TCP/UDP device MTU to be n and derive the tun MTU\n" + " from it.\n" + "--mtu-disc type : Should we do Path MTU discovery on TCP/UDP channel?\n" + " 'no' -- Never send DF (Don't Fragment) frames\n" + " 'maybe' -- Use per-route hints\n" + " 'yes' -- Always DF (Don't Fragment)\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + "--mtu-test : Empirically measure and report MTU.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + "--fragment max : Enable internal datagram fragmentation so that no UDP\n" + " datagrams are sent which are larger than max bytes.\n" + " Adds 4 bytes of overhead per datagram.\n" +#endif + "--mssfix [n] : Set upper bound on TCP MSS, default = tun-mtu size\n" + " or --fragment max value, whichever is lower.\n" + "--sndbuf size : Set the TCP/UDP send buffer size.\n" + "--rcvbuf size : Set the TCP/UDP receive buffer size.\n" +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) && HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK + "--mark value : Mark encrypted packets being sent with value. The mark value\n" + " can be matched in policy routing and packetfilter rules.\n" +#endif + "--txqueuelen n : Set the tun/tap TX queue length to n (Linux only).\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + "--memstats file : Write live usage stats to memory mapped binary file.\n" +#endif + "--mlock : Disable Paging -- ensures key material and tunnel\n" + " data will never be written to disk.\n" + "--up cmd : Run command cmd after successful tun device open.\n" + " Execute as: cmd tun/tap-dev tun-mtu link-mtu \\\n" + " ifconfig-local-ip ifconfig-remote-ip\n" + " (pre --user or --group UID/GID change)\n" + "--up-delay : Delay tun/tap open and possible --up script execution\n" + " until after TCP/UDP connection establishment with peer.\n" + "--down cmd : Run command cmd after tun device close.\n" + " (post --user/--group UID/GID change and/or --chroot)\n" + " (command parameters are same as --up option)\n" + "--down-pre : Run --down command before TUN/TAP close.\n" + "--up-restart : Run up/down commands for all restarts including those\n" + " caused by --ping-restart or SIGUSR1\n" + "--user user : Set UID to user after initialization.\n" + "--group group : Set GID to group after initialization.\n" + "--chroot dir : Chroot to this directory after initialization.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + "--setcon context: Apply this SELinux context after initialization.\n" +#endif + "--cd dir : Change to this directory before initialization.\n" + "--daemon [name] : Become a daemon after initialization.\n" + " The optional 'name' parameter will be passed\n" + " as the program name to the system logger.\n" + "--syslog [name] : Output to syslog, but do not become a daemon.\n" + " See --daemon above for a description of the 'name' parm.\n" + "--inetd [name] ['wait'|'nowait'] : Run as an inetd or xinetd server.\n" + " See --daemon above for a description of the 'name' parm.\n" + "--log file : Output log to file which is created/truncated on open.\n" + "--log-append file : Append log to file, or create file if nonexistent.\n" + "--suppress-timestamps : Don't log timestamps to stdout/stderr.\n" + "--writepid file : Write main process ID to file.\n" + "--nice n : Change process priority (>0 = lower, <0 = higher).\n" + "--echo [parms ...] : Echo parameters to log output.\n" + "--verb n : Set output verbosity to n (default=%d):\n" + " (Level 3 is recommended if you want a good summary\n" + " of what's happening without being swamped by output).\n" + " : 0 -- no output except fatal errors\n" + " : 1 -- startup info + connection initiated messages +\n" + " non-fatal encryption & net errors\n" + " : 2,3 -- show TLS negotiations & route info\n" + " : 4 -- show parameters\n" + " : 5 -- show 'RrWw' chars on console for each packet sent\n" + " and received from TCP/UDP (caps) or tun/tap (lc)\n" + " : 6 to 11 -- debug messages of increasing verbosity\n" + "--mute n : Log at most n consecutive messages in the same category.\n" + "--status file n : Write operational status to file every n seconds.\n" + "--status-version [n] : Choose the status file format version number.\n" + " Currently, n can be 1, 2, or 3 (default=1).\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + "--disable-occ : Disable options consistency check between peers.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + "--gremlin mask : Special stress testing mode (for debugging only).\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + "--comp-lzo : Use fast LZO compression -- may add up to 1 byte per\n" + " packet for uncompressible data.\n" + "--comp-noadapt : Don't use adaptive compression when --comp-lzo\n" + " is specified.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + "--management ip port [pass] : Enable a TCP server on ip:port to handle\n" + " management functions. pass is a password file\n" + " or 'stdin' to prompt from console.\n" +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + " To listen on a unix domain socket, specific the pathname\n" + " in place of ip and use 'unix' as the port number.\n" +#endif + "--management-client : Management interface will connect as a TCP client to\n" + " ip/port rather than listen as a TCP server.\n" + "--management-query-passwords : Query management channel for private key\n" + " and auth-user-pass passwords.\n" + "--management-query-proxy : Query management channel for proxy information.\n" + "--management-query-remote : Query management channel for --remote directive.\n" + "--management-hold : Start " PACKAGE_NAME " in a hibernating state, until a client\n" + " of the management interface explicitly starts it.\n" + "--management-signal : Issue SIGUSR1 when management disconnect event occurs.\n" + "--management-forget-disconnect : Forget passwords when management disconnect\n" + " event occurs.\n" + "--management-up-down : Report tunnel up/down events to management interface.\n" + "--management-log-cache n : Cache n lines of log file history for usage\n" + " by the management channel.\n" +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + "--management-client-user u : When management interface is a unix socket, only\n" + " allow connections from user u.\n" + "--management-client-group g : When management interface is a unix socket, only\n" + " allow connections from group g.\n" +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + "--management-client-auth : gives management interface client the responsibility\n" + " to authenticate clients after their client certificate\n" + " has been verified.\n" +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + "--management-client-pf : management interface clients must specify a packet\n" + " filter file for each connecting client.\n" +#endif +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + "--plugin m [str]: Load plug-in module m passing str as an argument\n" + " to its initialization function.\n" +#endif +#if P2MP +#if P2MP_SERVER + "\n" + "Multi-Client Server options (when --mode server is used):\n" + "--server network netmask : Helper option to easily configure server mode.\n" + "--server-ipv6 network/bits : Configure IPv6 server mode.\n" + "--server-bridge [IP netmask pool-start-IP pool-end-IP] : Helper option to\n" + " easily configure ethernet bridging server mode.\n" + "--push \"option\" : Push a config file option back to the peer for remote\n" + " execution. Peer must specify --pull in its config file.\n" + "--push-reset : Don't inherit global push list for specific\n" + " client instance.\n" + "--ifconfig-pool start-IP end-IP [netmask] : Set aside a pool of subnets\n" + " to be dynamically allocated to connecting clients.\n" + "--ifconfig-pool-linear : Use individual addresses rather than /30 subnets\n" + " in tun mode. Not compatible with Windows clients.\n" + "--ifconfig-pool-persist file [seconds] : Persist/unpersist ifconfig-pool\n" + " data to file, at seconds intervals (default=600).\n" + " If seconds=0, file will be treated as read-only.\n" + "--ifconfig-ipv6-pool base-IP/bits : set aside an IPv6 network block\n" + " to be dynamically allocated to connecting clients.\n" + "--ifconfig-push local remote-netmask : Push an ifconfig option to remote,\n" + " overrides --ifconfig-pool dynamic allocation.\n" + " Only valid in a client-specific config file.\n" + "--ifconfig-ipv6-push local/bits remote : Push an ifconfig-ipv6 option to\n" + " remote, overrides --ifconfig-ipv6-pool allocation.\n" + " Only valid in a client-specific config file.\n" + "--iroute network [netmask] : Route subnet to client.\n" + "--iroute-ipv6 network/bits : Route IPv6 subnet to client.\n" + " Sets up internal routes only.\n" + " Only valid in a client-specific config file.\n" + "--disable : Client is disabled.\n" + " Only valid in a client-specific config file.\n" + "--client-cert-not-required : Don't require client certificate, client\n" + " will authenticate using username/password.\n" + "--username-as-common-name : For auth-user-pass authentication, use\n" + " the authenticated username as the common name,\n" + " rather than the common name from the client cert.\n" + "--auth-user-pass-verify cmd method: Query client for username/password and\n" + " run command cmd to verify. If method='via-env', pass\n" + " user/pass via environment, if method='via-file', pass\n" + " user/pass via temporary file.\n" + "--opt-verify : Clients that connect with options that are incompatible\n" + " with those of the server will be disconnected.\n" + "--auth-user-pass-optional : Allow connections by clients that don't\n" + " specify a username/password.\n" + "--no-name-remapping : Allow Common Name and X509 Subject to include\n" + " any printable character.\n" + "--client-to-client : Internally route client-to-client traffic.\n" + "--duplicate-cn : Allow multiple clients with the same common name to\n" + " concurrently connect.\n" + "--client-connect cmd : Run command cmd on client connection.\n" + "--client-disconnect cmd : Run command cmd on client disconnection.\n" + "--client-config-dir dir : Directory for custom client config files.\n" + "--ccd-exclusive : Refuse connection unless custom client config is found.\n" + "--tmp-dir dir : Temporary directory, used for --client-connect return file and plugin communication.\n" + "--hash-size r v : Set the size of the real address hash table to r and the\n" + " virtual address table to v.\n" + "--bcast-buffers n : Allocate n broadcast buffers.\n" + "--tcp-queue-limit n : Maximum number of queued TCP output packets.\n" + "--tcp-nodelay : Macro that sets TCP_NODELAY socket flag on the server\n" + " as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n" + "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n" + "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n" + "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n" + "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n" + "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n" + " older than n seconds. Run this check every t\n" + " seconds (defaults to n).\n" +#if PORT_SHARE + "--port-share host port [dir] : When run in TCP mode, proxy incoming HTTPS\n" + " sessions to a web server at host:port. dir specifies an\n" + " optional directory to write origin IP:port data.\n" +#endif +#endif + "\n" + "Client options (when connecting to a multi-client server):\n" + "--client : Helper option to easily configure client mode.\n" + "--auth-user-pass [up] : Authenticate with server using username/password.\n" + " up is a file containing username/password on 2 lines,\n" + " or omit to prompt from console.\n" + "--pull : Accept certain config file options from the peer as if they\n" + " were part of the local config file. Must be specified\n" + " when connecting to a '--mode server' remote host.\n" + "--auth-retry t : How to handle auth failures. Set t to\n" + " none (default), interact, or nointeract.\n" + "--static-challenge t e : Enable static challenge/response protocol using\n" + " challenge text t, with e indicating echo flag (0|1)\n" + "--server-poll-timeout n : when polling possible remote servers to connect to\n" + " in a round-robin fashion, spend no more than n seconds\n" + " waiting for a response before trying the next server.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + "--explicit-exit-notify [n] : On exit/restart, send exit signal to\n" + " server/remote. n = # of retries, default=1.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + "\n" + "Data Channel Encryption Options (must be compatible between peers):\n" + "(These options are meaningful for both Static Key & TLS-mode)\n" + "--secret f [d] : Enable Static Key encryption mode (non-TLS).\n" + " Use shared secret file f, generate with --genkey.\n" + " The optional d parameter controls key directionality.\n" + " If d is specified, use separate keys for each\n" + " direction, set d=0 on one side of the connection,\n" + " and d=1 on the other side.\n" + "--auth alg : Authenticate packets with HMAC using message\n" + " digest algorithm alg (default=%s).\n" + " (usually adds 16 or 20 bytes per packet)\n" + " Set alg=none to disable authentication.\n" + "--cipher alg : Encrypt packets with cipher algorithm alg\n" + " (default=%s).\n" + " Set alg=none to disable encryption.\n" + "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" + " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH + "--keysize n : Size of cipher key in bits (optional).\n" + " If unspecified, defaults to cipher-specific default.\n" +#endif +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + "--engine [name] : Enable OpenSSL hardware crypto engine functionality.\n" +#endif + "--no-replay : Disable replay protection.\n" + "--mute-replay-warnings : Silence the output of replay warnings to log file.\n" + "--replay-window n [t] : Use a replay protection sliding window of size n\n" + " and a time window of t seconds.\n" + " Default n=%d t=%d\n" + "--no-iv : Disable cipher IV -- only allowed with CBC mode ciphers.\n" + "--replay-persist file : Persist replay-protection state across sessions\n" + " using file.\n" + "--test-crypto : Run a self-test of crypto features enabled.\n" + " For debugging only.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + "--use-prediction-resistance: Enable prediction resistance on the random\n" + " number generator.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + "\n" + "TLS Key Negotiation Options:\n" + "(These options are meaningful only for TLS-mode)\n" + "--tls-server : Enable TLS and assume server role during TLS handshake.\n" + "--tls-client : Enable TLS and assume client role during TLS handshake.\n" + "--key-method m : Data channel key exchange method. m should be a method\n" + " number, such as 1 (default), 2, etc.\n" + "--ca file : Certificate authority file in .pem format containing\n" + " root certificate.\n" +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + "--capath dir : A directory of trusted certificates (CAs" +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + " and CRLs).\n" +#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L */ + ").\n" + " WARNING: no support of CRL available with this version.\n" +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ + "--dh file : File containing Diffie Hellman parameters\n" + " in .pem format (for --tls-server only).\n" + " Use \"openssl dhparam -out dh1024.pem 1024\" to generate.\n" + "--cert file : Local certificate in .pem format -- must be signed\n" + " by a Certificate Authority in --ca file.\n" + "--extra-certs file : one or more PEM certs that complete the cert chain.\n" + "--key file : Local private key in .pem format.\n" +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + "--pkcs12 file : PKCS#12 file containing local private key, local certificate\n" + " and optionally the root CA certificate.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + "--x509-username-field : Field used in x509 certificate to be username.\n" + " Default is CN.\n" +#endif + "--verify-hash : Specify SHA1 fingerprint for level-1 cert.\n" +#ifdef WIN32 + "--cryptoapicert select-string : Load the certificate and private key from the\n" + " Windows Certificate System Store.\n" +#endif + "--tls-cipher l : A list l of allowable TLS ciphers separated by : (optional).\n" + " : Use --show-tls to see a list of supported TLS ciphers.\n" + "--tls-timeout n : Packet retransmit timeout on TLS control channel\n" + " if no ACK from remote within n seconds (default=%d).\n" + "--reneg-bytes n : Renegotiate data chan. key after n bytes sent and recvd.\n" + "--reneg-pkts n : Renegotiate data chan. key after n packets sent and recvd.\n" + "--reneg-sec n : Renegotiate data chan. key after n seconds (default=%d).\n" + "--hand-window n : Data channel key exchange must finalize within n seconds\n" + " of handshake initiation by any peer (default=%d).\n" + "--tran-window n : Transition window -- old key can live this many seconds\n" + " after new key renegotiation begins (default=%d).\n" + "--single-session: Allow only one session (reset state on restart).\n" + "--tls-exit : Exit on TLS negotiation failure.\n" + "--tls-auth f [d]: Add an additional layer of authentication on top of the TLS\n" + " control channel to protect against DoS attacks.\n" + " f (required) is a shared-secret passphrase file.\n" + " The optional d parameter controls key directionality,\n" + " see --secret option for more info.\n" + "--askpass [file]: Get PEM password from controlling tty before we daemonize.\n" + "--auth-nocache : Don't cache --askpass or --auth-user-pass passwords.\n" + "--crl-verify crl ['dir']: Check peer certificate against a CRL.\n" + "--tls-verify cmd: Run command cmd to verify the X509 name of a\n" + " pending TLS connection that has otherwise passed all other\n" + " tests of certification. cmd should return 0 to allow\n" + " TLS handshake to proceed, or 1 to fail. (cmd is\n" + " executed as 'cmd certificate_depth subject')\n" + "--tls-export-cert [directory] : Get peer cert in PEM format and store it \n" + " in an openvpn temporary file in [directory]. Peer cert is \n" + " stored before tls-verify script execution and deleted after.\n" + "--tls-remote x509name: Accept connections only from a host with X509 name\n" + " x509name. The remote host must also pass all other tests\n" + " of verification.\n" + "--ns-cert-type t: Require that peer certificate was signed with an explicit\n" + " nsCertType designation t = 'client' | 'server'.\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + "--x509-track x : Save peer X509 attribute x in environment for use by\n" + " plugins and management interface.\n" +#endif +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L || ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + "--remote-cert-ku v ... : Require that the peer certificate was signed with\n" + " explicit key usage, you can specify more than one value.\n" + " value should be given in hex format.\n" + "--remote-cert-eku oid : Require that the peer certificate was signed with\n" + " explicit extended key usage. Extended key usage can be encoded\n" + " as an object identifier or OpenSSL string representation.\n" + "--remote-cert-tls t: Require that peer certificate was signed with explicit\n" + " key usage and extended key usage based on RFC3280 TLS rules.\n" + " t = 'client' | 'server'.\n" +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER || ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + "\n" + "PKCS#11 Options:\n" + "--pkcs11-providers provider ... : PKCS#11 provider to load.\n" + "--pkcs11-protected-authentication [0|1] ... : Use PKCS#11 protected authentication\n" + " path. Set for each provider.\n" + "--pkcs11-private-mode hex ... : PKCS#11 private key mode mask.\n" + " 0 : Try to determind automatically (default).\n" + " 1 : Use Sign.\n" + " 2 : Use SignRecover.\n" + " 4 : Use Decrypt.\n" + " 8 : Use Unwrap.\n" + "--pkcs11-cert-private [0|1] ... : Set if login should be performed before\n" + " certificate can be accessed. Set for each provider.\n" + "--pkcs11-pin-cache seconds : Number of seconds to cache PIN. The default is -1\n" + " cache until token is removed.\n" + "--pkcs11-id-management : Acquire identity from management interface.\n" + "--pkcs11-id serialized-id 'id' : Identity to use, get using standalone --show-pkcs11-ids\n" +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + "\n" + "SSL Library information:\n" + "--show-ciphers : Show cipher algorithms to use with --cipher option.\n" + "--show-digests : Show message digest algorithms to use with --auth option.\n" + "--show-engines : Show hardware crypto accelerator engines (if available).\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + "--show-tls : Show all TLS ciphers (TLS used only as a control channel).\n" +#endif +#ifdef WIN32 + "\n" + "Windows Specific:\n" + "--win-sys path : Pathname of Windows system directory. Default is the pathname\n" + " from SystemRoot environment variable.\n" + "--ip-win32 method : When using --ifconfig on Windows, set TAP-Windows adapter\n" + " IP address using method = manual, netsh, ipapi,\n" + " dynamic, or adaptive (default = adaptive).\n" + " Dynamic method allows two optional parameters:\n" + " offset: DHCP server address offset (> -256 and < 256).\n" + " If 0, use network address, if >0, take nth\n" + " address forward from network address, if <0,\n" + " take nth address backward from broadcast\n" + " address.\n" + " Default is 0.\n" + " lease-time: Lease time in seconds.\n" + " Default is one year.\n" + "--route-method : Which method to use for adding routes on Windows?\n" + " adaptive (default) -- Try ipapi then fall back to exe.\n" + " ipapi -- Use IP helper API.\n" + " exe -- Call the route.exe shell command.\n" + "--dhcp-option type [parm] : Set extended TAP-Windows properties, must\n" + " be used with --ip-win32 dynamic. For options\n" + " which allow multiple addresses,\n" + " --dhcp-option must be repeated.\n" + " DOMAIN name : Set DNS suffix\n" + " DNS addr : Set domain name server address(es)\n" + " NTP : Set NTP server address(es)\n" + " NBDD : Set NBDD server address(es)\n" + " WINS addr : Set WINS server address(es)\n" + " NBT type : Set NetBIOS over TCP/IP Node type\n" + " 1: B, 2: P, 4: M, 8: H\n" + " NBS id : Set NetBIOS scope ID\n" + " DISABLE-NBT : Disable Netbios-over-TCP/IP.\n" + "--dhcp-renew : Ask Windows to renew the TAP adapter lease on startup.\n" + "--dhcp-pre-release : Ask Windows to release the previous TAP adapter lease on\n" +" startup.\n" + "--dhcp-release : Ask Windows to release the TAP adapter lease on shutdown.\n" + "--register-dns : Run net stop dnscache, net start dnscache, ipconfig /flushdns\n" + " and ipconfig /registerdns on connection initiation.\n" + "--tap-sleep n : Sleep for n seconds after TAP adapter open before\n" + " attempting to set adapter properties.\n" + "--pause-exit : When run from a console window, pause before exiting.\n" + "--service ex [0|1] : For use when " PACKAGE_NAME " is being instantiated by a\n" + " service, and should not be used directly by end-users.\n" + " ex is the name of an event object which, when\n" + " signaled, will cause " PACKAGE_NAME " to exit. A second\n" + " optional parameter controls the initial state of ex.\n" + "--show-net-up : Show " PACKAGE_NAME "'s view of routing table and net adapter list\n" + " after TAP adapter is up and routes have been added.\n" + "Windows Standalone Options:\n" + "\n" + "--show-adapters : Show all TAP-Windows adapters.\n" + "--show-net : Show " PACKAGE_NAME "'s view of routing table and net adapter list.\n" + "--show-valid-subnets : Show valid subnets for --dev tun emulation.\n" + "--allow-nonadmin [TAP-adapter] : Allow " PACKAGE_NAME " running without admin privileges\n" + " to access TAP adapter.\n" +#endif + "\n" + "Generate a random key (only for non-TLS static key encryption mode):\n" + "--genkey : Generate a random key to be used as a shared secret,\n" + " for use with the --secret option.\n" + "--secret file : Write key to file.\n" +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + "\n" + "Tun/tap config mode (available with linux 2.4+):\n" + "--mktun : Create a persistent tunnel.\n" + "--rmtun : Remove a persistent tunnel.\n" + "--dev tunX|tapX : tun/tap device\n" + "--dev-type dt : Device type. See tunnel options above for details.\n" + "--user user : User to set privilege to.\n" + "--group group : Group to set privilege to.\n" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + "\n" + "PKCS#11 standalone options:\n" + "--show-pkcs11-ids provider [cert_private] : Show PKCS#11 available ids.\n" + " --verb option can be added *BEFORE* this.\n" +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + "\n" + "General Standalone Options:\n" +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + "--show-gateway : Show info about default gateway.\n" +#endif + ; + +#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */ + +/* + * This is where the options defaults go. + * Any option not explicitly set here + * will be set to 0. + */ +void +init_options (struct options *o, const bool init_gc) +{ + CLEAR (*o); + if (init_gc) + { + gc_init (&o->gc); + o->gc_owned = true; + } + o->mode = MODE_POINT_TO_POINT; + o->topology = TOP_NET30; + o->ce.proto = PROTO_UDP; + o->ce.af = AF_UNSPEC; + o->ce.connect_retry_seconds = 5; + o->ce.connect_timeout = 10; + o->connect_retry_max = 0; + o->ce.local_port = o->ce.remote_port = OPENVPN_PORT; + o->verbosity = 1; + o->status_file_update_freq = 60; + o->status_file_version = 1; + o->ce.bind_local = true; + o->ce.tun_mtu = TUN_MTU_DEFAULT; + o->ce.link_mtu = LINK_MTU_DEFAULT; + o->ce.mtu_discover_type = -1; + o->ce.mssfix = MSSFIX_DEFAULT; + o->route_delay_window = 30; + o->max_routes = MAX_ROUTES_DEFAULT; + o->resolve_retry_seconds = RESOLV_RETRY_INFINITE; + o->proto_force = -1; +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + o->occ = true; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + o->management_log_history_cache = 250; + o->management_echo_buffer_size = 100; + o->management_state_buffer_size = 100; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + o->persist_mode = 1; +#endif +#ifndef WIN32 + o->rcvbuf = 65536; + o->sndbuf = 65536; +#endif +#ifdef TARGET_LINUX + o->tuntap_options.txqueuelen = 100; +#endif +#ifdef WIN32 +#if 0 + o->tuntap_options.ip_win32_type = IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE; +#else + o->tuntap_options.ip_win32_type = IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ; +#endif + o->tuntap_options.dhcp_lease_time = 31536000; /* one year */ + o->tuntap_options.dhcp_masq_offset = 0; /* use network address as internal DHCP server address */ + o->route_method = ROUTE_METHOD_ADAPTIVE; +#endif +#if P2MP_SERVER + o->real_hash_size = 256; + o->virtual_hash_size = 256; + o->n_bcast_buf = 256; + o->tcp_queue_limit = 64; + o->max_clients = 1024; + o->max_routes_per_client = 256; + o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0; + o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600; +#endif +#if P2MP + o->scheduled_exit_interval = 5; + o->server_poll_timeout = 0; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + o->ciphername = "BF-CBC"; + o->ciphername_defined = true; + o->authname = "SHA1"; + o->authname_defined = true; + o->prng_hash = "SHA1"; + o->prng_nonce_secret_len = 16; + o->replay = true; + o->replay_window = DEFAULT_SEQ_BACKTRACK; + o->replay_time = DEFAULT_TIME_BACKTRACK; + o->use_iv = true; + o->key_direction = KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL; +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + o->use_prediction_resistance = false; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + o->key_method = 2; + o->tls_timeout = 2; + o->renegotiate_seconds = 3600; + o->handshake_window = 60; + o->transition_window = 3600; +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + o->x509_username_field = X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT; +#endif +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + o->pkcs11_pin_cache_period = -1; +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + +/* tmp is only used in P2MP server context */ +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* Set default --tmp-dir */ +#ifdef WIN32 + /* On Windows, find temp dir via enviroment variables */ + o->tmp_dir = win_get_tempdir(); +#else + /* Non-windows platforms use $TMPDIR, and if not set, default to '/tmp' */ + o->tmp_dir = getenv("TMPDIR"); + if( !o->tmp_dir ) { + o->tmp_dir = "/tmp"; + } +#endif /* WIN32 */ +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ +} + +void +uninit_options (struct options *o) +{ + if (o->gc_owned) + { + gc_free (&o->gc); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +#define SHOW_PARM(name, value, format) msg(D_SHOW_PARMS, " " #name " = " format, (value)) +#define SHOW_STR(var) SHOW_PARM(var, (o->var ? o->var : "[UNDEF]"), "'%s'") +#define SHOW_INT(var) SHOW_PARM(var, o->var, "%d") +#define SHOW_UINT(var) SHOW_PARM(var, o->var, "%u") +#define SHOW_UNSIGNED(var) SHOW_PARM(var, o->var, "0x%08x") +#define SHOW_BOOL(var) SHOW_PARM(var, (o->var ? "ENABLED" : "DISABLED"), "%s"); + +#endif + +void +setenv_connection_entry (struct env_set *es, + const struct connection_entry *e, + const int i) +{ + setenv_str_i (es, "proto", proto2ascii (e->proto, e->af, false), i); + setenv_str_i (es, "local", e->local, i); + setenv_str_i (es, "local_port", e->local_port, i); + setenv_str_i (es, "remote", e->remote, i); + setenv_str_i (es, "remote_port", e->remote_port, i); + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (e->http_proxy_options) + { + setenv_str_i (es, "http_proxy_server", e->http_proxy_options->server, i); + setenv_str_i (es, "http_proxy_port", e->http_proxy_options->port, i); + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (e->socks_proxy_server) + { + setenv_str_i (es, "socks_proxy_server", e->socks_proxy_server, i); + setenv_str_i (es, "socks_proxy_port", e->socks_proxy_port, i); + } +#endif +} + +void +setenv_settings (struct env_set *es, const struct options *o) +{ + setenv_str (es, "config", o->config); + setenv_int (es, "verb", o->verbosity); + setenv_int (es, "daemon", o->daemon); + setenv_int (es, "daemon_log_redirect", o->log); + setenv_unsigned (es, "daemon_start_time", time(NULL)); + setenv_int (es, "daemon_pid", platform_getpid()); + + if (o->connection_list) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < o->connection_list->len; ++i) + setenv_connection_entry (es, o->connection_list->array[i], i+1); + } + else + setenv_connection_entry (es, &o->ce, 1); +} + +static in_addr_t +get_ip_addr (const char *ip_string, int msglevel, bool *error) +{ + unsigned int flags = GETADDR_HOST_ORDER; + bool succeeded = false; + in_addr_t ret; + + if (msglevel & M_FATAL) + flags |= GETADDR_FATAL; + + ret = getaddr (flags, ip_string, 0, &succeeded, NULL); + if (!succeeded && error) + *error = true; + return ret; +} + +/* helper: parse a text string containing an IPv6 address + netbits + * in "standard format" (2001:dba::/32) + * "/nn" is optional, default to /64 if missing + * + * return true if parsing succeeded, modify *network and *netbits + * return address part without "/nn" in *printable_ipv6 (if != NULL) + */ +bool +get_ipv6_addr( const char * prefix_str, struct in6_addr *network, + unsigned int * netbits, char ** printable_ipv6, int msglevel ) +{ + int rc; + char * sep, * endp; + int bits; + struct in6_addr t_network; + + sep = strchr( prefix_str, '/' ); + if ( sep == NULL ) + { + bits = 64; + } + else + { + bits = strtol( sep+1, &endp, 10 ); + if ( *endp != '\0' || bits < 0 || bits > 128 ) + { + msg (msglevel, "IPv6 prefix '%s': invalid '/bits' spec", prefix_str); + return false; + } + } + + /* temporary replace '/' in caller-provided string with '\0', otherwise + * inet_pton() will refuse prefix string + * (alternative would be to strncpy() the prefix to temporary buffer) + */ + + if ( sep != NULL ) *sep = '\0'; + + rc = inet_pton( AF_INET6, prefix_str, &t_network ); + + if ( rc == 1 && printable_ipv6 != NULL ) + { + *printable_ipv6 = string_alloc( prefix_str, NULL ); + } + + if ( sep != NULL ) *sep = '/'; + + if ( rc != 1 ) + { + msg (msglevel, "IPv6 prefix '%s': invalid IPv6 address", prefix_str); + return false; + } + + if ( netbits != NULL ) + { + *netbits = bits; + } + if ( network != NULL ) + { + *network = t_network; + } + return true; /* parsing OK, values set */ +} + +static bool ipv6_addr_safe_hexplusbits( const char * ipv6_prefix_spec ) +{ + struct in6_addr t_addr; + unsigned int t_bits; + + return get_ipv6_addr( ipv6_prefix_spec, &t_addr, &t_bits, NULL, M_WARN ); +} + +static char * +string_substitute (const char *src, int from, int to, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char *ret = (char *) gc_malloc (strlen (src) + 1, true, gc); + char *dest = ret; + char c; + + do + { + c = *src++; + if (c == from) + c = to; + *dest++ = c; + } + while (c); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL +static uint8_t * +parse_hash_fingerprint(const char *str, int nbytes, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int i; + const char *cp = str; + uint8_t *ret = (uint8_t *) gc_malloc (nbytes, true, gc); + char term = 1; + int byte; + char bs[3]; + + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; ++i) + { + if (strlen(cp) < 2) + msg (msglevel, "format error in hash fingerprint: %s", str); + bs[0] = *cp++; + bs[1] = *cp++; + bs[2] = 0; + byte = 0; + if (sscanf(bs, "%x", &byte) != 1) + msg (msglevel, "format error in hash fingerprint hex byte: %s", str); + ret[i] = (uint8_t)byte; + term = *cp++; + if (term != ':' && term != 0) + msg (msglevel, "format error in hash fingerprint delimiter: %s", str); + if (term == 0) + break; + } + if (term != 0 || i != nbytes-1) + msg (msglevel, "hash fingerprint is different length than expected (%d bytes): %s", nbytes, str); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static void +show_dhcp_option_addrs (const char *name, const in_addr_t *array, int len) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + { + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " %s[%d] = %s", + name, + i, + print_in_addr_t (array[i], 0, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +show_tuntap_options (const struct tuntap_options *o) +{ + SHOW_BOOL (ip_win32_defined); + SHOW_INT (ip_win32_type); + SHOW_INT (dhcp_masq_offset); + SHOW_INT (dhcp_lease_time); + SHOW_INT (tap_sleep); + SHOW_BOOL (dhcp_options); + SHOW_BOOL (dhcp_renew); + SHOW_BOOL (dhcp_pre_release); + SHOW_BOOL (dhcp_release); + SHOW_STR (domain); + SHOW_STR (netbios_scope); + SHOW_INT (netbios_node_type); + SHOW_BOOL (disable_nbt); + + show_dhcp_option_addrs ("DNS", o->dns, o->dns_len); + show_dhcp_option_addrs ("WINS", o->wins, o->wins_len); + show_dhcp_option_addrs ("NTP", o->ntp, o->ntp_len); + show_dhcp_option_addrs ("NBDD", o->nbdd, o->nbdd_len); +} + +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(TARGET_ANDROID) +static void +dhcp_option_address_parse (const char *name, const char *parm, in_addr_t *array, int *len, int msglevel) +{ + if (*len >= N_DHCP_ADDR) + { + msg (msglevel, "--dhcp-option %s: maximum of %d %s servers can be specified", + name, + N_DHCP_ADDR, + name); + } + else + { + if (ip_addr_dotted_quad_safe (parm)) /* FQDN -- IP address only */ + { + bool error = false; + const in_addr_t addr = get_ip_addr (parm, msglevel, &error); + if (!error) + array[(*len)++] = addr; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "dhcp-option parameter %s '%s' must be an IP address", name, parm); + } + } +} + +#endif + +#if P2MP + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static void +show_p2mp_parms (const struct options *o) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + +#if P2MP_SERVER + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_network = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_network, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_netmask = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_netmask, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_network_ipv6 = %s", print_in6_addr (o->server_network_ipv6, 0, &gc) ); + SHOW_INT (server_netbits_ipv6); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_bridge_ip = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_bridge_ip, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_bridge_netmask = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_bridge_netmask, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_bridge_pool_start = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_bridge_pool_start, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " server_bridge_pool_end = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->server_bridge_pool_end, 0, &gc)); + if (o->push_list.head) + { + const struct push_entry *e = o->push_list.head; + while (e) + { + if (e->enable) + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " push_entry = '%s'", e->option); + e = e->next; + } + } + SHOW_BOOL (ifconfig_pool_defined); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " ifconfig_pool_start = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->ifconfig_pool_start, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " ifconfig_pool_end = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->ifconfig_pool_end, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " ifconfig_pool_netmask = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->ifconfig_pool_netmask, 0, &gc)); + SHOW_STR (ifconfig_pool_persist_filename); + SHOW_INT (ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq); + SHOW_BOOL (ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base = %s", print_in6_addr (o->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base, 0, &gc)); + SHOW_INT (ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits); + SHOW_INT (n_bcast_buf); + SHOW_INT (tcp_queue_limit); + SHOW_INT (real_hash_size); + SHOW_INT (virtual_hash_size); + SHOW_STR (client_connect_script); + SHOW_STR (learn_address_script); + SHOW_STR (client_disconnect_script); + SHOW_STR (client_config_dir); + SHOW_BOOL (ccd_exclusive); + SHOW_STR (tmp_dir); + SHOW_BOOL (push_ifconfig_defined); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " push_ifconfig_local = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->push_ifconfig_local, 0, &gc)); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = %s", print_in_addr_t (o->push_ifconfig_remote_netmask, 0, &gc)); + SHOW_BOOL (push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " push_ifconfig_ipv6_local = %s/%d", print_in6_addr (o->push_ifconfig_ipv6_local, 0, &gc), o->push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits ); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote = %s", print_in6_addr (o->push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote, 0, &gc)); + SHOW_BOOL (enable_c2c); + SHOW_BOOL (duplicate_cn); + SHOW_INT (cf_max); + SHOW_INT (cf_per); + SHOW_INT (max_clients); + SHOW_INT (max_routes_per_client); + SHOW_STR (auth_user_pass_verify_script); + SHOW_BOOL (auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file); +#if PORT_SHARE + SHOW_STR (port_share_host); + SHOW_STR (port_share_port); +#endif +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ + + SHOW_BOOL (client); + SHOW_BOOL (pull); + SHOW_STR (auth_user_pass_file); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_DEBUG */ + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +static void +option_iroute (struct options *o, + const char *network_str, + const char *netmask_str, + int msglevel) +{ + struct iroute *ir; + + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (ir, struct iroute, &o->gc); + ir->network = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, network_str, 0, NULL, NULL); + ir->netbits = -1; + + if (netmask_str) + { + const in_addr_t netmask = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, netmask_str, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (!netmask_to_netbits (ir->network, netmask, &ir->netbits)) + { + msg (msglevel, "in --iroute %s %s : Bad network/subnet specification", + network_str, + netmask_str); + return; + } + } + + ir->next = o->iroutes; + o->iroutes = ir; +} + +static void +option_iroute_ipv6 (struct options *o, + const char *prefix_str, + int msglevel) +{ + struct iroute_ipv6 *ir; + + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (ir, struct iroute_ipv6, &o->gc); + + if ( get_ipv6_addr (prefix_str, &ir->network, &ir->netbits, NULL, msglevel ) < 0 ) + { + msg (msglevel, "in --iroute-ipv6 %s: Bad IPv6 prefix specification", + prefix_str); + return; + } + + ir->next = o->iroutes_ipv6; + o->iroutes_ipv6 = ir; +} +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ +#endif /* P2MP */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) && defined(ENABLE_DEBUG) +static void +show_http_proxy_options (const struct http_proxy_options *o) +{ + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "BEGIN http_proxy"); + SHOW_STR (server); + SHOW_STR (port); + SHOW_STR (auth_method_string); + SHOW_STR (auth_file); + SHOW_BOOL (retry); + SHOW_INT (timeout); + SHOW_STR (http_version); + SHOW_STR (user_agent); + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "END http_proxy"); +} +#endif + +void +options_detach (struct options *o) +{ + gc_detach (&o->gc); + o->routes = NULL; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + o->client_nat = NULL; +#endif +#if P2MP_SERVER + clone_push_list(o); +#endif +} + +void +rol_check_alloc (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->routes) + options->routes = new_route_option_list (options->max_routes, &options->gc); +} + +void +rol6_check_alloc (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->routes_ipv6) + options->routes_ipv6 = new_route_ipv6_option_list (options->max_routes, &options->gc); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT +static void +cnol_check_alloc (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->client_nat) + options->client_nat = new_client_nat_list (&options->gc); +} +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +static void +show_connection_entry (const struct connection_entry *o) +{ + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, " proto = %s", proto2ascii (o->proto, o->af, false)); + SHOW_STR (local); + SHOW_STR (local_port); + SHOW_STR (remote); + SHOW_STR (remote_port); + SHOW_BOOL (remote_float); + SHOW_BOOL (bind_defined); + SHOW_BOOL (bind_local); + SHOW_INT (connect_retry_seconds); + SHOW_INT (connect_timeout); + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (o->http_proxy_options) + show_http_proxy_options (o->http_proxy_options); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + SHOW_STR (socks_proxy_server); + SHOW_STR (socks_proxy_port); + SHOW_BOOL (socks_proxy_retry); +#endif + SHOW_INT (tun_mtu); + SHOW_BOOL (tun_mtu_defined); + SHOW_INT (link_mtu); + SHOW_BOOL (link_mtu_defined); + SHOW_INT (tun_mtu_extra); + SHOW_BOOL (tun_mtu_extra_defined); + + SHOW_INT (mtu_discover_type); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + SHOW_INT (fragment); +#endif + SHOW_INT (mssfix); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + SHOW_INT (explicit_exit_notification); +#endif +} + + +static void +show_connection_entries (const struct options *o) +{ + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "Connection profiles [default]:"); + show_connection_entry (&o->ce); + if (o->connection_list) + { + const struct connection_list *l = o->connection_list; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < l->len; ++i) + { + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "Connection profiles [%d]:", i); + show_connection_entry (l->array[i]); + } + } + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "Connection profiles END"); +} + +#endif + +void +show_settings (const struct options *o) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + msg (D_SHOW_PARMS, "Current Parameter Settings:"); + + SHOW_STR (config); + + SHOW_INT (mode); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + SHOW_BOOL (persist_config); + SHOW_INT (persist_mode); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + SHOW_BOOL (show_ciphers); + SHOW_BOOL (show_digests); + SHOW_BOOL (show_engines); + SHOW_BOOL (genkey); +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + SHOW_STR (key_pass_file); + SHOW_BOOL (show_tls_ciphers); +#endif +#endif + + SHOW_INT (connect_retry_max); + show_connection_entries (o); + + SHOW_BOOL (remote_random); + + SHOW_STR (ipchange); + SHOW_STR (dev); + SHOW_STR (dev_type); + SHOW_STR (dev_node); + SHOW_STR (lladdr); + SHOW_INT (topology); + SHOW_BOOL (tun_ipv6); + SHOW_STR (ifconfig_local); + SHOW_STR (ifconfig_remote_netmask); + SHOW_BOOL (ifconfig_noexec); + SHOW_BOOL (ifconfig_nowarn); + SHOW_STR (ifconfig_ipv6_local); + SHOW_INT (ifconfig_ipv6_netbits); + SHOW_STR (ifconfig_ipv6_remote); + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + SHOW_INT (shaper); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + SHOW_INT (mtu_test); +#endif + + SHOW_BOOL (mlock); + + SHOW_INT (keepalive_ping); + SHOW_INT (keepalive_timeout); + SHOW_INT (inactivity_timeout); + SHOW_INT (ping_send_timeout); + SHOW_INT (ping_rec_timeout); + SHOW_INT (ping_rec_timeout_action); + SHOW_BOOL (ping_timer_remote); + SHOW_INT (remap_sigusr1); + SHOW_BOOL (persist_tun); + SHOW_BOOL (persist_local_ip); + SHOW_BOOL (persist_remote_ip); + SHOW_BOOL (persist_key); + +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + SHOW_BOOL (passtos); +#endif + + SHOW_INT (resolve_retry_seconds); + + SHOW_STR (username); + SHOW_STR (groupname); + SHOW_STR (chroot_dir); + SHOW_STR (cd_dir); +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + SHOW_STR (selinux_context); +#endif + SHOW_STR (writepid); + SHOW_STR (up_script); + SHOW_STR (down_script); + SHOW_BOOL (down_pre); + SHOW_BOOL (up_restart); + SHOW_BOOL (up_delay); + SHOW_BOOL (daemon); + SHOW_INT (inetd); + SHOW_BOOL (log); + SHOW_BOOL (suppress_timestamps); + SHOW_INT (nice); + SHOW_INT (verbosity); + SHOW_INT (mute); +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + SHOW_INT (gremlin); +#endif + SHOW_STR (status_file); + SHOW_INT (status_file_version); + SHOW_INT (status_file_update_freq); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + SHOW_BOOL (occ); +#endif + SHOW_INT (rcvbuf); + SHOW_INT (sndbuf); +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) && HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK + SHOW_INT (mark); +#endif + SHOW_INT (sockflags); + + SHOW_BOOL (fast_io); + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + SHOW_INT (lzo); +#endif + + SHOW_STR (route_script); + SHOW_STR (route_default_gateway); + SHOW_INT (route_default_metric); + SHOW_BOOL (route_noexec); + SHOW_INT (route_delay); + SHOW_INT (route_delay_window); + SHOW_BOOL (route_delay_defined); + SHOW_BOOL (route_nopull); + SHOW_BOOL (route_gateway_via_dhcp); + SHOW_INT (max_routes); + SHOW_BOOL (allow_pull_fqdn); + if (o->routes) + print_route_options (o->routes, D_SHOW_PARMS); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + if (o->client_nat) + print_client_nat_list(o->client_nat, D_SHOW_PARMS); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + SHOW_STR (management_addr); + SHOW_STR (management_port); + SHOW_STR (management_user_pass); + SHOW_INT (management_log_history_cache); + SHOW_INT (management_echo_buffer_size); + SHOW_STR (management_write_peer_info_file); + SHOW_STR (management_client_user); + SHOW_STR (management_client_group); + SHOW_INT (management_flags); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + if (o->plugin_list) + plugin_option_list_print (o->plugin_list, D_SHOW_PARMS); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + SHOW_STR (shared_secret_file); + SHOW_INT (key_direction); + SHOW_BOOL (ciphername_defined); + SHOW_STR (ciphername); + SHOW_BOOL (authname_defined); + SHOW_STR (authname); + SHOW_STR (prng_hash); + SHOW_INT (prng_nonce_secret_len); + SHOW_INT (keysize); +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + SHOW_BOOL (engine); +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ + SHOW_BOOL (replay); + SHOW_BOOL (mute_replay_warnings); + SHOW_INT (replay_window); + SHOW_INT (replay_time); + SHOW_STR (packet_id_file); + SHOW_BOOL (use_iv); + SHOW_BOOL (test_crypto); +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + SHOW_BOOL (use_prediction_resistance); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + SHOW_BOOL (tls_server); + SHOW_BOOL (tls_client); + SHOW_INT (key_method); + SHOW_STR (ca_file); + SHOW_STR (ca_path); + SHOW_STR (dh_file); + SHOW_STR (cert_file); + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if((o->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY)) + SHOW_PARM ("priv_key_file","EXTERNAL_PRIVATE_KEY","%s"); + else +#endif + SHOW_STR (priv_key_file); +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + SHOW_STR (pkcs12_file); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + SHOW_STR (cryptoapi_cert); +#endif + SHOW_STR (cipher_list); + SHOW_STR (tls_verify); + SHOW_STR (tls_export_cert); + SHOW_STR (tls_remote); + SHOW_STR (crl_file); + SHOW_INT (ns_cert_type); + { + int i; + for (i=0;ipkcs11_providers[i] != NULL;i++) + SHOW_PARM (pkcs11_providers, o->pkcs11_providers[i], "%s"); + } + { + int i; + for (i=0;ipkcs11_protected_authentication[i] ? "ENABLED" : "DISABLED", "%s"); + } + { + int i; + for (i=0;ipkcs11_private_mode[i], "%08x"); + } + { + int i; + for (i=0;ipkcs11_cert_private[i] ? "ENABLED" : "DISABLED", "%s"); + } + SHOW_INT (pkcs11_pin_cache_period); + SHOW_STR (pkcs11_id); + SHOW_BOOL (pkcs11_id_management); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + +#if P2MP + show_p2mp_parms (o); +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + SHOW_BOOL (show_net_up); + SHOW_INT (route_method); + show_tuntap_options (&o->tuntap_options); +#endif +#endif +} + +#undef SHOW_PARM +#undef SHOW_STR +#undef SHOW_INT +#undef SHOW_BOOL + +#if HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE + +static struct http_proxy_options * +parse_http_proxy_override (const char *server, + const char *port, + const char *flags, + const int msglevel, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (server && port) + { + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (ho, struct http_proxy_options, gc); + ho->server = string_alloc(server, gc); + ho->port = port; + ho->retry = true; + ho->timeout = 5; + if (flags && !strcmp(flags, "nct")) + ho->auth_retry = PAR_NCT; + else + ho->auth_retry = PAR_ALL; + ho->http_version = "1.0"; + ho->user_agent = "OpenVPN-Autoproxy/1.0"; + return ho; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +void +options_postprocess_http_proxy_override (struct options *o) +{ + const struct connection_list *l = o->connection_list; + int i; + bool succeed = false; + for (i = 0; i < l->len; ++i) + { + struct connection_entry *ce = l->array[i]; + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT || ce->proto == PROTO_TCP) + { + ce->http_proxy_options = o->http_proxy_override; + succeed = true; + } + } + if (succeed) + { + for (i = 0; i < l->len; ++i) + { + struct connection_entry *ce = l->array[i]; + if (ce->proto == PROTO_UDP) + { + ce->flags |= CE_DISABLED; + } + } + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, "Note: option http-proxy-override ignored because no TCP-based connection profiles are defined"); + } +} + +#endif + +static struct connection_list * +alloc_connection_list_if_undef (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->connection_list) + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (options->connection_list, struct connection_list, &options->gc); + return options->connection_list; +} + +static struct connection_entry * +alloc_connection_entry (struct options *options, const int msglevel) +{ + struct connection_list *l = alloc_connection_list_if_undef (options); + struct connection_entry *e; + + if (l->len >= CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE) + { + msg (msglevel, "Maximum number of 'connection' options (%d) exceeded", CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE); + return NULL; + } + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (e, struct connection_entry, &options->gc); + l->array[l->len++] = e; + return e; +} + +static struct remote_list * +alloc_remote_list_if_undef (struct options *options) +{ + if (!options->remote_list) + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (options->remote_list, struct remote_list, &options->gc); + return options->remote_list; +} + +static struct remote_entry * +alloc_remote_entry (struct options *options, const int msglevel) +{ + struct remote_list *l = alloc_remote_list_if_undef (options); + struct remote_entry *e; + + if (l->len >= CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE) + { + msg (msglevel, "Maximum number of 'remote' options (%d) exceeded", CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE); + return NULL; + } + ALLOC_OBJ_GC (e, struct remote_entry, &options->gc); + l->array[l->len++] = e; + return e; +} + +void +connection_entry_load_re (struct connection_entry *ce, const struct remote_entry *re) +{ + if (re->remote) + ce->remote = re->remote; + if (re->remote_port) + ce->remote_port = re->remote_port; + if (re->proto >= 0) + ce->proto = re->proto; + if (re->af > 0) + ce->af = re->af; +} + +static void +options_postprocess_verify_ce (const struct options *options, const struct connection_entry *ce) +{ + struct options defaults; + int dev = DEV_TYPE_UNDEF; + bool pull = false; + + init_options (&defaults, true); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + if (options->test_crypto) + { + notnull (options->shared_secret_file, "key file (--secret)"); + } + else +#endif + notnull (options->dev, "TUN/TAP device (--dev)"); + + /* + * Get tun/tap/null device type + */ + dev = dev_type_enum (options->dev, options->dev_type); + + /* + * If "proto tcp" is specified, make sure we know whether it is + * tcp-client or tcp-server. + */ + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP) + msg (M_USAGE, "--proto tcp is ambiguous in this context. Please specify --proto tcp-server or --proto tcp-client"); + + /* + * Sanity check on daemon/inetd modes + */ + + if (options->daemon && options->inetd) + msg (M_USAGE, "only one of --daemon or --inetd may be specified"); + + if (options->inetd && (ce->local || ce->remote)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--local or --remote cannot be used with --inetd"); + + if (options->inetd && ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + msg (M_USAGE, "--proto tcp-client cannot be used with --inetd"); + + if (options->inetd == INETD_NOWAIT && ce->proto != PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + msg (M_USAGE, "--inetd nowait can only be used with --proto tcp-server"); + + if (options->inetd == INETD_NOWAIT +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + && !(options->tls_server || options->tls_client) +#endif + ) + msg (M_USAGE, "--inetd nowait can only be used in TLS mode"); + + if (options->inetd == INETD_NOWAIT && dev != DEV_TYPE_TAP) + msg (M_USAGE, "--inetd nowait only makes sense in --dev tap mode"); + + + if (options->lladdr && dev != DEV_TYPE_TAP) + msg (M_USAGE, "--lladdr can only be used in --dev tap mode"); + + /* + * Sanity check on TCP mode options + */ + if (ce->connect_timeout_defined && ce->proto != PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + msg (M_USAGE, "--connect-timeout doesn't make sense unless also used with " + "--proto tcp-client or tcp6-client"); + + /* + * Sanity check on MTU parameters + */ + if (options->ce.tun_mtu_defined && options->ce.link_mtu_defined) + msg (M_USAGE, "only one of --tun-mtu or --link-mtu may be defined (note that --ifconfig implies --link-mtu %d)", LINK_MTU_DEFAULT); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && options->mtu_test) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mtu-test only makes sense with --proto udp"); +#endif + + /* will we be pulling options from server? */ +#if P2MP + pull = options->pull; +#endif + + /* + * Sanity check on --local, --remote, and --ifconfig + */ + + if (proto_is_net(ce->proto) + && string_defined_equal (ce->local, ce->remote) + && string_defined_equal (ce->local_port, ce->remote_port)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--remote and --local addresses are the same"); + + if (string_defined_equal (ce->remote, options->ifconfig_local) + || string_defined_equal (ce->remote, options->ifconfig_remote_netmask)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--local and --remote addresses must be distinct from --ifconfig addresses"); + + if (string_defined_equal (ce->local, options->ifconfig_local) + || string_defined_equal (ce->local, options->ifconfig_remote_netmask)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--local addresses must be distinct from --ifconfig addresses"); + + if (string_defined_equal (options->ifconfig_local, options->ifconfig_remote_netmask)) + msg (M_USAGE, "local and remote/netmask --ifconfig addresses must be different"); + + if (ce->bind_defined && !ce->bind_local) + msg (M_USAGE, "--bind and --nobind can't be used together"); + + if (ce->local && !ce->bind_local) + msg (M_USAGE, "--local and --nobind don't make sense when used together"); + + if (ce->local_port_defined && !ce->bind_local) + msg (M_USAGE, "--lport and --nobind don't make sense when used together"); + + if (!ce->remote && !ce->bind_local) + msg (M_USAGE, "--nobind doesn't make sense unless used with --remote"); + + /* + * Check for consistency of management options + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (!options->management_addr && + (options->management_flags + || options->management_write_peer_info_file + || options->management_log_history_cache != defaults.management_log_history_cache)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--management is not specified, however one or more options which modify the behavior of --management were specified"); + + if ((options->management_client_user || options->management_client_group) + && !(options->management_flags & MF_UNIX_SOCK)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--management-client-(user|group) can only be used on unix domain sockets"); +#endif + + /* + * Windows-specific options. + */ + +#ifdef WIN32 + if (dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN && !(pull || (options->ifconfig_local && options->ifconfig_remote_netmask))) + msg (M_USAGE, "On Windows, --ifconfig is required when --dev tun is used"); + + if ((options->tuntap_options.ip_win32_defined) + && !(pull || (options->ifconfig_local && options->ifconfig_remote_netmask))) + msg (M_USAGE, "On Windows, --ip-win32 doesn't make sense unless --ifconfig is also used"); + + if (options->tuntap_options.dhcp_options + && options->tuntap_options.ip_win32_type != IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ + && options->tuntap_options.ip_win32_type != IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE) + msg (M_USAGE, "--dhcp-options requires --ip-win32 dynamic or adaptive"); +#endif + + /* + * Check that protocol options make sense. + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && ce->fragment) + msg (M_USAGE, "--fragment can only be used with --proto udp"); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && ce->explicit_exit_notification) + msg (M_USAGE, "--explicit-exit-notify can only be used with --proto udp"); +#endif + + if (!ce->remote && ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + msg (M_USAGE, "--remote MUST be used in TCP Client mode"); + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if ((ce->http_proxy_options) && ce->proto != PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + msg (M_USAGE, "--http-proxy MUST be used in TCP Client mode (i.e. --proto tcp-client)"); +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) && defined(ENABLE_SOCKS) + if (ce->http_proxy_options && ce->socks_proxy_server) + msg (M_USAGE, "--http-proxy can not be used together with --socks-proxy"); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (ce->socks_proxy_server && ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + msg (M_USAGE, "--socks-proxy can not be used in TCP Server mode"); +#endif + + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER && (options->connection_list->len > 1)) + msg (M_USAGE, "TCP server mode allows at most one --remote address"); + +#if P2MP_SERVER + + /* + * Check consistency of --mode server options. + */ + if (options->mode == MODE_SERVER) + { + if (!(dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN || dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mode server only works with --dev tun or --dev tap"); + if (options->pull) + msg (M_USAGE, "--pull cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (!(proto_is_udp(ce->proto) || ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mode server currently only supports " + "--proto udp or --proto tcp-server or proto tcp6-server"); +#if PORT_SHARE + if ((options->port_share_host || options->port_share_port) && + (ce->proto != PROTO_TCP_SERVER)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--port-share only works in TCP server mode " + "(--proto tcp-server or tcp6-server)"); +#endif + if (!options->tls_server) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mode server requires --tls-server"); + if (ce->remote) + msg (M_USAGE, "--remote cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (!ce->bind_local) + msg (M_USAGE, "--nobind cannot be used with --mode server"); +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + if (ce->http_proxy_options) + msg (M_USAGE, "--http-proxy cannot be used with --mode server"); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (ce->socks_proxy_server) + msg (M_USAGE, "--socks-proxy cannot be used with --mode server"); +#endif + if (options->connection_list) + msg (M_USAGE, " cannot be used with --mode server"); +#if 0 + if (options->tun_ipv6) + msg (M_USAGE, "--tun-ipv6 cannot be used with --mode server"); +#endif + if (options->shaper) + msg (M_USAGE, "--shaper cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (options->inetd) + msg (M_USAGE, "--inetd cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (options->ipchange) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ipchange cannot be used with --mode server (use --client-connect instead)"); + if (!(proto_is_dgram(ce->proto) || ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mode server currently only supports " + "--proto udp or --proto tcp-server or --proto tcp6-server"); + if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && (options->cf_max || options->cf_per)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--connect-freq only works with --mode server --proto udp. Try --max-clients instead."); + if (!(dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN && options->topology == TOP_SUBNET)) && options->ifconfig_pool_netmask) + msg (M_USAGE, "The third parameter to --ifconfig-pool (netmask) is only valid in --dev tap mode"); +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (ce->explicit_exit_notification) + msg (M_USAGE, "--explicit-exit-notify cannot be used with --mode server"); +#endif + if (options->routes && (options->routes->flags & RG_ENABLE)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--redirect-gateway cannot be used with --mode server (however --push \"redirect-gateway\" is fine)"); + if (options->route_delay_defined) + msg (M_USAGE, "--route-delay cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (options->up_delay) + msg (M_USAGE, "--up-delay cannot be used with --mode server"); + if (!options->ifconfig_pool_defined && options->ifconfig_pool_persist_filename) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ifconfig-pool-persist must be used with --ifconfig-pool"); + if (options->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined && !options->ifconfig_ipv6_local ) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ifconfig-ipv6-pool needs --ifconfig-ipv6"); + if (options->ifconfig_ipv6_local && !options->tun_ipv6 ) + msg (M_INFO, "Warning: --ifconfig-ipv6 without --tun-ipv6 will not do IPv6"); + + if (options->auth_user_pass_file) + msg (M_USAGE, "--auth-user-pass cannot be used with --mode server (it should be used on the client side only)"); + if (options->ccd_exclusive && !options->client_config_dir) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ccd-exclusive must be used with --client-config-dir"); + if (options->key_method != 2) + msg (M_USAGE, "--mode server requires --key-method 2"); + + { + const bool ccnr = (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script + || PLUGIN_OPTION_LIST (options) + || MAN_CLIENT_AUTH_ENABLED (options)); + const char *postfix = "must be used with --management-client-auth, an --auth-user-pass-verify script, or plugin"; + if ((options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED) && !ccnr) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-cert-not-required %s", postfix); + if ((options->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) && !ccnr) + msg (M_USAGE, "--username-as-common-name %s", postfix); + if ((options->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) && !ccnr) + msg (M_USAGE, "--auth-user-pass-optional %s", postfix); + } + } + else + { + /* + * When not in server mode, err if parameters are + * specified which require --mode server. + */ + if (options->ifconfig_pool_defined || options->ifconfig_pool_persist_filename) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ifconfig-pool/--ifconfig-pool-persist requires --mode server"); + if (options->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined) + msg (M_USAGE, "--ifconfig-ipv6-pool requires --mode server"); + if (options->real_hash_size != defaults.real_hash_size + || options->virtual_hash_size != defaults.virtual_hash_size) + msg (M_USAGE, "--hash-size requires --mode server"); + if (options->learn_address_script) + msg (M_USAGE, "--learn-address requires --mode server"); + if (options->client_connect_script) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-connect requires --mode server"); + if (options->client_disconnect_script) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-disconnect requires --mode server"); + if (options->client_config_dir || options->ccd_exclusive) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-config-dir/--ccd-exclusive requires --mode server"); + if (options->enable_c2c) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-to-client requires --mode server"); + if (options->duplicate_cn) + msg (M_USAGE, "--duplicate-cn requires --mode server"); + if (options->cf_max || options->cf_per) + msg (M_USAGE, "--connect-freq requires --mode server"); + if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED) + msg (M_USAGE, "--client-cert-not-required requires --mode server"); + if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) + msg (M_USAGE, "--username-as-common-name requires --mode server"); + if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) + msg (M_USAGE, "--auth-user-pass-optional requires --mode server"); + if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_OPT_VERIFY) + msg (M_USAGE, "--opt-verify requires --mode server"); + if (options->server_flags & SF_TCP_NODELAY_HELPER) + msg (M_USAGE, "--tcp-nodelay requires --mode server"); + if (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script) + msg (M_USAGE, "--auth-user-pass-verify requires --mode server"); +#if PORT_SHARE + if (options->port_share_host || options->port_share_port) + msg (M_USAGE, "--port-share requires TCP server mode (--mode server --proto tcp-server)"); +#endif + + if (options->stale_routes_check_interval) + msg (M_USAGE, "--stale-routes-check requires --mode server"); + + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--compat-x509-names no-remapping requires --mode server"); + } +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + + /* + * Check consistency of replay options + */ + if ((!proto_is_udp(ce->proto)) + && (options->replay_window != defaults.replay_window + || options->replay_time != defaults.replay_time)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--replay-window only makes sense with --proto udp"); + + if (!options->replay + && (options->replay_window != defaults.replay_window + || options->replay_time != defaults.replay_time)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--replay-window doesn't make sense when replay protection is disabled with --no-replay"); + + /* + * SSL/TLS mode sanity checks. + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + if (options->tls_server + options->tls_client + + (options->shared_secret_file != NULL) > 1) + msg (M_USAGE, "specify only one of --tls-server, --tls-client, or --secret"); + + if (options->tls_server) + { + notnull (options->dh_file, "DH file (--dh)"); + } + if (options->tls_server || options->tls_client) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + if (options->pkcs11_providers[0]) + { + notnull (options->ca_file, "CA file (--ca)"); + + if (options->pkcs11_id_management && options->pkcs11_id != NULL) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --pkcs11-id cannot be used when --pkcs11-id-management is also specified."); + if (!options->pkcs11_id_management && options->pkcs11_id == NULL) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --pkcs11-id or --pkcs11-id-management should be specified."); + if (options->cert_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --cert cannot be used when --pkcs11-provider is also specified."); + if (options->priv_key_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --key cannot be used when --pkcs11-provider is also specified."); +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if (options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --management-external-key cannot be used when --pkcs11-provider is also specified."); +#endif + if (options->pkcs12_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --pkcs12 cannot be used when --pkcs11-provider is also specified."); +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + if (options->cryptoapi_cert) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --cryptoapicert cannot be used when --pkcs11-provider is also specified."); +#endif + } + else +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if((options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY) && options->priv_key_file) + { + msg (M_USAGE, "--key and --management-external-key are mutually exclusive"); + } + else +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + if (options->cryptoapi_cert) + { + if ((!(options->ca_file)) && (!(options->ca_path))) + msg(M_USAGE, "You must define CA file (--ca) or CA path (--capath)"); + if (options->cert_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --cert cannot be used when --cryptoapicert is also specified."); + if (options->priv_key_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --key cannot be used when --cryptoapicert is also specified."); + if (options->pkcs12_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --pkcs12 cannot be used when --cryptoapicert is also specified."); +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if (options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --management-external-key cannot be used when --cryptoapicert is also specified."); +#endif + } + else +#endif + if (options->pkcs12_file) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --pkcs12 cannot be used with the PolarSSL version version of OpenVPN."); +#else + if (options->ca_path) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --capath cannot be used when --pkcs12 is also specified."); + if (options->cert_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --cert cannot be used when --pkcs12 is also specified."); + if (options->priv_key_file) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --key cannot be used when --pkcs12 is also specified."); +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if (options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --external-management-key cannot be used when --pkcs12 is also specified."); +#endif +#endif + } + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + if (!(options->ca_file)) + msg(M_USAGE, "You must define CA file (--ca)"); + if (options->ca_path) + msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --capath cannot be used with the PolarSSL version version of OpenVPN."); +#else + if ((!(options->ca_file)) && (!(options->ca_path))) + msg(M_USAGE, "You must define CA file (--ca) or CA path (--capath)"); +#endif + if (pull) + { + + const int sum = (options->cert_file != NULL) + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + ((options->priv_key_file != NULL) || (options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY)); +#else + (options->priv_key_file != NULL); +#endif + + + if (sum == 0) + { +#if P2MP + if (!options->auth_user_pass_file) +#endif + msg (M_USAGE, "No client-side authentication method is specified. You must use either --cert/--key, --pkcs12, or --auth-user-pass"); + } + else if (sum == 2) + ; + else + { + msg (M_USAGE, "If you use one of --cert or --key, you must use them both"); + } + } + else + { + notnull (options->cert_file, "certificate file (--cert) or PKCS#12 file (--pkcs12)"); +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if (!(options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY)) +#endif + notnull (options->priv_key_file, "private key file (--key) or PKCS#12 file (--pkcs12)"); + } + } + } + else + { + /* + * Make sure user doesn't specify any TLS options + * when in non-TLS mode. + */ + +#define MUST_BE_UNDEF(parm) if (options->parm != defaults.parm) msg (M_USAGE, err, #parm); + + const char err[] = "Parameter %s can only be specified in TLS-mode, i.e. where --tls-server or --tls-client is also specified."; + + MUST_BE_UNDEF (ca_file); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (ca_path); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (dh_file); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (cert_file); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (priv_key_file); +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + MUST_BE_UNDEF (pkcs12_file); +#endif + MUST_BE_UNDEF (cipher_list); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_verify); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_export_cert); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_remote); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_timeout); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (renegotiate_bytes); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (renegotiate_packets); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (renegotiate_seconds); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (handshake_window); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (transition_window); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_auth_file); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (single_session); +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + MUST_BE_UNDEF (push_peer_info); +#endif + MUST_BE_UNDEF (tls_exit); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (crl_file); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (key_method); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (ns_cert_type); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_ku[0]); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (remote_cert_eku); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + MUST_BE_UNDEF (pkcs11_providers[0]); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (pkcs11_private_mode[0]); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (pkcs11_id); + MUST_BE_UNDEF (pkcs11_id_management); +#endif + + if (pull) + msg (M_USAGE, err, "--pull"); + } +#undef MUST_BE_UNDEF +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + +#if P2MP + if (options->auth_user_pass_file && !options->pull) + msg (M_USAGE, "--auth-user-pass requires --pull"); +#endif + + uninit_options (&defaults); +} + +static void +options_postprocess_mutate_ce (struct options *o, struct connection_entry *ce) +{ + const int dev = dev_type_enum (o->dev, o->dev_type); + +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (o->server_defined || o->server_bridge_defined || o->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp) + { + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP) + ce->proto = PROTO_TCP_SERVER; + } +#endif +#if P2MP + if (o->client) + { + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP) + ce->proto = PROTO_TCP_CLIENT; + } +#endif + + if (ce->proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT && !ce->local && !ce->local_port_defined && !ce->bind_defined) + ce->bind_local = false; + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (ce->proto == PROTO_UDP && ce->socks_proxy_server && !ce->local && !ce->local_port_defined && !ce->bind_defined) + ce->bind_local = false; +#endif + + if (!ce->bind_local) + ce->local_port = NULL; + + /* if protocol forcing is enabled, disable all protocols except for the forced one */ + if (o->proto_force >= 0 && o->proto_force != ce->proto) + ce->flags |= CE_DISABLED; + + /* + * If --mssfix is supplied without a parameter, default + * it to --fragment value, if --fragment is specified. + */ + if (o->ce.mssfix_default) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (ce->fragment) + o->ce.mssfix = ce->fragment; +#else + msg (M_USAGE, "--mssfix must specify a parameter"); +#endif + } + + /* + * Set MTU defaults + */ + { + if (!ce->tun_mtu_defined && !ce->link_mtu_defined) + { + ce->tun_mtu_defined = true; + } + if ((dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP) && !ce->tun_mtu_extra_defined) + { + ce->tun_mtu_extra_defined = true; + ce->tun_mtu_extra = TAP_MTU_EXTRA_DEFAULT; + } + } + +} + +static void +options_postprocess_mutate_invariant (struct options *options) +{ + const int dev = dev_type_enum (options->dev, options->dev_type); + + /* + * In forking TCP server mode, you don't need to ifconfig + * the tap device (the assumption is that it will be bridged). + */ + if (options->inetd == INETD_NOWAIT) + options->ifconfig_noexec = true; + +#ifdef WIN32 + if ((dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN || dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP) && !options->route_delay_defined) + { + if (options->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT) + { + options->route_delay_defined = true; + options->route_delay = 5; /* Vista sometimes has a race without this */ + } + } + + if (options->ifconfig_noexec) + { + options->tuntap_options.ip_win32_type = IPW32_SET_MANUAL; + options->ifconfig_noexec = false; + } +#endif + +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* + * Check consistency of --mode server options. + */ + if (options->mode == MODE_SERVER) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + /* + * We need to explicitly set --tap-sleep because + * we do not schedule event timers in the top-level context. + */ + options->tuntap_options.tap_sleep = 10; + if (options->route_delay_defined && options->route_delay) + options->tuntap_options.tap_sleep = options->route_delay; + options->route_delay_defined = false; +#endif + } +#endif +} + +static void +options_postprocess_verify (const struct options *o) +{ + if (o->connection_list) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < o->connection_list->len; ++i) + options_postprocess_verify_ce (o, o->connection_list->array[i]); + } + else + options_postprocess_verify_ce (o, &o->ce); +} + +static void +options_postprocess_mutate (struct options *o) +{ + /* + * Process helper-type options which map to other, more complex + * sequences of options. + */ + helper_client_server (o); + helper_keepalive (o); + helper_tcp_nodelay (o); + + options_postprocess_mutate_invariant (o); + + if (o->remote_list && !o->connection_list) + { + /* + * Convert remotes into connection list + */ + const struct remote_list *rl = o->remote_list; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rl->len; ++i) + { + const struct remote_entry *re = rl->array[i]; + struct connection_entry ce = o->ce; + struct connection_entry *ace; + + ASSERT (re->remote); + connection_entry_load_re (&ce, re); + ace = alloc_connection_entry (o, M_USAGE); + ASSERT (ace); + *ace = ce; + } + } + else if(!o->remote_list && !o->connection_list) + { + struct connection_entry *ace; + ace = alloc_connection_entry (o, M_USAGE); + ASSERT (ace); + *ace = o->ce; + } + + ASSERT (o->connection_list); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < o->connection_list->len; ++i) + options_postprocess_mutate_ce (o, o->connection_list->array[i]); + +#if HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE + if (o->http_proxy_override) + options_postprocess_http_proxy_override(o); +#endif + +#if P2MP + /* + * Save certain parms before modifying options via --pull + */ + pre_pull_save (o); +#endif +} + +/* + * Check file/directory sanity + * + */ +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL /** Expect people using the stripped down version to know what they do */ + +#define CHKACC_FILE (1<<0) /** Check for a file/directory precense */ +#define CHKACC_DIRPATH (1<<1) /** Check for directory precense where a file should reside */ +#define CHKACC_FILEXSTWR (1<<2) /** If file exists, is it writable? */ +#define CHKACC_INLINE (1<<3) /** File is present if it's an inline file */ +#define CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN (1<<4) /** If filename is stdin, it's allowed and "exists" */ + +static bool +check_file_access(const int type, const char *file, const int mode, const char *opt) +{ + int errcode = 0; + + /* If no file configured, no errors to look for */ + if (!file) + return false; + + /* If this may be an inline file, and the proper inline "filename" is set - no issues */ + if ((type & CHKACC_INLINE) && streq(file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) ) + return false; + + /* If stdin is allowed and the file name is 'stdin', then do no + * further checks as stdin is always available + */ + if( (type & CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN) && streq(file, "stdin") ) + return false; + + /* Is the directory path leading to the given file accessible? */ + if (type & CHKACC_DIRPATH) + { + char *fullpath = strdup(file); /* POSIX dirname() implementaion may modify its arguments */ + char *dirpath = dirname(fullpath); + + if (platform_access (dirpath, mode|X_OK) != 0) + errcode = errno; + free(fullpath); + } + + /* Is the file itself accessible? */ + if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILE) && (platform_access (file, mode) != 0) ) + errcode = errno; + + /* If the file exists and is accessible, is it writable? */ + if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILEXSTWR) && (platform_access (file, F_OK) == 0) ) + if (platform_access (file, W_OK) != 0) + errcode = errno; + + /* Scream if an error is found */ + if( errcode > 0 ) + msg (M_NOPREFIX|M_OPTERR, "%s fails with '%s': %s", + opt, file, strerror(errno)); + + /* Return true if an error occured */ + return (errcode != 0 ? true : false); +} + +/* + * Verifies that the path in the "command" that comes after certain script options (e.g., --up) is a + * valid file with appropriate permissions. + * + * "command" consists of a path, optionally followed by a space, which may be + * followed by arbitrary arguments. It is NOT a full shell command line -- shell expansion is not + * performed. + * + * The path and arguments in "command" may be single- or double-quoted or escaped. + * + * The path is extracted from "command", then check_file_access() is called to check it. The + * arguments, if any, are ignored. + * + * Note that the type, mode, and opt arguments to this routine are the same as the corresponding + * check_file_access() arguments. + */ +static bool +check_cmd_access(const char *command, const char *opt) +{ + struct argv argv; + bool return_code; + + /* If no command was set, there are no errors to look for */ + if (! command) + return false; + + /* Extract executable path and arguments */ + argv = argv_new (); + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc", command); + + /* if an executable is specified then check it; otherwise, complain */ + if (argv.argv[0]) + /* Scripts requires R_OK as well, but that might fail on binaries which + * only requires X_OK to function on Unix - a scenario not unlikely to + * be seen on suid binaries. + */ + return_code = check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE, argv.argv[0], X_OK, opt); + else + { + msg (M_NOPREFIX|M_OPTERR, "%s fails with '%s': No path to executable.", + opt, command); + return_code = true; + } + + argv_reset (&argv); + + return return_code; +} + +/* + * Sanity check of all file/dir options. Checks that file/dir + * is accessible by OpenVPN + */ +static void +options_postprocess_filechecks (struct options *options) +{ + bool errs = false; + + /* ** SSL/TLS/crypto related files ** */ +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->dh_file, R_OK, "--dh"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->ca_file, R_OK, "--ca"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->ca_path, R_OK, "--capath"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->cert_file, R_OK, "--cert"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->extra_certs_file, R_OK, + "--extra-certs"); +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + if(!(options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY)) +#endif + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->priv_key_file, R_OK, + "--key"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->pkcs12_file, R_OK, + "--pkcs12"); + + if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR) + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file, R_OK|X_OK, + "--crl-verify directory"); + else + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file, R_OK, + "--crl-verify"); + + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->tls_auth_file, R_OK, + "--tls-auth"); +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->shared_secret_file, R_OK, + "--secret"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_DIRPATH|CHKACC_FILEXSTWR, + options->packet_id_file, R_OK|W_OK, "--replay-persist"); +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + + + /* ** Password files ** */ +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->key_pass_file, R_OK, + "--askpass"); +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN, + options->management_user_pass, R_OK, + "--management user/password file"); +#endif /* ENABLE_MANAGEMENT */ +#if P2MP + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN, + options->auth_user_pass_file, R_OK, + "--auth-user-pass"); +#endif /* P2MP */ + + /* ** System related ** */ + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->chroot_dir, + R_OK|X_OK, "--chroot directory"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_DIRPATH|CHKACC_FILEXSTWR, options->writepid, + R_OK|W_OK, "--writepid"); + + /* ** Log related ** */ + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_DIRPATH|CHKACC_FILEXSTWR, options->status_file, + R_OK|W_OK, "--status"); + + /* ** Config related ** */ +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->tls_export_cert, + R_OK|W_OK|X_OK, "--tls-export-cert"); +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#if P2MP_SERVER + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->client_config_dir, + R_OK|X_OK, "--client-config-dir"); + errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE, options->tmp_dir, + R_OK|W_OK|X_OK, "Temporary directory (--tmp-dir)"); + + /* ** Script hooks that accept an optionally quoted and/or escaped executable path, ** */ + /* ** optionally followed by arguments ** */ + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script, + "--auth-user-pass-verify script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->client_connect_script, + "--client-connect script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->client_disconnect_script, + "--client-disconnect script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->tls_verify, + "--tls-verify script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->up_script, + "--up script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->down_script, + "--down script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->ipchange, + "--ipchange script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->route_script, + "--route-up script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->route_predown_script, + "--route-pre-down script"); + errs |= check_cmd_access (options->learn_address_script, + "--learn-address script"); +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ + + if (errs) + msg (M_USAGE, "Please correct these errors."); +} +#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */ + +/* + * Sanity check on options. + * Also set some options based on other + * options. + */ +void +options_postprocess (struct options *options) +{ + options_postprocess_mutate (options); + options_postprocess_verify (options); +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + options_postprocess_filechecks (options); +#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */ +} + +#if P2MP + +/* + * Save/Restore certain option defaults before --pull is applied. + */ + +void +pre_pull_save (struct options *o) +{ + if (o->pull) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (o->pre_pull, struct options_pre_pull, &o->gc); + o->pre_pull->tuntap_options = o->tuntap_options; + o->pre_pull->tuntap_options_defined = true; + o->pre_pull->foreign_option_index = o->foreign_option_index; + if (o->routes) + { + o->pre_pull->routes = clone_route_option_list(o->routes, &o->gc); + o->pre_pull->routes_defined = true; + } + if (o->routes_ipv6) + { + o->pre_pull->routes_ipv6 = clone_route_ipv6_option_list(o->routes_ipv6, &o->gc); + o->pre_pull->routes_ipv6_defined = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + if (o->client_nat) + { + o->pre_pull->client_nat = clone_client_nat_option_list(o->client_nat, &o->gc); + o->pre_pull->client_nat_defined = true; + } +#endif + } +} + +void +pre_pull_restore (struct options *o) +{ + const struct options_pre_pull *pp = o->pre_pull; + if (pp) + { + CLEAR (o->tuntap_options); + if (pp->tuntap_options_defined) + o->tuntap_options = pp->tuntap_options; + + if (pp->routes_defined) + { + rol_check_alloc (o); + copy_route_option_list (o->routes, pp->routes); + } + else + o->routes = NULL; + + if (pp->routes_ipv6_defined) + { + rol6_check_alloc (o); + copy_route_ipv6_option_list (o->routes_ipv6, pp->routes_ipv6); + } + else + o->routes_ipv6 = NULL; + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + if (pp->client_nat_defined) + { + cnol_check_alloc (o); + copy_client_nat_option_list (o->client_nat, pp->client_nat); + } + else + o->client_nat = NULL; +#endif + + o->foreign_option_index = pp->foreign_option_index; + } + + o->push_continuation = 0; +} + +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + +/* + * Build an options string to represent data channel encryption options. + * This string must match exactly between peers. The keysize is checked + * separately by read_key(). + * + * The following options must match on both peers: + * + * Tunnel options: + * + * --dev tun|tap [unit number need not match] + * --dev-type tun|tap + * --link-mtu + * --udp-mtu + * --tun-mtu + * --proto udp + * --proto tcp-client [matched with --proto tcp-server + * on the other end of the connection] + * --proto tcp-server [matched with --proto tcp-client on + * the other end of the connection] + * --tun-ipv6 + * --ifconfig x y [matched with --ifconfig y x on + * the other end of the connection] + * + * --comp-lzo + * --fragment + * + * Crypto Options: + * + * --cipher + * --auth + * --keysize + * --secret + * --no-replay + * --no-iv + * + * SSL Options: + * + * --tls-auth + * --tls-client [matched with --tls-server on + * the other end of the connection] + * --tls-server [matched with --tls-client on + * the other end of the connection] + */ + +char * +options_string (const struct options *o, + const struct frame *frame, + struct tuntap *tt, + bool remote, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf (OPTION_LINE_SIZE); + bool tt_local = false; + + buf_printf (&out, "V4"); + + /* + * Tunnel Options + */ + + buf_printf (&out, ",dev-type %s", dev_type_string (o->dev, o->dev_type)); + buf_printf (&out, ",link-mtu %d", EXPANDED_SIZE (frame)); + buf_printf (&out, ",tun-mtu %d", PAYLOAD_SIZE (frame)); + buf_printf (&out, ",proto %s", proto_remote (o->ce.proto, remote)); + + /* send tun_ipv6 only in peer2peer mode - in client/server mode, it + * is usually pushed by the server, triggering a non-helpful warning + */ + if (o->tun_ipv6 && o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED(o)) + buf_printf (&out, ",tun-ipv6"); + + /* + * Try to get ifconfig parameters into the options string. + * If tt is undefined, make a temporary instantiation. + */ + if (!tt) + { + tt = init_tun (o->dev, + o->dev_type, + o->topology, + o->ifconfig_local, + o->ifconfig_remote_netmask, + o->ifconfig_ipv6_local, + o->ifconfig_ipv6_netbits, + o->ifconfig_ipv6_remote, + (in_addr_t)0, + (in_addr_t)0, + false, + NULL); + if (tt) + tt_local = true; + } + + if (tt && o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED(o)) + { + const char *ios = ifconfig_options_string (tt, remote, o->ifconfig_nowarn, gc); + if (ios && strlen (ios)) + buf_printf (&out, ",ifconfig %s", ios); + } + if (tt_local) + { + free (tt); + tt = NULL; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + if (o->lzo & LZO_SELECTED) + buf_printf (&out, ",comp-lzo"); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + if (o->ce.fragment) + buf_printf (&out, ",mtu-dynamic"); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL +#define TLS_CLIENT (o->tls_client) +#define TLS_SERVER (o->tls_server) +#else +#define TLS_CLIENT (false) +#define TLS_SERVER (false) +#endif + + /* + * Key direction + */ + { + const char *kd = keydirection2ascii (o->key_direction, remote); + if (kd) + buf_printf (&out, ",keydir %s", kd); + } + + /* + * Crypto Options + */ + if (o->shared_secret_file || TLS_CLIENT || TLS_SERVER) + { + struct key_type kt; + + ASSERT ((o->shared_secret_file != NULL) + + (TLS_CLIENT == true) + + (TLS_SERVER == true) + <= 1); + + init_key_type (&kt, o->ciphername, o->ciphername_defined, + o->authname, o->authname_defined, + o->keysize, true, false); + + buf_printf (&out, ",cipher %s", cipher_kt_name (kt.cipher)); + buf_printf (&out, ",auth %s", md_kt_name (kt.digest)); + buf_printf (&out, ",keysize %d", kt.cipher_length * 8); + if (o->shared_secret_file) + buf_printf (&out, ",secret"); + if (!o->replay) + buf_printf (&out, ",no-replay"); + if (!o->use_iv) + buf_printf (&out, ",no-iv"); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + if (o->use_prediction_resistance) + buf_printf (&out, ",use-prediction-resistance"); +#endif + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* + * SSL Options + */ + { + if (TLS_CLIENT || TLS_SERVER) + { + if (o->tls_auth_file) + buf_printf (&out, ",tls-auth"); + + if (o->key_method > 1) + buf_printf (&out, ",key-method %d", o->key_method); + } + + if (remote) + { + if (TLS_CLIENT) + buf_printf (&out, ",tls-server"); + else if (TLS_SERVER) + buf_printf (&out, ",tls-client"); + } + else + { + if (TLS_CLIENT) + buf_printf (&out, ",tls-client"); + else if (TLS_SERVER) + buf_printf (&out, ",tls-server"); + } + } +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ + +#undef TLS_CLIENT +#undef TLS_SERVER + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Compare option strings for equality. + * If the first two chars of the strings differ, it means that + * we are looking at different versions of the options string, + * therefore don't compare them and return true. + */ + +bool +options_cmp_equal (char *actual, const char *expected) +{ + return options_cmp_equal_safe (actual, expected, strlen (actual) + 1); +} + +void +options_warning (char *actual, const char *expected) +{ + options_warning_safe (actual, expected, strlen (actual) + 1); +} + +static const char * +options_warning_extract_parm1 (const char *option_string, + struct gc_arena *gc_ret) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer b = string_alloc_buf (option_string, &gc); + char *p = gc_malloc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, false, &gc); + const char *ret; + + buf_parse (&b, ' ', p, OPTION_PARM_SIZE); + ret = string_alloc (p, gc_ret); + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static void +options_warning_safe_scan2 (const int msglevel, + const int delim, + const bool report_inconsistent, + const char *p1, + const struct buffer *b2_src, + const char *b1_name, + const char *b2_name) +{ + /* we will stop sending 'proto xxx' in OCC in a future version + * (because it's not useful), and to reduce questions when + * interoperating, we start not-printing a warning about it today + */ + if (strncmp(p1, "proto ", 6) == 0 ) + { + return; + } + + if (strlen (p1) > 0) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer b2 = *b2_src; + const char *p1_prefix = options_warning_extract_parm1 (p1, &gc); + char *p2 = gc_malloc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, false, &gc); + + while (buf_parse (&b2, delim, p2, OPTION_PARM_SIZE)) + { + if (strlen (p2)) + { + const char *p2_prefix = options_warning_extract_parm1 (p2, &gc); + + if (!strcmp (p1, p2)) + goto done; + if (!strcmp (p1_prefix, p2_prefix)) + { + if (report_inconsistent) + msg (msglevel, "WARNING: '%s' is used inconsistently, %s='%s', %s='%s'", + safe_print (p1_prefix, &gc), + b1_name, + safe_print (p1, &gc), + b2_name, + safe_print (p2, &gc)); + goto done; + } + } + } + + msg (msglevel, "WARNING: '%s' is present in %s config but missing in %s config, %s='%s'", + safe_print (p1_prefix, &gc), + b1_name, + b2_name, + b1_name, + safe_print (p1, &gc)); + + done: + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static void +options_warning_safe_scan1 (const int msglevel, + const int delim, + const bool report_inconsistent, + const struct buffer *b1_src, + const struct buffer *b2_src, + const char *b1_name, + const char *b2_name) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer b = *b1_src; + char *p = gc_malloc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, true, &gc); + + while (buf_parse (&b, delim, p, OPTION_PARM_SIZE)) + options_warning_safe_scan2 (msglevel, delim, report_inconsistent, p, b2_src, b1_name, b2_name); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +options_warning_safe_ml (const int msglevel, char *actual, const char *expected, size_t actual_n) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (actual_n > 0) + { + struct buffer local = alloc_buf_gc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE + 16, &gc); + struct buffer remote = alloc_buf_gc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE + 16, &gc); + actual[actual_n - 1] = 0; + + buf_printf (&local, "version %s", expected); + buf_printf (&remote, "version %s", actual); + + options_warning_safe_scan1 (msglevel, ',', true, + &local, &remote, + "local", "remote"); + + options_warning_safe_scan1 (msglevel, ',', false, + &remote, &local, + "remote", "local"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +bool +options_cmp_equal_safe (char *actual, const char *expected, size_t actual_n) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = true; + + if (actual_n > 0) + { + actual[actual_n - 1] = 0; +#ifndef ENABLE_STRICT_OPTIONS_CHECK + if (strncmp (actual, expected, 2)) + { + msg (D_SHOW_OCC, "NOTE: Options consistency check may be skewed by version differences"); + options_warning_safe_ml (D_SHOW_OCC, actual, expected, actual_n); + } + else +#endif + ret = !strcmp (actual, expected); + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +void +options_warning_safe (char *actual, const char *expected, size_t actual_n) +{ + options_warning_safe_ml (M_WARN, actual, expected, actual_n); +} + +const char * +options_string_version (const char* s, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (4, gc); + strncpynt ((char *) BPTR (&out), s, 3); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_OCC */ + +static void +foreign_option (struct options *o, char *argv[], int len, struct env_set *es) +{ + if (len > 0) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + struct buffer name = alloc_buf_gc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, &gc); + struct buffer value = alloc_buf_gc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, &gc); + int i; + bool first = true; + bool good = true; + + good &= buf_printf (&name, "foreign_option_%d", o->foreign_option_index + 1); + ++o->foreign_option_index; + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + { + if (argv[i]) + { + if (!first) + good &= buf_printf (&value, " "); + good &= buf_printf (&value, "%s", argv[i]); + first = false; + } + } + if (good) + setenv_str (es, BSTR(&name), BSTR(&value)); + else + msg (M_WARN, "foreign_option: name/value overflow"); + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +/* + * parse/print topology coding + */ + +int +parse_topology (const char *str, const int msglevel) +{ + if (streq (str, "net30")) + return TOP_NET30; + else if (streq (str, "p2p")) + return TOP_P2P; + else if (streq (str, "subnet")) + return TOP_SUBNET; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--topology must be net30, p2p, or subnet"); + return TOP_UNDEF; + } +} + +const char * +print_topology (const int topology) +{ + switch (topology) + { + case TOP_UNDEF: + return "undef"; + case TOP_NET30: + return "net30"; + case TOP_P2P: + return "p2p"; + case TOP_SUBNET: + return "subnet"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +#if P2MP + +/* + * Manage auth-retry variable + */ + +static int global_auth_retry; /* GLOBAL */ + +int +auth_retry_get (void) +{ + return global_auth_retry; +} + +bool +auth_retry_set (const int msglevel, const char *option) +{ + if (streq (option, "interact")) + global_auth_retry = AR_INTERACT; + else if (streq (option, "nointeract")) + global_auth_retry = AR_NOINTERACT; + else if (streq (option, "none")) + global_auth_retry = AR_NONE; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--auth-retry method must be 'interact', 'nointeract', or 'none'"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +const char * +auth_retry_print (void) +{ + switch (global_auth_retry) + { + case AR_NONE: + return "none"; + case AR_NOINTERACT: + return "nointeract"; + case AR_INTERACT: + return "interact"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +#endif + +/* + * Print the help message. + */ +static void +usage (void) +{ + FILE *fp = msg_fp(0); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SMALL + + fprintf (fp, "Usage message not available\n"); + +#else + + struct options o; + init_options (&o, true); + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + fprintf (fp, usage_message, + title_string, + o.ce.connect_retry_seconds, + o.ce.local_port, o.ce.remote_port, + TUN_MTU_DEFAULT, TAP_MTU_EXTRA_DEFAULT, + o.verbosity, + o.authname, o.ciphername, + o.replay_window, o.replay_time, + o.tls_timeout, o.renegotiate_seconds, + o.handshake_window, o.transition_window); +#elif defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) + fprintf (fp, usage_message, + title_string, + o.ce.connect_retry_seconds, + o.ce.local_port, o.ce.remote_port, + TUN_MTU_DEFAULT, TAP_MTU_EXTRA_DEFAULT, + o.verbosity, + o.authname, o.ciphername, + o.replay_window, o.replay_time); +#else + fprintf (fp, usage_message, + title_string, + o.ce.connect_retry_seconds, + o.ce.local_port, o.ce.remote_port, + TUN_MTU_DEFAULT, TAP_MTU_EXTRA_DEFAULT, + o.verbosity); +#endif + fflush(fp); + +#endif /* ENABLE_SMALL */ + + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_USAGE); /* exit point */ +} + +void +usage_small (void) +{ + msg (M_WARN|M_NOPREFIX, "Use --help for more information."); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_USAGE); /* exit point */ +} + +static void +usage_version (void) +{ + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "%s", title_string); + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "Originally developed by James Yonan"); + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. "); +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL +#ifdef CONFIGURE_DEFINES + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "Compile time defines: %s", CONFIGURE_DEFINES); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIGURE_SPECIAL_BUILD + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "special build: %s", CONFIGURE_SPECIAL_BUILD); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "git revision: %s", CONFIGURE_GIT_REVISION); +#endif +#endif + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_USAGE); /* exit point */ +} + +void +notnull (const char *arg, const char *description) +{ + if (!arg) + msg (M_USAGE, "You must define %s", description); +} + +bool +string_defined_equal (const char *s1, const char *s2) +{ + if (s1 && s2) + return !strcmp (s1, s2); + else + return false; +} + +#if 0 +static void +ping_rec_err (int msglevel) +{ + msg (msglevel, "only one of --ping-exit or --ping-restart options may be specified"); +} +#endif + +static int +positive_atoi (const char *str) +{ + const int i = atoi (str); + return i < 0 ? 0 : i; +} + +#ifdef WIN32 /* This function is only used when compiling on Windows */ +static unsigned int +atou (const char *str) +{ + unsigned int val = 0; + sscanf (str, "%u", &val); + return val; +} +#endif + +static inline bool +space (unsigned char c) +{ + return c == '\0' || isspace (c); +} + +int +parse_line (const char *line, + char *p[], + const int n, + const char *file, + const int line_num, + int msglevel, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const int STATE_INITIAL = 0; + const int STATE_READING_QUOTED_PARM = 1; + const int STATE_READING_UNQUOTED_PARM = 2; + const int STATE_DONE = 3; + const int STATE_READING_SQUOTED_PARM = 4; + + const char *error_prefix = ""; + + int ret = 0; + const char *c = line; + int state = STATE_INITIAL; + bool backslash = false; + char in, out; + + char parm[OPTION_PARM_SIZE]; + unsigned int parm_len = 0; + + msglevel &= ~M_OPTERR; + + if (msglevel & M_MSG_VIRT_OUT) + error_prefix = "ERROR: "; + + do + { + in = *c; + out = 0; + + if (!backslash && in == '\\' && state != STATE_READING_SQUOTED_PARM) + { + backslash = true; + } + else + { + if (state == STATE_INITIAL) + { + if (!space (in)) + { + if (in == ';' || in == '#') /* comment */ + break; + if (!backslash && in == '\"') + state = STATE_READING_QUOTED_PARM; + else if (!backslash && in == '\'') + state = STATE_READING_SQUOTED_PARM; + else + { + out = in; + state = STATE_READING_UNQUOTED_PARM; + } + } + } + else if (state == STATE_READING_UNQUOTED_PARM) + { + if (!backslash && space (in)) + state = STATE_DONE; + else + out = in; + } + else if (state == STATE_READING_QUOTED_PARM) + { + if (!backslash && in == '\"') + state = STATE_DONE; + else + out = in; + } + else if (state == STATE_READING_SQUOTED_PARM) + { + if (in == '\'') + state = STATE_DONE; + else + out = in; + } + if (state == STATE_DONE) + { + /* ASSERT (parm_len > 0); */ + p[ret] = gc_malloc (parm_len + 1, true, gc); + memcpy (p[ret], parm, parm_len); + p[ret][parm_len] = '\0'; + state = STATE_INITIAL; + parm_len = 0; + ++ret; + } + + if (backslash && out) + { + if (!(out == '\\' || out == '\"' || space (out))) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_SMALL + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions warning: Bad backslash ('\\') usage in %s:%d", error_prefix, file, line_num); +#else + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions warning: Bad backslash ('\\') usage in %s:%d: remember that backslashes are treated as shell-escapes and if you need to pass backslash characters as part of a Windows filename, you should use double backslashes such as \"c:\\\\" PACKAGE "\\\\static.key\"", error_prefix, file, line_num); +#endif + return 0; + } + } + backslash = false; + } + + /* store parameter character */ + if (out) + { + if (parm_len >= SIZE (parm)) + { + parm[SIZE (parm) - 1] = 0; + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions error: Parameter at %s:%d is too long (%d chars max): %s", + error_prefix, file, line_num, (int) SIZE (parm), parm); + return 0; + } + parm[parm_len++] = out; + } + + /* avoid overflow if too many parms in one config file line */ + if (ret >= n) + break; + + } while (*c++ != '\0'); + + if (state == STATE_READING_QUOTED_PARM) + { + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions error: No closing quotation (\") in %s:%d", error_prefix, file, line_num); + return 0; + } + if (state == STATE_READING_SQUOTED_PARM) + { + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions error: No closing single quotation (\') in %s:%d", error_prefix, file, line_num); + return 0; + } + if (state != STATE_INITIAL) + { + msg (msglevel, "%sOptions error: Residual parse state (%d) in %s:%d", error_prefix, state, file, line_num); + return 0; + } +#if 0 + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < ret; ++i) + { + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "%s:%d ARG[%d] '%s'", file, line_num, i, p[i]); + } + } +#endif + return ret; +} + +static void +bypass_doubledash (char **p) +{ + if (strlen (*p) >= 3 && !strncmp (*p, "--", 2)) + *p += 2; +} + +struct in_src { +# define IS_TYPE_FP 1 +# define IS_TYPE_BUF 2 + int type; + union { + FILE *fp; + struct buffer *multiline; + } u; +}; + +static bool +in_src_get (const struct in_src *is, char *line, const int size) +{ + if (is->type == IS_TYPE_FP) + { + return BOOL_CAST (fgets (line, size, is->u.fp)); + } + else if (is->type == IS_TYPE_BUF) + { + bool status = buf_parse (is->u.multiline, '\n', line, size); + if ((int) strlen (line) + 1 < size) + strcat (line, "\n"); + return status; + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + return false; + } +} + +static char * +read_inline_file (struct in_src *is, const char *close_tag, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char line[OPTION_LINE_SIZE]; + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf (10000); + char *ret; + while (in_src_get (is, line, sizeof (line))) + { + if (!strncmp (line, close_tag, strlen (close_tag))) + break; + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", line); + } + ret = string_alloc (BSTR (&buf), gc); + buf_clear (&buf); + free_buf (&buf); + CLEAR (line); + return ret; +} + +static bool +check_inline_file (struct in_src *is, char *p[], struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (p[0] && !p[1]) + { + char *arg = p[0]; + if (arg[0] == '<' && arg[strlen(arg)-1] == '>') + { + struct buffer close_tag; + arg[strlen(arg)-1] = '\0'; + p[0] = string_alloc (arg+1, gc); + p[1] = string_alloc (INLINE_FILE_TAG, gc); + close_tag = alloc_buf (strlen(p[0]) + 4); + buf_printf (&close_tag, "", p[0]); + p[2] = read_inline_file (is, BSTR (&close_tag), gc); + p[3] = NULL; + free_buf (&close_tag); + ret = true; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static bool +check_inline_file_via_fp (FILE *fp, char *p[], struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct in_src is; + is.type = IS_TYPE_FP; + is.u.fp = fp; + return check_inline_file (&is, p, gc); +} + +static bool +check_inline_file_via_buf (struct buffer *multiline, char *p[], struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct in_src is; + is.type = IS_TYPE_BUF; + is.u.multiline = multiline; + return check_inline_file (&is, p, gc); +} + +static void +add_option (struct options *options, + char *p[], + const char *file, + int line, + const int level, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es); + +static void +read_config_file (struct options *options, + const char *file, + int level, + const char *top_file, + const int top_line, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + const int max_recursive_levels = 10; + FILE *fp; + int line_num; + char line[OPTION_LINE_SIZE]; + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + + ++level; + if (level <= max_recursive_levels) + { + if (streq (file, "stdin")) + fp = stdin; + else + fp = platform_fopen (file, "r"); + if (fp) + { + line_num = 0; + while (fgets(line, sizeof (line), fp)) + { + CLEAR (p); + ++line_num; + if (parse_line (line, p, SIZE (p), file, line_num, msglevel, &options->gc)) + { + bypass_doubledash (&p[0]); + check_inline_file_via_fp (fp, p, &options->gc); + add_option (options, p, file, line_num, level, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + } + } + if (fp != stdin) + fclose (fp); + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "In %s:%d: Error opening configuration file: %s", top_file, top_line, file); + } + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "In %s:%d: Maximum recursive include levels exceeded in include attempt of file %s -- probably you have a configuration file that tries to include itself.", top_file, top_line, file); + } + CLEAR (line); + CLEAR (p); +} + +static void +read_config_string (const char *prefix, + struct options *options, + const char *config, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + char line[OPTION_LINE_SIZE]; + struct buffer multiline; + int line_num = 0; + + buf_set_read (&multiline, (uint8_t*)config, strlen (config)); + + while (buf_parse (&multiline, '\n', line, sizeof (line))) + { + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + CLEAR (p); + ++line_num; + if (parse_line (line, p, SIZE (p), prefix, line_num, msglevel, &options->gc)) + { + bypass_doubledash (&p[0]); + check_inline_file_via_buf (&multiline, p, &options->gc); + add_option (options, p, NULL, line_num, 0, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + } + CLEAR (p); + } + CLEAR (line); +} + +void +parse_argv (struct options *options, + const int argc, + char *argv[], + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + int i, j; + + /* usage message */ + if (argc <= 1) + usage (); + + /* config filename specified only? */ + if (argc == 2 && strncmp (argv[1], "--", 2)) + { + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + CLEAR (p); + p[0] = "config"; + p[1] = argv[1]; + add_option (options, p, NULL, 0, 0, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + } + else + { + /* parse command line */ + for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) + { + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + CLEAR (p); + p[0] = argv[i]; + if (strncmp(p[0], "--", 2)) + { + msg (msglevel, "I'm trying to parse \"%s\" as an --option parameter but I don't see a leading '--'", p[0]); + } + else + p[0] += 2; + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS; ++j) + { + if (i + j < argc) + { + char *arg = argv[i + j]; + if (strncmp (arg, "--", 2)) + p[j] = arg; + else + break; + } + } + add_option (options, p, NULL, 0, 0, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + i += j - 1; + } + } +} + +bool +apply_push_options (struct options *options, + struct buffer *buf, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + char line[OPTION_PARM_SIZE]; + int line_num = 0; + const char *file = "[PUSH-OPTIONS]"; + const int msglevel = D_PUSH_ERRORS|M_OPTERR; + + while (buf_parse (buf, ',', line, sizeof (line))) + { + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + CLEAR (p); + ++line_num; + if (parse_line (line, p, SIZE (p), file, line_num, msglevel, &options->gc)) + { + add_option (options, p, file, line_num, 0, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + } + } + return true; +} + +void +options_server_import (struct options *o, + const char *filename, + int msglevel, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + msg (D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: reading client specific options from: %s", filename); + read_config_file (o, + filename, + 0, + filename, + 0, + msglevel, + permission_mask, + option_types_found, + es); +} + +void options_string_import (struct options *options, + const char *config, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + read_config_string ("[CONFIG-STRING]", options, config, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); +} + +#if P2MP + +#define VERIFY_PERMISSION(mask) { if (!verify_permission(p[0], file, (mask), permission_mask, option_types_found, msglevel)) goto err; } + +static bool +verify_permission (const char *name, + const char* file, + const unsigned int type, + const unsigned int allowed, + unsigned int *found, + const int msglevel) +{ + if (!(type & allowed)) + { + msg (msglevel, "option '%s' cannot be used in this context (%s)", name, file); + return false; + } + else + { + if (found) + *found |= type; + return true; + } +} + +#else + +#define VERIFY_PERMISSION(mask) + +#endif + +/* + * Check that an option doesn't have too + * many parameters. + */ + +#define NM_QUOTE_HINT (1<<0) + +static bool +no_more_than_n_args (const int msglevel, + char *p[], + const int max, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + const int len = string_array_len ((const char **)p); + + if (!len) + return false; + + if (len > max) + { + msg (msglevel, "the --%s directive should have at most %d parameter%s.%s", + p[0], + max - 1, + max >= 3 ? "s" : "", + (flags & NM_QUOTE_HINT) ? " To pass a list of arguments as one of the parameters, try enclosing them in double quotes (\"\")." : ""); + return false; + } + else + return true; +} + +static inline int +msglevel_forward_compatible (struct options *options, const int msglevel) +{ + return options->forward_compatible ? M_WARN : msglevel; +} + +static void +warn_multiple_script (const char *script, const char *type) { + if (script) { + msg (M_WARN, "Multiple --%s scripts defined. " + "The previously configured script is overridden.", type); + } +} + + +static void +add_option (struct options *options, + char *p[], + const char *file, + int line, + const int level, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const bool pull_mode = BOOL_CAST (permission_mask & OPT_P_PULL_MODE); + int msglevel_fc = msglevel_forward_compatible (options, msglevel); + + ASSERT (MAX_PARMS >= 5); + if (!file) + { + file = "[CMD-LINE]"; + line = 1; + } + if (streq (p[0], "help")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + usage (); + } + if (streq (p[0], "version")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + usage_version (); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "config") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CONFIG); + + /* save first config file only in options */ + if (!options->config) + options->config = p[1]; + + read_config_file (options, p[1], level, file, line, msglevel, permission_mask, option_types_found, es); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + else if (streq (p[0], "show-gateway")) + { + struct route_gateway_info rgi; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + get_default_gateway(&rgi); + print_default_gateway(M_INFO, &rgi); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } +#endif +#if 0 + else if (streq (p[0], "foreign-option") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + foreign_option (options, p, 3, es); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "echo") || streq (p[0], "parameter")) + { + struct buffer string = alloc_buf_gc (OPTION_PARM_SIZE, &gc); + int j; + bool good = true; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ECHO); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS; ++j) + { + if (!p[j]) + break; + if (j > 1) + good &= buf_printf (&string, " "); + good &= buf_printf (&string, "%s", p[j]); + } + if (good) + { +#if 0 + /* removed for now since ECHO can potentially include + security-sensitive strings */ + msg (M_INFO, "%s:%s", + pull_mode ? "ECHO-PULL" : "ECHO", + BSTR (&string)); +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_echo (management, BSTR (&string), pull_mode); +#endif + } + else + msg (M_WARN, "echo/parameter option overflow"); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + else if (streq (p[0], "management") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[2], "unix")) + { +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + options->management_flags |= MF_UNIX_SOCK; +#else + msg (msglevel, "MANAGEMENT: this platform does not support unix domain sockets"); + goto err; +#endif + } + + options->management_addr = p[1]; + options->management_port = p[2]; + if (p[3]) + { + options->management_user_pass = p[3]; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-client-user") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_client_user = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-client-group") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_client_group = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-query-passwords")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_QUERY_PASSWORDS; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-query-remote")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_QUERY_REMOTE; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-query-proxy")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_QUERY_PROXY; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-hold")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_HOLD; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-signal")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_SIGNAL; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-forget-disconnect")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_FORGET_DISCONNECT; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-up-down")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_UP_DOWN; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "management-client")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT; + options->management_write_peer_info_file = p[1]; + } +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + else if (streq (p[0], "management-external-key")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_EXTERNAL_KEY; + } +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + else if (streq (p[0], "management-client-auth")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= MF_CLIENT_AUTH; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + else if (streq (p[0], "x509-track") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + x509_track_add (&options->x509_track, p[1], msglevel, &options->gc); + } +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + else if (streq (p[0], "management-client-pf")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->management_flags |= (MF_CLIENT_PF | MF_CLIENT_AUTH); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "management-log-cache") && p[1]) + { + int cache; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + cache = atoi (p[1]); + if (cache < 1) + { + msg (msglevel, "--management-log-cache parameter is out of range"); + goto err; + } + options->management_log_history_cache = cache; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + else if (streq (p[0], "plugin") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PLUGIN); + if (!options->plugin_list) + options->plugin_list = plugin_option_list_new (&options->gc); + if (!plugin_option_list_add (options->plugin_list, &p[1], &options->gc)) + { + msg (msglevel, "plugin add failed: %s", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "mode") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "p2p")) + options->mode = MODE_POINT_TO_POINT; +#if P2MP_SERVER + else if (streq (p[1], "server")) + options->mode = MODE_SERVER; +#endif + else + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad --mode parameter: %s", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dev") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->dev = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dev-type") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->dev_type = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dev-node") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->dev_node = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "lladdr") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + if (mac_addr_safe (p[1])) /* MAC address only */ + options->lladdr = p[1]; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "lladdr parm '%s' must be a MAC address", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "topology") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + options->topology = parse_topology (p[1], msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tun-ipv6")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + options->tun_ipv6 = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + else if (streq (p[0], "iproute") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + iproute_path = p[1]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + if (ip_or_dns_addr_safe (p[1], options->allow_pull_fqdn) && ip_or_dns_addr_safe (p[2], options->allow_pull_fqdn)) /* FQDN -- may be DNS name */ + { + options->ifconfig_local = p[1]; + options->ifconfig_remote_netmask = p[2]; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "ifconfig parms '%s' and '%s' must be valid addresses", p[1], p[2]); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-ipv6") && p[1] && p[2] ) + { + unsigned int netbits; + char * ipv6_local; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + if ( get_ipv6_addr( p[1], NULL, &netbits, &ipv6_local, msglevel ) && + ipv6_addr_safe( p[2] ) ) + { + if ( netbits < 64 || netbits > 124 ) + { + msg( msglevel, "ifconfig-ipv6: /netbits must be between 64 and 124, not '/%d'", netbits ); + goto err; + } + + if (options->ifconfig_ipv6_local) + /* explicitly ignoring this is a const char */ + free ((char *) options->ifconfig_ipv6_local); + + options->ifconfig_ipv6_local = ipv6_local; + options->ifconfig_ipv6_netbits = netbits; + options->ifconfig_ipv6_remote = p[2]; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "ifconfig-ipv6 parms '%s' and '%s' must be valid addresses", p[1], p[2]); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-noexec")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + options->ifconfig_noexec = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-nowarn")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + options->ifconfig_nowarn = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "local") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.local = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remote-random")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->remote_random = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "connection") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + struct options sub; + struct connection_entry *e; + + init_options (&sub, true); + sub.ce = options->ce; + read_config_string ("[CONNECTION-OPTIONS]", &sub, p[2], msglevel, OPT_P_CONNECTION, option_types_found, es); + if (!sub.ce.remote) + { + msg (msglevel, "Each 'connection' block must contain exactly one 'remote' directive"); + goto err; + } + + e = alloc_connection_entry (options, msglevel); + if (!e) + goto err; + *e = sub.ce; + gc_transfer (&options->gc, &sub.gc); + uninit_options (&sub); + } + } +#if HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE + else if (streq (p[0], "http-proxy-override") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->http_proxy_override = parse_http_proxy_override(p[1], p[2], p[3], msglevel, &options->gc); + if (!options->http_proxy_override) + goto err; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "remote") && p[1]) + { + struct remote_entry re; + re.remote = re.remote_port= NULL; + re.proto = -1; + re.af=0; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + re.remote = p[1]; + if (p[2]) + { + re.remote_port = p[2]; + if (p[3]) + { + const int proto = ascii2proto (p[3]); + const sa_family_t af = ascii2af (p[3]); + if (proto < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, "remote: bad protocol associated with host %s: '%s'", p[1], p[3]); + goto err; + } + re.proto = proto; + re.af = af; + } + } + if (permission_mask & OPT_P_GENERAL) + { + struct remote_entry *e = alloc_remote_entry (options, msglevel); + if (!e) + goto err; + *e = re; + } + else if (permission_mask & OPT_P_CONNECTION) + { + connection_entry_load_re (&options->ce, &re); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "resolv-retry") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "infinite")) + options->resolve_retry_seconds = RESOLV_RETRY_INFINITE; + else + options->resolve_retry_seconds = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "connect-retry") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.connect_retry_seconds = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "connect-timeout") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.connect_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ce.connect_timeout_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "connect-retry-max") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->connect_retry_max = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ipchange") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->ipchange, "ipchange"); + options->ipchange = string_substitute (p[1], ',', ' ', &options->gc); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "float")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.remote_float = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + else if (streq (p[0], "gremlin") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->gremlin = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "chroot") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->chroot_dir = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "cd") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (platform_chdir (p[1])) + { + msg (M_ERR, "cd to '%s' failed", p[1]); + goto err; + } + options->cd_dir = p[1]; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + else if (streq (p[0], "setcon") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->selinux_context = p[1]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "writepid") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->writepid = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "up") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->up_script, "up"); + options->up_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "down") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->down_script, "down"); + options->down_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "down-pre")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->down_pre = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "up-delay")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->up_delay = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "up-restart")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->up_restart = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "syslog")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + open_syslog (p[1], false); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "daemon")) + { + bool didit = false; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (!options->daemon) + { + options->daemon = didit = true; + open_syslog (p[1], false); + } + if (p[1]) + { + if (!didit) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Multiple --daemon directives specified, ignoring --daemon %s. (Note that initscripts sometimes add their own --daemon directive.)", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "inetd")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (!options->inetd) + { + int z; + const char *name = NULL; + const char *opterr = "when --inetd is used with two parameters, one of them must be 'wait' or 'nowait' and the other must be a daemon name to use for system logging"; + + options->inetd = -1; + + for (z = 1; z <= 2; ++z) + { + if (p[z]) + { + if (streq (p[z], "wait")) + { + if (options->inetd != -1) + { + msg (msglevel, "%s", opterr); + goto err; + } + else + options->inetd = INETD_WAIT; + } + else if (streq (p[z], "nowait")) + { + if (options->inetd != -1) + { + msg (msglevel, "%s", opterr); + goto err; + } + else + options->inetd = INETD_NOWAIT; + } + else + { + if (name != NULL) + { + msg (msglevel, "%s", opterr); + goto err; + } + name = p[z]; + } + } + } + + /* default */ + if (options->inetd == -1) + options->inetd = INETD_WAIT; + + save_inetd_socket_descriptor (); + open_syslog (name, true); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "log") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->log = true; + redirect_stdout_stderr (p[1], false); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "suppress-timestamps")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->suppress_timestamps = true; + set_suppress_timestamps(true); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "log-append") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->log = true; + redirect_stdout_stderr (p[1], true); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + else if (streq (p[0], "memstats") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->memstats_fn = p[1]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "mlock")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->mlock = true; + } +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + else if (streq (p[0], "multihome")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->sockflags |= SF_USE_IP_PKTINFO; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "verb") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MESSAGES); + options->verbosity = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mute") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MESSAGES); + options->mute = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "errors-to-stderr")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MESSAGES); + errors_to_stderr(); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "status") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->status_file = p[1]; + if (p[2]) + { + options->status_file_update_freq = positive_atoi (p[2]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "status-version") && p[1]) + { + int version; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + version = atoi (p[1]); + if (version < 1 || version > 3) + { + msg (msglevel, "--status-version must be 1 to 3"); + goto err; + } + options->status_file_version = version; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remap-usr1") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "SIGHUP")) + options->remap_sigusr1 = SIGHUP; + else if (streq (p[1], "SIGTERM")) + options->remap_sigusr1 = SIGTERM; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--remap-usr1 parm must be 'SIGHUP' or 'SIGTERM'"); + goto err; + } + } + else if ((streq (p[0], "link-mtu") || streq (p[0], "udp-mtu")) && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.link_mtu = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ce.link_mtu_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tun-mtu") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.tun_mtu = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ce.tun_mtu_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tun-mtu-extra") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.tun_mtu_extra = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ce.tun_mtu_extra_defined = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT + else if (streq (p[0], "mtu-dynamic")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + msg (msglevel, "--mtu-dynamic has been replaced by --fragment"); + goto err; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "fragment") && p[1]) + { +/* VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU); */ + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.fragment = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "mtu-disc") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_MTU|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.mtu_discover_type = translate_mtu_discover_type_name (p[1]); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + else if (streq (p[0], "mtu-test")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->mtu_test = true; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "nice") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_NICE); + options->nice = atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "rcvbuf") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SOCKBUF); + options->rcvbuf = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "sndbuf") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SOCKBUF); + options->sndbuf = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mark") && p[1]) + { +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) && HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->mark = atoi(p[1]); +#endif + } + else if (streq (p[0], "socket-flags")) + { + int j; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SOCKFLAGS); + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j]; ++j) + { + if (streq (p[j], "TCP_NODELAY")) + options->sockflags |= SF_TCP_NODELAY; + else + msg (msglevel, "unknown socket flag: %s", p[j]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "txqueuelen") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); +#ifdef TARGET_LINUX + options->tuntap_options.txqueuelen = positive_atoi (p[1]); +#else + msg (msglevel, "--txqueuelen not supported on this OS"); + goto err; +#endif + } + else if (streq (p[0], "shaper") && p[1]) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + int shaper; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SHAPER); + shaper = atoi (p[1]); + if (shaper < SHAPER_MIN || shaper > SHAPER_MAX) + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad shaper value, must be between %d and %d", + SHAPER_MIN, SHAPER_MAX); + goto err; + } + options->shaper = shaper; +#else /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + msg (msglevel, "--shaper requires the gettimeofday() function which is missing"); + goto err; +#endif /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "port") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.local_port = options->ce.remote_port = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "lport") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.local_port_defined = true; + options->ce.local_port = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "rport") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.remote_port = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "bind")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.bind_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "nobind")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.bind_local = false; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "fast-io")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->fast_io = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "inactive") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER); + options->inactivity_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + if (p[2]) + options->inactivity_minimum_bytes = positive_atoi (p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "proto") && p[1]) + { + int proto; + sa_family_t af; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + proto = ascii2proto (p[1]); + af = ascii2af(p[1]); + if (proto < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad protocol: '%s'. Allowed protocols with --proto option: %s", + p[1], + proto2ascii_all (&gc)); + goto err; + } + options->ce.proto = proto; + options->ce.af = af; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "proto-force") && p[1]) + { + int proto_force; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + proto_force = ascii2proto (p[1]); + if (proto_force < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad --proto-force protocol: '%s'", p[1]); + goto err; + } + options->proto_force = proto_force; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + else if (streq (p[0], "http-proxy") && p[1]) + { + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + + { + if (!p[2]) + { + msg (msglevel, "http-proxy port number not defined"); + goto err; + } + + ho = init_http_proxy_options_once (&options->ce.http_proxy_options, &options->gc); + + ho->server = p[1]; + ho->port = p[2]; + } + + if (p[3]) + { + /* auto -- try to figure out proxy addr, port, and type automatically */ + /* semiauto -- given proxy addr:port, try to figure out type automatically */ + /* (auto|semiauto)-nct -- disable proxy auth cleartext protocols (i.e. basic auth) */ + if (streq (p[3], "auto")) + ho->auth_retry = PAR_ALL; + else if (streq (p[3], "auto-nct")) + ho->auth_retry = PAR_NCT; + else + { + ho->auth_method_string = "basic"; + ho->auth_file = p[3]; + + if (p[4]) + { + ho->auth_method_string = p[4]; + } + } + } + else + { + ho->auth_method_string = "none"; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "http-proxy-retry")) + { + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + ho = init_http_proxy_options_once (&options->ce.http_proxy_options, &options->gc); + ho->retry = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "http-proxy-timeout") && p[1]) + { + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + ho = init_http_proxy_options_once (&options->ce.http_proxy_options, &options->gc); + ho->timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "http-proxy-option") && p[1]) + { + struct http_proxy_options *ho; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + ho = init_http_proxy_options_once (&options->ce.http_proxy_options, &options->gc); + + if (streq (p[1], "VERSION") && p[2]) + { + ho->http_version = p[2]; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "AGENT") && p[2]) + { + ho->user_agent = p[2]; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad http-proxy-option or missing parameter: '%s'", p[1]); + } + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + else if (streq (p[0], "socks-proxy") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + + if (p[2]) + { + options->ce.socks_proxy_port = p[2]; + } + else + { + options->ce.socks_proxy_port = "1080"; + } + options->ce.socks_proxy_server = p[1]; + options->ce.socks_proxy_authfile = p[3]; /* might be NULL */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "socks-proxy-retry")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + options->ce.socks_proxy_retry = true; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "keepalive") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->keepalive_ping = atoi (p[1]); + options->keepalive_timeout = atoi (p[2]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ping") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER); + options->ping_send_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ping-exit") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER); + options->ping_rec_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ping_rec_timeout_action = PING_EXIT; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ping-restart") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER); + options->ping_rec_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + options->ping_rec_timeout_action = PING_RESTART; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ping-timer-rem")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TIMER); + options->ping_timer_remote = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + else if (streq (p[0], "explicit-exit-notify")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); +/* VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY); */ + if (p[1]) + { + options->ce.explicit_exit_notification = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else + { + options->ce.explicit_exit_notification = 1; + } + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "persist-tun")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PERSIST); + options->persist_tun = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "persist-key")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PERSIST); + options->persist_key = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "persist-local-ip")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PERSIST_IP); + options->persist_local_ip = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "persist-remote-ip")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PERSIST_IP); + options->persist_remote_ip = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + else if (streq (p[0], "client-nat") && p[1] && p[2] && p[3] && p[4]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE); + cnol_check_alloc (options); + add_client_nat_to_option_list(options->client_nat, p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], msglevel); + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "route") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE); + rol_check_alloc (options); + if (pull_mode) + { + if (!ip_or_dns_addr_safe (p[1], options->allow_pull_fqdn) && !is_special_addr (p[1])) /* FQDN -- may be DNS name */ + { + msg (msglevel, "route parameter network/IP '%s' must be a valid address", p[1]); + goto err; + } + if (p[2] && !ip_addr_dotted_quad_safe (p[2])) /* FQDN -- must be IP address */ + { + msg (msglevel, "route parameter netmask '%s' must be an IP address", p[2]); + goto err; + } + if (p[3] && !ip_or_dns_addr_safe (p[3], options->allow_pull_fqdn) && !is_special_addr (p[3])) /* FQDN -- may be DNS name */ + { + msg (msglevel, "route parameter gateway '%s' must be a valid address", p[3]); + goto err; + } + } + add_route_to_option_list (options->routes, p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-ipv6") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE); + rol6_check_alloc (options); + if (pull_mode) + { + if (!ipv6_addr_safe_hexplusbits (p[1])) + { + msg (msglevel, "route-ipv6 parameter network/IP '%s' must be a valid address", p[1]); + goto err; + } + if (p[2] && !ipv6_addr_safe (p[2])) + { + msg (msglevel, "route-ipv6 parameter gateway '%s' must be a valid address", p[2]); + goto err; + } + /* p[3] is metric, if present */ + } + add_route_ipv6_to_option_list (options->routes_ipv6, p[1], p[2], p[3]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "max-routes") && p[1]) + { + int max_routes; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + max_routes = atoi (p[1]); + if (max_routes < 0 || max_routes > 100000000) + { + msg (msglevel, "--max-routes parameter is out of range"); + goto err; + } + if (options->routes || options->routes_ipv6) + { + msg (msglevel, "--max-routes must to be specifed before any route/route-ipv6/redirect-gateway option"); + goto err; + } + options->max_routes = max_routes; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-gateway") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS); + if (streq (p[1], "dhcp")) + { + options->route_gateway_via_dhcp = true; + } + else + { + if (ip_or_dns_addr_safe (p[1], options->allow_pull_fqdn) || is_special_addr (p[1])) /* FQDN -- may be DNS name */ + { + options->route_default_gateway = p[1]; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "route-gateway parm '%s' must be a valid address", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-metric") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE); + options->route_default_metric = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-delay")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS); + options->route_delay_defined = true; + if (p[1]) + { + options->route_delay = positive_atoi (p[1]); + if (p[2]) + { + options->route_delay_window = positive_atoi (p[2]); + } + } + else + { + options->route_delay = 0; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-up") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->route_script, "route-up"); + options->route_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-pre-down") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->route_predown_script, "route-pre-down"); + options->route_predown_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-noexec")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + options->route_noexec = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-nopull")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->route_nopull = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "allow-pull-fqdn")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->allow_pull_fqdn = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "redirect-gateway") || streq (p[0], "redirect-private")) + { + int j; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE); + rol_check_alloc (options); + if (streq (p[0], "redirect-gateway")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_REROUTE_GW; + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + { + if (streq (p[j], "local")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_LOCAL; + else if (streq (p[j], "autolocal")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_AUTO_LOCAL; + else if (streq (p[j], "def1")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_DEF1; + else if (streq (p[j], "bypass-dhcp")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_BYPASS_DHCP; + else if (streq (p[j], "bypass-dns")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_BYPASS_DNS; + else if (streq (p[j], "block-local")) + options->routes->flags |= RG_BLOCK_LOCAL; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "unknown --%s flag: %s", p[0], p[j]); + goto err; + } + } + options->routes->flags |= RG_ENABLE; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remote-random-hostname")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->sockflags |= SF_HOST_RANDOMIZE; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "setenv") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "REMOTE_RANDOM_HOSTNAME")) + { + options->sockflags |= SF_HOST_RANDOMIZE; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "GENERIC_CONFIG")) + { + msg (msglevel, "this is a generic configuration and cannot directly be used"); + goto err; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + else if (streq (p[1], "PUSH_PEER_INFO")) + { + options->push_peer_info = true; + } +#endif +#if P2MP + else if (streq (p[1], "SERVER_POLL_TIMEOUT") && p[2]) + { + options->server_poll_timeout = positive_atoi(p[2]); + } +#endif + else + { + if (streq (p[1], "FORWARD_COMPATIBLE") && p[2] && streq (p[2], "1")) + { + options->forward_compatible = true; + msglevel_fc = msglevel_forward_compatible (options, msglevel); + } + setenv_str (es, p[1], p[2] ? p[2] : ""); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "setenv-safe") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SETENV); + setenv_str_safe (es, p[1], p[2] ? p[2] : ""); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "script-security") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + script_security = atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mssfix")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_CONNECTION); + if (p[1]) + { + options->ce.mssfix = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else + options->ce.mssfix_default = true; + + } +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + else if (streq (p[0], "disable-occ")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->occ = false; + } +#endif +#if P2MP +#if P2MP_SERVER + else if (streq (p[0], "server") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + const int lev = M_WARN; + bool error = false; + in_addr_t network, netmask; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + network = get_ip_addr (p[1], lev, &error); + netmask = get_ip_addr (p[2], lev, &error); + if (error || !network || !netmask) + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --server parameters"); + goto err; + } + options->server_defined = true; + options->server_network = network; + options->server_netmask = netmask; + + if (p[3]) + { + if (streq (p[3], "nopool")) + options->server_flags |= SF_NOPOOL; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --server: %s is not a recognized flag", p[3]); + goto err; + } + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "server-ipv6") && p[1] ) + { + const int lev = M_WARN; + struct in6_addr network; + unsigned int netbits = 0; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if ( ! get_ipv6_addr (p[1], &network, &netbits, NULL, lev) ) + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --server-ipv6 parameter"); + goto err; + } + if ( netbits < 64 || netbits > 112 ) + { + msg( msglevel, "--server-ipv6 settings: only /64../112 supported right now (not /%d)", netbits ); + goto err; + } + options->server_ipv6_defined = true; + options->server_network_ipv6 = network; + options->server_netbits_ipv6 = netbits; + + if (p[2]) /* no "nopool" options or similar for IPv6 */ + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --server-ipv6: %s is not a recognized flag", p[3]); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "server-bridge") && p[1] && p[2] && p[3] && p[4]) + { + const int lev = M_WARN; + bool error = false; + in_addr_t ip, netmask, pool_start, pool_end; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + ip = get_ip_addr (p[1], lev, &error); + netmask = get_ip_addr (p[2], lev, &error); + pool_start = get_ip_addr (p[3], lev, &error); + pool_end = get_ip_addr (p[4], lev, &error); + if (error || !ip || !netmask || !pool_start || !pool_end) + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --server-bridge parameters"); + goto err; + } + options->server_bridge_defined = true; + options->server_bridge_ip = ip; + options->server_bridge_netmask = netmask; + options->server_bridge_pool_start = pool_start; + options->server_bridge_pool_end = pool_end; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "server-bridge") && p[1] && streq (p[1], "nogw")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp = true; + options->server_flags |= SF_NO_PUSH_ROUTE_GATEWAY; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "server-bridge") && !p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->server_bridge_proxy_dhcp = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "push") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PUSH); + push_options (options, &p[1], msglevel, &options->gc); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "push-reset")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + push_reset (options); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-pool") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + const int lev = M_WARN; + bool error = false; + in_addr_t start, end, netmask=0; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + start = get_ip_addr (p[1], lev, &error); + end = get_ip_addr (p[2], lev, &error); + if (p[3]) + { + netmask = get_ip_addr (p[3], lev, &error); + } + if (error) + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --ifconfig-pool parameters"); + goto err; + } + if (!ifconfig_pool_verify_range (msglevel, start, end)) + goto err; + + options->ifconfig_pool_defined = true; + options->ifconfig_pool_start = start; + options->ifconfig_pool_end = end; + if (netmask) + options->ifconfig_pool_netmask = netmask; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-pool-persist") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ifconfig_pool_persist_filename = p[1]; + if (p[2]) + { + options->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = positive_atoi (p[2]); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-pool-linear")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->topology = TOP_P2P; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-ipv6-pool") && p[1] ) + { + const int lev = M_WARN; + struct in6_addr network; + unsigned int netbits = 0; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if ( ! get_ipv6_addr (p[1], &network, &netbits, NULL, lev ) ) + { + msg (msglevel, "error parsing --ifconfig-ipv6-pool parameters"); + goto err; + } + if ( netbits != 64 ) + { + msg( msglevel, "--ifconfig-ipv6-pool settings: only /64 supported right now (not /%d)", netbits ); + goto err; + } + + options->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined = true; + options->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base = network; + options->ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits = netbits; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "hash-size") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + int real, virtual; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + real = atoi (p[1]); + virtual = atoi (p[2]); + if (real < 1 || virtual < 1) + { + msg (msglevel, "--hash-size sizes must be >= 1 (preferably a power of 2)"); + goto err; + } + options->real_hash_size = real; + options->virtual_hash_size = real; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "connect-freq") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + int cf_max, cf_per; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + cf_max = atoi (p[1]); + cf_per = atoi (p[2]); + if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, "--connect-freq parms must be > 0"); + goto err; + } + options->cf_max = cf_max; + options->cf_per = cf_per; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "max-clients") && p[1]) + { + int max_clients; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + max_clients = atoi (p[1]); + if (max_clients < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, "--max-clients must be at least 1"); + goto err; + } + options->max_clients = max_clients; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "max-routes-per-client") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INHERIT); + options->max_routes_per_client = max_int (atoi (p[1]), 1); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-cert-not-required")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "username-as-common-name")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-user-pass-optional")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "compat-names")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET | COMPAT_NAMES); + if (p[1] && streq (p[1], "no-remapping")) + compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "opt-verify")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_OPT_VERIFY; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-user-pass-verify") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 3, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + if (p[2]) + { + if (streq (p[2], "via-env")) + options->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file = false; + else if (streq (p[2], "via-file")) + options->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file = true; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "second parm to --auth-user-pass-verify must be 'via-env' or 'via-file'"); + goto err; + } + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--auth-user-pass-verify requires a second parameter ('via-env' or 'via-file')"); + goto err; + } + warn_multiple_script (options->auth_user_pass_verify_script, "auth-user-pass-verify"); + options->auth_user_pass_verify_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-connect") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->client_connect_script, "client-connect"); + options->client_connect_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-disconnect") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->client_disconnect_script, "client-disconnect"); + options->client_disconnect_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "learn-address") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->learn_address_script, "learn-address"); + options->learn_address_script = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tmp-dir") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tmp_dir = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "client-config-dir") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->client_config_dir = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ccd-exclusive")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ccd_exclusive = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "bcast-buffers") && p[1]) + { + int n_bcast_buf; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + n_bcast_buf = atoi (p[1]); + if (n_bcast_buf < 1) + msg (msglevel, "--bcast-buffers parameter must be > 0"); + options->n_bcast_buf = n_bcast_buf; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tcp-queue-limit") && p[1]) + { + int tcp_queue_limit; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + tcp_queue_limit = atoi (p[1]); + if (tcp_queue_limit < 1) + msg (msglevel, "--tcp-queue-limit parameter must be > 0"); + options->tcp_queue_limit = tcp_queue_limit; + } +#if PORT_SHARE + else if (streq (p[0], "port-share") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->port_share_host = p[1]; + options->port_share_port = p[2]; + options->port_share_journal_dir = p[3]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "client-to-client")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->enable_c2c = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "duplicate-cn")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->duplicate_cn = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "iroute") && p[1]) + { + const char *netmask = NULL; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + if (p[2]) + { + netmask = p[2]; + } + option_iroute (options, p[1], netmask, msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "iroute-ipv6") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + option_iroute_ipv6 (options, p[1], msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-push") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + in_addr_t local, remote_netmask; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + local = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_RESOLVE, p[1], 0, NULL, NULL); + remote_netmask = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_RESOLVE, p[2], 0, NULL, NULL); + if (local && remote_netmask) + { + options->push_ifconfig_defined = true; + options->push_ifconfig_local = local; + options->push_ifconfig_remote_netmask = remote_netmask; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + if (p[3]) + options->push_ifconfig_local_alias = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_RESOLVE, p[3], 0, NULL, NULL); +#endif + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "cannot parse --ifconfig-push addresses"); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-push-constraint") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + in_addr_t network, netmask; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + network = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_RESOLVE, p[1], 0, NULL, NULL); + netmask = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, p[2], 0, NULL, NULL); + if (network && netmask) + { + options->push_ifconfig_constraint_defined = true; + options->push_ifconfig_constraint_network = network; + options->push_ifconfig_constraint_netmask = netmask; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "cannot parse --ifconfig-push-constraint addresses"); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ifconfig-ipv6-push") && p[1] ) + { + struct in6_addr local, remote; + unsigned int netbits; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + + if ( ! get_ipv6_addr( p[1], &local, &netbits, NULL, msglevel ) ) + { + msg (msglevel, "cannot parse --ifconfig-ipv6-push addresses"); + goto err; + } + + if ( p[2] ) + { + if ( !get_ipv6_addr( p[2], &remote, NULL, NULL, msglevel ) ) + { + msg( msglevel, "cannot parse --ifconfig-ipv6-push addresses"); + goto err; + } + } + else + { + if ( ! options->ifconfig_ipv6_local || + ! get_ipv6_addr( options->ifconfig_ipv6_local, &remote, + NULL, NULL, msglevel ) ) + { + msg( msglevel, "second argument to --ifconfig-ipv6-push missing and no global --ifconfig-ipv6 address set"); + goto err; + } + } + + options->push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined = true; + options->push_ifconfig_ipv6_local = local; + options->push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits = netbits; + options->push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote = remote; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "disable")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_INSTANCE); + options->disable = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tcp-nodelay")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->server_flags |= SF_TCP_NODELAY_HELPER; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "stale-routes-check") && p[1]) + { + int ageing_time, check_interval; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + ageing_time = atoi (p[1]); + if (p[2]) + check_interval = atoi (p[2]); + else + check_interval = ageing_time; + + if (ageing_time < 1 || check_interval < 1) + { + msg (msglevel, "--stale-routes-check aging time and check interval must be >= 1"); + goto err; + } + options->stale_routes_ageing_time = ageing_time; + options->stale_routes_check_interval = check_interval; + } +#endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ + + else if (streq (p[0], "client")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->client = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pull")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->pull = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "push-continuation") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_PULL_MODE); + options->push_continuation = atoi(p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "server-poll-timeout") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->server_poll_timeout = positive_atoi(p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-user-pass")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (p[1]) + { + options->auth_user_pass_file = p[1]; + } + else + options->auth_user_pass_file = "stdin"; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-retry") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + auth_retry_set (msglevel, p[1]); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + else if (streq (p[0], "static-challenge") && p[1] && p[2]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->sc_info.challenge_text = p[1]; + if (atoi(p[2])) + options->sc_info.flags |= SC_ECHO; + } +#endif +#endif +#ifdef WIN32 + else if (streq (p[0], "win-sys") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "env")) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: --win-sys env is default from OpenVPN v2.3. " + "This entry will now be ignored. " + "Please remove this entry from your configuration file."); + else + set_win_sys_path (p[1], es); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-method") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS); + if (streq (p[1], "adaptive")) + options->route_method = ROUTE_METHOD_ADAPTIVE; + else if (streq (p[1], "ipapi")) + options->route_method = ROUTE_METHOD_IPAPI; + else if (streq (p[1], "exe")) + options->route_method = ROUTE_METHOD_EXE; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--route method must be 'adaptive', 'ipapi', or 'exe'"); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ip-win32") && p[1]) + { + const int index = ascii2ipset (p[1]); + struct tuntap_options *to = &options->tuntap_options; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + + if (index < 0) + { + msg (msglevel, + "Bad --ip-win32 method: '%s'. Allowed methods: %s", + p[1], + ipset2ascii_all (&gc)); + goto err; + } + + if (index == IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE) + options->route_delay_window = IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE_DELAY_WINDOW; + + if (index == IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ) + { + if (p[2]) + { + if (!streq (p[2], "default")) + { + int offset = atoi (p[2]); + + if (!(offset > -256 && offset < 256)) + { + msg (msglevel, "--ip-win32 dynamic [offset] [lease-time]: offset (%d) must be > -256 and < 256", offset); + goto err; + } + + to->dhcp_masq_custom_offset = true; + to->dhcp_masq_offset = offset; + } + + if (p[3]) + { + const int min_lease = 30; + int lease_time; + lease_time = atoi (p[3]); + if (lease_time < min_lease) + { + msg (msglevel, "--ip-win32 dynamic [offset] [lease-time]: lease time parameter (%d) must be at least %d seconds", lease_time, min_lease); + goto err; + } + to->dhcp_lease_time = lease_time; + } + } + } + to->ip_win32_type = index; + to->ip_win32_defined = true; + } +#endif +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-option") && p[1]) + { + struct tuntap_options *o = &options->tuntap_options; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + + if (streq (p[1], "DOMAIN") && p[2]) + { + o->domain = p[2]; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "NBS") && p[2]) + { + o->netbios_scope = p[2]; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "NBT") && p[2]) + { + int t; + t = atoi (p[2]); + if (!(t == 1 || t == 2 || t == 4 || t == 8)) + { + msg (msglevel, "--dhcp-option NBT: parameter (%d) must be 1, 2, 4, or 8", t); + goto err; + } + o->netbios_node_type = t; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "DNS") && p[2]) + { + dhcp_option_address_parse ("DNS", p[2], o->dns, &o->dns_len, msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[1], "WINS") && p[2]) + { + dhcp_option_address_parse ("WINS", p[2], o->wins, &o->wins_len, msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[1], "NTP") && p[2]) + { + dhcp_option_address_parse ("NTP", p[2], o->ntp, &o->ntp_len, msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[1], "NBDD") && p[2]) + { + dhcp_option_address_parse ("NBDD", p[2], o->nbdd, &o->nbdd_len, msglevel); + } + else if (streq (p[1], "DISABLE-NBT")) + { + o->disable_nbt = 1; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--dhcp-option: unknown option type '%s' or missing parameter", p[1]); + goto err; + } + o->dhcp_options = true; + } +#endif +#ifdef WIN32 + else if (streq (p[0], "show-adapters")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + show_tap_win_adapters (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, M_WARN|M_NOPREFIX); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "show-net")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + show_routes (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + show_adapters (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "show-net-up")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_UP); + options->show_net_up = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tap-sleep") && p[1]) + { + int s; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + s = atoi (p[1]); + if (s < 0 || s >= 256) + { + msg (msglevel, "--tap-sleep parameter must be between 0 and 255"); + goto err; + } + options->tuntap_options.tap_sleep = s; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-renew")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + options->tuntap_options.dhcp_renew = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-pre-release")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + options->tuntap_options.dhcp_pre_release = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-release")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + options->tuntap_options.dhcp_release = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-internal") && p[1]) /* standalone method for internal use */ + { + unsigned int adapter_index; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + set_debug_level (options->verbosity, SDL_CONSTRAIN); + adapter_index = atou (p[1]); + sleep (options->tuntap_options.tap_sleep); + if (options->tuntap_options.dhcp_pre_release) + dhcp_release_by_adapter_index (adapter_index); + if (options->tuntap_options.dhcp_renew) + dhcp_renew_by_adapter_index (adapter_index); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "register-dns")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + options->tuntap_options.register_dns = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "rdns-internal")) + /* standalone method for internal use + * + * (if --register-dns is set, openvpn needs to call itself in a + * sub-process to execute the required functions in a non-blocking + * way, and uses --rdns-internal to signal that to itself) + */ + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + set_debug_level (options->verbosity, SDL_CONSTRAIN); + if (options->tuntap_options.register_dns) + ipconfig_register_dns (NULL); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "show-valid-subnets")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + show_valid_win32_tun_subnets (); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pause-exit")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + set_pause_exit_win32 (); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "service") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->exit_event_name = p[1]; + if (p[2]) + { + options->exit_event_initial_state = (atoi(p[2]) != 0); + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "allow-nonadmin")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + tap_allow_nonadmin_access (p[1]); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "user") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: --user option is not implemented on Windows"); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "group") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: --group option is not implemented on Windows"); + } +#else + else if (streq (p[0], "user") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->username = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "group") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->groupname = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "dhcp-option") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_IPWIN32); + foreign_option (options, p, 3, es); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "route-method") && p[1]) /* ignore when pushed to non-Windows OS */ + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS); + } +#endif +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + else if (streq (p[0], "passtos")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->passtos = true; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + else if (streq (p[0], "comp-lzo")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_COMP); + if (p[1]) + { + if (streq (p[1], "yes")) + options->lzo = LZO_SELECTED|LZO_ON; + else if (streq (p[1], "no")) + options->lzo = LZO_SELECTED; + else if (streq (p[1], "adaptive")) + options->lzo = LZO_SELECTED|LZO_ON|LZO_ADAPTIVE; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "bad comp-lzo option: %s -- must be 'yes', 'no', or 'adaptive'", p[1]); + goto err; + } + } + else + options->lzo = LZO_SELECTED|LZO_ON|LZO_ADAPTIVE; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "comp-noadapt")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_COMP); + options->lzo &= ~LZO_ADAPTIVE; + } +#endif /* ENABLE_LZO */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + else if (streq (p[0], "show-ciphers")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->show_ciphers = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "show-digests")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->show_digests = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "show-engines")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->show_engines = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "key-direction") && p[1]) + { + int key_direction; + + key_direction = ascii2keydirection (msglevel, p[1]); + if (key_direction >= 0) + options->key_direction = key_direction; + else + goto err; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "secret") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->shared_secret_file_inline = p[2]; + } + else + if (p[2]) + { + int key_direction; + + key_direction = ascii2keydirection (msglevel, p[2]); + if (key_direction >= 0) + options->key_direction = key_direction; + else + goto err; + } + options->shared_secret_file = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "genkey")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->genkey = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->authname_defined = true; + options->authname = p[1]; + if (streq (options->authname, "none")) + { + options->authname_defined = false; + options->authname = NULL; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->authname_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "cipher") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->ciphername_defined = true; + options->ciphername = p[1]; + if (streq (options->ciphername, "none")) + { + options->ciphername_defined = false; + options->ciphername = NULL; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "cipher")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->ciphername_defined = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "prng") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + if (streq (p[1], "none")) + options->prng_hash = NULL; + else + options->prng_hash = p[1]; + if (p[2]) + { + const int sl = atoi (p[2]); + if (sl >= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN && sl <= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MAX) + { + options->prng_nonce_secret_len = sl; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "prng parameter nonce_secret_len must be between %d and %d", + NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN, NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MAX); + goto err; + } + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "no-replay")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->replay = false; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "replay-window")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + if (p[1]) + { + int replay_window; + + replay_window = atoi (p[1]); + if (!(MIN_SEQ_BACKTRACK <= replay_window && replay_window <= MAX_SEQ_BACKTRACK)) + { + msg (msglevel, "replay-window window size parameter (%d) must be between %d and %d", + replay_window, + MIN_SEQ_BACKTRACK, + MAX_SEQ_BACKTRACK); + goto err; + } + options->replay_window = replay_window; + + if (p[2]) + { + int replay_time; + + replay_time = atoi (p[2]); + if (!(MIN_TIME_BACKTRACK <= replay_time && replay_time <= MAX_TIME_BACKTRACK)) + { + msg (msglevel, "replay-window time window parameter (%d) must be between %d and %d", + replay_time, + MIN_TIME_BACKTRACK, + MAX_TIME_BACKTRACK); + goto err; + } + options->replay_time = replay_time; + } + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "replay-window option is missing window size parameter"); + goto err; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mute-replay-warnings")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->mute_replay_warnings = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "no-iv")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + options->use_iv = false; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "replay-persist") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->packet_id_file = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "test-crypto")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->test_crypto = true; + } +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + else if (streq (p[0], "engine")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (p[1]) + { + options->engine = p[1]; + } + else + options->engine = "auto"; + } +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH + else if (streq (p[0], "keysize") && p[1]) + { + int keysize; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_CRYPTO); + keysize = atoi (p[1]) / 8; + if (keysize < 0 || keysize > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + msg (msglevel, "Bad keysize: %s", p[1]); + goto err; + } + options->keysize = keysize; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + else if (streq (p[0], "use-prediction-resistance")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->use_prediction_resistance = true; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + else if (streq (p[0], "show-tls")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->show_tls_ciphers = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-server")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tls_server = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-client")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tls_client = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ca") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ca_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->ca_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + else if (streq (p[0], "capath") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->ca_path = p[1]; + } +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ + else if (streq (p[0], "dh") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->dh_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->dh_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "cert") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->cert_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->cert_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "extra-certs") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->extra_certs_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->extra_certs_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } + else if (streq (p[0], "verify-hash") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->verify_hash = parse_hash_fingerprint(p[1], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, msglevel, &options->gc); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + else if (streq (p[0], "cryptoapicert") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->cryptoapi_cert = p[1]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "key") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->priv_key_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->priv_key_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs12") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->pkcs12_file = p[1]; + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->pkcs12_file_inline = p[2]; + } + } +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ + else if (streq (p[0], "askpass")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (p[1]) + { + options->key_pass_file = p[1]; + } + else + options->key_pass_file = "stdin"; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-nocache")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + ssl_set_auth_nocache (); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "auth-token") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_ECHO); + ssl_set_auth_token(p[1]); +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_auth_token (management, p[1]); +#endif + } + else if (streq (p[0], "single-session")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->single_session = true; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + else if (streq (p[0], "push-peer-info")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->push_peer_info = true; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-exit")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tls_exit = true; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-cipher") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->cipher_list = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "crl-verify") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (p[2] && streq(p[2], "dir")) + options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR; + options->crl_file = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-verify") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_SCRIPT); + if (!no_more_than_n_args (msglevel, p, 2, NM_QUOTE_HINT)) + goto err; + warn_multiple_script (options->tls_verify, "tls-verify"); + options->tls_verify = string_substitute (p[1], ',', ' ', &options->gc); + } +#ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-export-cert") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tls_export_cert = p[1]; + } +#endif + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-remote") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->tls_remote = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "ns-cert-type") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], "server")) + options->ns_cert_type = NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER; + else if (streq (p[1], "client")) + options->ns_cert_type = NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT; + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--ns-cert-type must be 'client' or 'server'"); + goto err; + } + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L || ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + else if (streq (p[0], "remote-cert-ku")) + { + int j; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + sscanf (p[j], "%x", &(options->remote_cert_ku[j-1])); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remote-cert-eku") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->remote_cert_eku = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "remote-cert-tls") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + if (streq (p[1], "server")) + { + options->remote_cert_ku[0] = 0xa0; + options->remote_cert_ku[1] = 0x88; + options->remote_cert_eku = "TLS Web Server Authentication"; + } + else if (streq (p[1], "client")) + { + options->remote_cert_ku[0] = 0x80; + options->remote_cert_ku[1] = 0x08; + options->remote_cert_ku[2] = 0x88; + options->remote_cert_eku = "TLS Web Client Authentication"; + } + else + { + msg (msglevel, "--remote-cert-tls must be 'client' or 'server'"); + goto err; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-timeout") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->tls_timeout = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "reneg-bytes") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->renegotiate_bytes = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "reneg-pkts") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->renegotiate_packets = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "reneg-sec") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->renegotiate_seconds = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "hand-window") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->handshake_window = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tran-window") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_TLS_PARMS); + options->transition_window = positive_atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "tls-auth") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2]) + { + options->tls_auth_file_inline = p[2]; + } + else + if (p[2]) + { + int key_direction; + + key_direction = ascii2keydirection (msglevel, p[2]); + if (key_direction >= 0) + options->key_direction = key_direction; + else + goto err; + } + options->tls_auth_file = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "key-method") && p[1]) + { + int key_method; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + key_method = atoi (p[1]); + if (key_method < KEY_METHOD_MIN || key_method > KEY_METHOD_MAX) + { + msg (msglevel, "key_method parameter (%d) must be >= %d and <= %d", + key_method, + KEY_METHOD_MIN, + KEY_METHOD_MAX); + goto err; + } + options->key_method = key_method; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + else if (streq (p[0], "x509-username-field") && p[1]) + { + char *s = p[1]; + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + if( strncmp ("ext:",s,4) != 0 ) + while ((*s = toupper(*s)) != '\0') s++; /* Uppercase if necessary */ + options->x509_username_field = p[1]; + } +#endif /* ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME */ +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + else if (streq (p[0], "show-pkcs11-ids") && p[1]) + { + char *provider = p[1]; + bool cert_private = (p[2] == NULL ? false : ( atoi (p[2]) != 0 )); + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + set_debug_level (options->verbosity, SDL_CONSTRAIN); + show_pkcs11_ids (provider, cert_private); + openvpn_exit (OPENVPN_EXIT_STATUS_GOOD); /* exit point */ + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-providers") && p[1]) + { + int j; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + options->pkcs11_providers[j-1] = p[j]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-protected-authentication")) + { + int j; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + options->pkcs11_protected_authentication[j-1] = atoi (p[j]) != 0 ? 1 : 0; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-private-mode") && p[1]) + { + int j; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + sscanf (p[j], "%x", &(options->pkcs11_private_mode[j-1])); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-cert-private")) + { + int j; + + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + + for (j = 1; j < MAX_PARMS && p[j] != NULL; ++j) + options->pkcs11_cert_private[j-1] = atoi (p[j]) != 0 ? 1 : 0; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-pin-cache") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->pkcs11_pin_cache_period = atoi (p[1]); + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-id") && p[1]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->pkcs11_id = p[1]; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "pkcs11-id-management")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->pkcs11_id_management = true; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + else if (streq (p[0], "rmtun")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->persist_config = true; + options->persist_mode = 0; + } + else if (streq (p[0], "mktun")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + options->persist_config = true; + options->persist_mode = 1; + } +#endif + else + { + if (file) + msg (msglevel_fc, "Unrecognized option or missing parameter(s) in %s:%d: %s (%s)", file, line, p[0], PACKAGE_VERSION); + else + msg (msglevel_fc, "Unrecognized option or missing parameter(s): --%s (%s)", p[0], PACKAGE_VERSION); + } + err: + gc_free (&gc); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..909cb38a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/options.h @@ -0,0 +1,777 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * 2004-01-28: Added Socks5 proxy support + * (Christof Meerwald, http://cmeerw.org) + */ + +#ifndef OPTIONS_H +#define OPTIONS_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "route.h" +#include "tun.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "plugin.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "proxy.h" +#include "lzo.h" +#include "pushlist.h" +#include "clinat.h" + +/* + * Maximum number of parameters associated with an option, + * including the option name itself. + */ +#define MAX_PARMS 16 + +/* + * Max size of options line and parameter. + */ +#define OPTION_PARM_SIZE 256 +#define OPTION_LINE_SIZE 256 + +extern const char title_string[]; + +#if P2MP + +/* certain options are saved before --pull modifications are applied */ +struct options_pre_pull +{ + bool tuntap_options_defined; + struct tuntap_options tuntap_options; + + bool routes_defined; + struct route_option_list *routes; + + bool routes_ipv6_defined; + struct route_ipv6_option_list *routes_ipv6; + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + bool client_nat_defined; + struct client_nat_option_list *client_nat; +#endif + + int foreign_option_index; +}; + +#endif +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) +# error "At least one of OpenSSL or PolarSSL needs to be defined." +#endif + +struct connection_entry +{ + int proto; + sa_family_t af; + const char* local_port; + bool local_port_defined; + const char* remote_port; + const char *local; + const char *remote; + bool remote_float; + bool bind_defined; + bool bind_local; + int connect_retry_seconds; + int connect_timeout; + bool connect_timeout_defined; +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + struct http_proxy_options *http_proxy_options; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + const char *socks_proxy_server; + const char *socks_proxy_port; + const char *socks_proxy_authfile; + bool socks_proxy_retry; +#endif + + int tun_mtu; /* MTU of tun device */ + bool tun_mtu_defined; /* true if user overriding parm with command line option */ + int tun_mtu_extra; + bool tun_mtu_extra_defined; + int link_mtu; /* MTU of device over which tunnel packets pass via TCP/UDP */ + bool link_mtu_defined; /* true if user overriding parm with command line option */ + + /* Advanced MTU negotiation and datagram fragmentation options */ + int mtu_discover_type; /* used if OS supports setting Path MTU discovery options on socket */ + + int fragment; /* internal fragmentation size */ + int mssfix; /* Upper bound on TCP MSS */ + bool mssfix_default; /* true if --mssfix was supplied without a parameter */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + int explicit_exit_notification; /* Explicitly tell peer when we are exiting via OCC_EXIT message */ +#endif + +# define CE_DISABLED (1<<0) +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_PROXY (1<<1) +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_UNDEF 0 +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_QUERY 1 +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_ACCEPT 2 +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MOD 3 +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SKIP 4 +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_MASK (0x07) +# define CE_MAN_QUERY_REMOTE_SHIFT (2) + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct remote_entry +{ + const char *remote; + const char *remote_port; + int proto; + sa_family_t af; +}; + +#define CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE 64 + +struct connection_list +{ + int len; + int current; + struct connection_entry *array[CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE]; +}; + +struct remote_list +{ + int len; + struct remote_entry *array[CONNECTION_LIST_SIZE]; +}; + +struct remote_host_store +{ +# define RH_HOST_LEN 80 + char host[RH_HOST_LEN]; +#define RH_PORT_LEN 20 + char port[RH_PORT_LEN]; +}; + +/* Command line options */ +struct options +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + bool gc_owned; + + /* first config file */ + const char *config; + + /* major mode */ +# define MODE_POINT_TO_POINT 0 +# define MODE_SERVER 1 + int mode; + + /* enable forward compatibility for post-2.1 features */ + bool forward_compatible; + + /* persist parms */ + bool persist_config; + int persist_mode; + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + const char *key_pass_file; + bool show_ciphers; + bool show_digests; + bool show_engines; +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + bool show_tls_ciphers; +#endif + bool genkey; +#endif + + /* Networking parms */ + int connect_retry_max; + struct connection_entry ce; + struct connection_list *connection_list; + + struct remote_list *remote_list; + /* Do not advanced the connection or remote addr list*/ + bool no_advance; + /* Counts the number of unsuccessful connection attempts */ + unsigned int unsuccessful_attempts; + +#if HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE + struct http_proxy_options *http_proxy_override; +#endif + + struct remote_host_store *rh_store; + + bool remote_random; + const char *ipchange; + const char *dev; + const char *dev_type; + const char *dev_node; + const char *lladdr; + int topology; /* one of the TOP_x values from proto.h */ + const char *ifconfig_local; + const char *ifconfig_remote_netmask; + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local; + int ifconfig_ipv6_netbits; + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_remote; + bool ifconfig_noexec; + bool ifconfig_nowarn; +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + int shaper; +#endif + + int proto_force; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + bool mtu_test; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MEMSTATS + char *memstats_fn; +#endif + + bool mlock; + + int keepalive_ping; /* a proxy for ping/ping-restart */ + int keepalive_timeout; + + int inactivity_timeout; /* --inactive */ + int inactivity_minimum_bytes; + + int ping_send_timeout; /* Send a TCP/UDP ping to remote every n seconds */ + int ping_rec_timeout; /* Expect a TCP/UDP ping from remote at least once every n seconds */ + bool ping_timer_remote; /* Run ping timer only if we have a remote address */ + bool tun_ipv6; /* Build tun dev that supports IPv6 */ + +# define PING_UNDEF 0 +# define PING_EXIT 1 +# define PING_RESTART 2 + int ping_rec_timeout_action; /* What action to take on ping_rec_timeout (exit or restart)? */ + + bool persist_tun; /* Don't close/reopen TUN/TAP dev on SIGUSR1 or PING_RESTART */ + bool persist_local_ip; /* Don't re-resolve local address on SIGUSR1 or PING_RESTART */ + bool persist_remote_ip; /* Don't re-resolve remote address on SIGUSR1 or PING_RESTART */ + bool persist_key; /* Don't re-read key files on SIGUSR1 or PING_RESTART */ + +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + bool passtos; +#endif + + int resolve_retry_seconds; /* If hostname resolve fails, retry for n seconds */ + + struct tuntap_options tuntap_options; + + /* Misc parms */ + const char *username; + const char *groupname; + const char *chroot_dir; + const char *cd_dir; +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX + char *selinux_context; +#endif + const char *writepid; + const char *up_script; + const char *down_script; + bool down_pre; + bool up_delay; + bool up_restart; + bool daemon; + + int remap_sigusr1; + + /* inetd modes defined in socket.h */ + int inetd; + + bool log; + bool suppress_timestamps; + int nice; + int verbosity; + int mute; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + int gremlin; +#endif + + const char *status_file; + int status_file_version; + int status_file_update_freq; + + /* optimize TUN/TAP/UDP writes */ + bool fast_io; + +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + /* LZO_x flags from lzo.h */ + unsigned int lzo; +#endif + + /* buffer sizes */ + int rcvbuf; + int sndbuf; + + /* mark value */ + int mark; + + /* socket flags */ + unsigned int sockflags; + + /* route management */ + const char *route_script; + const char *route_predown_script; + const char *route_default_gateway; + int route_default_metric; + bool route_noexec; + int route_delay; + int route_delay_window; + bool route_delay_defined; + int max_routes; + struct route_option_list *routes; + struct route_ipv6_option_list *routes_ipv6; /* IPv6 */ + bool route_nopull; + bool route_gateway_via_dhcp; + bool allow_pull_fqdn; /* as a client, allow server to push a FQDN for certain parameters */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + struct client_nat_option_list *client_nat; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* Enable options consistency check between peers */ + bool occ; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + const char *management_addr; + const char *management_port; + const char *management_user_pass; + int management_log_history_cache; + int management_echo_buffer_size; + int management_state_buffer_size; + const char *management_write_peer_info_file; + + const char *management_client_user; + const char *management_client_group; + + /* Mask of MF_ values of manage.h */ + unsigned int management_flags; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + struct plugin_option_list *plugin_list; +#endif + + + +#if P2MP + +#if P2MP_SERVER + /* the tmp dir is for now only used in the P2P server context */ + const char *tmp_dir; + bool server_defined; + in_addr_t server_network; + in_addr_t server_netmask; + bool server_ipv6_defined; /* IPv6 */ + struct in6_addr server_network_ipv6; /* IPv6 */ + unsigned int server_netbits_ipv6; /* IPv6 */ + +# define SF_NOPOOL (1<<0) +# define SF_TCP_NODELAY_HELPER (1<<1) +# define SF_NO_PUSH_ROUTE_GATEWAY (1<<2) + unsigned int server_flags; + + bool server_bridge_proxy_dhcp; + + bool server_bridge_defined; + in_addr_t server_bridge_ip; + in_addr_t server_bridge_netmask; + in_addr_t server_bridge_pool_start; + in_addr_t server_bridge_pool_end; + + struct push_list push_list; + bool ifconfig_pool_defined; + in_addr_t ifconfig_pool_start; + in_addr_t ifconfig_pool_end; + in_addr_t ifconfig_pool_netmask; + const char *ifconfig_pool_persist_filename; + int ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq; + + bool ifconfig_ipv6_pool_defined; /* IPv6 */ + struct in6_addr ifconfig_ipv6_pool_base; /* IPv6 */ + int ifconfig_ipv6_pool_netbits; /* IPv6 */ + + int real_hash_size; + int virtual_hash_size; + const char *client_connect_script; + const char *client_disconnect_script; + const char *learn_address_script; + const char *client_config_dir; + bool ccd_exclusive; + bool disable; + int n_bcast_buf; + int tcp_queue_limit; + struct iroute *iroutes; + struct iroute_ipv6 *iroutes_ipv6; /* IPv6 */ + bool push_ifconfig_defined; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_local; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_remote_netmask; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_local_alias; +#endif + bool push_ifconfig_constraint_defined; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_constraint_network; + in_addr_t push_ifconfig_constraint_netmask; + bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined; /* IPv6 */ + struct in6_addr push_ifconfig_ipv6_local; /* IPv6 */ + int push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits; /* IPv6 */ + struct in6_addr push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote; /* IPv6 */ + bool enable_c2c; + bool duplicate_cn; + int cf_max; + int cf_per; + int max_clients; + int max_routes_per_client; + int stale_routes_check_interval; + int stale_routes_ageing_time; + + const char *auth_user_pass_verify_script; + bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file; +#if PORT_SHARE + char *port_share_host; + char *port_share_port; + const char *port_share_journal_dir; +#endif +#endif + + bool client; + bool pull; /* client pull of config options from server */ + int push_continuation; + const char *auth_user_pass_file; + struct options_pre_pull *pre_pull; + + int server_poll_timeout; + + int scheduled_exit_interval; + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + struct static_challenge_info sc_info; +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + /* Cipher parms */ + const char *shared_secret_file; + const char *shared_secret_file_inline; + int key_direction; + bool ciphername_defined; + const char *ciphername; + bool authname_defined; + const char *authname; + int keysize; + const char *prng_hash; + int prng_nonce_secret_len; + const char *engine; + bool replay; + bool mute_replay_warnings; + int replay_window; + int replay_time; + const char *packet_id_file; + bool use_iv; + bool test_crypto; +#ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE + bool use_prediction_resistance; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + /* TLS (control channel) parms */ + bool tls_server; + bool tls_client; + const char *ca_file; + const char *ca_path; + const char *dh_file; + const char *cert_file; + const char *extra_certs_file; + const char *priv_key_file; + const char *pkcs12_file; + const char *cipher_list; + const char *tls_verify; + const char *tls_export_cert; + const char *tls_remote; + const char *crl_file; + + const char *ca_file_inline; + const char *cert_file_inline; + const char *extra_certs_file_inline; + char *priv_key_file_inline; + const char *dh_file_inline; + const char *pkcs12_file_inline; /* contains the base64 encoding of pkcs12 file */ + + int ns_cert_type; /* set to 0, NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER, or NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT */ + unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS]; + const char *remote_cert_eku; + uint8_t *verify_hash; + unsigned int ssl_flags; /* set to SSLF_x flags from ssl.h */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + const char *pkcs11_providers[MAX_PARMS]; + unsigned pkcs11_private_mode[MAX_PARMS]; + bool pkcs11_protected_authentication[MAX_PARMS]; + bool pkcs11_cert_private[MAX_PARMS]; + int pkcs11_pin_cache_period; + const char *pkcs11_id; + bool pkcs11_id_management; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + const char *cryptoapi_cert; +#endif + + /* data channel key exchange method */ + int key_method; + + /* Per-packet timeout on control channel */ + int tls_timeout; + + /* Data channel key renegotiation parameters */ + int renegotiate_bytes; + int renegotiate_packets; + int renegotiate_seconds; + + /* Data channel key handshake must finalize + within n seconds of handshake initiation. */ + int handshake_window; + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + /* Field used to be the username in X509 cert. */ + char *x509_username_field; +#endif + + /* Old key allowed to live n seconds after new key goes active */ + int transition_window; + + /* Special authentication MAC for TLS control channel */ + const char *tls_auth_file; /* shared secret */ + const char *tls_auth_file_inline; + + /* Allow only one session */ + bool single_session; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + bool push_peer_info; +#endif + + bool tls_exit; + +#endif /* ENABLE_SSL */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + const struct x509_track *x509_track; +#endif + + /* special state parms */ + int foreign_option_index; + +#ifdef WIN32 + const char *exit_event_name; + bool exit_event_initial_state; + bool show_net_up; + int route_method; +#endif +}; + +#define streq(x, y) (!strcmp((x), (y))) + +/* + * Option classes. + */ +#define OPT_P_GENERAL (1<<0) +#define OPT_P_UP (1<<1) +#define OPT_P_ROUTE (1<<2) +#define OPT_P_IPWIN32 (1<<3) +#define OPT_P_SCRIPT (1<<4) +#define OPT_P_SETENV (1<<5) +#define OPT_P_SHAPER (1<<6) +#define OPT_P_TIMER (1<<7) +#define OPT_P_PERSIST (1<<8) +#define OPT_P_PERSIST_IP (1<<9) +#define OPT_P_COMP (1<<10) /* TODO */ +#define OPT_P_MESSAGES (1<<11) +#define OPT_P_CRYPTO (1<<12) /* TODO */ +#define OPT_P_TLS_PARMS (1<<13) /* TODO */ +#define OPT_P_MTU (1<<14) /* TODO */ +#define OPT_P_NICE (1<<15) +#define OPT_P_PUSH (1<<16) +#define OPT_P_INSTANCE (1<<17) +#define OPT_P_CONFIG (1<<18) +#define OPT_P_EXPLICIT_NOTIFY (1<<19) +#define OPT_P_ECHO (1<<20) +#define OPT_P_INHERIT (1<<21) +#define OPT_P_ROUTE_EXTRAS (1<<22) +#define OPT_P_PULL_MODE (1<<23) +#define OPT_P_PLUGIN (1<<24) +#define OPT_P_SOCKBUF (1<<25) +#define OPT_P_SOCKFLAGS (1<<26) +#define OPT_P_CONNECTION (1<<27) + +#define OPT_P_DEFAULT (~(OPT_P_INSTANCE|OPT_P_PULL_MODE)) + +#if P2MP +#define PULL_DEFINED(opt) ((opt)->pull) +#if P2MP_SERVER +#define PUSH_DEFINED(opt) ((opt)->push_list) +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef PULL_DEFINED +#define PULL_DEFINED(opt) (false) +#endif + +#ifndef PUSH_DEFINED +#define PUSH_DEFINED(opt) (false) +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 +#define ROUTE_OPTION_FLAGS(o) ((o)->route_method & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) +#else +#define ROUTE_OPTION_FLAGS(o) (0) +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER +#define SHAPER_DEFINED(opt) ((opt)->shaper) +#else +#define SHAPER_DEFINED(opt) (false) +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN +#define PLUGIN_OPTION_LIST(opt) ((opt)->plugin_list) +#else +#define PLUGIN_OPTION_LIST(opt) (NULL) +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +#define MAN_CLIENT_AUTH_ENABLED(opt) ((opt)->management_flags & MF_CLIENT_AUTH) +#else +#define MAN_CLIENT_AUTH_ENABLED(opt) (false) +#endif + +void parse_argv (struct options *options, + const int argc, + char *argv[], + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es); + +void notnull (const char *arg, const char *description); + +void usage_small (void); + +void init_options (struct options *o, const bool init_gc); +void uninit_options (struct options *o); + +void setenv_settings (struct env_set *es, const struct options *o); +void show_settings (const struct options *o); + +bool string_defined_equal (const char *s1, const char *s2); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + +const char *options_string_version (const char* s, struct gc_arena *gc); + +char *options_string (const struct options *o, + const struct frame *frame, + struct tuntap *tt, + bool remote, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +bool options_cmp_equal_safe (char *actual, const char *expected, size_t actual_n); +void options_warning_safe (char *actual, const char *expected, size_t actual_n); +bool options_cmp_equal (char *actual, const char *expected); +void options_warning (char *actual, const char *expected); + +#endif + +void options_postprocess (struct options *options); + +void pre_pull_save (struct options *o); +void pre_pull_restore (struct options *o); + +bool apply_push_options (struct options *options, + struct buffer *buf, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es); + +void options_detach (struct options *o); + +void options_server_import (struct options *o, + const char *filename, + int msglevel, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es); + +void pre_pull_default (struct options *o); + +void rol_check_alloc (struct options *options); + +int parse_line (const char *line, + char *p[], + const int n, + const char *file, + const int line_num, + int msglevel, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * parse/print topology coding + */ + +int parse_topology (const char *str, const int msglevel); +const char *print_topology (const int topology); + +/* + * Manage auth-retry variable + */ + +#if P2MP + +#define AR_NONE 0 +#define AR_INTERACT 1 +#define AR_NOINTERACT 2 + +int auth_retry_get (void); +bool auth_retry_set (const int msglevel, const char *option); +const char *auth_retry_print (void); + +#endif + +void options_string_import (struct options *options, + const char *config, + const int msglevel, + const unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found, + struct env_set *es); + +bool get_ipv6_addr( const char * prefix_str, struct in6_addr *network, + unsigned int * netbits, char ** printable_ipv6, + int msglevel ); + + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2c1e5b13 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "otime.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +time_t now = 0; /* GLOBAL */ + +#if TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION + +static time_t now_adj = 0; /* GLOBAL */ +time_t now_usec = 0; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Try to filter out time instability caused by the system + * clock backtracking or jumping forward. + */ + +void +update_now (const time_t system_time) +{ + const int forward_threshold = 86400; /* threshold at which to dampen forward jumps */ + const int backward_trigger = 10; /* backward jump must be >= this many seconds before we adjust */ + time_t real_time = system_time + now_adj; + + if (real_time > now) + { + const time_t overshoot = real_time - now - 1; + if (overshoot > forward_threshold && now_adj >= overshoot) + { + now_adj -= overshoot; + real_time -= overshoot; + } + now = real_time; + } + else if (real_time < now - backward_trigger) + now_adj += (now - real_time); +} + +void +update_now_usec (struct timeval *tv) +{ + const time_t last = now; + update_now (tv->tv_sec); + if (now > last || (now == last && tv->tv_usec > now_usec)) + now_usec = tv->tv_usec; +} + +#endif /* TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION */ + +/* + * Return a numerical string describing a struct timeval. + */ +const char * +tv_string (const struct timeval *tv, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "[%d/%d]", + (int) tv->tv_sec, + (int )tv->tv_usec); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Return an ascii string describing an absolute + * date/time in a struct timeval. + * + */ +const char * +tv_string_abs (const struct timeval *tv, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return time_string ((time_t) tv->tv_sec, + (int) tv->tv_usec, + true, + gc); +} + +/* format a time_t as ascii, or use current time if 0 */ + +const char * +time_string (time_t t, int usec, bool show_usec, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + struct timeval tv; + + if (t) + { + tv.tv_sec = t; + tv.tv_usec = usec; + } + else + { + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + } + + t = tv.tv_sec; + buf_printf (&out, "%s", ctime(&t)); + buf_rmtail (&out, '\n'); + + if (show_usec && tv.tv_usec) + buf_printf (&out, " us=%d", (int)tv.tv_usec); + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Limit the frequency of an event stream. + * + * Used to control maximum rate of new + * incoming connections. + */ + +struct frequency_limit * +frequency_limit_init (int max, int per) +{ + struct frequency_limit *f; + + ASSERT (max >= 0 && per >= 0); + + ALLOC_OBJ (f, struct frequency_limit); + f->max = max; + f->per = per; + f->n = 0; + f->reset = 0; + return f; +} + +void +frequency_limit_free (struct frequency_limit *f) +{ + free (f); +} + +bool +frequency_limit_event_allowed (struct frequency_limit *f) +{ + if (f->per) + { + bool ret; + if (now >= f->reset + f->per) + { + f->reset = now; + f->n = 0; + } + ret = (++f->n <= f->max); + return ret; + } + else + return true; +} + +#ifdef TIME_TEST +void +time_test (void) +{ + struct timeval tv; + time_t t; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) + { + t = time(NULL); + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); +#if 1 + msg (M_INFO, "t=%u s=%u us=%u", + (unsigned int)t, + (unsigned int)tv.tv_sec, + (unsigned int)tv.tv_usec); +#endif + } +} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ca10326 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/otime.h @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OTIME_H +#define OTIME_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "buffer.h" + +struct frequency_limit +{ + int max; + int per; + int n; + time_t reset; +}; + +struct frequency_limit *frequency_limit_init (int max, int per); +void frequency_limit_free (struct frequency_limit *f); +bool frequency_limit_event_allowed (struct frequency_limit *f); + +/* format a time_t as ascii, or use current time if 0 */ +const char* time_string (time_t t, int usec, bool show_usec, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* struct timeval functions */ + +const char *tv_string (const struct timeval *tv, struct gc_arena *gc); +const char *tv_string_abs (const struct timeval *tv, struct gc_arena *gc); + +extern time_t now; /* updated frequently to time(NULL) */ + +void time_test (void); + +#if TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION + +void update_now (const time_t system_time); + +extern time_t now_usec; +void update_now_usec (struct timeval *tv); + +static inline int +openvpn_gettimeofday (struct timeval *tv, void *tz) +{ + const int status = gettimeofday (tv, tz); + if (!status) + { + update_now_usec (tv); + tv->tv_sec = now; + tv->tv_usec = now_usec; + } + return status; +} + +static inline void +update_time (void) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + /* on WIN32, gettimeofday is faster than time(NULL) */ + struct timeval tv; + openvpn_gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); +#else + update_now (time (NULL)); +#endif +} + +#else /* !TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION */ + +static inline void +update_time (void) +{ +#if defined(WIN32) + /* on WIN32, gettimeofday is faster than time(NULL) */ + struct timeval tv; + if (!gettimeofday (&tv, NULL)) + { + if (tv.tv_sec != now) + now = tv.tv_sec; + } +#else + const time_t real_time = time (NULL); + if (real_time != now) + now = real_time; +#endif +} + +static inline int +openvpn_gettimeofday (struct timeval *tv, void *tz) +{ + return gettimeofday (tv, tz); +} + +#endif /* TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION */ + +static inline time_t +openvpn_time (time_t *t) +{ + update_time (); + if (t) + *t = now; + return now; +} + +static inline void +tv_clear (struct timeval *tv) +{ + tv->tv_sec = 0; + tv->tv_usec = 0; +} + +static inline bool +tv_defined (const struct timeval *tv) +{ + return tv->tv_sec > 0 && tv->tv_usec > 0; +} + +/* return tv1 - tv2 in usec, constrained by max_seconds */ +static inline int +tv_subtract (const struct timeval *tv1, const struct timeval *tv2, const unsigned int max_seconds) +{ + const int max_usec = max_seconds * 1000000; + const int sec_diff = tv1->tv_sec - tv2->tv_sec; + + if (sec_diff > ((int)max_seconds + 10)) + return max_usec; + else if (sec_diff < -((int)max_seconds + 10)) + return -max_usec; + return constrain_int (sec_diff * 1000000 + (tv1->tv_usec - tv2->tv_usec), -max_usec, max_usec); +} + +static inline void +tv_add (struct timeval *dest, const struct timeval *src) +{ + dest->tv_sec += src->tv_sec; + dest->tv_usec += src->tv_usec; + dest->tv_sec += (dest->tv_usec >> 20); + dest->tv_usec &= 0x000FFFFF; + if (dest->tv_usec >= 1000000) + { + dest->tv_usec -= 1000000; + dest->tv_sec += 1; + } +} + +static inline bool +tv_lt (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + if (t1->tv_sec < t2->tv_sec) + return true; + else if (t1->tv_sec > t2->tv_sec) + return false; + else + return t1->tv_usec < t2->tv_usec; +} + +static inline bool +tv_le (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + if (t1->tv_sec < t2->tv_sec) + return true; + else if (t1->tv_sec > t2->tv_sec) + return false; + else + return t1->tv_usec <= t2->tv_usec; +} + +static inline bool +tv_ge (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + if (t1->tv_sec > t2->tv_sec) + return true; + else if (t1->tv_sec < t2->tv_sec) + return false; + else + return t1->tv_usec >= t2->tv_usec; +} + +static inline bool +tv_gt (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + if (t1->tv_sec > t2->tv_sec) + return true; + else if (t1->tv_sec < t2->tv_sec) + return false; + else + return t1->tv_usec > t2->tv_usec; +} + +static inline bool +tv_eq (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + return t1->tv_sec == t2->tv_sec && t1->tv_usec == t2->tv_usec; +} + +static inline void +tv_delta (struct timeval *dest, const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2) +{ + int sec = t2->tv_sec - t1->tv_sec; + int usec = t2->tv_usec - t1->tv_usec; + + while (usec < 0) + { + usec += 1000000; + sec -= 1; + } + + if (sec < 0) + usec = sec = 0; + + dest->tv_sec = sec; + dest->tv_usec = usec; +} + +#define TV_WITHIN_SIGMA_MAX_SEC 600 +#define TV_WITHIN_SIGMA_MAX_USEC (TV_WITHIN_SIGMA_MAX_SEC * 1000000) + +/* + * Is t1 and t2 within sigma microseconds of each other? + */ +static inline bool +tv_within_sigma (const struct timeval *t1, const struct timeval *t2, unsigned int sigma) +{ + const int delta = tv_subtract (t1, t2, TV_WITHIN_SIGMA_MAX_SEC); /* sigma should be less than 10 minutes */ + return -(int)sigma <= delta && delta <= (int)sigma; +} + +/* + * Used to determine in how many seconds we should be + * called again. + */ +static inline void +interval_earliest_wakeup (interval_t *wakeup, time_t at, time_t current) { + if (at > current) + { + const interval_t delta = (interval_t) (at - current); + if (delta < *wakeup) + *wakeup = delta; + if (*wakeup < 0) + *wakeup = 0; + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..baa49664 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.c @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * These routines are designed to catch replay attacks, + * where a man-in-the-middle captures packets and then + * attempts to replay them back later. + * + * We use the "sliding-window" algorithm, similar + * to IPSec. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "integer.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* #define PID_SIMULATE_BACKTRACK */ + +/* + * Special time_t value that indicates that + * sequence number has expired. + */ +#define SEQ_UNSEEN ((time_t)0) +#define SEQ_EXPIRED ((time_t)1) + +static void packet_id_debug_print (int msglevel, + const struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin, + const char *message, + int value); + +static inline void +packet_id_debug (int msglevel, + const struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin, + const char *message, + int value) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (unlikely(check_debug_level(msglevel))) + packet_id_debug_print (msglevel, p, pin, message, value); +#endif +} + +void +packet_id_init (struct packet_id *p, bool tcp_mode, int seq_backtrack, int time_backtrack, const char *name, int unit) +{ + dmsg (D_PID_DEBUG, "PID packet_id_init tcp_mode=%d seq_backtrack=%d time_backtrack=%d", + tcp_mode, + seq_backtrack, + time_backtrack); + + ASSERT (p); + CLEAR (*p); + + p->rec.name = name; + p->rec.unit = unit; + if (seq_backtrack && !tcp_mode) + { + ASSERT (MIN_SEQ_BACKTRACK <= seq_backtrack && seq_backtrack <= MAX_SEQ_BACKTRACK); + ASSERT (MIN_TIME_BACKTRACK <= time_backtrack && time_backtrack <= MAX_TIME_BACKTRACK); + CIRC_LIST_ALLOC (p->rec.seq_list, struct seq_list, seq_backtrack); + p->rec.seq_backtrack = seq_backtrack; + p->rec.time_backtrack = time_backtrack; + } + p->rec.initialized = true; +} + +void +packet_id_free (struct packet_id *p) +{ + if (p) + { + dmsg (D_PID_DEBUG, "PID packet_id_free"); + if (p->rec.seq_list) + free (p->rec.seq_list); + CLEAR (*p); + } +} + +void +packet_id_add (struct packet_id_rec *p, const struct packet_id_net *pin) +{ + const time_t local_now = now; + if (p->seq_list) + { + packet_id_type diff; + + /* + * If time value increases, start a new + * sequence number sequence. + */ + if (!CIRC_LIST_SIZE (p->seq_list) + || pin->time > p->time + || (pin->id >= (packet_id_type)p->seq_backtrack + && pin->id - (packet_id_type)p->seq_backtrack > p->id)) + { + p->time = pin->time; + p->id = 0; + if (pin->id > (packet_id_type)p->seq_backtrack) + p->id = pin->id - (packet_id_type)p->seq_backtrack; + CIRC_LIST_RESET (p->seq_list); + } + + while (p->id < pin->id +#ifdef PID_SIMULATE_BACKTRACK + || (get_random() % 64) < 31 +#endif + ) + { + CIRC_LIST_PUSH (p->seq_list, SEQ_UNSEEN); + ++p->id; + } + + diff = p->id - pin->id; + if (diff < (packet_id_type) CIRC_LIST_SIZE (p->seq_list) + && local_now > SEQ_EXPIRED) + CIRC_LIST_ITEM (p->seq_list, diff) = local_now; + } + else + { + p->time = pin->time; + p->id = pin->id; + } +} + +/* + * Expire sequence numbers which can no longer + * be accepted because they would violate + * time_backtrack. + */ +void +packet_id_reap (struct packet_id_rec *p) +{ + const time_t local_now = now; + if (p->time_backtrack) + { + int i; + bool expire = false; + for (i = 0; i < CIRC_LIST_SIZE (p->seq_list); ++i) + { + const time_t t = CIRC_LIST_ITEM (p->seq_list, i); + if (t == SEQ_EXPIRED) + break; + if (!expire && t && t + p->time_backtrack < local_now) + expire = true; + if (expire) + CIRC_LIST_ITEM (p->seq_list, i) = SEQ_EXPIRED; + } + } + p->last_reap = local_now; +} + +/* + * Return true if packet id is ok, or false if + * it is a replay. + */ +bool +packet_id_test (struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin) +{ + packet_id_type diff; + + packet_id_debug (D_PID_DEBUG, p, pin, "PID_TEST", 0); + + ASSERT (p->initialized); + + if (!pin->id) + return false; + + if (p->seq_backtrack) + { + /* + * In backtrack mode, we allow packet reordering subject + * to the seq_backtrack and time_backtrack constraints. + * + * This mode is used with UDP. + */ + if (pin->time == p->time) + { + /* is packet-id greater than any one we've seen yet? */ + if (pin->id > p->id) + return true; + + /* check packet-id sliding window for original/replay status */ + diff = p->id - pin->id; + + /* keep track of maximum backtrack seen for debugging purposes */ + if ((int)diff > p->max_backtrack_stat) + { + p->max_backtrack_stat = (int)diff; + packet_id_debug (D_PID_DEBUG_LOW, p, pin, "PID_ERR replay-window backtrack occurred", p->max_backtrack_stat); + } + + if (diff >= (packet_id_type) CIRC_LIST_SIZE (p->seq_list)) + { + packet_id_debug (D_PID_DEBUG_LOW, p, pin, "PID_ERR large diff", diff); + return false; + } + + { + const time_t v = CIRC_LIST_ITEM (p->seq_list, diff); + if (v == 0) + return true; + else + { + /* raised from D_PID_DEBUG_LOW to reduce verbosity */ + packet_id_debug (D_PID_DEBUG_MEDIUM, p, pin, "PID_ERR replay", diff); + return false; + } + } + } + else if (pin->time < p->time) /* if time goes back, reject */ + { + packet_id_debug (D_PID_DEBUG_LOW, p, pin, "PID_ERR time backtrack", 0); + return false; + } + else /* time moved forward */ + return true; + } + else + { + /* + * In non-backtrack mode, all sequence number series must + * begin at some number n > 0 and must increment linearly without gaps. + * + * This mode is used with TCP. + */ + if (pin->time == p->time) + return !p->id || pin->id == p->id + 1; + else if (pin->time < p->time) /* if time goes back, reject */ + return false; + else /* time moved forward */ + return pin->id == 1; + } +} + +/* + * Read/write a packet ID to/from the buffer. Short form is sequence number + * only. Long form is sequence number and timestamp. + */ + +bool +packet_id_read (struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form) +{ + packet_id_type net_id; + net_time_t net_time; + + pin->id = 0; + pin->time = 0; + + if (!buf_read (buf, &net_id, sizeof (net_id))) + return false; + pin->id = ntohpid (net_id); + if (long_form) + { + if (!buf_read (buf, &net_time, sizeof (net_time))) + return false; + pin->time = ntohtime (net_time); + } + return true; +} + +bool +packet_id_write (const struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form, bool prepend) +{ + packet_id_type net_id = htonpid (pin->id); + net_time_t net_time = htontime (pin->time); + + if (prepend) + { + if (long_form) + { + if (!buf_write_prepend (buf, &net_time, sizeof (net_time))) + return false; + } + if (!buf_write_prepend (buf, &net_id, sizeof (net_id))) + return false; + } + else + { + if (!buf_write (buf, &net_id, sizeof (net_id))) + return false; + if (long_form) + { + if (!buf_write (buf, &net_time, sizeof (net_time))) + return false; + } + } + return true; +} + +const char * +packet_id_net_print (const struct packet_id_net *pin, bool print_timestamp, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "[ #" packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)pin->id); + if (print_timestamp && pin->time) + buf_printf (&out, " / time = (" packet_id_format ") %s", + (packet_id_print_type)pin->time, + time_string (pin->time, 0, false, gc)); + + buf_printf (&out, " ]"); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* initialize the packet_id_persist structure in a disabled state */ +void +packet_id_persist_init (struct packet_id_persist *p) +{ + p->filename = NULL; + p->fd = -1; + p->time = p->time_last_written = 0; + p->id = p->id_last_written = 0; +} + +/* close the file descriptor if it is open, and switch to disabled state */ +void +packet_id_persist_close (struct packet_id_persist *p) +{ + if (packet_id_persist_enabled (p)) + { + if (close (p->fd)) + msg (D_PID_PERSIST | M_ERRNO, "Close error on --replay-persist file %s", p->filename); + packet_id_persist_init (p); + } +} + +/* load persisted rec packet_id (time and id) only once from file, and set state to enabled */ +void +packet_id_persist_load (struct packet_id_persist *p, const char *filename) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (!packet_id_persist_enabled (p)) + { + /* open packet-id persist file for both read and write */ + p->fd = platform_open (filename, + O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + if (p->fd == -1) + { + msg (D_PID_PERSIST | M_ERRNO, + "Cannot open --replay-persist file %s for read/write", + filename); + } + else + { + struct packet_id_persist_file_image image; + ssize_t n; + +#if defined(HAVE_FLOCK) && defined(LOCK_EX) && defined(LOCK_NB) + if (flock (p->fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB)) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot obtain exclusive lock on --replay-persist file %s", filename); +#endif + + p->filename = filename; + n = read (p->fd, &image, sizeof(image)); + if (n == sizeof(image)) + { + p->time = p->time_last_written = image.time; + p->id = p->id_last_written = image.id; + dmsg (D_PID_PERSIST_DEBUG, "PID Persist Read from %s: %s", + p->filename, packet_id_persist_print (p, &gc)); + } + else if (n == -1) + { + msg (D_PID_PERSIST | M_ERRNO, + "Read error on --replay-persist file %s", + p->filename); + } + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* save persisted rec packet_id (time and id) to file (only if enabled state) */ +void +packet_id_persist_save (struct packet_id_persist *p) +{ + if (packet_id_persist_enabled (p) && p->time && (p->time != p->time_last_written || + p->id != p->id_last_written)) + { + struct packet_id_persist_file_image image; + ssize_t n; + off_t seek_ret; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + image.time = p->time; + image.id = p->id; + seek_ret = lseek(p->fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET); + if (seek_ret == (off_t)0) + { + n = write(p->fd, &image, sizeof(image)); + if (n == sizeof(image)) + { + p->time_last_written = p->time; + p->id_last_written = p->id; + dmsg (D_PID_PERSIST_DEBUG, "PID Persist Write to %s: %s", + p->filename, packet_id_persist_print (p, &gc)); + } + else + { + msg (D_PID_PERSIST | M_ERRNO, + "Cannot write to --replay-persist file %s", + p->filename); + } + } + else + { + msg (D_PID_PERSIST | M_ERRNO, + "Cannot seek to beginning of --replay-persist file %s", + p->filename); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +/* transfer packet_id_persist -> packet_id */ +void +packet_id_persist_load_obj (const struct packet_id_persist *p, struct packet_id *pid) +{ + if (p && pid && packet_id_persist_enabled (p) && p->time) + { + pid->rec.time = p->time; + pid->rec.id = p->id; + } +} + +const char * +packet_id_persist_print (const struct packet_id_persist *p, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "["); + + if (packet_id_persist_enabled (p)) + { + buf_printf (&out, " #" packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)p->id); + if (p->time) + buf_printf (&out, " / time = (" packet_id_format ") %s", + (packet_id_print_type)p->time, + time_string (p->time, 0, false, gc)); + } + + buf_printf (&out, " ]"); + return (char *)out.data; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static void +packet_id_debug_print (int msglevel, + const struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin, + const char *message, + int value) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + struct timeval tv; + const time_t prev_now = now; + const struct seq_list *sl = p->seq_list; + int i; + + CLEAR (tv); + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s [%d]", message, value); + buf_printf (&out, " [%s-%d] [", p->name, p->unit); + for (i = 0; sl != NULL && i < sl->x_size; ++i) + { + char c; + time_t v; + int diff; + + v = CIRC_LIST_ITEM(sl, i); + if (v == SEQ_UNSEEN) + c = '_'; + else if (v == SEQ_EXPIRED) + c = 'E'; + else + { + diff = (int) prev_now - v; + if (diff < 0) + c = 'N'; + else if (diff < 10) + c = '0' + diff; + else + c = '>'; + } + buf_printf(&out, "%c", c); + } + buf_printf (&out, "] " time_format ":" packet_id_format, (time_type)p->time, (packet_id_print_type)p->id); + if (pin) + buf_printf (&out, " " time_format ":" packet_id_format, (time_type)pin->time, (packet_id_print_type)pin->id); + + buf_printf (&out, " t=" time_format "[%d]", + (time_type)prev_now, + (int)(prev_now - tv.tv_sec)); + + buf_printf (&out, " r=[%d,%d,%d,%d,%d]", + (int)(p->last_reap - tv.tv_sec), + p->seq_backtrack, + p->time_backtrack, + p->max_backtrack_stat, + (int)p->initialized); + if (sl != NULL) + { + buf_printf (&out, " sl=[%d,%d,%d,%d]", + sl->x_head, + sl->x_size, + sl->x_cap, + sl->x_sizeof); + } + + + msg (msglevel, "%s", BSTR(&out)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef PID_TEST + +void +packet_id_interactive_test () +{ + struct packet_id pid; + struct packet_id_net pin; + bool long_form; + bool count = 0; + bool test; + + const int seq_backtrack = 10; + const int time_backtrack = 10; + + packet_id_init (&pid, seq_backtrack, time_backtrack); + + while (true) { + char buf[80]; + if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin)) + break; + update_time (); + if (sscanf (buf, "%lu,%u", &pin.time, &pin.id) == 2) + { + packet_id_reap_test (&pid.rec); + test = packet_id_test (&pid.rec, &pin); + printf ("packet_id_test (" time_format ", " packet_id_format ") returned %d\n", + (time_type)pin.time, + (packet_id_print_type)pin.id, + test); + if (test) + packet_id_add (&pid.rec, &pin); + } + else + { + long_form = (count < 20); + packet_id_alloc_outgoing (&pid.send, &pin, long_form); + printf ("(" time_format "(" packet_id_format "), %d)\n", + (time_type)pin.time, + (packet_id_print_type)pin.id, + long_form); + if (pid.send.id == 10) + pid.send.id = 0xFFFFFFF8; + ++count; + } + } + packet_id_free (&pid); +} +#endif + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ddaab6a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/packet_id.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * These routines are designed to catch replay attacks, + * where a man-in-the-middle captures packets and then + * attempts to replay them back later. + */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO + +#ifndef PACKET_ID_H +#define PACKET_ID_H + +#include "circ_list.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "otime.h" + +/* + * Enables OpenVPN to be compiled in special packet_id test mode. + */ +/*#define PID_TEST*/ + +#if 1 +/* + * These are the types that members of + * a struct packet_id_net are converted + * to for network transmission. + */ +typedef uint32_t packet_id_type; +typedef uint32_t net_time_t; + +/* + * In TLS mode, when a packet ID gets to this level, + * start thinking about triggering a new + * SSL/TLS handshake. + */ +#define PACKET_ID_WRAP_TRIGGER 0xFF000000 + +/* convert a packet_id_type from host to network order */ +#define htonpid(x) htonl(x) + +/* convert a packet_id_type from network to host order */ +#define ntohpid(x) ntohl(x) + +/* convert a time_t in host order to a net_time_t in network order */ +#define htontime(x) htonl((net_time_t)x) + +/* convert a net_time_t in network order to a time_t in host order */ +#define ntohtime(x) ((time_t)ntohl(x)) + +#else + +/* + * DEBUGGING ONLY. + * Make packet_id_type and net_time_t small + * to test wraparound logic and corner cases. + */ + +typedef uint8_t packet_id_type; +typedef uint16_t net_time_t; + +#define PACKET_ID_WRAP_TRIGGER 0x80 + +#define htonpid(x) (x) +#define ntohpid(x) (x) +#define htontime(x) htons((net_time_t)x) +#define ntohtime(x) ((time_t)ntohs(x)) + +#endif + +/* + * Printf formats for special types + */ +#define packet_id_format "%u" +typedef unsigned int packet_id_print_type; + +/* + * Maximum allowed backtrack in + * sequence number due to packets arriving + * out of order. + */ +#define MIN_SEQ_BACKTRACK 0 +#define MAX_SEQ_BACKTRACK 65536 +#define DEFAULT_SEQ_BACKTRACK 64 + +/* + * Maximum allowed backtrack in + * seconds due to packets arriving + * out of order. + */ +#define MIN_TIME_BACKTRACK 0 +#define MAX_TIME_BACKTRACK 600 +#define DEFAULT_TIME_BACKTRACK 15 + +/* + * Do a reap pass through the sequence number + * array once every n seconds in order to + * expire sequence numbers which can no longer + * be accepted because they would violate + * TIME_BACKTRACK. + */ +#define SEQ_REAP_INTERVAL 5 + +CIRC_LIST (seq_list, time_t); + +/* + * This is the data structure we keep on the receiving side, + * to check that no packet-id (i.e. sequence number + optional timestamp) + * is accepted more than once. + */ +struct packet_id_rec +{ + time_t last_reap; /* last call of packet_id_reap */ + time_t time; /* highest time stamp received */ + packet_id_type id; /* highest sequence number received */ + int seq_backtrack; /* set from --replay-window */ + int time_backtrack; /* set from --replay-window */ + int max_backtrack_stat; /* maximum backtrack seen so far */ + bool initialized; /* true if packet_id_init was called */ + struct seq_list *seq_list; /* packet-id "memory" */ + const char *name; + int unit; +}; + +/* + * file to facilitate cross-session persistence + * of time/id + */ +struct packet_id_persist +{ + const char *filename; + int fd; + time_t time; /* time stamp */ + packet_id_type id; /* sequence number */ + time_t time_last_written; + packet_id_type id_last_written; +}; + +struct packet_id_persist_file_image +{ + time_t time; /* time stamp */ + packet_id_type id; /* sequence number */ +}; + +/* + * Keep a record of our current packet-id state + * on the sending side. + */ +struct packet_id_send +{ + packet_id_type id; + time_t time; +}; + +/* + * Communicate packet-id over the wire. + * A short packet-id is just a 32 bit + * sequence number. A long packet-id + * includes a timestamp as well. + * + * Long packet-ids are used as IVs for + * CFB/OFB ciphers. + * + * This data structure is always sent + * over the net in network byte order, + * by calling htonpid, ntohpid, + * htontime, and ntohtime on the + * data elements to change them + * to and from standard sizes. + * + * In addition, time is converted to + * a net_time_t before sending, + * since openvpn always + * uses a 32-bit time_t but some + * 64 bit platforms use a + * 64 bit time_t. + */ +struct packet_id_net +{ + packet_id_type id; + time_t time; /* converted to net_time_t before transmission */ +}; + +struct packet_id +{ + struct packet_id_send send; + struct packet_id_rec rec; +}; + +void packet_id_init (struct packet_id *p, bool tcp_mode, int seq_backtrack, int time_backtrack, const char *name, int unit); +void packet_id_free (struct packet_id *p); + +/* should we accept an incoming packet id ? */ +bool packet_id_test (struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin); + +/* change our current state to reflect an accepted packet id */ +void packet_id_add (struct packet_id_rec *p, + const struct packet_id_net *pin); + +/* expire TIME_BACKTRACK sequence numbers */ +void packet_id_reap (struct packet_id_rec *p); + +/* + * packet ID persistence + */ + +/* initialize the packet_id_persist structure in a disabled state */ +void packet_id_persist_init (struct packet_id_persist *p); + +/* close the file descriptor if it is open, and switch to disabled state */ +void packet_id_persist_close (struct packet_id_persist *p); + +/* load persisted rec packet_id (time and id) only once from file, and set state to enabled */ +void packet_id_persist_load (struct packet_id_persist *p, const char *filename); + +/* save persisted rec packet_id (time and id) to file (only if enabled state) */ +void packet_id_persist_save (struct packet_id_persist *p); + +/* transfer packet_id_persist -> packet_id */ +void packet_id_persist_load_obj (const struct packet_id_persist *p, struct packet_id* pid); + +/* return an ascii string representing a packet_id_persist object */ +const char *packet_id_persist_print (const struct packet_id_persist *p, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Read/write a packet ID to/from the buffer. Short form is sequence number + * only. Long form is sequence number and timestamp. + */ + +bool packet_id_read (struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form); +bool packet_id_write (const struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form, bool prepend); + +/* + * Inline functions. + */ + +/* are we in enabled state? */ +static inline bool +packet_id_persist_enabled (const struct packet_id_persist *p) +{ + return p->fd >= 0; +} + +/* transfer packet_id -> packet_id_persist */ +static inline void +packet_id_persist_save_obj (struct packet_id_persist *p, const struct packet_id* pid) +{ + if (packet_id_persist_enabled (p) && pid->rec.time) + { + p->time = pid->rec.time; + p->id = pid->rec.id; + } +} + +const char* packet_id_net_print(const struct packet_id_net *pin, bool print_timestamp, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#ifdef PID_TEST +void packet_id_interactive_test(); +#endif + +static inline int +packet_id_size (bool long_form) +{ + return sizeof (packet_id_type) + (long_form ? sizeof (net_time_t) : 0); +} + +static inline bool +packet_id_close_to_wrapping (const struct packet_id_send *p) +{ + return p->id >= PACKET_ID_WRAP_TRIGGER; +} + +/* + * Allocate an outgoing packet id. + * Sequence number ranges from 1 to 2^32-1. + * In long_form, a time_t is added as well. + */ +static inline void +packet_id_alloc_outgoing (struct packet_id_send *p, struct packet_id_net *pin, bool long_form) +{ + if (!p->time) + p->time = now; + pin->id = ++p->id; + if (!pin->id) + { + ASSERT (long_form); + p->time = now; + pin->id = p->id = 1; + } + pin->time = p->time; +} + +static inline bool +check_timestamp_delta (time_t remote, unsigned int max_delta) +{ + unsigned int abs; + const time_t local_now = now; + + if (local_now >= remote) + abs = local_now - remote; + else + abs = remote - local_now; + return abs <= max_delta; +} + +static inline void +packet_id_reap_test (struct packet_id_rec *p) +{ + if (p->last_reap + SEQ_REAP_INTERVAL <= now) + packet_id_reap (p); +} + +#endif /* PACKET_ID_H */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..910d171d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "perf.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PERFORMANCE_METRICS + +#include "error.h" +#include "otime.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +static const char *metric_names[] = { + "PERF_BIO_READ_PLAINTEXT", + "PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT", + "PERF_BIO_READ_CIPHERTEXT", + "PERF_BIO_WRITE_CIPHERTEXT", + "PERF_TLS_MULTI_PROCESS", + "PERF_IO_WAIT", + "PERF_EVENT_LOOP", + "PERF_MULTI_CREATE_INSTANCE", + "PERF_MULTI_CLOSE_INSTANCE", + "PERF_MULTI_SHOW_STATS", + "PERF_MULTI_BCAST", + "PERF_MULTI_MCAST", + "PERF_SCRIPT", + "PERF_READ_IN_LINK", + "PERF_PROC_IN_LINK", + "PERF_READ_IN_TUN", + "PERF_PROC_IN_TUN", + "PERF_PROC_OUT_LINK", + "PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN", + "PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN_MTCP" +}; + +struct perf +{ +# define PS_INITIAL 0 +# define PS_METER_RUNNING 1 +# define PS_METER_INTERRUPTED 2 + int state; + + struct timeval start; + double sofar; + double sum; + double max; + double count; +}; + +struct perf_set +{ + int stack_len; + int stack[STACK_N]; + struct perf perf[PERF_N]; +}; + +static struct perf_set perf_set; + +static void perf_print_state (int lev); + +static inline int +get_stack_index (int sdelta) +{ + const int sindex = perf_set.stack_len + sdelta; + if (sindex >= 0 && sindex < STACK_N) + return sindex; + else + return -1; +} + +static int +get_perf_index (int sdelta) +{ + const int sindex = get_stack_index (sdelta); + if (sindex >= 0) + { + const int pindex = perf_set.stack[sindex]; + if (pindex >= 0 && pindex < PERF_N) + return pindex; + else + return -1; + } + else + return -1; +} + +static struct perf * +get_perf (int sdelta) +{ + const int pindex = get_perf_index (sdelta); + if (pindex >= 0) + return &perf_set.perf[pindex]; + else + return NULL; +} + +static void +push_perf_index (int pindex) +{ + const int sindex = get_stack_index (0); + const int newlen = get_stack_index (1); + if (sindex >= 0 && newlen >= 0 + && pindex >= 0 && pindex < PERF_N) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sindex; ++i) + if (perf_set.stack[i] == pindex) + { + perf_print_state (M_INFO); + msg (M_FATAL, "PERF: push_perf_index %s failed", + metric_names [pindex]); + } + + perf_set.stack[sindex] = pindex; + perf_set.stack_len = newlen; + } + else + msg (M_FATAL, "PERF: push_perf_index: stack push error"); +} + +static void +pop_perf_index (void) +{ + const int newlen = get_stack_index (-1); + if (newlen >= 0) + { + perf_set.stack_len = newlen; + } + else + msg (M_FATAL, "PERF: pop_perf_index: stack pop error"); +} + +static void +state_must_be (const struct perf *p, const int wanted) +{ + if (p->state != wanted) + msg (M_FATAL, "PERF: bad state actual=%d wanted=%d", + p->state, + wanted); +} + +static void +update_sofar (struct perf *p) +{ + struct timeval current; + ASSERT (!gettimeofday (¤t, NULL)); + p->sofar += (double) tv_subtract (¤t, &p->start, 600) / 1000000.0; + tv_clear (&p->start); +} + +static void +perf_start (struct perf *p) +{ + state_must_be (p, PS_INITIAL); + ASSERT (!gettimeofday (&p->start, NULL)); + p->sofar = 0.0; + p->state = PS_METER_RUNNING; +} + +static void +perf_stop (struct perf *p) +{ + state_must_be (p, PS_METER_RUNNING); + update_sofar (p); + p->sum += p->sofar; + if (p->sofar > p->max) + p->max = p->sofar; + p->count += 1.0; + p->sofar = 0.0; + p->state = PS_INITIAL; +} + +static void +perf_interrupt (struct perf *p) +{ + state_must_be (p, PS_METER_RUNNING); + update_sofar (p); + p->state = PS_METER_INTERRUPTED; +} + +static void +perf_resume (struct perf *p) +{ + state_must_be (p, PS_METER_INTERRUPTED); + ASSERT (!gettimeofday (&p->start, NULL)); + p->state = PS_METER_RUNNING; +} + +void +perf_push (int type) +{ + struct perf *prev; + struct perf *cur; + + ASSERT (SIZE(metric_names) == PERF_N); + push_perf_index (type); + + prev = get_perf (-2); + cur = get_perf (-1); + + ASSERT (cur); + + if (prev) + perf_interrupt (prev); + perf_start (cur); +} + +void +perf_pop (void) +{ + struct perf *prev; + struct perf *cur; + + prev = get_perf (-2); + cur = get_perf (-1); + + ASSERT (cur); + perf_stop (cur); + + if (prev) + perf_resume (prev); + + pop_perf_index (); +} + +void +perf_output_results (void) +{ + int i; + msg (M_INFO, "LATENCY PROFILE (mean and max are in milliseconds)"); + for (i = 0; i < PERF_N; ++i) + { + struct perf *p = &perf_set.perf[i]; + if (p->count > 0.0) + { + const double mean = p->sum / p->count; + msg (M_INFO, "%s n=%.0f mean=%.3f max=%.3f", metric_names[i], p->count, mean*1000.0, p->max*1000.0); + } + } +} + +static void +perf_print_state (int lev) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + msg (lev, "PERF STATE"); + msg (lev, "Stack:"); + for (i = 0; i < perf_set.stack_len; ++i) + { + const int j = perf_set.stack[i]; + const struct perf *p = &perf_set.perf[j]; + msg (lev, "[%d] %s state=%d start=%s sofar=%f sum=%f max=%f count=%f", + i, + metric_names[j], + p->state, + tv_string (&p->start, &gc), + p->sofar, + p->sum, + p->max, + p->count); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#else +#ifdef _MSC_VER /* Dummy function needed to avoid empty file compiler warning in Microsoft VC */ +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c531d9c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/perf.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * The interval_ routines are designed to optimize the calling of a routine + * (normally tls_multi_process()) which can be called less frequently + * between triggers. + */ + +#ifndef PERF_H +#define PERF_H + +/*#define ENABLE_PERFORMANCE_METRICS*/ + +/* + * Metrics + */ +#define PERF_BIO_READ_PLAINTEXT 0 +#define PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT 1 +#define PERF_BIO_READ_CIPHERTEXT 2 +#define PERF_BIO_WRITE_CIPHERTEXT 3 +#define PERF_TLS_MULTI_PROCESS 4 +#define PERF_IO_WAIT 5 +#define PERF_EVENT_LOOP 6 +#define PERF_MULTI_CREATE_INSTANCE 7 +#define PERF_MULTI_CLOSE_INSTANCE 8 +#define PERF_MULTI_SHOW_STATS 9 +#define PERF_MULTI_BCAST 10 +#define PERF_MULTI_MCAST 11 +#define PERF_SCRIPT 12 +#define PERF_READ_IN_LINK 13 +#define PERF_PROC_IN_LINK 14 +#define PERF_READ_IN_TUN 15 +#define PERF_PROC_IN_TUN 16 +#define PERF_PROC_OUT_LINK 17 +#define PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN 18 +#define PERF_PROC_OUT_TUN_MTCP 19 +#define PERF_N 20 + +#ifdef ENABLE_PERFORMANCE_METRICS + +#include "basic.h" + +/* + * Stack size + */ +#define STACK_N 64 + +void perf_push (int type); +void perf_pop (void); +void perf_output_results (void); + +#else + +static inline void perf_push (int type) {} +static inline void perf_pop (void) {} +static inline void perf_output_results (void) {} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf-inline.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf-inline.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b5dcb25 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf-inline.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_PF) && !defined(PF_INLINE_H) +#define PF_INLINE_H + +/* + * Inline functions + */ + +#define PCT_SRC 1 +#define PCT_DEST 2 +static inline bool +pf_c2c_test (const struct context *src, const struct context *dest, const char *prefix) +{ + bool pf_cn_test (struct pf_set *pfs, const struct tls_multi *tm, const int type, const char *prefix); + return (!src->c2.pf.enabled || pf_cn_test (src->c2.pf.pfs, dest->c2.tls_multi, PCT_DEST, prefix)) + && (!dest->c2.pf.enabled || pf_cn_test (dest->c2.pf.pfs, src->c2.tls_multi, PCT_SRC, prefix)); +} + +static inline bool +pf_addr_test (const struct context *src, const struct mroute_addr *dest, const char *prefix) +{ + bool pf_addr_test_dowork (const struct context *src, const struct mroute_addr *dest, const char *prefix); + + if (src->c2.pf.enabled) + return pf_addr_test_dowork (src, dest, prefix); + else + return true; +} + +static inline bool +pf_kill_test (const struct pf_set *pfs) +{ + return pfs->kill; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aafe9ff0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.c @@ -0,0 +1,716 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* packet filter functions */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_PF) + +#include "init.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "pf-inline.h" + +static void +pf_destroy (struct pf_set *pfs) +{ + if (pfs) + { + if (pfs->cns.hash_table) + hash_free (pfs->cns.hash_table); + + { + struct pf_cn_elem *l = pfs->cns.list; + while (l) + { + struct pf_cn_elem *next = l->next; + free (l->rule.cn); + free (l); + l = next; + } + } + { + struct pf_subnet *l = pfs->sns.list; + while (l) + { + struct pf_subnet *next = l->next; + free (l); + l = next; + } + } + free (pfs); + } +} + +static bool +add_client (const char *line, const char *prefix, const int line_num, struct pf_cn_elem ***next, const bool exclude) +{ + struct pf_cn_elem *e; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (e, struct pf_cn_elem); + e->rule.exclude = exclude; + e->rule.cn = string_alloc (line, NULL); + **next = e; + *next = &e->next; + return true; +} + +static bool +add_subnet (const char *line, const char *prefix, const int line_num, struct pf_subnet ***next, const bool exclude) +{ + struct in_addr network; + in_addr_t netmask = 0; + + if (strcmp (line, "unknown")) + { + int netbits = 32; + char *div = strchr (line, '/'); + + if (div) + { + *div++ = '\0'; + if (sscanf (div, "%d", &netbits) != 1) + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d: bad '/n' subnet specifier: '%s'", prefix, line_num, div); + return false; + } + if (netbits < 0 || netbits > 32) + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d: bad '/n' subnet specifier: must be between 0 and 32: '%s'", prefix, line_num, div); + return false; + } + } + + if (openvpn_inet_aton (line, &network) != OIA_IP) + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d: bad network address: '%s'", prefix, line_num, line); + return false; + } + netmask = netbits_to_netmask (netbits); + if ((network.s_addr & htonl (netmask)) != network.s_addr) + { + network.s_addr &= htonl (netmask); + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: PF: %s/%d: incorrect subnet %s/%d changed to %s/%d", prefix, line_num, line, netbits, inet_ntoa (network), netbits); + } + } + else + { + /* match special "unknown" tag for addresses unrecognized by mroute */ + network.s_addr = htonl(0); + netmask = IPV4_NETMASK_HOST; + } + + { + struct pf_subnet *e; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (e, struct pf_subnet); + e->rule.exclude = exclude; + e->rule.network = ntohl (network.s_addr); + e->rule.netmask = netmask; + **next = e; + *next = &e->next; + return true; + } +} + +static uint32_t +cn_hash_function (const void *key, uint32_t iv) +{ + return hash_func ((uint8_t *)key, strlen ((char *)key) + 1, iv); +} + +static bool +cn_compare_function (const void *key1, const void *key2) +{ + return !strcmp((const char *)key1, (const char *)key2); +} + +static bool +genhash (struct pf_cn_set *cns, const char *prefix, const int n_clients) +{ + struct pf_cn_elem *e; + bool status = true; + int n_buckets = n_clients; + + if (n_buckets < 16) + n_buckets = 16; + cns->hash_table = hash_init (n_buckets, 0, cn_hash_function, cn_compare_function); + for (e = cns->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + { + if (!hash_add (cns->hash_table, e->rule.cn, &e->rule, false)) + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s: duplicate common name in [clients] section: '%s'", prefix, e->rule.cn); + status = false; + } + } + + return status; +} + +static struct pf_set * +pf_init (const struct buffer_list *bl, const char *prefix, const bool allow_kill) +{ +# define MODE_UNDEF 0 +# define MODE_CLIENTS 1 +# define MODE_SUBNETS 2 + int mode = MODE_UNDEF; + int line_num = 0; + int n_clients = 0; + int n_subnets = 0; + int n_errors = 0; + struct pf_set *pfs = NULL; + char line[PF_MAX_LINE_LEN]; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pfs, struct pf_set); + if (bl) + { + struct pf_cn_elem **cl = &pfs->cns.list; + struct pf_subnet **sl = &pfs->sns.list; + struct buffer_entry *be; + + for (be = bl->head; be != NULL; be = be->next) + { + ++line_num; + strncpynt (line, BSTR(&be->buf), sizeof(line)); + rm_trailing_chars (line, "\r\n\t "); + if (line[0] == '\0' || line[0] == '#') + ; + else if (line[0] == '+' || line[0] == '-') + { + bool exclude = (line[0] == '-'); + + if (line[1] =='\0') + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d: no data after +/-: '%s'", prefix, line_num, line); + ++n_errors; + } + else if (mode == MODE_CLIENTS) + { + if (add_client (&line[1], prefix, line_num, &cl, exclude)) + ++n_clients; + else + ++n_errors; + } + else if (mode == MODE_SUBNETS) + { + if (add_subnet (&line[1], prefix, line_num, &sl, exclude)) + ++n_subnets; + else + ++n_errors; + } + else if (mode == MODE_UNDEF) + ; + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } + else if (line[0] == '[') + { + if (!strcasecmp (line, "[clients accept]")) + { + mode = MODE_CLIENTS; + pfs->cns.default_allow = true; + } + else if (!strcasecmp (line, "[clients drop]")) + { + mode = MODE_CLIENTS; + pfs->cns.default_allow = false; + } + else if (!strcasecmp (line, "[subnets accept]")) + { + mode = MODE_SUBNETS; + pfs->sns.default_allow = true; + } + else if (!strcasecmp (line, "[subnets drop]")) + { + mode = MODE_SUBNETS; + pfs->sns.default_allow = false; + } + else if (!strcasecmp (line, "[end]")) + goto done; + else if (allow_kill && !strcasecmp (line, "[kill]")) + goto kill; + else + { + mode = MODE_UNDEF; + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d unknown tag: '%s'", prefix, line_num, line); + ++n_errors; + } + } + else + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s/%d line must begin with '+', '-', or '[' : '%s'", prefix, line_num, line); + ++n_errors; + } + } + ++n_errors; + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s: missing [end]", prefix); + } + else + { + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s: cannot open", prefix); + ++n_errors; + } + + done: + if (bl) + { + if (!n_errors) + { + if (!genhash (&pfs->cns, prefix, n_clients)) + ++n_errors; + } + if (n_errors) + msg (D_PF_INFO, "PF: %s rejected due to %d error(s)", prefix, n_errors); + } + if (n_errors) + { + pf_destroy (pfs); + pfs = NULL; + } + return pfs; + + kill: + pf_destroy (pfs); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pfs, struct pf_set); + pfs->kill = true; + return pfs; +} + +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF +static struct pf_set * +pf_init_from_file (const char *fn) +{ + struct buffer_list *bl = buffer_list_file (fn, PF_MAX_LINE_LEN); + if (bl) + { + struct pf_set *pfs = pf_init (bl, fn, true); + buffer_list_free (bl); + return pfs; + } + else + { + msg (D_PF_INFO|M_ERRNO, "PF: %s: cannot open", fn); + return NULL; + } +} +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static const char * +drop_accept (const bool accept) +{ + return accept ? "ACCEPT" : "DROP"; +} + +static const char * +pct_name (const int type) +{ + switch (type) + { + case PCT_SRC: + return "SRC"; + case PCT_DEST: + return "DEST"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +static void +pf_cn_test_print (const char *prefix, + const int type, + const char *prefix2, + const char *cn, + const bool allow, + const struct pf_cn *rule) +{ + if (rule) + { + dmsg (D_PF_DEBUG, "PF: %s/%s/%s %s %s rule=[%s %s]", + prefix, prefix2, pct_name (type), + cn, drop_accept (allow), + rule->cn, drop_accept (!rule->exclude)); + } + else + { + dmsg (D_PF_DEBUG, "PF: %s/%s/%s %s %s", + prefix, prefix2, pct_name (type), + cn, drop_accept (allow)); + } +} + +static void +pf_addr_test_print (const char *prefix, + const char *prefix2, + const struct context *src, + const struct mroute_addr *dest, + const bool allow, + const struct ipv4_subnet *rule) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (rule) + { + dmsg (D_PF_DEBUG, "PF: %s/%s %s %s %s rule=[%s/%s %s]", + prefix, + prefix2, + tls_common_name (src->c2.tls_multi, false), + mroute_addr_print_ex (dest, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc), + drop_accept (allow), + print_in_addr_t (rule->network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (rule->netmask, 0, &gc), + drop_accept (!rule->exclude)); + } + else + { + dmsg (D_PF_DEBUG, "PF: %s/%s %s %s %s", + prefix, + prefix2, + tls_common_name (src->c2.tls_multi, false), + mroute_addr_print_ex (dest, MAPF_SHOW_ARP, &gc), + drop_accept (allow)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +static inline struct pf_cn * +lookup_cn_rule (struct hash *h, const char *cn, const uint32_t cn_hash) +{ + struct hash_element *he = hash_lookup_fast (h, hash_bucket (h, cn_hash), cn, cn_hash); + if (he) + return (struct pf_cn *) he->value; + else + return NULL; +} + +bool +pf_cn_test (struct pf_set *pfs, const struct tls_multi *tm, const int type, const char *prefix) +{ + if (!pfs->kill) + { + const char *cn; + uint32_t cn_hash; + if (tls_common_name_hash (tm, &cn, &cn_hash)) + { + const struct pf_cn *rule = lookup_cn_rule (pfs->cns.hash_table, cn, cn_hash); + if (rule) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_cn_test_print ("PF_CN_MATCH", type, prefix, cn, !rule->exclude, rule); +#endif + if (!rule->exclude) + return true; + else + return false; + } + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_cn_test_print ("PF_CN_DEFAULT", type, prefix, cn, pfs->cns.default_allow, NULL); +#endif + if (pfs->cns.default_allow) + return true; + else + return false; + } + } + } +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_cn_test_print ("PF_CN_FAULT", type, prefix, tls_common_name (tm, false), false, NULL); +#endif + return false; +} + +bool +pf_addr_test_dowork (const struct context *src, const struct mroute_addr *dest, const char *prefix) +{ + struct pf_set *pfs = src->c2.pf.pfs; + if (pfs && !pfs->kill) + { + const in_addr_t addr = in_addr_t_from_mroute_addr (dest); + const struct pf_subnet *se = pfs->sns.list; + while (se) + { + if ((addr & se->rule.netmask) == se->rule.network) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_addr_test_print ("PF_ADDR_MATCH", prefix, src, dest, !se->rule.exclude, &se->rule); +#endif + return !se->rule.exclude; + } + se = se->next; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_addr_test_print ("PF_ADDR_DEFAULT", prefix, src, dest, pfs->sns.default_allow, NULL); +#endif + return pfs->sns.default_allow; + } + else + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_addr_test_print ("PF_ADDR_FAULT", prefix, src, dest, false, NULL); +#endif + return false; + } +} + +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF +void +pf_check_reload (struct context *c) +{ + const int slow_wakeup = 15; + const int fast_wakeup = 1; + const int wakeup_transition = 60; + bool reloaded = false; + + if (c->c2.pf.enabled + && c->c2.pf.filename + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.pf.reload, &c->c2.timeval, ETT_DEFAULT)) + { + platform_stat_t s; + if (!platform_stat (c->c2.pf.filename, &s)) + { + if (s.st_mtime > c->c2.pf.file_last_mod) + { + struct pf_set *pfs = pf_init_from_file (c->c2.pf.filename); + if (pfs) + { + if (c->c2.pf.pfs) + pf_destroy (c->c2.pf.pfs); + c->c2.pf.pfs = pfs; + reloaded = true; + if (pf_kill_test (pfs)) + { + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; + c->sig->signal_text = "pf-kill"; + } + } + c->c2.pf.file_last_mod = s.st_mtime; + } + } + { + int wakeup = slow_wakeup; + if (!c->c2.pf.pfs && c->c2.pf.n_check_reload < wakeup_transition) + wakeup = fast_wakeup; + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.pf.reload, wakeup, now); + reset_coarse_timers (c); + c->c2.pf.n_check_reload++; + } + } +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (reloaded && check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_context_print (&c->c2.pf, "pf_check_reload", D_PF_DEBUG); +#endif +} +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF +bool +pf_load_from_buffer_list (struct context *c, const struct buffer_list *config) +{ + struct pf_set *pfs = pf_init (config, "[SERVER-PF]", false); + if (pfs) + { + if (c->c2.pf.pfs) + pf_destroy (c->c2.pf.pfs); + c->c2.pf.pfs = pfs; + return true; + } + else + return false; +} +#endif + +void +pf_init_context (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF + if (plugin_defined (c->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF)) + { + const char *pf_file = create_temp_file (c->options.tmp_dir, "pf", &gc); + if( pf_file ) { + setenv_str (c->c2.es, "pf_file", pf_file); + + if (plugin_call (c->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF, NULL, NULL, c->c2.es) == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + { + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.pf.reload, 1, now); + c->c2.pf.filename = string_alloc (pf_file, &c->c2.gc); + c->c2.pf.enabled = true; +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_context_print (&c->c2.pf, "pf_init_context#1", D_PF_DEBUG); +#endif + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF disabled"); + } + } + } +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF + if (!c->c2.pf.enabled && management_enable_pf (management)) + { + c->c2.pf.enabled = true; +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_PF_DEBUG)) + pf_context_print (&c->c2.pf, "pf_init_context#2", D_PF_DEBUG); +#endif + } +#endif + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +pf_destroy_context (struct pf_context *pfc) +{ +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF + if (pfc->filename) + { + platform_unlink (pfc->filename); + } +#endif + if (pfc->pfs) + pf_destroy (pfc->pfs); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static void +pf_subnet_set_print (const struct pf_subnet_set *s, const int lev) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (s) + { + struct pf_subnet *e; + + msg (lev, " ----- struct pf_subnet_set -----"); + msg (lev, " default_allow=%s", drop_accept (s->default_allow)); + + for (e = s->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + { + msg (lev, " %s/%s %s", + print_in_addr_t (e->rule.network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (e->rule.netmask, 0, &gc), + drop_accept (!e->rule.exclude)); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +pf_cn_set_print (const struct pf_cn_set *s, const int lev) +{ + if (s) + { + struct hash_iterator hi; + struct hash_element *he; + + msg (lev, " ----- struct pf_cn_set -----"); + msg (lev, " default_allow=%s", drop_accept (s->default_allow)); + + if (s->hash_table) + { + hash_iterator_init (s->hash_table, &hi); + while ((he = hash_iterator_next (&hi))) + { + struct pf_cn *e = (struct pf_cn *)he->value; + msg (lev, " %s %s", + e->cn, + drop_accept (!e->exclude)); + } + + msg (lev, " ----------"); + + { + struct pf_cn_elem *ce; + for (ce = s->list; ce != NULL; ce = ce->next) + { + struct pf_cn *e = lookup_cn_rule (s->hash_table, ce->rule.cn, cn_hash_function (ce->rule.cn, 0)); + if (e) + { + msg (lev, " %s %s", + e->cn, + drop_accept (!e->exclude)); + } + else + { + msg (lev, " %s LOOKUP FAILED", ce->rule.cn); + } + } + } + } + } +} + +static void +pf_set_print (const struct pf_set *pfs, const int lev) +{ + if (pfs) + { + msg (lev, " ----- struct pf_set -----"); + msg (lev, " kill=%d", pfs->kill); + pf_subnet_set_print (&pfs->sns, lev); + pf_cn_set_print (&pfs->cns, lev); + } +} + +void +pf_context_print (const struct pf_context *pfc, const char *prefix, const int lev) +{ + msg (lev, "----- %s : struct pf_context -----", prefix); + if (pfc) + { + msg (lev, "enabled=%d", pfc->enabled); +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF + msg (lev, "filename='%s'", np(pfc->filename)); + msg (lev, "file_last_mod=%u", (unsigned int)pfc->file_last_mod); + msg (lev, "n_check_reload=%u", pfc->n_check_reload); + msg (lev, "reload=[%d,%u,%u]", pfc->reload.defined, pfc->reload.n, (unsigned int)pfc->reload.last); +#endif + pf_set_print (pfc->pfs, lev); + } + msg (lev, "--------------------"); +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..04adf0ea --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pf.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* packet filter functions */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_PF) && !defined(OPENVPN_PF_H) +#define OPENVPN_PF_H + +#include "list.h" +#include "mroute.h" + +#define PF_MAX_LINE_LEN 256 + +struct context; + +struct ipv4_subnet { + bool exclude; + in_addr_t network; + in_addr_t netmask; +}; + +struct pf_subnet { + struct pf_subnet *next; + struct ipv4_subnet rule; +}; + +struct pf_subnet_set { + bool default_allow; + struct pf_subnet *list; +}; + +struct pf_cn { + bool exclude; + char *cn; +}; + +struct pf_cn_elem { + struct pf_cn_elem *next; + struct pf_cn rule; +}; + +struct pf_cn_set { + bool default_allow; + struct pf_cn_elem *list; + struct hash *hash_table; +}; + +struct pf_set { + bool kill; + struct pf_subnet_set sns; + struct pf_cn_set cns; +}; + +struct pf_context { + bool enabled; + struct pf_set *pfs; +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF + char *filename; + time_t file_last_mod; + unsigned int n_check_reload; + struct event_timeout reload; +#endif +}; + +void pf_init_context (struct context *c); + +void pf_destroy_context (struct pf_context *pfc); + +#ifdef PLUGIN_PF +void pf_check_reload (struct context *c); +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_PF +bool pf_load_from_buffer_list (struct context *c, const struct buffer_list *config); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void pf_context_print (const struct pf_context *pfc, const char *prefix, const int lev); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping-inline.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping-inline.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c7249705 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping-inline.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PING_INLINE_H +#define PING_INLINE_H + +/* + * Should we exit or restart due to ping (or other authenticated packet) + * not received in n seconds? + */ +static inline void +check_ping_restart (struct context *c) +{ + void check_ping_restart_dowork (struct context *c); + if (c->options.ping_rec_timeout + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.ping_rec_interval, + &c->c2.timeval, + (!c->options.ping_timer_remote + || link_socket_actual_defined (&c->c1.link_socket_addr.actual)) + ? ETT_DEFAULT : 15)) + check_ping_restart_dowork (c); +} + +/* + * Should we ping the remote? + */ +static inline void +check_ping_send (struct context *c) +{ + void check_ping_send_dowork (struct context *c); + if (c->options.ping_send_timeout + && event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.ping_send_interval, + &c->c2.timeval, + !TO_LINK_DEF(c) ? ETT_DEFAULT : 1)) + check_ping_send_dowork (c); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6dc0b4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "ping.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "ping-inline.h" + +/* + * This random string identifies an OpenVPN ping packet. + * It should be of sufficient length and randomness + * so as not to collide with other tunnel data. + * + * PING_STRING_SIZE must be sizeof (ping_string) + */ +const uint8_t ping_string[] = { + 0x2a, 0x18, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0x64, 0x1e, 0xb4, 0xcb, + 0x07, 0xed, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0x98, 0x1f, 0xc7, 0x48 +}; + +/* + * Should we exit or restart due to ping (or other authenticated packet) + * not received in n seconds? + */ +void +check_ping_restart_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + switch (c->options.ping_rec_timeout_action) + { + case PING_EXIT: + msg (M_INFO, "%sInactivity timeout (--ping-exit), exiting", + format_common_name (c, &gc)); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; + c->sig->signal_text = "ping-exit"; + break; + case PING_RESTART: + msg (M_INFO, "%sInactivity timeout (--ping-restart), restarting", + format_common_name (c, &gc)); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGUSR1; /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- Ping Restart */ + c->sig->signal_text = "ping-restart"; + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Should we ping the remote? + */ +void +check_ping_send_dowork (struct context *c) +{ + c->c2.buf = c->c2.buffers->aux_buf; + ASSERT (buf_init (&c->c2.buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&c->c2.frame))); + ASSERT (buf_safe (&c->c2.buf, MAX_RW_SIZE_TUN (&c->c2.frame))); + ASSERT (buf_write (&c->c2.buf, ping_string, sizeof (ping_string))); + + /* + * We will treat the ping like any other outgoing packet, + * encrypt, sign, etc. + */ + encrypt_sign (c, true); + /* Set length to 0, so it won't be counted as activity */ + c->c2.buf.len = 0; + dmsg (D_PING, "SENT PING"); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..88f5f3a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ping.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PING_H +#define PING_H + +#include "init.h" +#include "forward.h" + +/* + * Initial default --ping-restart before --pull + */ +#define PRE_PULL_INITIAL_PING_RESTART 120 /* in seconds */ + +extern const uint8_t ping_string[]; + +/* PING_STRING_SIZE must be sizeof (ping_string) */ +#define PING_STRING_SIZE 16 + +static inline bool +is_ping_msg (const struct buffer* buf) +{ + return buf_string_match (buf, ping_string, PING_STRING_SIZE); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a15ef68 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,946 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + +#include +#include "basic.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "otime.h" +#include "console.h" +#include "pkcs11_backend.h" + +static +time_t +__mytime (void) { + return openvpn_time (NULL); +} + +#if !defined(_WIN32) +static +int +__mygettimeofday (struct timeval *tv) { + return gettimeofday (tv, NULL); +} +#endif + +static +void +__mysleep (const unsigned long usec) { +#if defined(_WIN32) + Sleep (usec/1000); +#else + usleep (usec); +#endif +} + + +static pkcs11h_engine_system_t s_pkcs11h_sys_engine = { + malloc, + free, + __mytime, + __mysleep, +#if defined(_WIN32) + NULL +#else + __mygettimeofday +#endif +}; + +static +unsigned +_pkcs11_msg_pkcs112openvpn ( + const unsigned flags +) { + unsigned openvpn_flags; + + switch (flags) { + case PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2: + openvpn_flags = D_PKCS11_DEBUG; + break; + case PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG1: + openvpn_flags = D_SHOW_PKCS11; + break; + case PKCS11H_LOG_INFO: + openvpn_flags = M_INFO; + break; + case PKCS11H_LOG_WARN: + openvpn_flags = M_WARN; + break; + case PKCS11H_LOG_ERROR: + openvpn_flags = M_FATAL; + break; + default: + openvpn_flags = M_FATAL; + break; + } + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11_FORCE_DEBUG) + openvpn_flags=M_INFO; +#endif + + return openvpn_flags; +} + +static +unsigned +_pkcs11_msg_openvpn2pkcs11 ( + const unsigned flags +) { + unsigned pkcs11_flags; + + if ((flags & D_PKCS11_DEBUG) != 0) { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2; + } + else if ((flags & D_SHOW_PKCS11) != 0) { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG1; + } + else if ((flags & M_INFO) != 0) { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_INFO; + } + else if ((flags & M_WARN) != 0) { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_WARN; + } + else if ((flags & M_FATAL) != 0) { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_ERROR; + } + else { + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11_FORCE_DEBUG) + pkcs11_flags = PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2; +#endif + + return pkcs11_flags; +} + +static +void +_pkcs11_openvpn_log ( + void * const global_data, + unsigned flags, + const char * const szFormat, + va_list args +) { + char Buffer[10*1024]; + + (void)global_data; + + vsnprintf (Buffer, sizeof (Buffer), szFormat, args); + Buffer[sizeof (Buffer)-1] = 0; + + msg (_pkcs11_msg_pkcs112openvpn (flags), "%s", Buffer); +} + +static +PKCS11H_BOOL +_pkcs11_openvpn_token_prompt ( + void * const global_data, + void * const user_data, + const pkcs11h_token_id_t token, + const unsigned retry +) { + struct user_pass token_resp; + + (void)global_data; + (void)user_data; + (void)retry; + + ASSERT (token!=NULL); + + CLEAR (token_resp); + token_resp.defined = false; + token_resp.nocache = true; + openvpn_snprintf ( + token_resp.username, + sizeof (token_resp.username), + "Please insert %s token", + token->label + ); + + if ( + !get_user_pass ( + &token_resp, + NULL, + "token-insertion-request", + GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK|GET_USER_PASS_NOFATAL + ) + ) { + return false; + } + else { + return strcmp (token_resp.password, "ok") == 0; + } +} + +static +PKCS11H_BOOL +_pkcs11_openvpn_pin_prompt ( + void * const global_data, + void * const user_data, + const pkcs11h_token_id_t token, + const unsigned retry, + char * const pin, + const size_t pin_max +) { + struct user_pass token_pass; + char prompt[1024]; + + (void)global_data; + (void)user_data; + (void)retry; + + ASSERT (token!=NULL); + + openvpn_snprintf (prompt, sizeof (prompt), "%s token", token->label); + + token_pass.defined = false; + token_pass.nocache = true; + + if ( + !get_user_pass ( + &token_pass, + NULL, + prompt, + GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY|GET_USER_PASS_NOFATAL + ) + ) { + return false; + } + else { + strncpynt (pin, token_pass.password, pin_max); + purge_user_pass (&token_pass, true); + + if (strlen (pin) == 0) { + return false; + } + else { + return true; + } + } +} + +bool +pkcs11_initialize ( + const bool protected_auth, + const int nPINCachePeriod +) { + CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_initialize - entered" + ); + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_engine_setSystem (&s_pkcs11h_sys_engine)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize system engine %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_initialize ()) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setLogHook (_pkcs11_openvpn_log, NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set hooks %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + pkcs11h_setLogLevel (_pkcs11_msg_openvpn2pkcs11 (get_debug_level ())); + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setForkMode (TRUE)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set fork mode %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setTokenPromptHook (_pkcs11_openvpn_token_prompt, NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set hooks %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setPINPromptHook (_pkcs11_openvpn_pin_prompt, NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set hooks %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setProtectedAuthentication (protected_auth)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set protected authentication mode %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setPINCachePeriod (nPINCachePeriod)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set Pcache period %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rv = CKR_OK; + +cleanup: + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_initialize - return %ld-'%s'", + rv, + pkcs11h_getMessage (rv) + ); + + return rv == CKR_OK; +} + +void +pkcs11_terminate () { + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_terminate - entered" + ); + + pkcs11h_terminate (); + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_terminate - return" + ); +} + +void +pkcs11_forkFixup () { + pkcs11h_forkFixup (); +} + +bool +pkcs11_addProvider ( + const char * const provider, + const bool protected_auth, + const unsigned private_mode, + const bool cert_private +) { + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + + ASSERT (provider!=NULL); + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_addProvider - entered - provider='%s', private_mode=%08x", + provider, + private_mode + ); + + msg ( + M_INFO, + "PKCS#11: Adding PKCS#11 provider '%s'", + provider + ); + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_addProvider ( + provider, + provider, + protected_auth, + private_mode, + PKCS11H_SLOTEVENT_METHOD_AUTO, + 0, + cert_private + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize provider '%s' %ld-'%s'", provider, rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + } + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_addProvider - return rv=%ld-'%s'", + rv, + pkcs11h_getMessage (rv) + ); + + return rv == CKR_OK; +} + +int +pkcs11_logout() { + return pkcs11h_logout () == CKR_OK; +} + +int +pkcs11_management_id_count () { + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t id_list = NULL; + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t t = NULL; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + int count = 0; + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_management_id_count - entered" + ); + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_enumCertificateIds ( + PKCS11H_ENUM_METHOD_CACHE_EXIST, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + NULL, + &id_list + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate list %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + for (count = 0, t = id_list; t != NULL; t = t->next) { + count++; + } + +cleanup: + + if (id_list != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateIdList (id_list); + id_list = NULL; + } + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_management_id_count - return count=%d", + count + ); + + return count; +} + +bool +pkcs11_management_id_get ( + const int index, + char ** id, + char **base64 +) { + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t id_list = NULL; + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t entry = NULL; +#if 0 /* certificate_id seems to be unused -- JY */ + pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL; +#endif + pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate = NULL; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + unsigned char *certificate_blob = NULL; + size_t certificate_blob_size = 0; + size_t max; + char *internal_id = NULL; + char *internal_base64 = NULL; + int count = 0; + bool success = false; + + ASSERT (id!=NULL); + ASSERT (base64!=NULL); + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_management_id_get - entered index=%d", + index + ); + + *id = NULL; + *base64 = NULL; + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_enumCertificateIds ( + PKCS11H_ENUM_METHOD_CACHE_EXIST, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + NULL, + &id_list + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate list %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + entry = id_list; + count = 0; + while (entry != NULL && count != index) { + count++; + entry = entry->next; + } + + if (entry == NULL) { + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_management_id_get - no certificate at index=%d", + index + ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId ( + NULL, + &max, + entry->certificate_id + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot serialize certificate id %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((internal_id = (char *)malloc (max)) == NULL) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot allocate memory"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId ( + internal_id, + &max, + entry->certificate_id + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot serialize certificate id %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_create ( + entry->certificate_id, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + PKCS11H_PIN_CACHE_INFINITE, + &certificate + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob ( + certificate, + NULL, + &certificate_blob_size + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate blob %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((certificate_blob = (unsigned char *)malloc (certificate_blob_size)) == NULL) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot allocate memory"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob ( + certificate, + certificate_blob, + &certificate_blob_size + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate blob %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (openvpn_base64_encode (certificate_blob, certificate_blob_size, &internal_base64) == -1) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot encode certificate"); + goto cleanup; + } + + *id = internal_id; + internal_id = NULL; + *base64 = internal_base64; + internal_base64 = NULL; + success = true; + +cleanup: + + if (id_list != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateIdList (id_list); + id_list = NULL; + } + + if (internal_id != NULL) { + free (internal_id); + internal_id = NULL; + } + + if (internal_base64 != NULL) { + free (internal_base64); + internal_base64 = NULL; + } + + if (certificate_blob != NULL) { + free (certificate_blob); + certificate_blob = NULL; + } + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: pkcs11_management_id_get - return success=%d, id='%s'", + success ? 1 : 0, + *id + ); + + return success; +} + +int +tls_ctx_use_pkcs11 ( + struct tls_root_ctx * const ssl_ctx, + bool pkcs11_id_management, + const char * const pkcs11_id +) { + pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL; + pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate = NULL; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + + bool ok = false; + + ASSERT (ssl_ctx!=NULL); + ASSERT (pkcs11_id_management || pkcs11_id!=NULL); + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: tls_ctx_use_pkcs11 - entered - ssl_ctx=%p, pkcs11_id_management=%d, pkcs11_id='%s'", + (void *)ssl_ctx, + pkcs11_id_management ? 1 : 0, + pkcs11_id + ); + + if (pkcs11_id_management) { + struct user_pass id_resp; + + CLEAR (id_resp); + + id_resp.defined = false; + id_resp.nocache = true; + openvpn_snprintf ( + id_resp.username, + sizeof (id_resp.username), + "Please specify PKCS#11 id to use" + ); + + if ( + !get_user_pass ( + &id_resp, + NULL, + "pkcs11-id-request", + GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_NEED_STR|GET_USER_PASS_NOFATAL + ) + ) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId ( + &certificate_id, + id_resp.password + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot deserialize id %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + } + else { + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId ( + &certificate_id, + pkcs11_id + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot deserialize id %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_create ( + certificate_id, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + PKCS11H_PIN_CACHE_INFINITE, + &certificate + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot get certificate %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (pkcs11_init_tls_session ( + certificate, + ssl_ctx + )) + ) { + /* Handled by SSL context free */ + certificate = NULL; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Handled by SSL context free */ + certificate = NULL; + ok = true; + +cleanup: + if (certificate != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate (certificate); + certificate = NULL; + } + + if (certificate_id != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateId (certificate_id); + certificate_id = NULL; + } + + dmsg ( + D_PKCS11_DEBUG, + "PKCS#11: tls_ctx_use_pkcs11 - return ok=%d, rv=%ld", + ok ? 1 : 0, + rv + ); + + return ok ? 1 : 0; +} + +static +PKCS11H_BOOL +_pkcs11_openvpn_show_pkcs11_ids_pin_prompt ( + void * const global_data, + void * const user_data, + const pkcs11h_token_id_t token, + const unsigned retry, + char * const pin, + const size_t pin_max +) { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer pass_prompt = alloc_buf_gc (128, &gc); + + (void)global_data; + (void)user_data; + (void)retry; + + ASSERT (token!=NULL); + + buf_printf (&pass_prompt, "Please enter '%s' token PIN or 'cancel': ", token->display); + + if (!get_console_input (BSTR (&pass_prompt), false, pin, pin_max)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot read password from stdin"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + + if (!strcmp (pin, "cancel")) { + return FALSE; + } + else { + return TRUE; + } +} + +void +show_pkcs11_ids ( + const char * const provider, + bool cert_private +) { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t user_certificates = NULL; + pkcs11h_certificate_id_list_t current = NULL; + CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_initialize ()) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setLogHook (_pkcs11_openvpn_log, NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set hooks %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + pkcs11h_setLogLevel (_pkcs11_msg_openvpn2pkcs11 (get_debug_level ())); + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setProtectedAuthentication (TRUE)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set protected authentication %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((rv = pkcs11h_setPINPromptHook (_pkcs11_openvpn_show_pkcs11_ids_pin_prompt, NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot set PIN hook %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_addProvider ( + provider, + provider, + TRUE, + 0, + FALSE, + 0, + cert_private ? TRUE : FALSE + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot add provider '%s' %ld-'%s'", provider, rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_enumCertificateIds ( + PKCS11H_ENUM_METHOD_CACHE_EXIST, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + NULL, + &user_certificates + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot enumerate certificates %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup; + } + + msg ( + M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX|M_NOLF, + ( + "\n" + "The following objects are available for use.\n" + "Each object shown below may be used as parameter to\n" + "--pkcs11-id option please remember to use single quote mark.\n" + ) + ); + for (current = user_certificates;current != NULL; current = current->next) { + pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate = NULL; + char *dn = NULL; + char serial[1024] = {0}; + char *ser = NULL; + size_t ser_len = 0; + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId ( + NULL, + &ser_len, + current->certificate_id + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot serialize certificate %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup1; + } + + if ( + rv == CKR_OK && + (ser = (char *)malloc (ser_len)) == NULL + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot allocate memory"); + goto cleanup1; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId ( + ser, + &ser_len, + current->certificate_id + )) != CKR_OK + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot serialize certificate %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup1; + } + + if ( + (rv = pkcs11h_certificate_create ( + current->certificate_id, + NULL, + PKCS11H_PROMPT_MASK_ALLOW_ALL, + PKCS11H_PIN_CACHE_INFINITE, + &certificate + )) + ) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot create certificate %ld-'%s'", rv, pkcs11h_getMessage (rv)); + goto cleanup1; + } + + if ( + (dn = pkcs11_certificate_dn ( + certificate, + &gc + )) == NULL + ) { + goto cleanup1; + } + + if ( + (pkcs11_certificate_serial ( + certificate, + serial, + sizeof(serial) + )) + ) { + goto cleanup1; + } + + msg ( + M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX|M_NOLF, + ( + "\n" + "Certificate\n" + " DN: %s\n" + " Serial: %s\n" + " Serialized id: %s\n" + ), + dn, + serial, + ser + ); + + cleanup1: + + if (certificate != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate (certificate); + certificate = NULL; + } + + if (ser != NULL) { + free (ser); + ser = NULL; + } + } + +cleanup: + if (user_certificates != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateIdList (user_certificates); + user_certificates = NULL; + } + + pkcs11h_terminate (); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#else +#ifdef _MSC_VER /* Dummy function needed to avoid empty file compiler warning in Microsoft VC */ +static void dummy (void) {} +#endif +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4261871d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_PKCS11_H +#define OPENVPN_PKCS11_H + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + +#include "ssl_common.h" + +bool +pkcs11_initialize ( + const bool fProtectedAuthentication, + const int nPINCachePeriod +); + +void +pkcs11_terminate (); + +void +pkcs11_forkFixup (); + +bool +pkcs11_addProvider ( + const char * const provider, + const bool fProtectedAuthentication, + const unsigned private_mode, + const bool fCertIsPrivate +); + +int +pkcs11_logout(); + +int +pkcs11_management_id_count (); + +bool +pkcs11_management_id_get ( + const int index, + char ** id, + char **base64 +); + +int +tls_ctx_use_pkcs11 ( + struct tls_root_ctx * const ssl_ctx, + bool pkcs11_id_management, + const char * const pkcs11_id +); + +void +show_pkcs11_ids ( + const char * const provider, + bool cert_private +); + +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + +#endif /* OPENVPN_PKCS11H_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7b7ec45b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file PKCS #11 SSL library-specific backend + */ + +#ifndef PKCS11_BACKEND_H_ +#define PKCS11_BACKEND_H_ + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + +#include "ssl_common.h" + +#include + +/** + * Retrieve PKCS #11 Certificate's DN in a printable format. + * + * @param certificate The PKCS #11 helper certificate object + * @param gc Garbage collection pool to allocate memory in + * + * @return Certificate's DN on success, NULL on failure + */ +char * pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/** + * Retrieve PKCS #11 Certificate's serial number in a printable format. + * + * @param certificate The PKCS #11 helper certificate object + * @param serial Buffer that the certificate's serial will be placed in. + * @param serial_len Size of said buffer. + * + * @return 1 on failure, 0 on success + */ +int pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, char *serial, + size_t serial_len); + +/** + * Load PKCS #11 Certificate's information into the given TLS context + * + * @param certificate The PKCS #11 helper certificate object + * @param ssl_ctx TLS context to use. + * + * @return 1 on failure, 0 on success + */ +int pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, + struct tls_root_ctx * const ssl_ctx); + +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) */ +#endif /* PKCS11_BACKEND_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af843b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file PKCS #11 OpenSSL backend + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + +#include "errlevel.h" +#include "pkcs11_backend.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include + +int +pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, + struct tls_root_ctx * const ssl_ctx) +{ + int ret = 1; + + X509 *x509 = NULL; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + pkcs11h_openssl_session_t openssl_session = NULL; + + if ((openssl_session = pkcs11h_openssl_createSession (certificate)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize openssl session"); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Will be released by openssl_session + */ + certificate = NULL; + + if ((rsa = pkcs11h_openssl_session_getRSA (openssl_session)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Unable get rsa object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_session_getX509 (openssl_session)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Unable get certificate object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey (ssl_ctx->ctx, rsa)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot set private key for openssl"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate (ssl_ctx->ctx, x509)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Cannot set certificate for openssl"); + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + /* + * Certificate freeing is usually handled by openssl_session. + * If something went wrong, creating the session we have to do it manually. + */ + if (certificate != NULL) { + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate (certificate); + certificate = NULL; + } + + /* + * openssl objects have reference + * count, so release them + */ + if (x509 != NULL) + { + X509_free (x509); + x509 = NULL; + } + + if (rsa != NULL) + { + RSA_free (rsa); + rsa = NULL; + } + + if (openssl_session != NULL) + { + pkcs11h_openssl_freeSession (openssl_session); + openssl_session = NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +char * +pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + X509 *x509 = NULL; + + char *dn = NULL; + + if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_getX509 (certificate)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot get X509"); + goto cleanup; + } + + dn = x509_get_subject (x509, gc); + +cleanup: + if (x509 != NULL) + { + X509_free (x509); + x509 = NULL; + } + + return dn; +} + +int +pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, char *serial, + size_t serial_len) +{ + X509 *x509 = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + int ret = 1; + int n; + + if ((x509 = pkcs11h_openssl_getX509 (certificate)) == NULL) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot get X509"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ())) == NULL) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot create BIO"); + goto cleanup; + } + + i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bio, X509_get_serialNumber (x509)); + n = BIO_read (bio, serial, serial_len-1); + + if (n<0) { + serial[0] = '\x0'; + } + else { + serial[n] = 0; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + + if (x509 != NULL) + { + X509_free (x509); + x509 = NULL; + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) && defined(ENABLE_OPENSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03b2bab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pkcs11_polarssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file PKCS #11 PolarSSL backend + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + +#include "errlevel.h" +#include "pkcs11_backend.h" +#include + +int +pkcs11_init_tls_session(pkcs11h_certificate_t certificate, + struct tls_root_ctx * const ssl_ctx) +{ + int ret = 1; + + ASSERT (NULL != ssl_ctx); + + if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(ssl_ctx->crt_chain, certificate)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + ssl_ctx->priv_key_pkcs11 = malloc(sizeof(pkcs11_context)); + + if (ssl_ctx->priv_key_pkcs11 == NULL) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot allocate PolarSSL private key object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (pkcs11_priv_key_init(ssl_ctx->priv_key_pkcs11, certificate)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot initialize PolarSSL private key object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +char * +pkcs11_certificate_dn (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + char dn[1024] = {0}; + + x509_cert polar_cert = {0}; + + if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (-1 == x509parse_dn_gets (dn, sizeof(dn), &polar_cert.subject)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse subject"); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = string_alloc(dn, gc); + +cleanup: + x509_free(&polar_cert); + + return ret; +} + +int +pkcs11_certificate_serial (pkcs11h_certificate_t cert, char *serial, + size_t serial_len) +{ + int ret = 1; + + x509_cert polar_cert = {0}; + + if (pkcs11_x509_cert_init(&polar_cert, cert)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot retrieve PolarSSL certificate object"); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (-1 == x509parse_serial_gets (serial, serial_len, &polar_cert.serial)) { + msg (M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: PolarSSL cannot parse serial"); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + x509_free(&polar_cert); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e79de7a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "win32.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#include "platform.h" + +/* Redefine the top level directory of the filesystem + to restrict access to files for security */ +void +platform_chroot (const char *path) +{ + if (path) + { +#ifdef HAVE_CHROOT + const char *top = "/"; + if (chroot (path)) + msg (M_ERR, "chroot to '%s' failed", path); + if (platform_chdir (top)) + msg (M_ERR, "cd to '%s' failed", top); + msg (M_INFO, "chroot to '%s' and cd to '%s' succeeded", path, top); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry but I can't chroot to '%s' because this operating system doesn't appear to support the chroot() system call", path); +#endif + } +} + +/* Get/Set UID of process */ + +bool +platform_user_get (const char *username, struct platform_state_user *state) +{ + bool ret = false; + CLEAR (*state); + if (username) + { +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETUID) + state->pw = getpwnam (username); + if (!state->pw) + msg (M_ERR, "failed to find UID for user %s", username); + state->username = username; + ret = true; +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "cannot get UID for user %s -- platform lacks getpwname() or setuid() system calls", username); +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +void +platform_user_set (const struct platform_state_user *state) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETUID) + if (state->username && state->pw) + { + if (setuid (state->pw->pw_uid)) + msg (M_ERR, "setuid('%s') failed", state->username); + msg (M_INFO, "UID set to %s", state->username); + } +#endif +} + +/* Get/Set GID of process */ + +bool +platform_group_get (const char *groupname, struct platform_state_group *state) +{ + bool ret = false; + CLEAR (*state); + if (groupname) + { +#if defined(HAVE_GETGRNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETGID) + state->gr = getgrnam (groupname); + if (!state->gr) + msg (M_ERR, "failed to find GID for group %s", groupname); + state->groupname = groupname; + ret = true; +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "cannot get GID for group %s -- platform lacks getgrnam() or setgid() system calls", groupname); +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +void +platform_group_set (const struct platform_state_group *state) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETGRNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETGID) + if (state->groupname && state->gr) + { + if (setgid (state->gr->gr_gid)) + msg (M_ERR, "setgid('%s') failed", state->groupname); + msg (M_INFO, "GID set to %s", state->groupname); +#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPS + { + gid_t gr_list[1]; + gr_list[0] = state->gr->gr_gid; + if (setgroups (1, gr_list)) + msg (M_ERR, "setgroups('%s') failed", state->groupname); + } +#endif + } +#endif +} + +/* Change process priority */ +void +platform_nice (int niceval) +{ + if (niceval) + { +#ifdef HAVE_NICE + errno = 0; + if (nice (niceval) < 0 && errno != 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "WARNING: nice %d failed: %s", niceval, strerror(errno)); + else + msg (M_INFO, "nice %d succeeded", niceval); +#else + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: nice %d failed (function not implemented)", niceval); +#endif + } +} + +/* Get current PID */ +unsigned int +platform_getpid () +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return (unsigned int) GetCurrentProcessId (); +#else +#ifdef HAVE_GETPID + return (unsigned int) getpid (); +#else + return 0; +#endif +#endif +} + +/* Disable paging */ +void +platform_mlockall(bool print_msg) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_MLOCKALL + if (mlockall (MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "WARNING: mlockall call failed"); + else if (print_msg) + msg (M_INFO, "mlockall call succeeded"); +#else + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: mlockall call failed (function not implemented)"); +#endif +} + +/* + * Wrapper for chdir library function + */ +int +platform_chdir (const char* dir) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CHDIR +#ifdef WIN32 + int res; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + res = _wchdir (wide_string (dir, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return res; +#else + return chdir (dir); +#endif +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +/* + * convert execve() return into a success/failure value + */ +bool +platform_system_ok (int stat) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return stat == 0; +#else + return stat != -1 && WIFEXITED (stat) && WEXITSTATUS (stat) == 0; +#endif +} + +int +platform_access (const char *path, int mode) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int ret = _waccess (wide_string (path, &gc), mode & ~X_OK); + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +#else + return access (path, mode); +#endif +} + +/* + * Go to sleep for n milliseconds. + */ +void +platform_sleep_milliseconds (unsigned int n) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + Sleep (n); +#else + struct timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = n / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (n % 1000) * 1000; + select (0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv); +#endif +} + +/* + * Go to sleep indefinitely. + */ +void +platform_sleep_until_signal (void) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + ASSERT (0); +#else + select (0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); +#endif +} + +/* delete a file, return true if succeeded */ +bool +platform_unlink (const char *filename) +{ +#if defined(WIN32) + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + BOOL ret = DeleteFileW (wide_string (filename, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return (ret != 0); +#elif defined(HAVE_UNLINK) + return (unlink (filename) == 0); +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +int platform_putenv(char *string) +{ + int status; +#if defined(WIN32) + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *s = string_alloc(string, &gc); + char *value = strchr(s, '='); + if (value!=NULL) + { + *value = '\0'; + value++; + if (*value == '\0') + value = NULL; + } + + status = SetEnvironmentVariableW (wide_string (s, &gc), + wide_string (value, &gc)) ? 1: 0; + gc_free (&gc); +#elif defined(HAVE_PUTENV) + void manage_env (char *str); /* TODO: Resolve properly */ + status = putenv (string); + if (!status) + manage_env (string); +#endif + + return status; +} + +FILE * +platform_fopen (const char *path, const char *mode) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + FILE *f = _wfopen (wide_string (path, &gc), wide_string (mode, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return f; +#else + return fopen(path, mode); +#endif +} + +int +platform_open (const char *path, int flags, int mode) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int fd = _wopen (wide_string (path, &gc), flags, mode); + gc_free (&gc); + return fd; +#else + return open(path, flags, mode); +#endif +} + +int +platform_stat (const char *path, platform_stat_t *buf) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int res = _wstat (wide_string (path, &gc), buf); + gc_free (&gc); + return res; +#else + return stat(path, buf); +#endif +} + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c0a4d72 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_H +#define PLATFORM_H + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDIO_H +#include +#endif + +#include "basic.h" + +/* Get/Set UID of process */ + +struct platform_state_user { +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETUID) + const char *username; + struct passwd *pw; +#else + int dummy; +#endif +}; + +/* Get/Set GID of process */ + +struct platform_state_group { +#if defined(HAVE_GETGRNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETGID) + const char *groupname; + struct group *gr; +#else + int dummy; +#endif +}; + +bool platform_user_get (const char *username, struct platform_state_user *state); +void platform_user_set (const struct platform_state_user *state); + +bool platform_group_get (const char *groupname, struct platform_state_group *state); +void platform_group_set (const struct platform_state_group *state); + +/* + * Extract UID or GID + */ + +static inline int +platform_state_user_uid (const struct platform_state_user *s) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETUID) + if (s->pw) + return s->pw->pw_uid; +#endif + return -1; +} + +static inline int +platform_state_group_gid (const struct platform_state_group *s) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETGRNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETGID) + if (s->gr) + return s->gr->gr_gid; +#endif + return -1; +} + +void platform_chroot (const char *path); + +void platform_nice (int niceval); + +unsigned int platform_getpid (void); + +void platform_mlockall (bool print_msg); /* Disable paging */ + +int platform_chdir (const char* dir); + +/* interpret the status code returned by execve() */ +bool platform_system_ok (int stat); + +int platform_access (const char *path, int mode); + +void platform_sleep_milliseconds (unsigned int n); + +void platform_sleep_until_signal (void); + +/* delete a file, return true if succeeded */ +bool platform_unlink (const char *filename); + +int platform_putenv (char *string); + +FILE *platform_fopen (const char *path, const char *mode); +int platform_open (const char *path, int flags, int mode); + +#ifdef WIN32 +typedef struct _stat platform_stat_t; +#else +typedef struct stat platform_stat_t; +#endif +int platform_stat (const char *path, platform_stat_t *buf); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83f79e4f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.c @@ -0,0 +1,871 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + +#ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H +#include +#endif + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "plugin.h" +#include "win32.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#define PLUGIN_SYMBOL_REQUIRED (1<<0) + +/* used only for program aborts */ +static struct plugin_common *static_plugin_common = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ + +static void +plugin_show_string_array (int msglevel, const char *name, const char *array[]) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; array[i]; ++i) + { + if (env_safe_to_print (array[i])) + msg (msglevel, "%s[%d] = '%s'", name, i, array[i]); + } +} + +static void +plugin_show_args_env (int msglevel, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + if (check_debug_level (msglevel)) + { + plugin_show_string_array (msglevel, "ARGV", argv); + plugin_show_string_array (msglevel, "ENVP", envp); + } +} + +static const char * +plugin_type_name (const int type) +{ + switch (type) + { + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP: + return "PLUGIN_UP"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN: + return "PLUGIN_DOWN"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP: + return "PLUGIN_ROUTE_UP"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE: + return "PLUGIN_IPCHANGE"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY: + return "PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY: + return "PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT: + return "PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2: + return "PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT: + return "PLUGIN_CLIENT_DISCONNECT"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS: + return "PLUGIN_LEARN_ADDRESS"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL: + return "PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF: + return "PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF"; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ROUTE_PREDOWN: + return "PLUGIN_ROUTE_PREDOWN"; + default: + return "PLUGIN_???"; + } +} + +static const char * +plugin_mask_string (const unsigned int type_mask, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + bool first = true; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < OPENVPN_PLUGIN_N; ++i) + { + if (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (i) & type_mask) + { + if (!first) + buf_printf (&out, "|"); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", plugin_type_name (i)); + first = false; + } + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static inline unsigned int +plugin_supported_types (void) +{ + return ((1<n < MAX_PLUGINS) + { + struct plugin_option *o = &list->plugins[list->n++]; + o->argv = make_extended_arg_array (p, gc); + if (o->argv[0]) + o->so_pathname = o->argv[0]; + return true; + } + else + return false; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void +plugin_option_list_print (const struct plugin_option_list *list, int msglevel) +{ + int i; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + for (i = 0; i < list->n; ++i) + { + const struct plugin_option *o = &list->plugins[i]; + msg (msglevel, " plugin[%d] %s '%s'", i, o->so_pathname, print_argv (o->argv, &gc, PA_BRACKET)); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} +#endif + +#ifndef WIN32 + +static void +libdl_resolve_symbol (void *handle, void **dest, const char *symbol, const char *plugin_name, const unsigned int flags) +{ + *dest = dlsym (handle, symbol); + if ((flags & PLUGIN_SYMBOL_REQUIRED) && !*dest) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN: could not find required symbol '%s' in plugin shared object %s: %s", symbol, plugin_name, dlerror()); +} + +#else + +static void +dll_resolve_symbol (HMODULE module, void **dest, const char *symbol, const char *plugin_name, const unsigned int flags) +{ + *dest = GetProcAddress (module, symbol); + if ((flags & PLUGIN_SYMBOL_REQUIRED) && !*dest) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN: could not find required symbol '%s' in plugin DLL %s", symbol, plugin_name); +} + +#endif + +static void +plugin_init_item (struct plugin *p, const struct plugin_option *o) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool rel = false; + + p->so_pathname = o->so_pathname; + p->plugin_type_mask = plugin_supported_types (); + +#ifndef WIN32 + + p->handle = NULL; +#if defined(PLUGIN_LIBDIR) + if (!absolute_pathname (p->so_pathname)) + { + char full[PATH_MAX]; + + openvpn_snprintf (full, sizeof(full), "%s/%s", PLUGIN_LIBDIR, p->so_pathname); + p->handle = dlopen (full, RTLD_NOW); +#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGIN_SEARCH) + if (!p->handle) + { + rel = true; + p->handle = dlopen (p->so_pathname, RTLD_NOW); + } +#endif + } + else +#endif + { + rel = !absolute_pathname (p->so_pathname); + p->handle = dlopen (p->so_pathname, RTLD_NOW); + } + if (!p->handle) + msg (M_ERR, "PLUGIN_INIT: could not load plugin shared object %s: %s", p->so_pathname, dlerror()); + +# define PLUGIN_SYM(var, name, flags) libdl_resolve_symbol (p->handle, (void*)&p->var, name, p->so_pathname, flags) + +#else + + rel = !absolute_pathname (p->so_pathname); + p->module = LoadLibraryW (wide_string (p->so_pathname, &gc)); + if (!p->module) + msg (M_ERR, "PLUGIN_INIT: could not load plugin DLL: %s", p->so_pathname); + +# define PLUGIN_SYM(var, name, flags) dll_resolve_symbol (p->module, (void*)&p->var, name, p->so_pathname, flags) + +#endif + + PLUGIN_SYM (open1, "openvpn_plugin_open_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (open2, "openvpn_plugin_open_v2", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (open3, "openvpn_plugin_open_v3", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (func1, "openvpn_plugin_func_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (func2, "openvpn_plugin_func_v2", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (func3, "openvpn_plugin_func_v3", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (close, "openvpn_plugin_close_v1", PLUGIN_SYMBOL_REQUIRED); + PLUGIN_SYM (abort, "openvpn_plugin_abort_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (client_constructor, "openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (client_destructor, "openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (min_version_required, "openvpn_plugin_min_version_required_v1", 0); + PLUGIN_SYM (initialization_point, "openvpn_plugin_select_initialization_point_v1", 0); + + if (!p->open1 && !p->open2 && !p->open3) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN: symbol openvpn_plugin_open_vX is undefined in plugin: %s", p->so_pathname); + + if (!p->func1 && !p->func2 && !p->func3) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN: symbol openvpn_plugin_func_vX is undefined in plugin: %s", p->so_pathname); + + /* + * Verify that we are sufficiently up-to-date to handle the plugin + */ + if (p->min_version_required) + { + const int plugin_needs_version = (*p->min_version_required)(); + if (plugin_needs_version > OPENVPN_PLUGIN_VERSION) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN_INIT: plugin needs interface version %d, but this version of OpenVPN only supports version %d: %s", + plugin_needs_version, + OPENVPN_PLUGIN_VERSION, + p->so_pathname); + } + + if (p->initialization_point) + p->requested_initialization_point = (*p->initialization_point)(); + else + p->requested_initialization_point = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_INIT_PRE_DAEMON; + + if (rel) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: plugin '%s' specified by a relative pathname -- using an absolute pathname would be more secure", p->so_pathname); + + p->initialized = true; + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +plugin_vlog (openvpn_plugin_log_flags_t flags, const char *name, const char *format, va_list arglist) +{ + unsigned int msg_flags; + + if (!format) + return; + + if (!name || name[0] == '\0') + { + msg (D_PLUGIN_DEBUG, "PLUGIN: suppressed log message from plugin with unknown name"); + return; + } + + if (flags & PLOG_ERR) + msg_flags = M_INFO | M_NONFATAL; + else if (flags & PLOG_WARN) + msg_flags = M_INFO | M_WARN; + else if (flags & PLOG_NOTE) + msg_flags = M_INFO; + else if (flags & PLOG_DEBUG) + msg_flags = D_PLUGIN_DEBUG; + + if (flags & PLOG_ERRNO) + msg_flags |= M_ERRNO; + if (flags & PLOG_NOMUTE) + msg_flags |= M_NOMUTE; + + if (MSG_TEST (msg_flags)) + { + struct gc_arena gc; + char* msg_fmt; + + /* Never add instance prefix; not thread safe */ + msg_flags |= M_NOIPREFIX; + + gc_init (&gc); + msg_fmt = gc_malloc (ERR_BUF_SIZE, false, &gc); + openvpn_snprintf (msg_fmt, ERR_BUF_SIZE, "PLUGIN %s: %s", name, format); + x_msg_va (msg_flags, msg_fmt, arglist); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static void +plugin_log (openvpn_plugin_log_flags_t flags, const char *name, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + va_start (arglist, format); + plugin_vlog (flags, name, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); +} + +static struct openvpn_plugin_callbacks callbacks = { + plugin_log, + plugin_vlog +}; + +static void +plugin_open_item (struct plugin *p, + const struct plugin_option *o, + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **retlist, + const char **envp, + const int init_point) +{ + ASSERT (p->initialized); + + /* clear return list */ + if (retlist) + *retlist = NULL; + + if (!p->plugin_handle && init_point == p->requested_initialization_point) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + dmsg (D_PLUGIN_DEBUG, "PLUGIN_INIT: PRE"); + plugin_show_args_env (D_PLUGIN_DEBUG, o->argv, envp); + + /* + * Call the plugin initialization + */ + if (p->open3) { + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_in args = { p->plugin_type_mask, + (const char ** const) o->argv, + (const char ** const) envp, + &callbacks }; + struct openvpn_plugin_args_open_return retargs; + + CLEAR(retargs); + retargs.return_list = retlist; + if ((*p->open3)(OPENVPN_PLUGINv3_STRUCTVER, &args, &retargs) == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) { + p->plugin_type_mask = retargs.type_mask; + p->plugin_handle = retargs.handle; + } else { + p->plugin_handle = NULL; + } + } else if (p->open2) + p->plugin_handle = (*p->open2)(&p->plugin_type_mask, o->argv, envp, retlist); + else if (p->open1) + p->plugin_handle = (*p->open1)(&p->plugin_type_mask, o->argv, envp); + else + ASSERT (0); + + msg (D_PLUGIN, "PLUGIN_INIT: POST %s '%s' intercepted=%s %s", + p->so_pathname, + print_argv (o->argv, &gc, PA_BRACKET), + plugin_mask_string (p->plugin_type_mask, &gc), + (retlist && *retlist) ? "[RETLIST]" : ""); + + if ((p->plugin_type_mask | plugin_supported_types()) != plugin_supported_types()) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN_INIT: plugin %s expressed interest in unsupported plugin types: [want=0x%08x, have=0x%08x]", + p->so_pathname, + p->plugin_type_mask, + plugin_supported_types()); + + if (p->plugin_handle == NULL) + msg (M_FATAL, "PLUGIN_INIT: plugin initialization function failed: %s", + p->so_pathname); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static int +plugin_call_item (const struct plugin *p, + void *per_client_context, + const int type, + const struct argv *av, + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **retlist, + const char **envp +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + , int certdepth, + openvpn_x509_cert_t *current_cert +#endif + ) +{ + int status = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + + /* clear return list */ + if (retlist) + *retlist = NULL; + + if (p->plugin_handle && (p->plugin_type_mask & OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (type))) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv a = argv_insert_head (av, p->so_pathname); + + dmsg (D_PLUGIN_DEBUG, "PLUGIN_CALL: PRE type=%s", plugin_type_name (type)); + plugin_show_args_env (D_PLUGIN_DEBUG, (const char **)a.argv, envp); + + /* + * Call the plugin work function + */ + if (p->func3) { + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_in args = { type, + (const char ** const) a.argv, + (const char ** const) envp, + p->plugin_handle, + per_client_context, +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + (current_cert ? certdepth : -1), + current_cert +#else + -1, + NULL +#endif + }; + + struct openvpn_plugin_args_func_return retargs; + + CLEAR(retargs); + retargs.return_list = retlist; + status = (*p->func3)(OPENVPN_PLUGINv3_STRUCTVER, &args, &retargs); + } else if (p->func2) + status = (*p->func2)(p->plugin_handle, type, (const char **)a.argv, envp, per_client_context, retlist); + else if (p->func1) + status = (*p->func1)(p->plugin_handle, type, (const char **)a.argv, envp); + else + ASSERT (0); + + msg (D_PLUGIN, "PLUGIN_CALL: POST %s/%s status=%d", + p->so_pathname, + plugin_type_name (type), + status); + + if (status == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR) + msg (M_WARN, "PLUGIN_CALL: plugin function %s failed with status %d: %s", + plugin_type_name (type), + status, + p->so_pathname); + + argv_reset (&a); + gc_free (&gc); + } + return status; +} + +static void +plugin_close_item (struct plugin *p) +{ + if (p->initialized) + { + msg (D_PLUGIN, "PLUGIN_CLOSE: %s", p->so_pathname); + + /* + * Call the plugin close function + */ + if (p->plugin_handle) + (*p->close)(p->plugin_handle); + +#ifndef WIN32 + if (dlclose (p->handle)) + msg (M_WARN, "PLUGIN_CLOSE: dlclose() failed on plugin: %s", p->so_pathname); +#elif defined(WIN32) + if (!FreeLibrary (p->module)) + msg (M_WARN, "PLUGIN_CLOSE: FreeLibrary() failed on plugin: %s", p->so_pathname); +#endif + + p->initialized = false; + } +} + +static void +plugin_abort_item (const struct plugin *p) +{ + /* + * Call the plugin abort function + */ + if (p->abort) + (*p->abort)(p->plugin_handle); +} + +static void +plugin_per_client_init (const struct plugin_common *pc, + struct plugin_per_client *cli, + const int init_point) +{ + const int n = pc->n; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + const struct plugin *p = &pc->plugins[i]; + if (p->plugin_handle + && (init_point < 0 || init_point == p->requested_initialization_point) + && p->client_constructor) + cli->per_client_context[i] = (*p->client_constructor)(p->plugin_handle); + } +} + +static void +plugin_per_client_destroy (const struct plugin_common *pc, struct plugin_per_client *cli) +{ + const int n = pc->n; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + const struct plugin *p = &pc->plugins[i]; + void *cc = cli->per_client_context[i]; + + if (p->client_destructor && cc) + (*p->client_destructor)(p->plugin_handle, cc); + } + CLEAR (*cli); +} + +struct plugin_list * +plugin_list_inherit (const struct plugin_list *src) +{ + struct plugin_list *pl; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pl, struct plugin_list); + pl->common = src->common; + ASSERT (pl->common); + plugin_per_client_init (pl->common, &pl->per_client, -1); + return pl; +} + +static struct plugin_common * +plugin_common_init (const struct plugin_option_list *list) +{ + int i; + struct plugin_common *pc; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pc, struct plugin_common); + + for (i = 0; i < list->n; ++i) + { + plugin_init_item (&pc->plugins[i], + &list->plugins[i]); + pc->n = i + 1; + } + + static_plugin_common = pc; + return pc; +} + +static void +plugin_common_open (struct plugin_common *pc, + const struct plugin_option_list *list, + struct plugin_return *pr, + const struct env_set *es, + const int init_point) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + const char **envp; + + envp = make_env_array (es, false, &gc); + + if (pr) + plugin_return_init (pr); + + for (i = 0; i < pc->n; ++i) + { + plugin_open_item (&pc->plugins[i], + &list->plugins[i], + pr ? &pr->list[i] : NULL, + envp, + init_point); + } + + if (pr) + pr->n = i; + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +plugin_common_close (struct plugin_common *pc) +{ + static_plugin_common = NULL; + if (pc) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < pc->n; ++i) + plugin_close_item (&pc->plugins[i]); + free (pc); + } +} + +struct plugin_list * +plugin_list_init (const struct plugin_option_list *list) +{ + struct plugin_list *pl; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pl, struct plugin_list); + pl->common = plugin_common_init (list); + pl->common_owned = true; + return pl; +} + +void +plugin_list_open (struct plugin_list *pl, + const struct plugin_option_list *list, + struct plugin_return *pr, + const struct env_set *es, + const int init_point) +{ + plugin_common_open (pl->common, list, pr, es, init_point); + plugin_per_client_init (pl->common, &pl->per_client, init_point); +} + +int +plugin_call_ssl (const struct plugin_list *pl, + const int type, + const struct argv *av, + struct plugin_return *pr, + struct env_set *es +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + , int certdepth, + openvpn_x509_cert_t *current_cert +#endif + ) +{ + if (pr) + plugin_return_init (pr); + + if (plugin_defined (pl, type)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + const char **envp; + const int n = plugin_n (pl); + bool success = false; + bool error = false; + bool deferred = false; + + setenv_del (es, "script_type"); + envp = make_env_array (es, false, &gc); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + const int status = plugin_call_item (&pl->common->plugins[i], + pl->per_client.per_client_context[i], + type, + av, + pr ? &pr->list[i] : NULL, + envp +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + ,certdepth, + current_cert +#endif + ); + switch (status) + { + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS: + success = true; + break; + case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED: + deferred = true; + break; + default: + error = true; + break; + } + } + + if (pr) + pr->n = i; + + gc_free (&gc); + + if (type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_ENABLE_PF && success) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + else if (error) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + else if (deferred) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED; + } + + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +void +plugin_list_close (struct plugin_list *pl) +{ + if (pl) + { + if (pl->common) + { + plugin_per_client_destroy (pl->common, &pl->per_client); + + if (pl->common_owned) + plugin_common_close (pl->common); + } + + free (pl); + } +} + +void +plugin_abort (void) +{ + struct plugin_common *pc = static_plugin_common; + static_plugin_common = NULL; + if (pc) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < pc->n; ++i) + plugin_abort_item (&pc->plugins[i]); + } +} + +bool +plugin_defined (const struct plugin_list *pl, const int type) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if (pl) + { + const struct plugin_common *pc = pl->common; + + if (pc) + { + int i; + const unsigned int mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (type); + for (i = 0; i < pc->n; ++i) + { + if (pc->plugins[i].plugin_type_mask & mask) + { + ret = true; + break; + } + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Plugin return functions + */ + +static void +openvpn_plugin_string_list_item_free (struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *l) +{ + if (l) + { + free (l->name); + string_clear (l->value); + free (l->value); + free (l); + } +} + +static void +openvpn_plugin_string_list_free (struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *l) +{ + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *next; + while (l) + { + next = l->next; + openvpn_plugin_string_list_item_free (l); + l = next; + } +} + +static struct openvpn_plugin_string_list * +openvpn_plugin_string_list_find (struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *l, const char *name) +{ + while (l) + { + if (!strcmp (l->name, name)) + return l; + l = l->next; + } + return NULL; +} + +void +plugin_return_get_column (const struct plugin_return *src, + struct plugin_return *dest, + const char *colname) +{ + int i; + + dest->n = 0; + for (i = 0; i < src->n; ++i) + dest->list[i] = openvpn_plugin_string_list_find (src->list[i], colname); + dest->n = i; +} + +void +plugin_return_free (struct plugin_return *pr) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < pr->n; ++i) + openvpn_plugin_string_list_free (pr->list[i]); + pr->n = 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void +plugin_return_print (const int msglevel, const char *prefix, const struct plugin_return *pr) +{ + int i; + msg (msglevel, "PLUGIN_RETURN_PRINT %s", prefix); + for (i = 0; i < pr->n; ++i) + { + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *l = pr->list[i]; + int count = 0; + + msg (msglevel, "PLUGIN #%d (%s)", i, prefix); + while (l) + { + msg (msglevel, "[%d] '%s' -> '%s'\n", + ++count, + l->name, + l->value); + l = l->next; + } + } +} +#endif + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_PLUGIN */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ba150d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/plugin.h @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * plug-in support, using dynamically loaded libraries + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H +#define OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#include "ssl_verify_polarssl.h" +#endif +#include "openvpn-plugin.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PLUGIN + +#include "misc.h" + +#define MAX_PLUGINS 16 + +struct plugin_option { + const char *so_pathname; + const char **argv; +}; + +struct plugin_option_list { + int n; + struct plugin_option plugins[MAX_PLUGINS]; +}; + +struct plugin { + bool initialized; + const char *so_pathname; + unsigned int plugin_type_mask; + int requested_initialization_point; + +#ifndef WIN32 + void *handle; +#else + HMODULE module; +#endif + + openvpn_plugin_open_v1 open1; + openvpn_plugin_open_v2 open2; + openvpn_plugin_open_v3 open3; + openvpn_plugin_func_v1 func1; + openvpn_plugin_func_v2 func2; + openvpn_plugin_func_v3 func3; + openvpn_plugin_close_v1 close; + openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 abort; + openvpn_plugin_client_constructor_v1 client_constructor; + openvpn_plugin_client_destructor_v1 client_destructor; + openvpn_plugin_min_version_required_v1 min_version_required; + openvpn_plugin_select_initialization_point_v1 initialization_point; + + openvpn_plugin_handle_t plugin_handle; +}; + +struct plugin_per_client +{ + void *per_client_context[MAX_PLUGINS]; +}; + +struct plugin_common +{ + int n; + struct plugin plugins[MAX_PLUGINS]; +}; + +struct plugin_list +{ + struct plugin_per_client per_client; + struct plugin_common *common; + bool common_owned; +}; + +struct plugin_return +{ + int n; + struct openvpn_plugin_string_list *list[MAX_PLUGINS]; +}; + +struct plugin_option_list *plugin_option_list_new (struct gc_arena *gc); +bool plugin_option_list_add (struct plugin_option_list *list, char **p, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void plugin_option_list_print (const struct plugin_option_list *list, int msglevel); +#endif + +struct plugin_list *plugin_list_init (const struct plugin_option_list *list); + +void plugin_list_open (struct plugin_list *pl, + const struct plugin_option_list *list, + struct plugin_return *pr, + const struct env_set *es, + const int init_point); + +struct plugin_list *plugin_list_inherit (const struct plugin_list *src); + +int plugin_call_ssl (const struct plugin_list *pl, + const int type, + const struct argv *av, + struct plugin_return *pr, + struct env_set *es +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + , int current_cert_depth, + openvpn_x509_cert_t *current_cert +#endif + ); + +void plugin_list_close (struct plugin_list *pl); +bool plugin_defined (const struct plugin_list *pl, const int type); + +void plugin_return_get_column (const struct plugin_return *src, + struct plugin_return *dest, + const char *colname); + +void plugin_return_free (struct plugin_return *pr); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void plugin_return_print (const int msglevel, const char *prefix, const struct plugin_return *pr); +#endif + +static inline int +plugin_n (const struct plugin_list *pl) +{ + if (pl && pl->common) + return pl->common->n; + else + return 0; +} + +static inline bool +plugin_return_defined (const struct plugin_return *pr) +{ + return pr->n >= 0; +} + +static inline void +plugin_return_init (struct plugin_return *pr) +{ + pr->n = 0; +} + +#else +struct plugin_list { int dummy; }; +struct plugin_return { int dummy; }; + +static inline bool +plugin_defined (const struct plugin_list *pl, const int type) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline int +plugin_call_ssl (const struct plugin_list *pl, + const int type, + const struct argv *av, + struct plugin_return *pr, + struct env_set *es +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + , int current_cert_depth, + openvpn_x509_cert_t *current_cert +#endif + ) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_PLUGIN */ + +static inline int +plugin_call(const struct plugin_list *pl, + const int type, + const struct argv *av, + struct plugin_return *pr, + struct env_set *es) +{ + return plugin_call_ssl(pl, type, av, pr, es +#ifdef ENABLE_SSL + , -1, NULL +#endif + ); +} + +#endif /* OPENVPN_PLUGIN_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28c26b4d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.c @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "pool.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "otime.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#if P2MP + +static void +ifconfig_pool_entry_free (struct ifconfig_pool_entry *ipe, bool hard) +{ + ipe->in_use = false; + if (hard && ipe->common_name) + { + free (ipe->common_name); + ipe->common_name = NULL; + } + if (hard) + ipe->last_release = 0; + else + ipe->last_release = now; +} + +static int +ifconfig_pool_find (struct ifconfig_pool *pool, const char *common_name) +{ + int i; + time_t earliest_release = 0; + int previous_usage = -1; + int new_usage = -1; + + for (i = 0; i < pool->size; ++i) + { + struct ifconfig_pool_entry *ipe = &pool->list[i]; + if (!ipe->in_use) + { + /* + * If duplicate_cn mode, take first available IP address + */ + if (pool->duplicate_cn) + { + new_usage = i; + break; + } + + /* + * Keep track of the unused IP address entry which + * was released earliest. + */ + if ((new_usage == -1 || ipe->last_release < earliest_release) && !ipe->fixed) + { + earliest_release = ipe->last_release; + new_usage = i; + } + + /* + * Keep track of a possible allocation to us + * from an earlier session. + */ + if (previous_usage < 0 + && common_name + && ipe->common_name + && !strcmp (common_name, ipe->common_name)) + previous_usage = i; + + } + } + + if (previous_usage >= 0) + return previous_usage; + + if (new_usage >= 0) + return new_usage; + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Verify start/end range + */ +bool +ifconfig_pool_verify_range (const int msglevel, const in_addr_t start, const in_addr_t end) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = true; + + if (start > end) + { + msg (msglevel, "--ifconfig-pool start IP [%s] is greater than end IP [%s]", + print_in_addr_t (start, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (end, 0, &gc)); + ret = false; + } + if (end - start >= IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX) + { + msg (msglevel, "--ifconfig-pool address range is too large [%s -> %s]. Current maximum is %d addresses, as defined by IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX variable.", + print_in_addr_t (start, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (end, 0, &gc), + IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX); + ret = false; + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +struct ifconfig_pool * +ifconfig_pool_init (int type, in_addr_t start, in_addr_t end, + const bool duplicate_cn, + const bool ipv6_pool, const struct in6_addr ipv6_base, + const int ipv6_netbits ) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct ifconfig_pool *pool = NULL; + + ASSERT (start <= end && end - start < IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pool, struct ifconfig_pool); + + pool->type = type; + pool->duplicate_cn = duplicate_cn; + + switch (type) + { + case IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET: + pool->base = start & ~3; + pool->size = (((end | 3) + 1) - pool->base) >> 2; + break; + case IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV: + pool->base = start; + pool->size = end - start + 1; + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* IPv6 pools are always "INDIV" type */ + pool->ipv6 = ipv6_pool; + + if ( pool->ipv6 ) + { + pool->base_ipv6 = ipv6_base; + pool->size_ipv6 = ipv6_netbits>96? ( 1<<(128-ipv6_netbits) ) + : IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX; + + msg( D_IFCONFIG_POOL, "IFCONFIG POOL IPv6: (IPv4) size=%d, size_ipv6=%d, netbits=%d, base_ipv6=%s", + pool->size, pool->size_ipv6, ipv6_netbits, + print_in6_addr( pool->base_ipv6, 0, &gc )); + + /* the current code is very simple and assumes that the IPv6 + * pool is at least as big as the IPv4 pool, and we don't need + * to do separate math etc. for IPv6 + */ + ASSERT( pool->size < pool->size_ipv6 ); + } + + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR (pool->list, struct ifconfig_pool_entry, pool->size); + + msg (D_IFCONFIG_POOL, "IFCONFIG POOL: base=%s size=%d, ipv6=%d", + print_in_addr_t (pool->base, 0, &gc), + pool->size, pool->ipv6 ); + + gc_free (&gc); + return pool; +} + +void +ifconfig_pool_free (struct ifconfig_pool *pool) +{ + if (pool) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < pool->size; ++i) + ifconfig_pool_entry_free (&pool->list[i], true); + free (pool->list); + free (pool); + } +} + +ifconfig_pool_handle +ifconfig_pool_acquire (struct ifconfig_pool *pool, in_addr_t *local, in_addr_t *remote, struct in6_addr *remote_ipv6, const char *common_name) +{ + int i; + + i = ifconfig_pool_find (pool, common_name); + if (i >= 0) + { + struct ifconfig_pool_entry *ipe = &pool->list[i]; + ASSERT (!ipe->in_use); + ifconfig_pool_entry_free (ipe, true); + ipe->in_use = true; + if (common_name) + ipe->common_name = string_alloc (common_name, NULL); + + switch (pool->type) + { + case IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET: + { + in_addr_t b = pool->base + (i << 2); + *local = b + 1; + *remote = b + 2; + break; + } + case IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV: + { + in_addr_t b = pool->base + i; + *local = 0; + *remote = b; + break; + } + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* IPv6 pools are always INDIV (--linear) */ + if ( pool->ipv6 && remote_ipv6 ) + { + *remote_ipv6 = add_in6_addr( pool->base_ipv6, i ); + } + } + return i; +} + +bool +ifconfig_pool_release (struct ifconfig_pool* pool, ifconfig_pool_handle hand, const bool hard) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (pool && hand >= 0 && hand < pool->size) + { + ifconfig_pool_entry_free (&pool->list[hand], hard); + ret = true; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * private access functions + */ + +static ifconfig_pool_handle +ifconfig_pool_ip_base_to_handle (const struct ifconfig_pool* pool, const in_addr_t addr) +{ + ifconfig_pool_handle ret = -1; + + switch (pool->type) + { + case IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET: + { + ret = (addr - pool->base) >> 2; + break; + } + case IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV: + { + ret = (addr - pool->base); + break; + } + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + if (ret < 0 || ret >= pool->size) + ret = -1; + + return ret; +} + +static in_addr_t +ifconfig_pool_handle_to_ip_base (const struct ifconfig_pool* pool, ifconfig_pool_handle hand) +{ + in_addr_t ret = 0; + + if (hand >= 0 && hand < pool->size) + { + switch (pool->type) + { + case IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET: + { + ret = pool->base + (hand << 2);; + break; + } + case IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV: + { + ret = pool->base + hand; + break; + } + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static struct in6_addr +ifconfig_pool_handle_to_ipv6_base (const struct ifconfig_pool* pool, ifconfig_pool_handle hand) +{ + struct in6_addr ret = in6addr_any; + + /* IPv6 pools are always INDIV (--linear) */ + if (hand >= 0 && hand < pool->size_ipv6 ) + { + ret = add_in6_addr( pool->base_ipv6, hand ); + } + return ret; +} + +static void +ifconfig_pool_set (struct ifconfig_pool* pool, const char *cn, const in_addr_t addr, const bool fixed) +{ + ifconfig_pool_handle h = ifconfig_pool_ip_base_to_handle (pool, addr); + if (h >= 0) + { + struct ifconfig_pool_entry *e = &pool->list[h]; + ifconfig_pool_entry_free (e, true); + e->in_use = false; + e->common_name = string_alloc (cn, NULL); + e->last_release = now; + e->fixed = fixed; + } +} + +static void +ifconfig_pool_list (const struct ifconfig_pool* pool, struct status_output *out) +{ + if (pool && out) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < pool->size; ++i) + { + const struct ifconfig_pool_entry *e = &pool->list[i]; + if (e->common_name) + { + const in_addr_t ip = ifconfig_pool_handle_to_ip_base (pool, i); + if ( pool->ipv6 ) + { + struct in6_addr ip6 = ifconfig_pool_handle_to_ipv6_base (pool, i); + status_printf (out, "%s,%s,%s", + e->common_name, + print_in_addr_t (ip, 0, &gc), + print_in6_addr (ip6, 0, &gc)); + } + else + { + status_printf (out, "%s,%s", + e->common_name, + print_in_addr_t (ip, 0, &gc)); + } + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static void +ifconfig_pool_msg (const struct ifconfig_pool* pool, int msglevel) +{ + struct status_output *so = status_open (NULL, 0, msglevel, NULL, 0); + ASSERT (so); + status_printf (so, "IFCONFIG POOL LIST"); + ifconfig_pool_list (pool, so); + status_close (so); +} + +/* + * Deal with reading/writing the ifconfig pool database to a file + */ + +struct ifconfig_pool_persist * +ifconfig_pool_persist_init (const char *filename, int refresh_freq) +{ + struct ifconfig_pool_persist *ret; + + ASSERT (filename); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ret, struct ifconfig_pool_persist); + if (refresh_freq > 0) + { + ret->fixed = false; + ret->file = status_open (filename, refresh_freq, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_READ|STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); + } + else + { + ret->fixed = true; + ret->file = status_open (filename, 0, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_READ); + } + return ret; +} + +void +ifconfig_pool_persist_close (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist) +{ + if (persist) + { + if (persist->file) + status_close (persist->file); + free (persist); + } +} + +bool +ifconfig_pool_write_trigger (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist) +{ + if (persist->file) + return status_trigger (persist->file); + else + return false; +} + +void +ifconfig_pool_read (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist, struct ifconfig_pool *pool) +{ + const int buf_size = 128; + + update_time (); + if (persist && persist->file && pool) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer in = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + char *cn_buf; + char *ip_buf; + int line = 0; + + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (cn_buf, char, buf_size, &gc); + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ip_buf, char, buf_size, &gc); + + while (true) + { + ASSERT (buf_init (&in, 0)); + if (!status_read (persist->file, &in)) + break; + ++line; + if (BLEN (&in)) + { + int c = *BSTR(&in); + if (c == '#' || c == ';') + continue; + msg( M_INFO, "ifconfig_pool_read(), in='%s', TODO: IPv6", + BSTR(&in) ); + + if (buf_parse (&in, ',', cn_buf, buf_size) + && buf_parse (&in, ',', ip_buf, buf_size)) + { + bool succeeded; + const in_addr_t addr = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, ip_buf, 0, &succeeded, NULL); + if (succeeded) + { + msg( M_INFO, "succeeded -> ifconfig_pool_set()"); + ifconfig_pool_set (pool, cn_buf, addr, persist->fixed); + } + } + } + } + + ifconfig_pool_msg (pool, D_IFCONFIG_POOL); + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +void +ifconfig_pool_write (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist, const struct ifconfig_pool *pool) +{ + if (persist && persist->file && (status_rw_flags (persist->file) & STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE) && pool) + { + status_reset (persist->file); + ifconfig_pool_list (pool, persist->file); + status_flush (persist->file); + } +} + +/* + * TESTING ONLY + */ + +#ifdef IFCONFIG_POOL_TEST + +#define DUP_CN + +void +ifconfig_pool_test (in_addr_t start, in_addr_t end) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct ifconfig_pool *p = ifconfig_pool_init (IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET, start, end); + /*struct ifconfig_pool *p = ifconfig_pool_init (IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV, start, end);*/ + ifconfig_pool_handle array[256]; + int i; + + CLEAR (array); + + msg (M_INFO | M_NOPREFIX, "************ 1"); + for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE (array); ++i) + { + char *cn; + ifconfig_pool_handle h; + in_addr_t local, remote; + char buf[256]; + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "common-name-%d", i); +#ifdef DUP_CN + cn = NULL; +#else + cn = buf; +#endif + h = ifconfig_pool_acquire (p, &local, &remote, NULL, cn); + if (h < 0) + break; + msg (M_INFO | M_NOPREFIX, "IFCONFIG_POOL TEST pass 1: l=%s r=%s cn=%s", + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote, 0, &gc), + cn); + array[i] = h; + + } + + msg (M_INFO | M_NOPREFIX, "************* 2"); + for (i = (int) SIZE (array) / 16; i < (int) SIZE (array) / 8; ++i) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Attempt to release %d cn=%s", array[i], p->list[i].common_name); + if (!ifconfig_pool_release (p, array[i])) + break; + msg (M_INFO, "Succeeded"); + } + + CLEAR (array); + + msg (M_INFO | M_NOPREFIX, "**************** 3"); + for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE (array); ++i) + { + char *cn; + ifconfig_pool_handle h; + in_addr_t local, remote; + char buf[256]; + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "common-name-%d", i+24); +#ifdef DUP_CN + cn = NULL; +#else + cn = buf; +#endif + h = ifconfig_pool_acquire (p, &local, &remote, NULL, cn); + if (h < 0) + break; + msg (M_INFO | M_NOPREFIX, "IFCONFIG_POOL TEST pass 3: l=%s r=%s cn=%s", + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote, 0, &gc), + cn); + array[i] = h; + + } + + ifconfig_pool_free (p); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc9d6ab2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pool.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef POOL_H +#define POOL_H + +#if P2MP + +/*#define IFCONFIG_POOL_TEST*/ + +#include "basic.h" +#include "status.h" + +#define IFCONFIG_POOL_MAX 65536 +#define IFCONFIG_POOL_MIN_NETBITS 16 + +#define IFCONFIG_POOL_30NET 0 +#define IFCONFIG_POOL_INDIV 1 + +struct ifconfig_pool_entry +{ + bool in_use; + char *common_name; + time_t last_release; + bool fixed; +}; + +struct ifconfig_pool +{ + in_addr_t base; + int size; + int type; + bool duplicate_cn; + bool ipv6; + struct in6_addr base_ipv6; + unsigned int size_ipv6; + struct ifconfig_pool_entry *list; +}; + +struct ifconfig_pool_persist +{ + struct status_output *file; + bool fixed; +}; + +typedef int ifconfig_pool_handle; + +struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool_init (int type, in_addr_t start, in_addr_t end, const bool duplicate_cn, const bool ipv6_pool, const struct in6_addr ipv6_base, const int ipv6_netbits ); + +void ifconfig_pool_free (struct ifconfig_pool *pool); + +bool ifconfig_pool_verify_range (const int msglevel, const in_addr_t start, const in_addr_t end); + +ifconfig_pool_handle ifconfig_pool_acquire (struct ifconfig_pool *pool, in_addr_t *local, in_addr_t *remote, struct in6_addr *remote_ipv6, const char *common_name); + +bool ifconfig_pool_release (struct ifconfig_pool* pool, ifconfig_pool_handle hand, const bool hard); + +struct ifconfig_pool_persist *ifconfig_pool_persist_init (const char *filename, int refresh_freq); +void ifconfig_pool_persist_close (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist); +bool ifconfig_pool_write_trigger (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist); + +void ifconfig_pool_read (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist, struct ifconfig_pool *pool); +void ifconfig_pool_write (struct ifconfig_pool_persist *persist, const struct ifconfig_pool *pool); + +#ifdef IFCONFIG_POOL_TEST +void ifconfig_pool_test (in_addr_t start, in_addr_t end); +#endif + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b437f1ad --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "proto.h" +#include "error.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * If raw tunnel packet is IPv, return true and increment + * buffer offset to start of IP header. + */ +static +bool +is_ipv_X ( int tunnel_type, struct buffer *buf, int ip_ver ) +{ + int offset; + const struct openvpn_iphdr *ih; + + verify_align_4 (buf); + if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + if (BLEN (buf) < (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr)) + return false; + offset = 0; + } + else if (tunnel_type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + const struct openvpn_ethhdr *eh; + if (BLEN (buf) < (int)(sizeof (struct openvpn_ethhdr) + + sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr))) + return false; + eh = (const struct openvpn_ethhdr *) BPTR (buf); + if (ntohs (eh->proto) != OPENVPN_ETH_P_IPV4) + return false; + offset = sizeof (struct openvpn_ethhdr); + } + else + return false; + + ih = (const struct openvpn_iphdr *) (BPTR (buf) + offset); + + /* IP version is stored in the same bits for IPv4 or IPv6 header */ + if (OPENVPN_IPH_GET_VER (ih->version_len) == ip_ver) + return buf_advance (buf, offset); + else + return false; +} + +bool +is_ipv4 (int tunnel_type, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return is_ipv_X( tunnel_type, buf, 4 ); +} +bool +is_ipv6 (int tunnel_type, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return is_ipv_X( tunnel_type, buf, 6 ); +} + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + +void +ipv4_packet_size_verify (const uint8_t *data, + const int size, + const int tunnel_type, + const char *prefix, + counter_type *errors) +{ + if (size > 0) + { + struct buffer buf; + + buf_set_read (&buf, data, size); + + if (is_ipv4 (tunnel_type, &buf)) + { + const struct openvpn_iphdr *pip; + int hlen; + int totlen; + const char *msgstr = "PACKET SIZE INFO"; + unsigned int msglevel = D_PACKET_TRUNC_DEBUG; + + if (BLEN (&buf) < (int) sizeof (struct openvpn_iphdr)) + return; + + verify_align_4 (&buf); + pip = (struct openvpn_iphdr *) BPTR (&buf); + + hlen = OPENVPN_IPH_GET_LEN (pip->version_len); + totlen = ntohs (pip->tot_len); + + if (BLEN (&buf) != totlen) + { + msgstr = "PACKET TRUNCATION ERROR"; + msglevel = D_PACKET_TRUNC_ERR; + if (errors) + ++(*errors); + } + + msg (msglevel, "%s %s: size=%d totlen=%d hlen=%d errcount=" counter_format, + msgstr, + prefix, + BLEN (&buf), + totlen, + hlen, + errors ? *errors : (counter_type)0); + } + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f91e787e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proto.h @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PROTO_H +#define PROTO_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "buffer.h" + +#pragma pack(1) + +/* + * Tunnel types + */ +#define DEV_TYPE_UNDEF 0 +#define DEV_TYPE_NULL 1 +#define DEV_TYPE_TUN 2 /* point-to-point IP tunnel */ +#define DEV_TYPE_TAP 3 /* ethernet (802.3) tunnel */ + +/* TUN topologies */ + +#define TOP_UNDEF 0 +#define TOP_NET30 1 +#define TOP_P2P 2 +#define TOP_SUBNET 3 + +/* + * IP and Ethernet protocol structs. For portability, + * OpenVPN needs its own definitions of these structs, and + * names have been adjusted to avoid collisions with + * native structs. + */ + +#define OPENVPN_ETH_ALEN 6 /* ethernet address length */ +struct openvpn_ethhdr +{ + uint8_t dest[OPENVPN_ETH_ALEN]; /* destination ethernet addr */ + uint8_t source[OPENVPN_ETH_ALEN]; /* source ethernet addr */ + +# define OPENVPN_ETH_P_IPV4 0x0800 /* IPv4 protocol */ +# define OPENVPN_ETH_P_IPV6 0x86DD /* IPv6 protocol */ +# define OPENVPN_ETH_P_ARP 0x0806 /* ARP protocol */ + uint16_t proto; /* packet type ID field */ +}; + +struct openvpn_arp { +# define ARP_MAC_ADDR_TYPE 0x0001 + uint16_t mac_addr_type; /* 0x0001 */ + + uint16_t proto_addr_type; /* 0x0800 */ + uint8_t mac_addr_size; /* 0x06 */ + uint8_t proto_addr_size; /* 0x04 */ + +# define ARP_REQUEST 0x0001 +# define ARP_REPLY 0x0002 + uint16_t arp_command; /* 0x0001 for ARP request, 0x0002 for ARP reply */ + + uint8_t mac_src[OPENVPN_ETH_ALEN]; + in_addr_t ip_src; + uint8_t mac_dest[OPENVPN_ETH_ALEN]; + in_addr_t ip_dest; +}; + +struct openvpn_iphdr { +# define OPENVPN_IPH_GET_VER(v) (((v) >> 4) & 0x0F) +# define OPENVPN_IPH_GET_LEN(v) (((v) & 0x0F) << 2) + uint8_t version_len; + + uint8_t tos; + uint16_t tot_len; + uint16_t id; + +# define OPENVPN_IP_OFFMASK 0x1fff + uint16_t frag_off; + + uint8_t ttl; + +# define OPENVPN_IPPROTO_IGMP 2 /* IGMP protocol */ +# define OPENVPN_IPPROTO_TCP 6 /* TCP protocol */ +# define OPENVPN_IPPROTO_UDP 17 /* UDP protocol */ + uint8_t protocol; + + uint16_t check; + uint32_t saddr; + uint32_t daddr; + /*The options start here. */ +}; + +/* + * IPv6 header + */ +struct openvpn_ipv6hdr { + uint8_t version_prio; + uint8_t flow_lbl[3]; + uint16_t payload_len; + uint8_t nexthdr; + uint8_t hop_limit; + + struct in6_addr saddr; + struct in6_addr daddr; +}; + + +/* + * UDP header + */ +struct openvpn_udphdr { + uint16_t source; + uint16_t dest; + uint16_t len; + uint16_t check; +}; + +/* + * TCP header, per RFC 793. + */ +struct openvpn_tcphdr { + uint16_t source; /* source port */ + uint16_t dest; /* destination port */ + uint32_t seq; /* sequence number */ + uint32_t ack_seq; /* acknowledgement number */ + +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_GET_DOFF(d) (((d) & 0xF0) >> 2) + uint8_t doff_res; + +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_FIN_MASK (1<<0) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_SYN_MASK (1<<1) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_RST_MASK (1<<2) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_PSH_MASK (1<<3) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_ACK_MASK (1<<4) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_URG_MASK (1<<5) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_ECE_MASK (1<<6) +# define OPENVPN_TCPH_CWR_MASK (1<<7) + uint8_t flags; + + uint16_t window; + uint16_t check; + uint16_t urg_ptr; +}; + +#define OPENVPN_TCPOPT_EOL 0 +#define OPENVPN_TCPOPT_NOP 1 +#define OPENVPN_TCPOPT_MAXSEG 2 +#define OPENVPN_TCPOLEN_MAXSEG 4 + +struct ip_tcp_udp_hdr { + struct openvpn_iphdr ip; + union { + struct openvpn_tcphdr tcp; + struct openvpn_udphdr udp; + } u; +}; + +#pragma pack() + +/* + * The following macro is used to update an + * internet checksum. "acc" is a 32-bit + * accumulation of all the changes to the + * checksum (adding in old 16-bit words and + * subtracting out new words), and "cksum" + * is the checksum value to be updated. + */ +#define ADJUST_CHECKSUM(acc, cksum) { \ + int _acc = acc; \ + _acc += (cksum); \ + if (_acc < 0) { \ + _acc = -_acc; \ + _acc = (_acc >> 16) + (_acc & 0xffff); \ + _acc += _acc >> 16; \ + (cksum) = (uint16_t) ~_acc; \ + } else { \ + _acc = (_acc >> 16) + (_acc & 0xffff); \ + _acc += _acc >> 16; \ + (cksum) = (uint16_t) _acc; \ + } \ +} + +#define ADD_CHECKSUM_32(acc, u32) { \ + acc += (u32) & 0xffff; \ + acc += (u32) >> 16; \ +} + +#define SUB_CHECKSUM_32(acc, u32) { \ + acc -= (u32) & 0xffff; \ + acc -= (u32) >> 16; \ +} + +/* + * We are in a "liberal" position with respect to MSS, + * i.e. we assume that MSS can be calculated from MTU + * by subtracting out only the IP and TCP header sizes + * without options. + * + * (RFC 879, section 7). + */ +#define MTU_TO_MSS(mtu) (mtu - sizeof(struct openvpn_iphdr) \ + - sizeof(struct openvpn_tcphdr)) + +/* + * If raw tunnel packet is IPv4 or IPv6, return true and increment + * buffer offset to start of IP header. + */ +bool is_ipv4 (int tunnel_type, struct buffer *buf); +bool is_ipv6 (int tunnel_type, struct buffer *buf); + +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK +void ipv4_packet_size_verify (const uint8_t *data, + const int size, + const int tunnel_type, + const char + *prefix, + counter_type *errors); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17748504 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,907 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "common.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "proxy.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "httpdigest.h" +#include "ntlm.h" +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + +#define UP_TYPE_PROXY "HTTP Proxy" + +struct http_proxy_options * +init_http_proxy_options_once (struct http_proxy_options **hpo, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (!*hpo) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (*hpo, struct http_proxy_options, gc); + /* http proxy defaults */ + (*hpo)->timeout = 5; + (*hpo)->http_version = "1.0"; + } + return *hpo; +} + + +/* cached proxy username/password */ +static struct user_pass static_proxy_user_pass; + +static bool +recv_line (socket_descriptor_t sd, + char *buf, + int len, + const int timeout_sec, + const bool verbose, + struct buffer *lookahead, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + struct buffer la; + int lastc = 0; + + CLEAR (la); + if (lookahead) + la = *lookahead; + + while (true) + { + int status; + ssize_t size; + fd_set reads; + struct timeval tv; + uint8_t c; + + if (buf_defined (&la)) + { + ASSERT (buf_init (&la, 0)); + } + + FD_ZERO (&reads); + FD_SET (sd, &reads); + tv.tv_sec = timeout_sec; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, &reads, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + goto error; + + /* timeout? */ + if (status == 0) + { + if (verbose) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_line: TCP port read timeout expired"); + goto error; + } + + /* error */ + if (status < 0) + { + if (verbose) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_line: TCP port read failed on select()"); + goto error; + } + + /* read single char */ + size = recv (sd, &c, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + /* error? */ + if (size != 1) + { + if (verbose) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_line: TCP port read failed on recv()"); + goto error; + } + +#if 0 + if (isprint(c)) + msg (M_INFO, "PROXY: read '%c' (%d)", c, (int)c); + else + msg (M_INFO, "PROXY: read (%d)", (int)c); +#endif + + /* store char in buffer */ + if (len > 1) + { + *buf++ = c; + --len; + } + + /* also store char in lookahead buffer */ + if (buf_defined (&la)) + { + buf_write_u8 (&la, c); + if (!isprint(c) && !isspace(c)) /* not ascii? */ + { + if (verbose) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_line: Non-ASCII character (%d) read on recv()", (int)c); + *lookahead = la; + return false; + } + } + + /* end of line? */ + if (lastc == '\r' && c == '\n') + break; + + lastc = c; + } + + /* append trailing null */ + if (len > 0) + *buf++ = '\0'; + + return true; + + error: + return false; +} + +static bool +send_line (socket_descriptor_t sd, + const char *buf) +{ + const ssize_t size = send (sd, buf, strlen (buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (size != (ssize_t) strlen (buf)) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "send_line: TCP port write failed on send()"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool +send_line_crlf (socket_descriptor_t sd, + const char *src) +{ + bool ret; + + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf (strlen (src) + 3); + ASSERT (buf_write (&buf, src, strlen (src))); + ASSERT (buf_write (&buf, "\r\n", 3)); + ret = send_line (sd, BSTR (&buf)); + free_buf (&buf); + return ret; +} + +static bool +send_crlf (socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + return send_line_crlf (sd, ""); +} + +uint8_t * +make_base64_string2 (const uint8_t *str, int src_len, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + uint8_t *ret = NULL; + char *b64out = NULL; + ASSERT (openvpn_base64_encode ((const void *)str, src_len, &b64out) >= 0); + ret = (uint8_t *) string_alloc (b64out, gc); + free (b64out); + return ret; +} + +uint8_t * +make_base64_string (const uint8_t *str, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return make_base64_string2 (str, strlen ((const char *)str), gc); +} + +static const char * +username_password_as_base64 (const struct http_proxy_info *p, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (strlen (p->up.username) + strlen (p->up.password) + 2, gc); + ASSERT (strlen (p->up.username) > 0); + buf_printf (&out, "%s:%s", p->up.username, p->up.password); + return (const char *)make_base64_string ((const uint8_t*)BSTR (&out), gc); +} + +static void +get_user_pass_http (struct http_proxy_info *p, const bool force) +{ + if (!static_proxy_user_pass.defined || force) + { + unsigned int flags = GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT; + if (p->queried_creds) + flags |= GET_USER_PASS_PREVIOUS_CREDS_FAILED; + get_user_pass (&static_proxy_user_pass, + p->options.auth_file, + UP_TYPE_PROXY, + flags); + p->queried_creds = true; + p->up = static_proxy_user_pass; + } +} +static void +clear_user_pass_http (void) +{ + purge_user_pass (&static_proxy_user_pass, true); +} + +static void +dump_residual (socket_descriptor_t sd, + int timeout, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char buf[256]; + while (true) + { + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof (buf), timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + return; + chomp (buf); + msg (D_PROXY, "PROXY HEADER: '%s'", buf); + } +} + +/* + * Extract the Proxy-Authenticate header from the stream. + * Consumes all headers. + */ +static int +get_proxy_authenticate (socket_descriptor_t sd, + int timeout, + char **data, + struct gc_arena *gc, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char buf[256]; + int ret = HTTP_AUTH_NONE; + while (true) + { + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof (buf), timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + { + *data = NULL; + return HTTP_AUTH_NONE; + } + chomp (buf); + if (!strlen(buf)) + return ret; + if (ret == HTTP_AUTH_NONE && !strncmp(buf, "Proxy-Authenticate: ", 20)) + { + if (!strncmp(buf+20, "Basic ", 6)) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "PROXY AUTH BASIC: '%s'", buf); + *data = string_alloc(buf+26, gc); + ret = HTTP_AUTH_BASIC; + } +#if PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH + else if (!strncmp(buf+20, "Digest ", 7)) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "PROXY AUTH DIGEST: '%s'", buf); + *data = string_alloc(buf+27, gc); + ret = HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST; + } +#endif +#if NTLM + else if (!strncmp(buf+20, "NTLM", 4)) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "PROXY AUTH HTLM: '%s'", buf); + *data = NULL; + ret = HTTP_AUTH_NTLM; + } +#endif + } + } +} + +static void +store_proxy_authenticate (struct http_proxy_info *p, char *data) +{ + if (p->proxy_authenticate) + free (p->proxy_authenticate); + p->proxy_authenticate = data; +} + +/* + * Parse out key/value pairs from Proxy-Authenticate string. + * Return true on success, or false on parse failure. + */ +static bool +get_key_value(const char *str, /* source string */ + char *key, /* key stored here */ + char *value, /* value stored here */ + int max_key_len, + int max_value_len, + const char **endptr) /* next search position */ +{ + int c; + bool starts_with_quote = false; + bool escape = false; + + for (c = max_key_len-1; (*str && (*str != '=') && c--); ) + *key++ = *str++; + *key = '\0'; + + if('=' != *str++) + /* no key/value found */ + return false; + + if('\"' == *str) + { + /* quoted string */ + str++; + starts_with_quote = true; + } + + for (c = max_value_len-1; *str && c--; str++) + { + switch (*str) + { + case '\\': + if (!escape) + { + /* possibly the start of an escaped quote */ + escape = true; + *value++ = '\\'; /* even though this is an escape character, we still + store it as-is in the target buffer */ + continue; + } + break; + case ',': + if (!starts_with_quote) + { + /* this signals the end of the value if we didn't get a starting quote + and then we do "sloppy" parsing */ + c=0; /* the end */ + continue; + } + break; + case '\r': + case '\n': + /* end of string */ + c=0; + continue; + case '\"': + if (!escape && starts_with_quote) + { + /* end of string */ + c=0; + continue; + } + break; + } + escape = false; + *value++ = *str; + } + *value = '\0'; + + *endptr = str; + + return true; /* success */ +} + +static char * +get_pa_var (const char *key, const char *pa, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char k[64]; + char v[256]; + const char *content = pa; + + while (true) + { + const int status = get_key_value(content, k, v, sizeof(k), sizeof(v), &content); + if (status) + { + if (!strcmp(key, k)) + return string_alloc(v, gc); + } + else + return NULL; + + /* advance to start of next key */ + if (*content == ',') + ++content; + while (*content && isspace(*content)) + ++content; + } +} + +struct http_proxy_info * +http_proxy_new (const struct http_proxy_options *o) +{ + struct http_proxy_info *p; + struct http_proxy_options opt; + + if (!o || !o->server) + msg (M_FATAL, "HTTP_PROXY: server not specified"); + + ASSERT ( o->port); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (p, struct http_proxy_info); + p->options = *o; + + /* parse authentication method */ + p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NONE; + if (o->auth_method_string) + { + if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "none")) + p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NONE; + else if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "basic")) + p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_BASIC; +#if NTLM + else if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "ntlm")) + p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NTLM; + else if (!strcmp (o->auth_method_string, "ntlm2")) + p->auth_method = HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2; +#endif + else + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: unknown HTTP authentication method: '%s'", + o->auth_method_string); + } + + /* only basic and NTLM/NTLMv2 authentication supported so far */ + if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2) + { + get_user_pass_http (p, true); + } + +#if !NTLM + if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2) + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, this version of " PACKAGE_NAME " was built without NTLM Proxy support."); +#endif + + p->defined = true; + return p; +} + +void +http_proxy_close (struct http_proxy_info *hp) +{ + free (hp); +} + +bool +establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, /* already open to proxy */ + const char *host, /* openvpn server remote */ + const char *port, /* openvpn server port */ + struct buffer *lookahead, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char buf[512]; + char buf2[128]; + char get[80]; + int status; + int nparms; + bool ret = false; + bool processed = false; + + /* get user/pass if not previously given */ + if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC + || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST + || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM) + get_user_pass_http (p, false); + + /* are we being called again after getting the digest server nonce in the previous transaction? */ + if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST && p->proxy_authenticate) + { + nparms = 1; + status = 407; + } + else + { + /* format HTTP CONNECT message */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%s HTTP/%s", + host, + port, + p->options.http_version); + + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + + /* send HTTP CONNECT message to proxy */ + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + openvpn_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Host: %s", host); + if (!send_line_crlf(sd, buf)) + goto error; + + /* send User-Agent string if provided */ + if (p->options.user_agent) + { + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "User-Agent: %s", + p->options.user_agent); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + } + + /* auth specified? */ + switch (p->auth_method) + { + case HTTP_AUTH_NONE: + break; + + case HTTP_AUTH_BASIC: + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s", + username_password_as_base64 (p, &gc)); + msg (D_PROXY, "Attempting Basic Proxy-Authorization"); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + break; + +#if NTLM + case HTTP_AUTH_NTLM: + case HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2: + /* keep-alive connection */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive"); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: NTLM %s", + ntlm_phase_1 (p, &gc)); + msg (D_PROXY, "Attempting NTLM Proxy-Authorization phase 1"); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEYS, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + break; +#endif + + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* send empty CR, LF */ + if (!send_crlf (sd)) + goto error; + + /* receive reply from proxy */ + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + + /* remove trailing CR, LF */ + chomp (buf); + + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy returned: '%s'", buf); + + /* parse return string */ + nparms = sscanf (buf, "%*s %d", &status); + + } + + /* check for a "407 Proxy Authentication Required" response */ + while (nparms >= 1 && status == 407) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "Proxy requires authentication"); + + if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC && !processed) + { + processed = true; + } + else if ((p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM || p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2) && !processed) /* check for NTLM */ + { +#if NTLM + /* look for the phase 2 response */ + + while (true) + { + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + chomp (buf); + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy returned: '%s'", buf); + + openvpn_snprintf (get, sizeof get, "%%*s NTLM %%%ds", (int) sizeof (buf2) - 1); + nparms = sscanf (buf, get, buf2); + buf2[127] = 0; /* we only need the beginning - ensure it's null terminated. */ + + /* check for "Proxy-Authenticate: NTLM TlRM..." */ + if (nparms == 1) + { + /* parse buf2 */ + msg (D_PROXY, "auth string: '%s'", buf2); + break; + } + } + /* if we are here then auth string was got */ + msg (D_PROXY, "Received NTLM Proxy-Authorization phase 2 response"); + + /* receive and discard everything else */ + while (recv_line (sd, NULL, 0, 2, true, NULL, signal_received)) + ; + + /* now send the phase 3 reply */ + + /* format HTTP CONNECT message */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%s HTTP/%s", + host, + port, + p->options.http_version); + + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + + /* send HTTP CONNECT message to proxy */ + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + /* keep-alive connection */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive"); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + + /* send HOST etc, */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Host: %s", host); + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + msg (D_PROXY, "Attempting NTLM Proxy-Authorization phase 3"); + { + const char *np3 = ntlm_phase_3 (p, buf2, &gc); + if (!np3) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "NTLM Proxy-Authorization phase 3 failed: received corrupted data from proxy server"); + goto error; + } + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: NTLM %s", np3); + } + + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + /* ok so far... */ + /* send empty CR, LF */ + if (!send_crlf (sd)) + goto error; + + /* receive reply from proxy */ + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + + /* remove trailing CR, LF */ + chomp (buf); + + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy returned: '%s'", buf); + + /* parse return string */ + nparms = sscanf (buf, "%*s %d", &status); + processed = true; +#endif + } +#if PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH + else if (p->auth_method == HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST && !processed) + { + char *pa = p->proxy_authenticate; + const int method = p->auth_method; + ASSERT(pa); + + if (method == HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST) + { + const char *http_method = "CONNECT"; + const char *nonce_count = "00000001"; + const char *qop = "auth"; + const char *username = p->up.username; + const char *password = p->up.password; + char *opaque_kv = ""; + char uri[128]; + uint8_t cnonce_raw[8]; + uint8_t *cnonce; + HASHHEX session_key; + HASHHEX response; + + const char *realm = get_pa_var("realm", pa, &gc); + const char *nonce = get_pa_var("nonce", pa, &gc); + const char *algor = get_pa_var("algorithm", pa, &gc); + const char *opaque = get_pa_var("opaque", pa, &gc); + + /* generate a client nonce */ + ASSERT(rand_bytes(cnonce_raw, sizeof(cnonce_raw))); + cnonce = make_base64_string2(cnonce_raw, sizeof(cnonce_raw), &gc); + + + /* build the digest response */ + openvpn_snprintf (uri, sizeof(uri), "%s:%s", + host, + port); + + if (opaque) + { + const int len = strlen(opaque)+16; + opaque_kv = gc_malloc(len, false, &gc); + openvpn_snprintf (opaque_kv, len, ", opaque=\"%s\"", opaque); + } + + DigestCalcHA1(algor, + username, + realm, + password, + nonce, + (char *)cnonce, + session_key); + DigestCalcResponse(session_key, + nonce, + nonce_count, + (char *)cnonce, + qop, + http_method, + uri, + NULL, + response); + + /* format HTTP CONNECT message */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s HTTP/%s", + http_method, + uri, + p->options.http_version); + + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + + /* send HTTP CONNECT message to proxy */ + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + /* send HOST etc, */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Host: %s", host); + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + + /* send digest response */ + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: Digest username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", qop=%s, nc=%s, cnonce=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"%s", + username, + realm, + nonce, + uri, + qop, + nonce_count, + cnonce, + response, + opaque_kv + ); + msg (D_PROXY, "Send to HTTP proxy: '%s'", buf); + if (!send_line_crlf (sd, buf)) + goto error; + if (!send_crlf (sd)) + goto error; + + /* receive reply from proxy */ + if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + + /* remove trailing CR, LF */ + chomp (buf); + + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy returned: '%s'", buf); + + /* parse return string */ + nparms = sscanf (buf, "%*s %d", &status); + processed = true; + } + else + { + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy: digest method not supported"); + goto error; + } + } +#endif + else if (p->options.auth_retry) + { + /* figure out what kind of authentication the proxy needs */ + char *pa = NULL; + const int method = get_proxy_authenticate(sd, + p->options.timeout, + &pa, + NULL, + signal_received); + if (method != HTTP_AUTH_NONE) + { + if (pa) + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy authenticate '%s'", pa); + if (p->options.auth_retry == PAR_NCT && method == HTTP_AUTH_BASIC) + { + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy: support for basic auth and other cleartext proxy auth methods is disabled"); + goto error; + } + p->auth_method = method; + store_proxy_authenticate(p, pa); + ret = true; + goto done; + } + else + { + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy: do not recognize the authentication method required by proxy"); + free (pa); + goto error; + } + } + else + { + if (!processed) + msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy: no support for proxy authentication method"); + goto error; + } + + /* clear state */ + if (p->options.auth_retry) + clear_user_pass_http(); + store_proxy_authenticate(p, NULL); + } + + /* check return code, success = 200 */ + if (nparms < 1 || status != 200) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "HTTP proxy returned bad status"); +#if 0 + /* DEBUGGING -- show a multi-line HTTP error response */ + dump_residual(sd, p->options.timeout, signal_received); +#endif + goto error; + } + + /* SUCCESS */ + + /* receive line from proxy and discard */ + if (!recv_line (sd, NULL, 0, p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + + /* + * Toss out any extraneous chars, but don't throw away the + * start of the OpenVPN data stream (put it in lookahead). + */ + while (recv_line (sd, NULL, 0, 2, false, lookahead, signal_received)) + ; + + /* reset queried_creds so that we don't think that the next creds request is due to an auth error */ + p->queried_creds = false; + +#if 0 + if (lookahead && BLEN (lookahead)) + msg (M_INFO, "HTTP PROXY: lookahead: %s", format_hex (BPTR (lookahead), BLEN (lookahead), 0)); +#endif + + done: + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; + + error: + /* on error, should we exit or restart? */ + if (!*signal_received) + *signal_received = (p->options.retry ? SIGUSR1 : SIGTERM); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- HTTP proxy error */ + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY */ + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d75e063 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/proxy.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PROXY_H +#define PROXY_H + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + +/* HTTP CONNECT authentication methods */ +#define HTTP_AUTH_NONE 0 +#define HTTP_AUTH_BASIC 1 +#define HTTP_AUTH_DIGEST 2 +#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM 3 +#define HTTP_AUTH_NTLM2 4 +#define HTTP_AUTH_N 5 /* number of HTTP_AUTH methods */ + +struct http_proxy_options { + const char *server; + const char *port; + bool retry; + int timeout; + +# define PAR_NO 0 /* don't support any auth retries */ +# define PAR_ALL 1 /* allow all proxy auth protocols */ +# define PAR_NCT 2 /* disable cleartext proxy auth protocols */ + int auth_retry; + + const char *auth_method_string; + const char *auth_file; + const char *http_version; + const char *user_agent; +}; + +struct http_proxy_options_simple { + const char *server; + const char *port; + int auth_retry; +}; + +struct http_proxy_info { + bool defined; + int auth_method; + struct http_proxy_options options; + struct user_pass up; + char *proxy_authenticate; + bool queried_creds; +}; + +struct http_proxy_options *init_http_proxy_options_once (struct http_proxy_options **hpo, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +struct http_proxy_info *http_proxy_new (const struct http_proxy_options *o); + +void http_proxy_close (struct http_proxy_info *hp); + +bool establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, /* already open to proxy */ + const char *host, /* openvpn server remote */ + const char *port, /* openvpn server port */ + struct buffer *lookahead, + volatile int *signal_received); + +uint8_t *make_base64_string2 (const uint8_t *str, int str_len, struct gc_arena *gc); +uint8_t *make_base64_string (const uint8_t *str, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif /* ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY */ + +#endif /* PROXY_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1868642 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.c @@ -0,0 +1,977 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if PORT_SHARE + +#include "event.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "ps.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +struct port_share *port_share = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* size of i/o buffers */ +#define PROXY_CONNECTION_BUFFER_SIZE 1500 + +/* Command codes for foreground -> background communication */ +#define COMMAND_REDIRECT 10 +#define COMMAND_EXIT 11 + +/* Response codes for background -> foreground communication */ +#define RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED 20 +#define RESPONSE_INIT_FAILED 21 + +/* + * Return values for proxy_connection_io functions + */ + +#define IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_READ 0 /* recv returned EAGAIN */ +#define IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_WRITE 1 /* send returned EAGAIN */ +#define IOSTAT_READ_ERROR 2 /* the other end of our read socket (pc) was closed */ +#define IOSTAT_WRITE_ERROR 3 /* the other end of our write socket (pc->counterpart) was closed */ +#define IOSTAT_GOOD 4 /* nothing to report */ + +/* + * A foreign (non-OpenVPN) connection we are proxying, + * usually HTTPS + */ +struct proxy_connection { + bool defined; + struct proxy_connection *next; + struct proxy_connection *counterpart; + struct buffer buf; + bool buffer_initial; + int rwflags; + int sd; + char *jfn; +}; + +#if 0 +static const char * +headc (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + static char foo[16]; + strncpy (foo, BSTR(buf), 15); + foo[15] = 0; + return foo; +} +#endif + +static inline void +close_socket_if_defined (const socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + if (socket_defined (sd)) + openvpn_close_socket (sd); +} + +/* + * Close most of parent's fds. + * Keep stdin/stdout/stderr, plus one + * other fd which is presumed to be + * our pipe back to parent. + * Admittedly, a bit of a kludge, + * but posix doesn't give us a kind + * of FD_CLOEXEC which will stop + * fds from crossing a fork(). + */ +static void +close_fds_except (int keep) +{ + socket_descriptor_t i; + closelog (); + for (i = 3; i <= 100; ++i) + { + if (i != keep) + openvpn_close_socket (i); + } +} + +/* + * Usually we ignore signals, because our parent will + * deal with them. + */ +static void +set_signals (void) +{ + signal (SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR1, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +} + +/* + * Socket read/write functions. + */ + +static int +recv_control (const socket_descriptor_t fd) +{ + unsigned char c; + const ssize_t size = read (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return c; + else + { + return -1; + } +} + +static int +send_control (const socket_descriptor_t fd, int code) +{ + unsigned char c = (unsigned char) code; + const ssize_t size = write (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return (int) size; + else + return -1; +} + +static int +cmsg_size () +{ + return CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(socket_descriptor_t)); +} + +/* + * Send a command (char), data (head), and a file descriptor (sd_send) to a local process + * over unix socket sd. Unfortunately, there's no portable way to send file descriptors + * to other processes, so this code, as well as its analog (control_message_from_parent below), + * is Linux-specific. This function runs in the context of the main process and is used to + * send commands, data, and file descriptors to the background process. + */ +static void +port_share_sendmsg (const socket_descriptor_t sd, + const char command, + const struct buffer *head, + const socket_descriptor_t sd_send) +{ + if (socket_defined (sd)) + { + struct msghdr mesg; + struct cmsghdr* h; + struct iovec iov[2]; + socket_descriptor_t sd_null[2] = { SOCKET_UNDEFINED, SOCKET_UNDEFINED }; + char cmd; + ssize_t status; + + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE: sendmsg sd=%d len=%d", + (int)sd_send, + head ? BLEN(head) : -1); + + CLEAR (mesg); + + cmd = command; + + iov[0].iov_base = &cmd; + iov[0].iov_len = sizeof (cmd); + mesg.msg_iovlen = 1; + + if (head) + { + iov[1].iov_base = BPTR (head); + iov[1].iov_len = BLEN (head); + mesg.msg_iovlen = 2; + } + + mesg.msg_iov = iov; + + mesg.msg_controllen = cmsg_size (); + mesg.msg_control = (char *) malloc (mesg.msg_controllen); + check_malloc_return (mesg.msg_control); + mesg.msg_flags = 0; + + h = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&mesg); + h->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + h->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + h->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(socket_descriptor_t)); + + if (socket_defined (sd_send)) + { + *((socket_descriptor_t*)CMSG_DATA(h)) = sd_send; + } + else + { + socketpair (PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sd_null); + *((socket_descriptor_t*)CMSG_DATA(h)) = sd_null[0]; + } + + status = sendmsg (sd, &mesg, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (status == -1) + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "PORT SHARE: sendmsg failed -- unable to communicate with background process (%d,%d,%d,%d)", + sd, sd_send, sd_null[0], sd_null[1] + ); + + close_socket_if_defined (sd_null[0]); + close_socket_if_defined (sd_null[1]); + free (mesg.msg_control); + } +} + +static void +proxy_entry_close_sd (struct proxy_connection *pc, struct event_set *es) +{ + if (pc->defined && socket_defined (pc->sd)) + { + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: delete sd=%d", (int)pc->sd); + if (es) + event_del (es, pc->sd); + openvpn_close_socket (pc->sd); + pc->sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + } +} + +/* + * Mark a proxy entry and its counterpart for close. + */ +static void +proxy_entry_mark_for_close (struct proxy_connection *pc, struct event_set *es) +{ + if (pc->defined) + { + struct proxy_connection *cp = pc->counterpart; + proxy_entry_close_sd (pc, es); + free_buf (&pc->buf); + pc->buffer_initial = false; + pc->rwflags = 0; + pc->defined = false; + if (pc->jfn) + { + unlink (pc->jfn); + free (pc->jfn); + pc->jfn = NULL; + } + if (cp && cp->defined && cp->counterpart == pc) + proxy_entry_mark_for_close (cp, es); + } +} + +/* + * Run through the proxy entry list and delete all entries marked + * for close. + */ +static void +proxy_list_housekeeping (struct proxy_connection **list) +{ + if (list) + { + struct proxy_connection *prev = NULL; + struct proxy_connection *pc = *list; + + while (pc) + { + struct proxy_connection *next = pc->next; + if (!pc->defined) + { + free (pc); + if (prev) + prev->next = next; + else + *list = next; + } + else + prev = pc; + pc = next; + } + } +} + +/* + * Record IP/port of client in filesystem, so that server receiving + * the proxy can determine true client origin. + */ +static void +journal_add (const char *journal_dir, struct proxy_connection *pc, struct proxy_connection *cp) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct openvpn_sockaddr from, to; + socklen_t slen, dlen; + int fnlen; + char *jfn; + int fd; + + slen = sizeof(from.addr.sa); + dlen = sizeof(to.addr.sa); + if (!getpeername (pc->sd, (struct sockaddr *) &from.addr.sa, &slen) + && !getsockname (cp->sd, (struct sockaddr *) &to.addr.sa, &dlen)) + { + const char *f = print_openvpn_sockaddr (&from, &gc); + const char *t = print_openvpn_sockaddr (&to, &gc); + fnlen = strlen(journal_dir) + strlen(t) + 2; + jfn = (char *) malloc(fnlen); + check_malloc_return (jfn); + openvpn_snprintf (jfn, fnlen, "%s/%s", journal_dir, t); + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: client origin %s -> %s", jfn, f); + fd = platform_open (jfn, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP); + if (fd != -1) + { + write(fd, f, strlen(f)); + close (fd); + cp->jfn = jfn; + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "PORT SHARE: unable to write journal file in %s", jfn); + free (jfn); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Cleanup function, on proxy process exit. + */ +static void +proxy_list_close (struct proxy_connection **list) +{ + if (list) + { + struct proxy_connection *pc = *list; + while (pc) + { + proxy_entry_mark_for_close (pc, NULL); + pc = pc->next; + } + proxy_list_housekeeping (list); + } +} + +static void +sock_addr_set (struct openvpn_sockaddr *osaddr, + const in_addr_t addr, + const int port) +{ + CLEAR (*osaddr); + osaddr->addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; + osaddr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (addr); + osaddr->addr.in4.sin_port = htons (port); +} + +static inline void +proxy_connection_io_requeue (struct proxy_connection *pc, const int rwflags_new, struct event_set *es) +{ + if (socket_defined (pc->sd) && pc->rwflags != rwflags_new) + { + /*dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: requeue[%d] rwflags=%d", (int)pc->sd, rwflags_new);*/ + event_ctl (es, pc->sd, rwflags_new, (void*)pc); + pc->rwflags = rwflags_new; + } +} + +/* + * Create a new pair of proxy_connection entries, one for each + * socket file descriptor involved in the proxy. We are given + * the client fd, and we should derive our own server fd by connecting + * to the server given by server_addr/server_port. Return true + * on success and false on failure to connect to server. + */ +static bool +proxy_entry_new (struct proxy_connection **list, + struct event_set *es, + const struct sockaddr_in server_addr, + const socket_descriptor_t sd_client, + struct buffer *initial_data, + const char *journal_dir) +{ + struct openvpn_sockaddr osaddr; + socket_descriptor_t sd_server; + int status; + struct proxy_connection *pc; + struct proxy_connection *cp; + + /* connect to port share server */ + osaddr.addr.in4 = server_addr; + if ((sd_server = socket (PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "PORT SHARE PROXY: cannot create socket"); + return false; + } + status = openvpn_connect (sd_server, &osaddr, 5, NULL); + if (status) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PORT SHARE PROXY: connect to port-share server failed"); + openvpn_close_socket (sd_server); + return false; + } + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: connect to port-share server succeeded"); + + set_nonblock (sd_client); + set_nonblock (sd_server); + + /* allocate 2 new proxy_connection objects */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (pc, struct proxy_connection); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (cp, struct proxy_connection); + + /* client object */ + pc->defined = true; + pc->next = cp; + pc->counterpart = cp; + pc->buf = *initial_data; + pc->buffer_initial = true; + pc->rwflags = EVENT_UNDEF; + pc->sd = sd_client; + + /* server object */ + cp->defined = true; + cp->next = *list; + cp->counterpart = pc; + cp->buf = alloc_buf (PROXY_CONNECTION_BUFFER_SIZE); + cp->buffer_initial = false; + cp->rwflags = EVENT_UNDEF; + cp->sd = sd_server; + + /* add to list */ + *list = pc; + + /* add journal entry */ + if (journal_dir) + journal_add (journal_dir, pc, cp); + + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: NEW CONNECTION [c=%d s=%d]", (int)sd_client, (int)sd_server); + + /* set initial i/o states */ + proxy_connection_io_requeue (pc, EVENT_READ, es); + proxy_connection_io_requeue (cp, EVENT_READ|EVENT_WRITE, es); + + return true; +} + +/* + * This function runs in the context of the background proxy process. + * Receive a control message from the parent (sent by the port_share_sendmsg + * function above) and act on it. Return false if the proxy process should + * exit, true otherwise. + */ +static bool +control_message_from_parent (const socket_descriptor_t sd_control, + struct proxy_connection **list, + struct event_set *es, + const struct sockaddr_in server_addr, + const int max_initial_buf, + const char *journal_dir) +{ + /* this buffer needs to be large enough to handle the largest buffer + that might be returned by the link_socket_read call in read_incoming_link. */ + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf (max_initial_buf); + + struct msghdr mesg; + struct cmsghdr* h; + struct iovec iov[2]; + char command = 0; + ssize_t status; + int ret = true; + + CLEAR (mesg); + + iov[0].iov_base = &command; + iov[0].iov_len = sizeof (command); + iov[1].iov_base = BPTR (&buf); + iov[1].iov_len = BCAP (&buf); + mesg.msg_iov = iov; + mesg.msg_iovlen = 2; + + mesg.msg_controllen = cmsg_size (); + mesg.msg_control = (char *) malloc (mesg.msg_controllen); + check_malloc_return (mesg.msg_control); + mesg.msg_flags = 0; + + h = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&mesg); + h->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(socket_descriptor_t)); + h->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + h->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + *((socket_descriptor_t*)CMSG_DATA(h)) = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + + status = recvmsg (sd_control, &mesg, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (status != -1) + { + if ( h == NULL + || h->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(socket_descriptor_t)) + || h->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET + || h->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS ) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PORT SHARE PROXY: received unknown message"); + } + else + { + const socket_descriptor_t received_fd = *((socket_descriptor_t*)CMSG_DATA(h)); + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: RECEIVED sd=%d", (int)received_fd); + + if (status >= 2 && command == COMMAND_REDIRECT) + { + buf.len = status - 1; + if (proxy_entry_new (list, + es, + server_addr, + received_fd, + &buf, + journal_dir)) + { + CLEAR (buf); /* we gave the buffer to proxy_entry_new */ + } + else + { + openvpn_close_socket (received_fd); + } + } + else if (status >= 1 && command == COMMAND_EXIT) + { + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: RECEIVED COMMAND_EXIT"); + openvpn_close_socket (received_fd); /* null socket */ + ret = false; + } + } + } + free (mesg.msg_control); + free_buf (&buf); + return ret; +} + +static int +proxy_connection_io_recv (struct proxy_connection *pc) +{ + /* recv data from socket */ + const int status = recv (pc->sd, BPTR(&pc->buf), BCAP(&pc->buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (status < 0) + { + return (errno == EAGAIN) ? IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_READ : IOSTAT_READ_ERROR; + } + else + { + if (!status) + return IOSTAT_READ_ERROR; + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: read[%d] %d", (int)pc->sd, status); + pc->buf.len = status; + } + return IOSTAT_GOOD; +} + +static int +proxy_connection_io_send (struct proxy_connection *pc, int *bytes_sent) +{ + const socket_descriptor_t sd = pc->counterpart->sd; + const int status = send (sd, BPTR(&pc->buf), BLEN(&pc->buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + if (status < 0) + { + const int e = errno; + return (e == EAGAIN) ? IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_WRITE : IOSTAT_WRITE_ERROR; + } + else + { + *bytes_sent += status; + if (status != pc->buf.len) + { + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: partial write[%d], tried=%d got=%d", (int)sd, pc->buf.len, status); + buf_advance (&pc->buf, status); + return IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_WRITE; + } + else + { + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: wrote[%d] %d", (int)sd, status); + pc->buf.len = 0; + pc->buf.offset = 0; + } + } + + /* realloc send buffer after initial send */ + if (pc->buffer_initial) + { + free_buf (&pc->buf); + pc->buf = alloc_buf (PROXY_CONNECTION_BUFFER_SIZE); + pc->buffer_initial = false; + } + return IOSTAT_GOOD; +} + +/* + * Forward data from pc to pc->counterpart. + */ + +static int +proxy_connection_io_xfer (struct proxy_connection *pc, const int max_transfer) +{ + int transferred = 0; + while (transferred < max_transfer) + { + if (!BLEN (&pc->buf)) + { + const int status = proxy_connection_io_recv (pc); + if (status != IOSTAT_GOOD) + return status; + } + + if (BLEN (&pc->buf)) + { + const int status = proxy_connection_io_send (pc, &transferred); + if (status != IOSTAT_GOOD) + return status; + } + } + return IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_READ; +} + +/* + * Decide how the receipt of an EAGAIN status should affect our next IO queueing. + */ +static bool +proxy_connection_io_status (const int status, int *rwflags_pc, int *rwflags_cp) +{ + switch (status) + { + case IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_READ: + *rwflags_pc |= EVENT_READ; + *rwflags_cp &= ~EVENT_WRITE; + return true; + case IOSTAT_EAGAIN_ON_WRITE: + *rwflags_pc &= ~EVENT_READ; + *rwflags_cp |= EVENT_WRITE; + return true; + case IOSTAT_READ_ERROR: + return false; + case IOSTAT_WRITE_ERROR: + return false; + default: + msg (M_FATAL, "PORT SHARE PROXY: unexpected status=%d", status); + } + return false; /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Dispatch function for forwarding data between the two socket fds involved + * in the proxied connection. + */ +static int +proxy_connection_io_dispatch (struct proxy_connection *pc, + const int rwflags, + struct event_set *es) +{ + const int max_transfer_per_iteration = 10000; + struct proxy_connection *cp = pc->counterpart; + int rwflags_pc = pc->rwflags; + int rwflags_cp = cp->rwflags; + + ASSERT(pc->defined && cp->defined && cp->counterpart == pc); + + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + { + const int status = proxy_connection_io_xfer (pc, max_transfer_per_iteration); + if (!proxy_connection_io_status (status, &rwflags_pc, &rwflags_cp)) + goto bad; + } + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + { + const int status = proxy_connection_io_xfer (cp, max_transfer_per_iteration); + if (!proxy_connection_io_status (status, &rwflags_cp, &rwflags_pc)) + goto bad; + } + proxy_connection_io_requeue (pc, rwflags_pc, es); + proxy_connection_io_requeue (cp, rwflags_cp, es); + + return true; + + bad: + proxy_entry_mark_for_close (pc, es); + return false; +} + +/* + * This is the main function for the port share proxy background process. + */ +static void +port_share_proxy (const struct sockaddr_in hostaddr, + const socket_descriptor_t sd_control, + const int max_initial_buf, + const char *journal_dir) +{ + if (send_control (sd_control, RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) >= 0) + { + void *sd_control_marker = (void *)1; + int maxevents = 256; + struct event_set *es; + struct event_set_return esr[64]; + struct proxy_connection *list = NULL; + time_t last_housekeeping = 0; + + msg (D_PS_PROXY, "PORT SHARE PROXY: proxy starting"); + + es = event_set_init (&maxevents, 0); + event_ctl (es, sd_control, EVENT_READ, sd_control_marker); + while (true) + { + int n_events; + struct timeval tv; + time_t current; + + tv.tv_sec = 10; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + n_events = event_wait (es, &tv, esr, SIZE(esr)); + /*dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: event_wait returned %d", n_events);*/ + current = time(NULL); + if (n_events > 0) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < n_events; ++i) + { + const struct event_set_return *e = &esr[i]; + if (e->arg == sd_control_marker) + { + if (!control_message_from_parent (sd_control, &list, es, hostaddr, max_initial_buf, journal_dir)) + goto done; + } + else + { + struct proxy_connection *pc = (struct proxy_connection *)e->arg; + if (pc->defined) + proxy_connection_io_dispatch (pc, e->rwflags, es); + } + } + } + else if (n_events < 0) + { + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE PROXY: event_wait failed"); + } + if (current > last_housekeeping) + { + proxy_list_housekeeping (&list); + last_housekeeping = current; + } + } + + done: + proxy_list_close (&list); + event_free (es); + } + msg (M_INFO, "PORT SHARE PROXY: proxy exiting"); +} + +/* + * Called from the main OpenVPN process to enable the port + * share proxy. + */ +struct port_share * +port_share_open (const char *host, + const char *port, + const int max_initial_buf, + const char *journal_dir) +{ + pid_t pid; + socket_descriptor_t fd[2]; + struct sockaddr_in hostaddr; + struct port_share *ps; + int status; + struct addrinfo* ai; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ps, struct port_share); + ps->foreground_fd = -1; + ps->background_pid = -1; + + /* + * Get host's IP address + */ + + status = openvpn_getaddrinfo (GETADDR_RESOLVE|GETADDR_HOST_ORDER|GETADDR_FATAL, + host, port, 0, NULL, AF_INET, &ai); + ASSERT (status==0); + hostaddr = *((struct sockaddr_in*) ai->ai_addr); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + + /* + * Make a socket for foreground and background processes + * to communicate. + */ + if (socketpair (PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd) == -1) + { + msg (M_WARN, "PORT SHARE: socketpair call failed"); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Fork off background proxy process. + */ + pid = fork (); + + if (pid) + { + int status; + + /* + * Foreground Process + */ + + ps->background_pid = pid; + + /* close our copy of child's socket */ + openvpn_close_socket (fd[1]); + + /* don't let future subprocesses inherit child socket */ + set_cloexec (fd[0]); + + /* wait for background child process to initialize */ + status = recv_control (fd[0]); + if (status == RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) + { + /* note that this will cause possible EAGAIN when writing to + control socket if proxy process is backlogged */ + set_nonblock (fd[0]); + + ps->foreground_fd = fd[0]; + return ps; + } + else + { + msg (M_ERR, "PORT SHARE: unexpected init recv_control status=%d", status); + } + } + else + { + /* + * Background Process + */ + + /* Ignore most signals (the parent will receive them) */ + set_signals (); + + /* Let msg know that we forked */ + msg_forked (); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + /* Don't interact with management interface */ + management = NULL; +#endif + + /* close all parent fds except our socket back to parent */ + close_fds_except (fd[1]); + + /* no blocking on control channel back to parent */ + set_nonblock (fd[1]); + + /* initialize prng */ + prng_init (NULL, 0); + + /* execute the event loop */ + port_share_proxy (hostaddr, fd[1], max_initial_buf, journal_dir); + + openvpn_close_socket (fd[1]); + + exit (0); + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + error: + port_share_close (ps); + return NULL; +} + +void +port_share_close (struct port_share *ps) +{ + if (ps) + { + if (ps->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + /* tell background process to exit */ + port_share_sendmsg (ps->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT, NULL, SOCKET_UNDEFINED); + + /* wait for background process to exit */ + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE: waiting for background process to exit"); + if (ps->background_pid > 0) + waitpid (ps->background_pid, NULL, 0); + dmsg (D_PS_PROXY_DEBUG, "PORT SHARE: background process exited"); + + openvpn_close_socket (ps->foreground_fd); + ps->foreground_fd = -1; + } + + free (ps); + } +} + +void +port_share_abort (struct port_share *ps) +{ + if (ps) + { + /* tell background process to exit */ + if (ps->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + send_control (ps->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT); + openvpn_close_socket (ps->foreground_fd); + ps->foreground_fd = -1; + } + } +} + +/* + * Given either the first 2 or 3 bytes of an initial client -> server + * data payload, return true if the protocol is that of an OpenVPN + * client attempting to connect with an OpenVPN server. + */ +bool +is_openvpn_protocol (const struct buffer *buf) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) BSTR (buf); + const int len = BLEN (buf); + if (len >= 3) + { + return p[0] == 0 + && p[1] >= 14 + && p[2] == (P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2<= 2) + { + return p[0] == 0 && p[1] >= 14; + } + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Called from the foreground process. Send a message to the background process that it + * should proxy the TCP client on sd to the host/port defined in the initial port_share_open + * call. + */ +void +port_share_redirect (struct port_share *ps, const struct buffer *head, socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + if (ps) + { + port_share_sendmsg (ps->foreground_fd, COMMAND_REDIRECT, head, sd); + } +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8919d48 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ps.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PS_H +#define PS_H + +#if PORT_SHARE + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "ssl.h" + +typedef void (*post_fork_cleanup_func_t)(void *arg); + +struct port_share { + /* Foreground's socket to background process */ + socket_descriptor_t foreground_fd; + + /* Process ID of background process */ + pid_t background_pid; +}; + +extern struct port_share *port_share; + +struct port_share *port_share_open (const char *host, + const char *port, + const int max_initial_buf, + const char *journal_dir); + +void port_share_close (struct port_share *ps); +void port_share_abort (struct port_share *ps); + +bool is_openvpn_protocol (const struct buffer *buf); + +void port_share_redirect (struct port_share *ps, const struct buffer *head, socket_descriptor_t sd); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..994b7ba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.c @@ -0,0 +1,551 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "push.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "manage.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#if P2MP + +/* + * Auth username/password + * + * Client received an authentication failed message from server. + * Runs on client. + */ +void +receive_auth_failed (struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer) +{ + msg (M_VERB0, "AUTH: Received control message: %s", BSTR(buffer)); + c->options.no_advance=true; + if (c->options.pull) + { + switch (auth_retry_get ()) + { + case AR_NONE: + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; /* SOFT-SIGTERM -- Auth failure error */ + break; + case AR_INTERACT: + ssl_purge_auth (false); + case AR_NOINTERACT: + c->sig->signal_received = SIGUSR1; /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- Auth failure error */ + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + c->sig->signal_text = "auth-failure"; +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + const char *reason = NULL; + struct buffer buf = *buffer; + if (buf_string_compare_advance (&buf, "AUTH_FAILED,") && BLEN (&buf)) + reason = BSTR (&buf); + management_auth_failure (management, UP_TYPE_AUTH, reason); + } else +#endif + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + struct buffer buf = *buffer; + if (buf_string_match_head_str (&buf, "AUTH_FAILED,CRV1:") && BLEN (&buf)) + { + buf_advance (&buf, 12); /* Length of "AUTH_FAILED," substring */ + ssl_put_auth_challenge (BSTR (&buf)); + } +#endif + } + } +} + +/* + * Act on received restart message from server + */ +void +server_pushed_signal (struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer, const bool restart, const int adv) +{ + if (c->options.pull) + { + struct buffer buf = *buffer; + const char *m = ""; + if (buf_advance (&buf, adv) && buf_read_u8 (&buf) == ',' && BLEN (&buf)) + m = BSTR (&buf); + + /* preserve cached passwords? */ + { + bool purge = true; + + if (m[0] == '[') + { + int i; + for (i = 1; m[i] != '\0' && m[i] != ']'; ++i) + { + if (m[i] == 'P') + purge = false; + } + } + if (purge) + ssl_purge_auth (true); + } + + if (restart) + { + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Connection reset command was pushed by server ('%s')", m); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGUSR1; /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- server-pushed connection reset */ + c->sig->signal_text = "server-pushed-connection-reset"; + } + else + { + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Halt command was pushed by server ('%s')", m); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; /* SOFT-SIGTERM -- server-pushed halt */ + c->sig->signal_text = "server-pushed-halt"; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_notify (management, "info", c->sig->signal_text, m); +#endif + } +} + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +/* + * Send auth failed message from server to client. + */ +void +send_auth_failed (struct context *c, const char *client_reason) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + static const char auth_failed[] = "AUTH_FAILED"; + size_t len; + + schedule_exit (c, c->options.scheduled_exit_interval, SIGTERM); + + len = (client_reason ? strlen(client_reason)+1 : 0) + sizeof(auth_failed); + if (len > PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE) + len = PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE; + + { + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc (len, &gc); + buf_printf (&buf, auth_failed); + if (client_reason) + buf_printf (&buf, ",%s", client_reason); + send_control_channel_string (c, BSTR (&buf), D_PUSH); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Send restart message from server to client. + */ +void +send_restart (struct context *c, const char *kill_msg) +{ + schedule_exit (c, c->options.scheduled_exit_interval, SIGTERM); + send_control_channel_string (c, kill_msg ? kill_msg : "RESTART", D_PUSH); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Push/Pull + */ + +void +incoming_push_message (struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + unsigned int option_types_found = 0; + int status; + + msg (D_PUSH, "PUSH: Received control message: '%s'", sanitize_control_message(BSTR(buffer), &gc)); + + status = process_incoming_push_msg (c, + buffer, + c->options.pull, + pull_permission_mask (c), + &option_types_found); + + if (status == PUSH_MSG_ERROR) + msg (D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received bad push/pull message: %s", sanitize_control_message(BSTR(buffer), &gc)); + else if (status == PUSH_MSG_REPLY || status == PUSH_MSG_CONTINUATION) + { + if (status == PUSH_MSG_REPLY) + do_up (c, true, option_types_found); /* delay bringing tun/tap up until --push parms received from remote */ + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.push_request_interval); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +bool +send_push_request (struct context *c) +{ + const int max_push_requests = c->options.handshake_window / PUSH_REQUEST_INTERVAL; + if (++c->c2.n_sent_push_requests <= max_push_requests) + { + return send_control_channel_string (c, "PUSH_REQUEST", D_PUSH); + } + else + { + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "No reply from server after sending %d push requests", max_push_requests); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGUSR1; /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- server-pushed connection reset */ + c->sig->signal_text = "no-push-reply"; + return false; + } +} + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +bool +send_push_reply (struct context *c) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc (PUSH_BUNDLE_SIZE, &gc); + struct push_entry *e = c->options.push_list.head; + bool multi_push = false; + static char cmd[] = "PUSH_REPLY"; + const int extra = 84; /* extra space for possible trailing ifconfig and push-continuation */ + const int safe_cap = BCAP (&buf) - extra; + bool push_sent = false; + + msg( M_INFO, "send_push_reply(): safe_cap=%d", safe_cap ); + + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", cmd); + + if ( c->c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_defined ) + { + /* IPv6 is put into buffer first, could be lengthy */ + buf_printf( &buf, ",ifconfig-ipv6 %s/%d %s", + print_in6_addr( c->c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_local, 0, &gc), + c->c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_netbits, + print_in6_addr( c->c2.push_ifconfig_ipv6_remote, 0, &gc) ); + if (BLEN (&buf) >= safe_cap) + { + msg (M_WARN, "--push ifconfig-ipv6 option is too long"); + goto fail; + } + } + + while (e) + { + if (e->enable) + { + const int l = strlen (e->option); + if (BLEN (&buf) + l >= safe_cap) + { + buf_printf (&buf, ",push-continuation 2"); + { + const bool status = send_control_channel_string (c, BSTR (&buf), D_PUSH); + if (!status) + goto fail; + push_sent = true; + multi_push = true; + buf_reset_len (&buf); + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", cmd); + } + } + if (BLEN (&buf) + l >= safe_cap) + { + msg (M_WARN, "--push option is too long"); + goto fail; + } + buf_printf (&buf, ",%s", e->option); + } + e = e->next; + } + + if (c->c2.push_ifconfig_defined && c->c2.push_ifconfig_local && c->c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask) + { + in_addr_t ifconfig_local = c->c2.push_ifconfig_local; +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + if (c->c2.push_ifconfig_local_alias) + ifconfig_local = c->c2.push_ifconfig_local_alias; +#endif + buf_printf (&buf, ",ifconfig %s %s", + print_in_addr_t (ifconfig_local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (c->c2.push_ifconfig_remote_netmask, 0, &gc)); + } + if (multi_push) + buf_printf (&buf, ",push-continuation 1"); + + if (BLEN (&buf) > sizeof(cmd)-1) + { + const bool status = send_control_channel_string (c, BSTR (&buf), D_PUSH); + if (!status) + goto fail; + push_sent = true; + } + + /* If nothing have been pushed, send an empty push, + * as the client is expecting a response + */ + if (!push_sent) + { + bool status = false; + + buf_reset_len (&buf); + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", cmd); + status = send_control_channel_string (c, BSTR(&buf), D_PUSH); + if (!status) + goto fail; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + + fail: + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +static void +push_option_ex (struct options *o, const char *opt, bool enable, int msglevel) +{ + if (!string_class (opt, CC_ANY, CC_COMMA)) + { + msg (msglevel, "PUSH OPTION FAILED (illegal comma (',') in string): '%s'", opt); + } + else + { + struct push_entry *e; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (e, struct push_entry, &o->gc); + e->enable = true; + e->option = opt; + if (o->push_list.head) + { + ASSERT(o->push_list.tail); + o->push_list.tail->next = e; + o->push_list.tail = e; + } + else + { + ASSERT(!o->push_list.tail); + o->push_list.head = e; + o->push_list.tail = e; + } + } +} + +void +push_option (struct options *o, const char *opt, int msglevel) +{ + push_option_ex (o, opt, true, msglevel); +} + +void +clone_push_list (struct options *o) +{ + if (o->push_list.head) + { + const struct push_entry *e = o->push_list.head; + push_reset (o); + while (e) + { + push_option_ex (o, string_alloc (e->option, &o->gc), true, M_FATAL); + e = e->next; + } + } +} + +void +push_options (struct options *o, char **p, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const char **argv = make_extended_arg_array (p, gc); + char *opt = print_argv (argv, gc, 0); + push_option (o, opt, msglevel); +} + +void +push_reset (struct options *o) +{ + CLEAR (o->push_list); +} +#endif + +int +process_incoming_push_msg (struct context *c, + const struct buffer *buffer, + bool honor_received_options, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found) +{ + int ret = PUSH_MSG_ERROR; + struct buffer buf = *buffer; + +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (buf_string_compare_advance (&buf, "PUSH_REQUEST")) + { + if (tls_authentication_status (c->c2.tls_multi, 0) == TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED || c->c2.context_auth == CAS_FAILED) + { + const char *client_reason = tls_client_reason (c->c2.tls_multi); + send_auth_failed (c, client_reason); + ret = PUSH_MSG_AUTH_FAILURE; + } + else if (!c->c2.push_reply_deferred && c->c2.context_auth == CAS_SUCCEEDED) + { + time_t now; + + openvpn_time(&now); + if (c->c2.sent_push_reply_expiry > now) + { + ret = PUSH_MSG_ALREADY_REPLIED; + } + else + { + if (send_push_reply (c)) + { + ret = PUSH_MSG_REQUEST; + c->c2.sent_push_reply_expiry = now + 30; + } + } + } + else + { + ret = PUSH_MSG_REQUEST_DEFERRED; + } + } + else +#endif + + if (honor_received_options && buf_string_compare_advance (&buf, "PUSH_REPLY")) + { + const uint8_t ch = buf_read_u8 (&buf); + if (ch == ',') + { + struct buffer buf_orig = buf; + if (!c->c2.pulled_options_md5_init_done) + { + md5_state_init (&c->c2.pulled_options_state); + c->c2.pulled_options_md5_init_done = true; + } + if (!c->c2.did_pre_pull_restore) + { + pre_pull_restore (&c->options); + c->c2.did_pre_pull_restore = true; + } + if (apply_push_options (&c->options, + &buf, + permission_mask, + option_types_found, + c->c2.es)) + switch (c->options.push_continuation) + { + case 0: + case 1: + md5_state_update (&c->c2.pulled_options_state, BPTR(&buf_orig), BLEN(&buf_orig)); + md5_state_final (&c->c2.pulled_options_state, &c->c2.pulled_options_digest); + c->c2.pulled_options_md5_init_done = false; + ret = PUSH_MSG_REPLY; + break; + case 2: + md5_state_update (&c->c2.pulled_options_state, BPTR(&buf_orig), BLEN(&buf_orig)); + ret = PUSH_MSG_CONTINUATION; + break; + } + } + else if (ch == '\0') + { + ret = PUSH_MSG_REPLY; + } + /* show_settings (&c->options); */ + } + return ret; +} + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +/* + * Remove iroutes from the push_list. + */ +void +remove_iroutes_from_push_route_list (struct options *o) +{ + if (o && o->push_list.head && o->iroutes) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct push_entry *e = o->push_list.head; + + /* cycle through the push list */ + while (e) + { + char *p[MAX_PARMS]; + bool enable = true; + + /* parse the push item */ + CLEAR (p); + if (parse_line (e->option, p, SIZE (p), "[PUSH_ROUTE_REMOVE]", 1, D_ROUTE_DEBUG, &gc)) + { + /* is the push item a route directive? */ + if (p[0] && !strcmp (p[0], "route") && !p[3]) + { + /* get route parameters */ + bool status1, status2; + const in_addr_t network = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, p[1], 0, &status1, NULL); + const in_addr_t netmask = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, p[2] ? p[2] : "255.255.255.255", 0, &status2, NULL); + + /* did route parameters parse correctly? */ + if (status1 && status2) + { + const struct iroute *ir; + + /* does route match an iroute? */ + for (ir = o->iroutes; ir != NULL; ir = ir->next) + { + if (network == ir->network && netmask == netbits_to_netmask (ir->netbits >= 0 ? ir->netbits : 32)) + { + enable = false; + break; + } + } + } + } + } + + /* should we copy the push item? */ + e->enable = enable; + if (!enable) + msg (D_PUSH, "REMOVE PUSH ROUTE: '%s'", e->option); + + e = e->next; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8c3f1575 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/push.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef PUSH_H +#define PUSH_H + +#if P2MP + +#include "forward.h" + +#define PUSH_MSG_ERROR 0 +#define PUSH_MSG_REQUEST 1 +#define PUSH_MSG_REPLY 2 +#define PUSH_MSG_REQUEST_DEFERRED 3 +#define PUSH_MSG_AUTH_FAILURE 4 +#define PUSH_MSG_CONTINUATION 5 +#define PUSH_MSG_ALREADY_REPLIED 6 + +void incoming_push_message (struct context *c, + const struct buffer *buffer); + +int process_incoming_push_msg (struct context *c, + const struct buffer *buffer, + bool honor_received_options, + unsigned int permission_mask, + unsigned int *option_types_found); + +bool send_push_request (struct context *c); + +void receive_auth_failed (struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer); + +void server_pushed_signal (struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer, const bool restart, const int adv); + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +void clone_push_list (struct options *o); + +void push_option (struct options *o, const char *opt, int msglevel); +void push_options (struct options *o, char **p, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc); + +void push_reset (struct options *o); + +bool send_push_reply (struct context *c); + +void remove_iroutes_from_push_route_list (struct options *o); + +void send_auth_failed (struct context *c, const char *client_reason); + +void send_restart (struct context *c, const char *kill_msg); + +#endif +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pushlist.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pushlist.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2526761 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/pushlist.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#if !defined(PUSHLIST_H) && P2MP && P2MP_SERVER +#define PUSHLIST_H + +/* parameters to be pushed to peer */ + +struct push_entry { + struct push_entry *next; + bool enable; + const char *option; +}; + +struct push_list { + struct push_entry *head; + struct push_entry *tail; +}; + + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..763169ed --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.c @@ -0,0 +1,757 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * These routines implement a reliability layer on top of UDP, + * so that SSL/TLS can be run over UDP. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "reliable.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * verify that test - base < extent while allowing for base or test wraparound + */ +static inline bool +reliable_pid_in_range1 (const packet_id_type test, + const packet_id_type base, + const unsigned int extent) +{ + if (test >= base) + { + if (test - base < extent) + return true; + } + else + { + if ((test+0x80000000u) - (base+0x80000000u) < extent) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/* + * verify that test < base + extent while allowing for base or test wraparound + */ +static inline bool +reliable_pid_in_range2 (const packet_id_type test, + const packet_id_type base, + const unsigned int extent) +{ + if (base + extent >= base) + { + if (test < base + extent) + return true; + } + else + { + if ((test+0x80000000u) < (base+0x80000000u) + extent) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/* + * verify that p1 < p2 while allowing for p1 or p2 wraparound + */ +static inline bool +reliable_pid_min (const packet_id_type p1, + const packet_id_type p2) +{ + return !reliable_pid_in_range1 (p1, p2, 0x80000000u); +} + +/* check if a particular packet_id is present in ack */ +static inline bool +reliable_ack_packet_id_present (struct reliable_ack *ack, packet_id_type pid) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < ack->len; ++i) + if (ack->packet_id[i] == pid) + return true; + return false; +} + +/* get a packet_id from buf */ +bool +reliable_ack_read_packet_id (struct buffer *buf, packet_id_type *pid) +{ + packet_id_type net_pid; + + if (buf_read (buf, &net_pid, sizeof (net_pid))) + { + *pid = ntohpid (net_pid); + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK read ID " packet_id_format " (buf->len=%d)", + (packet_id_print_type)*pid, buf->len); + return true; + } + + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, "ACK read ID FAILED (buf->len=%d)", buf->len); + return false; +} + +/* acknowledge a packet_id by adding it to a struct reliable_ack */ +bool +reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (struct reliable_ack *ack, packet_id_type pid) +{ + if (!reliable_ack_packet_id_present (ack, pid) && ack->len < RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE) + { + ack->packet_id[ack->len++] = pid; + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK acknowledge ID " packet_id_format " (ack->len=%d)", + (packet_id_print_type)pid, ack->len); + return true; + } + + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, "ACK acknowledge ID " packet_id_format " FAILED (ack->len=%d)", + (packet_id_print_type)pid, ack->len); + return false; +} + +/* read a packet ID acknowledgement record from buf into ack */ +bool +reliable_ack_read (struct reliable_ack * ack, + struct buffer * buf, const struct session_id * sid) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + uint8_t count; + packet_id_type net_pid; + packet_id_type pid; + struct session_id session_id_remote; + + if (!buf_read (buf, &count, sizeof (count))) + goto error; + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) + { + if (!buf_read (buf, &net_pid, sizeof (net_pid))) + goto error; + if (ack->len >= RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE) + goto error; + pid = ntohpid (net_pid); + ack->packet_id[ack->len++] = pid; + } + if (count) + { + if (!session_id_read (&session_id_remote, buf)) + goto error; + if (!session_id_defined (&session_id_remote) || + !session_id_equal (&session_id_remote, sid)) + { + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, + "ACK read BAD SESSION-ID FROM REMOTE, local=%s, remote=%s", + session_id_print (sid, &gc), session_id_print (&session_id_remote, &gc)); + goto error; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + +error: + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +#define ACK_SIZE(n) (sizeof (uint8_t) + ((n) ? SID_SIZE : 0) + sizeof (packet_id_type) * (n)) + +/* write a packet ID acknowledgement record to buf, */ +/* removing all acknowledged entries from ack */ +bool +reliable_ack_write (struct reliable_ack * ack, + struct buffer * buf, + const struct session_id * sid, int max, bool prepend) +{ + int i, j; + uint8_t n; + struct buffer sub; + + n = ack->len; + if (n > max) + n = max; + sub = buf_sub (buf, ACK_SIZE(n), prepend); + if (!BDEF (&sub)) + goto error; + ASSERT (buf_write (&sub, &n, sizeof (n))); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + packet_id_type pid = ack->packet_id[i]; + packet_id_type net_pid = htonpid (pid); + ASSERT (buf_write (&sub, &net_pid, sizeof (net_pid))); + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK write ID " packet_id_format " (ack->len=%d, n=%d)", (packet_id_print_type)pid, ack->len, n); + } + if (n) + { + ASSERT (session_id_defined (sid)); + ASSERT (session_id_write (sid, &sub)); + for (i = 0, j = n; j < ack->len;) + ack->packet_id[i++] = ack->packet_id[j++]; + ack->len = i; + } + + return true; + +error: + return false; +} + +/* add to extra_frame the maximum number of bytes we will need for reliable_ack_write */ +void +reliable_ack_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame* frame, int max) +{ + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, ACK_SIZE (max)); +} + +/* print a reliable ACK record coming off the wire */ +const char * +reliable_ack_print (struct buffer *buf, bool verbose, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int i; + uint8_t n_ack; + struct session_id sid_ack; + packet_id_type pid; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "["); + if (!buf_read (buf, &n_ack, sizeof (n_ack))) + goto done; + for (i = 0; i < n_ack; ++i) + { + if (!buf_read (buf, &pid, sizeof (pid))) + goto done; + pid = ntohpid (pid); + buf_printf (&out, " " packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)pid); + } + if (n_ack) + { + if (!session_id_read (&sid_ack, buf)) + goto done; + if (verbose) + buf_printf (&out, " sid=%s", session_id_print (&sid_ack, gc)); + } + + done: + buf_printf (&out, " ]"); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * struct reliable member functions. + */ + +void +reliable_init (struct reliable *rel, int buf_size, int offset, int array_size, bool hold) +{ + int i; + + CLEAR (*rel); + ASSERT (array_size > 0 && array_size <= RELIABLE_CAPACITY); + rel->hold = hold; + rel->size = array_size; + rel->offset = offset; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + e->buf = alloc_buf (buf_size); + ASSERT (buf_init (&e->buf, offset)); + } +} + +void +reliable_free (struct reliable *rel) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + free_buf (&e->buf); + } +} + +/* no active buffers? */ +bool +reliable_empty (const struct reliable *rel) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/* del acknowledged items from send buf */ +void +reliable_send_purge (struct reliable *rel, struct reliable_ack *ack) +{ + int i, j; + for (i = 0; i < ack->len; ++i) + { + packet_id_type pid = ack->packet_id[i]; + for (j = 0; j < rel->size; ++j) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[j]; + if (e->active && e->packet_id == pid) + { + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, + "ACK received for pid " packet_id_format ", deleting from send buffer", + (packet_id_print_type)pid); +#if 0 + /* DEBUGGING -- how close were we timing out on ACK failure and resending? */ + { + if (e->next_try) + { + const interval_t wake = e->next_try - now; + msg (M_INFO, "ACK " packet_id_format ", wake=%d", pid, wake); + } + } +#endif + e->active = false; + break; + } + } + } +} + +/* print the current sequence of active packet IDs */ +static const char * +reliable_print_ids (const struct reliable *rel, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + int i; + + buf_printf (&out, "[" packet_id_format "]", (packet_id_print_type)rel->packet_id); + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + buf_printf (&out, " " packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)e->packet_id); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* true if at least one free buffer available */ +bool +reliable_can_get (const struct reliable *rel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (!e->active) + return true; + } + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, "ACK no free receive buffer available: %s", reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +/* make sure that incoming packet ID isn't a replay */ +bool +reliable_not_replay (const struct reliable *rel, packet_id_type id) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + if (reliable_pid_min (id, rel->packet_id)) + goto bad; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active && e->packet_id == id) + goto bad; + } + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + + bad: + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK " packet_id_format " is a replay: %s", (packet_id_print_type)id, reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +/* make sure that incoming packet ID won't deadlock the receive buffer */ +bool +reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (const struct reliable *rel, packet_id_type id) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + const int ret = reliable_pid_in_range2 (id, rel->packet_id, rel->size); + + if (!ret) + { + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, "ACK " packet_id_format " breaks sequentiality: %s", + (packet_id_print_type)id, reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + } + + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK RWBS rel->size=%d rel->packet_id=%08x id=%08x ret=%d\n", rel->size, rel->packet_id, id, ret); + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* grab a free buffer */ +struct buffer * +reliable_get_buf (struct reliable *rel) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (!e->active) + { + ASSERT (buf_init (&e->buf, rel->offset)); + return &e->buf; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* grab a free buffer, fail if buffer clogged by unacknowledged low packet IDs */ +struct buffer * +reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced (struct reliable *rel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + packet_id_type min_id = 0; + bool min_id_defined = false; + struct buffer *ret = NULL; + + /* find minimum active packet_id */ + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + { + if (!min_id_defined || reliable_pid_min (e->packet_id, min_id)) + { + min_id_defined = true; + min_id = e->packet_id; + } + } + } + + if (!min_id_defined || reliable_pid_in_range1 (rel->packet_id, min_id, rel->size)) + { + ret = reliable_get_buf (rel); + } + else + { + dmsg (D_REL_LOW, "ACK output sequence broken: %s", reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* get active buffer for next sequentially increasing key ID */ +struct buffer * +reliable_get_buf_sequenced (struct reliable *rel) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active && e->packet_id == rel->packet_id) + { + return &e->buf; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* return true if reliable_send would return a non-NULL result */ +bool +reliable_can_send (const struct reliable *rel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + int n_active = 0, n_current = 0; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + { + ++n_active; + if (now >= e->next_try) + ++n_current; + } + } + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK reliable_can_send active=%d current=%d : %s", + n_active, + n_current, + reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); + return n_current > 0 && !rel->hold; +} + +#ifdef EXPONENTIAL_BACKOFF +/* return a unique point-in-time to trigger retry */ +static time_t +reliable_unique_retry (struct reliable *rel, time_t retry) +{ + int i; + while (true) + { + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active && e->next_try == retry) + goto again; + } + break; + again: + ++retry; + } + return retry; +} +#endif + +/* return next buffer to send to remote */ +struct buffer * +reliable_send (struct reliable *rel, int *opcode) +{ + int i; + struct reliable_entry *best = NULL; + const time_t local_now = now; + + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active && local_now >= e->next_try) + { + if (!best || reliable_pid_min (e->packet_id, best->packet_id)) + best = e; + } + } + if (best) + { +#ifdef EXPONENTIAL_BACKOFF + /* exponential backoff */ + best->next_try = reliable_unique_retry (rel, local_now + best->timeout); + best->timeout *= 2; +#else + /* constant timeout, no backoff */ + best->next_try = local_now + best->timeout; +#endif + *opcode = best->opcode; + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK reliable_send ID " packet_id_format " (size=%d to=%d)", + (packet_id_print_type)best->packet_id, best->buf.len, + (int)(best->next_try - local_now)); + return &best->buf; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* schedule all pending packets for immediate retransmit */ +void +reliable_schedule_now (struct reliable *rel) +{ + int i; + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK reliable_schedule_now"); + rel->hold = false; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + { + e->next_try = now; + e->timeout = rel->initial_timeout; + } + } +} + +/* in how many seconds should we wake up to check for timeout */ +/* if we return BIG_TIMEOUT, nothing to wait for */ +interval_t +reliable_send_timeout (const struct reliable *rel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + interval_t ret = BIG_TIMEOUT; + int i; + const time_t local_now = now; + + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + { + if (e->next_try <= local_now) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + else + { + ret = min_int (ret, e->next_try - local_now); + } + } + } + + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK reliable_send_timeout %d %s", + (int) ret, + reliable_print_ids (rel, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Enable an incoming buffer previously returned by a get function as active. + */ + +void +reliable_mark_active_incoming (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, + packet_id_type pid, int opcode) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (buf == &e->buf) + { + e->active = true; + + /* packets may not arrive in sequential order */ + e->packet_id = pid; + + /* check for replay */ + ASSERT (!reliable_pid_min (pid, rel->packet_id)); + + e->opcode = opcode; + e->next_try = 0; + e->timeout = 0; + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK mark active incoming ID " packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)e->packet_id); + return; + } + } + ASSERT (0); /* buf not found in rel */ +} + +/* + * Enable an outgoing buffer previously returned by a get function as active. + */ + +void +reliable_mark_active_outgoing (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, int opcode) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (buf == &e->buf) + { + /* Write mode, increment packet_id (i.e. sequence number) + linearly and prepend id to packet */ + packet_id_type net_pid; + e->packet_id = rel->packet_id++; + net_pid = htonpid (e->packet_id); + ASSERT (buf_write_prepend (buf, &net_pid, sizeof (net_pid))); + e->active = true; + e->opcode = opcode; + e->next_try = 0; + e->timeout = rel->initial_timeout; + dmsg (D_REL_DEBUG, "ACK mark active outgoing ID " packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)e->packet_id); + return; + } + } + ASSERT (0); /* buf not found in rel */ +} + +/* delete a buffer previously activated by reliable_mark_active() */ +void +reliable_mark_deleted (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, bool inc_pid) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (buf == &e->buf) + { + e->active = false; + if (inc_pid) + rel->packet_id = e->packet_id + 1; + return; + } + } + ASSERT (0); +} + +#if 0 + +void +reliable_ack_debug_print (const struct reliable_ack *ack, char *desc) +{ + int i; + + printf ("********* struct reliable_ack %s\n", desc); + for (i = 0; i < ack->len; ++i) + { + printf (" %d: " packet_id_format "\n", i, (packet_id_print_type) ack->packet_id[i]); + } +} + +void +reliable_debug_print (const struct reliable *rel, char *desc) +{ + int i; + update_time (); + + printf ("********* struct reliable %s\n", desc); + printf (" initial_timeout=%d\n", (int)rel->initial_timeout); + printf (" packet_id=" packet_id_format "\n", rel->packet_id); + printf (" now=" time_format "\n", now); + for (i = 0; i < rel->size; ++i) + { + const struct reliable_entry *e = &rel->array[i]; + if (e->active) + { + printf (" %d: packet_id=" packet_id_format " len=%d", i, e->packet_id, e->buf.len); + printf (" next_try=" time_format, e->next_try); + printf ("\n"); + } + } +} + +#endif + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL*/ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..594ab825 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/reliable.h @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + + +/** + * @file + * Reliability Layer module header file. + */ + + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#ifndef RELIABLE_H +#define RELIABLE_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "session_id.h" +#include "mtu.h" + +/** @addtogroup reliable + * @{ */ + + +#define EXPONENTIAL_BACKOFF + +#define RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE 8 /**< The maximum number of packet IDs + * waiting to be acknowledged which can + * be stored in one \c reliable_ack + * structure. */ + +#define RELIABLE_CAPACITY 8 /**< The maximum number of packets that + * the reliability layer for one VPN + * tunnel in one direction can store. */ + +/** + * The acknowledgment structure in which packet IDs are stored for later + * acknowledgment. + */ +struct reliable_ack +{ + int len; + packet_id_type packet_id[RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE]; +}; + +/** + * The structure in which the reliability layer stores a single incoming + * or outgoing packet. + */ +struct reliable_entry +{ + bool active; + interval_t timeout; + time_t next_try; + packet_id_type packet_id; + int opcode; + struct buffer buf; +}; + +/** + * The reliability layer storage structure for one VPN tunnel's control + * channel in one direction. + */ +struct reliable +{ + int size; + interval_t initial_timeout; + packet_id_type packet_id; + int offset; + bool hold; /* don't xmit until reliable_schedule_now is called */ + struct reliable_entry array[RELIABLE_CAPACITY]; +}; + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for processing incoming acknowledgments + * @{ */ + +/** + * Read an acknowledgment record from a received packet. + * + * This function reads the packet ID acknowledgment record from the packet + * contained in \a buf. If the record contains acknowledgments, these are + * stored in \a ack. This function also compares the packet's session ID + * with the expected session ID \a sid, which should be equal. + * + * @param ack The acknowledgment structure in which received + * acknowledgments are to be stored. + * @param buf The buffer containing the packet. + * @param sid The expected session ID to compare to the session ID in + * the packet. + * + * @return + * @li True, if processing was successful. + * @li False, if an error occurs during processing. + */ +bool reliable_ack_read (struct reliable_ack *ack, + struct buffer *buf, const struct session_id *sid); + +/** + * Remove acknowledged packets from a reliable structure. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure storing sent packets. + * @param ack The acknowledgment structure containing received + * acknowledgments. + */ +void reliable_send_purge (struct reliable *rel, struct reliable_ack *ack); + +/** @} name Functions for processing incoming acknowledgments */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for processing outgoing acknowledgments + * @{ */ + +/** + * Check whether an acknowledgment structure contains any + * packet IDs to be acknowledged. + * + * @param ack The acknowledgment structure to check. + * + * @return + * @li True, if the acknowledgment structure is empty. + * @li False, if there are packet IDs to be acknowledged. + */ +static inline bool +reliable_ack_empty (struct reliable_ack *ack) +{ + return !ack->len; +} + +/** + * Write a packet ID acknowledgment record to a buffer. + * + * @param ack The acknowledgment structure containing packet IDs to be + * acknowledged. + * @param buf The buffer into which the acknowledgment record will be + * written. + * @param sid The session ID of the VPN tunnel associated with the + * packet IDs to be acknowledged. + * @param max The maximum number of acknowledgments to be written in + * the record. + * @param prepend If true, prepend the acknowledgment record in the + * buffer; if false, write into the buffer's current position. + * + * @return + * @li True, if processing was successful. + * @li False, if an error occurs during processing. + */ +bool reliable_ack_write (struct reliable_ack *ack, + struct buffer *buf, + const struct session_id *sid, int max, bool prepend); + +/** @} name Functions for processing outgoing acknowledgments */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup + * @{ */ + +/** + * Initialize a reliable structure. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure to initialize. + * @param buf_size The size of the buffers in which packets will be + * stored. + * @param offset The size of reserved space at the beginning of the + * buffers to allow efficient header prepending. + * @param array_size The number of packets that this reliable + * structure can store simultaneously. + * @param hold description + */ +void reliable_init (struct reliable *rel, int buf_size, int offset, int array_size, bool hold); + +/** + * Free allocated memory associated with a reliable structure. + * + * @param rel The reliable structured to clean up. + */ +void reliable_free (struct reliable *rel); + +/* add to extra_frame the maximum number of bytes we will need for reliable_ack_write */ +void reliable_ack_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame* frame, int max); + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for inserting incoming packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Check whether a reliable structure has any free buffers + * available for use. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure to check. + * + * @return + * @li True, if at least one buffer is available for use. + * @li False, if all the buffers are active. + */ +bool reliable_can_get (const struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Check that a received packet's ID is not a replay. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure for handling this VPN tunnel's + * received packets. + * @param id The packet ID of the received packet. + * + * @return + * @li True, if the packet ID is not a replay. + * @li False, if the packet ID is a replay. + */ +bool reliable_not_replay (const struct reliable *rel, packet_id_type id); + +/** + * Check that a received packet's ID can safely be stored in + * the reliable structure's processing window. + * + * This function checks the difference between the received packet's ID + * and the lowest non-acknowledged packet ID in the given reliable + * structure. If that difference is larger than the total number of + * packets which can be stored, then this packet cannot be stored safely, + * because the reliable structure could possibly fill up without leaving + * room for all intervening packets. In that case, this received packet + * could break the reliable structure's sequentiality, and must therefore + * be discarded. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure for handling this VPN tunnel's + * received packets. + * @param id The packet ID of the received packet. + * + * @return + * @li True, if the packet can safely be stored. + * @li False, if the packet does not fit safely in the reliable + * structure's processing window. + */ +bool reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (const struct reliable *rel, packet_id_type id); + +/** + * Read the packet ID of a received packet. + * + * @param buf The buffer containing the received packet. + * @param pid A pointer where the packet's packet ID will be written. + * + * @return + * @li True, if processing was successful. + * @li False, if an error occurs during processing. + */ +bool reliable_ack_read_packet_id (struct buffer *buf, packet_id_type *pid); + +/** + * Get the buffer of a free %reliable entry in which to store a + * packet. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure in which to search for a free + * entry. + * + * @return A pointer to a buffer of a free entry in the \a rel + * reliable structure. If there are no free entries available, this + * function returns NULL. + */ +struct buffer *reliable_get_buf (struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Mark the %reliable entry associated with the given buffer as active + * incoming. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure associated with this packet. + * @param buf The buffer into which the packet has been copied. + * @param pid The packet's packet ID. + * @param opcode The packet's opcode. + */ +void reliable_mark_active_incoming (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, + packet_id_type pid, int opcode); + +/** + * Record a packet ID for later acknowledgment. + * + * @param ack The acknowledgment structure which stores this VPN + * tunnel's packet IDs for later acknowledgment. + * @param pid The packet ID of the received packet which should be + * acknowledged. + * + * @return + * @li True, if the packet ID was added to \a ack. + * @li False, if the packet ID was already present in \a ack or \a ack + * has no free space to store any more packet IDs. + */ +bool reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (struct reliable_ack *ack, packet_id_type pid); + +/** @} name Functions for inserting incoming packets */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for extracting incoming packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Get the buffer of the next sequential and active entry. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure from which to retrieve the + * buffer. + * + * @return A pointer to the buffer of the entry with the next + * sequential key ID. If no such entry is present, this function + * returns NULL. + */ +struct buffer *reliable_get_buf_sequenced (struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Remove an entry from a reliable structure. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure associated with the given buffer. + * @param buf The buffer of the reliable entry which is to be removed. + * @param inc_pid If true, the reliable structure's packet ID counter + * will be incremented. + */ +void reliable_mark_deleted (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, bool inc_pid); + +/** @} name Functions for extracting incoming packets */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for inserting outgoing packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Get the buffer of free reliable entry and check whether the + * outgoing acknowledgment sequence is still okay. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure in which to search for a free + * entry. + * + * @return A pointer to a buffer of a free entry in the \a rel + * reliable structure. If there are no free entries available, this + * function returns NULL. If the outgoing acknowledgment sequence is + * broken, this function also returns NULL. + */ +struct buffer *reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced (struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Mark the reliable entry associated with the given buffer as + * active outgoing. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure for handling this VPN tunnel's + * outgoing packets. + * @param buf The buffer previously returned by \c + * reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced() into which the packet has been + * copied. + * @param opcode The packet's opcode. + */ +void reliable_mark_active_outgoing (struct reliable *rel, struct buffer *buf, int opcode); + +/** @} name Functions for inserting outgoing packets */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for extracting outgoing packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Check whether a reliable structure has any active entries + * ready to be (re)sent. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure to check. + * + * @return + * @li True, if there are active entries ready to be (re)sent + * president. + * @li False, if there are no active entries, or the active entries + * are not yet ready for resending. + */ +bool reliable_can_send (const struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Get the next packet to send to the remote peer. + * + * This function looks for the active entry ready for (re)sending with the + * lowest packet ID, and returns the buffer associated with it. This + * function also resets the timeout after which that entry will become + * ready for resending again. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure to check. + * @param opcode A pointer to an integer in which this function will + * store the opcode of the next packet to be sent. + * + * @return A pointer to the buffer of the next entry to be sent, or + * NULL if there are no entries ready for (re)sending present in the + * reliable structure. If a valid pointer is returned, then \a opcode + * will point to the opcode of that packet. + */ +struct buffer *reliable_send (struct reliable *rel, int *opcode); + +/** @} name Functions for extracting outgoing packets */ + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Miscellaneous functions + * @{ */ + +/** + * Check whether a reliable structure is empty. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure to check. + * + * @return + * @li True, if there are no active entries in the given reliable + * structure. + * @li False, if there is at least one active entry present. + */ +bool reliable_empty (const struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Determined how many seconds until the earliest resend should + * be attempted. + * + * @param rel The reliable structured to check. + * + * @return The interval in seconds until the earliest resend attempt + * of the outgoing packets stored in the \a rel reliable structure. If + * the next time for attempting resending of one or more packets has + * already passed, this function will return 0. + */ +interval_t reliable_send_timeout (const struct reliable *rel); + +/** + * Reschedule all entries of a reliable structure to be ready + * for (re)sending immediately. + * + * @param rel The reliable structure of which the entries should be + * modified. + */ +void reliable_schedule_now (struct reliable *rel); + +void reliable_debug_print (const struct reliable *rel, char *desc); + +/* set sending timeout (after this time we send again until ACK) */ +static inline void +reliable_set_timeout (struct reliable *rel, interval_t timeout) +{ + rel->initial_timeout = timeout; +} + +/* print a reliable ACK record coming off the wire */ +const char *reliable_ack_print (struct buffer *buf, bool verbose, struct gc_arena *gc); + +void reliable_ack_debug_print (const struct reliable_ack *ack, char *desc); + +/** @} name Miscellaneous functions */ + + +/** @} addtogroup reliable */ + + +#endif /* RELIABLE_H */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a778884 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.c @@ -0,0 +1,3319 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Support routines for adding/deleting network routes. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "common.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "route.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "options.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 +#define METRIC_NOT_USED ((DWORD)-1) +#endif + +static void delete_route (struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, const struct env_set *es); + +static void get_bypass_addresses (struct route_bypass *rb, const unsigned int flags); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static void +print_bypass_addresses (const struct route_bypass *rb) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rb->n_bypass; ++i) + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE: bypass_host_route[%d]=%s", + i, + print_in_addr_t (rb->bypass[i], 0, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +static bool +add_bypass_address (struct route_bypass *rb, const in_addr_t a) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rb->n_bypass; ++i) + { + if (a == rb->bypass[i]) /* avoid duplicates */ + return true; + } + if (rb->n_bypass < N_ROUTE_BYPASS) + { + rb->bypass[rb->n_bypass++] = a; + return true; + } + else + { + return false; + } +} + +struct route_option_list * +new_route_option_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + struct route_option_list *ret; + ALLOC_VAR_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, struct route_option_list, struct route_option, max_routes, a); + ret->capacity = max_routes; + return ret; +} + +struct route_ipv6_option_list * +new_route_ipv6_option_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + struct route_ipv6_option_list *ret; + ALLOC_VAR_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, struct route_ipv6_option_list, struct route_ipv6_option, max_routes, a); + ret->capacity = max_routes; + return ret; +} + +struct route_option_list * +clone_route_option_list (const struct route_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + const size_t rl_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route_option), src->capacity, sizeof(struct route_option_list)); + struct route_option_list *ret = gc_malloc (rl_size, false, a); + memcpy (ret, src, rl_size); + return ret; +} + +struct route_ipv6_option_list * +clone_route_ipv6_option_list (const struct route_ipv6_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + const size_t rl_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route_ipv6_option), src->capacity, sizeof(struct route_ipv6_option_list)); + struct route_ipv6_option_list *ret = gc_malloc (rl_size, false, a); + memcpy (ret, src, rl_size); + return ret; +} + +void +copy_route_option_list (struct route_option_list *dest, const struct route_option_list *src) +{ + const size_t src_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route_option), src->capacity, sizeof(struct route_option_list)); + if (src->capacity > dest->capacity) + msg (M_FATAL, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: (copy) number of route options in src (%d) is greater than route list capacity in dest (%d)", src->capacity, dest->capacity); + memcpy (dest, src, src_size); +} + +void +copy_route_ipv6_option_list (struct route_ipv6_option_list *dest, + const struct route_ipv6_option_list *src) +{ + const size_t src_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route_ipv6_option), src->capacity, sizeof(struct route_ipv6_option_list)); + if (src->capacity > dest->capacity) + msg (M_FATAL, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: (copy) number of route options in src (%d) is greater than route list capacity in dest (%d)", src->capacity, dest->capacity); + memcpy (dest, src, src_size); +} + +struct route_list * +new_route_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + struct route_list *ret; + ALLOC_VAR_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, struct route_list, struct route, max_routes, a); + ret->capacity = max_routes; + return ret; +} + +struct route_ipv6_list * +new_route_ipv6_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a) +{ + struct route_ipv6_list *ret; + ALLOC_VAR_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (ret, struct route_ipv6_list, struct route_ipv6, max_routes, a); + ret->capacity = max_routes; + return ret; +} + +static const char * +route_string (const struct route *r, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "ROUTE network %s netmask %s gateway %s", + print_in_addr_t (r->network, 0, gc), + print_in_addr_t (r->netmask, 0, gc), + print_in_addr_t (r->gateway, 0, gc) + ); + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, " metric %d", r->metric); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +static bool +is_route_parm_defined (const char *parm) +{ + if (!parm) + return false; + if (!strcmp (parm, "default")) + return false; + return true; +} + +static void +setenv_route_addr (struct env_set *es, const char *key, const in_addr_t addr, int i) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer name = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + if (i >= 0) + buf_printf (&name, "route_%s_%d", key, i); + else + buf_printf (&name, "route_%s", key); + setenv_str (es, BSTR (&name), print_in_addr_t (addr, 0, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static bool +get_special_addr (const struct route_list *rl, + const char *string, + in_addr_t *out, + bool *status) +{ + if (status) + *status = true; + if (!strcmp (string, "vpn_gateway")) + { + if (rl) + { + if (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT) + *out = rl->spec.remote_endpoint; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: vpn_gateway undefined"); + if (status) + *status = false; + } + } + return true; + } + else if (!strcmp (string, "net_gateway")) + { + if (rl) + { + if (rl->rgi.flags & RGI_ADDR_DEFINED) + *out = rl->rgi.gateway.addr; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: net_gateway undefined -- unable to get default gateway from system"); + if (status) + *status = false; + } + } + return true; + } + else if (!strcmp (string, "remote_host")) + { + if (rl) + { + if (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_HOST) + *out = rl->spec.remote_host; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: remote_host undefined"); + if (status) + *status = false; + } + } + return true; + } + return false; +} + +bool +is_special_addr (const char *addr_str) +{ + if (addr_str) + return get_special_addr (NULL, addr_str, NULL, NULL); + else + return false; +} + +static bool +init_route (struct route *r, + struct addrinfo **network_list, + const struct route_option *ro, + const struct route_list *rl) +{ + const in_addr_t default_netmask = IPV4_NETMASK_HOST; + bool status; + int ret; + struct in_addr special; + + CLEAR (*r); + r->option = ro; + + /* network */ + + if (!is_route_parm_defined (ro->network)) + { + goto fail; + } + + + /* get_special_addr replaces specialaddr with a special ip addr + like gw. getaddrinfo is called to convert a a addrinfo struct */ + + if(get_special_addr (rl, ro->network, &special.s_addr, &status)) + { + special.s_addr = htonl(special.s_addr); + ret = openvpn_getaddrinfo(0, inet_ntoa(special), NULL, 0, NULL, + AF_INET, network_list); + } + else + ret = openvpn_getaddrinfo(GETADDR_RESOLVE | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL, + ro->network, NULL, 0, NULL, AF_INET, network_list); + + status = (ret == 0); + + if (!status) + goto fail; + + /* netmask */ + + if (is_route_parm_defined (ro->netmask)) + { + r->netmask = getaddr ( + GETADDR_HOST_ORDER + | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL, + ro->netmask, + 0, + &status, + NULL); + if (!status) + goto fail; + } + else + r->netmask = default_netmask; + + /* gateway */ + + if (is_route_parm_defined (ro->gateway)) + { + if (!get_special_addr (rl, ro->gateway, &r->gateway, &status)) + { + r->gateway = getaddr ( + GETADDR_RESOLVE + | GETADDR_HOST_ORDER + | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL, + ro->gateway, + 0, + &status, + NULL); + } + if (!status) + goto fail; + } + else + { + if (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT) + r->gateway = rl->spec.remote_endpoint; + else + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: " PACKAGE_NAME " needs a gateway parameter for a --route option and no default was specified by either --route-gateway or --ifconfig options"); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* metric */ + + r->metric = 0; + if (is_route_parm_defined (ro->metric)) + { + r->metric = atoi (ro->metric); + if (r->metric < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: route metric for network %s (%s) must be >= 0", + ro->network, + ro->metric); + goto fail; + } + r->flags |= RT_METRIC_DEFINED; + } + else if (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_DEFAULT_METRIC) + { + r->metric = rl->spec.default_metric; + r->flags |= RT_METRIC_DEFINED; + } + + r->flags |= RT_DEFINED; + + return true; + + fail: + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: failed to parse/resolve route for host/network: %s", + ro->network); + return false; +} + +static bool +init_route_ipv6 (struct route_ipv6 *r6, + const struct route_ipv6_option *r6o, + const struct route_ipv6_list *rl6 ) +{ + r6->defined = false; + + if ( !get_ipv6_addr( r6o->prefix, &r6->network, &r6->netbits, NULL, M_WARN )) + goto fail; + + /* gateway */ + if (is_route_parm_defined (r6o->gateway)) + { + if ( inet_pton( AF_INET6, r6o->gateway, &r6->gateway ) != 1 ) + { + msg( M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME "ROUTE6: cannot parse gateway spec '%s'", r6o->gateway ); + } + } + else if (rl6->remote_endpoint_defined) + { + r6->gateway = rl6->remote_endpoint_ipv6; + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE6: " PACKAGE_NAME " needs a gateway parameter for a --route-ipv6 option and no default was specified by either --route-ipv6-gateway or --ifconfig-ipv6 options"); + goto fail; + } + + /* metric */ + + r6->metric_defined = false; + r6->metric = -1; + if (is_route_parm_defined (r6o->metric)) + { + r6->metric = atoi (r6o->metric); + if (r6->metric < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: route metric for network %s (%s) must be >= 0", + r6o->prefix, + r6o->metric); + goto fail; + } + r6->metric_defined = true; + } + else if (rl6->default_metric_defined) + { + r6->metric = rl6->default_metric; + r6->metric_defined = true; + } + + r6->defined = true; + + return true; + + fail: + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: failed to parse/resolve route for host/network: %s", + r6o->prefix); + r6->defined = false; + return false; +} + +void +add_route_to_option_list (struct route_option_list *l, + const char *network, + const char *netmask, + const char *gateway, + const char *metric) +{ + struct route_option *ro; + if (l->n >= l->capacity) + msg (M_FATAL, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: cannot add more than %d routes -- please increase the max-routes option in the client configuration file", + l->capacity); + ro = &l->routes[l->n]; + ro->network = network; + ro->netmask = netmask; + ro->gateway = gateway; + ro->metric = metric; + ++l->n; +} + +void +add_route_ipv6_to_option_list (struct route_ipv6_option_list *l, + const char *prefix, + const char *gateway, + const char *metric) +{ + struct route_ipv6_option *ro; + if (l->n >= l->capacity) + msg (M_FATAL, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: cannot add more than %d IPv6 routes -- please increase the max-routes option in the client configuration file", + l->capacity); + ro = &l->routes_ipv6[l->n]; + ro->prefix = prefix; + ro->gateway = gateway; + ro->metric = metric; + ++l->n; +} + +void +clear_route_list (struct route_list *rl) +{ + const int capacity = rl->capacity; + const size_t rl_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route), capacity, sizeof(struct route_list)); + memset(rl, 0, rl_size); + rl->capacity = capacity; +} + +void +clear_route_ipv6_list (struct route_ipv6_list *rl6) +{ + const int capacity = rl6->capacity; + const size_t rl6_size = array_mult_safe (sizeof(struct route_ipv6), capacity, sizeof(struct route_ipv6_list)); + memset(rl6, 0, rl6_size); + rl6->capacity = capacity; +} + +void +route_list_add_vpn_gateway (struct route_list *rl, + struct env_set *es, + const in_addr_t addr) +{ + rl->spec.remote_endpoint = addr; + rl->spec.flags |= RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT; + setenv_route_addr (es, "vpn_gateway", rl->spec.remote_endpoint, -1); +} + +static void +add_block_local_item (struct route_list *rl, + const struct route_gateway_address *gateway, + in_addr_t target) +{ + const int rgi_needed = (RGI_ADDR_DEFINED|RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED); + if ((rl->rgi.flags & rgi_needed) == rgi_needed + && rl->rgi.gateway.netmask < 0xFFFFFFFF + && (rl->n)+2 <= rl->capacity) + { + struct route r; + unsigned int l2; + + /* split a route into two smaller blocking routes, and direct them to target */ + CLEAR(r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED; + r.gateway = target; + r.network = gateway->addr & gateway->netmask; + l2 = ((~gateway->netmask)+1)>>1; + r.netmask = ~(l2-1); + rl->routes[rl->n++] = r; + r.network += l2; + rl->routes[rl->n++] = r; + } +} + +static void +add_block_local (struct route_list *rl) +{ + const int rgi_needed = (RGI_ADDR_DEFINED|RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED); + if ((rl->flags & RG_BLOCK_LOCAL) + && (rl->rgi.flags & rgi_needed) == rgi_needed + && (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT) + && rl->spec.remote_host_local != TLA_LOCAL) + { + size_t i; + + /* add bypass for gateway addr */ + add_bypass_address (&rl->spec.bypass, rl->rgi.gateway.addr); + + /* block access to local subnet */ + add_block_local_item (rl, &rl->rgi.gateway, rl->spec.remote_endpoint); + + /* process additional subnets on gateway interface */ + for (i = 0; i < rl->rgi.n_addrs; ++i) + { + const struct route_gateway_address *gwa = &rl->rgi.addrs[i]; + /* omit the add/subnet in &rl->rgi which we processed above */ + if (!((rl->rgi.gateway.addr & rl->rgi.gateway.netmask) == (gwa->addr & gwa->netmask) + && rl->rgi.gateway.netmask == gwa->netmask)) + add_block_local_item (rl, gwa, rl->spec.remote_endpoint); + } + } +} + +bool +init_route_list (struct route_list *rl, + const struct route_option_list *opt, + const char *remote_endpoint, + int default_metric, + in_addr_t remote_host, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = true; + + clear_route_list (rl); + + rl->flags = opt->flags; + + if (remote_host) + { + rl->spec.remote_host = remote_host; + rl->spec.flags |= RTSA_REMOTE_HOST; + } + + if (default_metric) + { + rl->spec.default_metric = default_metric; + rl->spec.flags |= RTSA_DEFAULT_METRIC; + } + + get_default_gateway (&rl->rgi); + if (rl->rgi.flags & RGI_ADDR_DEFINED) + { + setenv_route_addr (es, "net_gateway", rl->rgi.gateway.addr, -1); +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + print_default_gateway (D_ROUTE, &rl->rgi); +#endif + } + else + { + dmsg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE: default_gateway=UNDEF"); + } + + if (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_HOST) + rl->spec.remote_host_local = test_local_addr (remote_host, &rl->rgi); + + if (is_route_parm_defined (remote_endpoint)) + { + bool defined = false; + rl->spec.remote_endpoint = getaddr ( + GETADDR_RESOLVE + | GETADDR_HOST_ORDER + | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL, + remote_endpoint, + 0, + &defined, + NULL); + + if (defined) + { + setenv_route_addr (es, "vpn_gateway", rl->spec.remote_endpoint, -1); + rl->spec.flags |= RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT; + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: failed to parse/resolve default gateway: %s", + remote_endpoint); + ret = false; + } + } + + if (rl->flags & RG_ENABLE) + { + add_block_local (rl); + get_bypass_addresses (&rl->spec.bypass, rl->flags); +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + print_bypass_addresses (&rl->spec.bypass); +#endif + } + + /* parse the routes from opt to rl */ + { + int i = 0; + int j = rl->n; + bool warned = false; + for (i = 0; i < opt->n; ++i) + { + struct addrinfo* netlist; + struct route r; + + if (!init_route (&r, + &netlist, + &opt->routes[i], + rl)) + ret = false; + else + { + struct addrinfo* curele; + for (curele = netlist; curele; curele = curele->ai_next) + { + if (j < rl->capacity) + { + r.network = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in*)(curele)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr); + rl->routes[j++] = r; + } + else + { + if (!warned) + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: routes dropped because number of expanded routes is greater than route list capacity (%d)", rl->capacity); + warned = true; + } + } + } + freeaddrinfo(netlist); + } + } + rl->n = j; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +bool +init_route_ipv6_list (struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, + const struct route_ipv6_option_list *opt6, + const char *remote_endpoint, + int default_metric, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = true; + + clear_route_ipv6_list (rl6); + + rl6->flags = opt6->flags; + + if (default_metric >= 0 ) + { + rl6->default_metric = default_metric; + rl6->default_metric_defined = true; + } + + /* "default_gateway" is stuff for "redirect-gateway", which we don't + * do for IPv6 yet -> TODO + */ + { + dmsg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE6: default_gateway=UNDEF"); + } + + if ( is_route_parm_defined( remote_endpoint )) + { + if ( inet_pton( AF_INET6, remote_endpoint, + &rl6->remote_endpoint_ipv6) == 1 ) + { + rl6->remote_endpoint_defined = true; + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE: failed to parse/resolve default gateway: %s", remote_endpoint); + ret = false; + } + } + else + rl6->remote_endpoint_defined = false; + + + if (!(opt6->n >= 0 && opt6->n <= rl6->capacity)) + msg (M_FATAL, PACKAGE_NAME " ROUTE6: (init) number of route options (%d) is greater than route list capacity (%d)", opt6->n, rl6->capacity); + + /* parse the routes from opt to rl6 */ + { + int i, j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < opt6->n; ++i) + { + if (!init_route_ipv6 (&rl6->routes_ipv6[j], + &opt6->routes_ipv6[i], + rl6 )) + ret = false; + else + ++j; + } + rl6->n = j; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static void +add_route3 (in_addr_t network, + in_addr_t netmask, + in_addr_t gateway, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct route r; + CLEAR (r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED; + r.network = network; + r.netmask = netmask; + r.gateway = gateway; + add_route (&r, tt, flags, rgi, es); +} + +static void +del_route3 (in_addr_t network, + in_addr_t netmask, + in_addr_t gateway, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct route r; + CLEAR (r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED|RT_ADDED; + r.network = network; + r.netmask = netmask; + r.gateway = gateway; + delete_route (&r, tt, flags, rgi, es); +} + +static void +add_bypass_routes (struct route_bypass *rb, + in_addr_t gateway, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rb->n_bypass; ++i) + { + if (rb->bypass[i]) + add_route3 (rb->bypass[i], + IPV4_NETMASK_HOST, + gateway, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + rgi, + es); + } +} + +static void +del_bypass_routes (struct route_bypass *rb, + in_addr_t gateway, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rb->n_bypass; ++i) + { + if (rb->bypass[i]) + del_route3 (rb->bypass[i], + IPV4_NETMASK_HOST, + gateway, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + rgi, + es); + } +} + +static void +redirect_default_route_to_vpn (struct route_list *rl, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + const char err[] = "NOTE: unable to redirect default gateway --"; + + if ( rl && rl->flags & RG_ENABLE ) + { + if (!(rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "%s VPN gateway parameter (--route-gateway or --ifconfig) is missing", err); + } + else if (!(rl->rgi.flags & RGI_ADDR_DEFINED)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "%s Cannot read current default gateway from system", err); + } + else if (!(rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_HOST)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "%s Cannot obtain current remote host address", err); + } + else + { + bool local = BOOL_CAST(rl->flags & RG_LOCAL); + if (rl->flags & RG_AUTO_LOCAL) { + const int tla = rl->spec.remote_host_local; + if (tla == TLA_NONLOCAL) + { + dmsg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE remote_host is NOT LOCAL"); + local = false; + } + else if (tla == TLA_LOCAL) + { + dmsg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE remote_host is LOCAL"); + local = true; + } + } + if (!local) + { + /* route remote host to original default gateway */ + /* if remote_host is not ipv4 (ie: ipv6), just skip + * adding this special /32 route */ + if (rl->spec.remote_host != IPV4_INVALID_ADDR) { + add_route3 (rl->spec.remote_host, + IPV4_NETMASK_HOST, + rl->rgi.gateway.addr, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + &rl->rgi, + es); + rl->iflags |= RL_DID_LOCAL; + } else { + dmsg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE remote_host protocol differs from tunneled"); + } + } + + /* route DHCP/DNS server traffic through original default gateway */ + add_bypass_routes (&rl->spec.bypass, rl->rgi.gateway.addr, tt, flags, &rl->rgi, es); + + if (rl->flags & RG_REROUTE_GW) + { + if (rl->flags & RG_DEF1) + { + /* add new default route (1st component) */ + add_route3 (0x00000000, + 0x80000000, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + + /* add new default route (2nd component) */ + add_route3 (0x80000000, + 0x80000000, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + } + else + { + /* delete default route */ + del_route3 (0, + 0, + rl->rgi.gateway.addr, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + &rl->rgi, + es); + + /* add new default route */ + add_route3 (0, + 0, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + } + } + + /* set a flag so we can undo later */ + rl->iflags |= RL_DID_REDIRECT_DEFAULT_GATEWAY; + } + } +} + +static void +undo_redirect_default_route_to_vpn (struct route_list *rl, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + if ( rl && rl->iflags & RL_DID_REDIRECT_DEFAULT_GATEWAY ) + { + /* delete remote host route */ + if (rl->iflags & RL_DID_LOCAL) + { + del_route3 (rl->spec.remote_host, + IPV4_NETMASK_HOST, + rl->rgi.gateway.addr, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + &rl->rgi, + es); + rl->iflags &= ~RL_DID_LOCAL; + } + + /* delete special DHCP/DNS bypass route */ + del_bypass_routes (&rl->spec.bypass, rl->rgi.gateway.addr, tt, flags, &rl->rgi, es); + + if (rl->flags & RG_REROUTE_GW) + { + if (rl->flags & RG_DEF1) + { + /* delete default route (1st component) */ + del_route3 (0x00000000, + 0x80000000, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + + /* delete default route (2nd component) */ + del_route3 (0x80000000, + 0x80000000, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + } + else + { + /* delete default route */ + del_route3 (0, + 0, + rl->spec.remote_endpoint, + tt, + flags, + &rl->rgi, + es); + + /* restore original default route */ + add_route3 (0, + 0, + rl->rgi.gateway.addr, + tt, + flags | ROUTE_REF_GW, + &rl->rgi, + es); + } + } + + rl->iflags &= ~RL_DID_REDIRECT_DEFAULT_GATEWAY; + } +} + +void +add_routes (struct route_list *rl, struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + redirect_default_route_to_vpn (rl, tt, flags, es); + if ( rl && !(rl->iflags & RL_ROUTES_ADDED) ) + { + int i; + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management && rl->n) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_ADD_ROUTES, + NULL, + 0, + 0); + } +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < rl->n; ++i) + { + struct route *r = &rl->routes[i]; + check_subnet_conflict (r->network, r->netmask, "route"); + if (flags & ROUTE_DELETE_FIRST) + delete_route (r, tt, flags, &rl->rgi, es); + add_route (r, tt, flags, &rl->rgi, es); + } + rl->iflags |= RL_ROUTES_ADDED; + } + if (rl6 && !rl6->routes_added) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rl6->n; ++i) + { + struct route_ipv6 *r = &rl6->routes_ipv6[i]; + if (flags & ROUTE_DELETE_FIRST) + delete_route_ipv6 (r, tt, flags, es); + add_route_ipv6 (r, tt, flags, es); + } + rl6->routes_added = true; + } +} + +void +delete_routes (struct route_list *rl, struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, + const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + if ( rl && rl->iflags & RL_ROUTES_ADDED ) + { + int i; + for (i = rl->n - 1; i >= 0; --i) + { + struct route * r = &rl->routes[i]; + delete_route (r, tt, flags, &rl->rgi, es); + } + rl->iflags &= ~RL_ROUTES_ADDED; + } + + undo_redirect_default_route_to_vpn (rl, tt, flags, es); + + if ( rl ) + { + clear_route_list (rl); + } + + if ( rl6 && rl6->routes_added ) + { + int i; + for (i = rl6->n - 1; i >= 0; --i) + { + const struct route_ipv6 *r6 = &rl6->routes_ipv6[i]; + delete_route_ipv6 (r6, tt, flags, es); + } + rl6->routes_added = false; + } + + if ( rl6 ) + { + clear_route_ipv6_list (rl6); + } +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + +static const char * +show_opt (const char *option) +{ + if (!option) + return "nil"; + else + return option; +} + +static void +print_route_option (const struct route_option *ro, int level) +{ + msg (level, " route %s/%s/%s/%s", + show_opt (ro->network), + show_opt (ro->netmask), + show_opt (ro->gateway), + show_opt (ro->metric)); +} + +void +print_route_options (const struct route_option_list *rol, + int level) +{ + int i; + if (rol->flags & RG_ENABLE) + msg (level, " [redirect_default_gateway local=%d]", + (rol->flags & RG_LOCAL) != 0); + for (i = 0; i < rol->n; ++i) + print_route_option (&rol->routes[i], level); +} + +void +print_default_gateway(const int msglevel, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (rgi->flags & RGI_ADDR_DEFINED) + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + buf_printf (&out, "ROUTE_GATEWAY"); + if (rgi->flags & RGI_ON_LINK) + buf_printf (&out, " ON_LINK"); + else + buf_printf (&out, " %s", print_in_addr_t (rgi->gateway.addr, 0, &gc)); + if (rgi->flags & RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, "/%s", print_in_addr_t (rgi->gateway.netmask, 0, &gc)); +#ifdef WIN32 + if (rgi->flags & RGI_IFACE_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, " I=%u", (unsigned int)rgi->adapter_index); +#else + if (rgi->flags & RGI_IFACE_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, " IFACE=%s", rgi->iface); +#endif + if (rgi->flags & RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, " HWADDR=%s", format_hex_ex (rgi->hwaddr, 6, 0, 1, ":", &gc)); + msg (msglevel, "%s", BSTR (&out)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +static void +print_route (const struct route *r, int level) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (r->flags & RT_DEFINED) + msg (level, "%s", route_string (r, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +print_routes (const struct route_list *rl, int level) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rl->n; ++i) + print_route (&rl->routes[i], level); +} + +static void +setenv_route (struct env_set *es, const struct route *r, int i) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (r->flags & RT_DEFINED) + { + setenv_route_addr (es, "network", r->network, i); + setenv_route_addr (es, "netmask", r->netmask, i); + setenv_route_addr (es, "gateway", r->gateway, i); + + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + { + struct buffer name = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + buf_printf (&name, "route_metric_%d", i); + setenv_int (es, BSTR (&name), r->metric); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +setenv_routes (struct env_set *es, const struct route_list *rl) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rl->n; ++i) + setenv_route (es, &rl->routes[i], i + 1); +} + +static void +setenv_route_ipv6 (struct env_set *es, const struct route_ipv6 *r6, int i) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (r6->defined) + { + struct buffer name1 = alloc_buf_gc( 256, &gc ); + struct buffer val = alloc_buf_gc( 256, &gc ); + struct buffer name2 = alloc_buf_gc( 256, &gc ); + + buf_printf( &name1, "route_ipv6_network_%d", i ); + buf_printf( &val, "%s/%d", print_in6_addr( r6->network, 0, &gc ), + r6->netbits ); + setenv_str( es, BSTR(&name1), BSTR(&val) ); + + buf_printf( &name2, "route_ipv6_gateway_%d", i ); + setenv_str( es, BSTR(&name2), print_in6_addr( r6->gateway, 0, &gc )); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} +void +setenv_routes_ipv6 (struct env_set *es, const struct route_ipv6_list *rl6) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rl6->n; ++i) + setenv_route_ipv6 (es, &rl6->routes_ipv6[i], i + 1); +} + +/* + * local_route() determines whether the gateway of a provided host + * route is on the same interface that owns the default gateway. + * It uses the data structure + * returned by get_default_gateway() (struct route_gateway_info) + * to determine this. If the route is local, LR_MATCH is returned. + * When adding routes into the kernel, if LR_MATCH is defined for + * a given route, the route should explicitly reference the default + * gateway interface as the route destination. For example, here + * is an example on Linux that uses LR_MATCH: + * + * route add -net 10.10.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 dev eth0 + * + * This capability is needed by the "default-gateway block-local" + * directive, to allow client access to the local subnet to be + * blocked but still allow access to the local default gateway. + */ + +/* local_route() return values */ +#define LR_NOMATCH 0 /* route is not local */ +#define LR_MATCH 1 /* route is local */ +#define LR_ERROR 2 /* caller should abort adding route */ + +static int +local_route (in_addr_t network, + in_addr_t netmask, + in_addr_t gateway, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + /* set LR_MATCH on local host routes */ + const int rgi_needed = (RGI_ADDR_DEFINED|RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED|RGI_IFACE_DEFINED); + if (rgi + && (rgi->flags & rgi_needed) == rgi_needed + && gateway == rgi->gateway.addr + && netmask == 0xFFFFFFFF) + { + if (((network ^ rgi->gateway.addr) & rgi->gateway.netmask) == 0) + return LR_MATCH; + else + { + /* examine additional subnets on gateway interface */ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < rgi->n_addrs; ++i) + { + const struct route_gateway_address *gwa = &rgi->addrs[i]; + if (((network ^ gwa->addr) & gwa->netmask) == 0) + return LR_MATCH; + } + } + } + return LR_NOMATCH; +} + +/* Return true if the "on-link" form of the route should be used. This is when the gateway for a + a route is specified as an interface rather than an address. */ +static inline bool +is_on_link (const int is_local_route, const unsigned int flags, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + return rgi && (is_local_route == LR_MATCH || ((flags & ROUTE_REF_GW) && (rgi->flags & RGI_ON_LINK))); +} + +void +add_route (struct route *r, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, /* may be NULL */ + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + struct argv argv; + const char *network; + const char *netmask; + const char *gateway; + bool status = false; + int is_local_route; + + if (!(r->flags & RT_DEFINED)) + return; + + gc_init (&gc); + argv_init (&argv); + + network = print_in_addr_t (r->network, 0, &gc); + netmask = print_in_addr_t (r->netmask, 0, &gc); + gateway = print_in_addr_t (r->gateway, 0, &gc); + + is_local_route = local_route(r->network, r->netmask, r->gateway, rgi); + if (is_local_route == LR_ERROR) + goto done; + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + /* FIXME -- add on-link support for ENABLE_IPROUTE */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%s route add %s/%d via %s", + iproute_path, + network, + count_netmask_bits(netmask), + gateway); + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "metric %d", r->metric); + +#else + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -net %s netmask %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + netmask); + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "metric %d", r->metric); + if (is_on_link (is_local_route, flags, rgi)) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "dev %s", rgi->iface); + else + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "gw %s", gateway); + +#endif /*ENABLE_IPROUTE*/ + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Linux route add command failed"); + +#elif defined (TARGET_ANDROID) + + struct user_pass up; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, &gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s %s", network, netmask); + + strcpy(up.username, buf_bptr(&out)); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "ROUTE", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + + +#elif defined (WIN32) + { + DWORD ai = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc ADD %s MASK %s %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_ROUTE_PATH_SUFFIX, + network, + netmask, + gateway); + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "METRIC %d", r->metric); + if (is_on_link (is_local_route, flags, rgi)) + { + ai = rgi->adapter_index; + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "IF %u", (unsigned int)ai); + } + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + + if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_IPAPI) + { + status = add_route_ipapi (r, tt, ai); + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route addition via IPAPI %s", status ? "succeeded" : "failed"); + } + else if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_EXE) + { + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route add command failed"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + } + else if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_ADAPTIVE) + { + status = add_route_ipapi (r, tt, ai); + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route addition via IPAPI %s [adaptive]", status ? "succeeded" : "failed"); + if (!status) + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route addition fallback to route.exe"); + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route add command failed [adaptive]"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + } + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } + +#elif defined (TARGET_SOLARIS) + + /* example: route add 192.0.2.32 -netmask 255.255.255.224 somegateway */ + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add", + ROUTE_PATH); + +#if 0 + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-rtt %d", r->metric); +#endif + + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s -netmask %s %s", + network, + netmask, + gateway); + + /* FIXME -- add on-link support for Solaris */ + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Solaris route add command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add", + ROUTE_PATH); + +#if 0 + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-rtt %d", r->metric); +#endif + + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-net %s %s %s", + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + /* FIXME -- add on-link support for FreeBSD */ + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: FreeBSD route add command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add", + ROUTE_PATH); + +#if 0 + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-rtt %d", r->metric); +#endif + + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-net %s %s %s", + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + /* FIXME -- add on-link support for Dragonfly */ + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: DragonFly route add command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add", + ROUTE_PATH); + +#if 0 + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-rtt %d", r->metric); +#endif + + if (is_on_link (is_local_route, flags, rgi)) + { + /* Mac OS X route syntax for ON_LINK: + route add -cloning -net 10.10.0.1 -netmask 255.255.255.255 -interface en0 */ + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-cloning -net %s -netmask %s -interface %s", + network, + netmask, + rgi->iface); + } + else + { + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-net %s %s %s", + network, + gateway, + netmask); + } + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OS X route add command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) || defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add", + ROUTE_PATH); + +#if 0 + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-rtt %d", r->metric); +#endif + + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-net %s %s -netmask %s", + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + /* FIXME -- add on-link support for OpenBSD/NetBSD */ + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OpenBSD/NetBSD route add command failed"); + +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I don't know how to do 'route' commands on this operating system. Try putting your routes in a --route-up script"); +#endif + + done: + if (status) + r->flags |= RT_ADDED; + else + r->flags &= ~RT_ADDED; + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + + +static const char * +print_in6_addr_netbits_only( struct in6_addr network_copy, int netbits, + struct gc_arena * gc) +{ + /* clear host bit parts of route + * (needed if routes are specified improperly, or if we need to + * explicitely setup/clear the "connected" network routes on some OSes) + */ + int byte = 15; + int bits_to_clear = 128 - netbits; + + while( byte >= 0 && bits_to_clear > 0 ) + { + if ( bits_to_clear >= 8 ) + { network_copy.s6_addr[byte--] = 0; bits_to_clear -= 8; } + else + { network_copy.s6_addr[byte--] &= (0xff << bits_to_clear); bits_to_clear = 0; } + } + + return print_in6_addr( network_copy, 0, gc); +} + +void +add_route_ipv6 (struct route_ipv6 *r6, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + struct argv argv; + + const char *network; + const char *gateway; + bool status = false; + const char *device = tt->actual_name; + + bool gateway_needed = false; + + if (!r6->defined) + return; + + gc_init (&gc); + argv_init (&argv); + + network = print_in6_addr_netbits_only( r6->network, r6->netbits, &gc); + gateway = print_in6_addr( r6->gateway, 0, &gc); + + if ( !tt->ipv6 ) + { + msg( M_INFO, "add_route_ipv6(): not adding %s/%d, no IPv6 on if %s", + network, r6->netbits, device ); + return; + } + + msg( M_INFO, "add_route_ipv6(%s/%d -> %s metric %d) dev %s", + network, r6->netbits, gateway, r6->metric, device ); + + /* + * Filter out routes which are essentially no-ops + * (not currently done for IPv6) + */ + + /* On "tun" interface, we never set a gateway if the operating system + * can do "route to interface" - it does not add value, as the target + * dev already fully qualifies the route destination on point-to-point + * interfaces. OTOH, on "tap" interface, we must always set the + * gateway unless the route is to be an on-link network + */ + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP && + !(r6->metric_defined && r6->metric == 0 ) ) + { + gateway_needed = true; + } + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + argv_printf (&argv, "%s -6 route add %s/%d dev %s", + iproute_path, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "via %s", gateway); + if (r6->metric_defined && r6->metric > 0 ) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, " metric %d", r6->metric); + +#else + argv_printf (&argv, "%s -A inet6 add %s/%d dev %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "gw %s", gateway); + if (r6->metric_defined && r6->metric > 0 ) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, " metric %d", r6->metric); +#endif /*ENABLE_IPROUTE*/ + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Linux route -6/-A inet6 add command failed"); + +#elif defined (TARGET_ANDROID) + struct user_pass up; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, &gc); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s/%d", network, r6->netbits); + + strcpy(up.username, buf_bptr(&out)); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "ROUTE6", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + +#elif defined (WIN32) + + /* netsh interface ipv6 add route 2001:db8::/32 MyTunDevice */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc interface ipv6 add route %s/%d %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + + /* next-hop depends on TUN or TAP mode: + * - in TAP mode, we use the "real" next-hop + * - in TUN mode we use a special-case link-local address that the tapdrvr + * knows about and will answer ND (neighbor discovery) packets for + */ + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN ) + argv_printf_cat( &argv, " %s", "fe80::8" ); + else + argv_printf_cat( &argv, " %s", gateway ); + +#if 0 + if (r->metric_defined) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, " METRIC %d", r->metric); +#endif + + /* in some versions of Windows, routes are persistent across reboots by + * default, unless "store=active" is set (pointed out by Tony Lim, thanks) + */ + argv_printf_cat( &argv, " store=active" ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route add ipv6 command failed"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + +#elif defined (TARGET_SOLARIS) + + /* example: route add -inet6 2001:db8::/32 somegateway 0 */ + + /* for some weird reason, this does not work for me unless I set + * "metric 0" - otherwise, the routes will be nicely installed, but + * packets will just disappear somewhere. So we use "0" now... + */ + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -inet6 %s/%d %s 0", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits, + gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Solaris route add -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) || defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -inet6 %s/%d", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits); + + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", gateway); + else + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-iface %s", device); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: *BSD route add -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -inet6 %s -prefixlen %d", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits ); + + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", gateway); + else + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-iface %s", device); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: MacOS X route add -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -inet6 %s -prefixlen %d %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits, gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OpenBSD route add -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s add -inet6 %s/%d %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits, gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: NetBSD route add -inet6 command failed"); + +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I don't know how to do 'route ipv6' commands on this operating system. Try putting your routes in a --route-up script"); +#endif + + r6->defined = status; + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +delete_route (struct route *r, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + struct argv argv; + const char *network; + const char *netmask; + const char *gateway; + int is_local_route; + + if ((r->flags & (RT_DEFINED|RT_ADDED)) != (RT_DEFINED|RT_ADDED)) + return; + + gc_init (&gc); + argv_init (&argv); + + network = print_in_addr_t (r->network, 0, &gc); + netmask = print_in_addr_t (r->netmask, 0, &gc); + gateway = print_in_addr_t (r->gateway, 0, &gc); + + is_local_route = local_route(r->network, r->netmask, r->gateway, rgi); + if (is_local_route == LR_ERROR) + goto done; + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + argv_printf (&argv, "%s route del %s/%d", + iproute_path, + network, + count_netmask_bits(netmask)); +#else + argv_printf (&argv, "%s del -net %s netmask %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + netmask); +#endif /*ENABLE_IPROUTE*/ + if (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "metric %d", r->metric); + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Linux route delete command failed"); + +#elif defined (WIN32) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc DELETE %s MASK %s %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_ROUTE_PATH_SUFFIX, + network, + netmask, + gateway); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + + if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_IPAPI) + { + const bool status = del_route_ipapi (r, tt); + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route deletion via IPAPI %s", status ? "succeeded" : "failed"); + } + else if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_EXE) + { + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route delete command failed"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + } + else if ((flags & ROUTE_METHOD_MASK) == ROUTE_METHOD_ADAPTIVE) + { + const bool status = del_route_ipapi (r, tt); + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route deletion via IPAPI %s [adaptive]", status ? "succeeded" : "failed"); + if (!status) + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "Route deletion fallback to route.exe"); + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route delete command failed [adaptive]"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + } + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + +#elif defined (TARGET_SOLARIS) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete %s -netmask %s %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + netmask, + gateway); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Solaris route delete command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -net %s %s %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: FreeBSD route delete command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -net %s %s %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: DragonFly route delete command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + + if (is_on_link (is_local_route, flags, rgi)) + { + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -cloning -net %s -netmask %s -interface %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + netmask, + rgi->iface); + } + else + { + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -net %s %s %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + gateway, + netmask); + } + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OS X route delete command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) || defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -net %s %s -netmask %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + gateway, + netmask); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OpenBSD/NetBSD route delete command failed"); +#elif defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + msg (M_NONFATAL, "Sorry, deleting routes on Android is not possible. The VpnService API allows routes to be set on connect only."); +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I don't know how to do 'route' commands on this operating system. Try putting your routes in a --route-up script"); +#endif + + done: + r->flags &= ~RT_ADDED; + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +delete_route_ipv6 (const struct route_ipv6 *r6, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc; + struct argv argv; + const char *network; + const char *gateway; + const char *device = tt->actual_name; + bool gateway_needed = false; + + if (!r6->defined) + return; + + gc_init (&gc); + argv_init (&argv); + + network = print_in6_addr_netbits_only( r6->network, r6->netbits, &gc); + gateway = print_in6_addr( r6->gateway, 0, &gc); + + if ( !tt->ipv6 ) + { + msg( M_INFO, "delete_route_ipv6(): not deleting %s/%d, no IPv6 on if %s", + network, r6->netbits, device ); + return; + } + + msg( M_INFO, "delete_route_ipv6(%s/%d)", network, r6->netbits ); + + /* if we used a gateway on "add route", we also need to specify it on + * delete, otherwise some OSes will refuse to delete the route + */ + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP && + !(r6->metric_defined && r6->metric == 0 ) ) + { + gateway_needed = true; + } + + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + argv_printf (&argv, "%s -6 route del %s/%d dev %s", + iproute_path, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "via %s", gateway); +#else + argv_printf (&argv, "%s -A inet6 del %s/%d dev %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "gw %s", gateway); + if (r6->metric_defined && r6->metric > 0 ) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, " metric %d", r6->metric); +#endif /*ENABLE_IPROUTE*/ + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Linux route -6/-A inet6 del command failed"); + +#elif defined (WIN32) + + /* netsh interface ipv6 delete route 2001:db8::/32 MyTunDevice */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc interface ipv6 delete route %s/%d %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + network, + r6->netbits, + device); + + /* next-hop depends on TUN or TAP mode: + * - in TAP mode, we use the "real" next-hop + * - in TUN mode we use a special-case link-local address that the tapdrvr + * knows about and will answer ND (neighbor discovery) packets for + * (and "route deletion without specifying next-hop" does not work...) + */ + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN ) + argv_printf_cat( &argv, " %s", "fe80::8" ); + else + argv_printf_cat( &argv, " %s", gateway ); + +#if 0 + if (r->metric_defined) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "METRIC %d", r->metric); +#endif + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Windows route add ipv6 command failed"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + +#elif defined (TARGET_SOLARIS) + + /* example: route delete -inet6 2001:db8::/32 somegateway */ + /* GERT-TODO: this is untested, but should work */ + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s/%d %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits, + gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: Solaris route delete -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) || defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s/%d", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, + r6->netbits ); + + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", gateway); + else + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-iface %s", device); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: *BSD route delete -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s -prefixlen %d", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits ); + + if (gateway_needed) + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "%s", gateway); + else + argv_printf_cat (&argv, "-iface %s", device); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: MacOS X route delete -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s -prefixlen %d %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits, gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: OpenBSD route delete -inet6 command failed"); + +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s/%d %s", + ROUTE_PATH, + network, r6->netbits, gateway ); + + argv_msg (D_ROUTE, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "ERROR: NetBSD route delete -inet6 command failed"); + +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I don't know how to do 'route ipv6' commands on this operating system. Try putting your routes in a --route-down script"); +#endif + + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * The --redirect-gateway option requires OS-specific code below + * to get the current default gateway. + */ + +#if defined(WIN32) + +static const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE * +get_windows_routing_table (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + ULONG size = 0; + PMIB_IPFORWARDTABLE rt = NULL; + DWORD status; + + status = GetIpForwardTable (NULL, &size, TRUE); + if (status == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) + { + rt = (PMIB_IPFORWARDTABLE) gc_malloc (size, false, gc); + status = GetIpForwardTable (rt, &size, TRUE); + if (status != NO_ERROR) + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "NOTE: GetIpForwardTable returned error: %s (code=%u)", + strerror_win32 (status, gc), + (unsigned int)status); + rt = NULL; + } + } + return rt; +} + +static int +test_route (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *adapters, + const in_addr_t gateway, + DWORD *index) +{ + int count = 0; + DWORD i = adapter_index_of_ip (adapters, gateway, &count, NULL); + if (index) + *index = i; + return count; +} + +static void +test_route_helper (bool *ret, + int *count, + int *good, + int *ambig, + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *adapters, + const in_addr_t gateway) +{ + int c; + + ++*count; + c = test_route (adapters, gateway, NULL); + if (c == 0) + *ret = false; + else + ++*good; + if (c > 1) + ++*ambig; +} + +/* + * If we tried to add routes now, would we succeed? + */ +bool +test_routes (const struct route_list *rl, const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *adapters = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + bool ret = false; + int count = 0; + int good = 0; + int ambig = 0; + bool adapter_up = false; + + if (is_adapter_up (tt, adapters)) + { + ret = true; + adapter_up = true; + + if (rl) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rl->n; ++i) + test_route_helper (&ret, &count, &good, &ambig, adapters, rl->routes[i].gateway); + + if ((rl->flags & RG_ENABLE) && (rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT)) + test_route_helper (&ret, &count, &good, &ambig, adapters, rl->spec.remote_endpoint); + } + } + + msg (D_ROUTE, "TEST ROUTES: %d/%d succeeded len=%d ret=%d a=%d u/d=%s", + good, + count, + rl ? rl->n : -1, + (int)ret, + ambig, + adapter_up ? "up" : "down"); + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static const MIB_IPFORWARDROW * +get_default_gateway_row (const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE *routes) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + DWORD lowest_metric = MAXDWORD; + const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *ret = NULL; + int i; + int best = -1; + + if (routes) + { + for (i = 0; i < routes->dwNumEntries; ++i) + { + const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *row = &routes->table[i]; + const in_addr_t net = ntohl (row->dwForwardDest); + const in_addr_t mask = ntohl (row->dwForwardMask); + const DWORD index = row->dwForwardIfIndex; + const DWORD metric = row->dwForwardMetric1; + + dmsg (D_ROUTE_DEBUG, "GDGR: route[%d] %s/%s i=%d m=%d", + i, + print_in_addr_t ((in_addr_t) net, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t ((in_addr_t) mask, 0, &gc), + (int)index, + (int)metric); + + if (!net && !mask && metric < lowest_metric) + { + ret = row; + lowest_metric = metric; + best = i; + } + } + } + + dmsg (D_ROUTE_DEBUG, "GDGR: best=%d lm=%u", best, (unsigned int)lowest_metric); + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *adapters = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE *routes = get_windows_routing_table (&gc); + const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *row = get_default_gateway_row (routes); + DWORD a_index; + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai; + + CLEAR(*rgi); + + if (row) + { + rgi->gateway.addr = ntohl (row->dwForwardNextHop); + if (rgi->gateway.addr) + { + rgi->flags |= RGI_ADDR_DEFINED; + a_index = adapter_index_of_ip (adapters, rgi->gateway.addr, NULL, &rgi->gateway.netmask); + if (a_index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + rgi->adapter_index = a_index; + rgi->flags |= (RGI_IFACE_DEFINED|RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED); + ai = get_adapter (adapters, a_index); + if (ai) + { + memcpy (rgi->hwaddr, ai->Address, 6); + rgi->flags |= RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED; + } + } + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static DWORD +windows_route_find_if_index (const struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + DWORD ret = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + int count = 0; + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *adapters = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *tun_adapter = get_tun_adapter (tt, adapters); + bool on_tun = false; + + /* first test on tun interface */ + if (is_ip_in_adapter_subnet (tun_adapter, r->gateway, NULL)) + { + ret = tun_adapter->Index; + count = 1; + on_tun = true; + } + else /* test on other interfaces */ + { + count = test_route (adapters, r->gateway, &ret); + } + + if (count == 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Warning: route gateway is not reachable on any active network adapters: %s", + print_in_addr_t (r->gateway, 0, &gc)); + ret = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + } + else if (count > 1) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Warning: route gateway is ambiguous: %s (%d matches)", + print_in_addr_t (r->gateway, 0, &gc), + count); + ret = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + } + + dmsg (D_ROUTE_DEBUG, "DEBUG: route find if: on_tun=%d count=%d index=%d", + on_tun, + count, + (int)ret); + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +bool +add_route_ipapi (const struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt, DWORD adapter_index) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + DWORD status; + const DWORD if_index = (adapter_index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) ? windows_route_find_if_index (r, tt) : adapter_index; + + if (if_index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + MIB_IPFORWARDROW fr; + CLEAR (fr); + fr.dwForwardDest = htonl (r->network); + fr.dwForwardMask = htonl (r->netmask); + fr.dwForwardPolicy = 0; + fr.dwForwardNextHop = htonl (r->gateway); + fr.dwForwardIfIndex = if_index; + fr.dwForwardType = 4; /* the next hop is not the final dest */ + fr.dwForwardProto = 3; /* PROTO_IP_NETMGMT */ + fr.dwForwardAge = 0; + fr.dwForwardNextHopAS = 0; + fr.dwForwardMetric1 = (r->flags & RT_METRIC_DEFINED) ? r->metric : 1; + fr.dwForwardMetric2 = METRIC_NOT_USED; + fr.dwForwardMetric3 = METRIC_NOT_USED; + fr.dwForwardMetric4 = METRIC_NOT_USED; + fr.dwForwardMetric5 = METRIC_NOT_USED; + + if ((r->network & r->netmask) != r->network) + msg (M_WARN, "Warning: address %s is not a network address in relation to netmask %s", + print_in_addr_t (r->network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (r->netmask, 0, &gc)); + + status = CreateIpForwardEntry (&fr); + + if (status == NO_ERROR) + ret = true; + else + { + /* failed, try increasing the metric to work around Vista issue */ + const unsigned int forward_metric_limit = 2048; /* iteratively retry higher metrics up to this limit */ + + for ( ; fr.dwForwardMetric1 <= forward_metric_limit; ++fr.dwForwardMetric1) + { + /* try a different forward type=3 ("the next hop is the final dest") in addition to 4. + --redirect-gateway over RRAS seems to need this. */ + for (fr.dwForwardType = 4; fr.dwForwardType >= 3; --fr.dwForwardType) + { + status = CreateIpForwardEntry (&fr); + if (status == NO_ERROR) + { + msg (D_ROUTE, "ROUTE: CreateIpForwardEntry succeeded with dwForwardMetric1=%u and dwForwardType=%u", + (unsigned int)fr.dwForwardMetric1, + (unsigned int)fr.dwForwardType); + ret = true; + goto doublebreak; + } + else if (status != ERROR_BAD_ARGUMENTS) + goto doublebreak; + } + } + + doublebreak: + if (status != NO_ERROR) + msg (M_WARN, "ROUTE: route addition failed using CreateIpForwardEntry: %s [status=%u if_index=%u]", + strerror_win32 (status, &gc), + (unsigned int)status, + (unsigned int)if_index); + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +bool +del_route_ipapi (const struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + DWORD status; + const DWORD if_index = windows_route_find_if_index (r, tt); + + if (if_index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + MIB_IPFORWARDROW fr; + CLEAR (fr); + + fr.dwForwardDest = htonl (r->network); + fr.dwForwardMask = htonl (r->netmask); + fr.dwForwardPolicy = 0; + fr.dwForwardNextHop = htonl (r->gateway); + fr.dwForwardIfIndex = if_index; + + status = DeleteIpForwardEntry (&fr); + + if (status == NO_ERROR) + ret = true; + else + msg (M_WARN, "ROUTE: route deletion failed using DeleteIpForwardEntry: %s", + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static const char * +format_route_entry (const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *r, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "%s %s %s p=%d i=%d t=%d pr=%d a=%d h=%d m=%d/%d/%d/%d/%d", + print_in_addr_t (r->dwForwardDest, IA_NET_ORDER, gc), + print_in_addr_t (r->dwForwardMask, IA_NET_ORDER, gc), + print_in_addr_t (r->dwForwardNextHop, IA_NET_ORDER, gc), + (int)r->dwForwardPolicy, + (int)r->dwForwardIfIndex, + (int)r->dwForwardType, + (int)r->dwForwardProto, + (int)r->dwForwardAge, + (int)r->dwForwardNextHopAS, + (int)r->dwForwardMetric1, + (int)r->dwForwardMetric2, + (int)r->dwForwardMetric3, + (int)r->dwForwardMetric4, + (int)r->dwForwardMetric5); + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Show current routing table + */ +void +show_routes (int msglev) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + + const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE *rt = get_windows_routing_table (&gc); + + msg (msglev, "SYSTEM ROUTING TABLE"); + if (rt) + { + for (i = 0; i < rt->dwNumEntries; ++i) + { + msg (msglev, "%s", format_route_entry (&rt->table[i], &gc)); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_LINUX) || defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int sd = -1; + char best_name[16]; + best_name[0] = 0; + + CLEAR(*rgi); + + /* get default gateway IP addr */ + { + FILE *fp = fopen ("/proc/net/route", "r"); + if (fp) + { + char line[256]; + int count = 0; + unsigned int lowest_metric = UINT_MAX; + in_addr_t best_gw = 0; + bool found = false; + while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), fp) != NULL) + { + if (count) + { + unsigned int net_x = 0; + unsigned int mask_x = 0; + unsigned int gw_x = 0; + unsigned int metric = 0; + unsigned int flags = 0; + char name[16]; + name[0] = 0; + const int np = sscanf (line, "%15s\t%x\t%x\t%x\t%*s\t%*s\t%d\t%x", + name, + &net_x, + &gw_x, + &flags, + &metric, + &mask_x); + if (np == 6 && (flags & IFF_UP)) + { + const in_addr_t net = ntohl (net_x); + const in_addr_t mask = ntohl (mask_x); + const in_addr_t gw = ntohl (gw_x); + + if (!net && !mask && metric < lowest_metric) + { + found = true; + best_gw = gw; + strcpy (best_name, name); + lowest_metric = metric; + } + } + } + ++count; + } + fclose (fp); + + if (found) + { + rgi->gateway.addr = best_gw; + rgi->flags |= RGI_ADDR_DEFINED; + if (!rgi->gateway.addr && best_name[0]) + rgi->flags |= RGI_ON_LINK; + } + } + } + + /* scan adapter list */ + if (rgi->flags & RGI_ADDR_DEFINED) + { + struct ifreq *ifr, *ifend; + in_addr_t addr, netmask; + struct ifreq ifreq; + struct ifconf ifc; + struct ifreq ifs[20]; /* Maximum number of interfaces to scan */ + + if ((sd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: socket() failed"); + goto done; + } + ifc.ifc_len = sizeof (ifs); + ifc.ifc_req = ifs; + if (ioctl (sd, SIOCGIFCONF, &ifc) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: ioctl(SIOCGIFCONF) failed"); + goto done; + } + + /* scan through interface list */ + ifend = ifs + (ifc.ifc_len / sizeof (struct ifreq)); + for (ifr = ifc.ifc_req; ifr < ifend; ifr++) + { + if (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET) + { + /* get interface addr */ + addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *) &ifr->ifr_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr); + + /* get interface name */ + strncpynt (ifreq.ifr_name, ifr->ifr_name, sizeof (ifreq.ifr_name)); + + /* check that the interface is up */ + if (ioctl (sd, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifreq) < 0) + continue; + if (!(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) + continue; + + if (rgi->flags & RGI_ON_LINK) + { + /* check that interface name of current interface + matches interface name of best default route */ + if (strcmp(ifreq.ifr_name, best_name)) + continue; +#if 0 + /* if point-to-point link, use remote addr as route gateway */ + if ((ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && ioctl (sd, SIOCGIFDSTADDR, &ifreq) >= 0) + { + rgi->gateway.addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *) &ifreq.ifr_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr); + if (rgi->gateway.addr) + rgi->flags &= ~RGI_ON_LINK; + } +#endif + } + else + { + /* get interface netmask */ + if (ioctl (sd, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &ifreq) < 0) + continue; + netmask = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *) &ifreq.ifr_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr); + + /* check that interface matches default route */ + if (((rgi->gateway.addr ^ addr) & netmask) != 0) + continue; + + /* save netmask */ + rgi->gateway.netmask = netmask; + rgi->flags |= RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED; + } + + /* save iface name */ + strncpynt (rgi->iface, ifreq.ifr_name, sizeof(rgi->iface)); + rgi->flags |= RGI_IFACE_DEFINED; + + /* now get the hardware address. */ + memset (&ifreq.ifr_hwaddr, 0, sizeof (struct sockaddr)); + if (ioctl (sd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifreq) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: SIOCGIFHWADDR(%s) failed", ifreq.ifr_name); + goto done; + } + memcpy (rgi->hwaddr, &ifreq.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, 6); + rgi->flags |= RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED; + + break; + } + } + } + + done: + if (sd >= 0) + close (sd); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD)||defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + +#include +#include +#include + +/* all of this is taken from in FreeBSD */ +#define RTA_DST 0x1 +#define RTA_GATEWAY 0x2 +#define RTA_NETMASK 0x4 + +#define RTM_GET 0x4 +#define RTM_VERSION 5 + +#define RTF_UP 0x1 +#define RTF_GATEWAY 0x2 + +/* + * These numbers are used by reliable protocols for determining + * retransmission behavior and are included in the routing structure. + */ +struct rt_metrics { + u_long rmx_locks; /* Kernel must leave these values alone */ + u_long rmx_mtu; /* MTU for this path */ + u_long rmx_hopcount; /* max hops expected */ + u_long rmx_expire; /* lifetime for route, e.g. redirect */ + u_long rmx_recvpipe; /* inbound delay-bandwidth product */ + u_long rmx_sendpipe; /* outbound delay-bandwidth product */ + u_long rmx_ssthresh; /* outbound gateway buffer limit */ + u_long rmx_rtt; /* estimated round trip time */ + u_long rmx_rttvar; /* estimated rtt variance */ + u_long rmx_pksent; /* packets sent using this route */ + u_long rmx_filler[4]; /* will be used for T/TCP later */ +}; + +/* + * Structures for routing messages. + */ +struct rt_msghdr { + u_short rtm_msglen; /* to skip over non-understood messages */ + u_char rtm_version; /* future binary compatibility */ + u_char rtm_type; /* message type */ + u_short rtm_index; /* index for associated ifp */ + int rtm_flags; /* flags, incl. kern & message, e.g. DONE */ + int rtm_addrs; /* bitmask identifying sockaddrs in msg */ + pid_t rtm_pid; /* identify sender */ + int rtm_seq; /* for sender to identify action */ + int rtm_errno; /* why failed */ + int rtm_use; /* from rtentry */ + u_long rtm_inits; /* which metrics we are initializing */ + struct rt_metrics rtm_rmx; /* metrics themselves */ +}; + +struct { + struct rt_msghdr m_rtm; + char m_space[512]; +} m_rtmsg; + +#define ROUNDUP(a) \ + ((a) > 0 ? (1 + (((a) - 1) | (sizeof(long) - 1))) : sizeof(long)) + +/* + * FIXME -- add support for netmask, hwaddr, and iface + */ +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int s, seq, l, pid, rtm_addrs, i; + struct sockaddr so_dst, so_mask; + char *cp = m_rtmsg.m_space; + struct sockaddr *gate = NULL, *sa; + struct rt_msghdr *rtm_aux; + +#define NEXTADDR(w, u) \ + if (rtm_addrs & (w)) {\ + l = ROUNDUP(u.sa_len); memmove(cp, &(u), l); cp += l;\ + } + +#define ADVANCE(x, n) (x += ROUNDUP((n)->sa_len)) + +#define rtm m_rtmsg.m_rtm + + CLEAR(*rgi); + + pid = getpid(); + seq = 0; + rtm_addrs = RTA_DST | RTA_NETMASK; + + bzero(&so_dst, sizeof(so_dst)); + bzero(&so_mask, sizeof(so_mask)); + bzero(&rtm, sizeof(struct rt_msghdr)); + + rtm.rtm_type = RTM_GET; + rtm.rtm_flags = RTF_UP | RTF_GATEWAY; + rtm.rtm_version = RTM_VERSION; + rtm.rtm_seq = ++seq; + rtm.rtm_addrs = rtm_addrs; + + so_dst.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_dst.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + so_mask.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_mask.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + + NEXTADDR(RTA_DST, so_dst); + NEXTADDR(RTA_NETMASK, so_mask); + + rtm.rtm_msglen = l = cp - (char *)&m_rtmsg; + + s = socket(PF_ROUTE, SOCK_RAW, 0); + + if (write(s, (char *)&m_rtmsg, l) < 0) + { + msg(M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "Could not retrieve default gateway from route socket:"); + gc_free (&gc); + close(s); + return; + } + + do { + l = read(s, (char *)&m_rtmsg, sizeof(m_rtmsg)); + } while (l > 0 && (rtm.rtm_seq != seq || rtm.rtm_pid != pid)); + + close(s); + + rtm_aux = &rtm; + + cp = ((char *)(rtm_aux + 1)); + if (rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) { + for (i = 1; i; i <<= 1) + if (i & rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) { + sa = (struct sockaddr *)cp; + if (i == RTA_GATEWAY ) + gate = sa; + ADVANCE(cp, sa); + } + } + else + { + gc_free (&gc); + return; + } + + + if (gate != NULL ) + { + rgi->gateway.addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)gate)->sin_addr.s_addr); + rgi->flags |= RGI_ADDR_DEFINED; + + gc_free (&gc); + } + else + { + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +struct rtmsg { + struct rt_msghdr m_rtm; + char m_space[512]; +}; + +#define ROUNDUP(a) \ + ((a) > 0 ? (1 + (((a) - 1) | (sizeof(uint32_t) - 1))) : sizeof(uint32_t)) + +#define NEXTADDR(w, u) \ + if (rtm_addrs & (w)) {\ + l = ROUNDUP(u.sa_len); memmove(cp, &(u), l); cp += l;\ + } + +#define ADVANCE(x, n) (x += ROUNDUP((n)->sa_len)) + +#define max(a,b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b)) + +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct rtmsg m_rtmsg; + int sockfd = -1; + int seq, l, pid, rtm_addrs, i; + struct sockaddr so_dst, so_mask; + char *cp = m_rtmsg.m_space; + struct sockaddr *gate = NULL, *ifp = NULL, *sa; + struct rt_msghdr *rtm_aux; + +# define rtm m_rtmsg.m_rtm + + CLEAR(*rgi); + + /* setup data to send to routing socket */ + pid = getpid(); + seq = 0; + rtm_addrs = RTA_DST | RTA_NETMASK | RTA_IFP; + + bzero(&m_rtmsg, sizeof(m_rtmsg)); + bzero(&so_dst, sizeof(so_dst)); + bzero(&so_mask, sizeof(so_mask)); + bzero(&rtm, sizeof(struct rt_msghdr)); + + rtm.rtm_type = RTM_GET; + rtm.rtm_flags = RTF_UP | RTF_GATEWAY; + rtm.rtm_version = RTM_VERSION; + rtm.rtm_seq = ++seq; + rtm.rtm_addrs = rtm_addrs; + + so_dst.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_dst.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + so_mask.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_mask.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + + NEXTADDR(RTA_DST, so_dst); + NEXTADDR(RTA_NETMASK, so_mask); + + rtm.rtm_msglen = l = cp - (char *)&m_rtmsg; + + /* transact with routing socket */ + sockfd = socket(PF_ROUTE, SOCK_RAW, 0); + if (sockfd < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: socket #1 failed"); + goto done; + } + if (write(sockfd, (char *)&m_rtmsg, l) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: problem writing to routing socket"); + goto done; + } + do { + l = read(sockfd, (char *)&m_rtmsg, sizeof(m_rtmsg)); + } while (l > 0 && (rtm.rtm_seq != seq || rtm.rtm_pid != pid)); + close(sockfd); + sockfd = -1; + + /* extract return data from routing socket */ + rtm_aux = &rtm; + cp = ((char *)(rtm_aux + 1)); + if (rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) + { + for (i = 1; i; i <<= 1) + { + if (i & rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) + { + sa = (struct sockaddr *)cp; + if (i == RTA_GATEWAY ) + gate = sa; + else if (i == RTA_IFP) + ifp = sa; + ADVANCE(cp, sa); + } + } + } + else + goto done; + + /* get gateway addr and interface name */ + if (gate != NULL ) + { + /* get default gateway addr */ + rgi->gateway.addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)gate)->sin_addr.s_addr); + if (rgi->gateway.addr) + rgi->flags |= RGI_ADDR_DEFINED; + + if (ifp) + { + /* get interface name */ + const struct sockaddr_dl *adl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) ifp; + int len = adl->sdl_nlen; + if (adl->sdl_nlen && adl->sdl_nlen < sizeof(rgi->iface)) + { + memcpy (rgi->iface, adl->sdl_data, adl->sdl_nlen); + rgi->iface[adl->sdl_nlen] = '\0'; + rgi->flags |= RGI_IFACE_DEFINED; + } + } + } + + /* get netmask of interface that owns default gateway */ + if (rgi->flags & RGI_IFACE_DEFINED) { + struct ifreq ifr; + + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (sockfd < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: socket #2 failed"); + goto done; + } + + CLEAR(ifr); + ifr.ifr_addr.sa_family = AF_INET; + strncpynt(ifr.ifr_name, rgi->iface, IFNAMSIZ); + + if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFNETMASK, (char *)&ifr) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: ioctl #1 failed"); + goto done; + } + close(sockfd); + sockfd = -1; + + rgi->gateway.netmask = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)&ifr.ifr_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr); + rgi->flags |= RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED; + } + + /* try to read MAC addr associated with interface that owns default gateway */ + if (rgi->flags & RGI_IFACE_DEFINED) + { + struct ifconf ifc; + struct ifreq *ifr; + const int bufsize = 4096; + char *buffer; + + buffer = (char *) gc_malloc (bufsize, true, &gc); + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (sockfd < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: socket #3 failed"); + goto done; + } + + ifc.ifc_len = bufsize; + ifc.ifc_buf = buffer; + + if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "GDG: ioctl #2 failed"); + goto done; + } + close(sockfd); + sockfd = -1; + + for (cp = buffer; cp <= buffer + ifc.ifc_len - sizeof(struct ifreq); ) + { + ifr = (struct ifreq *)cp; + const size_t len = sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + max(sizeof(ifr->ifr_addr), ifr->ifr_addr.sa_len); + if (!ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family) + break; + if (!strncmp(ifr->ifr_name, rgi->iface, IFNAMSIZ)) + { + if (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_LINK) + { + struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *)&ifr->ifr_addr; + memcpy(rgi->hwaddr, LLADDR(sdl), 6); + rgi->flags |= RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED; + } + } + cp += len; + } + } + + done: + if (sockfd >= 0) + close(sockfd); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#undef max + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) || defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + +#include +#include +#include + +/* all of this is taken from in OpenBSD 3.6 */ +#define RTA_DST 0x1 /* destination sockaddr present */ +#define RTA_GATEWAY 0x2 /* gateway sockaddr present */ +#define RTA_NETMASK 0x4 /* netmask sockaddr present */ + +#define RTM_GET 0x4 /* Report Metrics */ + +#define RTM_VERSION 3 /* Up the ante and ignore older versions */ + +#define RTF_UP 0x1 /* route usable */ +#define RTF_GATEWAY 0x2 /* destination is a gateway */ + +/* + * Huge version for userland compatibility. + */ +struct rt_metrics { + u_long rmx_locks; /* Kernel must leave these values alone */ + u_long rmx_mtu; /* MTU for this path */ + u_long rmx_hopcount; /* max hops expected */ + u_long rmx_expire; /* lifetime for route, e.g. redirect */ + u_long rmx_recvpipe; /* inbound delay-bandwidth product */ + u_long rmx_sendpipe; /* outbound delay-bandwidth product */ + u_long rmx_ssthresh; /* outbound gateway buffer limit */ + u_long rmx_rtt; /* estimated round trip time */ + u_long rmx_rttvar; /* estimated rtt variance */ + u_long rmx_pksent; /* packets sent using this route */ +}; + +/* + * Structures for routing messages. + */ +struct rt_msghdr { + u_short rtm_msglen; /* to skip over non-understood messages */ + u_char rtm_version; /* future binary compatibility */ + u_char rtm_type; /* message type */ + u_short rtm_index; /* index for associated ifp */ + int rtm_flags; /* flags, incl. kern & message, e.g. DONE */ + int rtm_addrs; /* bitmask identifying sockaddrs in msg */ + pid_t rtm_pid; /* identify sender */ + int rtm_seq; /* for sender to identify action */ + int rtm_errno; /* why failed */ + int rtm_use; /* from rtentry */ + u_long rtm_inits; /* which metrics we are initializing */ + struct rt_metrics rtm_rmx; /* metrics themselves */ +}; + +struct { + struct rt_msghdr m_rtm; + char m_space[512]; +} m_rtmsg; + +#define ROUNDUP(a) \ + ((a) > 0 ? (1 + (((a) - 1) | (sizeof(long) - 1))) : sizeof(long)) + +/* + * FIXME -- add support for netmask, hwaddr, and iface + */ +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int s, seq, l, rtm_addrs, i; + pid_t pid; + struct sockaddr so_dst, so_mask; + char *cp = m_rtmsg.m_space; + struct sockaddr *gate = NULL, *sa; + struct rt_msghdr *rtm_aux; + +#define NEXTADDR(w, u) \ + if (rtm_addrs & (w)) {\ + l = ROUNDUP(u.sa_len); memmove(cp, &(u), l); cp += l;\ + } + +#define ADVANCE(x, n) (x += ROUNDUP((n)->sa_len)) + +#define rtm m_rtmsg.m_rtm + + CLEAR(*rgi); + + pid = getpid(); + seq = 0; + rtm_addrs = RTA_DST | RTA_NETMASK; + + bzero(&so_dst, sizeof(so_dst)); + bzero(&so_mask, sizeof(so_mask)); + bzero(&rtm, sizeof(struct rt_msghdr)); + + rtm.rtm_type = RTM_GET; + rtm.rtm_flags = RTF_UP | RTF_GATEWAY; + rtm.rtm_version = RTM_VERSION; + rtm.rtm_seq = ++seq; + rtm.rtm_addrs = rtm_addrs; + + so_dst.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_dst.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + so_mask.sa_family = AF_INET; + so_mask.sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + + NEXTADDR(RTA_DST, so_dst); + NEXTADDR(RTA_NETMASK, so_mask); + + rtm.rtm_msglen = l = cp - (char *)&m_rtmsg; + + s = socket(PF_ROUTE, SOCK_RAW, 0); + + if (write(s, (char *)&m_rtmsg, l) < 0) + { + msg(M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "Could not retrieve default gateway from route socket:"); + gc_free (&gc); + close(s); + return; + } + + do { + l = read(s, (char *)&m_rtmsg, sizeof(m_rtmsg)); + } while (l > 0 && (rtm.rtm_seq != seq || rtm.rtm_pid != pid)); + + close(s); + + rtm_aux = &rtm; + + cp = ((char *)(rtm_aux + 1)); + if (rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) { + for (i = 1; i; i <<= 1) + if (i & rtm_aux->rtm_addrs) { + sa = (struct sockaddr *)cp; + if (i == RTA_GATEWAY ) + gate = sa; + ADVANCE(cp, sa); + } + } + else + { + gc_free (&gc); + return; + } + + + if (gate != NULL ) + { + rgi->gateway.addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)gate)->sin_addr.s_addr); + rgi->flags |= RGI_ADDR_DEFINED; + + gc_free (&gc); + } + else + { + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +#else + +/* + * This is a platform-specific method that returns data about + * the current default gateway. Return data is placed into + * a struct route_gateway_info object provided by caller. The + * implementation should CLEAR the structure before adding + * data to it. + * + * Data returned includes: + * 1. default gateway address (rgi->gateway.addr) + * 2. netmask of interface that owns default gateway + * (rgi->gateway.netmask) + * 3. hardware address (i.e. MAC address) of interface that owns + * default gateway (rgi->hwaddr) + * 4. interface name (or adapter index on Windows) that owns default + * gateway (rgi->iface or rgi->adapter_index) + * 5. an array of additional address/netmask pairs defined by + * interface that owns default gateway (rgi->addrs with length + * given in rgi->n_addrs) + * + * The flags RGI_x_DEFINED may be used to indicate which of the data + * members were successfully returned (set in rgi->flags). All of + * the data members are optional, however certain OpenVPN functionality + * may be disabled by missing items. + */ +void +get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + CLEAR(*rgi); +} + +#endif + +bool +netmask_to_netbits (const in_addr_t network, const in_addr_t netmask, int *netbits) +{ + int i; + const int addrlen = sizeof (in_addr_t) * 8; + + if ((network & netmask) == network) + { + for (i = 0; i <= addrlen; ++i) + { + in_addr_t mask = netbits_to_netmask (i); + if (mask == netmask) + { + if (i == addrlen) + *netbits = -1; + else + *netbits = i; + return true; + } + } + } + return false; +} + +/* + * get_bypass_addresses() is used by the redirect-gateway bypass-x + * functions to build a route bypass to selected DHCP/DNS servers, + * so that outgoing packets to these servers don't end up in the tunnel. + */ + +#if defined(WIN32) + +static void +add_host_route_if_nonlocal (struct route_bypass *rb, const in_addr_t addr) +{ + if (test_local_addr(addr, NULL) == TLA_NONLOCAL && addr != 0 && addr != IPV4_NETMASK_HOST) + add_bypass_address (rb, addr); +} + +static void +add_host_route_array (struct route_bypass *rb, const IP_ADDR_STRING *iplist) +{ + while (iplist) + { + bool succeed = false; + const in_addr_t ip = getaddr (GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, iplist->IpAddress.String, 0, &succeed, NULL); + if (succeed) + { + add_host_route_if_nonlocal (rb, ip); + } + iplist = iplist->Next; + } +} + +static void +get_bypass_addresses (struct route_bypass *rb, const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + /*bool ret_bool = false;*/ + + /* get full routing table */ + const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE *routes = get_windows_routing_table (&gc); + + /* get the route which represents the default gateway */ + const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *row = get_default_gateway_row (routes); + + if (row) + { + /* get the adapter which the default gateway is associated with */ + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *dgi = get_adapter_info (row->dwForwardIfIndex, &gc); + + /* get extra adapter info, such as DNS addresses */ + const IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO *pai = get_per_adapter_info (row->dwForwardIfIndex, &gc); + + /* Bypass DHCP server address */ + if ((flags & RG_BYPASS_DHCP) && dgi && dgi->DhcpEnabled) + add_host_route_array (rb, &dgi->DhcpServer); + + /* Bypass DNS server addresses */ + if ((flags & RG_BYPASS_DNS) && pai) + add_host_route_array (rb, &pai->DnsServerList); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#else + +static void +get_bypass_addresses (struct route_bypass *rb, const unsigned int flags) /* PLATFORM-SPECIFIC */ +{ +} + +#endif + +/* + * Test if addr is reachable via a local interface (return ILA_LOCAL), + * or if it needs to be routed via the default gateway (return + * ILA_NONLOCAL). If the target platform doesn't implement this + * function, return ILA_NOT_IMPLEMENTED. + * + * Used by redirect-gateway autolocal feature + */ + +#if defined(WIN32) + +int +test_local_addr (const in_addr_t addr, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const in_addr_t nonlocal_netmask = 0x80000000L; /* routes with netmask <= to this are considered non-local */ + bool ret = TLA_NONLOCAL; + + /* get full routing table */ + const MIB_IPFORWARDTABLE *rt = get_windows_routing_table (&gc); + if (rt) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rt->dwNumEntries; ++i) + { + const MIB_IPFORWARDROW *row = &rt->table[i]; + const in_addr_t net = ntohl (row->dwForwardDest); + const in_addr_t mask = ntohl (row->dwForwardMask); + if (mask > nonlocal_netmask && (addr & mask) == net) + { + ret = TLA_LOCAL; + break; + } + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +#else + +int +test_local_addr (const in_addr_t addr, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi) /* PLATFORM-SPECIFIC */ +{ + if (rgi) + { + if (local_route (addr, 0xFFFFFFFF, rgi->gateway.addr, rgi)) + return TLA_LOCAL; + else + return TLA_NONLOCAL; + } + return TLA_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e63db595 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/route.h @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Support routines for adding/deleting network routes. + */ + +#ifndef ROUTE_H +#define ROUTE_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "tun.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#define MAX_ROUTES_DEFAULT 100 + +#ifdef WIN32 +/* + * Windows route methods + */ +#define ROUTE_METHOD_ADAPTIVE 0 /* try IP helper first then route.exe */ +#define ROUTE_METHOD_IPAPI 1 /* use IP helper API */ +#define ROUTE_METHOD_EXE 2 /* use route.exe */ +#define ROUTE_METHOD_MASK 3 +#endif + +/* + * Route add/delete flags (must stay clear of ROUTE_METHOD bits) + */ +#define ROUTE_DELETE_FIRST (1<<2) +#define ROUTE_REF_GW (1<<3) + +struct route_bypass +{ +# define N_ROUTE_BYPASS 8 + int n_bypass; + in_addr_t bypass[N_ROUTE_BYPASS]; +}; + +struct route_special_addr +{ + /* bits indicating which members below are defined */ +# define RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT (1<<0) +# define RTSA_REMOTE_HOST (1<<1) +# define RTSA_DEFAULT_METRIC (1<<2) + unsigned int flags; + + in_addr_t remote_endpoint; + in_addr_t remote_host; + int remote_host_local; /* TLA_x value */ + struct route_bypass bypass; + int default_metric; +}; + +struct route_option { + const char *network; + const char *netmask; + const char *gateway; + const char *metric; +}; + +/* redirect-gateway flags */ +#define RG_ENABLE (1<<0) +#define RG_LOCAL (1<<1) +#define RG_DEF1 (1<<2) +#define RG_BYPASS_DHCP (1<<3) +#define RG_BYPASS_DNS (1<<4) +#define RG_REROUTE_GW (1<<5) +#define RG_AUTO_LOCAL (1<<6) +#define RG_BLOCK_LOCAL (1<<7) + +struct route_option_list { + unsigned int flags; /* RG_x flags */ + int capacity; + int n; + struct route_option routes[EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE]; +}; + +struct route_ipv6_option { + const char *prefix; /* e.g. "2001:db8:1::/64" */ + const char *gateway; /* e.g. "2001:db8:0::2" */ + const char *metric; /* e.g. "5" */ +}; + +struct route_ipv6_option_list { + unsigned int flags; + int capacity; + int n; + struct route_ipv6_option routes_ipv6[EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE]; +}; + +struct route { +# define RT_DEFINED (1<<0) +# define RT_ADDED (1<<1) +# define RT_METRIC_DEFINED (1<<2) + unsigned int flags; + const struct route_option *option; + in_addr_t network; + in_addr_t netmask; + in_addr_t gateway; + int metric; +}; + +struct route_ipv6 { + bool defined; + struct in6_addr network; + unsigned int netbits; + struct in6_addr gateway; + bool metric_defined; + int metric; +}; + +struct route_ipv6_list { + bool routes_added; + unsigned int flags; + int default_metric; + bool default_metric_defined; + struct in6_addr remote_endpoint_ipv6; + bool remote_endpoint_defined; + bool did_redirect_default_gateway; /* TODO (?) */ + bool did_local; /* TODO (?) */ + int capacity; + int n; + struct route_ipv6 routes_ipv6[EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE]; +}; + + +struct route_gateway_address { + in_addr_t addr; + in_addr_t netmask; +}; + +struct route_gateway_info { +# define RGI_ADDR_DEFINED (1<<0) /* set if gateway.addr defined */ +# define RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED (1<<1) /* set if gateway.netmask defined */ +# define RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED (1<<2) /* set if hwaddr is defined */ +# define RGI_IFACE_DEFINED (1<<3) /* set if iface is defined */ +# define RGI_OVERFLOW (1<<4) /* set if more interface addresses than will fit in addrs */ +# define RGI_ON_LINK (1<<5) + unsigned int flags; + + /* gateway interface */ +# ifdef WIN32 + DWORD adapter_index; /* interface or ~0 if undefined */ +#else + char iface[16]; /* interface name (null terminated), may be empty */ +#endif + + /* gateway interface hardware address */ + uint8_t hwaddr[6]; + + /* gateway/router address */ + struct route_gateway_address gateway; + + /* address/netmask pairs bound to interface */ +# define RGI_N_ADDRESSES 8 + int n_addrs; /* len of addrs, may be 0 */ + struct route_gateway_address addrs[RGI_N_ADDRESSES]; /* local addresses attached to iface */ +}; + +struct route_list { +# define RL_DID_REDIRECT_DEFAULT_GATEWAY (1<<0) +# define RL_DID_LOCAL (1<<1) +# define RL_ROUTES_ADDED (1<<2) + unsigned int iflags; + + struct route_special_addr spec; + struct route_gateway_info rgi; + unsigned int flags; /* RG_x flags */ + int capacity; + int n; + struct route routes[EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE]; +}; + +#if P2MP +/* internal OpenVPN route */ +struct iroute { + in_addr_t network; + int netbits; + struct iroute *next; +}; + +struct iroute_ipv6 { + struct in6_addr network; + unsigned int netbits; + struct iroute_ipv6 *next; +}; +#endif + +struct route_option_list *new_route_option_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a); +struct route_ipv6_option_list *new_route_ipv6_option_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a); + +struct route_option_list *clone_route_option_list (const struct route_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *a); +struct route_ipv6_option_list *clone_route_ipv6_option_list (const struct route_ipv6_option_list *src, struct gc_arena *a); +void copy_route_option_list (struct route_option_list *dest, const struct route_option_list *src); +void copy_route_ipv6_option_list (struct route_ipv6_option_list *dest, + const struct route_ipv6_option_list *src); + +struct route_list *new_route_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a); +struct route_ipv6_list *new_route_ipv6_list (const int max_routes, struct gc_arena *a); + +void add_route_ipv6 (struct route_ipv6 *r, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es); +void delete_route_ipv6 (const struct route_ipv6 *r, const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int flags, const struct env_set *es); + +void add_route (struct route *r, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct route_gateway_info *rgi, + const struct env_set *es); + +void add_route_to_option_list (struct route_option_list *l, + const char *network, + const char *netmask, + const char *gateway, + const char *metric); + +void add_route_ipv6_to_option_list (struct route_ipv6_option_list *l, + const char *prefix, + const char *gateway, + const char *metric); + +bool init_route_list (struct route_list *rl, + const struct route_option_list *opt, + const char *remote_endpoint, + int default_metric, + in_addr_t remote_host, + struct env_set *es); + +bool init_route_ipv6_list (struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, + const struct route_ipv6_option_list *opt6, + const char *remote_endpoint, + int default_metric, + struct env_set *es); + +void route_list_add_vpn_gateway (struct route_list *rl, + struct env_set *es, + const in_addr_t addr); + +void add_routes (struct route_list *rl, + struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct env_set *es); + +void delete_routes (struct route_list *rl, + struct route_ipv6_list *rl6, + const struct tuntap *tt, + unsigned int flags, + const struct env_set *es); + +void setenv_routes (struct env_set *es, const struct route_list *rl); +void setenv_routes_ipv6 (struct env_set *es, const struct route_ipv6_list *rl6); + + + +bool is_special_addr (const char *addr_str); + +void get_default_gateway (struct route_gateway_info *rgi); +void print_default_gateway(const int msglevel, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi); + +/* + * Test if addr is reachable via a local interface (return ILA_LOCAL), + * or if it needs to be routed via the default gateway (return + * ILA_NONLOCAL). If the current platform doesn't implement this + * function, return ILA_NOT_IMPLEMENTED. + */ +#define TLA_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 0 +#define TLA_NONLOCAL 1 +#define TLA_LOCAL 2 +int test_local_addr (const in_addr_t addr, const struct route_gateway_info *rgi); + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +void print_route_options (const struct route_option_list *rol, + int level); +#endif + +void print_routes (const struct route_list *rl, int level); + +#ifdef WIN32 + +void show_routes (int msglev); +bool test_routes (const struct route_list *rl, const struct tuntap *tt); +bool add_route_ipapi (const struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt, DWORD adapter_index); +bool del_route_ipapi (const struct route *r, const struct tuntap *tt); + +#else +static inline bool test_routes (const struct route_list *rl, const struct tuntap *tt) { return true; } +#endif + +bool netmask_to_netbits (const in_addr_t network, const in_addr_t netmask, int *netbits); + +static inline in_addr_t +netbits_to_netmask (const int netbits) +{ + const int addrlen = sizeof (in_addr_t) * 8; + in_addr_t mask = 0; + if (netbits > 0 && netbits <= addrlen) + mask = IPV4_NETMASK_HOST << (addrlen-netbits); + return mask; +} + +static inline bool +route_list_vpn_gateway_needed (const struct route_list *rl) +{ + if (!rl) + return false; + else + return !(rl->spec.flags & RTSA_REMOTE_ENDPOINT); +} + +static inline int +route_did_redirect_default_gateway(const struct route_list *rl) +{ + return rl && BOOL_CAST(rl->iflags & RL_DID_REDIRECT_DEFAULT_GATEWAY); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..471330f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.c @@ -0,0 +1,659 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "schedule.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + +struct status +{ + int sru; + int ins; + int coll; + int lsteps; +}; + +static struct status z; + +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG +static void +schedule_entry_debug_info (const char *caller, const struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (e) + { + dmsg (D_SCHEDULER, "SCHEDULE: %s wakeup=[%s] pri=%u", + caller, + tv_string_abs (&e->tv, &gc), + e->pri); + } + else + { + dmsg (D_SCHEDULER, "SCHEDULE: %s NULL", + caller); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} +#endif + +static inline void +schedule_set_pri (struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + e->pri = random (); + if (e->pri < 1) + e->pri = 1; +} + +/* This is the master key comparison routine. A key is + * simply a struct timeval containing the absolute time for + * an event. The unique treap priority (pri) is used to ensure + * that keys do not collide. + */ +static inline int +schedule_entry_compare (const struct schedule_entry *e1, + const struct schedule_entry *e2) +{ + if (e1->tv.tv_sec < e2->tv.tv_sec) + return -1; + else if (e1->tv.tv_sec > e2->tv.tv_sec) + return 1; + else + { + if (e1->tv.tv_usec < e2->tv.tv_usec) + return -1; + else if (e1->tv.tv_usec > e2->tv.tv_usec) + return 1; + else + { + if (e1->pri < e2->pri) + return -1; + else if (e1->pri > e2->pri) + return 1; + else + return 0; + } + } +} + +/* + * Detach a btree node from its parent + */ +static inline void +schedule_detach_parent (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + if (e) + { + if (e->parent) + { + if (e->parent->lt == e) + e->parent->lt = NULL; + else if (e->parent->gt == e) + e->parent->gt = NULL; + else + { + /* parent <-> child linkage is corrupted */ + ASSERT (0); + } + e->parent = NULL; + } + else + { + if (s->root == e) /* last element deleted, tree is empty */ + s->root = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* + * + * Given a binary search tree, move a node toward the root + * while still maintaining the correct ordering relationships + * within the tree. This function is the workhorse + * of the tree balancer. + * + * This code will break on key collisions, which shouldn't + * happen because the treap priority is considered part of the key + * and is guaranteed to be unique. + */ +static void +schedule_rotate_up (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + if (e && e->parent) + { + struct schedule_entry *lt = e->lt; + struct schedule_entry *gt = e->gt; + struct schedule_entry *p = e->parent; + struct schedule_entry *gp = p->parent; + + if (gp) /* if grandparent exists, modify its child link */ + { + if (gp->gt == p) + gp->gt = e; + else if (gp->lt == p) + gp->lt = e; + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } + else /* no grandparent, now we are the root */ + { + s->root = e; + } + + /* grandparent is now our parent */ + e->parent = gp; + + /* parent is now our child */ + p->parent = e; + + /* reorient former parent's links + to reflect new position in the tree */ + if (p->gt == e) + { + e->lt = p; + p->gt = lt; + if (lt) + lt->parent = p; + } + else if (p->lt == e) + { + e->gt = p; + p->lt = gt; + if (gt) + gt->parent = p; + } + else + { + /* parent <-> child linkage is corrupted */ + ASSERT (0); + } + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + ++z.sru; +#endif + } +} + +/* + * This is the treap deletion algorithm: + * + * Rotate lesser-priority children up in the tree + * until we are childless. Then delete. + */ +void +schedule_remove_node (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + while (e->lt || e->gt) + { + if (e->lt) + { + if (e->gt) + { + if (e->lt->pri < e->gt->pri) + schedule_rotate_up (s, e->lt); + else + schedule_rotate_up (s, e->gt); + } + else + schedule_rotate_up (s, e->lt); + } + else if (e->gt) + schedule_rotate_up (s, e->gt); + } + + schedule_detach_parent (s, e); + e->pri = 0; +} + +/* + * Trivially add a node to a binary search tree without + * regard for balance. + */ +static void +schedule_insert (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + struct schedule_entry *c = s->root; + while (true) + { + const int comp = schedule_entry_compare (e, c); + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + ++z.ins; +#endif + + if (comp == -1) + { + if (c->lt) + { + c = c->lt; + continue; + } + else + { + c->lt = e; + e->parent = c; + break; + } + } + else if (comp == 1) + { + if (c->gt) + { + c = c->gt; + continue; + } + else + { + c->gt = e; + e->parent = c; + break; + } + } + else + { + /* rare key/priority collision -- no big deal, + just choose another priority and retry */ +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + ++z.coll; +#endif + schedule_set_pri (e); + /* msg (M_INFO, "PRI COLLISION pri=%u", e->pri); */ + c = s->root; + continue; + } + } +} + +/* + * Given an element, remove it from the btree if it's already + * there and re-insert it based on its current key. + */ +void +schedule_add_modify (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_SCHEDULER)) + schedule_entry_debug_info ("schedule_add_modify", e); +#endif + + /* already in tree, remove */ + if (IN_TREE (e)) + schedule_remove_node (s, e); + + /* set random priority */ + schedule_set_pri (e); + + if (s->root) + schedule_insert (s, e); /* trivial insert into tree */ + else + s->root = e; /* tree was empty, we are the first element */ + + /* This is the magic of the randomized treap algorithm which + keeps the tree balanced. Move the node up the tree until + its own priority is greater than that of its parent */ + while (e->parent && e->parent->pri > e->pri) + schedule_rotate_up (s, e); +} + +/* + * Find the earliest event to be scheduled + */ +struct schedule_entry * +schedule_find_least (struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + if (e) + { + while (e->lt) + { +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + ++z.lsteps; +#endif + e = e->lt; + } + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + if (check_debug_level (D_SCHEDULER)) + schedule_entry_debug_info ("schedule_find_least", e); +#endif + + return e; +} + +/* + * Public functions below this point + */ + +struct schedule * +schedule_init (void) +{ + struct schedule *s; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (s, struct schedule); + return s; +} + +void +schedule_free (struct schedule *s) +{ + free (s); +} + +void +schedule_remove_entry (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e) +{ + s->earliest_wakeup = NULL; /* invalidate cache */ + schedule_remove_node (s, e); +} + +/* + * Debug functions below this point + */ + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST + +static inline struct schedule_entry * +schedule_find_earliest_wakeup (struct schedule *s) +{ + return schedule_find_least (s->root); +} + +/* + * Recursively check that the treap (btree) is + * internally consistent. + */ +int +schedule_debug_entry (const struct schedule_entry* e, + int depth, + int *count, + struct timeval *least, + const struct timeval *min, + const struct timeval *max) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int maxdepth = depth; + if (e) + { + int d; + + ASSERT (e != e->lt); + ASSERT (e != e->gt); + ASSERT (e != e->parent); + ASSERT (!e->parent || e->parent != e->lt); + ASSERT (!e->parent || e->parent != e->gt); + ASSERT (!e->lt || e->lt != e->gt); + + if (e->lt) + { + ASSERT (e->lt->parent == e); + ASSERT (schedule_entry_compare (e->lt, e) == -1); + ASSERT (e->lt->pri >= e->pri); + } + + if (e->gt) + { + ASSERT (e->gt->parent == e); + ASSERT (schedule_entry_compare (e->gt, e)); + ASSERT (e->gt->pri >= e->pri); + } + + ASSERT (tv_le (min, &e->tv)); + ASSERT (tv_le (&e->tv, max)); + + if (count) + ++(*count); + + if (least && tv_lt (&e->tv, least)) + *least = e->tv; + + d = schedule_debug_entry (e->lt, depth+1, count, least, min, &e->tv); + if (d > maxdepth) + maxdepth = d; + + d = schedule_debug_entry (e->gt, depth+1, count, least, &e->tv, max); + if (d > maxdepth) + maxdepth = d; + } + gc_free (&gc); + return maxdepth; +} + +int +schedule_debug (struct schedule *s, int *count, struct timeval *least) +{ + struct timeval min; + struct timeval max; + + min.tv_sec = 0; + min.tv_usec = 0; + max.tv_sec = 0x7FFFFFFF; + max.tv_usec = 0x7FFFFFFF; + + if (s->root) + { + ASSERT (s->root->parent == NULL); + } + return schedule_debug_entry (s->root, 0, count, least, &min, &max); +} + +#if 1 + +void +tv_randomize (struct timeval *tv) +{ + tv->tv_sec += random() % 100; + tv->tv_usec = random () % 100; +} + +#else + +void +tv_randomize (struct timeval *tv) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + long int choice = get_random (); + if ((choice & 0xFF) == 0) + tv->tv_usec += ((choice >> 8) & 0xFF); + else + prng_bytes ((uint8_t *)tv, sizeof (struct timeval)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif + +void +schedule_verify (struct schedule *s) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct timeval least; + int count; + int maxlev; + struct schedule_entry* e; + const struct status zz = z; + + least.tv_sec = least.tv_usec = 0x7FFFFFFF; + + count = 0; + + maxlev = schedule_debug (s, &count, &least); + + e = schedule_find_earliest_wakeup (s); + + if (e) + { + printf ("Verification Phase count=%d maxlev=%d sru=%d ins=%d coll=%d ls=%d l=%s", + count, + maxlev, + zz.sru, + zz.ins, + zz.coll, + zz.lsteps, + tv_string (&e->tv, &gc)); + + if (!tv_eq (&least, &e->tv)) + printf (" [COMPUTED DIFFERENT MIN VALUES!]"); + + printf ("\n"); + } + + CLEAR (z); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +schedule_randomize_array (struct schedule_entry **array, int size) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) + { + const int src = get_random () % size; + struct schedule_entry *tmp = array [i]; + if (i != src) + { + array [i] = array [src]; + array [src] = tmp; + } + } +} + +void +schedule_print_work (struct schedule_entry *e, int indent) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < indent; ++i) + printf (" "); + if (e) + { + printf ("%s [%u] e=" ptr_format ", p=" ptr_format " lt=" ptr_format " gt=" ptr_format "\n", + tv_string (&e->tv, &gc), + e->pri, + (ptr_type)e, + (ptr_type)e->parent, + (ptr_type)e->lt, + (ptr_type)e->gt); + schedule_print_work (e->lt, indent+1); + schedule_print_work (e->gt, indent+1); + } + else + printf ("NULL\n"); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +schedule_print (struct schedule *s) +{ + printf ("*************************\n"); + schedule_print_work (s->root, 0); +} + +void +schedule_test (void) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int n = 1000; + int n_mod = 25; + + int i, j; + struct schedule_entry **array; + struct schedule *s = schedule_init (); + struct schedule_entry* e; + + CLEAR (z); + ALLOC_ARRAY (array, struct schedule_entry *, n); + + printf ("Creation/Insertion Phase\n"); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (array[i], struct schedule_entry); + tv_randomize (&array[i]->tv); + /*schedule_print (s);*/ + /*schedule_verify (s);*/ + schedule_add_modify (s, array[i]); + } + + schedule_randomize_array (array, n); + + /*schedule_print (s);*/ + schedule_verify (s); + + for (j = 1; j <= n_mod; ++j) + { + printf ("Modification Phase Pass %d\n", j); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + e = schedule_find_earliest_wakeup (s); + /*printf ("BEFORE %s\n", tv_string (&e->tv, &gc));*/ + tv_randomize (&e->tv); + /*printf ("AFTER %s\n", tv_string (&e->tv, &gc));*/ + schedule_add_modify (s, e); + /*schedule_verify (s);*/ + /*schedule_print (s);*/ + } + schedule_verify (s); + /*schedule_print (s);*/ + } + + /*printf ("INS=%d\n", z.ins);*/ + + while ((e = schedule_find_earliest_wakeup (s))) + { + schedule_remove_node (s, e); + /*schedule_verify (s);*/ + } + schedule_verify (s); + + printf ("S->ROOT is %s\n", s->root ? "NOT NULL" : "NULL"); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + free (array[i]); + } + free (array); + free (s); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71c6d8ca --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/schedule.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef SCHEDULE_H +#define SCHEDULE_H + +/* + * This code implements an efficient scheduler using + * a random treap binary tree. + * + * The scheduler is used by the server executive to + * keep track of which instances need service at a + * known time in the future. Instances need to + * schedule events for things such as sending + * a ping or scheduling a TLS renegotiation. + */ + +#if P2MP_SERVER + +/* define to enable a special test mode */ +/*#define SCHEDULE_TEST*/ + +#include "otime.h" +#include "error.h" + +struct schedule_entry +{ + struct timeval tv; /* wakeup time */ + unsigned int pri; /* random treap priority */ + struct schedule_entry *parent; /* treap (btree) links */ + struct schedule_entry *lt; + struct schedule_entry *gt; +}; + +struct schedule +{ + struct schedule_entry *earliest_wakeup; /* cached earliest wakeup */ + struct schedule_entry *root; /* the root of the treap (btree) */ +}; + +/* Public functions */ + +struct schedule *schedule_init (void); +void schedule_free (struct schedule *s); +void schedule_remove_entry (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e); + +#ifdef SCHEDULE_TEST +void schedule_test (void); +#endif + +/* Private Functions */ + +/* is node already in tree? */ +#define IN_TREE(e) ((e)->pri) + +struct schedule_entry *schedule_find_least (struct schedule_entry *e); +void schedule_add_modify (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e); +void schedule_remove_node (struct schedule *s, struct schedule_entry *e); + +/* Public inline functions */ + +/* + * Add a struct schedule_entry (whose storage is managed by + * caller) to the btree. tv signifies the wakeup time for + * a future event. sigma is a time interval measured + * in microseconds -- the event window being represented + * starts at (tv - sigma) and ends at (tv + sigma). + * Event signaling can occur anywere within this interval. + * Making the interval larger makes the scheduler more efficient, + * while making it smaller results in more precise scheduling. + * The caller should treat the passed struct schedule_entry as + * an opaque object. + */ +static inline void +schedule_add_entry (struct schedule *s, + struct schedule_entry *e, + const struct timeval *tv, + unsigned int sigma) +{ + if (!IN_TREE (e) || !sigma || !tv_within_sigma (tv, &e->tv, sigma)) + { + e->tv = *tv; + schedule_add_modify (s, e); + s->earliest_wakeup = NULL; /* invalidate cache */ + } +} + +/* + * Return the node with the earliest wakeup time. If two + * nodes have the exact same wakeup time, select based on + * the random priority assigned to each node (the priority + * is randomized every time an entry is re-added). + */ +static inline struct schedule_entry * +schedule_get_earliest_wakeup (struct schedule *s, + struct timeval *wakeup) +{ + struct schedule_entry *ret; + + /* cache result */ + if (!s->earliest_wakeup) + s->earliest_wakeup = schedule_find_least (s->root); + ret = s->earliest_wakeup; + if (ret) + *wakeup = ret->tv; + + return ret; +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e07b547 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Each session is identified by a random 8-byte session identifier. + * + * For efficiency, the session id is only transmitted over the control + * channel (which only sees traffic occasionally when keys are being + * negotiated). The data channel sees a smaller version of the session-id -- + * it is called the key_id and is currently 2 bits long. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#include "error.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "session_id.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +const struct session_id x_session_id_zero; + +void +session_id_random (struct session_id *sid) +{ + prng_bytes (sid->id, SID_SIZE); +} + +const char * +session_id_print (const struct session_id *sid, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return format_hex (sid->id, SID_SIZE, 0, gc); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL*/ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33909dd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/session_id.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Each session is identified by a random 8-byte session identifier. + * + * For efficiency, the session id is only transmitted over the control + * channel (which only sees traffic occasionally when keys are being + * negotiated). + */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#ifndef SESSION_ID_H +#define SESSION_ID_H + +#include "basic.h" +#include "buffer.h" + +struct session_id +{ + uint8_t id[8]; +}; + +extern const struct session_id x_session_id_zero; + +#define SID_SIZE (sizeof (x_session_id_zero.id)) + +static inline bool +session_id_equal (const struct session_id *sid1, + const struct session_id *sid2) +{ + return !memcmp (sid1->id, sid2->id, SID_SIZE); +} + +static inline bool +session_id_defined (const struct session_id *sid1) +{ + return memcmp (sid1->id, &x_session_id_zero.id, SID_SIZE) != 0; +} + +static inline bool +session_id_read (struct session_id *sid, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf_read (buf, sid->id, SID_SIZE); +} + +static inline bool +session_id_write_prepend (const struct session_id *sid, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf_write_prepend (buf, sid->id, SID_SIZE); +} + +static inline bool +session_id_write (const struct session_id *sid, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return buf_write (buf, sid->id, SID_SIZE); +} + +void session_id_random (struct session_id *sid); + +const char *session_id_print (const struct session_id *sid, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif /* SESSION_ID_H */ +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8a7d38b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "shaper.h" +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + +/* + * We want to wake up in delay microseconds. If timeval is larger + * than delay, set timeval to delay. + */ +bool +shaper_soonest_event (struct timeval *tv, int delay) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (delay < 1000000) + { + if (tv->tv_sec) + { + tv->tv_sec = 0; + tv->tv_usec = delay; + ret = true; + } + else if (delay < tv->tv_usec) + { + tv->tv_usec = delay; + ret = true; + } + } + else + { + const int sec = delay / 1000000; + const int usec = delay % 1000000; + + if (sec < tv->tv_sec) + { + tv->tv_sec = sec; + tv->tv_usec = usec; + ret = true; + } + else if (sec == tv->tv_sec) + { + if (usec < tv->tv_usec) + { + tv->tv_usec = usec; + ret = true; + } + } + } +#ifdef SHAPER_DEBUG + dmsg (D_SHAPER_DEBUG, "SHAPER shaper_soonest_event sec=%d usec=%d ret=%d", + (int)tv->tv_sec, (int)tv->tv_usec, (int)ret); +#endif + return ret; +} + +void +shaper_reset_wakeup (struct shaper *s) +{ + CLEAR (s->wakeup); +} + +void +shaper_msg (struct shaper *s) +{ + msg (M_INFO, "Output Traffic Shaping initialized at %d bytes per second", + s->bytes_per_second); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afeb9c3c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/shaper.h @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef SHAPER_H +#define SHAPER_H + +/*#define SHAPER_DEBUG*/ + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER + +#include "basic.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "interval.h" + +/* + * A simple traffic shaper for + * the output direction. + */ + +#define SHAPER_MIN 100 /* bytes per second */ +#define SHAPER_MAX 100000000 + +#define SHAPER_MAX_TIMEOUT 10 /* seconds */ + +#define SHAPER_USE_FP + +struct shaper +{ + int bytes_per_second; + struct timeval wakeup; + +#ifdef SHAPER_USE_FP + double factor; +#else + int factor; +#endif +}; + +void shaper_msg (struct shaper *s); +void shaper_reset_wakeup (struct shaper *s); + +/* + * We want to wake up in delay microseconds. If timeval is larger + * than delay, set timeval to delay. + */ +bool shaper_soonest_event (struct timeval *tv, int delay); + +/* + * inline functions + */ + +static inline void +shaper_reset (struct shaper *s, int bytes_per_second) +{ + s->bytes_per_second = bytes_per_second ? constrain_int (bytes_per_second, SHAPER_MIN, SHAPER_MAX) : 0; + +#ifdef SHAPER_USE_FP + s->factor = 1000000.0 / (double)s->bytes_per_second; +#else + s->factor = 1000000 / s->bytes_per_second; +#endif +} + +static inline void +shaper_init (struct shaper *s, int bytes_per_second) +{ + shaper_reset (s, bytes_per_second); + shaper_reset_wakeup (s); +} + +static inline int +shaper_current_bandwidth (struct shaper *s) +{ + return s->bytes_per_second; +} + +/* + * Returns traffic shaping delay in microseconds relative to current + * time, or 0 if no delay. + */ +static inline int +shaper_delay (struct shaper* s) +{ + struct timeval tv; + int delay = 0; + + if (tv_defined (&s->wakeup)) + { + ASSERT (!openvpn_gettimeofday (&tv, NULL)); + delay = tv_subtract (&s->wakeup, &tv, SHAPER_MAX_TIMEOUT); +#ifdef SHAPER_DEBUG + dmsg (D_SHAPER_DEBUG, "SHAPER shaper_delay delay=%d", delay); +#endif + } + + return delay > 0 ? delay : 0; +} + + +/* + * We are about to send a datagram of nbytes bytes. + * + * Compute when we can send another datagram, + * based on target throughput (s->bytes_per_second). + */ +static inline void +shaper_wrote_bytes (struct shaper* s, int nbytes) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + /* compute delay in microseconds */ + tv.tv_sec = 0; +#ifdef SHAPER_USE_FP + tv.tv_usec = min_int ((int)((double)max_int (nbytes, 100) * s->factor), (SHAPER_MAX_TIMEOUT*1000000)); +#else + tv.tv_usec = s->bytes_per_second + ? min_int (max_int (nbytes, 100) * s->factor, (SHAPER_MAX_TIMEOUT*1000000)) + : 0; +#endif + + if (tv.tv_usec) + { + ASSERT (!openvpn_gettimeofday (&s->wakeup, NULL)); + tv_add (&s->wakeup, &tv); + +#ifdef SHAPER_DEBUG + dmsg (D_SHAPER_DEBUG, "SHAPER shaper_wrote_bytes bytes=%d delay=%d sec=%d usec=%d", + nbytes, + (int)tv.tv_usec, + (int)s->wakeup.tv_sec, + (int)s->wakeup.tv_usec); +#endif + } +} + +#if 0 +/* + * Increase/Decrease bandwidth by a percentage. + * + * Return true if bandwidth changed. + */ +static inline bool +shaper_change_pct (struct shaper *s, int pct) +{ + const int orig_bandwidth = s->bytes_per_second; + const int new_bandwidth = orig_bandwidth + (orig_bandwidth * pct / 100); + ASSERT (s->bytes_per_second); + shaper_reset (s, new_bandwidth); + return s->bytes_per_second != orig_bandwidth; +} +#endif + +#endif /* ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER */ + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ddfd0ed --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,400 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "init.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "occ.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "openvpn.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* Handle signals */ + +struct signal_info siginfo_static; /* GLOBAL */ + +struct signame { + int value; + const char *upper; + const char *lower; +}; + +static const struct signame signames[] = { + { SIGINT, "SIGINT", "sigint"}, + { SIGTERM, "SIGTERM", "sigterm" }, + { SIGHUP, "SIGHUP", "sighup" }, + { SIGUSR1, "SIGUSR1", "sigusr1" }, + { SIGUSR2, "SIGUSR2", "sigusr2" } +}; + +int +parse_signal (const char *signame) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < (int)SIZE (signames); ++i) + { + if (!strcmp (signame, signames[i].upper)) + return signames[i].value; + } + return -1; +} + +const char * +signal_name (const int sig, const bool upper) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < (int)SIZE (signames); ++i) + { + if (sig == signames[i].value) + return upper ? signames[i].upper : signames[i].lower; + } + return "UNKNOWN"; +} + +const char * +signal_description (const int signum, const char *sigtext) +{ + if (sigtext) + return sigtext; + else + return signal_name (signum, false); +} + +void +throw_signal (const int signum) +{ + siginfo_static.signal_received = signum; + siginfo_static.source = SIG_SOURCE_HARD; +} + +void +throw_signal_soft (const int signum, const char *signal_text) +{ + siginfo_static.signal_received = signum; + siginfo_static.source = SIG_SOURCE_SOFT; + siginfo_static.signal_text = signal_text; +} + +static void +signal_reset (struct signal_info *si) +{ + if (si) + { + si->signal_received = 0; + si->signal_text = NULL; + si->source = SIG_SOURCE_SOFT; + } +} + +void +print_signal (const struct signal_info *si, const char *title, int msglevel) +{ + if (si) + { + const char *type = (si->signal_text ? si->signal_text : ""); + const char *t = (title ? title : "process"); + const char *hs; + switch (si->source) + { + case SIG_SOURCE_SOFT: + hs= "soft"; + break; + case SIG_SOURCE_HARD: + hs = "hard"; + break; + case SIG_SOURCE_CONNECTION_FAILED: + hs = "connection failed(soft)"; + break; + default: + ASSERT(0); + } + + switch (si->signal_received) + { + case SIGINT: + case SIGTERM: + msg (msglevel, "%s[%s,%s] received, %s exiting", + signal_name (si->signal_received, true), hs, type, t); + break; + case SIGHUP: + case SIGUSR1: + msg (msglevel, "%s[%s,%s] received, %s restarting", + signal_name (si->signal_received, true), hs, type, t); + break; + default: + msg (msglevel, "Unknown signal %d [%s,%s] received by %s", si->signal_received, hs, type, t); + break; + } + } + else + msg (msglevel, "Unknown signal received"); +} + +/* + * Call management interface with restart info + */ +void +signal_restart_status (const struct signal_info *si) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + int state = -1; + switch (si->signal_received) + { + case SIGINT: + case SIGTERM: + state = OPENVPN_STATE_EXITING; + break; + case SIGHUP: + case SIGUSR1: + state = OPENVPN_STATE_RECONNECTING; + break; + } + + if (state >= 0) + management_set_state (management, + state, + si->signal_text ? si->signal_text : signal_name (si->signal_received, true), + (in_addr_t)0, + (in_addr_t)0); + } +#endif +} + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + +/* normal signal handler, when we are in event loop */ +static void +signal_handler (const int signum) +{ + throw_signal (signum); + signal (signum, signal_handler); +} + +#endif + +/* set handlers for unix signals */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H +#define SM_UNDEF 0 +#define SM_PRE_INIT 1 +#define SM_POST_INIT 2 +static int signal_mode; /* GLOBAL */ +#endif + +void +pre_init_signal_catch (void) +{ +#ifndef WIN32 +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + signal_mode = SM_PRE_INIT; + signal (SIGINT, signal_handler); + signal (SIGTERM, signal_handler); + signal (SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR1, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +#endif /* HAVE_SIGNAL_H */ +#endif /* WIN32 */ +} + +void +post_init_signal_catch (void) +{ +#ifndef WIN32 +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + signal_mode = SM_POST_INIT; + signal (SIGINT, signal_handler); + signal (SIGTERM, signal_handler); + signal (SIGHUP, signal_handler); + signal (SIGUSR1, signal_handler); + signal (SIGUSR2, signal_handler); + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +#endif /* HAVE_SIGNAL_H */ +#endif +} + +/* called after daemonization to retain signal settings */ +void +restore_signal_state (void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + if (signal_mode == SM_PRE_INIT) + pre_init_signal_catch (); + else if (signal_mode == SM_POST_INIT) + post_init_signal_catch (); +#endif +} + +/* + * Print statistics. + * + * Triggered by SIGUSR2 or F2 on Windows. + */ +void +print_status (const struct context *c, struct status_output *so) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + status_reset (so); + + status_printf (so, "OpenVPN STATISTICS"); + status_printf (so, "Updated,%s", time_string (0, 0, false, &gc)); + status_printf (so, "TUN/TAP read bytes," counter_format, c->c2.tun_read_bytes); + status_printf (so, "TUN/TAP write bytes," counter_format, c->c2.tun_write_bytes); + status_printf (so, "TCP/UDP read bytes," counter_format, c->c2.link_read_bytes); + status_printf (so, "TCP/UDP write bytes," counter_format, c->c2.link_write_bytes); + status_printf (so, "Auth read bytes," counter_format, c->c2.link_read_bytes_auth); +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO + if (lzo_defined (&c->c2.lzo_compwork)) + lzo_print_stats (&c->c2.lzo_compwork, so); +#endif +#ifdef PACKET_TRUNCATION_CHECK + status_printf (so, "TUN read truncations," counter_format, c->c2.n_trunc_tun_read); + status_printf (so, "TUN write truncations," counter_format, c->c2.n_trunc_tun_write); + status_printf (so, "Pre-encrypt truncations," counter_format, c->c2.n_trunc_pre_encrypt); + status_printf (so, "Post-decrypt truncations," counter_format, c->c2.n_trunc_post_decrypt); +#endif +#ifdef WIN32 + if (tuntap_defined (c->c1.tuntap)) + status_printf (so, "TAP-WIN32 driver status,\"%s\"", + tap_win_getinfo (c->c1.tuntap, &gc)); +#endif + + status_printf (so, "END"); + status_flush (so); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC +/* + * Handle the triggering and time-wait of explicit + * exit notification. + */ + +static void +process_explicit_exit_notification_init (struct context *c) +{ + msg (M_INFO, "SIGTERM received, sending exit notification to peer"); + event_timeout_init (&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval, 1, 0); + reset_coarse_timers (c); + signal_reset (c->sig); + halt_non_edge_triggered_signals (); + c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait = now; +} + +void +process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup (struct context *c) +{ + if (event_timeout_trigger (&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval, + &c->c2.timeval, + ETT_DEFAULT)) + { + ASSERT (c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait && c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification); + if (now >= c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait + c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification) + { + event_timeout_clear (&c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_interval); + c->sig->signal_received = SIGTERM; + c->sig->signal_text = "exit-with-notification"; + } + else + { + c->c2.occ_op = OCC_EXIT; + } + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Process signals + */ + +void +remap_signal (struct context *c) +{ + if (c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR1 && c->options.remap_sigusr1) + c->sig->signal_received = c->options.remap_sigusr1; +} + +static void +process_sigusr2 (const struct context *c) +{ + struct status_output *so = status_open (NULL, 0, M_INFO, NULL, 0); + print_status (c, so); + status_close (so); + signal_reset (c->sig); +} + +static bool +process_sigterm (struct context *c) +{ + bool ret = true; +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + if (c->options.ce.explicit_exit_notification + && !c->c2.explicit_exit_notification_time_wait) + { + process_explicit_exit_notification_init (c); + ret = false; + } +#endif + return ret; +} + +bool +process_signal (struct context *c) +{ + bool ret = true; + + if (c->sig->signal_received == SIGTERM || c->sig->signal_received == SIGINT) + { + ret = process_sigterm (c); + } + else if (c->sig->signal_received == SIGUSR2) + { + process_sigusr2 (c); + ret = false; + } + return ret; +} + +void +register_signal (struct context *c, int sig, const char *text) +{ + if (c->sig->signal_received != SIGTERM) + c->sig->signal_received = sig; + c->sig->signal_text = text; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c2c7b54e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/sig.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef SIG_H +#define SIG_H + +#include "status.h" +#include "win32.h" + + + +#define SIG_SOURCE_SOFT 0 +#define SIG_SOURCE_HARD 1 +/* CONNECTION_FAILED is also a "soft" status, + * It is thrown if a connection attempt fails + */ +#define SIG_SOURCE_CONNECTION_FAILED 2 + +/* + * Signal information, including signal code + * and descriptive text. + */ +struct signal_info +{ + volatile int signal_received; + volatile int source; + const char *signal_text; +}; + +#define IS_SIG(c) ((c)->sig->signal_received) + +struct context; + +extern struct signal_info siginfo_static; + +int parse_signal (const char *signame); +const char *signal_name (const int sig, const bool upper); +const char *signal_description (const int signum, const char *sigtext); +void throw_signal (const int signum); +void throw_signal_soft (const int signum, const char *signal_text); + +void pre_init_signal_catch (void); +void post_init_signal_catch (void); +void restore_signal_state (void); + +void print_signal (const struct signal_info *si, const char *title, int msglevel); +void print_status (const struct context *c, struct status_output *so); + +void remap_signal (struct context *c); + +void signal_restart_status (const struct signal_info *si); + +bool process_signal (struct context *c); + +void register_signal (struct context *c, int sig, const char *text); + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC +void process_explicit_exit_notification_timer_wakeup (struct context *c); +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static inline void +get_signal (volatile int *sig) +{ + *sig = win32_signal_get (&win32_signal); +} + +static inline void +halt_non_edge_triggered_signals (void) +{ + win32_signal_close (&win32_signal); +} + +#else + +static inline void +get_signal (volatile int *sig) +{ + const int i = siginfo_static.signal_received; + if (i) + *sig = i; +} + +static inline void +halt_non_edge_triggered_signals (void) +{ +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31ff6d21 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.c @@ -0,0 +1,3391 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "socket.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "gremlin.h" +#include "plugin.h" +#include "ps.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +const int proto_overhead[] = { /* indexed by PROTO_x */ + 0, + IPv4_UDP_HEADER_SIZE, /* IPv4 */ + IPv4_TCP_HEADER_SIZE, + IPv4_TCP_HEADER_SIZE, + IPv6_UDP_HEADER_SIZE, /* IPv6 */ + IPv6_TCP_HEADER_SIZE, + IPv6_TCP_HEADER_SIZE, + IPv6_TCP_HEADER_SIZE, +}; + +/* + * Convert sockflags/getaddr_flags into getaddr_flags + */ +static unsigned int +sf2gaf(const unsigned int getaddr_flags, + const unsigned int sockflags) +{ + if (sockflags & SF_HOST_RANDOMIZE) + return getaddr_flags | GETADDR_RANDOMIZE; + else + return getaddr_flags; +} + +/* + * Functions related to the translation of DNS names to IP addresses. + */ + +static const char* +h_errno_msg(int h_errno_err) +{ + switch (h_errno_err) + { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND: + return "[HOST_NOT_FOUND] The specified host is unknown."; + case NO_DATA: + return "[NO_DATA] The requested name is valid but does not have an IP address."; + case NO_RECOVERY: + return "[NO_RECOVERY] A non-recoverable name server error occurred."; + case TRY_AGAIN: + return "[TRY_AGAIN] A temporary error occurred on an authoritative name server."; + } + return "[unknown h_errno value]"; +} + +/* + * Translate IP addr or hostname to in_addr_t. + * If resolve error, try again for + * resolve_retry_seconds seconds. + */ +in_addr_t +getaddr (unsigned int flags, + const char *hostname, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + bool *succeeded, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai; + int status; + status = openvpn_getaddrinfo (flags & ~GETADDR_HOST_ORDER, hostname, NULL, + resolve_retry_seconds, signal_received, AF_INET, &ai); + if(status==0) { + struct in_addr ia; + if(succeeded) + *succeeded=true; + ia = ((struct sockaddr_in*)ai->ai_addr)->sin_addr; + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return (flags & GETADDR_HOST_ORDER) ? ntohl (ia.s_addr) : ia.s_addr; + } else { + if(succeeded) + *succeeded =false; + return 0; + } +} + + +/* + * Translate IPv4/IPv6 addr or hostname into struct addrinfo + * If resolve error, try again for resolve_retry_seconds seconds. + */ +int +openvpn_getaddrinfo (unsigned int flags, + const char *hostname, + const char *servname, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + volatile int *signal_received, + int ai_family, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + int status; + int sigrec = 0; + int msglevel = (flags & GETADDR_FATAL) ? M_FATAL : D_RESOLVE_ERRORS; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *print_hostname; + const char *print_servname; + + ASSERT(res); + +#if defined(HAVE_RES_INIT) + res_init (); +#endif + + ASSERT (hostname || servname); + ASSERT (!(flags & GETADDR_HOST_ORDER)); + + if (hostname && (flags & GETADDR_RANDOMIZE)) + hostname = hostname_randomize(hostname, &gc); + + if(hostname) + print_hostname = hostname; + else + print_hostname = "undefined"; + + if(servname) + print_servname = servname; + else + print_servname = ""; + + if (flags & GETADDR_MSG_VIRT_OUT) + msglevel |= M_MSG_VIRT_OUT; + + if ((flags & (GETADDR_FATAL_ON_SIGNAL|GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL)) + && !signal_received) + signal_received = &sigrec; + + /* try numeric ipv6 addr first */ + CLEAR(hints); + hints.ai_family = ai_family; + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + if(flags & GETADDR_PASSIVE) + hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; + + if(flags & GETADDR_DATAGRAM) + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + else + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + status = getaddrinfo(hostname, servname, &hints, res); + + if (status != 0) /* parse as numeric address failed? */ + { + const int fail_wait_interval = 5; /* seconds */ + /* Add +4 to cause integer division rounding up (1 + 4) = 5, (0+4)/5=0 */ + int resolve_retries = (flags & GETADDR_TRY_ONCE) ? 1 : + ((resolve_retry_seconds + 4)/ fail_wait_interval); + const char *fmt; + int level = 0; + + fmt = "RESOLVE: Cannot resolve host address: %s:%s (%s)"; + if ((flags & GETADDR_MENTION_RESOLVE_RETRY) + && !resolve_retry_seconds) + fmt = "RESOLVE: Cannot resolve host address: %s:%s (%s) (I would have retried this name query if you had specified the --resolv-retry option.)"; + + if (!(flags & GETADDR_RESOLVE) || status == EAI_FAIL) + { + msg (msglevel, "RESOLVE: Cannot parse IP address: %s:%s (%s)", + print_hostname,print_servname, gai_strerror(status)); + goto done; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (flags & GETADDR_UPDATE_MANAGEMENT_STATE) + { + if (management) + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_RESOLVE, + NULL, + (in_addr_t)0, + (in_addr_t)0); + } +#endif + + /* + * Resolve hostname + */ + while (true) + { + /* try hostname lookup */ + hints.ai_flags &= ~AI_NUMERICHOST; + dmsg (D_SOCKET_DEBUG, "GETADDRINFO flags=0x%04x ai_family=%d ai_socktype=%d", + flags, hints.ai_family, hints.ai_socktype); + status = getaddrinfo(hostname, servname, &hints, res); + + if (signal_received) + { + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) /* were we interrupted by a signal? */ + { + if (*signal_received == SIGUSR1) /* ignore SIGUSR1 */ + { + msg (level, "RESOLVE: Ignored SIGUSR1 signal received during DNS resolution attempt"); + *signal_received = 0; + } + else + { + if (0 == status) { + ASSERT(res); + freeaddrinfo(*res); + res = NULL; + } + goto done; + } + } + } + + /* success? */ + if (0 == status) + break; + + /* resolve lookup failed, should we + continue or fail? */ + level = msglevel; + if (resolve_retries > 0) + level = D_RESOLVE_ERRORS; + + msg (level, + fmt, + print_hostname, + print_servname, + gai_strerror(status)); + + if (--resolve_retries <= 0) + goto done; + + openvpn_sleep (fail_wait_interval); + } + + ASSERT(res); + + /* hostname resolve succeeded */ + + /* + * Do not chose an IP Addresse by random or change the order * + * of IP addresses, doing so will break RFC 3484 address selection * + */ + } + else + { + /* IP address parse succeeded */ + } + + done: + if (signal_received && *signal_received) + { + int level = 0; + if (flags & GETADDR_FATAL_ON_SIGNAL) + level = M_FATAL; + else if (flags & GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL) + level = M_WARN; + msg (level, "RESOLVE: signal received during DNS resolution attempt"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return status; +} + +/* + * We do our own inet_aton because the glibc function + * isn't very good about error checking. + */ +int +openvpn_inet_aton (const char *dotted_quad, struct in_addr *addr) +{ + unsigned int a, b, c, d; + + CLEAR (*addr); + if (sscanf (dotted_quad, "%u.%u.%u.%u", &a, &b, &c, &d) == 4) + { + if (a < 256 && b < 256 && c < 256 && d < 256) + { + addr->s_addr = htonl (a<<24 | b<<16 | c<<8 | d); + return OIA_IP; /* good dotted quad */ + } + } + if (string_class (dotted_quad, CC_DIGIT|CC_DOT, 0)) + return OIA_ERROR; /* probably a badly formatted dotted quad */ + else + return OIA_HOSTNAME; /* probably a hostname */ +} + +bool +ip_addr_dotted_quad_safe (const char *dotted_quad) +{ + /* verify non-NULL */ + if (!dotted_quad) + return false; + + /* verify length is within limits */ + if (strlen (dotted_quad) > 15) + return false; + + /* verify that all chars are either numeric or '.' and that no numeric + substring is greater than 3 chars */ + { + int nnum = 0; + const char *p = dotted_quad; + int c; + + while ((c = *p++)) + { + if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') + { + ++nnum; + if (nnum > 3) + return false; + } + else if (c == '.') + { + nnum = 0; + } + else + return false; + } + } + + /* verify that string will convert to IP address */ + { + struct in_addr a; + return openvpn_inet_aton (dotted_quad, &a) == OIA_IP; + } +} + +bool +ipv6_addr_safe (const char *ipv6_text_addr) +{ + /* verify non-NULL */ + if (!ipv6_text_addr) + return false; + + /* verify length is within limits */ + if (strlen (ipv6_text_addr) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN ) + return false; + + /* verify that string will convert to IPv6 address */ + { + struct in6_addr a6; + return inet_pton( AF_INET6, ipv6_text_addr, &a6 ) == 1; + } +} + +static bool +dns_addr_safe (const char *addr) +{ + if (addr) + { + const size_t len = strlen (addr); + return len > 0 && len <= 255 && string_class (addr, CC_ALNUM|CC_DASH|CC_DOT, 0); + } + else + return false; +} + +bool +ip_or_dns_addr_safe (const char *addr, const bool allow_fqdn) +{ + if (ip_addr_dotted_quad_safe (addr)) + return true; + else if (allow_fqdn) + return dns_addr_safe (addr); + else + return false; +} + +bool +mac_addr_safe (const char *mac_addr) +{ + /* verify non-NULL */ + if (!mac_addr) + return false; + + /* verify length is within limits */ + if (strlen (mac_addr) > 17) + return false; + + /* verify that all chars are either alphanumeric or ':' and that no + alphanumeric substring is greater than 2 chars */ + { + int nnum = 0; + const char *p = mac_addr; + int c; + + while ((c = *p++)) + { + if ( (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ) + { + ++nnum; + if (nnum > 2) + return false; + } + else if (c == ':') + { + nnum = 0; + } + else + return false; + } + } + + /* error-checking is left to script invoked in lladdr.c */ + return true; +} + +static int +socket_get_sndbuf (int sd) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_SNDBUF) + int val; + socklen_t len; + + len = sizeof (val); + if (getsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (void *) &val, &len) == 0 + && len == sizeof (val)) + return val; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static void +socket_set_sndbuf (int sd, int size) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_SNDBUF) + if (size > 0 && size < SOCKET_SND_RCV_BUF_MAX) + { + if (setsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (void *) &size, sizeof (size)) != 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: setsockopt SO_SNDBUF=%d failed", size); + } + } +#endif +} + +static int +socket_get_rcvbuf (int sd) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_RCVBUF) + int val; + socklen_t len; + + len = sizeof (val); + if (getsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, (void *) &val, &len) == 0 + && len == sizeof (val)) + return val; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static bool +socket_set_rcvbuf (int sd, int size) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_RCVBUF) + if (size > 0 && size < SOCKET_SND_RCV_BUF_MAX) + { + if (setsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, (void *) &size, sizeof (size)) != 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: setsockopt SO_RCVBUF=%d failed", size); + return false; + } + } + return true; +#endif +} + +static void +socket_set_buffers (int fd, const struct socket_buffer_size *sbs) +{ + if (sbs) + { + const int sndbuf_old = socket_get_sndbuf (fd); + const int rcvbuf_old = socket_get_rcvbuf (fd); + + if (sbs->sndbuf) + socket_set_sndbuf (fd, sbs->sndbuf); + + if (sbs->rcvbuf) + socket_set_rcvbuf (fd, sbs->rcvbuf); + + msg (D_OSBUF, "Socket Buffers: R=[%d->%d] S=[%d->%d]", + rcvbuf_old, + socket_get_rcvbuf (fd), + sndbuf_old, + socket_get_sndbuf (fd)); + } +} + +/* + * Set other socket options + */ + +static bool +socket_set_tcp_nodelay (int sd, int state) +{ +#if defined(WIN32) || (defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(IPPROTO_TCP) && defined(TCP_NODELAY)) + if (setsockopt (sd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &state, sizeof (state)) != 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: setsockopt TCP_NODELAY=%d failed", state); + return false; + } + else + { + dmsg (D_OSBUF, "Socket flags: TCP_NODELAY=%d succeeded", state); + return true; + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: setsockopt TCP_NODELAY=%d failed (No kernel support)", state); + return false; +#endif +} + +static inline void +socket_set_mark (int sd, int mark) +{ +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) && HAVE_DECL_SO_MARK + if (mark && setsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_MARK, &mark, sizeof (mark)) != 0) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: setsockopt SO_MARK=%d failed", mark); +#endif +} + +static bool +socket_set_flags (int sd, unsigned int sockflags) +{ + if (sockflags & SF_TCP_NODELAY) + return socket_set_tcp_nodelay (sd, 1); + else + return true; +} + +bool +link_socket_update_flags (struct link_socket *ls, unsigned int sockflags) +{ + if (ls && socket_defined (ls->sd)) + return socket_set_flags (ls->sd, ls->sockflags = sockflags); + else + return false; +} + +void +link_socket_update_buffer_sizes (struct link_socket *ls, int rcvbuf, int sndbuf) +{ + if (ls && socket_defined (ls->sd)) + { + ls->socket_buffer_sizes.sndbuf = sndbuf; + ls->socket_buffer_sizes.rcvbuf = rcvbuf; + socket_set_buffers (ls->sd, &ls->socket_buffer_sizes); + } +} + +/* + * SOCKET INITALIZATION CODE. + * Create a TCP/UDP socket + */ + +socket_descriptor_t +create_socket_tcp (int af) +{ + socket_descriptor_t sd; + + if ((sd = socket (af, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot create TCP socket"); + +#ifndef WIN32 /* using SO_REUSEADDR on Windows will cause bind to succeed on port conflicts! */ + /* set SO_REUSEADDR on socket */ + { + int on = 1; + if (setsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *) &on, sizeof (on)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "TCP: Cannot setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR on TCP socket"); + } +#endif + + return sd; +} + +static socket_descriptor_t +create_socket_udp (const int af, const unsigned int flags) +{ + socket_descriptor_t sd; + + if ((sd = socket (af, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "UDP: Cannot create UDP/UDP6 socket"); +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + else if (flags & SF_USE_IP_PKTINFO) + { + int pad = 1; + if(af == AF_INET) + { +#ifdef IP_PKTINFO + if (setsockopt (sd, SOL_IP, IP_PKTINFO, + (void*)&pad, sizeof(pad)) < 0) + msg(M_ERR, "UDP: failed setsockopt for IP_PKTINFO"); +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + if (setsockopt (sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_RECVDSTADDR, + (void*)&pad, sizeof(pad)) < 0) + msg(M_ERR, "UDP: failed setsockopt for IP_RECVDSTADDR"); +#else +#error ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO is set without IP_PKTINFO xor IP_RECVDSTADDR (fix syshead.h) +#endif + } + else if (af == AF_INET6 ) + { +#ifndef IPV6_RECVPKTINFO /* Some older Darwin platforms require this */ + if (setsockopt (sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, + (void*)&pad, sizeof(pad)) < 0) +#else + if (setsockopt (sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, + (void*)&pad, sizeof(pad)) < 0) +#endif + msg(M_ERR, "UDP: failed setsockopt for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO"); + } + } +#endif + return sd; +} + +static void +create_socket (struct link_socket *sock) +{ + /* create socket, use information carried over from getaddrinfo */ + const int ai_proto = sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_protocol; + const int ai_family = sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family; + + ASSERT (sock->info.af == AF_UNSPEC || sock->info.af == ai_family); + + + if (ai_proto == IPPROTO_UDP) + { + sock->sd = create_socket_udp (ai_family, sock->sockflags); + sock->sockflags |= SF_GETADDRINFO_DGRAM; + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (sock->socks_proxy) + sock->ctrl_sd = create_socket_tcp (ai_family); +#endif + } + else if (ai_proto == IPPROTO_TCP) + { + sock->sd = create_socket_tcp (ai_family); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* set socket buffers based on --sndbuf and --rcvbuf options */ + socket_set_buffers (sock->sd, &sock->socket_buffer_sizes); + + /* set socket to --mark packets with given value */ + socket_set_mark (sock->sd, sock->mark); + +} + +#ifdef TARGET_ANDROID +static void protect_fd_nonlocal (int fd, struct sockaddr* addr) +{ + if (addr_local (addr)) { + msg(M_DEBUG, "Address is local, not protecting socket fd %d", fd); + return; + } + + struct user_pass up; + strcpy(up.username ,__func__); + management->connection.fdtosend = fd; + msg(M_DEBUG, "Protecting socket fd %d", fd); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "PROTECTFD", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + +} +#endif + + +/* + * Functions used for establishing a TCP stream connection. + */ +static void +socket_do_listen (socket_descriptor_t sd, + const struct sockaddr *local, + bool do_listen, + bool do_set_nonblock) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (do_listen) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Listening for incoming TCP connection on %s", + print_sockaddr (local, &gc)); + if (listen (sd, 1)) + msg (M_ERR, "TCP: listen() failed"); + } + + /* set socket to non-blocking mode */ + if (do_set_nonblock) + set_nonblock (sd); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +socket_descriptor_t +socket_do_accept (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct link_socket_actual *act, + const bool nowait) +{ + /* af_addr_size WILL return 0 in this case if AFs other than AF_INET + * are compiled because act is empty here. + * could use getsockname() to support later remote_len check + */ + socklen_t remote_len_af = af_addr_size(act->dest.addr.sa.sa_family); + socklen_t remote_len = sizeof(act->dest.addr); + socket_descriptor_t new_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + + CLEAR (*act); + +#ifdef HAVE_GETPEERNAME + if (nowait) + { + new_sd = getpeername (sd, &act->dest.addr.sa, &remote_len); + + if (!socket_defined (new_sd)) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "TCP: getpeername() failed"); + else + new_sd = sd; + } +#else + if (nowait) + msg (M_WARN, "TCP: this OS does not provide the getpeername() function"); +#endif + else + { + new_sd = accept (sd, &act->dest.addr.sa, &remote_len); + } + +#if 0 /* For debugging only, test the effect of accept() failures */ + { + static int foo = 0; + ++foo; + if (foo & 1) + new_sd = -1; + } +#endif + + if (!socket_defined (new_sd)) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "TCP: accept(%d) failed", sd); + } + /* only valid if we have remote_len_af!=0 */ + else if (remote_len_af && remote_len != remote_len_af) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "TCP: Received strange incoming connection with unknown address length=%d", remote_len); + openvpn_close_socket (new_sd); + new_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + } + return new_sd; +} + +static void +tcp_connection_established (const struct link_socket_actual *act) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (M_INFO, "TCP connection established with %s", + print_link_socket_actual (act, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static int +socket_listen_accept (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct link_socket_actual *act, + const char *remote_dynamic, + const struct addrinfo *local, + bool do_listen, + bool nowait, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + /* struct openvpn_sockaddr *remote = &act->dest; */ + struct openvpn_sockaddr remote_verify = act->dest; + int new_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + + CLEAR (*act); + socket_do_listen (sd, local->ai_addr, do_listen, true); + + while (true) + { + int status; + fd_set reads; + struct timeval tv; + + FD_ZERO (&reads); + FD_SET (sd, &reads); + tv.tv_sec = 0; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, &reads, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + { + gc_free (&gc); + return sd; + } + + if (status < 0) + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "TCP: select() failed"); + + if (status <= 0) + { + openvpn_sleep (1); + continue; + } + + new_sd = socket_do_accept (sd, act, nowait); + + if (socket_defined (new_sd)) + { + struct addrinfo* ai; + if(remote_dynamic) + openvpn_getaddrinfo(0, remote_dynamic, NULL, 1, NULL, + remote_verify.addr.sa.sa_family, &ai); + + if(ai && !addrlist_match(&remote_verify, ai)) + { + msg (M_WARN, + "TCP NOTE: Rejected connection attempt from %s due to --remote setting", + print_link_socket_actual (act, &gc)); + if (openvpn_close_socket (new_sd)) + msg (M_ERR, "TCP: close socket failed (new_sd)"); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + } + else + { + if(ai) + freeaddrinfo(ai); + break; + } + } + openvpn_sleep (1); + } + + if (!nowait && openvpn_close_socket (sd)) + msg (M_ERR, "TCP: close socket failed (sd)"); + + tcp_connection_established (act); + + gc_free (&gc); + return new_sd; +} + +void +socket_bind (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct addrinfo *local, + int ai_family, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* FIXME (schwabe) + * getaddrinfo for the bind address might return multiple AF_INET/AF_INET6 + * entries for the requested protocol. + * For example if an address has multiple A records + * What is the correct way to deal with it? + */ + + ASSERT(local); + struct addrinfo* cur; + + /* find the first addrinfo with correct ai_family */ + for (cur = local; cur; cur=cur->ai_next) + { + if(cur->ai_family == ai_family) + break; + } + if (!cur) + msg (M_FATAL, "%s: Socket bind failed: Addr to bind has no %s record", + prefix, addr_family_name(ai_family)); + + if (bind (sd, cur->ai_addr, cur->ai_addrlen)) + { + const int errnum = openvpn_errno (); + msg (M_FATAL, "%s: Socket bind failed on local address %s: %s", + prefix, + print_sockaddr_ex (local->ai_addr, ":", PS_SHOW_PORT, &gc), + strerror_ts (errnum, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +int +openvpn_connect (socket_descriptor_t sd, + const struct sockaddr *remote, + int connect_timeout, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + int status = 0; + +#ifdef CONNECT_NONBLOCK + set_nonblock (sd); + + protect_fd_nonlocal(sd, remote); + status = connect (sd, remote, af_addr_size(remote->sa_family)); + + if (status) + status = openvpn_errno (); + if ( +#ifdef WIN32 + status == WSAEWOULDBLOCK +#else + status == EINPROGRESS +#endif + ) + { + while (true) + { + fd_set writes; + struct timeval tv; + + FD_ZERO (&writes); + FD_SET (sd, &writes); + tv.tv_sec = 0; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, NULL, &writes, NULL, &tv); + + if (signal_received) + { + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + { + status = 0; + break; + } + } + if (status < 0) + { + status = openvpn_errno (); + break; + } + if (status <= 0) + { + if (--connect_timeout < 0) + { + status = ETIMEDOUT; + break; + } + openvpn_sleep (1); + continue; + } + + /* got it */ + { + int val = 0; + socklen_t len; + + len = sizeof (val); + if (getsockopt (sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void *) &val, &len) == 0 + && len == sizeof (val)) + status = val; + else + status = openvpn_errno (); + break; + } + } + } +#else + status = connect (sd, &remote->addr.sa, af_addr_size(remote->addr.sa.sa_family)); + if (status) + status = openvpn_errno (); +#endif + + return status; +} + +void set_actual_address (struct link_socket_actual* actual, struct addrinfo* ai) +{ + CLEAR (*actual); + ASSERT (ai); + + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET) + actual->dest.addr.in4 = + *((struct sockaddr_in*) ai->ai_addr); + else if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + actual->dest.addr.in6 = + *((struct sockaddr_in6*) ai->ai_addr); + else + ASSERT(0); + + /* Copy addrinfo sock parameters for socket creating */ + actual->ai_family = ai->ai_family; + actual->ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; + actual->ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; +} + +void +socket_connect (socket_descriptor_t *sd, + struct link_socket_addr *lsa, + const int connect_timeout, + struct signal_info* sig_info) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct sockaddr *dest = &lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa; + + int status; + +#ifdef CONNECT_NONBLOCK + msg (M_INFO, "Attempting to establish TCP connection with %s [nonblock]", + print_sockaddr (dest, &gc)); +#else + msg (M_INFO, "Attempting to establish TCP connection with %s", + print_sockaddr (dest, &gc)); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_TCP_CONNECT, + NULL, + (in_addr_t)0, + (in_addr_t)0); +#endif + + /* Set the actual address */ + status = openvpn_connect (*sd, dest, connect_timeout, &sig_info->signal_received); + + get_signal (&sig_info->signal_received); + if (sig_info->signal_received) + goto done; + + if (status) { + + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "TCP: connect to %s failed: %s", + print_sockaddr (dest, &gc), + strerror_ts (status, &gc)); + + openvpn_close_socket (*sd); + *sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + sig_info->signal_received = SIGUSR1; + sig_info->source = SIG_SOURCE_CONNECTION_FAILED; + } else { + msg (M_INFO, "TCP connection established with %s", + print_sockaddr (dest, &gc)); + } + + done: + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* For stream protocols, allocate a buffer to build up packet. + Called after frame has been finalized. */ + +static void +socket_frame_init (const struct frame *frame, struct link_socket *sock) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + overlapped_io_init (&sock->reads, frame, FALSE, false); + overlapped_io_init (&sock->writes, frame, TRUE, false); + sock->rw_handle.read = sock->reads.overlapped.hEvent; + sock->rw_handle.write = sock->writes.overlapped.hEvent; +#endif + + if (link_socket_connection_oriented (sock)) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + stream_buf_init (&sock->stream_buf, + &sock->reads.buf_init, + sock->sockflags, + sock->info.proto); +#else + alloc_buf_sock_tun (&sock->stream_buf_data, + frame, + false, + FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_READ_STREAM); + + stream_buf_init (&sock->stream_buf, + &sock->stream_buf_data, + sock->sockflags, + sock->info.proto); +#endif + } +} + +/* + * Adjust frame structure based on a Path MTU value given + * to us by the OS. + */ +void +frame_adjust_path_mtu (struct frame *frame, int pmtu, int proto) +{ + frame_set_mtu_dynamic (frame, pmtu - datagram_overhead (proto), SET_MTU_UPPER_BOUND); +} + +static void +resolve_bind_local (struct link_socket *sock, const sa_family_t af) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* resolve local address if undefined */ + if (!sock->info.lsa->bind_local) + { + int flags = GETADDR_RESOLVE | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL | + GETADDR_FATAL | GETADDR_PASSIVE; + int status; + + if(proto_is_dgram(sock->info.proto)) + flags |= GETADDR_DATAGRAM; + + /* will return AF_{INET|INET6}from local_host */ + status = openvpn_getaddrinfo(flags, sock->local_host, sock->local_port, 0, + NULL, af, &sock->info.lsa->bind_local); + if(status !=0) { + msg (M_FATAL, "getaddrinfo() failed for local \"%s:%s\": %s", + sock->local_host, sock->local_port, + gai_strerror(status)); + } + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void bind_local (struct link_socket *sock) +{ + /* bind to local address/port */ + if (sock->bind_local) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (sock->socks_proxy && sock->info.proto == PROTO_UDP) + socket_bind (sock->ctrl_sd, sock->info.lsa->bind_local, + sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family, "SOCKS"); + else +#endif + socket_bind (sock->sd, sock->info.lsa->bind_local, + sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family, "TCP/UDP"); + } +} + +static void +resolve_remote (struct link_socket *sock, + int phase, + const char **remote_dynamic, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (!sock->did_resolve_remote) + { + /* resolve remote address if undefined */ + if (!sock->info.lsa->remote_list) + { + if (sock->remote_host) + { + unsigned int flags = sf2gaf(GETADDR_RESOLVE|GETADDR_UPDATE_MANAGEMENT_STATE, sock->sockflags); + int retry = 0; + int status = -1; + + if (proto_is_dgram(sock->info.proto)) + flags |= GETADDR_DATAGRAM; + + if (sock->resolve_retry_seconds == RESOLV_RETRY_INFINITE) + { + if (phase == 2) + flags |= (GETADDR_TRY_ONCE | GETADDR_FATAL); + retry = 0; + } + else if (phase == 1) + { + if (sock->resolve_retry_seconds) + { + retry = 0; + } + else + { + flags |= (GETADDR_FATAL | GETADDR_MENTION_RESOLVE_RETRY); + retry = 0; + } + } + else if (phase == 2) + { + if (sock->resolve_retry_seconds) + { + flags |= GETADDR_FATAL; + retry = sock->resolve_retry_seconds; + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + struct addrinfo* ai; + status = openvpn_getaddrinfo (flags, sock->remote_host, sock->remote_port, + retry, signal_received, sock->info.af, &ai); + if(status == 0) { + sock->info.lsa->remote_list = ai; + sock->info.lsa->current_remote = ai; + + dmsg (D_SOCKET_DEBUG, "RESOLVE_REMOTE flags=0x%04x phase=%d rrs=%d sig=%d status=%d", + flags, + phase, + retry, + signal_received ? *signal_received : -1, + status); + } + if (signal_received) + { + if (*signal_received) + goto done; + } + if (status!=0) + { + if (signal_received) + *signal_received = SIGUSR1; + goto done; + } + } + } + + /* should we re-use previous active remote address? */ + if (link_socket_actual_defined (&sock->info.lsa->actual)) + { + msg (M_INFO, "TCP/UDP: Preserving recently used remote address: %s", + print_link_socket_actual (&sock->info.lsa->actual, &gc)); + if (remote_dynamic) + *remote_dynamic = NULL; + } + /* else, quick hack to fix persistent-remote ....*/ + { + CLEAR (sock->info.lsa->actual); + if(sock->info.lsa->current_remote) + { + set_actual_address (&sock->info.lsa->actual, + sock->info.lsa->current_remote); + } + } + + /* remember that we finished */ + sock->did_resolve_remote = true; + } + + done: + gc_free (&gc); +} + + + +struct link_socket * +link_socket_new (void) +{ + struct link_socket *sock; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (sock, struct link_socket); + sock->sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + sock->ctrl_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +#endif + return sock; +} + +void +create_new_socket (struct link_socket* sock) +{ + if (sock->bind_local) { + resolve_bind_local (sock, sock->info.af); + } + resolve_remote (sock, 1, NULL, NULL); + /* + * In P2P or server mode we must create the socket even when resolving + * the remote site fails/is not specified. */ + + if (sock->info.af && sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family==0 && sock->bind_local) + { + /* Copy sock parameters from bind addr */ + set_actual_address (&sock->info.lsa->actual, sock->info.lsa->bind_local); + /* clear destination set by set_actual_address */ + CLEAR(sock->info.lsa->actual.dest); + } + + /* + * Create the socket early if socket should be bound + */ + if (sock->bind_local && sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family) + { + create_socket (sock); + + if (sock->bind_local) + bind_local(sock); + } +} + + +/* bind socket if necessary */ +void +link_socket_init_phase1 (struct link_socket *sock, + const char *local_host, + const char *local_port, + const char *remote_host, + const char *remote_port, + int proto, + sa_family_t af, + int mode, + const struct link_socket *accept_from, +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + struct http_proxy_info *http_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + struct socks_proxy_info *socks_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + int gremlin, +#endif + bool bind_local, + bool remote_float, + int inetd, + struct link_socket_addr *lsa, + const char *ipchange_command, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + int connect_timeout, + int mtu_discover_type, + int rcvbuf, + int sndbuf, + int mark, + unsigned int sockflags) +{ + ASSERT (sock); + + sock->local_host = local_host; + sock->local_port = local_port; + sock->remote_host = remote_host; + sock->remote_port = remote_port; + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + sock->http_proxy = http_proxy; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + sock->socks_proxy = socks_proxy; +#endif + + sock->bind_local = bind_local; + sock->inetd = inetd; + sock->resolve_retry_seconds = resolve_retry_seconds; + sock->connect_timeout = connect_timeout; + sock->mtu_discover_type = mtu_discover_type; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + sock->gremlin = gremlin; +#endif + + sock->socket_buffer_sizes.rcvbuf = rcvbuf; + sock->socket_buffer_sizes.sndbuf = sndbuf; + + sock->sockflags = sockflags; + sock->mark = mark; + + sock->info.proto = proto; + sock->info.af = af; + sock->info.remote_float = remote_float; + sock->info.lsa = lsa; + sock->info.ipchange_command = ipchange_command; + sock->info.plugins = plugins; + + sock->mode = mode; + if (mode == LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM) + { + ASSERT (accept_from); + ASSERT (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER); + ASSERT (!sock->inetd); + sock->sd = accept_from->sd; + } + + if (false) + ; +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + /* are we running in HTTP proxy mode? */ + else if (sock->http_proxy) + { + ASSERT (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT); + ASSERT (!sock->inetd); + + /* the proxy server */ + sock->remote_host = http_proxy->options.server; + sock->remote_port = http_proxy->options.port; + + /* the OpenVPN server we will use the proxy to connect to */ + sock->proxy_dest_host = remote_host; + sock->proxy_dest_port = remote_port; + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* or in Socks proxy mode? */ + else if (sock->socks_proxy) + { + ASSERT (sock->info.af == AF_INET); + ASSERT (!sock->inetd); + + /* the proxy server */ + sock->remote_host = socks_proxy->server; + sock->remote_port = socks_proxy->port; + + /* the OpenVPN server we will use the proxy to connect to */ + sock->proxy_dest_host = remote_host; + sock->proxy_dest_port = remote_port; + } +#endif + else + { + sock->remote_host = remote_host; + sock->remote_port = remote_port; + } + + /* bind behavior for TCP server vs. client */ + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER && sock->info.af==AF_INET) + { + if (sock->mode == LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM) + sock->bind_local = false; + else + sock->bind_local = true; + } + + /* were we started by inetd or xinetd? */ + if (sock->inetd) + { + ASSERT (sock->info.proto != PROTO_TCP_CLIENT); + ASSERT (socket_defined (inetd_socket_descriptor)); + sock->sd = inetd_socket_descriptor; + } + else if (mode != LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM) + { + create_new_socket (sock); + } +} + +static +void phase2_inetd (struct link_socket* sock, const struct frame *frame, + const char *remote_dynamic, volatile int *signal_received) +{ + bool remote_changed = false; + + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) { + /* AF_INET as default (and fallback) for inetd */ + sock->info.lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa.sa_family = AF_INET; +#ifdef HAVE_GETSOCKNAME + { + /* inetd: hint family type for dest = local's */ + struct openvpn_sockaddr local_addr; + socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(local_addr); + if (getsockname (sock->sd, &local_addr.addr.sa, &addrlen) == 0) { + sock->info.lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa.sa_family = local_addr.addr.sa.sa_family; + dmsg (D_SOCKET_DEBUG, "inetd(%s): using sa_family=%d from getsockname(%d)", + proto2ascii(sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, false), local_addr.addr.sa.sa_family, + sock->sd); + } else + msg (M_WARN, "inetd(%s): getsockname(%d) failed, using AF_INET", + proto2ascii(sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, false), sock->sd); + } +#else + msg (M_WARN, "inetd(%s): this OS does not provide the getsockname() " + "function, using AF_INET", + proto2ascii(sock->info.proto, false)); +#endif + sock->sd = + socket_listen_accept (sock->sd, + &sock->info.lsa->actual, + remote_dynamic, + sock->info.lsa->bind_local, + false, + sock->inetd == INETD_NOWAIT, + signal_received); + } + ASSERT (!remote_changed); +} + +static void +phase2_set_socket_flags (struct link_socket* sock) +{ + /* set misc socket parameters */ + socket_set_flags (sock->sd, sock->sockflags); + + /* set socket to non-blocking mode */ + set_nonblock (sock->sd); + + /* set socket file descriptor to not pass across execs, so that + scripts don't have access to it */ + set_cloexec (sock->sd); + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (socket_defined (sock->ctrl_sd)) + set_cloexec (sock->ctrl_sd); +#endif + + /* set Path MTU discovery options on the socket */ + set_mtu_discover_type (sock->sd, sock->mtu_discover_type); + +#if EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY + /* if the OS supports it, enable extended error passing on the socket */ + set_sock_extended_error_passing (sock->sd); +#endif +} + + +static void +linksock_print_addr (struct link_socket *sock) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* print local address */ + { + const int msglevel = (sock->mode == LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM) ? D_INIT_MEDIUM : M_INFO; + + if (sock->inetd) + msg (msglevel, "%s link local: [inetd]", proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true)); + else if (sock->bind_local) + { + /* Socket is always bound on the first matching address */ + struct addrinfo *cur; + for (cur = sock->info.lsa->bind_local; cur; cur=cur->ai_next) + { + if(cur->ai_family == sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family) + break; + } + ASSERT (cur); + msg (msglevel, "%s link local (bound): %s", + proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true), + print_sockaddr(cur->ai_addr,&gc)); + } + else + msg (msglevel, "%s link local: (not bound)", + proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true)); + + /* print active remote address */ + msg (msglevel, "%s link remote: %s", + proto2ascii (sock->info.proto, sock->info.af, true), + print_link_socket_actual_ex (&sock->info.lsa->actual, + ":", + PS_SHOW_PORT_IF_DEFINED, + &gc)); + } + gc_free(&gc); +} + +static void +phase2_tcp_server (struct link_socket *sock, const char *remote_dynamic, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + switch (sock->mode) + { + case LS_MODE_DEFAULT: + sock->sd = socket_listen_accept (sock->sd, + &sock->info.lsa->actual, + remote_dynamic, + sock->info.lsa->bind_local, + true, + false, + signal_received); + break; + case LS_MODE_TCP_LISTEN: + socket_do_listen (sock->sd, + sock->info.lsa->bind_local->ai_addr, + true, + false); + break; + case LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM: + sock->sd = socket_do_accept (sock->sd, + &sock->info.lsa->actual, + false); + if (!socket_defined (sock->sd)) + { + *signal_received = SIGTERM; + return; + } + tcp_connection_established (&sock->info.lsa->actual); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + +} + + +static void +phase2_tcp_client (struct link_socket *sock, struct signal_info *sig_info) +{ +#ifdef GENERAL_PROXY_SUPPORT + bool proxy_retry = false; +#else + const bool proxy_retry = false; +#endif + do { + socket_connect (&sock->sd, + sock->info.lsa, + sock->connect_timeout, + sig_info); + + if (sig_info->signal_received) + return; + + if (false) + ; +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + else if (sock->http_proxy) + { + proxy_retry = establish_http_proxy_passthru (sock->http_proxy, + sock->sd, + sock->proxy_dest_host, + sock->proxy_dest_port, + &sock->stream_buf.residual, + &sig_info->signal_received); + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + else if (sock->socks_proxy) + { + establish_socks_proxy_passthru (sock->socks_proxy, + sock->sd, + sock->proxy_dest_host, + sock->proxy_dest_port, + &sig_info->signal_received); + } +#endif + if (proxy_retry) + { + /* TODO (schwabe): This code assumes AF_INET for the proxy socket + * when retrying a connection */ + openvpn_close_socket (sock->sd); + sock->sd = create_socket_tcp (AF_INET); + } + } while (proxy_retry); + +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS +static void +phase2_socks_client (struct link_socket *sock, struct signal_info *sig_info) +{ + socket_connect (&sock->ctrl_sd, + sock->info.lsa, + sock->connect_timeout, + sig_info); + + if (sig_info->signal_received) + return; + + establish_socks_proxy_udpassoc (sock->socks_proxy, + sock->ctrl_sd, + sock->sd, + &sock->socks_relay.dest, + &sig_info->signal_received); + + if (sig_info->signal_received) + return; + + sock->remote_host = sock->proxy_dest_host; + sock->remote_port = sock->proxy_dest_port; + sock->did_resolve_remote = false; + + addr_zero_host(&sock->info.lsa->actual.dest); + if (sock->info.lsa->remote_list) + freeaddrinfo(sock->info.lsa->remote_list); + + resolve_remote (sock, 1, NULL, &sig_info->signal_received); + +} +#endif + +/* finalize socket initialization */ +void +link_socket_init_phase2 (struct link_socket *sock, + const struct frame *frame, + struct signal_info *sig_info) +{ + const char *remote_dynamic = NULL; + int sig_save = 0; + + ASSERT (sock); + + if (sig_info && sig_info->signal_received) + { + sig_save = sig_info->signal_received; + sig_info->signal_received = 0; + } + + /* initialize buffers */ + socket_frame_init (frame, sock); + + /* + * Pass a remote name to connect/accept so that + * they can test for dynamic IP address changes + * and throw a SIGUSR1 if appropriate. + */ + if (sock->resolve_retry_seconds) + remote_dynamic = sock->remote_host; + + /* were we started by inetd or xinetd? */ + if (sock->inetd) + { + phase2_inetd (sock, frame, remote_dynamic, &sig_info->signal_received); + if (sig_info && sig_info->signal_received) + goto done; + + } + else + { + /* Second chance to resolv/create socket */ + resolve_remote (sock, 2, &remote_dynamic, &sig_info->signal_received); + + /* If socket has not already been created create it now */ + if (sock->sd == SOCKET_UNDEFINED) + { + if (sock->info.lsa->actual.ai_family) + { + create_socket (sock); + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, "Could not determine IPv4/IPv6 protocol"); + sig_info->signal_received = SIGUSR1; + goto done; + } + + if (sock->bind_local) + bind_local(sock); + } + + + if (sig_info && sig_info->signal_received) + goto done; + + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + { + phase2_tcp_server (sock, remote_dynamic, + &sig_info->signal_received); + } + else if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + { + phase2_tcp_client (sock, sig_info); + + } + else if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_UDP) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_UDP && sock->socks_proxy) + { + phase2_socks_client (sock, sig_info); +#endif + } + protect_fd_nonlocal (sock->sd, &sock->info.lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa); + } + + if (sig_info && sig_info->signal_received) + goto done; + } + + phase2_set_socket_flags(sock); + linksock_print_addr(sock); + + done: + if (sig_save && sig_info) + { + if (!sig_info->signal_received) + sig_info->signal_received = sig_save; + } +} + +void +link_socket_close (struct link_socket *sock) +{ + if (sock) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + const int gremlin = GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_LEVEL (sock->gremlin); +#else + const int gremlin = 0; +#endif + + if (socket_defined (sock->sd)) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + close_net_event_win32 (&sock->listen_handle, sock->sd, 0); +#endif + if (!gremlin) + { + msg (D_LOW, "TCP/UDP: Closing socket"); + if (openvpn_close_socket (sock->sd)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "TCP/UDP: Close Socket failed"); + } + sock->sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +#ifdef WIN32 + if (!gremlin) + { + overlapped_io_close (&sock->reads); + overlapped_io_close (&sock->writes); + } +#endif + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + if (socket_defined (sock->ctrl_sd)) + { + if (openvpn_close_socket (sock->ctrl_sd)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "TCP/UDP: Close Socket (ctrl_sd) failed"); + sock->ctrl_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + } +#endif + + stream_buf_close (&sock->stream_buf); + free_buf (&sock->stream_buf_data); + if (!gremlin) + free (sock); + } +} + +/* for stream protocols, allow for packet length prefix */ +void +socket_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame *frame, int proto) +{ + if (link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (proto)) + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, sizeof (packet_size_type)); +} + +void +setenv_trusted (struct env_set *es, const struct link_socket_info *info) +{ + setenv_link_socket_actual (es, "trusted", &info->lsa->actual, SA_IP_PORT); +} + +static void +ipchange_fmt (const bool include_cmd, struct argv *argv, const struct link_socket_info *info, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const char *host = print_sockaddr_ex (&info->lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa, " ", PS_SHOW_PORT , gc); + if (include_cmd) + argv_printf (argv, "%sc %s", + info->ipchange_command, + host); + else + argv_printf (argv, "%s", host); + +} + +void +link_socket_connection_initiated (const struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const char *common_name, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + info->lsa->actual = *act; /* Note: skip this line for --force-dest */ + setenv_trusted (es, info); + info->connection_established = true; + + /* Print connection initiated message, with common name if available */ + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + if (common_name) + buf_printf (&out, "[%s] ", common_name); + buf_printf (&out, "Peer Connection Initiated with %s", print_link_socket_actual (&info->lsa->actual, &gc)); + msg (M_INFO, "%s", BSTR (&out)); + } + + /* set environmental vars */ + setenv_str (es, "common_name", common_name); + + /* Process --ipchange plugin */ + if (plugin_defined (info->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE)) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + ipchange_fmt (false, &argv, info, &gc); + if (plugin_call (info->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_IPCHANGE, &argv, NULL, es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: ipchange plugin call failed"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + /* Process --ipchange option */ + if (info->ipchange_command) + { + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + setenv_str (es, "script_type", "ipchange"); + ipchange_fmt (true, &argv, info, &gc); + openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, 0, "--ipchange"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +link_socket_bad_incoming_addr (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *from_addr) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct addrinfo* ai; + + switch(from_addr->dest.addr.sa.sa_family) + { + case AF_INET: + case AF_INET6: + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, + "TCP/UDP: Incoming packet rejected from %s[%d], expected peer address: %s (allow this incoming source address/port by removing --remote or adding --float)", + print_link_socket_actual (from_addr, &gc), + (int)from_addr->dest.addr.sa.sa_family, + print_sockaddr_ex (info->lsa->remote_list->ai_addr,":" ,PS_SHOW_PORT, &gc)); + /* print additional remote addresses */ + for(ai=info->lsa->remote_list->ai_next;ai;ai=ai->ai_next) { + msg(D_LINK_ERRORS,"or from peer address: %s", + print_sockaddr_ex(ai->ai_addr,":",PS_SHOW_PORT, &gc)); + } + break; + } + buf->len = 0; + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +link_socket_bad_outgoing_addr (void) +{ + dmsg (D_READ_WRITE, "TCP/UDP: No outgoing address to send packet"); +} + +in_addr_t +link_socket_current_remote (const struct link_socket_info *info) +{ + const struct link_socket_addr *lsa = info->lsa; + +/* + * This logic supports "redirect-gateway" semantic, which + * makes sense only for PF_INET routes over PF_INET endpoints + * + * Maybe in the future consider PF_INET6 endpoints also ... + * by now just ignore it + * + * For --remote entries with multiple addresses this + * only return the actual endpoint we have sucessfully connected to + */ + if (lsa->actual.dest.addr.sa.sa_family != AF_INET) + return IPV4_INVALID_ADDR; + + if (link_socket_actual_defined (&lsa->actual)) + return ntohl (lsa->actual.dest.addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr); + else if (lsa->current_remote) + return ntohl (((struct sockaddr_in*)lsa->current_remote->ai_addr) + ->sin_addr.s_addr); + else + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return a status string describing socket state. + */ +const char * +socket_stat (const struct link_socket *s, unsigned int rwflags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + if (s) + { + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + { + buf_printf (&out, "S%s", + (s->rwflags_debug & EVENT_READ) ? "R" : "r"); +#ifdef WIN32 + buf_printf (&out, "%s", + overlapped_io_state_ascii (&s->reads)); +#endif + } + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + { + buf_printf (&out, "S%s", + (s->rwflags_debug & EVENT_WRITE) ? "W" : "w"); +#ifdef WIN32 + buf_printf (&out, "%s", + overlapped_io_state_ascii (&s->writes)); +#endif + } + } + else + { + buf_printf (&out, "S?"); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Stream buffer functions, used to packetize a TCP + * stream connection. + */ + +static inline void +stream_buf_reset (struct stream_buf *sb) +{ + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: RESET"); + sb->residual_fully_formed = false; + sb->buf = sb->buf_init; + buf_reset (&sb->next); + sb->len = -1; +} + +void +stream_buf_init (struct stream_buf *sb, + struct buffer *buf, + const unsigned int sockflags, + const int proto) +{ + sb->buf_init = *buf; + sb->maxlen = sb->buf_init.len; + sb->buf_init.len = 0; + sb->residual = alloc_buf (sb->maxlen); + sb->error = false; +#if PORT_SHARE + sb->port_share_state = ((sockflags & SF_PORT_SHARE) && (proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER)) + ? PS_ENABLED + : PS_DISABLED; +#endif + stream_buf_reset (sb); + + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: INIT maxlen=%d", sb->maxlen); +} + +static inline void +stream_buf_set_next (struct stream_buf *sb) +{ + /* set up 'next' for next i/o read */ + sb->next = sb->buf; + sb->next.offset = sb->buf.offset + sb->buf.len; + sb->next.len = (sb->len >= 0 ? sb->len : sb->maxlen) - sb->buf.len; + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: SET NEXT, buf=[%d,%d] next=[%d,%d] len=%d maxlen=%d", + sb->buf.offset, sb->buf.len, + sb->next.offset, sb->next.len, + sb->len, sb->maxlen); + ASSERT (sb->next.len > 0); + ASSERT (buf_safe (&sb->buf, sb->next.len)); +} + +static inline void +stream_buf_get_final (struct stream_buf *sb, struct buffer *buf) +{ + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: GET FINAL len=%d", + buf_defined (&sb->buf) ? sb->buf.len : -1); + ASSERT (buf_defined (&sb->buf)); + *buf = sb->buf; +} + +static inline void +stream_buf_get_next (struct stream_buf *sb, struct buffer *buf) +{ + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: GET NEXT len=%d", + buf_defined (&sb->next) ? sb->next.len : -1); + ASSERT (buf_defined (&sb->next)); + *buf = sb->next; +} + +bool +stream_buf_read_setup_dowork (struct link_socket* sock) +{ + if (sock->stream_buf.residual.len && !sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed) + { + ASSERT (buf_copy (&sock->stream_buf.buf, &sock->stream_buf.residual)); + ASSERT (buf_init (&sock->stream_buf.residual, 0)); + sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed = stream_buf_added (&sock->stream_buf, 0); + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: RESIDUAL FULLY FORMED [%s], len=%d", + sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed ? "YES" : "NO", + sock->stream_buf.residual.len); + } + + if (!sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed) + stream_buf_set_next (&sock->stream_buf); + return !sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed; +} + +bool +stream_buf_added (struct stream_buf *sb, + int length_added) +{ + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: ADD length_added=%d", length_added); + if (length_added > 0) + sb->buf.len += length_added; + + /* if length unknown, see if we can get the length prefix from + the head of the buffer */ + if (sb->len < 0 && sb->buf.len >= (int) sizeof (packet_size_type)) + { + packet_size_type net_size; + +#if PORT_SHARE + if (sb->port_share_state == PS_ENABLED) + { + if (!is_openvpn_protocol (&sb->buf)) + { + msg (D_STREAM_ERRORS, "Non-OpenVPN client protocol detected"); + sb->port_share_state = PS_FOREIGN; + sb->error = true; + return false; + } + else + sb->port_share_state = PS_DISABLED; + } +#endif + + ASSERT (buf_read (&sb->buf, &net_size, sizeof (net_size))); + sb->len = ntohps (net_size); + + if (sb->len < 1 || sb->len > sb->maxlen) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Bad encapsulated packet length from peer (%d), which must be > 0 and <= %d -- please ensure that --tun-mtu or --link-mtu is equal on both peers -- this condition could also indicate a possible active attack on the TCP link -- [Attempting restart...]", sb->len, sb->maxlen); + stream_buf_reset (sb); + sb->error = true; + return false; + } + } + + /* is our incoming packet fully read? */ + if (sb->len > 0 && sb->buf.len >= sb->len) + { + /* save any residual data that's part of the next packet */ + ASSERT (buf_init (&sb->residual, 0)); + if (sb->buf.len > sb->len) + ASSERT (buf_copy_excess (&sb->residual, &sb->buf, sb->len)); + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: ADD returned TRUE, buf_len=%d, residual_len=%d", + BLEN (&sb->buf), + BLEN (&sb->residual)); + return true; + } + else + { + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: ADD returned FALSE (have=%d need=%d)", sb->buf.len, sb->len); + stream_buf_set_next (sb); + return false; + } +} + +void +stream_buf_close (struct stream_buf* sb) +{ + free_buf (&sb->residual); +} + +/* + * The listen event is a special event whose sole purpose is + * to tell us that there's a new incoming connection on a + * TCP socket, for use in server mode. + */ +event_t +socket_listen_event_handle (struct link_socket *s) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + if (!defined_net_event_win32 (&s->listen_handle)) + init_net_event_win32 (&s->listen_handle, FD_ACCEPT, s->sd, 0); + return &s->listen_handle; +#else + return s->sd; +#endif +} + +/* + * Format IP addresses in ascii + */ + +const char * +print_sockaddr_ex (const struct sockaddr *sa, + const char* separator, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + bool addr_is_defined; + char hostaddr[NI_MAXHOST] = ""; + char servname[NI_MAXSERV] = ""; + int status; + + socklen_t salen; + switch(sa->sa_family) + { + case AF_INET: + buf_puts (&out, "[AF_INET]"); + salen = sizeof (struct sockaddr_in); + addr_is_defined = ((struct sockaddr_in*) sa)->sin_addr.s_addr != 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + buf_puts (&out, "[AF_INET6]"); + salen = sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6); + addr_is_defined = !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&((struct sockaddr_in6*) sa)->sin6_addr); + break; + case AF_UNSPEC: + return "[AF_UNSPEC]"; + default: + ASSERT(0); + } + + status = getnameinfo(sa, salen, hostaddr, sizeof (hostaddr), + servname, sizeof(servname), NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV); + + if(status!=0) { + buf_printf(&out,"[nameinfo() err: %s]",gai_strerror(status)); + return BSTR(&out); + } + + if (!(flags & PS_DONT_SHOW_ADDR)) + { + if (addr_is_defined) + buf_puts (&out, hostaddr); + else + buf_puts (&out, "[undef]"); + } + + if ((flags & PS_SHOW_PORT) || (flags & PS_SHOW_PORT_IF_DEFINED)) + { + if (separator) + buf_puts (&out, separator); + + buf_puts (&out, servname); + } + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +const char * +print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return print_link_socket_actual_ex (act, ":", PS_SHOW_PORT|PS_SHOW_PKTINFO, gc); +} + +#ifndef IF_NAMESIZE +#define IF_NAMESIZE 16 +#endif + +const char * +print_link_socket_actual_ex (const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const char *separator, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (act) + { + char ifname[IF_NAMESIZE] = "[undef]"; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (128, gc); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", print_sockaddr_ex (&act->dest.addr.sa, separator, flags, gc)); +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + if ((flags & PS_SHOW_PKTINFO) && addr_defined_ipi(act)) + { + switch(act->dest.addr.sa.sa_family) + { + case AF_INET: + { + struct openvpn_sockaddr sa; + CLEAR (sa); + sa.addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; +#ifdef IP_PKTINFO + sa.addr.in4.sin_addr = act->pi.in4.ipi_spec_dst; + if_indextoname(act->pi.in4.ipi_ifindex, ifname); +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + sa.addr.in4.sin_addr = act->pi.in4; + ifname[0]=0; +#else +#error ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO is set without IP_PKTINFO xor IP_RECVDSTADDR (fix syshead.h) +#endif + buf_printf (&out, " (via %s%%%s)", + print_sockaddr_ex (&sa.addr.sa, separator, 0, gc), + ifname); + } + break; + case AF_INET6: + { + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = "[undef]"; + CLEAR(sin6); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_addr = act->pi.in6.ipi6_addr; + if_indextoname(act->pi.in6.ipi6_ifindex, ifname); + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6), + buf, sizeof (buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0) + buf_printf (&out, " (via %s%%%s)", buf, ifname); + else + buf_printf (&out, " (via [getnameinfo() err]%%%s)", ifname); + } + break; + } + } +#endif + return BSTR (&out); + } + else + return "[NULL]"; +} + +/* + * Convert an in_addr_t in host byte order + * to an ascii dotted quad. + */ +const char * +print_in_addr_t (in_addr_t addr, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct in_addr ia; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + + if (addr || !(flags & IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF)) + { + CLEAR (ia); + ia.s_addr = (flags & IA_NET_ORDER) ? addr : htonl (addr); + + buf_printf (&out, "%s", inet_ntoa (ia)); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Convert an in6_addr in host byte order + * to an ascii representation of an IPv6 address + */ +const char * +print_in6_addr (struct in6_addr a6, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + char tmp_out_buf[64]; /* inet_ntop wants pointer to buffer */ + + if ( memcmp(&a6, &in6addr_any, sizeof(a6)) != 0 || + !(flags & IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF)) + { + inet_ntop (AF_INET6, &a6, tmp_out_buf, sizeof(tmp_out_buf)-1); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", tmp_out_buf ); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +#ifndef UINT8_MAX +# define UINT8_MAX 0xff +#endif + +/* add some offset to an ipv6 address + * (add in steps of 8 bits, taking overflow into next round) + */ +struct in6_addr add_in6_addr( struct in6_addr base, uint32_t add ) +{ + int i; + + for( i=15; i>=0 && add > 0 ; i-- ) + { + register int carry; + register uint32_t h; + + h = (unsigned char) base.s6_addr[i]; + base.s6_addr[i] = (h+add) & UINT8_MAX; + + /* using explicit carry for the 8-bit additions will catch + * 8-bit and(!) 32-bit overruns nicely + */ + carry = ((h & 0xff) + (add & 0xff)) >> 8; + add = (add>>8) + carry; + } + return base; +} + +/* set environmental variables for ip/port in *addr */ +void +setenv_sockaddr (struct env_set *es, const char *name_prefix, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr, const unsigned int flags) +{ + char name_buf[256]; + + char buf[128]; + switch(addr->addr.sa.sa_family) + { + case AF_INET: + if (flags & SA_IP_PORT) + openvpn_snprintf (name_buf, sizeof (name_buf), "%s_ip", name_prefix); + else + openvpn_snprintf (name_buf, sizeof (name_buf), "%s", name_prefix); + + setenv_str (es, name_buf, inet_ntoa (addr->addr.in4.sin_addr)); + + if ((flags & SA_IP_PORT) && addr->addr.in4.sin_port) + { + openvpn_snprintf (name_buf, sizeof (name_buf), "%s_port", name_prefix); + setenv_int (es, name_buf, ntohs (addr->addr.in4.sin_port)); + } + break; + case AF_INET6: + openvpn_snprintf (name_buf, sizeof (name_buf), "%s_ip6", name_prefix); + getnameinfo(&addr->addr.sa, sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6), + buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); + setenv_str (es, name_buf, buf); + + if ((flags & SA_IP_PORT) && addr->addr.in6.sin6_port) + { + openvpn_snprintf (name_buf, sizeof (name_buf), "%s_port", name_prefix); + setenv_int (es, name_buf, ntohs (addr->addr.in6.sin6_port)); + } + break; + } +} + +void +setenv_in_addr_t (struct env_set *es, const char *name_prefix, in_addr_t addr, const unsigned int flags) +{ + if (addr || !(flags & SA_SET_IF_NONZERO)) + { + struct openvpn_sockaddr si; + CLEAR (si); + si.addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; + si.addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (addr); + setenv_sockaddr (es, name_prefix, &si, flags); + } +} + +void +setenv_link_socket_actual (struct env_set *es, + const char *name_prefix, + const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + setenv_sockaddr (es, name_prefix, &act->dest, flags); +} + +/* + * Convert protocol names between index and ascii form. + */ + +struct proto_names { + const char *short_form; + const char *display_form; + sa_family_t proto_af; + int proto; +}; + +/* Indexed by PROTO_x */ +static const struct proto_names proto_names[] = { + {"proto-uninitialized", "proto-NONE", AF_UNSPEC, PROTO_NONE}, + {"udp", "UDP", AF_UNSPEC, PROTO_UDP}, + {"udp4", "UDPv4", AF_INET, PROTO_UDP}, + {"tcp-server", "TCPv4_SERVER", AF_INET, PROTO_TCP_SERVER}, + {"tcp-client", "TCPv4_CLIENT", AF_INET, PROTO_TCP_CLIENT}, + {"tcp", "TCP", AF_UNSPEC, PROTO_TCP}, + {"tcp4", "TCPv4", AF_INET, PROTO_TCP}, + {"udp6" ,"UDPv6", AF_INET6, PROTO_UDP}, + {"tcp6-server","TCPv6_SERVER", AF_INET6, PROTO_TCP_SERVER}, + {"tcp6-client","TCPv6_CLIENT", AF_INET6, PROTO_TCP_CLIENT}, + {"tcp6" ,"TCPv6", AF_INET6, PROTO_TCP}, +}; + +bool +proto_is_net(int proto) +{ + if (proto < 0 || proto >= PROTO_N) + ASSERT(0); + return proto != PROTO_NONE; +} +bool +proto_is_dgram(int proto) +{ + return proto_is_udp(proto); +} + +bool +proto_is_udp(int proto) +{ + if (proto < 0 || proto >= PROTO_N) + ASSERT(0); + return proto == PROTO_UDP; +} + +bool +proto_is_tcp(int proto) +{ + if (proto < 0 || proto >= PROTO_N) + ASSERT(0); + return proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT || proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER || proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT; +} + +int +ascii2proto (const char* proto_name) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < SIZE (proto_names); ++i) + if (!strcmp (proto_name, proto_names[i].short_form)) + return proto_names[i].proto; + return -1; +} + +sa_family_t +ascii2af (const char* proto_name) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < SIZE (proto_names); ++i) + if (!strcmp (proto_name, proto_names[i].short_form)) + return proto_names[i].proto_af; + return 0; +} + +const char * +proto2ascii (int proto, sa_family_t af, bool display_form) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SIZE (proto_names); ++i) + { + if(proto_names[i].proto_af == af && proto_names[i].proto == proto) + { + if(display_form) + return proto_names[i].display_form; + else + return proto_names[i].short_form; + } + } + + return "[unknown protocol]"; +} + +const char * +proto2ascii_all (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SIZE (proto_names); ++i) + { + if (i) + buf_printf(&out, " "); + buf_printf(&out, "[%s]", proto_names[i].short_form); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +int +addr_guess_family(sa_family_t af, const char *name) +{ + unsigned short ret; + if (af) + { + return af; /* already stamped */ + } + else + { + struct addrinfo hints , *ai; + int err; + CLEAR(hints); + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + err = getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if ( 0 == err ) + { + ret=ai->ai_family; + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return ret; + } + } + return AF_INET; /* default */ +} +const char * +addr_family_name (int af) +{ + switch (af) + { + case AF_INET: return "AF_INET"; + case AF_INET6: return "AF_INET6"; + } + return "AF_UNSPEC"; +} + +/* + * Given a local proto, return local proto + * if !remote, or compatible remote proto + * if remote. + * + * This is used for options compatibility + * checking. + * + * IPv6 and IPv4 protocols are comptabile but OpenVPN + * has always sent UDPv4, TCPv4 over the wire. Keep these + * strings for backward compatbility + */ +const char* +proto_remote (int proto, bool remote) +{ + ASSERT (proto >= 0 && proto < PROTO_N); + if (proto == PROTO_UDP) + return "UDPv4"; + + if ( (remote && proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) || proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) + return "TCPv4_SERVER"; + if ( (remote && proto == PROTO_TCP_SERVER) || proto == PROTO_TCP_CLIENT) + return "TCPv4_CLIENT"; + + ASSERT (0); +} + +/* + * Bad incoming address lengths that differ from what + * we expect are considered to be fatal errors. + */ +void +bad_address_length (int actual, int expected) +{ + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: received strange incoming packet with an address length of %d -- we only accept address lengths of %d.", + actual, + expected); +} + +/* + * Socket Read Routines + */ + +int +link_socket_read_tcp (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf) +{ + int len = 0; + + if (!sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed) + { +#ifdef WIN32 + len = socket_finalize (sock->sd, &sock->reads, buf, NULL); +#else + struct buffer frag; + stream_buf_get_next (&sock->stream_buf, &frag); + len = recv (sock->sd, BPTR (&frag), BLEN (&frag), MSG_NOSIGNAL); +#endif + + if (!len) + sock->stream_reset = true; + if (len <= 0) + return buf->len = len; + } + + if (sock->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed + || stream_buf_added (&sock->stream_buf, len)) /* packet complete? */ + { + stream_buf_get_final (&sock->stream_buf, buf); + stream_buf_reset (&sock->stream_buf); + return buf->len; + } + else + return buf->len = 0; /* no error, but packet is still incomplete */ +} + +#ifndef WIN32 + +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + +#pragma pack(1) /* needed to keep structure size consistent for 32 vs. 64-bit architectures */ +struct openvpn_in4_pktinfo +{ + struct cmsghdr cmsghdr; +#ifdef HAVE_IN_PKTINFO + struct in_pktinfo pi4; +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + struct in_addr pi4; +#endif +}; +struct openvpn_in6_pktinfo +{ + struct cmsghdr cmsghdr; + struct in6_pktinfo pi6; +}; + +union openvpn_pktinfo { + struct openvpn_in4_pktinfo msgpi4; + struct openvpn_in6_pktinfo msgpi6; +}; +#pragma pack() + +static socklen_t +link_socket_read_udp_posix_recvmsg (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + int maxsize, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + struct iovec iov; + union openvpn_pktinfo opi; + struct msghdr mesg; + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof (from->dest.addr); + + iov.iov_base = BPTR (buf); + iov.iov_len = maxsize; + mesg.msg_iov = &iov; + mesg.msg_iovlen = 1; + mesg.msg_name = &from->dest.addr; + mesg.msg_namelen = fromlen; + mesg.msg_control = &opi; + mesg.msg_controllen = sizeof opi; + buf->len = recvmsg (sock->sd, &mesg, 0); + if (buf->len >= 0) + { + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + fromlen = mesg.msg_namelen; + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&mesg); + if (cmsg != NULL + && CMSG_NXTHDR (&mesg, cmsg) == NULL +#ifdef IP_PKTINFO + && cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_IP + && cmsg->cmsg_type == IP_PKTINFO +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + && cmsg->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IP + && cmsg->cmsg_type == IP_RECVDSTADDR +#else +#error ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO is set without IP_PKTINFO xor IP_RECVDSTADDR (fix syshead.h) +#endif + && cmsg->cmsg_len >= sizeof (struct openvpn_in4_pktinfo)) + { +#ifdef IP_PKTINFO + struct in_pktinfo *pkti = (struct in_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); + from->pi.in4.ipi_ifindex = pkti->ipi_ifindex; + from->pi.in4.ipi_spec_dst = pkti->ipi_spec_dst; +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + from->pi.in4 = *(struct in_addr*) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); +#else +#error ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO is set without IP_PKTINFO xor IP_RECVDSTADDR (fix syshead.h) +#endif + } + else if (cmsg != NULL + && CMSG_NXTHDR (&mesg, cmsg) == NULL + && cmsg->cmsg_level == IPPROTO_IPV6 + && cmsg->cmsg_type == IPV6_PKTINFO + && cmsg->cmsg_len >= sizeof (struct openvpn_in6_pktinfo)) + { + struct in6_pktinfo *pkti6 = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); + from->pi.in6.ipi6_ifindex = pkti6->ipi6_ifindex; + from->pi.in6.ipi6_addr = pkti6->ipi6_addr; + } + } + return fromlen; +} +#endif + +int +link_socket_read_udp_posix (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + int maxsize, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof (from->dest.addr); + socklen_t expectedlen = af_addr_size(sock->info.af); + addr_zero_host(&from->dest); + ASSERT (buf_safe (buf, maxsize)); +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + /* Both PROTO_UDPv4 and PROTO_UDPv6 */ + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto) && sock->sockflags & SF_USE_IP_PKTINFO) + fromlen = link_socket_read_udp_posix_recvmsg (sock, buf, maxsize, from); + else +#endif + buf->len = recvfrom (sock->sd, BPTR (buf), maxsize, 0, + &from->dest.addr.sa, &fromlen); + if (buf->len >= 0 && expectedlen && fromlen != expectedlen) + bad_address_length (fromlen, expectedlen); + return buf->len; +} + +#endif + +/* + * Socket Write Routines + */ + +int +link_socket_write_tcp (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + packet_size_type len = BLEN (buf); + dmsg (D_STREAM_DEBUG, "STREAM: WRITE %d offset=%d", (int)len, buf->offset); + ASSERT (len <= sock->stream_buf.maxlen); + len = htonps (len); + ASSERT (buf_write_prepend (buf, &len, sizeof (len))); +#ifdef WIN32 + return link_socket_write_win32 (sock, buf, to); +#else + return link_socket_write_tcp_posix (sock, buf, to); +#endif +} + +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + +size_t +link_socket_write_udp_posix_sendmsg (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + struct iovec iov; + struct msghdr mesg; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + + iov.iov_base = BPTR (buf); + iov.iov_len = BLEN (buf); + mesg.msg_iov = &iov; + mesg.msg_iovlen = 1; + switch (to->ai_family) + { + case AF_INET: + { + struct openvpn_in4_pktinfo msgpi4; + mesg.msg_name = &to->dest.addr.sa; + mesg.msg_namelen = sizeof (struct sockaddr_in); + mesg.msg_control = &msgpi4; + mesg.msg_controllen = sizeof msgpi4; + mesg.msg_flags = 0; + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&mesg); + cmsg->cmsg_len = sizeof (struct openvpn_in4_pktinfo); +#ifdef HAVE_IN_PKTINFO + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_IP; + cmsg->cmsg_type = IP_PKTINFO; + { + struct in_pktinfo *pkti; + pkti = (struct in_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); + pkti->ipi_ifindex = to->pi.in4.ipi_ifindex; + pkti->ipi_spec_dst = to->pi.in4.ipi_spec_dst; + pkti->ipi_addr.s_addr = 0; + } +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IP; + cmsg->cmsg_type = IP_RECVDSTADDR; + *(struct in_addr *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = to->pi.in4; +#else +#error ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO is set without IP_PKTINFO xor IP_RECVDSTADDR (fix syshead.h) +#endif + break; + } + case AF_INET6: + { + struct openvpn_in6_pktinfo msgpi6; + struct in6_pktinfo *pkti6; + mesg.msg_name = &to->dest.addr.sa; + mesg.msg_namelen = sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6); + mesg.msg_control = &msgpi6; + mesg.msg_controllen = sizeof msgpi6; + mesg.msg_flags = 0; + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&mesg); + cmsg->cmsg_len = sizeof (struct openvpn_in6_pktinfo); + cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IPV6; + cmsg->cmsg_type = IPV6_PKTINFO; + pkti6 = (struct in6_pktinfo *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg); + pkti6->ipi6_ifindex = to->pi.in6.ipi6_ifindex; + pkti6->ipi6_addr = to->pi.in6.ipi6_addr; + break; + } + default: ASSERT(0); + } + return sendmsg (sock->sd, &mesg, 0); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Win32 overlapped socket I/O functions. + */ + +#ifdef WIN32 + +int +socket_recv_queue (struct link_socket *sock, int maxsize) +{ + if (sock->reads.iostate == IOSTATE_INITIAL) + { + WSABUF wsabuf[1]; + int status; + + /* reset buf to its initial state */ + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto)) + { + sock->reads.buf = sock->reads.buf_init; + } + else if (proto_is_tcp(sock->info.proto)) + { + stream_buf_get_next (&sock->stream_buf, &sock->reads.buf); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* Win32 docs say it's okay to allocate the wsabuf on the stack */ + wsabuf[0].buf = BPTR (&sock->reads.buf); + wsabuf[0].len = maxsize ? maxsize : BLEN (&sock->reads.buf); + + /* check for buffer overflow */ + ASSERT (wsabuf[0].len <= BLEN (&sock->reads.buf)); + + /* the overlapped read will signal this event on I/O completion */ + ASSERT (ResetEvent (sock->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + sock->reads.flags = 0; + + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto)) + { + sock->reads.addr_defined = true; + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_UDPv6) + sock->reads.addrlen = sizeof (sock->reads.addr6); + else + sock->reads.addrlen = sizeof (sock->reads.addr); + status = WSARecvFrom( + sock->sd, + wsabuf, + 1, + &sock->reads.size, + &sock->reads.flags, + (struct sockaddr *) &sock->reads.addr, + &sock->reads.addrlen, + &sock->reads.overlapped, + NULL); + } + else if (proto_is_tcp(sock->info.proto)) + { + sock->reads.addr_defined = false; + status = WSARecv( + sock->sd, + wsabuf, + 1, + &sock->reads.size, + &sock->reads.flags, + &sock->reads.overlapped, + NULL); + } + else + { + status = 0; + ASSERT (0); + } + + if (!status) /* operation completed immediately? */ + { + int addrlen = af_addr_size(sock->info.lsa->local.addr.sa.sa_family); + if (sock->reads.addr_defined && sock->reads.addrlen != addrlen) + bad_address_length (sock->reads.addrlen, addrlen); + sock->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + + /* since we got an immediate return, we must signal the event object ourselves */ + ASSERT (SetEvent (sock->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + sock->reads.status = 0; + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Receive immediate return [%d,%d]", + (int) wsabuf[0].len, + (int) sock->reads.size); + } + else + { + status = WSAGetLastError (); + if (status == WSA_IO_PENDING) /* operation queued? */ + { + sock->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_QUEUED; + sock->reads.status = status; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Receive queued [%d]", + (int) wsabuf[0].len); + } + else /* error occurred */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + ASSERT (SetEvent (sock->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + sock->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + sock->reads.status = status; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Receive error [%d]: %s", + (int) wsabuf[0].len, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + } + } + } + return sock->reads.iostate; +} + +int +socket_send_queue (struct link_socket *sock, struct buffer *buf, const struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + if (sock->writes.iostate == IOSTATE_INITIAL) + { + WSABUF wsabuf[1]; + int status; + + /* make a private copy of buf */ + sock->writes.buf = sock->writes.buf_init; + sock->writes.buf.len = 0; + ASSERT (buf_copy (&sock->writes.buf, buf)); + + /* Win32 docs say it's okay to allocate the wsabuf on the stack */ + wsabuf[0].buf = BPTR (&sock->writes.buf); + wsabuf[0].len = BLEN (&sock->writes.buf); + + /* the overlapped write will signal this event on I/O completion */ + ASSERT (ResetEvent (sock->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + sock->writes.flags = 0; + + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto)) + { + /* set destination address for UDP writes */ + sock->writes.addr_defined = true; + if (sock->info.proto == PROTO_UDPv6) + { + sock->writes.addr6 = to->dest.addr.in6; + sock->writes.addrlen = sizeof (sock->writes.addr6); + } + else + { + sock->writes.addr = to->dest.addr.in4; + sock->writes.addrlen = sizeof (sock->writes.addr); + } + + status = WSASendTo( + sock->sd, + wsabuf, + 1, + &sock->writes.size, + sock->writes.flags, + (struct sockaddr *) &sock->writes.addr, + sock->writes.addrlen, + &sock->writes.overlapped, + NULL); + } + else if (proto_is_tcp(sock->info.proto)) + { + /* destination address for TCP writes was established on connection initiation */ + sock->writes.addr_defined = false; + + status = WSASend( + sock->sd, + wsabuf, + 1, + &sock->writes.size, + sock->writes.flags, + &sock->writes.overlapped, + NULL); + } + else + { + status = 0; + ASSERT (0); + } + + if (!status) /* operation completed immediately? */ + { + sock->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + + /* since we got an immediate return, we must signal the event object ourselves */ + ASSERT (SetEvent (sock->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + + sock->writes.status = 0; + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Send immediate return [%d,%d]", + (int) wsabuf[0].len, + (int) sock->writes.size); + } + else + { + status = WSAGetLastError (); + if (status == WSA_IO_PENDING) /* operation queued? */ + { + sock->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_QUEUED; + sock->writes.status = status; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Send queued [%d]", + (int) wsabuf[0].len); + } + else /* error occurred */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + ASSERT (SetEvent (sock->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + sock->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + sock->writes.status = status; + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Send error [%d]: %s", + (int) wsabuf[0].len, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); + } + } + } + return sock->writes.iostate; +} + +int +socket_finalize (SOCKET s, + struct overlapped_io *io, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + int ret = -1; + BOOL status; + + switch (io->iostate) + { + case IOSTATE_QUEUED: + status = WSAGetOverlappedResult( + s, + &io->overlapped, + &io->size, + FALSE, + &io->flags + ); + if (status) + { + /* successful return for a queued operation */ + if (buf) + *buf = io->buf; + ret = io->size; + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Completion success [%d]", ret); + } + else + { + /* error during a queued operation */ + ret = -1; + if (WSAGetLastError() != WSA_IO_INCOMPLETE) + { + /* if no error (i.e. just not finished yet), then DON'T execute this code */ + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + msg (D_WIN32_IO | M_ERRNO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Completion error"); + } + } + break; + + case IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN: + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + if (io->status) + { + /* error return for a non-queued operation */ + WSASetLastError (io->status); + ret = -1; + msg (D_WIN32_IO | M_ERRNO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Completion non-queued error"); + } + else + { + /* successful return for a non-queued operation */ + if (buf) + *buf = io->buf; + ret = io->size; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Completion non-queued success [%d]", ret); + } + break; + + case IOSTATE_INITIAL: /* were we called without proper queueing? */ + WSASetLastError (WSAEINVAL); + ret = -1; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: Socket Completion BAD STATE"); + break; + + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + /* return from address if requested */ + if (from) + { + if (ret >= 0 && io->addr_defined) + { + /* TODO(jjo): streamline this mess */ + /* in this func we dont have relevant info about the PF_ of this + * endpoint, as link_socket_actual will be zero for the 1st received packet + * + * Test for inets PF_ possible sizes + */ + switch (io->addrlen) + { + case sizeof(struct sockaddr_in): + case sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6): + /* TODO(jjo): for some reason (?) I'm getting 24,28 for AF_INET6 + * under WIN32*/ + case sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)-4: + break; + default: + bad_address_length (io->addrlen, af_addr_size(io->addr.sin_family)); + } + + switch (io->addr.sin_family) + { + case AF_INET: + from->dest.addr.in4 = io->addr; + break; + case AF_INET6: + from->dest.addr.in6 = io->addr6; + break; + } + } + else + CLEAR (from->dest.addr); + } + + if (buf) + buf->len = ret; + return ret; +} + +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +/* + * Socket event notification + */ + +unsigned int +socket_set (struct link_socket *s, + struct event_set *es, + unsigned int rwflags, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent) +{ + if (s) + { + if ((rwflags & EVENT_READ) && !stream_buf_read_setup (s)) + { + ASSERT (!persistent); + rwflags &= ~EVENT_READ; + } + +#ifdef WIN32 + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + socket_recv_queue (s, 0); +#endif + + /* if persistent is defined, call event_ctl only if rwflags has changed since last call */ + if (!persistent || *persistent != rwflags) + { + event_ctl (es, socket_event_handle (s), rwflags, arg); + if (persistent) + *persistent = rwflags; + } + + s->rwflags_debug = rwflags; + } + return rwflags; +} + +void +sd_close (socket_descriptor_t *sd) +{ + if (sd && socket_defined (*sd)) + { + openvpn_close_socket (*sd); + *sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + } +} + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + +/* + * code for unix domain sockets + */ + +const char * +sockaddr_unix_name (const struct sockaddr_un *local, const char *null) +{ + if (local && local->sun_family == PF_UNIX) + return local->sun_path; + else + return null; +} + +socket_descriptor_t +create_socket_unix (void) +{ + socket_descriptor_t sd; + + if ((sd = socket (PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot create unix domain socket"); + return sd; +} + +void +socket_bind_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *local, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + +#ifdef HAVE_UMASK + const mode_t orig_umask = umask (0); +#endif + + if (bind (sd, (struct sockaddr *) local, sizeof (struct sockaddr_un))) + { + const int errnum = openvpn_errno (); + msg (M_FATAL, "%s: Socket bind[%d] failed on unix domain socket %s: %s", + prefix, + (int)sd, + sockaddr_unix_name (local, "NULL"), + strerror_ts (errnum, &gc)); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_UMASK + umask (orig_umask); +#endif + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +socket_descriptor_t +socket_accept_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *remote) +{ + socklen_t remote_len = sizeof (struct sockaddr_un); + socket_descriptor_t ret; + + CLEAR (*remote); + ret = accept (sd, (struct sockaddr *) remote, &remote_len); + return ret; +} + +int +socket_connect_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *remote) +{ + int status = connect (sd, (struct sockaddr *) remote, sizeof (struct sockaddr_un)); + if (status) + status = openvpn_errno (); + return status; +} + +void +sockaddr_unix_init (struct sockaddr_un *local, const char *path) +{ + local->sun_family = PF_UNIX; + strncpynt (local->sun_path, path, sizeof (local->sun_path)); +} + +void +socket_delete_unix (const struct sockaddr_un *local) +{ + const char *name = sockaddr_unix_name (local, NULL); +#ifdef HAVE_UNLINK + if (name && strlen (name)) + unlink (name); +#endif +} + +bool +unix_socket_get_peer_uid_gid (const socket_descriptor_t sd, int *uid, int *gid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_GETPEEREID + uid_t u; + gid_t g; + if (getpeereid (sd, &u, &g) == -1) + return false; + if (uid) + *uid = u; + if (gid) + *gid = g; + return true; +#elif defined(SO_PEERCRED) + struct ucred peercred; + socklen_t so_len = sizeof(peercred); + if (getsockopt(sd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &peercred, &so_len) == -1) + return false; + if (uid) + *uid = peercred.uid; + if (gid) + *gid = peercred.gid; + return true; +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b7a26a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socket.h @@ -0,0 +1,1154 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef SOCKET_H +#define SOCKET_H + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "proto.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "proxy.h" +#include "socks.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* + * OpenVPN's default port number as assigned by IANA. + */ +#define OPENVPN_PORT "1194" + +/* + * Maximum size passed passed to setsockopt SNDBUF/RCVBUF + */ +#define SOCKET_SND_RCV_BUF_MAX 1000000 + +/* + * Number of seconds that "resolv-retry infinite" + * represents. + */ +#define RESOLV_RETRY_INFINITE 1000000000 + +/* + * packet_size_type is used to communicate packet size + * over the wire when stream oriented protocols are + * being used + */ + +typedef uint16_t packet_size_type; + +/* convert a packet_size_type from host to network order */ +#define htonps(x) htons(x) + +/* convert a packet_size_type from network to host order */ +#define ntohps(x) ntohs(x) + +/* OpenVPN sockaddr struct */ +struct openvpn_sockaddr +{ + /*int dummy;*/ /* add offset to force a bug if sa not explicitly dereferenced */ + union { + struct sockaddr sa; + struct sockaddr_in in4; + struct sockaddr_in6 in6; + } addr; +}; + +/* actual address of remote, based on source address of received packets */ +struct link_socket_actual +{ + /*int dummy;*/ /* add offset to force a bug if dest not explicitly dereferenced */ + int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */ + int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */ + int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */ + + + struct openvpn_sockaddr dest; +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + union { +#ifdef HAVE_IN_PKTINFO + struct in_pktinfo in4; +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + struct in_addr in4; +#endif + struct in6_pktinfo in6; + } pi; +#endif +}; + +/* IP addresses which are persistant across SIGUSR1s */ +struct link_socket_addr +{ + struct addrinfo* bind_local; + struct addrinfo* remote_list; /* complete remote list */ + struct addrinfo* current_remote; /* remote used in the + current connection attempt */ + struct link_socket_actual actual; /* reply to this address */ +}; + +struct link_socket_info +{ + struct link_socket_addr *lsa; + bool connection_established; + const char *ipchange_command; + const struct plugin_list *plugins; + bool remote_float; + int proto; /* Protocol (PROTO_x defined below) */ + sa_family_t af; /* Address family like AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNSPEC*/ + int mtu_changed; /* Set to true when mtu value is changed */ +}; + +/* + * Used to extract packets encapsulated in streams into a buffer, + * in this case IP packets embedded in a TCP stream. + */ +struct stream_buf +{ + struct buffer buf_init; + struct buffer residual; + int maxlen; + bool residual_fully_formed; + + struct buffer buf; + struct buffer next; + int len; /* -1 if not yet known */ + + bool error; /* if true, fatal TCP error has occurred, + requiring that connection be restarted */ +#if PORT_SHARE +# define PS_DISABLED 0 +# define PS_ENABLED 1 +# define PS_FOREIGN 2 + int port_share_state; +#endif +}; + +/* + * Used to set socket buffer sizes + */ +struct socket_buffer_size +{ + int rcvbuf; + int sndbuf; +}; + +/* + * This is the main socket structure used by OpenVPN. The SOCKET_ + * defines try to abstract away our implementation differences between + * using sockets on Posix vs. Win32. + */ +struct link_socket +{ + struct link_socket_info info; + + socket_descriptor_t sd; + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + socket_descriptor_t ctrl_sd; /* only used for UDP over Socks */ +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + struct overlapped_io reads; + struct overlapped_io writes; + struct rw_handle rw_handle; + struct rw_handle listen_handle; /* For listening on TCP socket in server mode */ +#endif + + /* used for printing status info only */ + unsigned int rwflags_debug; + + /* used for long-term queueing of pre-accepted socket listen */ + bool listen_persistent_queued; + + const char *remote_host; + const char *remote_port; + const char *local_host; + const char *local_port; + bool bind_local; + +# define INETD_NONE 0 +# define INETD_WAIT 1 +# define INETD_NOWAIT 2 + int inetd; + +# define LS_MODE_DEFAULT 0 +# define LS_MODE_TCP_LISTEN 1 +# define LS_MODE_TCP_ACCEPT_FROM 2 + int mode; + + int resolve_retry_seconds; + int connect_timeout; + int mtu_discover_type; + + struct socket_buffer_size socket_buffer_sizes; + + int mtu; /* OS discovered MTU, or 0 if unknown */ + + bool did_resolve_remote; + +# define SF_USE_IP_PKTINFO (1<<0) +# define SF_TCP_NODELAY (1<<1) +# define SF_PORT_SHARE (1<<2) +# define SF_HOST_RANDOMIZE (1<<3) +# define SF_GETADDRINFO_DGRAM (1<<4) + unsigned int sockflags; + int mark; + + /* for stream sockets */ + struct stream_buf stream_buf; + struct buffer stream_buf_data; + bool stream_reset; + +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + /* HTTP proxy */ + struct http_proxy_info *http_proxy; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + /* Socks proxy */ + struct socks_proxy_info *socks_proxy; + struct link_socket_actual socks_relay; /* Socks UDP relay address */ +#endif + +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) || defined(ENABLE_SOCKS) + /* The OpenVPN server we will use the proxy to connect to */ + const char *proxy_dest_host; + const char *proxy_dest_port; +#endif + +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + /* used to get/set TOS. */ +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) + uint8_t ptos; +#else /* all the BSDs, Solaris, MacOS use plain "int" -> see "man ip" there */ + int ptos; +#endif + bool ptos_defined; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + int gremlin; /* --gremlin bits */ +#endif +}; + +/* + * Some Posix/Win32 differences. + */ + +#ifndef MSG_NOSIGNAL +#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0 +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#define openvpn_close_socket(s) closesocket(s) + +int socket_recv_queue (struct link_socket *sock, int maxsize); + +int socket_send_queue (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_actual *to); + +int socket_finalize ( + SOCKET s, + struct overlapped_io *io, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *from); + +#else + +#define openvpn_close_socket(s) close(s) + +#endif + +struct link_socket *link_socket_new (void); + +void socket_bind (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct addrinfo *local, + int af_family, + const char *prefix); + +int openvpn_connect (socket_descriptor_t sd, + const struct sockaddr *remote, + int connect_timeout, + volatile int *signal_received); + +/* + * Initialize link_socket object. + */ + +void +link_socket_init_phase1 (struct link_socket *sock, + const char *local_host, + const char *local_port, + const char *remote_host, + const char *remote_port, + int proto, + sa_family_t af, + int mode, + const struct link_socket *accept_from, +#ifdef ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY + struct http_proxy_info *http_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + struct socks_proxy_info *socks_proxy, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + int gremlin, +#endif + bool bind_local, + bool remote_float, + int inetd, + struct link_socket_addr *lsa, + const char *ipchange_command, + const struct plugin_list *plugins, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + int connect_timeout, + int mtu_discover_type, + int rcvbuf, + int sndbuf, + int mark, + unsigned int sockflags); + +void link_socket_init_phase2 (struct link_socket *sock, + const struct frame *frame, + struct signal_info *sig_info); + +void socket_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame *frame, int proto); + +void frame_adjust_path_mtu (struct frame *frame, int pmtu, int proto); + +void link_socket_close (struct link_socket *sock); + +void sd_close (socket_descriptor_t *sd); + +#define PS_SHOW_PORT_IF_DEFINED (1<<0) +#define PS_SHOW_PORT (1<<1) +#define PS_SHOW_PKTINFO (1<<2) +#define PS_DONT_SHOW_ADDR (1<<3) + +const char *print_sockaddr_ex (const struct sockaddr *addr, + const char* separator, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +static inline +const char *print_openvpn_sockaddr_ex (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr, + const char* separator, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return print_sockaddr_ex(&addr->addr.sa, separator, flags, gc); +} + +static inline +const char *print_openvpn_sockaddr (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return print_sockaddr_ex (&addr->addr.sa, ":", PS_SHOW_PORT, gc); +} + +static inline +const char *print_sockaddr (const struct sockaddr *addr, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return print_sockaddr_ex (addr, ":", PS_SHOW_PORT, gc); +} + + + +const char *print_link_socket_actual_ex (const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const char* separator, + const unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act, + struct gc_arena *gc); + + +#define IA_EMPTY_IF_UNDEF (1<<0) +#define IA_NET_ORDER (1<<1) +const char *print_in_addr_t (in_addr_t addr, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc); +const char *print_in6_addr (struct in6_addr addr6, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc); +struct in6_addr add_in6_addr( struct in6_addr base, uint32_t add ); + +#define SA_IP_PORT (1<<0) +#define SA_SET_IF_NONZERO (1<<1) +void setenv_sockaddr (struct env_set *es, + const char *name_prefix, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr, + const unsigned int flags); + +void setenv_in_addr_t (struct env_set *es, + const char *name_prefix, + in_addr_t addr, + const unsigned int flags); + +void setenv_link_socket_actual (struct env_set *es, + const char *name_prefix, + const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const unsigned int flags); + +void bad_address_length (int actual, int expected); + +/* IPV4_INVALID_ADDR: returned by link_socket_current_remote() + * to ease redirect-gateway logic for ipv4 tunnels on ipv6 endpoints + */ +#define IPV4_INVALID_ADDR 0xffffffff +in_addr_t link_socket_current_remote (const struct link_socket_info *info); + +void link_socket_connection_initiated (const struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *addr, + const char *common_name, + struct env_set *es); + +void link_socket_bad_incoming_addr (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *from_addr); + +void set_actual_address (struct link_socket_actual* actual, + struct addrinfo* ai); + +void link_socket_bad_outgoing_addr (void); + +void setenv_trusted (struct env_set *es, const struct link_socket_info *info); + +bool link_socket_update_flags (struct link_socket *ls, unsigned int sockflags); +void link_socket_update_buffer_sizes (struct link_socket *ls, int rcvbuf, int sndbuf); + +/* + * Low-level functions + */ + +/* return values of openvpn_inet_aton */ +#define OIA_HOSTNAME 0 +#define OIA_IP 1 +#define OIA_ERROR -1 +int openvpn_inet_aton (const char *dotted_quad, struct in_addr *addr); + +/* integrity validation on pulled options */ +bool ip_addr_dotted_quad_safe (const char *dotted_quad); +bool ip_or_dns_addr_safe (const char *addr, const bool allow_fqdn); +bool mac_addr_safe (const char *mac_addr); +bool ipv6_addr_safe (const char *ipv6_text_addr); + +socket_descriptor_t create_socket_tcp (int af); + +socket_descriptor_t socket_do_accept (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct link_socket_actual *act, + const bool nowait); +/* + * proto related + */ +bool proto_is_net(int proto); +bool proto_is_dgram(int proto); +bool proto_is_udp(int proto); +bool proto_is_tcp(int proto); + + +#if UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT + +socket_descriptor_t create_socket_unix (void); + +void socket_bind_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *local, + const char *prefix); + +socket_descriptor_t socket_accept_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *remote); + +int socket_connect_unix (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct sockaddr_un *remote); + +void sockaddr_unix_init (struct sockaddr_un *local, const char *path); + +const char *sockaddr_unix_name (const struct sockaddr_un *local, const char *null); + +void socket_delete_unix (const struct sockaddr_un *local); + +bool unix_socket_get_peer_uid_gid (const socket_descriptor_t sd, int *uid, int *gid); + +#endif + +/* + * DNS resolution + */ + +#define GETADDR_RESOLVE (1<<0) +#define GETADDR_FATAL (1<<1) +#define GETADDR_HOST_ORDER (1<<2) +#define GETADDR_MENTION_RESOLVE_RETRY (1<<3) +#define GETADDR_FATAL_ON_SIGNAL (1<<4) +#define GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL (1<<5) +#define GETADDR_MSG_VIRT_OUT (1<<6) +#define GETADDR_TRY_ONCE (1<<7) +#define GETADDR_UPDATE_MANAGEMENT_STATE (1<<8) +#define GETADDR_RANDOMIZE (1<<9) +#define GETADDR_PASSIVE (1<<10) +#define GETADDR_DATAGRAM (1<<11) + +in_addr_t getaddr (unsigned int flags, + const char *hostname, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + bool *succeeded, + volatile int *signal_received); + +int openvpn_getaddrinfo (unsigned int flags, + const char *hostname, + const char *servname, + int resolve_retry_seconds, + volatile int *signal_received, + int ai_family, + struct addrinfo **res); + +/* + * Transport protocol naming and other details. + */ + +/* + * Use enum's instead of #define to allow for easier + * optional proto support + */ +enum proto_num { + PROTO_NONE, /* catch for uninitialized */ + PROTO_UDP, + PROTO_TCP, + PROTO_TCP_SERVER, + PROTO_TCP_CLIENT, + PROTO_N +}; + +int ascii2proto (const char* proto_name); +sa_family_t ascii2af (const char* proto_name); +const char *proto2ascii (int proto, sa_family_t af, bool display_form); +const char *proto2ascii_all (struct gc_arena *gc); +const char *proto_remote (int proto, bool remote); +const char *addr_family_name(int af); + +/* + * Overhead added to packets by various protocols. + */ +#define IPv4_UDP_HEADER_SIZE 28 +#define IPv4_TCP_HEADER_SIZE 40 +#define IPv6_UDP_HEADER_SIZE 48 +#define IPv6_TCP_HEADER_SIZE 60 + +extern const int proto_overhead[]; + +static inline int +datagram_overhead (int proto) +{ + ASSERT (proto >= 0 && proto < PROTO_N); + return proto_overhead [proto]; +} + +/* + * Misc inline functions + */ + +static inline bool +link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (int proto) +{ + return !proto_is_dgram(proto); +} + +static inline bool +link_socket_connection_oriented (const struct link_socket *sock) +{ + if (sock) + return link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (sock->info.proto); + else + return false; +} + +static inline bool +addr_defined (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr) +{ + if (!addr) return 0; + switch (addr->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: return addr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr != 0; + case AF_INET6: return !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&addr->addr.in6.sin6_addr); + default: return 0; + } +} + +static inline bool +addr_local (const struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + if (!addr) + return false; + switch (addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + return ((const struct sockaddr_in*)addr)->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + case AF_INET6: + return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&((const struct sockaddr_in6*)addr)->sin6_addr); + default: + return false; + } +} + + +static inline bool +addr_defined_ipi (const struct link_socket_actual *lsa) +{ +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + if (!lsa) return 0; + switch (lsa->dest.addr.sa.sa_family) { +#ifdef HAVE_IN_PKTINFO + case AF_INET: return lsa->pi.in4.ipi_spec_dst.s_addr != 0; +#elif defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) + case AF_INET: return lsa->pi.in4.s_addr != 0; +#endif + case AF_INET6: return !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&lsa->pi.in6.ipi6_addr); + default: return 0; + } +#else + ASSERT(0); +#endif + return false; +} + +static inline bool +link_socket_actual_defined (const struct link_socket_actual *act) +{ + return act && addr_defined (&act->dest); +} + +static inline bool +addr_match (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a2) +{ + switch(a1->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + return a1->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr == a2->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr; + case AF_INET6: + return IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&a1->addr.in6.sin6_addr, &a2->addr.in6.sin6_addr); + } + ASSERT(0); + return false; +} + +static inline bool +addrlist_match (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, const struct addrinfo *addrlist) +{ + const struct addrinfo *curele; + for (curele = addrlist; curele; curele=curele->ai_next) { + + switch(a1->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (a1->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr == ((struct sockaddr_in*)curele->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr) + return true; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&a1->addr.in6.sin6_addr, &((struct sockaddr_in6*) curele->ai_addr)->sin6_addr)) + return true; + break; + default: + ASSERT(0); + } + } + return false; +} + +static inline bool +addrlist_port_match (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, const struct addrinfo *a2) +{ + const struct addrinfo *curele; + for(curele=a2;curele;curele = curele->ai_next) { + switch(a1->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (curele->ai_family == AF_INET + && a1->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr == ((struct sockaddr_in*)curele->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr + && a1->addr.in4.sin_port == ((struct sockaddr_in*)curele->ai_addr)->sin_port) + return true; + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (curele->ai_family == AF_INET6 + && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&a1->addr.in6.sin6_addr, &((struct sockaddr_in6*) curele->ai_addr)->sin6_addr) + && a1->addr.in6.sin6_port == ((struct sockaddr_in6*) curele->ai_addr)->sin6_port) + return true; + break; + default: + ASSERT(0); + } + } + return false; +} + + + +static inline bool +addr_port_match (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a2) +{ + switch(a1->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + return a1->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr == a2->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr + && a1->addr.in4.sin_port == a2->addr.in4.sin_port; + case AF_INET6: + return IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&a1->addr.in6.sin6_addr, &a2->addr.in6.sin6_addr) + && a1->addr.in6.sin6_port == a2->addr.in6.sin6_port; + } + ASSERT(0); + return false; +} + +static inline bool +addr_match_proto (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a2, + const int proto) +{ + return link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (proto) + ? addr_match (a1, a2) + : addr_port_match (a1, a2); +} + + +static inline bool +addrlist_match_proto (const struct openvpn_sockaddr *a1, + struct addrinfo *addr_list, + const int proto) +{ + return link_socket_proto_connection_oriented (proto) + ? addrlist_match (a1, addr_list) + : addrlist_port_match (a1, addr_list); +} + +static inline void +addr_zero_host(struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr) +{ + switch(addr->addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + addr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + memset(&addr->addr.in6.sin6_addr, 0, sizeof (struct in6_addr)); + break; + } +} + +static inline void +addr_copy_sa(struct openvpn_sockaddr *dst, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *src) +{ + dst->addr = src->addr; +} + +static inline bool +addr_inet4or6(struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + return addr->sa_family == AF_INET || addr->sa_family == AF_INET6; +} + +int addr_guess_family(sa_family_t af,const char *name); +static inline int +af_addr_size(sa_family_t af) +{ + switch(af) { + case AF_INET: return sizeof (struct sockaddr_in); + case AF_INET6: return sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6); + default: +#if 0 + /* could be called from socket_do_accept() with empty addr */ + msg (M_ERR, "Bad address family: %d\n", af); + ASSERT(0); +#endif + return 0; + } +} + +static inline bool +link_socket_actual_match (const struct link_socket_actual *a1, const struct link_socket_actual *a2) +{ + return addr_port_match (&a1->dest, &a2->dest); +} + +#if PORT_SHARE + +static inline bool +socket_foreign_protocol_detected (const struct link_socket *sock) +{ + return link_socket_connection_oriented (sock) + && sock->stream_buf.port_share_state == PS_FOREIGN; +} + +static inline const struct buffer * +socket_foreign_protocol_head (const struct link_socket *sock) +{ + return &sock->stream_buf.buf; +} + +static inline int +socket_foreign_protocol_sd (const struct link_socket *sock) +{ + return sock->sd; +} + +#endif + +static inline bool +socket_connection_reset (const struct link_socket *sock, int status) +{ + if (link_socket_connection_oriented (sock)) + { + if (sock->stream_reset || sock->stream_buf.error) + return true; + else if (status < 0) + { + const int err = openvpn_errno (); +#ifdef WIN32 + return err == WSAECONNRESET || err == WSAECONNABORTED; +#else + return err == ECONNRESET; +#endif + } + } + return false; +} + +static inline bool +link_socket_verify_incoming_addr (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *from_addr) +{ + if (buf->len > 0) + { + switch (from_addr->dest.addr.sa.sa_family) { + case AF_INET6: + case AF_INET: + if (!link_socket_actual_defined (from_addr)) + return false; + if (info->remote_float || !info->lsa->remote_list) + return true; + if (addrlist_match_proto (&from_addr->dest, info->lsa->remote_list, info->proto)) + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +static inline void +link_socket_get_outgoing_addr (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_info *info, + struct link_socket_actual **act) +{ + if (buf->len > 0) + { + struct link_socket_addr *lsa = info->lsa; + if (link_socket_actual_defined (&lsa->actual)) + *act = &lsa->actual; + else + { + link_socket_bad_outgoing_addr (); + buf->len = 0; + *act = NULL; + } + } +} + +static inline void +link_socket_set_outgoing_addr (const struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_info *info, + const struct link_socket_actual *act, + const char *common_name, + struct env_set *es) +{ + if (!buf || buf->len > 0) + { + struct link_socket_addr *lsa = info->lsa; + if ( + /* new or changed address? */ + (!info->connection_established + || !addr_match_proto (&act->dest, &lsa->actual.dest, info->proto)) + /* address undef or address == remote or --float */ + && (info->remote_float + || !lsa->remote_list) + || addrlist_match_proto (&act->dest, lsa->remote_list, info->proto) + ) + { + link_socket_connection_initiated (buf, info, act, common_name, es); + } + } +} + +/* + * Stream buffer handling -- stream_buf is a helper class + * to assist in the packetization of stream transport protocols + * such as TCP. + */ + +void stream_buf_init (struct stream_buf *sb, + struct buffer *buf, + const unsigned int sockflags, + const int proto); + +void stream_buf_close (struct stream_buf* sb); +bool stream_buf_added (struct stream_buf *sb, int length_added); + +static inline bool +stream_buf_read_setup (struct link_socket* sock) +{ + bool stream_buf_read_setup_dowork (struct link_socket* sock); + if (link_socket_connection_oriented (sock)) + return stream_buf_read_setup_dowork (sock); + else + return true; +} + +/* + * Socket Read Routines + */ + +int link_socket_read_tcp (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf); + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static inline int +link_socket_read_udp_win32 (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + return socket_finalize (sock->sd, &sock->reads, buf, from); +} + +#else + +int link_socket_read_udp_posix (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + int maxsize, + struct link_socket_actual *from); + +#endif + +/* read a TCP or UDP packet from link */ +static inline int +link_socket_read (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + int maxsize, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto)) /* unified UDPv4 and UDPv6 */ + { + int res; + +#ifdef WIN32 + res = link_socket_read_udp_win32 (sock, buf, from); +#else + res = link_socket_read_udp_posix (sock, buf, maxsize, from); +#endif + return res; + } + else if (proto_is_tcp(sock->info.proto)) /* unified TCPv4 and TCPv6 */ + { + /* from address was returned by accept */ + addr_copy_sa(&from->dest, &sock->info.lsa->actual.dest); + return link_socket_read_tcp (sock, buf); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ + } +} + +/* + * Socket Write routines + */ + +int link_socket_write_tcp (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to); + +#ifdef WIN32 + +static inline int +link_socket_write_win32 (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + int err = 0; + int status = 0; + if (overlapped_io_active (&sock->writes)) + { + status = socket_finalize (sock->sd, &sock->writes, NULL, NULL); + if (status < 0) + err = WSAGetLastError (); + } + socket_send_queue (sock, buf, to); + if (status < 0) + { + WSASetLastError (err); + return status; + } + else + return BLEN (buf); +} + +#else + +static inline size_t +link_socket_write_udp_posix (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ +#if ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO + size_t link_socket_write_udp_posix_sendmsg (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to); + + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto) && (sock->sockflags & SF_USE_IP_PKTINFO) + && addr_defined_ipi(to)) + return link_socket_write_udp_posix_sendmsg (sock, buf, to); + else +#endif + return sendto (sock->sd, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), 0, + (struct sockaddr *) &to->dest.addr.sa, + (socklen_t) af_addr_size(to->dest.addr.sa.sa_family)); +} + +static inline size_t +link_socket_write_tcp_posix (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + return send (sock->sd, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf), MSG_NOSIGNAL); +} + +#endif + +static inline size_t +link_socket_write_udp (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return link_socket_write_win32 (sock, buf, to); +#else + return link_socket_write_udp_posix (sock, buf, to); +#endif +} + +/* write a TCP or UDP packet to link */ +static inline int +link_socket_write (struct link_socket *sock, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + if (proto_is_udp(sock->info.proto)) /* unified UDPv4 and UDPv6 */ + { + return link_socket_write_udp (sock, buf, to); + } + else if (proto_is_tcp(sock->info.proto)) /* unified TCPv4 and TCPv6 */ + { + return link_socket_write_tcp (sock, buf, to); + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ + } +} + +#if PASSTOS_CAPABILITY + +/* + * Extract TOS bits. Assumes that ipbuf is a valid IPv4 packet. + */ +static inline void +link_socket_extract_tos (struct link_socket *ls, const struct buffer *ipbuf) +{ + if (ls && ipbuf) + { + struct openvpn_iphdr *iph = (struct openvpn_iphdr *) BPTR (ipbuf); + ls->ptos = iph->tos; + ls->ptos_defined = true; + } +} + +/* + * Set socket properties to reflect TOS bits which were extracted + * from tunnel packet. + */ +static inline void +link_socket_set_tos (struct link_socket *ls) +{ + if (ls && ls->ptos_defined) + setsockopt (ls->sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &ls->ptos, sizeof (ls->ptos)); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Socket I/O wait functions + */ + +static inline bool +socket_read_residual (const struct link_socket *s) +{ + return s && s->stream_buf.residual_fully_formed; +} + +static inline event_t +socket_event_handle (const struct link_socket *s) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return &s->rw_handle; +#else + return s->sd; +#endif +} + +event_t socket_listen_event_handle (struct link_socket *s); + +unsigned int +socket_set (struct link_socket *s, + struct event_set *es, + unsigned int rwflags, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent); + +static inline void +socket_set_listen_persistent (struct link_socket *s, + struct event_set *es, + void *arg) +{ + if (s && !s->listen_persistent_queued) + { + event_ctl (es, socket_listen_event_handle (s), EVENT_READ, arg); + s->listen_persistent_queued = true; + } +} + +static inline void +socket_reset_listen_persistent (struct link_socket *s) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + reset_net_event_win32 (&s->listen_handle, s->sd); +#endif +} + +const char *socket_stat (const struct link_socket *s, unsigned int rwflags, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif /* SOCKET_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..804c9836 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.c @@ -0,0 +1,568 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * 2004-01-30: Added Socks5 proxy support, see RFC 1928 + * (Christof Meerwald, http://cmeerw.org) + * + * 2010-10-10: Added Socks5 plain text authentication support (RFC 1929) + * (Pierre Bourdon ) + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + +#include "common.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "proxy.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#define UP_TYPE_SOCKS "SOCKS Proxy" + +void +socks_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame *frame, int proto) +{ + if (proto == PROTO_UDP) + frame_add_to_extra_link (frame, 10); +} + +struct socks_proxy_info * +socks_proxy_new (const char *server, + const char *port, + const char *authfile, + bool retry) +{ + struct socks_proxy_info *p; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (p, struct socks_proxy_info); + + ASSERT (server); + ASSERT (port); + + strncpynt (p->server, server, sizeof (p->server)); + p->port = port; + + if (authfile) + strncpynt (p->authfile, authfile, sizeof (p->authfile)); + else + p->authfile[0] = 0; + + p->retry = retry; + p->defined = true; + + return p; +} + +void +socks_proxy_close (struct socks_proxy_info *sp) +{ + free (sp); +} + +static bool +socks_username_password_auth (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char to_send[516]; + char buf[2]; + int len = 0; + const int timeout_sec = 5; + struct user_pass creds; + ssize_t size; + + creds.defined = 0; + get_user_pass (&creds, p->authfile, UP_TYPE_SOCKS, GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT); + + if( !creds.username || (strlen(creds.username) > 255) + || !creds.password || (strlen(creds.password) > 255) ) { + msg (M_NONFATAL, + "SOCKS username and/or password exceeds 255 characters. " + "Authentication not possible."); + return false; + } + openvpn_snprintf (to_send, sizeof (to_send), "\x01%c%s%c%s", (int) strlen(creds.username), + creds.username, (int) strlen(creds.password), creds.password); + size = send (sd, to_send, strlen(to_send), MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + if (size != strlen (to_send)) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_username_password_auth: TCP port write failed on send()"); + return false; + } + + while (len < 2) + { + int status; + ssize_t size; + fd_set reads; + struct timeval tv; + char c; + + FD_ZERO (&reads); + FD_SET (sd, &reads); + tv.tv_sec = timeout_sec; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, &reads, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + return false; + + /* timeout? */ + if (status == 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_username_password_auth: TCP port read timeout expired"); + return false; + } + + /* error */ + if (status < 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_username_password_auth: TCP port read failed on select()"); + return false; + } + + /* read single char */ + size = recv(sd, &c, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + /* error? */ + if (size != 1) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_username_password_auth: TCP port read failed on recv()"); + return false; + } + + /* store char in buffer */ + buf[len++] = c; + } + + /* VER = 5, SUCCESS = 0 --> auth success */ + if (buf[0] != 5 && buf[1] != 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "socks_username_password_auth: server refused the authentication"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool +socks_handshake (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char buf[2]; + int len = 0; + const int timeout_sec = 5; + + /* VER = 5, NMETHODS = 2, METHODS = [0 (no auth), 2 (plain login)] */ + const ssize_t size = send (sd, "\x05\x02\x00\x02", 4, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (size != 4) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_handshake: TCP port write failed on send()"); + return false; + } + + while (len < 2) + { + int status; + ssize_t size; + fd_set reads; + struct timeval tv; + char c; + + FD_ZERO (&reads); + FD_SET (sd, &reads); + tv.tv_sec = timeout_sec; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, &reads, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + return false; + + /* timeout? */ + if (status == 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_handshake: TCP port read timeout expired"); + return false; + } + + /* error */ + if (status < 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_handshake: TCP port read failed on select()"); + return false; + } + + /* read single char */ + size = recv(sd, &c, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + /* error? */ + if (size != 1) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "socks_handshake: TCP port read failed on recv()"); + return false; + } + + /* store char in buffer */ + buf[len++] = c; + } + + /* VER == 5 */ + if (buf[0] != '\x05') + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "socks_handshake: Socks proxy returned bad status"); + return false; + } + + /* select the appropriate authentication method */ + switch (buf[1]) + { + case 0: /* no authentication */ + break; + + case 2: /* login/password */ + if (!p->authfile[0]) + { + msg(D_LINK_ERRORS, "socks_handshake: server asked for username/login auth but we were " + "not provided any credentials"); + return false; + } + + if (!socks_username_password_auth(p, sd, signal_received)) + return false; + + break; + + default: /* unknown auth method */ + msg(D_LINK_ERRORS, "socks_handshake: unknown SOCKS auth method"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool +recv_socks_reply (socket_descriptor_t sd, + struct openvpn_sockaddr *addr, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char atyp = '\0'; + int alen = 0; + int len = 0; + char buf[22]; + const int timeout_sec = 5; + + if (addr != NULL) + { + addr->addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr->addr.in4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_ANY); + addr->addr.in4.sin_port = htons (0); + } + + while (len < 4 + alen + 2) + { + int status; + ssize_t size; + fd_set reads; + struct timeval tv; + char c; + + FD_ZERO (&reads); + FD_SET (sd, &reads); + tv.tv_sec = timeout_sec; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + + status = select (sd + 1, &reads, NULL, NULL, &tv); + + get_signal (signal_received); + if (*signal_received) + return false; + + /* timeout? */ + if (status == 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_socks_reply: TCP port read timeout expired"); + return false; + } + + /* error */ + if (status < 0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_socks_reply: TCP port read failed on select()"); + return false; + } + + /* read single char */ + size = recv(sd, &c, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + + /* error? */ + if (size != 1) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "recv_socks_reply: TCP port read failed on recv()"); + return false; + } + + if (len == 3) + atyp = c; + + if (len == 4) + { + switch (atyp) + { + case '\x01': /* IP V4 */ + alen = 4; + break; + + case '\x03': /* DOMAINNAME */ + alen = (unsigned char) c; + break; + + case '\x04': /* IP V6 */ + alen = 16; + break; + + default: + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "recv_socks_reply: Socks proxy returned bad address type"); + return false; + } + } + + /* store char in buffer */ + if (len < (int)sizeof(buf)) + buf[len] = c; + ++len; + } + + /* VER == 5 && REP == 0 (succeeded) */ + if (buf[0] != '\x05' || buf[1] != '\x00') + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "recv_socks_reply: Socks proxy returned bad reply"); + return false; + } + + /* ATYP == 1 (IP V4 address) */ + if (atyp == '\x01' && addr != NULL) + { + memcpy (&addr->addr.in4.sin_addr, buf + 4, sizeof (addr->addr.in4.sin_addr)); + memcpy (&addr->addr.in4.sin_port, buf + 8, sizeof (addr->addr.in4.sin_port)); + } + + + return true; +} + +static int +port_from_servname(const char* servname) +{ + int port =0; + port = atoi(servname); + if(port >0 && port < 65536) + return port; + + struct servent* service; + service = getservbyname(servname, NULL); + if(service) + return service->s_port; + + return 0; +} + +void +establish_socks_proxy_passthru (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, /* already open to proxy */ + const char *host, /* openvpn server remote */ + const char *servname, /* openvpn server port */ + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + char buf[128]; + size_t len; + + if (!socks_handshake (p, sd, signal_received)) + goto error; + + /* format Socks CONNECT message */ + buf[0] = '\x05'; /* VER = 5 */ + buf[1] = '\x01'; /* CMD = 1 (CONNECT) */ + buf[2] = '\x00'; /* RSV */ + buf[3] = '\x03'; /* ATYP = 3 (DOMAINNAME) */ + + len = strlen(host); + len = (5 + len + 2 > sizeof(buf)) ? (sizeof(buf) - 5 - 2) : len; + + buf[4] = (char) len; + memcpy(buf + 5, host, len); + + int port = port_from_servname (servname); + if (port ==0) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS, "establish_socks_proxy_passthrough: Cannot convert %s to port number", servname); + goto error; + } + + buf[5 + len] = (char) (port >> 8); + buf[5 + len + 1] = (char) (port & 0xff); + + { + const ssize_t size = send (sd, buf, 5 + len + 2, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if ((int)size != 5 + (int)len + 2) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "establish_socks_proxy_passthru: TCP port write failed on send()"); + goto error; + } + } + + + /* receive reply from Socks proxy and discard */ + if (!recv_socks_reply (sd, NULL, signal_received)) + goto error; + + return; + + error: + /* on error, should we exit or restart? */ + if (!*signal_received) + *signal_received = (p->retry ? SIGUSR1 : SIGTERM); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- socks error */ + return; +} + +void +establish_socks_proxy_udpassoc (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t ctrl_sd, /* already open to proxy */ + socket_descriptor_t udp_sd, + struct openvpn_sockaddr *relay_addr, + volatile int *signal_received) +{ + if (!socks_handshake (p, ctrl_sd, signal_received)) + goto error; + + { + /* send Socks UDP ASSOCIATE message */ + /* VER = 5, CMD = 3 (UDP ASSOCIATE), RSV = 0, ATYP = 1 (IP V4), + BND.ADDR = 0, BND.PORT = 0 */ + const ssize_t size = send (ctrl_sd, + "\x05\x03\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + 10, MSG_NOSIGNAL); + if (size != 10) + { + msg (D_LINK_ERRORS | M_ERRNO, "establish_socks_proxy_passthru: TCP port write failed on send()"); + goto error; + } + } + + /* receive reply from Socks proxy */ + CLEAR (*relay_addr); + if (!recv_socks_reply (ctrl_sd, relay_addr, signal_received)) + goto error; + + return; + + error: + /* on error, should we exit or restart? */ + if (!*signal_received) + *signal_received = (p->retry ? SIGUSR1 : SIGTERM); /* SOFT-SIGUSR1 -- socks error */ + return; +} + +/* + * Remove the 10 byte socks5 header from an incoming + * UDP packet, setting *from to the source address. + * + * Run after UDP read. + */ +void +socks_process_incoming_udp (struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + int atyp; + + if (BLEN (buf) < 10) + goto error; + + buf_read_u16 (buf); + if (buf_read_u8 (buf) != 0) + goto error; + + atyp = buf_read_u8 (buf); + if (atyp != 1) /* ATYP == 1 (IP V4) */ + goto error; + + buf_read (buf, &from->dest.addr.in4.sin_addr, sizeof (from->dest.addr.in4.sin_addr)); + buf_read (buf, &from->dest.addr.in4.sin_port, sizeof (from->dest.addr.in4.sin_port)); + + return; + + error: + buf->len = 0; +} + +/* + * Add a 10 byte socks header prior to UDP write. + * *to is the destination address. + * + * Run before UDP write. + * Returns the size of the header. + */ +int +socks_process_outgoing_udp (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_actual *to) +{ + /* + * Get a 10 byte subset buffer prepended to buf -- + * we expect these bytes will be here because + * we allocated frame space in socks_adjust_frame_parameters. + */ + struct buffer head = buf_sub (buf, 10, true); + + /* crash if not enough headroom in buf */ + ASSERT (buf_defined (&head)); + + buf_write_u16 (&head, 0); /* RSV = 0 */ + buf_write_u8 (&head, 0); /* FRAG = 0 */ + buf_write_u8 (&head, '\x01'); /* ATYP = 1 (IP V4) */ + buf_write (&head, &to->dest.addr.in4.sin_addr, sizeof (to->dest.addr.in4.sin_addr)); + buf_write (&head, &to->dest.addr.in4.sin_port, sizeof (to->dest.addr.in4.sin_port)); + + return 10; +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_SOCKS */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30b957d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/socks.h @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * 2004-01-30: Added Socks5 proxy support + * (Christof Meerwald, http://cmeerw.org) + */ + +#ifndef SOCKS_H +#define SOCKS_H + +#ifdef ENABLE_SOCKS + +#include "buffer.h" + +struct openvpn_sockaddr; +struct link_socket_actual; + +struct socks_proxy_info { + bool defined; + bool retry; + + char server[128]; + const char *port; + char authfile[256]; +}; + +void socks_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame *frame, int proto); + +struct socks_proxy_info *socks_proxy_new (const char *server, + const char *port, + const char *authfile, + bool retry); + +void socks_proxy_close (struct socks_proxy_info *sp); + +void establish_socks_proxy_passthru (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t sd, /* already open to proxy */ + const char *host, /* openvpn server remote */ + const char *servname, /* openvpn server port */ + volatile int *signal_received); + +void establish_socks_proxy_udpassoc (struct socks_proxy_info *p, + socket_descriptor_t ctrl_sd, /* already open to proxy */ + socket_descriptor_t udp_sd, + struct openvpn_sockaddr *relay_addr, + volatile int *signal_received); + +void socks_process_incoming_udp (struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual *from); + +int socks_process_outgoing_udp (struct buffer *buf, + const struct link_socket_actual *to); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f570b9d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,3386 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * Additions for eurephia plugin done by: + * David Sommerseth Copyright (C) 2008-2009 + * + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel SSL/Data channel negotiation Module + */ + +/* + * The routines in this file deal with dynamically negotiating + * the data channel HMAC and cipher keys through a TLS session. + * + * Both the TLS session and the data channel are multiplexed + * over the same TCP/UDP port. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#include "error.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "integer.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "interval.h" +#include "perf.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "gremlin.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#include "list.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "route.h" + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include "ssl_backend.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +#ifndef ENABLE_OCC +static const char ssl_default_options_string[] = "V0 UNDEF"; +#endif + +static inline const char * +local_options_string (const struct tls_session *session) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + return session->opt->local_options; +#else + return ssl_default_options_string; +#endif +} + +#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS + +static int tls_handshake_success; /* GLOBAL */ +static int tls_handshake_error; /* GLOBAL */ +static int tls_packets_generated; /* GLOBAL */ +static int tls_packets_sent; /* GLOBAL */ + +#define INCR_SENT ++tls_packets_sent +#define INCR_GENERATED ++tls_packets_generated +#define INCR_SUCCESS ++tls_handshake_success +#define INCR_ERROR ++tls_handshake_error + +void +show_tls_performance_stats(void) +{ + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS Handshakes, success=%f%% (good=%d, bad=%d), retransmits=%f%%", + (double) tls_handshake_success / (tls_handshake_success + tls_handshake_error) * 100.0, + tls_handshake_success, tls_handshake_error, + (double) (tls_packets_sent - tls_packets_generated) / tls_packets_generated * 100.0); +} +#else + +#define INCR_SENT +#define INCR_GENERATED +#define INCR_SUCCESS +#define INCR_ERROR + +#endif + + +/* + * Max number of bytes we will add + * for data structures common to both + * data and control channel packets. + * (opcode only). + */ +void +tls_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame) +{ + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, 1); /* space for opcode */ +} + +/* + * Max number of bytes we will add + * to control channel packet. + */ +static void +tls_init_control_channel_frame_parameters(const struct frame *data_channel_frame, + struct frame *frame) +{ + /* + * frame->extra_frame is already initialized with tls_auth buffer requirements, + * if --tls-auth is enabled. + */ + + /* inherit link MTU and extra_link from data channel */ + frame->link_mtu = data_channel_frame->link_mtu; + frame->extra_link = data_channel_frame->extra_link; + + /* set extra_frame */ + tls_adjust_frame_parameters (frame); + reliable_ack_adjust_frame_parameters (frame, CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX); + frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame, SID_SIZE + sizeof (packet_id_type)); + + /* set dynamic link MTU to minimum value */ + frame_set_mtu_dynamic (frame, 0, SET_MTU_TUN); +} + +void +init_ssl_lib () +{ + tls_init_lib (); + + crypto_init_lib (); +} + +void +free_ssl_lib () +{ + crypto_uninit_lib (); + prng_uninit(); + + tls_free_lib(); +} + +/* + * OpenSSL library calls pem_password_callback if the + * private key is protected by a password. + */ + +static struct user_pass passbuf; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +pem_password_setup (const char *auth_file) +{ + if (!strlen (passbuf.password)) + get_user_pass (&passbuf, auth_file, UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY, GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE|GET_USER_PASS_PASSWORD_ONLY); +} + +int +pem_password_callback (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) +{ + if (buf) + { + /* prompt for password even if --askpass wasn't specified */ + pem_password_setup (NULL); + strncpynt (buf, passbuf.password, size); + purge_user_pass (&passbuf, false); + + return strlen (buf); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Auth username/password handling + */ + +static bool auth_user_pass_enabled; /* GLOBAL */ +static struct user_pass auth_user_pass; /* GLOBAL */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR +static char *auth_challenge; /* GLOBAL */ +#endif + +void +auth_user_pass_setup (const char *auth_file, const struct static_challenge_info *sci) +{ + auth_user_pass_enabled = true; + if (!auth_user_pass.defined) + { +#if AUTO_USERID + get_user_pass_auto_userid (&auth_user_pass, auth_file); +#else +# ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + if (auth_challenge) /* dynamic challenge/response */ + get_user_pass_cr (&auth_user_pass, + auth_file, + UP_TYPE_AUTH, + GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE|GET_USER_PASS_DYNAMIC_CHALLENGE, + auth_challenge); + else if (sci) /* static challenge response */ + { + int flags = GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE|GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE; + if (sci->flags & SC_ECHO) + flags |= GET_USER_PASS_STATIC_CHALLENGE_ECHO; + get_user_pass_cr (&auth_user_pass, + auth_file, + UP_TYPE_AUTH, + flags, + sci->challenge_text); + } + else +# endif + get_user_pass (&auth_user_pass, auth_file, UP_TYPE_AUTH, GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT|GET_USER_PASS_SENSITIVE); +#endif + } +} + +/* + * Disable password caching + */ +void +ssl_set_auth_nocache (void) +{ + passbuf.nocache = true; + auth_user_pass.nocache = true; +} + +/* + * Set an authentication token + */ +void +ssl_set_auth_token (const char *token) +{ + set_auth_token (&auth_user_pass, token); +} + +/* + * Forget private key password AND auth-user-pass username/password. + */ +void +ssl_purge_auth (const bool auth_user_pass_only) +{ + if (!auth_user_pass_only) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_logout (); +#endif + purge_user_pass (&passbuf, true); + } + purge_user_pass (&auth_user_pass, true); +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + ssl_purge_auth_challenge(); +#endif +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + +void +ssl_purge_auth_challenge (void) +{ + free (auth_challenge); + auth_challenge = NULL; +} + +void +ssl_put_auth_challenge (const char *cr_str) +{ + ssl_purge_auth_challenge(); + auth_challenge = string_alloc(cr_str, NULL); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Initialize SSL context. + * All files are in PEM format. + */ +void +init_ssl (const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *new_ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != new_ctx); + + tls_clear_error(); + + if (options->tls_server) + { + tls_ctx_server_new(new_ctx); + tls_ctx_load_dh_params(new_ctx, options->dh_file, options->dh_file_inline); + } + else /* if client */ + { + tls_ctx_client_new(new_ctx); + } + + tls_ctx_set_options(new_ctx, options->ssl_flags); + + if (options->pkcs12_file) + { + if (0 != tls_ctx_load_pkcs12(new_ctx, options->pkcs12_file, + options->pkcs12_file_inline, !options->ca_file)) + goto err; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + else if (options->pkcs11_providers[0]) + { + if (!tls_ctx_use_pkcs11 (new_ctx, options->pkcs11_id_management, options->pkcs11_id)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Cannot load certificate \"%s\" using PKCS#11 interface", + options->pkcs11_id); + goto err; + } + } +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI + else if (options->cryptoapi_cert) + { + tls_ctx_load_cryptoapi(new_ctx, options->cryptoapi_cert); + } +#endif +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + else if ((options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY) && options->cert_file) + { + openvpn_x509_cert_t *my_cert = NULL; + tls_ctx_load_cert_file(new_ctx, options->cert_file, options->cert_file_inline, + &my_cert); + tls_ctx_use_external_private_key(new_ctx, my_cert); + + tls_ctx_free_cert_file(my_cert); + } +#endif + else + { + /* Load Certificate */ + if (options->cert_file) + { + tls_ctx_load_cert_file(new_ctx, options->cert_file, options->cert_file_inline, NULL); + } + + /* Load Private Key */ + if (options->priv_key_file) + { + if (0 != tls_ctx_load_priv_file(new_ctx, options->priv_key_file, options->priv_key_file_inline)) + goto err; + } + } + + if (options->ca_file || options->ca_path) + { + tls_ctx_load_ca(new_ctx, options->ca_file, options->ca_file_inline, + options->ca_path, options->tls_server); + } + + /* Load extra certificates that are part of our own certificate + chain but shouldn't be included in the verify chain */ + if (options->extra_certs_file || options->extra_certs_file_inline) + { + tls_ctx_load_extra_certs(new_ctx, options->extra_certs_file, options->extra_certs_file_inline); + } + + /* Allowable ciphers */ + if (options->cipher_list) + { + tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers(new_ctx, options->cipher_list); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + /* Personalise the random by mixing in the certificate */ + tls_ctx_personalise_random (new_ctx); +#endif + + tls_clear_error (); + return; + + err: + tls_clear_error (); + tls_ctx_free (new_ctx); + return; +} + +/* + * Map internal constants to ascii names. + */ +static const char * +state_name (int state) +{ + switch (state) + { + case S_UNDEF: + return "S_UNDEF"; + case S_INITIAL: + return "S_INITIAL"; + case S_PRE_START: + return "S_PRE_START"; + case S_START: + return "S_START"; + case S_SENT_KEY: + return "S_SENT_KEY"; + case S_GOT_KEY: + return "S_GOT_KEY"; + case S_ACTIVE: + return "S_ACTIVE"; + case S_NORMAL_OP: + return "S_NORMAL_OP"; + case S_ERROR: + return "S_ERROR"; + default: + return "S_???"; + } +} + +static const char * +packet_opcode_name (int op) +{ + switch (op) + { + case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1: + return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1"; + case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1: + return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1"; + case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2: + return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2"; + case P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2: + return "P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2"; + case P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1: + return "P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1"; + case P_CONTROL_V1: + return "P_CONTROL_V1"; + case P_ACK_V1: + return "P_ACK_V1"; + case P_DATA_V1: + return "P_DATA_V1"; + default: + return "P_???"; + } +} + +static const char * +session_index_name (int index) +{ + switch (index) + { + case TM_ACTIVE: + return "TM_ACTIVE"; + case TM_UNTRUSTED: + return "TM_UNTRUSTED"; + case TM_LAME_DUCK: + return "TM_LAME_DUCK"; + default: + return "TM_???"; + } +} + +/* + * For debugging. + */ +static const char * +print_key_id (struct tls_multi *multi, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int i; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + + for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + buf_printf (&out, " [key#%d state=%s id=%d sid=%s]", i, + state_name (ks->state), ks->key_id, + session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, gc)); + } + + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Given a key_method, return true if op + * represents the required form of hard_reset. + * + * If key_method = 0, return true if any + * form of hard reset is used. + */ +static bool +is_hard_reset (int op, int key_method) +{ + if (!key_method || key_method == 1) + if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1) + return true; + + if (!key_method || key_method >= 2) + if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2) + return true; + + return false; +} + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ + +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup of key_state structures + * @{ */ + +/** + * Initialize a \c key_state structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function initializes a \c key_state structure associated with a \c + * tls_session. It sets up the structure's SSL-BIO, sets the object's \c + * key_state.state to \c S_INITIAL, and sets the session ID and key ID two + * appropriate values based on the \c tls_session's internal state. It + * also initializes a new set of structures for the \link reliable + * Reliability Layer\endlink. + * + * @param session - A pointer to the \c tls_session structure + * associated with the \a ks argument. + * @param ks - A pointer to the \c key_state structure to be + * initialized. This structure should already have + * been allocated before calling this function. + */ +static void +key_state_init (struct tls_session *session, struct key_state *ks) +{ + update_time (); + + CLEAR (*ks); + + /* + * Build TLS object that reads/writes ciphertext + * to/from memory BIOs. + */ + key_state_ssl_init(&ks->ks_ssl, &session->opt->ssl_ctx, session->opt->server, + session); + + /* Set control-channel initiation mode */ + ks->initial_opcode = session->initial_opcode; + session->initial_opcode = P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1; + ks->state = S_INITIAL; + ks->key_id = session->key_id; + + /* + * key_id increments to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back to 1. + * This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key. + */ + ++session->key_id; + session->key_id &= P_KEY_ID_MASK; + if (!session->key_id) + session->key_id = 1; + + /* allocate key source material object */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks->key_src, struct key_source2); + + /* allocate reliability objects */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks->send_reliable, struct reliable); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks->rec_reliable, struct reliable); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks->rec_ack, struct reliable_ack); + + /* allocate buffers */ + ks->plaintext_read_buf = alloc_buf (TLS_CHANNEL_BUF_SIZE); + ks->plaintext_write_buf = alloc_buf (TLS_CHANNEL_BUF_SIZE); + ks->ack_write_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (&session->opt->frame)); + reliable_init (ks->send_reliable, BUF_SIZE (&session->opt->frame), + FRAME_HEADROOM (&session->opt->frame), TLS_RELIABLE_N_SEND_BUFFERS, + ks->key_id ? false : session->opt->xmit_hold); + reliable_init (ks->rec_reliable, BUF_SIZE (&session->opt->frame), + FRAME_HEADROOM (&session->opt->frame), TLS_RELIABLE_N_REC_BUFFERS, + false); + reliable_set_timeout (ks->send_reliable, session->opt->packet_timeout); + + /* init packet ID tracker */ + packet_id_init (&ks->packet_id, + session->opt->tcp_mode, + session->opt->replay_window, + session->opt->replay_time, + "SSL", ks->key_id); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + ks->mda_key_id = session->opt->mda_context->mda_key_id_counter++; +#endif +} + + +/** + * Cleanup a \c key_state structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function cleans up a \c key_state structure. It frees the + * associated SSL-BIO, and the structures allocated for the \link reliable + * Reliability Layer\endlink. + * + * @param ks - A pointer to the \c key_state structure to be + * cleaned up. + * @param clear - Whether the memory allocated for the \a ks object + * should be overwritten with 0s. + */ +static void +key_state_free (struct key_state *ks, bool clear) +{ + ks->state = S_UNDEF; + + key_state_ssl_free(&ks->ks_ssl); + + free_key_ctx_bi (&ks->key); + free_buf (&ks->plaintext_read_buf); + free_buf (&ks->plaintext_write_buf); + free_buf (&ks->ack_write_buf); + buffer_list_free(ks->paybuf); + + if (ks->send_reliable) + { + reliable_free (ks->send_reliable); + free (ks->send_reliable); + } + + if (ks->rec_reliable) + { + reliable_free (ks->rec_reliable); + free (ks->rec_reliable); + } + + if (ks->rec_ack) + free (ks->rec_ack); + + if (ks->key_src) + free (ks->key_src); + + packet_id_free (&ks->packet_id); + +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + key_state_rm_auth_control_file (ks); +#endif + + if (clear) + CLEAR (*ks); +} + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup of key_state structures */ + +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + + +/* + * Must be called if we move a tls_session in memory. + */ +static inline void tls_session_set_self_referential_pointers (struct tls_session* session) { + session->tls_auth.packet_id = &session->tls_auth_pid; +} + + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ + +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup of tls_session structures + * @{ */ + +/** + * Initialize a \c tls_session structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function initializes a \c tls_session structure. This includes + * generating a random session ID, and initializing the \c KS_PRIMARY \c + * key_state in the \c tls_session.key array. + * + * @param multi - A pointer to the \c tls_multi structure + * associated with the \a session argument. + * @param session - A pointer to the \c tls_session structure to be + * initialized. This structure should already have + * been allocated before calling this function. + */ +static void +tls_session_init (struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: tls_session_init: entry"); + + CLEAR (*session); + + /* Set options data to point to parent's option structure */ + session->opt = &multi->opt; + + /* Randomize session # if it is 0 */ + while (!session_id_defined(&session->session_id)) + session_id_random (&session->session_id); + + /* Are we a TLS server or client? */ + ASSERT (session->opt->key_method >= 1); + if (session->opt->key_method == 1) + { + session->initial_opcode = session->opt->server ? + P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 : P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1; + } + else /* session->opt->key_method >= 2 */ + { + session->initial_opcode = session->opt->server ? + P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 : P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2; + } + + /* Initialize control channel authentication parameters */ + session->tls_auth = session->opt->tls_auth; + + /* Set session internal pointers (also called if session object is moved in memory) */ + tls_session_set_self_referential_pointers (session); + + /* initialize packet ID replay window for --tls-auth */ + packet_id_init (session->tls_auth.packet_id, + session->opt->tcp_mode, + session->opt->replay_window, + session->opt->replay_time, + "TLS_AUTH", session->key_id); + + /* load most recent packet-id to replay protect on --tls-auth */ + packet_id_persist_load_obj (session->tls_auth.pid_persist, session->tls_auth.packet_id); + + key_state_init (session, &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]); + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: tls_session_init: new session object, sid=%s", + session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/** + * Clean up a \c tls_session structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function cleans up a \c tls_session structure. This includes + * cleaning up all associated \c key_state structures. + * + * @param session - A pointer to the \c tls_session structure to be + * cleaned up. + * @param clear - Whether the memory allocated for the \a session + * object should be overwritten with 0s. + */ +static void +tls_session_free (struct tls_session *session, bool clear) +{ + int i; + + if (session->tls_auth.packet_id) + packet_id_free (session->tls_auth.packet_id); + + for (i = 0; i < KS_SIZE; ++i) + key_state_free (&session->key[i], false); + + if (session->common_name) + free (session->common_name); + + cert_hash_free (session->cert_hash_set); + + if (clear) + CLEAR (*session); +} + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup of tls_session structures */ + +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + + +static void +move_session (struct tls_multi* multi, int dest, int src, bool reinit_src) +{ + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: move_session: dest=%s src=%s reinit_src=%d", + session_index_name(dest), + session_index_name(src), + reinit_src); + ASSERT (src != dest); + ASSERT (src >= 0 && src < TM_SIZE); + ASSERT (dest >= 0 && dest < TM_SIZE); + tls_session_free (&multi->session[dest], false); + multi->session[dest] = multi->session[src]; + tls_session_set_self_referential_pointers (&multi->session[dest]); + + if (reinit_src) + tls_session_init (multi, &multi->session[src]); + else + CLEAR (multi->session[src]); + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: move_session: exit"); +} + +static void +reset_session (struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) +{ + tls_session_free (session, false); + tls_session_init (multi, session); +} + +#if 0 +/* + * Transmit a TLS reset on our untrusted channel. + */ +static void +initiate_untrusted_session (struct tls_multi *multi, struct sockaddr_in *to) +{ + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + reset_session (multi, session); + ks->remote_addr = *to; + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: initiate_untrusted_session: addr=%s", print_sockaddr (to)); +} +#endif + +/* + * Used to determine in how many seconds we should be + * called again. + */ +static inline void +compute_earliest_wakeup (interval_t *earliest, interval_t seconds_from_now) { + if (seconds_from_now < *earliest) + *earliest = seconds_from_now; + if (*earliest < 0) + *earliest = 0; +} + +/* + * Return true if "lame duck" or retiring key has expired and can + * no longer be used. + */ +static inline bool +lame_duck_must_die (const struct tls_session* session, interval_t *wakeup) +{ + const struct key_state* lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; + if (lame->state >= S_INITIAL) + { + const time_t local_now = now; + ASSERT (lame->must_die); /* a lame duck key must always have an expiration */ + if (local_now < lame->must_die) + { + compute_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, lame->must_die - local_now); + return false; + } + else + return true; + } + else if (lame->state == S_ERROR) + return true; + else + return false; +} + +struct tls_multi * +tls_multi_init (struct tls_options *tls_options) +{ + struct tls_multi *ret; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ret, struct tls_multi); + + /* get command line derived options */ + ret->opt = *tls_options; + + /* set up pointer to HMAC object for TLS packet authentication */ + ret->opt.tls_auth.key_ctx_bi = &ret->opt.tls_auth_key; + + /* set up list of keys to be scanned by data channel encrypt and decrypt routines */ + ASSERT (SIZE (ret->key_scan) == 3); + ret->key_scan[0] = &ret->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY]; + ret->key_scan[1] = &ret->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; + ret->key_scan[2] = &ret->session[TM_LAME_DUCK].key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; + + return ret; +} + +void +tls_multi_init_finalize (struct tls_multi* multi, const struct frame* frame) +{ + tls_init_control_channel_frame_parameters (frame, &multi->opt.frame); + + /* initialize the active and untrusted sessions */ + + tls_session_init (multi, &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]); + + if (!multi->opt.single_session) + tls_session_init (multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED]); +} + +/* + * Initialize and finalize a standalone tls-auth verification object. + */ + +struct tls_auth_standalone * +tls_auth_standalone_init (struct tls_options *tls_options, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct tls_auth_standalone *tas; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (tas, struct tls_auth_standalone, gc); + + /* set up pointer to HMAC object for TLS packet authentication */ + tas->tls_auth_key = tls_options->tls_auth_key; + tas->tls_auth_options.key_ctx_bi = &tas->tls_auth_key; + tas->tls_auth_options.flags |= CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM; + + /* get initial frame parms, still need to finalize */ + tas->frame = tls_options->frame; + + return tas; +} + +void +tls_auth_standalone_finalize (struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct frame *frame) +{ + tls_init_control_channel_frame_parameters (frame, &tas->frame); +} + +/* + * Set local and remote option compatibility strings. + * Used to verify compatibility of local and remote option + * sets. + */ +void +tls_multi_init_set_options (struct tls_multi* multi, + const char *local, + const char *remote) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* initialize options string */ + multi->opt.local_options = local; + multi->opt.remote_options = remote; +#endif +} + +/* + * Cleanup a tls_multi structure and free associated memory allocations. + */ +void +tls_multi_free (struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear) +{ + int i; + + ASSERT (multi); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + man_def_auth_set_client_reason(multi, NULL); + + free (multi->peer_info); +#endif + + if (multi->locked_cn) + free (multi->locked_cn); + + if (multi->locked_username) + free (multi->locked_username); + + cert_hash_free (multi->locked_cert_hash_set); + + for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) + tls_session_free (&multi->session[i], false); + + if (clear) + CLEAR (*multi); + + free(multi); +} + + +/* + * Move a packet authentication HMAC + related fields to or from the front + * of the buffer so it can be processed by encrypt/decrypt. + */ + +/* + * Dependent on hmac size, opcode size, and session_id size. + * Will assert if too small. + */ +#define SWAP_BUF_SIZE 256 + +static bool +swap_hmac (struct buffer *buf, const struct crypto_options *co, bool incoming) +{ + struct key_ctx *ctx; + + ASSERT (co); + + ctx = (incoming ? &co->key_ctx_bi->decrypt : &co->key_ctx_bi->encrypt); + ASSERT (ctx->hmac); + + { + /* hmac + packet_id (8 bytes) */ + const int hmac_size = hmac_ctx_size (ctx->hmac) + packet_id_size (true); + + /* opcode + session_id */ + const int osid_size = 1 + SID_SIZE; + + int e1, e2; + uint8_t *b = BPTR (buf); + uint8_t buf1[SWAP_BUF_SIZE]; + uint8_t buf2[SWAP_BUF_SIZE]; + + if (incoming) + { + e1 = osid_size; + e2 = hmac_size; + } + else + { + e1 = hmac_size; + e2 = osid_size; + } + + ASSERT (e1 <= SWAP_BUF_SIZE && e2 <= SWAP_BUF_SIZE); + + if (buf->len >= e1 + e2) + { + memcpy (buf1, b, e1); + memcpy (buf2, b + e1, e2); + memcpy (b, buf2, e2); + memcpy (b + e2, buf1, e1); + return true; + } + else + return false; + } +} + +#undef SWAP_BUF_SIZE + +/* + * Write a control channel authentication record. + */ +static void +write_control_auth (struct tls_session *session, + struct key_state *ks, + struct buffer *buf, + struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr, + int opcode, + int max_ack, + bool prepend_ack) +{ + uint8_t *header; + struct buffer null = clear_buf (); + + ASSERT (link_socket_actual_defined (&ks->remote_addr)); + ASSERT (reliable_ack_write + (ks->rec_ack, buf, &ks->session_id_remote, max_ack, prepend_ack)); + ASSERT (session_id_write_prepend (&session->session_id, buf)); + ASSERT (header = buf_prepend (buf, 1)); + *header = ks->key_id | (opcode << P_OPCODE_SHIFT); + if (session->tls_auth.key_ctx_bi->encrypt.hmac) + { + /* no encryption, only write hmac */ + openvpn_encrypt (buf, null, &session->tls_auth, NULL); + ASSERT (swap_hmac (buf, &session->tls_auth, false)); + } + *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; +} + +/* + * Read a control channel authentication record. + */ +static bool +read_control_auth (struct buffer *buf, + const struct crypto_options *co, + const struct link_socket_actual *from) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (co->key_ctx_bi->decrypt.hmac) + { + struct buffer null = clear_buf (); + + /* move the hmac record to the front of the packet */ + if (!swap_hmac (buf, co, true)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: cannot locate HMAC in incoming packet from %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return false; + } + + /* authenticate only (no decrypt) and remove the hmac record + from the head of the buffer */ + openvpn_decrypt (buf, null, co, NULL); + if (!buf->len) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: incoming packet authentication failed from %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return false; + } + + } + + /* advance buffer pointer past opcode & session_id since our caller + already read it */ + buf_advance (buf, SID_SIZE + 1); + + gc_free (&gc); + return true; +} + +/* + * For debugging, print contents of key_source2 structure. + */ + +static void +key_source_print (const struct key_source *k, + const char *prefix) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)k->pre_master, sizeof (k->pre_master)); + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)k->random1, sizeof (k->random1)); + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)k->random2, sizeof (k->random2)); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, + "%s pre_master: %s", + prefix, + format_hex (k->pre_master, sizeof (k->pre_master), 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, + "%s random1: %s", + prefix, + format_hex (k->random1, sizeof (k->random1), 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, + "%s random2: %s", + prefix, + format_hex (k->random2, sizeof (k->random2), 0, &gc)); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +key_source2_print (const struct key_source2 *k) +{ + key_source_print (&k->client, "Client"); + key_source_print (&k->server, "Server"); +} + +/* + * Generate the hash required by for the \c tls1_PRF function. + * + * @param md_kt Message digest to use + * @param sec Secret to base the hash on + * @param sec_len Length of the secret + * @param seed Seed to hash + * @param seed_len Length of the seed + * @param out Output buffer + * @param olen Length of the output buffer + */ +void +tls1_P_hash(const md_kt_t *md_kt, + const uint8_t *sec, + int sec_len, + const uint8_t *seed, + int seed_len, + uint8_t *out, + int olen) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int chunk,n; + hmac_ctx_t ctx; + hmac_ctx_t ctx_tmp; + uint8_t A1[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned int A1_len; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + const int olen_orig = olen; + const uint8_t *out_orig = out; +#endif + + CLEAR(ctx); + CLEAR(ctx_tmp); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "tls1_P_hash sec: %s", format_hex (sec, sec_len, 0, &gc)); + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "tls1_P_hash seed: %s", format_hex (seed, seed_len, 0, &gc)); + + chunk = md_kt_size(md_kt); + A1_len = md_kt_size(md_kt); + + hmac_ctx_init(&ctx, sec, sec_len, md_kt); + hmac_ctx_init(&ctx_tmp, sec, sec_len, md_kt); + + hmac_ctx_update(&ctx,seed,seed_len); + hmac_ctx_final(&ctx, A1); + + n=0; + for (;;) + { + hmac_ctx_reset(&ctx); + hmac_ctx_reset(&ctx_tmp); + hmac_ctx_update(&ctx,A1,A1_len); + hmac_ctx_update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len); + hmac_ctx_update(&ctx,seed,seed_len); + + if (olen > chunk) + { + hmac_ctx_final(&ctx, out); + out+=chunk; + olen-=chunk; + hmac_ctx_final(&ctx_tmp, A1); /* calc the next A1 value */ + } + else /* last one */ + { + hmac_ctx_final(&ctx, A1); + memcpy(out,A1,olen); + break; + } + } + hmac_ctx_cleanup(&ctx); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); + CLEAR (A1); + + dmsg (D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "tls1_P_hash out: %s", format_hex (out_orig, olen_orig, 0, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Use the TLS PRF function for generating data channel keys. + * This code is based on the OpenSSL library. + * + * TLS generates keys as such: + * + * master_secret[48] = PRF(pre_master_secret[48], "master secret", + * ClientHello.random[32] + ServerHello.random[32]) + * + * key_block[] = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret[48], + * "key expansion", + * SecurityParameters.server_random[32] + + * SecurityParameters.client_random[32]); + * + * Notes: + * + * (1) key_block contains a full set of 4 keys. + * (2) The pre-master secret is generated by the client. + */ +static void +tls1_PRF(uint8_t *label, + int label_len, + const uint8_t *sec, + int slen, + uint8_t *out1, + int olen) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const md_kt_t *md5 = md_kt_get("MD5"); + const md_kt_t *sha1 = md_kt_get("SHA1"); + int len,i; + const uint8_t *S1,*S2; + uint8_t *out2; + + out2 = (uint8_t *) gc_malloc (olen, false, &gc); + + len=slen/2; + S1=sec; + S2= &(sec[len]); + len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */ + + tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen); + tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen); + + for (i=0; iid, SID_SIZE)); + if (server_sid) + ASSERT (buf_write (&seed, server_sid->id, SID_SIZE)); + + /* compute PRF */ + tls1_PRF (BPTR(&seed), BLEN(&seed), secret, secret_len, output, output_len); + + buf_clear (&seed); + free_buf (&seed); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)output, output_len); +} + +/* + * Using source entropy from local and remote hosts, mix into + * master key. + */ +static bool +generate_key_expansion (struct key_ctx_bi *key, + const struct key_type *key_type, + const struct key_source2 *key_src, + const struct session_id *client_sid, + const struct session_id *server_sid, + bool server) +{ + uint8_t master[48]; + struct key2 key2; + bool ret = false; + int i; + + CLEAR (master); + CLEAR (key2); + + /* debugging print of source key material */ + key_source2_print (key_src); + + /* compute master secret */ + openvpn_PRF (key_src->client.pre_master, + sizeof(key_src->client.pre_master), + KEY_EXPANSION_ID " master secret", + key_src->client.random1, + sizeof(key_src->client.random1), + key_src->server.random1, + sizeof(key_src->server.random1), + NULL, + NULL, + master, + sizeof(master)); + + /* compute key expansion */ + openvpn_PRF (master, + sizeof(master), + KEY_EXPANSION_ID " key expansion", + key_src->client.random2, + sizeof(key_src->client.random2), + key_src->server.random2, + sizeof(key_src->server.random2), + client_sid, + server_sid, + (uint8_t*)key2.keys, + sizeof(key2.keys)); + + key2.n = 2; + + key2_print (&key2, key_type, "Master Encrypt", "Master Decrypt"); + + /* check for weak keys */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) + { + fixup_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type); + if (!check_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Bad dynamic key generated"); + goto exit; + } + } + + /* Initialize OpenSSL key contexts */ + + ASSERT (server == true || server == false); + + init_key_ctx (&key->encrypt, + &key2.keys[(int)server], + key_type, + OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT, + "Data Channel Encrypt"); + + init_key_ctx (&key->decrypt, + &key2.keys[1-(int)server], + key_type, + OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT, + "Data Channel Decrypt"); + + ret = true; + + exit: + CLEAR (master); + CLEAR (key2); + + return ret; +} + +static bool +random_bytes_to_buf (struct buffer *buf, + uint8_t *out, + int outlen) +{ + if (!rand_bytes (out, outlen)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for key generation [SSL]"); + if (!buf_write (buf, out, outlen)) + return false; + return true; +} + +static bool +key_source2_randomize_write (struct key_source2 *k2, + struct buffer *buf, + bool server) +{ + struct key_source *k = &k2->client; + if (server) + k = &k2->server; + + CLEAR (*k); + + if (!server) + { + if (!random_bytes_to_buf (buf, k->pre_master, sizeof (k->pre_master))) + return false; + } + + if (!random_bytes_to_buf (buf, k->random1, sizeof (k->random1))) + return false; + if (!random_bytes_to_buf (buf, k->random2, sizeof (k->random2))) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static int +key_source2_read (struct key_source2 *k2, + struct buffer *buf, + bool server) +{ + struct key_source *k = &k2->client; + + if (!server) + k = &k2->server; + + CLEAR (*k); + + if (server) + { + if (!buf_read (buf, k->pre_master, sizeof (k->pre_master))) + return 0; + } + + if (!buf_read (buf, k->random1, sizeof (k->random1))) + return 0; + if (!buf_read (buf, k->random2, sizeof (k->random2))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static void +flush_payload_buffer (struct key_state *ks) +{ + struct buffer *b; + + while ((b = buffer_list_peek (ks->paybuf))) + { + key_state_write_plaintext_const (&ks->ks_ssl, b->data, b->len); + buffer_list_pop (ks->paybuf); + } +} + +/* true if no in/out acknowledgements pending */ +#define FULL_SYNC \ + (reliable_empty(ks->send_reliable) && reliable_ack_empty (ks->rec_ack)) + +/* + * Move the active key to the lame duck key and reinitialize the + * active key. + */ +static void +key_state_soft_reset (struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + ks->must_die = now + session->opt->transition_window; /* remaining lifetime of old key */ + key_state_free (ks_lame, false); + *ks_lame = *ks; + + key_state_init (session, ks); + ks->session_id_remote = ks_lame->session_id_remote; + ks->remote_addr = ks_lame->remote_addr; +} + +/* + * Read/write strings from/to a struct buffer with a u16 length prefix. + */ + +static bool +write_empty_string (struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (!buf_write_u16 (buf, 0)) + return false; + return true; +} + +static bool +write_string (struct buffer *buf, const char *str, const int maxlen) +{ + const int len = strlen (str) + 1; + if (len < 1 || (maxlen >= 0 && len > maxlen)) + return false; + if (!buf_write_u16 (buf, len)) + return false; + if (!buf_write (buf, str, len)) + return false; + return true; +} + +static bool +read_string (struct buffer *buf, char *str, const unsigned int capacity) +{ + const int len = buf_read_u16 (buf); + if (len < 1 || len > (int)capacity) + return false; + if (!buf_read (buf, str, len)) + return false; + str[len-1] = '\0'; + return true; +} + +static char * +read_string_alloc (struct buffer *buf) +{ + const int len = buf_read_u16 (buf); + char *str; + + if (len < 1) + return NULL; + str = (char *) malloc(len); + check_malloc_return(str); + if (!buf_read (buf, str, len)) + { + free (str); + return NULL; + } + str[len-1] = '\0'; + return str; +} + +void +read_string_discard (struct buffer *buf) +{ + char *data = read_string_alloc(buf); + if (data) + free (data); +} + +/* + * Handle the reading and writing of key data to and from + * the TLS control channel (cleartext). + */ + +static bool +key_method_1_write (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct key key; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + ASSERT (session->opt->key_method == 1); + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, 0)); + + generate_key_random (&key, &session->opt->key_type); + if (!check_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Bad encrypting key generated"); + return false; + } + + if (!write_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type, buf)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: write_key failed"); + return false; + } + + init_key_ctx (&ks->key.encrypt, &key, &session->opt->key_type, + OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT, "Data Channel Encrypt"); + CLEAR (key); + + /* send local options string */ + { + const char *local_options = local_options_string (session); + const int optlen = strlen (local_options) + 1; + if (!buf_write (buf, local_options, optlen)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: KM1 write options failed"); + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +static bool +push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + if (session->opt->push_peer_info) /* write peer info */ + { + struct env_set *es = session->opt->es; + struct env_item *e; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (512*3, &gc); + + /* push version */ + buf_printf (&out, "IV_VER=%s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION); + + /* push platform */ +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=linux\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_SOLARIS) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=solaris\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=openbsd\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=mac\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=netbsd\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=freebsd\n"); +#elif defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + buf_printf(&out, "IV_PLAT=android\n"); +#elif defined(WIN32) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_PLAT=win\n"); +#endif + + /* push mac addr */ + { + struct route_gateway_info rgi; + get_default_gateway (&rgi); + if (rgi.flags & RGI_HWADDR_DEFINED) + buf_printf (&out, "IV_HWADDR=%s\n", format_hex_ex (rgi.hwaddr, 6, 0, 1, ":", &gc)); + } + + /* push LZO status */ +#ifdef ENABLE_LZO_STUB + buf_printf (&out, "IV_LZO_STUB=1\n"); +#endif + + /* push env vars that begin with UV_ */ + for (e=es->list; e != NULL; e=e->next) + { + if (e->string) + { + if (!strncmp(e->string, "UV_", 3) && buf_safe(&out, strlen(e->string)+1)) + buf_printf (&out, "%s\n", e->string); + } + } + + if (!write_string(buf, BSTR(&out), -1)) + goto error; + } + else +#endif + { + if (!write_empty_string (buf)) /* no peer info */ + goto error; + } + ret = true; + + error: + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static bool +key_method_2_write (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + ASSERT (session->opt->key_method == 2); + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, 0)); + + /* write a uint32 0 */ + if (!buf_write_u32 (buf, 0)) + goto error; + + /* write key_method + flags */ + if (!buf_write_u8 (buf, (session->opt->key_method & KEY_METHOD_MASK))) + goto error; + + /* write key source material */ + if (!key_source2_randomize_write (ks->key_src, buf, session->opt->server)) + goto error; + + /* write options string */ + { + if (!write_string (buf, local_options_string (session), TLS_OPTIONS_LEN)) + goto error; + } + + /* write username/password if specified */ + if (auth_user_pass_enabled) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + auth_user_pass_setup (NULL, session->opt->sci); +#else + auth_user_pass_setup (NULL, NULL); +#endif + if (!write_string (buf, auth_user_pass.username, -1)) + goto error; + if (!write_string (buf, auth_user_pass.password, -1)) + goto error; + purge_user_pass (&auth_user_pass, false); + } + else + { + if (!write_empty_string (buf)) /* no username */ + goto error; + if (!write_empty_string (buf)) /* no password */ + goto error; + } + + if (!push_peer_info (buf, session)) + goto error; + + /* + * generate tunnel keys if server + */ + if (session->opt->server) + { + if (ks->authenticated) + { + if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->key, + &session->opt->key_type, + ks->key_src, + &ks->session_id_remote, + &session->session_id, + true)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: server generate_key_expansion failed"); + goto error; + } + } + + CLEAR (*ks->key_src); + } + + return true; + + error: + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Key Method #2 write failed"); + CLEAR (*ks->key_src); + return false; +} + +static bool +key_method_1_read (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session) +{ + int status; + struct key key; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + ASSERT (session->opt->key_method == 1); + + if (!session->verified) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Certificate verification failed (key-method 1)"); + goto error; + } + + status = read_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type, buf); + if (status != 1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Error reading data channel key from plaintext buffer"); + goto error; + } + + if (!check_key (&key, &session->opt->key_type)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Bad decrypting key received from peer"); + goto error; + } + + if (buf->len < 1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Missing options string"); + goto error; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* compare received remote options string + with our locally computed options string */ + if (!session->opt->disable_occ && + !options_cmp_equal_safe ((char *) BPTR (buf), session->opt->remote_options, buf->len)) + { + options_warning_safe ((char *) BPTR (buf), session->opt->remote_options, buf->len); + } +#endif + + buf_clear (buf); + + init_key_ctx (&ks->key.decrypt, &key, &session->opt->key_type, + OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT, "Data Channel Decrypt"); + CLEAR (key); + ks->authenticated = true; + return true; + + error: + buf_clear (buf); + CLEAR (key); + return false; +} + +static bool +key_method_2_read (struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + int key_method_flags; + bool username_status, password_status; + + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *options; + + /* allocate temporary objects */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (options, char, TLS_OPTIONS_LEN, &gc); + + ASSERT (session->opt->key_method == 2); + + /* discard leading uint32 */ + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, 4)); + + /* get key method */ + key_method_flags = buf_read_u8 (buf); + if ((key_method_flags & KEY_METHOD_MASK) != 2) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: Unknown key_method/flags=%d received from remote host", + key_method_flags); + goto error; + } + + /* get key source material (not actual keys yet) */ + if (!key_source2_read (ks->key_src, buf, session->opt->server)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Error reading remote data channel key source entropy from plaintext buffer"); + goto error; + } + + /* get options */ + if (!read_string (buf, options, TLS_OPTIONS_LEN)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Failed to read required OCC options string"); + goto error; + } + + ks->authenticated = false; + + if (verify_user_pass_enabled(session)) + { + /* Perform username/password authentication */ + struct user_pass *up; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (up, struct user_pass, &gc); + username_status = read_string (buf, up->username, USER_PASS_LEN); + password_status = read_string (buf, up->password, USER_PASS_LEN); + + if (!username_status || !password_status) + { + CLEAR (*up); + if (!(session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Auth Username/Password was not provided by peer"); + goto error; + } + } + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + /* get peer info from control channel */ + free (multi->peer_info); + multi->peer_info = read_string_alloc (buf); +#endif + + verify_user_pass(up, multi, session); + CLEAR (*up); + } + else + { + /* Session verification should have occurred during TLS negotiation*/ + if (!session->verified) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Certificate verification failed (key-method 2)"); + goto error; + } + ks->authenticated = true; + } + + /* Perform final authentication checks */ + if (ks->authenticated) + { + verify_final_auth_checks(multi, session); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* check options consistency */ + if (!session->opt->disable_occ && + !options_cmp_equal (options, session->opt->remote_options)) + { + options_warning (options, session->opt->remote_options); + if (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_OPT_VERIFY) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "Option inconsistency warnings triggering disconnect due to --opt-verify"); + ks->authenticated = false; + } + } +#endif + + buf_clear (buf); + + /* + * Call OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL plugin if defined, for final + * veto opportunity over authentication decision. + */ + if (ks->authenticated && plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL)) + { + if (plugin_call (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL, NULL, NULL, session->opt->es) != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + ks->authenticated = false; + } + + /* + * Generate tunnel keys if client + */ + if (!session->opt->server) + { + if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->key, + &session->opt->key_type, + ks->key_src, + &session->session_id, + &ks->session_id_remote, + false)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: client generate_key_expansion failed"); + goto error; + } + + CLEAR (*ks->key_src); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return true; + + error: + CLEAR (*ks->key_src); + buf_clear (buf); + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +static int +auth_deferred_expire_window (const struct tls_options *o) +{ + int ret = o->handshake_window; + const int r2 = o->renegotiate_seconds / 2; + + if (o->renegotiate_seconds && r2 < ret) + ret = r2; + return ret; +} + +/* + * This is the primary routine for processing TLS stuff inside the + * the main event loop. When this routine exits + * with non-error status, it will set *wakeup to the number of seconds + * when it wants to be called again. + * + * Return value is true if we have placed a packet in *to_link which we + * want to send to our peer. + */ +static bool +tls_process (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct tls_session *session, + struct buffer *to_link, + struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr, + struct link_socket_info *to_link_socket_info, + interval_t *wakeup) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer *buf; + bool state_change = false; + bool active = false; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; /* retiring key */ + + /* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ + ASSERT (ks->state != S_UNDEF); + ASSERT (ks->state != S_ERROR); + ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); + + /* Should we trigger a soft reset? -- new key, keeps old key for a while */ + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE && + ((session->opt->renegotiate_seconds + && now >= ks->established + session->opt->renegotiate_seconds) + || (session->opt->renegotiate_bytes + && ks->n_bytes >= session->opt->renegotiate_bytes) + || (session->opt->renegotiate_packets + && ks->n_packets >= session->opt->renegotiate_packets) + || (packet_id_close_to_wrapping (&ks->packet_id.send)))) + { + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, + "TLS: soft reset sec=%d bytes=" counter_format "/%d pkts=" counter_format "/%d", + (int)(ks->established + session->opt->renegotiate_seconds - now), + ks->n_bytes, session->opt->renegotiate_bytes, + ks->n_packets, session->opt->renegotiate_packets); + key_state_soft_reset (session); + } + + /* Kill lame duck key transition_window seconds after primary key negotiation */ + if (lame_duck_must_die (session, wakeup)) { + key_state_free (ks_lame, true); + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_process: killed expiring key"); + } + + do + { + update_time (); + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: tls_process: chg=%d ks=%s lame=%s to_link->len=%d wakeup=%d", + state_change, + state_name (ks->state), + state_name (ks_lame->state), + to_link->len, + *wakeup); + + state_change = false; + + /* + * TLS activity is finished once we get to S_ACTIVE, + * though we will still process acknowledgements. + * + * CHANGED with 2.0 -> now we may send tunnel configuration + * info over the control channel. + */ + if (true) + { + /* Initial handshake */ + if (ks->state == S_INITIAL) + { + buf = reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced (ks->send_reliable); + if (buf) + { + ks->must_negotiate = now + session->opt->handshake_window; + ks->auth_deferred_expire = now + auth_deferred_expire_window (session->opt); + + /* null buffer */ + reliable_mark_active_outgoing (ks->send_reliable, buf, ks->initial_opcode); + INCR_GENERATED; + + ks->state = S_PRE_START; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: Initial Handshake, sid=%s", + session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management && ks->initial_opcode != P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_WAIT, + NULL, + 0, + 0); + } +#endif + } + } + + /* Are we timed out on receive? */ + if (now >= ks->must_negotiate) + { + if (ks->state < S_ACTIVE) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: TLS key negotiation failed to occur within %d seconds (check your network connectivity)", + session->opt->handshake_window); + goto error; + } + else /* assume that ks->state == S_ACTIVE */ + { + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "STATE S_NORMAL_OP"); + ks->state = S_NORMAL_OP; + ks->must_negotiate = 0; + } + } + + /* Wait for Initial Handshake ACK */ + if (ks->state == S_PRE_START && FULL_SYNC) + { + ks->state = S_START; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "STATE S_START"); + } + + /* Wait for ACK */ + if (((ks->state == S_GOT_KEY && !session->opt->server) || + (ks->state == S_SENT_KEY && session->opt->server))) + { + if (FULL_SYNC) + { + ks->established = now; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "STATE S_ACTIVE"); + if (check_debug_level (D_HANDSHAKE)) + print_details (&ks->ks_ssl, "Control Channel:"); + state_change = true; + ks->state = S_ACTIVE; + INCR_SUCCESS; + + /* Set outgoing address for data channel packets */ + link_socket_set_outgoing_addr (NULL, to_link_socket_info, &ks->remote_addr, session->common_name, session->opt->es); + + /* Flush any payload packets that were buffered before our state transitioned to S_ACTIVE */ + flush_payload_buffer (ks); + +#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS + show_tls_performance_stats(); +#endif + } + } + + /* Reliable buffer to outgoing TCP/UDP (send up to CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX ACKs + for previously received packets) */ + if (!to_link->len && reliable_can_send (ks->send_reliable)) + { + int opcode; + struct buffer b; + + buf = reliable_send (ks->send_reliable, &opcode); + ASSERT (buf); + b = *buf; + INCR_SENT; + + write_control_auth (session, ks, &b, to_link_addr, opcode, + CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX, true); + *to_link = b; + active = true; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Reliable -> TCP/UDP"); + break; + } + +#ifndef TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK + /* Send 1 or more ACKs (each received control packet gets one ACK) */ + if (!to_link->len && !reliable_ack_empty (ks->rec_ack)) + { + buf = &ks->ack_write_buf; + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&multi->opt.frame))); + write_control_auth (session, ks, buf, to_link_addr, P_ACK_V1, + RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE, false); + *to_link = *buf; + active = true; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Dedicated ACK -> TCP/UDP"); + break; + } +#endif + + /* Write incoming ciphertext to TLS object */ + buf = reliable_get_buf_sequenced (ks->rec_reliable); + if (buf) + { + int status = 0; + if (buf->len) + { + status = key_state_write_ciphertext (&ks->ks_ssl, buf); + if (status == -1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Incoming Ciphertext -> TLS object write error"); + goto error; + } + } + else + { + status = 1; + } + if (status == 1) + { + reliable_mark_deleted (ks->rec_reliable, buf, true); + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Incoming Ciphertext -> TLS"); + } + } + + /* Read incoming plaintext from TLS object */ + buf = &ks->plaintext_read_buf; + if (!buf->len) + { + int status; + + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, 0)); + status = key_state_read_plaintext (&ks->ks_ssl, buf, TLS_CHANNEL_BUF_SIZE); + update_time (); + if (status == -1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: TLS object -> incoming plaintext read error"); + goto error; + } + if (status == 1) + { + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS -> Incoming Plaintext"); + } +#if 0 /* show null plaintext reads */ + if (!status) + msg (M_INFO, "TLS plaintext read -> NULL return"); +#endif + } + + /* Send Key */ + buf = &ks->plaintext_write_buf; + if (!buf->len && ((ks->state == S_START && !session->opt->server) || + (ks->state == S_GOT_KEY && session->opt->server))) + { + if (session->opt->key_method == 1) + { + if (!key_method_1_write (buf, session)) + goto error; + } + else if (session->opt->key_method == 2) + { + if (!key_method_2_write (buf, session)) + goto error; + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "STATE S_SENT_KEY"); + ks->state = S_SENT_KEY; + } + + /* Receive Key */ + buf = &ks->plaintext_read_buf; + if (buf->len + && ((ks->state == S_SENT_KEY && !session->opt->server) + || (ks->state == S_START && session->opt->server))) + { + if (session->opt->key_method == 1) + { + if (!key_method_1_read (buf, session)) + goto error; + } + else if (session->opt->key_method == 2) + { + if (!key_method_2_read (buf, multi, session)) + goto error; + } + else + { + ASSERT (0); + } + + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED, "STATE S_GOT_KEY"); + ks->state = S_GOT_KEY; + } + + /* Write outgoing plaintext to TLS object */ + buf = &ks->plaintext_write_buf; + if (buf->len) + { + int status = key_state_write_plaintext (&ks->ks_ssl, buf); + if (status == -1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: Outgoing Plaintext -> TLS object write error"); + goto error; + } + if (status == 1) + { + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Outgoing Plaintext -> TLS"); + } + } + + /* Outgoing Ciphertext to reliable buffer */ + if (ks->state >= S_START) + { + buf = reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced (ks->send_reliable); + if (buf) + { + int status = key_state_read_ciphertext (&ks->ks_ssl, buf, PAYLOAD_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&multi->opt.frame)); + if (status == -1) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Ciphertext -> reliable TCP/UDP transport read error"); + goto error; + } + if (status == 1) + { + reliable_mark_active_outgoing (ks->send_reliable, buf, P_CONTROL_V1); + INCR_GENERATED; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Outgoing Ciphertext -> Reliable"); + } + } + } + } + } + while (state_change); + + update_time (); + +#ifdef TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK + /* Send 1 or more ACKs (each received control packet gets one ACK) */ + if (!to_link->len && !reliable_ack_empty (ks->rec_ack)) + { + buf = &ks->ack_write_buf; + ASSERT (buf_init (buf, FRAME_HEADROOM (&multi->opt.frame))); + write_control_auth (session, ks, buf, to_link_addr, P_ACK_V1, + RELIABLE_ACK_SIZE, false); + *to_link = *buf; + active = true; + state_change = true; + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "Dedicated ACK -> TCP/UDP"); + } +#endif + + /* When should we wake up again? */ + { + if (ks->state >= S_INITIAL) + { + compute_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, + reliable_send_timeout (ks->send_reliable)); + + if (ks->must_negotiate) + compute_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, ks->must_negotiate - now); + } + + if (ks->established && session->opt->renegotiate_seconds) + compute_earliest_wakeup (wakeup, + ks->established + session->opt->renegotiate_seconds - now); + + /* prevent event-loop spinning by setting minimum wakeup of 1 second */ + if (*wakeup <= 0) + { + *wakeup = 1; + + /* if we had something to send to remote, but to_link was busy, + let caller know we need to be called again soon */ + active = true; + } + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: tls_process: timeout set to %d", *wakeup); + + gc_free (&gc); + return active; + } + +error: + tls_clear_error(); + ks->state = S_ERROR; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: TLS handshake failed"); + INCR_ERROR; + gc_free (&gc); + return false; +} + +/* + * Called by the top-level event loop. + * + * Basically decides if we should call tls_process for + * the active or untrusted sessions. + */ + +int +tls_multi_process (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *to_link, + struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr, + struct link_socket_info *to_link_socket_info, + interval_t *wakeup) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int i; + int active = TLSMP_INACTIVE; + bool error = false; + int tas; + + perf_push (PERF_TLS_MULTI_PROCESS); + + tls_clear_error (); + + /* + * Process each session object having state of S_INITIAL or greater, + * and which has a defined remote IP addr. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK]; + + /* set initial remote address */ + if (i == TM_ACTIVE && ks->state == S_INITIAL && + link_socket_actual_defined (&to_link_socket_info->lsa->actual)) + ks->remote_addr = to_link_socket_info->lsa->actual; + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, + "TLS: tls_multi_process: i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s", + i, + state_name (ks->state), + session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), + session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), + print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); + + if (ks->state >= S_INITIAL && link_socket_actual_defined (&ks->remote_addr)) + { + struct link_socket_actual *tla = NULL; + + update_time (); + + if (tls_process (multi, session, to_link, &tla, + to_link_socket_info, wakeup)) + active = TLSMP_ACTIVE; + + /* + * If tls_process produced an outgoing packet, + * return the link_socket_actual object (which + * contains the outgoing address). + */ + if (tla) + { + multi->to_link_addr = *tla; + *to_link_addr = &multi->to_link_addr; + } + + /* + * If tls_process hits an error: + * (1) If the session has an unexpired lame duck key, preserve it. + * (2) Reinitialize the session. + * (3) Increment soft error count + */ + if (ks->state == S_ERROR) + { + ++multi->n_soft_errors; + + if (i == TM_ACTIVE) + error = true; + + if (i == TM_ACTIVE + && ks_lame->state >= S_ACTIVE + && !multi->opt.single_session) + move_session (multi, TM_LAME_DUCK, TM_ACTIVE, true); + else + reset_session (multi, session); + } + } + } + + update_time (); + + tas = tls_authentication_status (multi, TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL); + + /* + * If lame duck session expires, kill it. + */ + if (lame_duck_must_die (&multi->session[TM_LAME_DUCK], wakeup)) { + tls_session_free (&multi->session[TM_LAME_DUCK], true); + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_multi_process: killed expiring key"); + } + + /* + * If untrusted session achieves TLS authentication, + * move it to active session, usurping any prior session. + * + * A semi-trusted session is one in which the certificate authentication + * succeeded (if cert verification is enabled) but the username/password + * verification failed. A semi-trusted session can forward data on the + * TLS control channel but not on the tunnel channel. + */ + if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED].key[KS_PRIMARY])) { + move_session (multi, TM_ACTIVE, TM_UNTRUSTED, true); + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_multi_process: untrusted session promoted to %strusted", + tas == TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED ? "" : "semi-"); + } + + /* + * A hard error means that TM_ACTIVE hit an S_ERROR state and that no + * other key state objects are S_ACTIVE or higher. + */ + if (error) + { + for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) + { + if (multi->key_scan[i]->state >= S_ACTIVE) + goto nohard; + } + ++multi->n_hard_errors; + } + nohard: + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG + /* DEBUGGING -- flood peer with repeating connection attempts */ + { + const int throw_level = GREMLIN_CONNECTION_FLOOD_LEVEL (multi->opt.gremlin); + if (throw_level) + { + for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE (multi->key_scan); ++i) + { + if (multi->key_scan[i]->state >= throw_level) + { + ++multi->n_hard_errors; + ++multi->n_soft_errors; + } + } + } + } +#endif + + perf_pop (); + gc_free (&gc); + + return (tas == TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED) ? TLSMP_KILL : active; +} + +/* + * Pre and post-process the encryption & decryption buffers in order + * to implement a multiplexed TLS channel over the TCP/UDP port. + */ + +/* + * + * When we are in TLS mode, this is the first routine which sees + * an incoming packet. + * + * If it's a data packet, we set opt so that our caller can + * decrypt it. We also give our caller the appropriate decryption key. + * + * If it's a control packet, we authenticate it and process it, + * possibly creating a new tls_session if it represents the + * first packet of a new session. For control packets, we will + * also zero the size of *buf so that our caller ignores the + * packet on our return. + * + * Note that openvpn only allows one active session at a time, + * so a new session (once authenticated) will always usurp + * an old session. + * + * Return true if input was an authenticated control channel + * packet. + * + * If we are running in TLS thread mode, all public routines + * below this point must be called with the L_TLS lock held. + */ + +bool +tls_pre_decrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + struct buffer *buf, + struct crypto_options *opt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + + if (buf->len > 0) + { + int i; + int op; + int key_id; + + /* get opcode and key ID */ + { + uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); + op = c >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT; + key_id = c & P_KEY_ID_MASK; + } + + if (op == P_DATA_V1) + { /* data channel packet */ + for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + + /* + * This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN + * instance and its remote peer. + * + * If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source + * which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local + * OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation. + * + * It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the + * connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the + * passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the + * active side is the client which initiates connections). + */ + if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks) + && key_id == ks->key_id + && ks->authenticated +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + && !ks->auth_deferred +#endif + && link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr)) + { + /* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */ + opt->key_ctx_bi = &ks->key; + opt->packet_id = multi->opt.replay ? &ks->packet_id : NULL; + opt->pid_persist = NULL; + opt->flags &= multi->opt.crypto_flags_and; + opt->flags |= multi->opt.crypto_flags_or; + ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, 1)); + ++ks->n_packets; + ks->n_bytes += buf->len; + dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT, + "TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s", + key_id, print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; + } +#if 0 /* keys out of sync? */ + else + { + dmsg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS_PRE_DECRYPT: [%d] dken=%d rkid=%d lkid=%d auth=%d def=%d match=%d", + i, + DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks), + key_id, + ks->key_id, + ks->authenticated, +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + ks->auth_deferred, +#else + -1, +#endif + link_socket_actual_match (from, &ks->remote_addr)); + } +#endif + } + + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), key_id); + goto error_lite; + } + else /* control channel packet */ + { + bool do_burst = false; + bool new_link = false; + struct session_id sid; /* remote session ID */ + + /* verify legal opcode */ + if (op < P_FIRST_OPCODE || op > P_LAST_OPCODE) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), op); + goto error; + } + + /* hard reset ? */ + if (is_hard_reset (op, 0)) + { + /* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */ + if (((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 + || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2) && !multi->opt.server) + || ((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 + || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2) && multi->opt.server)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + } + + /* + * Authenticate Packet + */ + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s", + packet_opcode_name (op), print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + + /* get remote session-id */ + { + struct buffer tmp = *buf; + buf_advance (&tmp, 1); + if (!session_id_read (&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined (&sid)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + } + + /* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */ + for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, + "TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s", + i, + state_name (ks->state), + session_id_print (&session->session_id, &gc), + session_id_print (&sid, &gc), + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + session_id_print (&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), + print_link_socket_actual (&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); + + if (session_id_equal (&ks->session_id_remote, &sid)) + /* found a match */ + { + if (i == TM_LAME_DUCK) { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s", + session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + goto error; + } + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, + "TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s", + i, session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + break; + } + } + + /* + * Initial packet received. + */ + + if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset (op, 0)) + { + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS ERROR: initial packet local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s", + multi->opt.key_method, + packet_opcode_name (op)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will + * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED. + */ + if (!session_id_defined (&ks->session_id_remote)) + { + if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH, + NULL, + 0, + 0); + } +#endif + + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, + "TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + + do_burst = true; + new_link = true; + i = TM_ACTIVE; + session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } + } + + if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset (op, 0)) + { + /* + * No match with existing sessions, + * probably a new session. + */ + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED]; + + /* + * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request + * unless it the the first packet of the session. + */ + if (multi->opt.single_session) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + + if (!is_hard_reset (op, multi->opt.key_method)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS ERROR: new session local/remote key_method mismatch, local key_method=%d, op=%s", + multi->opt.key_method, + packet_opcode_name (op)); + goto error; + } + + if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_auth, from)) + goto error; + + /* + * New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point, + * assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used. + * + * Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS. + */ + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, + "TLS: new session incoming connection from %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + + new_link = true; + i = TM_UNTRUSTED; + session->untrusted_addr = *from; + } + else + { + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + /* + * Packet must belong to an existing session. + */ + if (i != TM_ACTIVE && i != TM_UNTRUSTED) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + i, + packet_opcode_name (op)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Verify remote IP address + */ + if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Remote is requesting a key renegotiation + */ + if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 + && DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) + { + if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_auth, from)) + goto error; + + key_state_soft_reset (session); + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, + "TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s", + i, session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } + else + { + /* + * Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? + */ + if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1) + do_burst = true; + + if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_auth, from)) + goto error; + + dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG, + "TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s", + i, session_id_print (&sid, &gc)); + } + } + + /* + * We have an authenticated packet (if --tls-auth was set). + * Now pass to our reliability level which deals with + * packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc. + */ + { + struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i]; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + /* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */ + ASSERT (ks->state != S_UNDEF); + ASSERT (ks->state != S_ERROR); + ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id)); + + /* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */ + ret = true; + + /* + * Set our remote address and remote session_id + */ + if (new_link) + { + ks->session_id_remote = sid; + ks->remote_addr = *from; + ++multi->n_sessions; + } + else if (!link_socket_actual_match (&ks->remote_addr, from)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in + * the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the + * initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online. + */ + if (do_burst && !session->burst) + { + reliable_schedule_now (ks->send_reliable); + session->burst = true; + } + + /* Check key_id */ + if (ks->key_id != key_id) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s", + ks->key_id, key_id, print_key_id (multi, &gc)); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now + * delete from reliable send buffer + */ + { + /* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */ + struct reliable_ack send_ack; + + send_ack.len = 0; + if (!reliable_ack_read (&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet"); + goto error; + } + reliable_send_purge (ks->send_reliable, &send_ack); + } + + if (op != P_ACK_V1 && reliable_can_get (ks->rec_reliable)) + { + packet_id_type id; + + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id (buf, &id)) + { + /* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */ + if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality (ks->rec_reliable, id)) + { + if (reliable_not_replay (ks->rec_reliable, id)) + { + /* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ + struct buffer *in = reliable_get_buf (ks->rec_reliable); + ASSERT (in); + ASSERT (buf_copy (in, buf)); + reliable_mark_active_incoming (ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); + } + + /* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */ + reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id (ks->rec_ack, id); + } + } + } + } + } + } + + done: + buf->len = 0; + opt->key_ctx_bi = NULL; + opt->packet_id = NULL; + opt->pid_persist = NULL; + opt->flags &= multi->opt.crypto_flags_and; + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; + + error: + ++multi->n_soft_errors; + error_lite: + tls_clear_error(); + goto done; +} + +/* + * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called + * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming + * packet. Note that we don't modify + * any state in our parameter objects. The purpose is solely to + * determine whether we should generate a client instance + * object, in which case true is returned. + * + * This function is essentially the first-line HMAC firewall + * on the UDP port listener in --mode server mode. + */ +bool +tls_pre_decrypt_lite (const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + const struct buffer *buf) + +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + + if (buf->len > 0) + { + int op; + int key_id; + + /* get opcode and key ID */ + { + uint8_t c = *BPTR (buf); + op = c >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT; + key_id = c & P_KEY_ID_MASK; + } + + /* this packet is from an as-yet untrusted source, so + scrutinize carefully */ + + if (op != P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2) + { + /* + * This can occur due to bogus data or DoS packets. + */ + dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS, + "TLS State Error: No TLS state for client %s, opcode=%d", + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + op); + goto error; + } + + if (key_id != 0) + { + dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS, + "TLS State Error: Unknown key ID (%d) received from %s -- 0 was expected", + key_id, + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc)); + goto error; + } + + if (buf->len > EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)) + { + dmsg (D_TLS_STATE_ERRORS, + "TLS State Error: Large packet (size %d) received from %s -- a packet no larger than %d bytes was expected", + buf->len, + print_link_socket_actual (from, &gc), + EXPANDED_SIZE_DYNAMIC (&tas->frame)); + goto error; + } + + { + struct buffer newbuf = clone_buf (buf); + struct crypto_options co = tas->tls_auth_options; + bool status; + + /* + * We are in read-only mode at this point with respect to TLS + * control channel state. After we build a new client instance + * object, we will process this session-initiating packet for real. + */ + co.flags |= CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID; + + /* HMAC test, if --tls-auth was specified */ + status = read_control_auth (&newbuf, &co, from); + free_buf (&newbuf); + if (!status) + goto error; + + /* + * At this point, if --tls-auth is being used, we know that + * the packet has passed the HMAC test, but we don't know if + * it is a replay yet. We will attempt to defeat replays + * by not advancing to the S_START state until we + * receive an ACK from our first reply to the client + * that includes an HMAC of our randomly generated 64 bit + * session ID. + * + * On the other hand if --tls-auth is not being used, we + * will proceed to begin the TLS authentication + * handshake with only cursory integrity checks having + * been performed, since we will be leaving the task + * of authentication solely up to TLS. + */ + + ret = true; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; + + error: + tls_clear_error(); + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* Choose the key with which to encrypt a data packet */ +void +tls_pre_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf, struct crypto_options *opt) +{ + multi->save_ks = NULL; + if (buf->len > 0) + { + int i; + struct key_state *ks_select = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE + && ks->authenticated +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + && !ks->auth_deferred +#endif + ) + { + if (!ks_select) + ks_select = ks; + if (now >= ks->auth_deferred_expire) + { + ks_select = ks; + break; + } + } + } + + if (ks_select) + { + opt->key_ctx_bi = &ks_select->key; + opt->packet_id = multi->opt.replay ? &ks_select->packet_id : NULL; + opt->pid_persist = NULL; + opt->flags &= multi->opt.crypto_flags_and; + opt->flags |= multi->opt.crypto_flags_or; + multi->save_ks = ks_select; + dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT, "TLS: tls_pre_encrypt: key_id=%d", ks_select->key_id); + return; + } + else + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + dmsg (D_TLS_KEYSELECT, "TLS Warning: no data channel send key available: %s", + print_key_id (multi, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + } + } + + buf->len = 0; + opt->key_ctx_bi = NULL; + opt->packet_id = NULL; + opt->pid_persist = NULL; + opt->flags &= multi->opt.crypto_flags_and; +} + +/* Prepend the appropriate opcode to encrypted buffer prior to TCP/UDP send */ +void +tls_post_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, struct buffer *buf) +{ + struct key_state *ks; + uint8_t *op; + + ks = multi->save_ks; + multi->save_ks = NULL; + if (buf->len > 0) + { + ASSERT (ks); + ASSERT (op = buf_prepend (buf, 1)); + *op = (P_DATA_V1 << P_OPCODE_SHIFT) | ks->key_id; + ++ks->n_packets; + ks->n_bytes += buf->len; + } +} + +/* + * Send a payload over the TLS control channel. + * Called externally. + */ + +bool +tls_send_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + const uint8_t *data, + int size) +{ + struct tls_session *session; + struct key_state *ks; + bool ret = false; + + tls_clear_error(); + + ASSERT (multi); + + session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; + ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE) + { + if (key_state_write_plaintext_const (&ks->ks_ssl, data, size) == 1) + ret = true; + } + else + { + if (!ks->paybuf) + ks->paybuf = buffer_list_new (0); + buffer_list_push_data (ks->paybuf, data, (size_t)size); + ret = true; + } + + + tls_clear_error(); + + return ret; +} + +bool +tls_rec_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf) +{ + struct tls_session *session; + struct key_state *ks; + bool ret = false; + + tls_clear_error(); + + ASSERT (multi); + + session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; + ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; + + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE && BLEN (&ks->plaintext_read_buf)) + { + if (buf_copy (buf, &ks->plaintext_read_buf)) + ret = true; + ks->plaintext_read_buf.len = 0; + } + + tls_clear_error(); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Dump a human-readable rendition of an openvpn packet + * into a garbage collectable string which is returned. + */ +const char * +protocol_dump (struct buffer *buffer, unsigned int flags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + struct buffer buf = *buffer; + + uint8_t c; + int op; + int key_id; + + int tls_auth_hmac_size = (flags & PD_TLS_AUTH_HMAC_SIZE_MASK); + + if (buf.len <= 0) + { + buf_printf (&out, "DATA UNDEF len=%d", buf.len); + goto done; + } + + if (!(flags & PD_TLS)) + goto print_data; + + /* + * Initial byte (opcode) + */ + if (!buf_read (&buf, &c, sizeof (c))) + goto done; + op = (c >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT); + key_id = c & P_KEY_ID_MASK; + buf_printf (&out, "%s kid=%d", packet_opcode_name (op), key_id); + + if (op == P_DATA_V1) + goto print_data; + + /* + * Session ID + */ + { + struct session_id sid; + + if (!session_id_read (&sid, &buf)) + goto done; + if (flags & PD_VERBOSE) + buf_printf (&out, " sid=%s", session_id_print (&sid, gc)); + } + + /* + * tls-auth hmac + packet_id + */ + if (tls_auth_hmac_size) + { + struct packet_id_net pin; + uint8_t tls_auth_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; + + ASSERT (tls_auth_hmac_size <= MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH); + + if (!buf_read (&buf, tls_auth_hmac, tls_auth_hmac_size)) + goto done; + if (flags & PD_VERBOSE) + buf_printf (&out, " tls_hmac=%s", format_hex (tls_auth_hmac, tls_auth_hmac_size, 0, gc)); + + if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &buf, true)) + goto done; + buf_printf(&out, " pid=%s", packet_id_net_print (&pin, (flags & PD_VERBOSE), gc)); + } + + /* + * ACK list + */ + buf_printf (&out, " %s", reliable_ack_print(&buf, (flags & PD_VERBOSE), gc)); + + if (op == P_ACK_V1) + goto done; + + /* + * Packet ID + */ + { + packet_id_type l; + if (!buf_read (&buf, &l, sizeof (l))) + goto done; + l = ntohpid (l); + buf_printf (&out, " pid=" packet_id_format, (packet_id_print_type)l); + } + +print_data: + if (flags & PD_SHOW_DATA) + buf_printf (&out, " DATA %s", format_hex (BPTR (&buf), BLEN (&buf), 80, gc)); + else + buf_printf (&out, " DATA len=%d", buf.len); + +done: + return BSTR (&out); +} + +#else +static void dummy(void) {} +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL*/ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd7cae2e --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel SSL/Data channel negotiation module + */ + +#ifndef OPENVPN_SSL_H +#define OPENVPN_SSL_H + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#include "basic.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "session_id.h" +#include "reliable.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "plugin.h" + +#include "ssl_common.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include "ssl_backend.h" + +/* Used in the TLS PRF function */ +#define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN" + +/* packet opcode (high 5 bits) and key-id (low 3 bits) are combined in one byte */ +#define P_KEY_ID_MASK 0x07 +#define P_OPCODE_SHIFT 3 + +/* packet opcodes -- the V1 is intended to allow protocol changes in the future */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 1 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 2 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 3 /* new key, graceful transition from old to new key */ +#define P_CONTROL_V1 4 /* control channel packet (usually TLS ciphertext) */ +#define P_ACK_V1 5 /* acknowledgement for packets received */ +#define P_DATA_V1 6 /* data channel packet */ + +/* indicates key_method >= 2 */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 7 /* initial key from client, forget previous state */ +#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 8 /* initial key from server, forget previous state */ + +/* define the range of legal opcodes */ +#define P_FIRST_OPCODE 1 +#define P_LAST_OPCODE 8 + +/* Should we aggregate TLS + * acknowledgements, and tack them onto + * control packets? */ +#define TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK + +/* + * If TLS_AGGREGATE_ACK, set the + * max number of acknowledgments that + * can "hitch a ride" on an outgoing + * non-P_ACK_V1 control packet. + */ +#define CONTROL_SEND_ACK_MAX 4 + +/* + * Define number of buffers for send and receive in the reliability layer. + */ +#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_SEND_BUFFERS 4 /* also window size for reliablity layer */ +#define TLS_RELIABLE_N_REC_BUFFERS 8 + +/* + * Various timeouts + */ +#define TLS_MULTI_REFRESH 15 /* call tls_multi_process once every n seconds */ +#define TLS_MULTI_HORIZON 2 /* call tls_multi_process frequently for n seconds after + every packet sent/received action */ + +/* + * The SSL/TLS worker thread will wait at most this many seconds for the + * interprocess communication pipe to the main thread to be ready to accept + * writes. + */ +#define TLS_MULTI_THREAD_SEND_TIMEOUT 5 + +/* Interval that tls_multi_process should call tls_authentication_status */ +#define TLS_MULTI_AUTH_STATUS_INTERVAL 10 + +/* + * Buffer sizes (also see mtu.h). + */ + +/* Maximum length of OCC options string passed as part of auth handshake */ +#define TLS_OPTIONS_LEN 512 + +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ +#define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN" + +/* + * Range of key exchange methods + */ +#define KEY_METHOD_MIN 1 +#define KEY_METHOD_MAX 2 + +/* key method taken from lower 4 bits */ +#define KEY_METHOD_MASK 0x0F + +/* + * Measure success rate of TLS handshakes, for debugging only + */ +/* #define MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS */ + +/* + * Used in --mode server mode to check tls-auth signature on initial + * packets received from new clients. + */ +struct tls_auth_standalone +{ + struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key; + struct crypto_options tls_auth_options; + struct frame frame; +}; + +/* + * Prepare the SSL library for use + */ +void init_ssl_lib (void); + +/* + * Free any internal state that the SSL library might have + */ +void free_ssl_lib (void); + +/** + * Build master SSL context object that serves for the whole of OpenVPN + * instantiation + */ +void init_ssl (const struct options *options, struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ + +/** @name Functions for initialization and cleanup of tls_multi structures + * @{ */ + +/** + * Allocate and initialize a \c tls_multi structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function allocates a new \c tls_multi structure, and performs some + * amount of initialization. Afterwards, the \c tls_multi_init_finalize() + * function must be called to finalize the structure's initialization + * process. + * + * @param tls_options - The configuration options to be used for this VPN + * tunnel. + * + * @return A newly allocated and initialized \c tls_multi structure. + */ +struct tls_multi *tls_multi_init (struct tls_options *tls_options); + +/** + * Finalize initialization of a \c tls_multi structure. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function initializes the \c TM_ACTIVE \c tls_session, and in + * server mode also the \c TM_UNTRUSTED \c tls_session, associated with + * this \c tls_multi structure. It also configures the control channel's + * \c frame structure based on the data channel's \c frame given in + * argument \a frame. + * + * @param multi - The \c tls_multi structure of which to finalize + * initialization. + * @param frame - The data channel's \c frame structure. + */ +void tls_multi_init_finalize(struct tls_multi *multi, + const struct frame *frame); + +/* + * Initialize a standalone tls-auth verification object. + */ +struct tls_auth_standalone *tls_auth_standalone_init (struct tls_options *tls_options, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Finalize a standalone tls-auth verification object. + */ +void tls_auth_standalone_finalize (struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct frame *frame); + +/* + * Set local and remote option compatibility strings. + * Used to verify compatibility of local and remote option + * sets. + */ +void tls_multi_init_set_options(struct tls_multi* multi, + const char *local, + const char *remote); + +/** + * Cleanup a \c tls_multi structure and free associated memory + * allocations. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This function cleans up a \c tls_multi structure. This includes + * cleaning up all associated \c tls_session structures. + * + * @param multi - The \c tls_multi structure to clean up in free. + * @param clear - Whether the memory allocated for the \a multi + * object should be overwritten with 0s. + */ +void tls_multi_free (struct tls_multi *multi, bool clear); + +/** @} name Functions for initialization and cleanup of tls_multi structures */ + +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + +#define TLSMP_INACTIVE 0 +#define TLSMP_ACTIVE 1 +#define TLSMP_KILL 2 + +/* + * Called by the top-level event loop. + * + * Basically decides if we should call tls_process for + * the active or untrusted sessions. + */ +int tls_multi_process (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *to_link, + struct link_socket_actual **to_link_addr, + struct link_socket_info *to_link_socket_info, + interval_t *wakeup); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** + * Determine whether an incoming packet is a data channel or control + * channel packet, and process accordingly. + * @ingroup external_multiplexer + * + * When OpenVPN is in TLS mode, this is the first function to process an + * incoming packet. It inspects the packet's one-byte header which + * contains the packet's opcode and key ID. Depending on the opcode, the + * packet is processed as a data channel or as a control channel packet. + * + * @par Data channel packets + * + * If the opcode indicates the packet is a data channel packet, then the + * packet's key ID is used to find the local TLS state it is associated + * with. This state is checked whether it is active, authenticated, and + * its remote peer is the source of this packet. If these checks passed, + * the state's security parameters are loaded into the \a opt crypto + * options so that \p openvpn_decrypt() can later use them to authenticate + * and decrypt the packet. + * + * This function then returns false. The \a buf buffer has not been + * modified, except for removing the header. + * + * @par Control channel packets + * + * If the opcode indicates the packet is a control channel packet, then + * this function will process it based on its plaintext header. depending + * on the packet's opcode and session ID this function determines if it is + * destined for an active TLS session, or whether a new TLS session should + * be started. This function also initiates data channel session key + * renegotiation if the received opcode requests that. + * + * If the incoming packet is destined for an active TLS session, then the + * packet is inserted into the Reliability Layer and will be handled + * later. + * + * @param multi - The TLS multi structure associated with the VPN tunnel + * of this packet. + * @param from - The source address of the packet. + * @param buf - A buffer structure containing the incoming packet. + * @param opt - A crypto options structure that will be loaded with the + * appropriate security parameters to handle the packet if it is a + * data channel packet. + * + * @return + * @li True if the packet is a control channel packet that has been + * processed successfully. + * @li False if the packet is a data channel packet, or if an error + * occurred during processing of a control channel packet. + */ +bool tls_pre_decrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + struct buffer *buf, + struct crypto_options *opt); + + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @name Functions for managing security parameter state for data channel packets + * @{ */ + +/** + * Inspect an incoming packet for which no VPN tunnel is active, and + * determine whether a new VPN tunnel should be created. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * This function receives the initial incoming packet from a client that + * wishes to establish a new VPN tunnel, and determines the packet is a + * valid initial packet. It is only used when OpenVPN is running in + * server mode. + * + * The tests performed by this function are whether the packet's opcode is + * correct for establishing a new VPN tunnel, whether its key ID is 0, and + * whether its size is not too large. This function also performs the + * initial HMAC firewall test, if configured to do so. + * + * The incoming packet and the local VPN tunnel state are not modified by + * this function. Its sole purpose is to inspect the packet and determine + * whether a new VPN tunnel should be created. If so, that new VPN tunnel + * instance will handle processing of the packet. + * + * @param tas - The standalone TLS authentication setting structure for + * this process. + * @param from - The source address of the packet. + * @param buf - A buffer structure containing the incoming packet. + * + * @return + * @li True if the packet is valid and a new VPN tunnel should be created + * for this client. + * @li False if the packet is not valid, did not pass the HMAC firewall + * test, or some other error occurred. + */ +bool tls_pre_decrypt_lite (const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas, + const struct link_socket_actual *from, + const struct buffer *buf); + + +/** + * Choose the appropriate security parameters with which to process an + * outgoing packet. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * If no appropriate security parameters can be found, or if some other + * error occurs, then the buffer is set to empty. + * + * @param multi - The TLS state for this packet's destination VPN tunnel. + * @param buf - The buffer containing the outgoing packet. + * @param opt - The crypto options structure into which the appropriate + * security parameters should be loaded. + */ +void tls_pre_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf, struct crypto_options *opt); + + +/** + * Prepend the one-byte OpenVPN header to the packet, and perform some + * accounting for the key state used. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * @param multi - The TLS state for this packet's destination VPN tunnel. + * @param buf - The buffer containing the outgoing packet. + */ +void tls_post_encrypt (struct tls_multi *multi, struct buffer *buf); + +/** @} name Functions for managing security parameter state for data channel packets */ + +/* + * Setup private key file password. If auth_file is given, use the + * credentials stored in the file. + */ +void pem_password_setup (const char *auth_file); + +/* + * Setup authentication username and password. If auth_file is given, use the + * credentials stored in the file. + */ +void auth_user_pass_setup (const char *auth_file, const struct static_challenge_info *sc_info); + +/* + * Ensure that no caching is performed on authentication information + */ +void ssl_set_auth_nocache (void); + +/* + * Purge any stored authentication information, both for key files and tunnel + * authentication. If PCKS #11 is enabled, purge authentication for that too. + */ +void ssl_purge_auth (const bool auth_user_pass_only); + +void ssl_set_auth_token (const char *token); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR +/* + * ssl_get_auth_challenge will parse the server-pushed auth-failed + * reason string and return a dynamically allocated + * auth_challenge_info struct. + */ +void ssl_purge_auth_challenge (void); +void ssl_put_auth_challenge (const char *cr_str); +#endif + +/* + * Reserve any extra space required on frames. + */ +void tls_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame); + +/* + * Send a payload over the TLS control channel + */ +bool tls_send_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + const uint8_t *data, + int size); + +/* + * Receive a payload through the TLS control channel + */ +bool tls_rec_payload (struct tls_multi *multi, + struct buffer *buf); + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +static inline char * +tls_get_peer_info(const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + return multi->peer_info; +} +#endif + +/* + * inline functions + */ + +static inline bool +tls_initial_packet_received (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + return multi->n_sessions > 0; +} + +static inline bool +tls_test_auth_deferred_interval (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY]; + return now < ks->auth_deferred_expire; + } + return false; +} + +static inline int +tls_test_payload_len (const struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct key_state *ks = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].key[KS_PRIMARY]; + if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE) + return BLEN (&ks->plaintext_read_buf); + } + return 0; +} + +static inline void +tls_set_single_session (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + multi->opt.single_session = true; +} + +/* + * protocol_dump() flags + */ +#define PD_TLS_AUTH_HMAC_SIZE_MASK 0xFF +#define PD_SHOW_DATA (1<<8) +#define PD_TLS (1<<9) +#define PD_VERBOSE (1<<10) + +const char *protocol_dump (struct buffer *buffer, + unsigned int flags, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * debugging code + */ + +#ifdef MEASURE_TLS_HANDSHAKE_STATS +void show_tls_performance_stats(void); +#endif + +/*#define EXTRACT_X509_FIELD_TEST*/ +void extract_x509_field_test (void); + +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO && ENABLE_SSL */ + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..203a4d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h @@ -0,0 +1,435 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel SSL library backend module + */ + + +#ifndef SSL_BACKEND_H_ +#define SSL_BACKEND_H_ + +#include "buffer.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include "ssl_openssl.h" +#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#include "ssl_polarssl.h" +#include "ssl_verify_polarssl.h" +#endif + + +/* + * + * Functions implemented in ssl.c for use by the backend SSL library + * + */ + +/** + * Callback to retrieve the user's password + * + * @param buf Buffer to return the password in + * @param size Size of the buffer + * @param rwflag Unused, needed for OpenSSL compatibility + * @param u Unused, needed for OpenSSL compatibility + */ +int pem_password_callback (char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u); + +/* + * + * Functions used in ssl.c which must be implemented by the backend SSL library + * + */ + +/** + * Perform any static initialisation necessary by the library. + * Called on OpenVPN initialisation + */ +void tls_init_lib(); + +/** + * Free any global SSL library-specific data structures. + */ +void tls_free_lib(); +/** + * Clear the underlying SSL library's error state. + */ +void tls_clear_error(); + +/** + * Initialise a library-specific TLS context for a server. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to initialise + */ +void tls_ctx_server_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); + +/** + * Initialises a library-specific TLS context for a client. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to initialise + */ +void tls_ctx_client_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); + +/** + * Frees the library-specific TLSv1 context + * + * @param ctx TLS context to free + */ +void tls_ctx_free(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); + +/** + * Checks whether the given TLS context is initialised + * + * @param ctx TLS context to check + * + * @return true if the context is initialised, false if not. + */ +bool tls_ctx_initialised(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); + +/** + * Set any library specific options. + * + * Examples include disabling session caching, the password callback to use, + * and session verification parameters. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to set options on + * @param ssl_flags SSL flags to set + */ +void tls_ctx_set_options (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, unsigned int ssl_flags); + +/** + * Restrict the list of ciphers that can be used within the TLS context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to restrict + * @param ciphers String containing : delimited cipher names. + */ +void tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ciphers); + +/** + * Load Diffie Hellman Parameters, and load them into the library-specific + * TLS context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param dh_file The file name to load the parameters from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param dh_file_inline A string containing the parameters + */ +void tls_ctx_load_dh_params(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *dh_file, + const char *dh_file_inline); + +/** + * Load PKCS #12 file for key, cert and (optionally) CA certs, and add to + * library-specific TLS context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param pkcs12_file The file name to load the information from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param pkcs12_file_inline A string containing the information + * + * @return 1 if an error occurred, 0 if parsing was + * successful. + */ +int tls_ctx_load_pkcs12(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *pkcs12_file, + const char *pkcs12_file_inline, bool load_ca_file + ); + +/** + * Use Windows cryptoapi for key and cert, and add to library-specific TLS + * context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param crypto_api_cert String representing the certificate to load. + */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI +void tls_ctx_load_cryptoapi(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cryptoapi_cert); +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +/** + * Load certificate file into the given TLS context. If the given certificate + * file contains a certificate chain, load the whole chain. + * + * If the x509 parameter is not NULL, the certificate will be returned in it. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param cert_file The file name to load the certificate from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param cert_file_inline A string containing the certificate + * @param x509 An optional certificate, if x509 is NULL, + * do nothing, if x509 is not NULL, *x509 will be + * allocated and filled with the loaded certificate. + * *x509 must be NULL. + */ +void tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file, + const char *cert_file_inline, openvpn_x509_cert_t **x509 + ); + +/** + * Free the given certificate + * + * @param x509 certificate to free + */ +void tls_ctx_free_cert_file (openvpn_x509_cert_t *x509); + +/** + * Load private key file into the given TLS context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param priv_key_file The file name to load the private key from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param priv_key_file_inline A string containing the private key + * + * @return 1 if an error occurred, 0 if parsing was + * successful. + */ +int tls_ctx_load_priv_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *priv_key_file, + const char *priv_key_file_inline + ); + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +/** + * Tell the management interface to load the external private key matching + * the given certificate. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param cert The certificate file to load the private key for + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * + * @return 1 if an error occurred, 0 if parsing was + * successful. + */ +int tls_ctx_use_external_private_key (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert); +#endif + + +/** + * Load certificate authority certificates from the given file or path. + * + * Note that not all SSL libraries support loading from a path. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param ca_file The file name to load the CAs from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param ca_file_inline A string containing the CAs + * @param ca_path The path to load the CAs from + */ +void tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file, + const char *ca_file_inline, const char *ca_path, bool tls_server + ); + +/** + * Load extra certificate authority certificates from the given file or path. + * These Load extra certificates that are part of our own certificate + * chain but shouldn't be included in the verify chain. + * + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + * @param extra_certs_file The file name to load the certs from, or + * "[[INLINE]]" in the case of inline files. + * @param extra_certs_file_inline A string containing the certs + */ +void tls_ctx_load_extra_certs (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *extra_certs_file, + const char *extra_certs_file_inline + ); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +/** + * Add a personalisation string to the PolarSSL RNG, based on the certificate + * loaded into the given context. + * + * @param ctx TLS context to use + */ +void tls_ctx_personalise_random(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx); +#endif + +/* ************************************** + * + * Key-state specific functions + * + ***************************************/ + +/** + * Initialise the SSL channel part of the given key state. Settings will be + * loaded from a previously initialised TLS context. + * + * @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info to initialise + * @param ssl_ctx The TLS context to use when initialising the channel. + * @param is_server Initialise a server? + * @param session The session associated with the given key_state + */ +void key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, + const struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, bool is_server, void *session); + +/** + * Free the SSL channel part of the given key state. + * + * @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info to free + */ +void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl); + +/**************************************************************************/ +/** @addtogroup control_tls + * @{ */ + +/** @name Functions for packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer + * @{ */ + +/** + * Insert a plaintext buffer into the TLS module. + * + * After successfully processing the data, the data in \a buf is zeroized, + * its length set to zero, and a value of \c 1 is returned. + * + * @param ks_ssl - The security parameter state for this %key + * session. + * @param buf - The plaintext message to process. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the data was successfully + * processed: + * - \c 1: All the data was processed successfully. + * - \c 0: The data was not processed, this function should be called + * again later to retry. + * - \c -1: An error occurred. + */ +int key_state_write_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf); + +/** + * Insert plaintext data into the TLS module. + * + * @param ks_ssl - The security parameter state for this %key + * session. + * @param data - A pointer to the data to process. + * @param len - The length in bytes of the data to process. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the data was successfully + * processed: + * - \c 1: All the data was processed successfully. + * - \c 0: The data was not processed, this function should be called + * again later to retry. + * - \c -1: An error occurred. + */ +int key_state_write_plaintext_const (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, + const uint8_t *data, int len); + +/** + * Extract ciphertext data from the TLS module. + * + * If the \a buf buffer has a length other than zero, this function does + * not perform any action and returns 0. + * + * @param ks_ssl - The security parameter state for this %key + * session. + * @param buf - A buffer in which to store the ciphertext. + * @param maxlen - The maximum number of bytes to extract. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the data was successfully + * processed: + * - \c 1: Data was extracted successfully. + * - \c 0: No data was extracted, this function should be called again + * later to retry. + * - \c -1: An error occurred. + */ +int key_state_read_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen); + +/** @} name Functions for packets to be sent to a remote OpenVPN peer */ + + +/** @name Functions for packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer + * @{ */ + +/** + * Insert a ciphertext buffer into the TLS module. + * + * After successfully processing the data, the data in \a buf is zeroized, + * its length set to zero, and a value of \c 1 is returned. + * + * @param ks_ssl - The security parameter state for this %key + * session. + * @param buf - The ciphertext message to process. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the data was successfully + * processed: + * - \c 1: All the data was processed successfully. + * - \c 0: The data was not processed, this function should be called + * again later to retry. + * - \c -1: An error occurred. + */ +int key_state_write_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, + struct buffer *buf); + +/** + * Extract plaintext data from the TLS module. + * + * If the \a buf buffer has a length other than zero, this function does + * not perform any action and returns 0. + * + * @param ks_ssl - The security parameter state for this %key + * session. + * @param buf - A buffer in which to store the plaintext. + * @param maxlen - The maximum number of bytes to extract. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the data was successfully + * processed: + * - \c 1: Data was extracted successfully. + * - \c 0: No data was extracted, this function should be called again + * later to retry. + * - \c -1: An error occurred. + */ +int key_state_read_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen); + +/** @} name Functions for packets received from a remote OpenVPN peer */ + +/** @} addtogroup control_tls */ + +/* ************************************** + * + * Information functions + * + * Print information for the end user. + * + ***************************************/ + +/* + * Print a one line summary of SSL/TLS session handshake. + */ +void print_details (struct key_state_ssl * ks_ssl, const char *prefix); + +/* + * Show the TLS ciphers that are available for us to use in the OpenSSL + * library. + */ +void show_available_tls_ciphers (); + +/* + * The OpenSSL library has a notion of preference in TLS ciphers. Higher + * preference == more secure. Return the highest preference cipher. + */ +void get_highest_preference_tls_cipher (char *buf, int size); + +#endif /* SSL_BACKEND_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb259a96 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,498 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Common Data Structures + */ + +#ifndef SSL_COMMON_H_ +#define SSL_COMMON_H_ + +#include "session_id.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "packet_id.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "options.h" + +#include "ssl_backend.h" + +/* passwords */ +#define UP_TYPE_AUTH "Auth" +#define UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY "Private Key" + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ +/** + * @name Control channel negotiation states + * + * These states represent the different phases of control channel + * negotiation between OpenVPN peers. OpenVPN servers and clients + * progress through the states in a different order, because of their + * different roles during exchange of random material. The references to + * the \c key_source2 structure in the list below is only valid if %key + * method 2 is being used. See the \link key_generation data channel key + * generation\endlink related page for more information. + * + * Clients follow this order: + * -# \c S_INITIAL, ready to begin three-way handshake and control + * channel negotiation. + * -# \c S_PRE_START, have started three-way handshake, waiting for + * acknowledgment from remote. + * -# \c S_START, initial three-way handshake complete. + * -# \c S_SENT_KEY, have sent local part of \c key_source2 random + * material. + * -# \c S_GOT_KEY, have received remote part of \c key_source2 random + * material. + * -# \c S_ACTIVE, normal operation during remaining handshake window. + * -# \c S_NORMAL_OP, normal operation. + * + * Servers follow the same order, except for \c S_SENT_KEY and \c + * S_GOT_KEY being reversed, because the server first receives the + * client's \c key_source2 random material before generating and sending + * its own. + * + * @{ + */ +#define S_ERROR -1 /**< Error state. */ +#define S_UNDEF 0 /**< Undefined state, used after a \c + * key_state is cleaned up. */ +#define S_INITIAL 1 /**< Initial \c key_state state after + * initialization by \c key_state_init() + * before start of three-way handshake. */ +#define S_PRE_START 2 /**< Waiting for the remote OpenVPN peer + * to acknowledge during the initial + * three-way handshake. */ +#define S_START 3 /**< Three-way handshake is complete, + * start of key exchange. */ +#define S_SENT_KEY 4 /**< Local OpenVPN process has sent its + * part of the key material. */ +#define S_GOT_KEY 5 /**< Local OpenVPN process has received + * the remote's part of the key + * material. */ +#define S_ACTIVE 6 /**< Operational \c key_state state + * immediately after negotiation has + * completed while still within the + * handshake window. */ +/* ready to exchange data channel packets */ +#define S_NORMAL_OP 7 /**< Normal operational \c key_state + * state. */ +/** @} name Control channel negotiation states */ +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + +/** + * Container for one half of random material to be used in %key method 2 + * \ref key_generation "data channel key generation". + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key_source { + uint8_t pre_master[48]; /**< Random used for master secret + * generation, provided only by client + * OpenVPN peer. */ + uint8_t random1[32]; /**< Seed used for master secret + * generation, provided by both client + * and server. */ + uint8_t random2[32]; /**< Seed used for key expansion, provided + * by both client and server. */ +}; + + +/** + * Container for both halves of random material to be used in %key method + * 2 \ref key_generation "data channel key generation". + * @ingroup control_processor + */ +struct key_source2 { + struct key_source client; /**< Random provided by client. */ + struct key_source server; /**< Random provided by server. */ +}; + +/** + * Security parameter state of one TLS and data channel %key session. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This structure represents one security parameter session between + * OpenVPN peers. It includes the control channel TLS state and the data + * channel crypto state. It also contains the reliability layer + * structures used for control channel messages. + * + * A new \c key_state structure is initialized for each hard or soft + * reset. + * + * @see + * - This structure should be initialized using the \c key_state_init() + * function. + * - This structure should be cleaned up using the \c key_state_free() + * function. + */ +struct key_state +{ + int state; + int key_id; /* inherited from struct tls_session below */ + + struct key_state_ssl ks_ssl; /* contains SSL object and BIOs for the control channel */ + + time_t established; /* when our state went S_ACTIVE */ + time_t must_negotiate; /* key negotiation times out if not finished before this time */ + time_t must_die; /* this object is destroyed at this time */ + + int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */ + struct session_id session_id_remote; /* peer's random session ID */ + struct link_socket_actual remote_addr; /* peer's IP addr */ + struct packet_id packet_id; /* for data channel, to prevent replay attacks */ + + struct key_ctx_bi key; /* data channel keys for encrypt/decrypt/hmac */ + + struct key_source2 *key_src; /* source entropy for key expansion */ + + struct buffer plaintext_read_buf; + struct buffer plaintext_write_buf; + struct buffer ack_write_buf; + + struct reliable *send_reliable; /* holds a copy of outgoing packets until ACK received */ + struct reliable *rec_reliable; /* order incoming ciphertext packets before we pass to TLS */ + struct reliable_ack *rec_ack; /* buffers all packet IDs we want to ACK back to sender */ + + struct buffer_list *paybuf; + + counter_type n_bytes; /* how many bytes sent/recvd since last key exchange */ + counter_type n_packets; /* how many packets sent/recvd since last key exchange */ + + /* + * If bad username/password, TLS connection will come up but 'authenticated' will be false. + */ + bool authenticated; + time_t auth_deferred_expire; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + /* If auth_deferred is true, authentication is being deferred */ + bool auth_deferred; +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + unsigned int mda_key_id; + unsigned int mda_status; +#endif +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + unsigned int auth_control_status; + time_t acf_last_mod; + char *auth_control_file; +#endif +#endif +}; + +/* + * Our const options, obtained directly or derived from + * command line options. + */ +struct tls_options +{ + /* our master TLS context from which all SSL objects derived */ + struct tls_root_ctx ssl_ctx; + + /* data channel cipher, hmac, and key lengths */ + struct key_type key_type; + + /* true if we are a TLS server, client otherwise */ + bool server; + + /* if true, don't xmit until first packet from peer is received */ + bool xmit_hold; + +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + /* local and remote options strings + that must match between client and server */ + const char *local_options; + const char *remote_options; +#endif + + /* from command line */ + int key_method; + bool replay; + bool single_session; +#ifdef ENABLE_OCC + bool disable_occ; +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO + bool push_peer_info; +#endif + int transition_window; + int handshake_window; + interval_t packet_timeout; + int renegotiate_bytes; + int renegotiate_packets; + interval_t renegotiate_seconds; + + /* cert verification parms */ + const char *verify_command; + const char *verify_export_cert; + const char *verify_x509name; + const char *crl_file; + int ns_cert_type; + unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS]; + const char *remote_cert_eku; + uint8_t *verify_hash; + char *x509_username_field; + + /* allow openvpn config info to be + passed over control channel */ + bool pass_config_info; + + /* struct crypto_option flags */ + unsigned int crypto_flags_and; + unsigned int crypto_flags_or; + + int replay_window; /* --replay-window parm */ + int replay_time; /* --replay-window parm */ + bool tcp_mode; + + /* packet authentication for TLS handshake */ + struct crypto_options tls_auth; + struct key_ctx_bi tls_auth_key; + + /* frame parameters for TLS control channel */ + struct frame frame; + + /* used for username/password authentication */ + const char *auth_user_pass_verify_script; + bool auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file; + const char *tmp_dir; + + /* use the client-config-dir as a positive authenticator */ + const char *client_config_dir_exclusive; + + /* instance-wide environment variable set */ + struct env_set *es; + const struct plugin_list *plugins; + + /* configuration file boolean options */ +# define SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED (1<<0) +# define SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME (1<<1) +# define SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL (1<<2) +# define SSLF_OPT_VERIFY (1<<4) +# define SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR (1<<5) + unsigned int ssl_flags; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + struct man_def_auth_context *mda_context; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + const struct x509_track *x509_track; +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_CLIENT_CR + const struct static_challenge_info *sci; +#endif + + /* --gremlin bits */ + int gremlin; +}; + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ +/** @name Index of key_state objects within a tls_session structure + * + * This is the index of \c tls_session.key + * + * @{ */ +#define KS_PRIMARY 0 /**< Primary %key state index. */ +#define KS_LAME_DUCK 1 /**< %Key state index that will retire + * soon. */ +#define KS_SIZE 2 /**< Size of the \c tls_session.key array. */ +/** @} name Index of key_state objects within a tls_session structure */ +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + + +/** + * Security parameter state of a single session within a VPN tunnel. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * This structure represents an OpenVPN peer-to-peer control channel + * session. + * + * A \c tls_session remains over soft resets, but a new instance is + * initialized for each hard reset. + * + * @see + * - This structure should be initialized using the \c tls_session_init() + * function. + * - This structure should be cleaned up using the \c tls_session_free() + * function. + */ +struct tls_session +{ + /* const options and config info */ + struct tls_options *opt; + + /* during hard reset used to control burst retransmit */ + bool burst; + + /* authenticate control packets */ + struct crypto_options tls_auth; + struct packet_id tls_auth_pid; + + int initial_opcode; /* our initial P_ opcode */ + struct session_id session_id; /* our random session ID */ + int key_id; /* increments with each soft reset (for key renegotiation) */ + + int limit_next; /* used for traffic shaping on the control channel */ + + int verify_maxlevel; + + char *common_name; + + struct cert_hash_set *cert_hash_set; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + uint32_t common_name_hashval; +#endif + + bool verified; /* true if peer certificate was verified against CA */ + + /* not-yet-authenticated incoming client */ + struct link_socket_actual untrusted_addr; + + struct key_state key[KS_SIZE]; +}; + +/** @addtogroup control_processor + * @{ */ +/** @name Index of tls_session objects within a tls_multi structure + * + * This is the index of \c tls_multi.session + * + * Normally three tls_session objects are maintained by an active openvpn + * session. The first is the current, TLS authenticated session, the + * second is used to process connection requests from a new client that + * would usurp the current session if successfully authenticated, and the + * third is used as a repository for a "lame-duck" %key in the event that + * the primary session resets due to error while the lame-duck %key still + * has time left before its expiration. Lame duck keys are used to + * maintain the continuity of the data channel connection while a new %key + * is being negotiated. + * + * @{ */ +#define TM_ACTIVE 0 /**< Active \c tls_session. */ +#define TM_UNTRUSTED 1 /**< As yet un-trusted \c tls_session + * being negotiated. */ +#define TM_LAME_DUCK 2 /**< Old \c tls_session. */ +#define TM_SIZE 3 /**< Size of the \c tls_multi.session + * array. */ +/** @} name Index of tls_session objects within a tls_multi structure */ +/** @} addtogroup control_processor */ + + +/* + * The number of keys we will scan on encrypt or decrypt. The first + * is the "active" key. The second is the lame_duck or retiring key + * associated with the active key's session ID. The third is a detached + * lame duck session that only occurs in situations where a key renegotiate + * failed on the active key, but a lame duck key was still valid. By + * preserving the lame duck session, we can be assured of having a data + * channel key available even when network conditions are so bad that + * we can't negotiate a new key within the time allotted. + */ +#define KEY_SCAN_SIZE 3 + + +/** + * Security parameter state for a single VPN tunnel. + * @ingroup control_processor + * + * An active VPN tunnel running with TLS enabled has one \c tls_multi + * object, in which it stores all control channel and data channel + * security parameter state. This structure can contain multiple, + * possibly simultaneously active, \c tls_context objects to allow for + * interruption-less transitions during session renegotiations. Each \c + * tls_context represents one control channel session, which can span + * multiple data channel security parameter sessions stored in \c + * key_state structures. + */ +struct tls_multi +{ + /* used to coordinate access between main thread and TLS thread */ + /*MUTEX_PTR_DEFINE (mutex);*/ + + /* const options and config info */ + struct tls_options opt; + + struct key_state* key_scan[KEY_SCAN_SIZE]; + /**< List of \c key_state objects in the + * order they should be scanned by data + * channel modules. */ + + /* + * used by tls_pre_encrypt to communicate the encrypt key + * to tls_post_encrypt() + */ + struct key_state *save_ks; /* temporary pointer used between pre/post routines */ + + /* + * Used to return outgoing address from + * tls_multi_process. + */ + struct link_socket_actual to_link_addr; + + int n_sessions; /**< Number of sessions negotiated thus + * far. */ + + /* + * Number of errors. + */ + int n_hard_errors; /* errors due to TLS negotiation failure */ + int n_soft_errors; /* errors due to unrecognized or failed-to-authenticate incoming packets */ + + /* + * Our locked common name, username, and cert hashes (cannot change during the life of this tls_multi object) + */ + char *locked_cn; + char *locked_username; + struct cert_hash_set *locked_cert_hash_set; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + /* + * An error message to send to client on AUTH_FAILED + */ + char *client_reason; + + /* + * A multi-line string of general-purpose info received from peer + * over control channel. + */ + char *peer_info; + + /* Time of last call to tls_authentication_status */ + time_t tas_last; +#endif + + /* + * Our session objects. + */ + struct tls_session session[TM_SIZE]; + /**< Array of \c tls_session objects + * representing control channel + * sessions with the remote peer. */ +}; + + +#endif /* SSL_COMMON_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a727b605 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,1175 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel OpenSSL Backend + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + +#include "errlevel.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "memdbg.h" +#include "ssl_backend.h" +#include "ssl_common.h" +#include "base64.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI +#include "cryptoapi.h" +#endif + +#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Allocate space in SSL objects in which to store a struct tls_session + * pointer back to parent. + * + */ + +int mydata_index; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +tls_init_lib() +{ + SSL_library_init(); +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + SSL_load_error_strings(); +#endif + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms (); + + mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "struct session *", NULL, NULL, NULL); + ASSERT (mydata_index >= 0); +} + +void +tls_free_lib() +{ + EVP_cleanup(); +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + ERR_free_strings(); +#endif +} + +void +tls_clear_error() +{ + ERR_clear_error (); +} + +/* + * OpenSSL callback to get a temporary RSA key, mostly + * used for export ciphers. + */ +static RSA * +tmp_rsa_cb (SSL * s, int is_export, int keylength) +{ + static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL; + if (rsa_tmp == NULL) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key", keylength); + rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key (keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL); + } + return (rsa_tmp); +} + +void +tls_ctx_server_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + ctx->ctx = SSL_CTX_new (TLSv1_server_method ()); + + if (ctx->ctx == NULL) + msg (M_SSLERR, "SSL_CTX_new TLSv1_server_method"); + + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback (ctx->ctx, tmp_rsa_cb); +} + +void +tls_ctx_client_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + ctx->ctx = SSL_CTX_new (TLSv1_client_method ()); + + if (ctx->ctx == NULL) + msg (M_SSLERR, "SSL_CTX_new TLSv1_client_method"); +} + +void +tls_ctx_free(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + if (NULL != ctx->ctx) + SSL_CTX_free (ctx->ctx); + ctx->ctx = NULL; +} + +bool tls_ctx_initialised(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + return NULL != ctx->ctx; +} + +/* + * Print debugging information on SSL/TLS session negotiation. + */ + +#ifndef INFO_CALLBACK_SSL_CONST +#define INFO_CALLBACK_SSL_CONST const +#endif +static void +info_callback (INFO_CALLBACK_SSL_CONST SSL * s, int where, int ret) +{ + if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) + { + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "SSL state (%s): %s", + where & SSL_ST_CONNECT ? "connect" : + where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT ? "accept" : + "undefined", SSL_state_string_long (s)); + } + else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) + { + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "SSL alert (%s): %s: %s", + where & SSL_CB_READ ? "read" : "write", + SSL_alert_type_string_long (ret), + SSL_alert_desc_string_long (ret)); + } +} + +void +tls_ctx_set_options (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, unsigned int ssl_flags) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode (ctx->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); + SSL_CTX_set_options (ctx->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb (ctx->ctx, pem_password_callback); + + /* Require peer certificate verification */ +#if P2MP_SERVER + if (ssl_flags & SSLF_CLIENT_CERT_NOT_REQUIRED) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS OPTION " + "--client-cert-not-required may accept clients which do not present " + "a certificate"); + } + else +#endif + SSL_CTX_set_verify (ctx->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, + verify_callback); + + SSL_CTX_set_info_callback (ctx->ctx, info_callback); +} + +void +tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ciphers) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx->ctx, ciphers)) + msg(M_SSLERR, "Failed to set restricted TLS cipher list: %s", ciphers); +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_dh_params (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *dh_file, + const char *dh_file_inline + ) +{ + DH *dh; + BIO *bio; + + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + if (!strcmp (dh_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && dh_file_inline) + { + if (!(bio = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)dh_file_inline, -1))) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot open memory BIO for inline DH parameters"); + } + else + { + /* Get Diffie Hellman Parameters */ + if (!(bio = BIO_new_file (dh_file, "r"))) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot open %s for DH parameters", dh_file); + } + + dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams (bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + BIO_free (bio); + + if (!dh) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load DH parameters from %s", dh_file); + if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh (ctx->ctx, dh)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh"); + + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "Diffie-Hellman initialized with %d bit key", + 8 * DH_size (dh)); + + DH_free (dh); +} + +int +tls_ctx_load_pkcs12(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *pkcs12_file, + const char *pkcs12_file_inline, + bool load_ca_file + ) +{ + FILE *fp; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + X509 *cert; + STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL; + PKCS12 *p12; + int i; + char password[256]; + + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + if (!strcmp (pkcs12_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && pkcs12_file_inline) + { + BIO *b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); + BIO *bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((void *) pkcs12_file_inline, + (int) strlen(pkcs12_file_inline)); + ASSERT(b64 && bio); + BIO_push(b64, bio); + p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(b64, NULL); + if (!p12) + msg(M_SSLERR, "Error reading inline PKCS#12 file"); + BIO_free(b64); + BIO_free(bio); + } + else + { + /* Load the PKCS #12 file */ + if (!(fp = platform_fopen(pkcs12_file, "rb"))) + msg(M_SSLERR, "Error opening file %s", pkcs12_file); + p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL); + fclose(fp); + if (!p12) + msg(M_SSLERR, "Error reading PKCS#12 file %s", pkcs12_file); + } + + /* Parse the PKCS #12 file */ + if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, "", &pkey, &cert, &ca)) + { + pem_password_callback (password, sizeof(password) - 1, 0, NULL); + /* Reparse the PKCS #12 file with password */ + ca = NULL; + if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON (ERR_peek_error()) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE)) + management_auth_failure (management, UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY, NULL); +#endif + PKCS12_free(p12); + return 1; + } + } + PKCS12_free(p12); + + /* Load Certificate */ + if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate (ctx->ctx, cert)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot use certificate"); + + /* Load Private Key */ + if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey (ctx->ctx, pkey)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot use private key"); + warn_if_group_others_accessible (pkcs12_file); + + /* Check Private Key */ + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx->ctx)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Private key does not match the certificate"); + + /* Set Certificate Verification chain */ + if (load_ca_file) + { + if (ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) + { + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) + { + if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->ctx->cert_store,sk_X509_value(ca, i))) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot add certificate to certificate chain (X509_STORE_add_cert)"); + if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx->ctx, sk_X509_value(ca, i))) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot add certificate to client CA list (SSL_CTX_add_client_CA)"); + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI +void +tls_ctx_load_cryptoapi(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cryptoapi_cert) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + /* Load Certificate and Private Key */ + if (!SSL_CTX_use_CryptoAPI_certificate (ctx->ctx, cryptoapi_cert)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load certificate \"%s\" from Microsoft Certificate Store", + cryptoapi_cert); +} +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +static void +tls_ctx_add_extra_certs (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, BIO *bio) +{ + X509 *cert; + for (;;) + { + cert = NULL; + if (!PEM_read_bio_X509 (bio, &cert, 0, NULL)) /* takes ownership of cert */ + break; + if (!cert) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Error reading extra certificate"); + if (SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx->ctx, cert) != 1) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Error adding extra certificate"); + } +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file, + const char *cert_file_inline, X509 **x509 + ) +{ + BIO *in = NULL; + X509 *x = NULL; + int ret = 0; + bool inline_file = false; + + ASSERT (NULL != ctx); + if (NULL != x509) + ASSERT (NULL == *x509); + + inline_file = (strcmp (cert_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) == 0); + + if (inline_file && cert_file_inline) + in = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)cert_file_inline, -1); + else + in = BIO_new_file (cert_file, "r"); + + if (in == NULL) + { + SSLerr (SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); + goto end; + } + + x = PEM_read_bio_X509 (in, NULL, ctx->ctx->default_passwd_callback, + ctx->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); + if (x == NULL) + { + SSLerr (SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); + goto end; + } + + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate (ctx->ctx, x); + if (ret) + tls_ctx_add_extra_certs (ctx, in); + +end: + if (!ret) + { + if (inline_file) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load inline certificate file"); + else + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file); + } + + if (in != NULL) + BIO_free(in); + if (x509) + *x509 = x; + else if (x) + X509_free (x); +} + +void +tls_ctx_free_cert_file (X509 *x509) +{ + X509_free(x509); +} + +int +tls_ctx_load_priv_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *priv_key_file, + const char *priv_key_file_inline + ) +{ + int status; + SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; + BIO *in = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int ret = 1; + + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + ssl_ctx = ctx->ctx; + + if (!strcmp (priv_key_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && priv_key_file_inline) + in = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)priv_key_file_inline, -1); + else + in = BIO_new_file (priv_key_file, "r"); + + if (!in) + goto end; + + pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey (in, NULL, + ssl_ctx->default_passwd_callback, + ssl_ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata); + if (!pkey) + goto end; + + if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey (ssl_ctx, pkey)) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON (ERR_peek_error()) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT)) + management_auth_failure (management, UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY, NULL); +#endif + msg (M_WARN|M_SSL, "Cannot load private key file %s", priv_key_file); + goto end; + } + warn_if_group_others_accessible (priv_key_file); + + /* Check Private Key */ + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ssl_ctx)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Private key does not match the certificate"); + ret = 0; + +end: + if (pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free (pkey); + if (in) + BIO_free (in); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +/* encrypt */ +static int +rsa_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +/* verify arbitrary data */ +static int +rsa_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +/* decrypt */ +static int +rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + ASSERT(0); + return -1; +} + +/* called at RSA_free */ +static int +rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + free ((void*)rsa->meth); + rsa->meth = NULL; + return 1; +} + +/* sign arbitrary data */ +static int +rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + /* optional app data in rsa->meth->app_data; */ + char *in_b64 = NULL; + char *out_b64 = NULL; + int ret = -1; + int len; + + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + { + RSAerr (RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto done; + } + + /* convert 'from' to base64 */ + if (openvpn_base64_encode (from, flen, &in_b64) <= 0) + goto done; + + /* call MI for signature */ + if (management) + out_b64 = management_query_rsa_sig (management, in_b64); + if (!out_b64) + goto done; + + /* decode base64 signature to binary */ + len = RSA_size(rsa); + ret = openvpn_base64_decode (out_b64, to, len); + + /* verify length */ + if (ret != len) + ret = -1; + + done: + if (in_b64) + free (in_b64); + if (out_b64) + free (out_b64); + return ret; +} + +int +tls_ctx_use_external_private_key (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, X509 *cert) +{ + RSA *rsa = NULL; + RSA *pub_rsa; + RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth; + + ASSERT (NULL != ctx); + ASSERT (NULL != cert); + + /* allocate custom RSA method object */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (rsa_meth, RSA_METHOD); + rsa_meth->name = "OpenVPN external private key RSA Method"; + rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc = rsa_pub_enc; + rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec = rsa_pub_dec; + rsa_meth->rsa_priv_enc = rsa_priv_enc; + rsa_meth->rsa_priv_dec = rsa_priv_dec; + rsa_meth->init = NULL; + rsa_meth->finish = rsa_finish; + rsa_meth->flags = RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK; + rsa_meth->app_data = NULL; + + /* allocate RSA object */ + rsa = RSA_new(); + if (rsa == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the public key */ + ASSERT(cert->cert_info->key->pkey); /* NULL before SSL_CTX_use_certificate() is called */ + pub_rsa = cert->cert_info->key->pkey->pkey.rsa; + + /* initialize RSA object */ + rsa->n = BN_dup(pub_rsa->n); + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + if (!RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_meth)) + goto err; + + /* bind our custom RSA object to ssl_ctx */ + if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx->ctx, rsa)) + goto err; + + RSA_free(rsa); /* doesn't necessarily free, just decrements refcount */ + return 1; + + err: + if (rsa) + RSA_free(rsa); + else + { + if (rsa_meth) + free(rsa_meth); + } + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot enable SSL external private key capability"); + return 0; +} + +#endif + +static int +sk_x509_name_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp (*a, *b); +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file, + const char *ca_file_inline, + const char *ca_path, bool tls_server + ) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *info_stack = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names = NULL; + X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; + X509_STORE *store = NULL; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + BIO *in = NULL; + int i, added = 0; + + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx->ctx); + if (!store) + msg(M_SSLERR, "Cannot get certificate store (SSL_CTX_get_cert_store)"); + + /* Try to add certificates and CRLs from ca_file */ + if (ca_file) + { + if (!strcmp (ca_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && ca_file_inline) + in = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)ca_file_inline, -1); + else + in = BIO_new_file (ca_file, "r"); + + if (in) + info_stack = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio (in, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (info_stack) + { + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num (info_stack); i++) + { + X509_INFO *info = sk_X509_INFO_value (info_stack, i); + if (info->crl) + X509_STORE_add_crl (store, info->crl); + + if (info->x509) + { + X509_STORE_add_cert (store, info->x509); + added++; + + if (!tls_server) + continue; + + /* Use names of CAs as a client CA list */ + if (cert_names == NULL) + { + cert_names = sk_X509_NAME_new (sk_x509_name_cmp); + if (!cert_names) + continue; + } + + xn = X509_get_subject_name (info->x509); + if (!xn) + continue; + + /* Don't add duplicate CA names */ + if (sk_X509_NAME_find (cert_names, xn) == -1) + { + xn = X509_NAME_dup (xn); + if (!xn) + continue; + sk_X509_NAME_push (cert_names, xn); + } + } + } + sk_X509_INFO_pop_free (info_stack, X509_INFO_free); + } + + if (tls_server) + SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list (ctx->ctx, cert_names); + + if (!added || (tls_server && sk_X509_NAME_num (cert_names) != added)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s", np(ca_file)); + if (in) + BIO_free (in); + } + + /* Set a store for certs (CA & CRL) with a lookup on the "capath" hash directory */ + if (ca_path) + { + lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup (store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir ()); + if (lookup && X509_LOOKUP_add_dir (lookup, ca_path, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) + msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: experimental option --capath %s", ca_path); + else + msg(M_SSLERR, "Cannot add lookup at --capath %s", ca_path); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + X509_STORE_set_flags (store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); +#else + msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: this version of OpenSSL cannot handle CRL files in capath"); +#endif + } +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_extra_certs (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *extra_certs_file, + const char *extra_certs_file_inline + ) +{ + BIO *in; + if (!strcmp (extra_certs_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && extra_certs_file_inline) + in = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)extra_certs_file_inline, -1); + else + in = BIO_new_file (extra_certs_file, "r"); + + if (in == NULL) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot load extra-certs file: %s", extra_certs_file); + else + tls_ctx_add_extra_certs (ctx, in); + + BIO_free (in); +} + +/* ************************************** + * + * Key-state specific functions + * + ***************************************/ +/* + * + * BIO functions + * + */ + +#ifdef BIO_DEBUG + +#warning BIO_DEBUG defined + +static FILE *biofp; /* GLOBAL */ +static bool biofp_toggle; /* GLOBAL */ +static time_t biofp_last_open; /* GLOBAL */ +static const int biofp_reopen_interval = 600; /* GLOBAL */ + +static void +close_biofp() +{ + if (biofp) + { + ASSERT (!fclose (biofp)); + biofp = NULL; + } +} + +static void +open_biofp() +{ + const time_t current = time (NULL); + const pid_t pid = getpid (); + + if (biofp_last_open + biofp_reopen_interval < current) + close_biofp(); + if (!biofp) + { + char fn[256]; + openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "bio/%d-%d.log", pid, biofp_toggle); + biofp = fopen (fn, "w"); + ASSERT (biofp); + biofp_last_open = time (NULL); + biofp_toggle ^= 1; + } +} + +static void +bio_debug_data (const char *mode, BIO *bio, const uint8_t *buf, int len, const char *desc) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + if (len > 0) + { + open_biofp(); + fprintf(biofp, "BIO_%s %s time=" time_format " bio=" ptr_format " len=%d data=%s\n", + mode, desc, time (NULL), (ptr_type)bio, len, format_hex (buf, len, 0, &gc)); + fflush (biofp); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +bio_debug_oc (const char *mode, BIO *bio) +{ + open_biofp(); + fprintf(biofp, "BIO %s time=" time_format " bio=" ptr_format "\n", + mode, time (NULL), (ptr_type)bio); + fflush (biofp); +} + +#endif + +/* + * OpenVPN's interface to SSL/TLS authentication, + * encryption, and decryption is exclusively + * through "memory BIOs". + */ +static BIO * +getbio (BIO_METHOD * type, const char *desc) +{ + BIO *ret; + ret = BIO_new (type); + if (!ret) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Error creating %s BIO", desc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Write to an OpenSSL BIO in non-blocking mode. + */ +static int +bio_write (BIO *bio, const uint8_t *data, int size, const char *desc) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + ASSERT (size >= 0); + if (size) + { + /* + * Free the L_TLS lock prior to calling BIO routines + * so that foreground thread can still call + * tls_pre_decrypt or tls_pre_encrypt, + * allowing tunnel packet forwarding to continue. + */ +#ifdef BIO_DEBUG + bio_debug_data ("write", bio, data, size, desc); +#endif + i = BIO_write (bio, data, size); + + if (i < 0) + { + if (BIO_should_retry (bio)) + { + ; + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS | M_SSL, "TLS ERROR: BIO write %s error", + desc); + ret = -1; + ERR_clear_error (); + } + } + else if (i != size) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS | M_SSL, + "TLS ERROR: BIO write %s incomplete %d/%d", desc, i, size); + ret = -1; + ERR_clear_error (); + } + else + { /* successful write */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "BIO write %s %d bytes", desc, i); + ret = 1; + } + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Inline functions for reading from and writing + * to BIOs. + */ + +static void +bio_write_post (const int status, struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (status == 1) /* success status return from bio_write? */ + { + memset (BPTR (buf), 0, BLEN (buf)); /* erase data just written */ + buf->len = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Read from an OpenSSL BIO in non-blocking mode. + */ +static int +bio_read (BIO *bio, struct buffer *buf, int maxlen, const char *desc) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + ASSERT (buf->len >= 0); + if (buf->len) + { + ; + } + else + { + int len = buf_forward_capacity (buf); + if (maxlen < len) + len = maxlen; + + /* + * BIO_read brackets most of the serious RSA + * key negotiation number crunching. + */ + i = BIO_read (bio, BPTR (buf), len); + + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *) &i, sizeof (i)); + +#ifdef BIO_DEBUG + bio_debug_data ("read", bio, BPTR (buf), i, desc); +#endif + if (i < 0) + { + if (BIO_should_retry (bio)) + { + ; + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS | M_SSL, "TLS_ERROR: BIO read %s error", + desc); + buf->len = 0; + ret = -1; + ERR_clear_error (); + } + } + else if (!i) + { + buf->len = 0; + } + else + { /* successful read */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "BIO read %s %d bytes", desc, i); + buf->len = i; + ret = 1; + VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *) BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)); + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, const struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, bool is_server, void *session) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ssl_ctx); + ASSERT(ks_ssl); + CLEAR (*ks_ssl); + + ks_ssl->ssl = SSL_new (ssl_ctx->ctx); + if (!ks_ssl->ssl) + msg (M_SSLERR, "SSL_new failed"); + + /* put session * in ssl object so we can access it + from verify callback*/ + SSL_set_ex_data (ks_ssl->ssl, mydata_index, session); + + ks_ssl->ssl_bio = getbio (BIO_f_ssl (), "ssl_bio"); + ks_ssl->ct_in = getbio (BIO_s_mem (), "ct_in"); + ks_ssl->ct_out = getbio (BIO_s_mem (), "ct_out"); + +#ifdef BIO_DEBUG + bio_debug_oc ("open ssl_bio", ks_ssl->ssl_bio); + bio_debug_oc ("open ct_in", ks_ssl->ct_in); + bio_debug_oc ("open ct_out", ks_ssl->ct_out); +#endif + + if (is_server) + SSL_set_accept_state (ks_ssl->ssl); + else + SSL_set_connect_state (ks_ssl->ssl); + + SSL_set_bio (ks_ssl->ssl, ks_ssl->ct_in, ks_ssl->ct_out); + BIO_set_ssl (ks_ssl->ssl_bio, ks_ssl->ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE); +} + +void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) +{ + if (ks_ssl->ssl) { +#ifdef BIO_DEBUG + bio_debug_oc ("close ssl_bio", ks_ssl->ssl_bio); + bio_debug_oc ("close ct_in", ks_ssl->ct_in); + bio_debug_oc ("close ct_out", ks_ssl->ct_out); +#endif + BIO_free_all(ks_ssl->ssl_bio); + SSL_free (ks_ssl->ssl); + } +} + +int +key_state_write_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf) +{ + int ret = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT); + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL + ASSERT (NULL != ks_ssl); + + ret = bio_write (ks_ssl->ssl_bio, BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), + "tls_write_plaintext"); + bio_write_post (ret, buf); +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL */ + + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +int +key_state_write_plaintext_const (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, const uint8_t *data, int len) +{ + int ret = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks_ssl); + + ret = bio_write (ks_ssl->ssl_bio, data, len, "tls_write_plaintext_const"); + + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +int +key_state_read_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen) +{ + int ret = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_READ_CIPHERTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks_ssl); + + ret = bio_read (ks_ssl->ct_out, buf, maxlen, "tls_read_ciphertext"); + + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +int +key_state_write_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf) +{ + int ret = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_CIPHERTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks_ssl); + + ret = bio_write (ks_ssl->ct_in, BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), "tls_write_ciphertext"); + bio_write_post (ret, buf); + + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +int +key_state_read_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen) +{ + int ret = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_READ_PLAINTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks_ssl); + + ret = bio_read (ks_ssl->ssl_bio, buf, maxlen, "tls_read_plaintext"); + + perf_pop (); + return ret; +} + +/* ************************************** + * + * Information functions + * + * Print information for the end user. + * + ***************************************/ +void +print_details (struct key_state_ssl * ks_ssl, const char *prefix) +{ + const SSL_CIPHER *ciph; + X509 *cert; + char s1[256]; + char s2[256]; + + s1[0] = s2[0] = 0; + ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher (ks_ssl->ssl); + openvpn_snprintf (s1, sizeof (s1), "%s %s, cipher %s %s", + prefix, + SSL_get_version (ks_ssl->ssl), + SSL_CIPHER_get_version (ciph), + SSL_CIPHER_get_name (ciph)); + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ks_ssl->ssl); + if (cert != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey (cert); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL + && pkey->pkey.rsa->n != NULL) + { + openvpn_snprintf (s2, sizeof (s2), ", %d bit RSA", + BN_num_bits (pkey->pkey.rsa->n)); + } + else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL + && pkey->pkey.dsa->p != NULL) + { + openvpn_snprintf (s2, sizeof (s2), ", %d bit DSA", + BN_num_bits (pkey->pkey.dsa->p)); + } + EVP_PKEY_free (pkey); + } + X509_free (cert); + } + /* The SSL API does not allow us to look at temporary RSA/DH keys, + * otherwise we should print their lengths too */ + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "%s%s", s1, s2); +} + +void +show_available_tls_ciphers () +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + const char *cipher_name; + int priority = 0; + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new (TLSv1_method ()); + if (!ctx) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot create SSL_CTX object"); + + ssl = SSL_new (ctx); + if (!ssl) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot create SSL object"); + + printf ("Available TLS Ciphers,\n"); + printf ("listed in order of preference:\n\n"); + while ((cipher_name = SSL_get_cipher_list (ssl, priority++))) + printf ("%s\n", cipher_name); + printf ("\n"); + + SSL_free (ssl); + SSL_CTX_free (ctx); +} + +void +get_highest_preference_tls_cipher (char *buf, int size) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + SSL *ssl; + const char *cipher_name; + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new (TLSv1_method ()); + if (!ctx) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot create SSL_CTX object"); + ssl = SSL_new (ctx); + if (!ssl) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Cannot create SSL object"); + + cipher_name = SSL_get_cipher_list (ssl, 0); + strncpynt (buf, cipher_name, size); + + SSL_free (ssl); + SSL_CTX_free (ctx); +} + +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc2052cb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel OpenSSL Backend + */ + +#ifndef SSL_OPENSSL_H_ +#define SSL_OPENSSL_H_ + +#include + +/** + * Structure that wraps the TLS context. Contents differ depending on the + * SSL library used. + */ +struct tls_root_ctx { + SSL_CTX *ctx; +}; + +struct key_state_ssl { + SSL *ssl; /* SSL object -- new obj created for each new key */ + BIO *ssl_bio; /* read/write plaintext from here */ + BIO *ct_in; /* write ciphertext to here */ + BIO *ct_out; /* read ciphertext from here */ +}; + +/** + * Allocate space in SSL objects in which to store a struct tls_session + * pointer back to parent. + */ +extern int mydata_index; /* GLOBAL */ + +void openssl_set_mydata_index (void); + +#endif /* SSL_OPENSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12318b33 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,870 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel PolarSSL Backend + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + +#include "errlevel.h" +#include "ssl_backend.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "ssl_common.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "ssl_verify_polarssl.h" +#include + +void +tls_init_lib() +{ +} + +void +tls_free_lib() +{ +} + +void +tls_clear_error() +{ +} + +static int default_ciphersuites[] = +{ + SSL_EDH_RSA_AES_256_SHA, + SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA, + SSL_EDH_RSA_AES_128_SHA, + SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA, + SSL_EDH_RSA_DES_168_SHA, + SSL_RSA_AES_256_SHA, + SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA, + SSL_RSA_AES_128_SHA, + SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA, + SSL_RSA_DES_168_SHA, + SSL_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, + SSL_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, + 0 +}; + +void +tls_ctx_server_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + CLEAR(*ctx); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->dhm_ctx, dhm_context); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->priv_key, rsa_context); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->ca_chain, x509_cert); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->crt_chain, x509_cert); + + + ctx->endpoint = SSL_IS_SERVER; + ctx->initialised = true; +} + +void +tls_ctx_client_new(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + CLEAR(*ctx); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->dhm_ctx, dhm_context); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->priv_key, rsa_context); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->ca_chain, x509_cert); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ctx->crt_chain, x509_cert); + + ctx->endpoint = SSL_IS_CLIENT; + ctx->initialised = true; +} + +void +tls_ctx_free(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx) + { + rsa_free(ctx->priv_key); + free(ctx->priv_key); + + x509_free(ctx->ca_chain); + free(ctx->ca_chain); + + x509_free(ctx->crt_chain); + free(ctx->crt_chain); + + dhm_free(ctx->dhm_ctx); + free(ctx->dhm_ctx); + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + if (ctx->priv_key_pkcs11 != NULL) { + pkcs11_priv_key_free(ctx->priv_key_pkcs11); + free(ctx->priv_key_pkcs11); + } +#endif + + if (ctx->allowed_ciphers) + free(ctx->allowed_ciphers); + + CLEAR(*ctx); + + ctx->initialised = false; + + } +} + +bool +tls_ctx_initialised(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + return ctx->initialised; +} + +void +tls_ctx_set_options (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, unsigned int ssl_flags) +{ +} + +void +tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ciphers) +{ + char *tmp_ciphers, *tmp_ciphers_orig, *token; + int i, cipher_count; + int ciphers_len = strlen (ciphers); + + ASSERT (NULL != ctx); + ASSERT (0 != ciphers_len); + + /* Get number of ciphers */ + for (i = 0, cipher_count = 1; i < ciphers_len; i++) + if (ciphers[i] == ':') + cipher_count++; + + /* Allocate an array for them */ + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR(ctx->allowed_ciphers, int, cipher_count+1) + + /* Parse allowed ciphers, getting IDs */ + i = 0; + tmp_ciphers_orig = tmp_ciphers = strdup(ciphers); + + token = strtok (tmp_ciphers, ":"); + while(token) + { + ctx->allowed_ciphers[i] = ssl_get_ciphersuite_id (token); + if (0 != ctx->allowed_ciphers[i]) + i++; + token = strtok (NULL, ":"); + } + free(tmp_ciphers_orig); +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_dh_params (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *dh_file, + const char *dh_file_inline + ) +{ + if (!strcmp (dh_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && dh_file_inline) + { + if (0 != x509parse_dhm(ctx->dhm_ctx, dh_file_inline, strlen(dh_file_inline))) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot read inline DH parameters"); + } +else + { + if (0 != x509parse_dhmfile(ctx->dhm_ctx, dh_file)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot read DH parameters from file %s", dh_file); + } + + msg (D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "Diffie-Hellman initialized with " counter_format " bit key", + (counter_type) 8 * mpi_size(&ctx->dhm_ctx->P)); +} + +int +tls_ctx_load_pkcs12(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *pkcs12_file, + const char *pkcs12_file_inline, + bool load_ca_file + ) +{ + msg(M_FATAL, "PKCS #12 files not yet supported for PolarSSL."); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI +void +tls_ctx_load_cryptoapi(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cryptoapi_cert) +{ + msg(M_FATAL, "Windows CryptoAPI not yet supported for PolarSSL."); +} +#endif /* WIN32 */ + +void +tls_ctx_load_cert_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *cert_file, + const char *cert_file_inline, + openvpn_x509_cert_t **x509 + ) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + if (NULL != x509) + ASSERT(NULL == *x509); + + if (!strcmp (cert_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && cert_file_inline) + { + if (0 != x509parse_crt(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file_inline, + strlen(cert_file_inline))) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load inline certificate file"); + } + else + { + if (0 != x509parse_crtfile(ctx->crt_chain, cert_file)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file); + } + if (x509) + { + *x509 = ctx->crt_chain; + } +} + +void +tls_ctx_free_cert_file (openvpn_x509_cert_t *x509) +{ + x509_free(x509); +} + +int +tls_ctx_load_priv_file (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *priv_key_file, + const char *priv_key_file_inline + ) +{ + int status; + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + if (!strcmp (priv_key_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && priv_key_file_inline) + { + status = x509parse_key(ctx->priv_key, + priv_key_file_inline, strlen(priv_key_file_inline), + NULL, 0); + if (POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED == status) + { + char passbuf[512] = {0}; + pem_password_callback(passbuf, 512, 0, NULL); + status = x509parse_key(ctx->priv_key, + priv_key_file_inline, strlen(priv_key_file_inline), + passbuf, strlen(passbuf)); + } + } + else + { + status = x509parse_keyfile(ctx->priv_key, priv_key_file, NULL); + if (POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED == status) + { + char passbuf[512] = {0}; + pem_password_callback(passbuf, 512, 0, NULL); + status = x509parse_keyfile(ctx->priv_key, priv_key_file, passbuf); + } + } + if (0 != status) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management && (POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH == status)) + management_auth_failure (management, UP_TYPE_PRIVATE_KEY, NULL); +#endif + msg (M_WARN, "Cannot load private key file %s", priv_key_file); + return 1; + } + + warn_if_group_others_accessible (priv_key_file); + + /* TODO: Check Private Key */ +#if 0 + if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) + msg (M_SSLERR, "Private key does not match the certificate"); +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY + +int +tls_ctx_use_external_private_key (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + msg(M_FATAL, "Use of management external keys not yet supported for PolarSSL."); + return false; +} + +#endif + +void tls_ctx_load_ca (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *ca_file, + const char *ca_file_inline, + const char *ca_path, bool tls_server + ) +{ + if (ca_path) + msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: PolarSSL cannot handle the capath directive"); + + if (ca_file && !strcmp (ca_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && ca_file_inline) + { + if (0 != x509parse_crt(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file_inline, strlen(ca_file_inline))) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load inline CA certificates"); + } + else + { + /* Load CA file for verifying peer supplied certificate */ + if (0 != x509parse_crtfile(ctx->ca_chain, ca_file)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load CA certificate file %s", ca_file); + } +} + +void +tls_ctx_load_extra_certs (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *extra_certs_file, + const char *extra_certs_file_inline + ) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ctx); + + if (!strcmp (extra_certs_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && extra_certs_file_inline) + { + if (0 != x509parse_crt(ctx->crt_chain, extra_certs_file_inline, + strlen(extra_certs_file_inline))) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load inline extra-certs file"); + } + else + { + if (0 != x509parse_crtfile(ctx->crt_chain, extra_certs_file)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot load extra-certs file: %s", extra_certs_file); + } +} + +/* ************************************** + * + * Key-state specific functions + * + ***************************************/ + +/* + * "Endless buffer" + */ + +static inline void buf_free_entry(buffer_entry *entry) +{ + if (NULL != entry) + { + free(entry->data); + free(entry); + } +} + +static void buf_free_entries(endless_buffer *buf) +{ + while(buf->first_block) + { + buffer_entry *cur_block = buf->first_block; + buf->first_block = cur_block->next_block; + buf_free_entry(cur_block); + } + buf->last_block = NULL; +} + +static int endless_buf_read( void * ctx, unsigned char * out, size_t out_len ) +{ + endless_buffer *in = (endless_buffer *) ctx; + size_t read_len = 0; + + if (in->first_block == NULL) + return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ; + + while (in->first_block != NULL && read_len < out_len) + { + int block_len = in->first_block->length - in->data_start; + if (block_len <= out_len - read_len) + { + buffer_entry *cur_entry = in->first_block; + memcpy(out + read_len, cur_entry->data + in->data_start, + block_len); + + read_len += block_len; + + in->first_block = cur_entry->next_block; + in->data_start = 0; + + if (in->first_block == NULL) + in->last_block = NULL; + + buf_free_entry(cur_entry); + } + else + { + memcpy(out + read_len, in->first_block->data + in->data_start, + out_len - read_len); + in->data_start += out_len - read_len; + read_len = out_len; + } + } + + return read_len; +} + +static int endless_buf_write( void *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t len ) +{ + endless_buffer *out = (endless_buffer *) ctx; + buffer_entry *new_block = malloc(sizeof(buffer_entry)); + if (NULL == new_block) + return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED; + + new_block->data = malloc(len); + if (NULL == new_block->data) + { + free(new_block); + return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED; + } + + new_block->length = len; + new_block->next_block = NULL; + + memcpy(new_block->data, in, len); + + if (NULL == out->first_block) + out->first_block = new_block; + + if (NULL != out->last_block) + out->last_block->next_block = new_block; + + out->last_block = new_block; + + return len; +} + +static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, const char *str ) +{ + if (level == 1) + { + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "PolarSSL alert: %s", str); + } +} + +/* + * Further personalise the RNG using a hash of the public key + */ +void tls_ctx_personalise_random(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) +{ + static char old_sha256_hash[32] = {0}; + char sha256_hash[32] = {0}; + ctr_drbg_context *cd_ctx = rand_ctx_get(); + + if (NULL != ctx->crt_chain) + { + x509_cert *cert = ctx->crt_chain; + + sha2(cert->tbs.p, cert->tbs.len, sha256_hash, false); + if ( 0 != memcmp(old_sha256_hash, sha256_hash, sizeof(sha256_hash))) + { + ctr_drbg_update(cd_ctx, sha256_hash, 32); + memcpy(old_sha256_hash, sha256_hash, sizeof(old_sha256_hash)); + } + } +} + +void key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, + const struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, bool is_server, void *session) +{ + ASSERT(NULL != ssl_ctx); + ASSERT(ks_ssl); + CLEAR(*ks_ssl); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_context); + if (0 == ssl_init(ks_ssl->ctx)) + { + /* Initialise SSL context */ + ssl_set_dbg (ks_ssl->ctx, my_debug, NULL); + ssl_set_endpoint (ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->endpoint); + + ssl_set_rng (ks_ssl->ctx, ctr_drbg_random, rand_ctx_get()); + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks_ssl->ssn, ssl_session); + ssl_set_session (ks_ssl->ctx, 0, 0, ks_ssl->ssn ); + if (ssl_ctx->allowed_ciphers) + ssl_set_ciphersuites (ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->allowed_ciphers); + else + ssl_set_ciphersuites (ks_ssl->ctx, default_ciphersuites); + + /* Initialise authentication information */ + if (is_server) + ssl_set_dh_param_ctx (ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->dhm_ctx ); +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + if (ssl_ctx->priv_key_pkcs11 != NULL) + ssl_set_own_cert_pkcs11( ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->crt_chain, + ssl_ctx->priv_key_pkcs11 ); + else +#endif + ssl_set_own_cert( ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->crt_chain, ssl_ctx->priv_key ); + + /* Initialise SSL verification */ + ssl_set_authmode (ks_ssl->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED); + ssl_set_verify (ks_ssl->ctx, verify_callback, session); + /* TODO: PolarSSL does not currently support sending the CA chain to the client */ + ssl_set_ca_chain (ks_ssl->ctx, ssl_ctx->ca_chain, NULL, NULL ); + + /* Initialise BIOs */ + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks_ssl->ct_in, endless_buffer); + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (ks_ssl->ct_out, endless_buffer); + ssl_set_bio (ks_ssl->ctx, endless_buf_read, ks_ssl->ct_in, + endless_buf_write, ks_ssl->ct_out); + + } +} + +void +key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) +{ + if (ks_ssl) { + if (ks_ssl->ctx) + { + ssl_free(ks_ssl->ctx); + free(ks_ssl->ctx); + } + if (ks_ssl->ssn) + free(ks_ssl->ssn); + if (ks_ssl->ct_in) { + buf_free_entries(ks_ssl->ct_in); + free(ks_ssl->ct_in); + } + if (ks_ssl->ct_out) { + buf_free_entries(ks_ssl->ct_out); + free(ks_ssl->ct_out); + } + CLEAR(*ks_ssl); + } +} + +int +key_state_write_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks, struct buffer *buf) +{ + int retval = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks); + ASSERT (buf); + ASSERT (buf->len >= 0); + + if (0 == buf->len) + { + return 0; + perf_pop (); + } + + retval = ssl_write(ks->ctx, BPTR(buf), buf->len); + + if (retval < 0) + { + perf_pop (); + if (POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE == retval || POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ == retval) + return 0; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_plaintext error"); + return -1; + } + + if (retval != buf->len) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_plaintext incomplete %d/%d", + retval, buf->len); + perf_pop (); + return -1; + } + + /* successful write */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "write tls_write_plaintext %d bytes", retval); + + memset (BPTR (buf), 0, BLEN (buf)); /* erase data just written */ + buf->len = 0; + + perf_pop (); + return 1; +} + +int +key_state_write_plaintext_const (struct key_state_ssl *ks, const uint8_t *data, int len) +{ + int retval = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_PLAINTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks); + ASSERT (len >= 0); + + if (0 == len) + { + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + ASSERT (data); + + retval = ssl_write(ks->ctx, data, len); + + if (retval < 0) + { + perf_pop (); + if (POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE == retval || POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ == retval) + return 0; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_plaintext_const error"); + return -1; + } + + if (retval != len) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_plaintext_const incomplete %d/%d", + retval, len); + perf_pop (); + return -1; + } + + /* successful write */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "write tls_write_plaintext_const %d bytes", retval); + + perf_pop (); + return 1; +} + +int +key_state_read_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen) +{ + int retval = 0; + int len = 0; + + perf_push (PERF_BIO_READ_CIPHERTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks); + ASSERT (buf); + ASSERT (buf->len >= 0); + + if (buf->len) + { + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + len = buf_forward_capacity (buf); + if (maxlen < len) + len = maxlen; + + retval = endless_buf_read(ks->ct_out, BPTR(buf), len); + + /* Error during read, check for retry error */ + if (retval < 0) + { + perf_pop (); + if (POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE == retval || POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ == retval) + return 0; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS_ERROR: read tls_read_plaintext error"); + buf->len = 0; + return -1; + } + /* Nothing read, try again */ + if (0 == retval) + { + buf->len = 0; + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + /* successful read */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "read tls_read_ciphertext %d bytes", retval); + buf->len = retval; + perf_pop (); + return 1; +} + +int +key_state_write_ciphertext (struct key_state_ssl *ks, struct buffer *buf) +{ + int retval = 0; + perf_push (PERF_BIO_WRITE_CIPHERTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks); + ASSERT (buf); + ASSERT (buf->len >= 0); + + if (0 == buf->len) + { + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + retval = endless_buf_write(ks->ct_in, BPTR(buf), buf->len); + + if (retval < 0) + { + perf_pop (); + + if (POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE == retval || POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ == retval) + return 0; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_ciphertext error"); + return -1; + } + + if (retval != buf->len) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, + "TLS ERROR: write tls_write_ciphertext incomplete %d/%d", + retval, buf->len); + perf_pop (); + return -1; + } + + /* successful write */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "write tls_write_ciphertext %d bytes", retval); + + memset (BPTR (buf), 0, BLEN (buf)); /* erase data just written */ + buf->len = 0; + + perf_pop (); + return 1; +} + +int +key_state_read_plaintext (struct key_state_ssl *ks, struct buffer *buf, + int maxlen) +{ + int retval = 0; + int len = 0; + + perf_push (PERF_BIO_READ_PLAINTEXT); + + ASSERT (NULL != ks); + ASSERT (buf); + ASSERT (buf->len >= 0); + + if (buf->len) + { + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + len = buf_forward_capacity (buf); + if (maxlen < len) + len = maxlen; + + retval = ssl_read(ks->ctx, BPTR(buf), len); + + /* Error during read, check for retry error */ + if (retval < 0) + { + if (POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE == retval || POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ == retval) + return 0; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS_ERROR: read tls_read_plaintext error"); + buf->len = 0; + perf_pop (); + return -1; + } + /* Nothing read, try again */ + if (0 == retval) + { + buf->len = 0; + perf_pop (); + return 0; + } + + /* successful read */ + dmsg (D_HANDSHAKE_VERBOSE, "read tls_read_plaintext %d bytes", retval); + buf->len = retval; + + perf_pop (); + return 1; +} + +/* ************************************** + * + * Information functions + * + * Print information for the end user. + * + ***************************************/ +void +print_details (struct key_state_ssl * ks_ssl, const char *prefix) +{ + x509_cert *cert; + char s1[256]; + char s2[256]; + + s1[0] = s2[0] = 0; + openvpn_snprintf (s1, sizeof (s1), "%s %s, cipher %s", + prefix, + ssl_get_version (ks_ssl->ctx), + ssl_get_ciphersuite(ks_ssl->ctx)); + + cert = ks_ssl->ctx->peer_cert; + if (cert != NULL) + { + openvpn_snprintf (s2, sizeof (s2), ", " counter_format " bit RSA", (counter_type) cert->rsa.len * 8); + } + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "%s%s", s1, s2); +} + +void +show_available_tls_ciphers () +{ + const int *ciphers = ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL + printf ("Available TLS Ciphers,\n"); + printf ("listed in order of preference:\n\n"); +#endif + + while (*ciphers != 0) + { + printf ("%s\n", ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(*ciphers)); + ciphers++; + } + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +get_highest_preference_tls_cipher (char *buf, int size) +{ + const char *cipher_name; + const int *ciphers = ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + if (*ciphers == 0) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot retrieve list of supported SSL ciphers."); + + cipher_name = ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(*ciphers); + strncpynt (buf, cipher_name, size); +} + +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..456573f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_polarssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel PolarSSL Backend + */ + +#ifndef SSL_POLARSSL_H_ +#define SSL_POLARSSL_H_ + +#include + +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) +#include +#endif + +typedef struct _buffer_entry buffer_entry; + +struct _buffer_entry { + size_t length; + uint8_t *data; + buffer_entry *next_block; +}; + +typedef struct { + size_t data_start; + buffer_entry *first_block; + buffer_entry *last_block; +} endless_buffer; + +/** + * Structure that wraps the TLS context. Contents differ depending on the + * SSL library used. + * + * Either \c priv_key_pkcs11 or \c priv_key must be filled in. + */ +struct tls_root_ctx { + bool initialised; /**< True if the context has been initialised */ + + int endpoint; /**< Whether or not this is a server or a client */ + + dhm_context *dhm_ctx; /**< Diffie-Helmann-Merkle context */ + x509_cert *crt_chain; /**< Local Certificate chain */ + x509_cert *ca_chain; /**< CA chain for remote verification */ + rsa_context *priv_key; /**< Local private key */ +#if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) + pkcs11_context *priv_key_pkcs11; /**< PKCS11 private key */ +#endif + int * allowed_ciphers; /**< List of allowed ciphers for this connection */ +}; + +struct key_state_ssl { + ssl_context *ctx; + ssl_session *ssn; + endless_buffer *ct_in; + endless_buffer *ct_out; +}; + + +#endif /* SSL_POLARSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cac46e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,1265 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) + +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include "ssl_verify_backend.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" +#endif + +/** Maximum length of common name */ +#define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64 + +/** Legal characters in an X509 name with --compat-names */ +#define X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH|CC_COLON|CC_EQUAL) + +/** Legal characters in a common name with --compat-names */ +#define COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH) + +static void +string_mod_remap_name (char *str, const unsigned int restrictive_flags) +{ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES) + && !compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING)) + string_mod (str, restrictive_flags, 0, '_'); + else + string_mod (str, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); +} + +/* + * Export the untrusted IP address and port to the environment + */ +static void +setenv_untrusted (struct tls_session *session) +{ + setenv_link_socket_actual (session->opt->es, "untrusted", &session->untrusted_addr, SA_IP_PORT); +} + +/* + * Remove authenticated state from all sessions in the given tunnel + */ +static void +tls_deauthenticate (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + if (multi) + { + int i, j; + for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) + for (j = 0; j < KS_SIZE; ++j) + multi->session[i].key[j].authenticated = false; + } +} + +/* + * Set the given session's common_name + */ +static void +set_common_name (struct tls_session *session, const char *common_name) +{ + if (session->common_name) + { + free (session->common_name); + session->common_name = NULL; +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + session->common_name_hashval = 0; +#endif + } + if (common_name) + { + /* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ + session->common_name = string_alloc (common_name, NULL); +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + { + const uint32_t len = (uint32_t) strlen (common_name); + if (len) + session->common_name_hashval = hash_func ((const uint8_t*)common_name, len+1, 0); + else + session->common_name_hashval = 0; + } +#endif + } +} + +/* + * Retrieve the common name for the given tunnel's active session. If the + * common name is NULL or empty, return NULL if null is true, or "UNDEF" if + * null is false. + */ +const char * +tls_common_name (const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) +{ + const char *ret = NULL; + if (multi) + ret = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; + if (ret && strlen (ret)) + return ret; + else if (null) + return NULL; + else + return "UNDEF"; +} + +/* + * Lock the common name for the given tunnel. + */ +void +tls_lock_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + const char *cn = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; + if (cn && !multi->locked_cn) + multi->locked_cn = string_alloc (cn, NULL); +} + +/* + * Lock the username for the given tunnel + */ +static bool +tls_lock_username (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *username) +{ + if (multi->locked_username) + { + if (!username || strcmp (username, multi->locked_username)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: username attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", + multi->locked_username, + np(username)); + + /* disable the tunnel */ + tls_deauthenticate (multi); + return false; + } + } + else + { + if (username) + multi->locked_username = string_alloc (username, NULL); + } + return true; +} + +const char * +tls_username (const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) +{ + const char *ret = NULL; + if (multi) + ret = multi->locked_username; + if (ret && strlen (ret)) + return ret; + else if (null) + return NULL; + else + return "UNDEF"; +} + +void +cert_hash_remember (struct tls_session *session, const int error_depth, const unsigned char *sha1_hash) +{ + if (error_depth >= 0 && error_depth < MAX_CERT_DEPTH) + { + if (!session->cert_hash_set) + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (session->cert_hash_set, struct cert_hash_set); + if (!session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]) + ALLOC_OBJ (session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth], struct cert_hash); + { + struct cert_hash *ch = session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]; + memcpy (ch->sha1_hash, sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + } + } +} + +#if 0 +static void +cert_hash_print (const struct cert_hash_set *chs, int msglevel) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (msglevel, "CERT_HASH"); + if (chs) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) + { + const struct cert_hash *ch = chs->ch[i]; + if (ch) + msg (msglevel, "%d:%s", i, format_hex(ch->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, &gc)); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} +#endif + +void +cert_hash_free (struct cert_hash_set *chs) +{ + if (chs) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) + free (chs->ch[i]); + free (chs); + } +} + +static bool +cert_hash_compare (const struct cert_hash_set *chs1, const struct cert_hash_set *chs2) +{ + if (chs1 && chs2) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) + { + const struct cert_hash *ch1 = chs1->ch[i]; + const struct cert_hash *ch2 = chs2->ch[i]; + + if (!ch1 && !ch2) + continue; + else if (ch1 && ch2 && !memcmp (ch1->sha1_hash, ch2->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + continue; + else + return false; + } + return true; + } + else if (!chs1 && !chs2) + return true; + else + return false; +} + +static struct cert_hash_set * +cert_hash_copy (const struct cert_hash_set *chs) +{ + struct cert_hash_set *dest = NULL; + if (chs) + { + int i; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (dest, struct cert_hash_set); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) + { + const struct cert_hash *ch = chs->ch[i]; + if (ch) + { + ALLOC_OBJ (dest->ch[i], struct cert_hash); + memcpy (dest->ch[i]->sha1_hash, ch->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + } + } + } + return dest; +} +void +tls_lock_cert_hash_set (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ + const struct cert_hash_set *chs = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].cert_hash_set; + if (chs && !multi->locked_cert_hash_set) + multi->locked_cert_hash_set = cert_hash_copy (chs); +} + +/* + * Returns the string associated with the given certificate type. + */ +static const char * +print_nsCertType (int type) +{ + switch (type) + { + case NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER: + return "SERVER"; + case NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT: + return "CLIENT"; + default: + return "?"; + } +} + +/* + * Verify the peer's certificate fields. + * + * @param opt the tls options to verify against + * @param peer_cert the peer's certificate + * @param subject the peer's extracted subject name + * @param subject the peer's extracted common name + */ +static result_t +verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, + const char *subject, const char *common_name) +{ + /* verify certificate nsCertType */ + if (opt->ns_cert_type != NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE) + { + if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_ns_cert_type (peer_cert, opt->ns_cert_type)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: nsCertType=%s", + print_nsCertType (opt->ns_cert_type)); + } + else + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY nsCertType ERROR: %s, require nsCertType=%s", + subject, print_nsCertType (opt->ns_cert_type)); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ + } + } + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L || ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + + /* verify certificate ku */ + if (opt->remote_cert_ku[0] != 0) + { + if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_ku (peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_ku, MAX_PARMS)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU OK"); + } + else + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU ERROR"); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ + } + } + + /* verify certificate eku */ + if (opt->remote_cert_eku != NULL) + { + if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_eku (peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_eku)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU OK"); + } + else + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU ERROR"); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ + } + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ + + /* verify X509 name or common name against --tls-remote */ + if (opt->verify_x509name && strlen (opt->verify_x509name) > 0) + { + if (strcmp (opt->verify_x509name, subject) == 0 + || strncmp (opt->verify_x509name, common_name, strlen (opt->verify_x509name)) == 0) + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", subject); + else + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME ERROR: %s, must be %s", + subject, opt->verify_x509name); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ + } + } + + return SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Export the subject, common_name, and raw certificate fields to the + * environment for later verification by scripts and plugins. + */ +static void +verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert_depth, + const char *subject, const char *common_name +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + , const struct x509_track *x509_track +#endif + ) +{ + char envname[64]; + char *serial = NULL; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + /* Save X509 fields in environment */ +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + if (x509_track) + x509_setenv_track (x509_track, es, cert_depth, peer_cert); + else +#endif + x509_setenv (es, cert_depth, peer_cert); + + /* export subject name string as environmental variable */ + openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_id_%d", cert_depth); + setenv_str (es, envname, subject); + +#if 0 + /* export common name string as environmental variable */ + openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_common_name_%d", cert_depth); + setenv_str (es, envname, common_name); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_EUREPHIA + /* export X509 cert SHA1 fingerprint */ + { + unsigned char *sha1_hash = x509_get_sha1_hash(peer_cert, &gc); + + openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_digest_%d", cert_depth); + setenv_str (es, envname, format_hex_ex(sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, 1, + ":", &gc)); + } +#endif + + /* export serial number as environmental variable */ + serial = x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc); + openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth); + setenv_str (es, envname, serial); + + gc_free(&gc); +} + +/* + * call --tls-verify plug-in(s) + */ +static result_t +verify_cert_call_plugin(const struct plugin_list *plugins, struct env_set *es, + int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject) +{ + if (plugin_defined (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY)) + { + int ret; + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%d %s", cert_depth, subject); + + ret = plugin_call_ssl (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY, &argv, NULL, es, cert_depth, cert); + + argv_reset (&argv); + + if (ret == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN OK: depth=%d, %s", + cert_depth, subject); + } + else + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN ERROR: depth=%d, %s", + cert_depth, subject); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ + } + } + return SUCCESS; +} + +static const char * +verify_cert_export_cert(openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert, const char *tmp_dir, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + FILE *peercert_file; + const char *peercert_filename=""; + + if(!tmp_dir) + return NULL; + + /* create tmp file to store peer cert */ + peercert_filename = create_temp_file (tmp_dir, "pcf", gc); + + /* write peer-cert in tmp-file */ + peercert_file = fopen(peercert_filename, "w+"); + if(!peercert_file) + { + msg (M_ERR, "Failed to open temporary file : %s", peercert_filename); + return NULL; + } + + if (SUCCESS != x509_write_pem(peercert_file, peercert)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error writing PEM file containing certificate"); + + fclose(peercert_file); + return peercert_filename; +} + + +/* + * run --tls-verify script + */ +static result_t +verify_cert_call_command(const char *verify_command, struct env_set *es, + int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject, const char *verify_export_cert) +{ + const char *tmp_file = NULL; + int ret; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + + setenv_str (es, "script_type", "tls-verify"); + + if (verify_export_cert) + { + if ((tmp_file=verify_cert_export_cert(cert, verify_export_cert, &gc))) + { + setenv_str(es, "peer_cert", tmp_file); + } + } + + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %d %s", verify_command, cert_depth, subject); + + argv_msg_prefix (D_TLS_DEBUG, &argv, "TLS: executing verify command"); + ret = openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, 0, "--tls-verify script"); + + if (verify_export_cert) + { + if (tmp_file) + platform_unlink(tmp_file); + } + + gc_free(&gc); + argv_reset (&argv); + + if (ret) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT OK: depth=%d, %s", + cert_depth, subject); + return SUCCESS; + } + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT ERROR: depth=%d, %s", + cert_depth, subject); + return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ +} + +/* + * check peer cert against CRL directory + */ +static result_t +verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + result_t ret = FAILURE; + char fn[256]; + int fd = -1; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + + char *serial = x509_get_serial(cert, &gc); + + if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: filename overflow"); + goto cleanup; + } + fd = platform_open (fn, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd >= 0) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: certificate serial number %s is revoked", serial); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + gc_free(&gc); + return ret; +} + +result_t +verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_depth) +{ + result_t ret = FAILURE; + char *subject = NULL; + char common_name[TLS_USERNAME_LEN] = {0}; + const struct tls_options *opt; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + + opt = session->opt; + ASSERT (opt); + + session->verified = false; + + /* get the X509 name */ + subject = x509_get_subject(cert, &gc); + if (!subject) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, could not extract X509 " + "subject string from certificate", cert_depth); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* enforce character class restrictions in X509 name */ + string_mod_remap_name (subject, X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); + string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_'); + + /* extract the username (default is CN) */ + if (SUCCESS != x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN, + opt->x509_username_field, cert)) + { + if (!cert_depth) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: could not extract %s from X509 " + "subject string ('%s') -- note that the username length is " + "limited to %d characters", + opt->x509_username_field, + subject, + TLS_USERNAME_LEN); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* enforce character class restrictions in common name */ + string_mod_remap_name (common_name, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); + + /* warn if cert chain is too deep */ + if (cert_depth >= MAX_CERT_DEPTH) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Convoluted certificate chain detected with depth [%d] greater than %d", cert_depth, MAX_CERT_DEPTH); + goto cleanup; /* Reject connection */ + } + + /* verify level 1 cert, i.e. the CA that signed our leaf cert */ + if (cert_depth == 1 && opt->verify_hash) + { + unsigned char *sha1_hash = x509_get_sha1_hash(cert, &gc); + if (memcmp (sha1_hash, opt->verify_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: level-1 certificate hash verification failed"); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* save common name in session object */ + if (cert_depth == 0) + set_common_name (session, common_name); + + session->verify_maxlevel = max_int (session->verify_maxlevel, cert_depth); + + /* export certificate values to the environment */ + verify_cert_set_env(opt->es, cert, cert_depth, subject, common_name +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + , opt->x509_track +#endif + ); + + /* export current untrusted IP */ + setenv_untrusted (session); + + /* If this is the peer's own certificate, verify it */ + if (cert_depth == 0 && SUCCESS != verify_peer_cert(opt, cert, subject, common_name)) + goto cleanup; + + /* call --tls-verify plug-in(s), if registered */ + if (SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_plugin(opt->plugins, opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject)) + goto cleanup; + + /* run --tls-verify script */ + if (opt->verify_command && SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_command(opt->verify_command, + opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject, opt->verify_export_cert)) + goto cleanup; + + /* check peer cert against CRL */ + if (opt->crl_file) + { + if (opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR) + { + if (SUCCESS != verify_check_crl_dir(opt->crl_file, cert)) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + if (SUCCESS != x509_verify_crl(opt->crl_file, cert, subject)) + goto cleanup; + } + } + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: depth=%d, %s", cert_depth, subject); + session->verified = true; + ret = SUCCESS; + +cleanup: + + if (ret != SUCCESS) + { + tls_clear_error(); /* always? */ + session->verified = false; /* double sure? */ + } + gc_free(&gc); + + return ret; +} + +/* *************************************************************************** + * Functions for the management of deferred authentication when using + * user/password authentication. + *************************************************************************** */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH +/* key_state_test_auth_control_file return values, + NOTE: acf_merge indexing depends on these values */ +#define ACF_UNDEFINED 0 +#define ACF_SUCCEEDED 1 +#define ACF_DISABLED 2 +#define ACF_FAILED 3 +#endif + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +void +man_def_auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *client_reason) +{ + if (multi->client_reason) + { + free (multi->client_reason); + multi->client_reason = NULL; + } + if (client_reason && strlen (client_reason)) + /* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ + multi->client_reason = string_alloc (client_reason, NULL); +} + +static inline unsigned int +man_def_auth_test (const struct key_state *ks) +{ + if (management_enable_def_auth (management)) + return ks->mda_status; + else + return ACF_DISABLED; +} +#endif + +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + +/* + * auth_control_file functions + */ + +void +key_state_rm_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks) +{ + if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) + { + platform_unlink (ks->auth_control_file); + free (ks->auth_control_file); + ks->auth_control_file = NULL; + } +} + +static void +key_state_gen_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks, const struct tls_options *opt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const char *acf; + + key_state_rm_auth_control_file (ks); + acf = create_temp_file (opt->tmp_dir, "acf", &gc); + if (acf) { + ks->auth_control_file = string_alloc (acf, NULL); + setenv_str (opt->es, "auth_control_file", ks->auth_control_file); + } /* FIXME: Should have better error handling? */ + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static unsigned int +key_state_test_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks) +{ + if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) + { + unsigned int ret = ks->auth_control_status; + if (ret == ACF_UNDEFINED) + { + FILE *fp = fopen (ks->auth_control_file, "r"); + if (fp) + { + const int c = fgetc (fp); + if (c == '1') + ret = ACF_SUCCEEDED; + else if (c == '0') + ret = ACF_FAILED; + fclose (fp); + ks->auth_control_status = ret; + } + } + return ret; + } + return ACF_DISABLED; +} + +#endif + +/* + * Return current session authentication state. Return + * value is TLS_AUTHENTICATION_x. + */ + +int +tls_authentication_status (struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency) +{ + bool deferred = false; + bool success = false; + bool active = false; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + static const unsigned char acf_merge[] = + { + ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ + ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ + ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_FAILED */ + ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ + ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ + ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_FAILED */ + ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ + ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ + ACF_DISABLED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_FAILED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ + ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ + ACF_FAILED /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_FAILED */ + }; +#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ + + if (multi) + { + int i; + +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + if (latency && multi->tas_last && multi->tas_last + latency >= now) + return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED; + multi->tas_last = now; +#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ + + for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) + { + active = true; + if (ks->authenticated) + { +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + unsigned int s1 = ACF_DISABLED; + unsigned int s2 = ACF_DISABLED; +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + s1 = key_state_test_auth_control_file (ks); +#endif /* PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + s2 = man_def_auth_test (ks); +#endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ + ASSERT (s1 < 4 && s2 < 4); + switch (acf_merge[(s1<<2) + s2]) + { + case ACF_SUCCEEDED: + case ACF_DISABLED: + success = true; + ks->auth_deferred = false; + break; + case ACF_UNDEFINED: + if (now < ks->auth_deferred_expire) + deferred = true; + break; + case ACF_FAILED: + ks->authenticated = false; + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } +#else /* !ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ + success = true; +#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ + } + } + } + } + +#if 0 + dmsg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TAS: a=%d s=%d d=%d", active, success, deferred); +#endif + + if (success) + return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED; + else if (!active || deferred) + return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED; + else + return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; +} + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +/* + * For deferred auth, this is where the management interface calls (on server) + * to indicate auth failure/success. + */ +bool +tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason) +{ + bool ret = false; + if (multi) + { + int i; + man_def_auth_set_client_reason (multi, client_reason); + for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) + { + struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; + if (ks->mda_key_id == mda_key_id) + { + ks->mda_status = auth ? ACF_SUCCEEDED : ACF_FAILED; + ret = true; + } + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif + + +/* **************************************************************************** + * Functions to verify username and password + * + * Authenticate a client using username/password. + * Runs on server. + * + * If you want to add new authentication methods, + * this is the place to start. + *************************************************************************** */ + +/* + * Verify the user name and password using a script + */ +static bool +verify_user_pass_script (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + const char *tmp_file = ""; + bool ret = false; + + /* Is username defined? */ + if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) + { + /* Set environmental variables prior to calling script */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "script_type", "user-pass-verify"); + + if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) + { + struct status_output *so; + + tmp_file = create_temp_file (session->opt->tmp_dir, "up", &gc); + if( tmp_file ) { + so = status_open (tmp_file, 0, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); + status_printf (so, "%s", up->username); + status_printf (so, "%s", up->password); + if (!status_close (so)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not write username/password to file: %s", + tmp_file); + goto done; + } + } else { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not create write " + "username/password to temp file"); + } + } + else + { + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); + } + + /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); + + /* setenv client real IP address */ + setenv_untrusted (session); + + /* format command line */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %s", session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script, tmp_file); + + /* call command */ + ret = openvpn_run_script (&argv, session->opt->es, 0, + "--auth-user-pass-verify"); + + if (!session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) + setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: peer provided a blank username"); + } + + done: + if (tmp_file && strlen (tmp_file) > 0) + platform_unlink (tmp_file); + + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify the username and password using a plugin + */ +static int +verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) +{ + int retval = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + + /* Is username defined? */ + if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) + { + /* set username/password in private env space */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); + + /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); + + /* setenv client real IP address */ + setenv_untrusted (session); + +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + /* generate filename for deferred auth control file */ + key_state_gen_auth_control_file (ks, session->opt); +#endif + + /* call command */ + retval = plugin_call (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY, NULL, NULL, session->opt->es); + +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + /* purge auth control filename (and file itself) for non-deferred returns */ + if (retval != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) + key_state_rm_auth_control_file (ks); +#endif + + setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); + if (raw_username) + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error (verify_user_pass_plugin): peer provided a blank username"); + } + + return retval; +} + + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +/* + * MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH internal ssl_verify.c status codes + */ +#define KMDA_ERROR 0 +#define KMDA_SUCCESS 1 +#define KMDA_UNDEF 2 +#define KMDA_DEF 3 + +static int +verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) +{ + int retval = KMDA_ERROR; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + + /* Is username defined? */ + if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) + { + /* set username/password in private env space */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); + + /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); + + /* setenv client real IP address */ + setenv_untrusted (session); + + if (management) + management_notify_client_needing_auth (management, ks->mda_key_id, session->opt->mda_context, session->opt->es); + + setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); + if (raw_username) + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); + + retval = KMDA_SUCCESS; + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error (verify_user_pass_management): peer provided a blank username"); + } + + return retval; +} +#endif + +/* + * Main username/password verification entry point + */ +void +verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, + struct tls_session *session) +{ + int s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + bool s2 = true; + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *raw_username = NULL; + +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + int man_def_auth = KMDA_UNDEF; + + if (management_enable_def_auth (management)) + man_def_auth = KMDA_DEF; +#endif + + /* + * Preserve the raw username before string_mod remapping, for plugins + * and management clients when in --compat-names mode + */ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES)) + { + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (raw_username, char, USER_PASS_LEN, &gc); + strcpy (raw_username, up->username); + string_mod (raw_username, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + } + + /* enforce character class restrictions in username/password */ + string_mod_remap_name (up->username, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); + string_mod (up->password, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + + /* call plugin(s) and/or script */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (man_def_auth == KMDA_DEF) + man_def_auth = verify_user_pass_management (session, up, raw_username); +#endif + if (plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY)) + s1 = verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up, raw_username); + if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) + s2 = verify_user_pass_script (session, up); + + /* check sizing of username if it will become our common name */ + if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) && strlen (up->username) >= TLS_USERNAME_LEN) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --username-as-common name specified and username is longer than the maximum permitted Common Name length of %d characters", TLS_USERNAME_LEN); + s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + /* auth succeeded? */ + if ((s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + || s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED +#endif + ) && s2 +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + && man_def_auth != KMDA_ERROR +#endif + && tls_lock_username (multi, up->username)) + { + ks->authenticated = true; +#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH + if (s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) + ks->auth_deferred = true; +#endif +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + if (man_def_auth != KMDA_UNDEF) + ks->auth_deferred = true; +#endif + if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME)) + set_common_name (session, up->username); +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", + ks->auth_deferred ? "deferred" : "succeeded", + up->username, + (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : ""); +#else + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", + "succeeded", + up->username, + (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : ""); +#endif + } + else + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: Auth Username/Password verification failed for peer"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) +{ + struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + + /* While it shouldn't really happen, don't allow the common name to be NULL */ + if (!session->common_name) + set_common_name (session, ""); + + /* Don't allow the CN to change once it's been locked */ + if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cn) + { + const char *cn = session->common_name; + if (cn && strcmp (cn, multi->locked_cn)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", + multi->locked_cn, + cn); + + /* change the common name back to its original value and disable the tunnel */ + set_common_name (session, multi->locked_cn); + tls_deauthenticate (multi); + } + } + + /* Don't allow the cert hashes to change once they have been locked */ + if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cert_hash_set) + { + const struct cert_hash_set *chs = session->cert_hash_set; + if (chs && !cert_hash_compare (chs, multi->locked_cert_hash_set)) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN=%s client-provided SSL certs unexpectedly changed during mid-session reauth", + session->common_name); + + /* disable the tunnel */ + tls_deauthenticate (multi); + } + } + + /* verify --client-config-dir based authentication */ + if (ks->authenticated && session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + const char *cn = session->common_name; + const char *path = gen_path (session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive, cn, &gc); + if (!cn || !strcmp (cn, CCD_DEFAULT) || !test_file (path)) + { + ks->authenticated = false; + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --client-config-dir authentication failed for common name '%s' file='%s'", + session->common_name, + path ? path : "UNDEF"); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + } +} +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d201523 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module + */ + +#ifndef SSL_VERIFY_H_ +#define SSL_VERIFY_H_ + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "ssl_common.h" + +/* Include OpenSSL-specific code */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL +#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#include "ssl_verify_polarssl.h" +#endif + +#include "ssl_verify_backend.h" + +/* + * Keep track of certificate hashes at various depths + */ + +/** Maximum certificate depth we will allow */ +#define MAX_CERT_DEPTH 16 + +/** Structure containing the hash for a single certificate */ +struct cert_hash { + unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /**< The SHA1 hash for a certificate */ +}; + +/** Structure containing the hashes for a full certificate chain */ +struct cert_hash_set { + struct cert_hash *ch[MAX_CERT_DEPTH]; /**< Array of certificate hashes */ +}; + + +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED 2 +#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED 3 + +/* + * Return current session authentication state. Return + * value is TLS_AUTHENTICATION_x. + * + * TODO: document this function + */ +int tls_authentication_status (struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency); + +/** Check whether the \a ks \c key_state is ready to receive data channel + * packets. + * @ingroup data_crypto + * + * If true, it is safe to assume that this session has been authenticated + * by TLS. + * + * @note This macro only works if S_SENT_KEY + 1 == S_GOT_KEY. */ +#define DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks) ((ks)->state >= (S_GOT_KEY - (multi)->opt.server)) + +/** + * Remove the given key state's auth control file, if it exists. + * + * @param ks The key state the remove the file for + */ +void key_state_rm_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks); + +/** + * Frees the given set of certificate hashes. + * + * @param chs The certificate hash set to free. + */ +void cert_hash_free (struct cert_hash_set *chs); + +/** + * Locks the certificate hash set used in the given tunnel + * + * @param multi The tunnel to lock + */ +void tls_lock_cert_hash_set (struct tls_multi *multi); + +/** + * Locks the common name field for the given tunnel + * + * @param multi The tunnel to lock + */ +void tls_lock_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi); + +/** + * Returns the common name field for the given tunnel + * + * @param multi The tunnel to return the common name for + * @param null Whether null may be returned. If not, "UNDEF" will be returned. + */ +const char *tls_common_name (const struct tls_multi* multi, const bool null); + +/** + * Returns the username field for the given tunnel + * + * @param multi The tunnel to return the username for + * @param null Whether null may be returned. If not, "UNDEF" will be returned. + */ +const char *tls_username (const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PF + +/** + * Retrieve the given tunnel's common name and its hash value. + * + * @param multi The tunnel to use + * @param cn Common name's string + * @param cn_hash Common name's hash value + * + * @return true if the common name was set, false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool +tls_common_name_hash (const struct tls_multi *multi, const char **cn, uint32_t *cn_hash) +{ + if (multi) + { + const struct tls_session *s = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; + if (s->common_name && s->common_name[0] != '\0') + { + *cn = s->common_name; + *cn_hash = s->common_name_hashval; + return true; + } + } + return false; +} + +#endif + +/** + * Returns whether or not the server should check for username/password + * + * @param session The current TLS session + * + * @return true if username and password verification is enabled, + * false if not. + * + */ +static inline bool verify_user_pass_enabled(struct tls_session *session) +{ + return (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script + || plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY) +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH + || management_enable_def_auth (management) +#endif + ); +} + +/** + * Verify the given username and password, using either an external script, a + * plugin, or the management interface. + * + * If authentication succeeds, the appropriate state is filled into the + * session's primary key state's authenticated field. Authentication may also + * be deferred, in which case the key state's auth_deferred field is filled in. + * + * @param up The username and password to verify. + * @param multi The TLS multi structure to verify usernames against. + * @param session The current TLS session + * + */ +void verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, + struct tls_session *session); + +/** + * Perform final authentication checks, including locking of the cn, the allowed + * certificate hashes, and whether a client config entry exists in the + * client config directory. + * + * @param multi The TLS multi structure to verify locked structures. + * @param session The current TLS session + * + */ +void verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session); + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + +struct x509_track +{ + const struct x509_track *next; + const char *name; +# define XT_FULL_CHAIN (1<<0) + unsigned int flags; + int nid; +}; + +void x509_track_add (const struct x509_track **ll_head, const char *name, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif + +/* + * Certificate checking for verify_nsCertType + */ +/** Do not perform Netscape certificate type verification */ +#define NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE (0) +/** Do not perform Netscape certificate type verification */ +#define NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER (1<<0) +/** Do not perform Netscape certificate type verification */ +#define NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT (1<<1) + +/* + * TODO: document + */ +#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +bool tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason); +void man_def_auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *client_reason); +#endif + +static inline const char * +tls_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH + return multi->client_reason; +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} + +#endif /* SSL_VERIFY_H_ */ + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1658cc02 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module library-specific backend interface + */ + +#ifndef SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ +#define SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ + +/** + * Result of verification function + */ +typedef enum { SUCCESS=0, FAILURE=1 } result_t; + +/* + * Backend support functions. + * + * The following functions are needed by the backend, but defined in the main + * file. + */ + +/* + * Verify certificate for the given session. Performs OpenVPN-specific + * verification. + * + * This function must be called for every certificate in the certificate + * chain during the certificate verification stage of the handshake. + * + * @param session TLS Session associated with this tunnel + * @param cert Certificate to process + * @param cert_depth Depth of the current certificate + * + * @return \c SUCCESS if verification was successful, \c FAILURE on failure. + */ +result_t verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_depth); + +/* + * Remember the given certificate hash, allowing the certificate chain to be + * locked between sessions. + * + * Must be called for every certificate in the verification chain, whether it + * is valid or not. + * + * @param session TLS Session associated with this tunnel + * @param cert_depth Depth of the current certificate + * @param sha1_hash Hash of the current certificate + */ +void cert_hash_remember (struct tls_session *session, const int cert_depth, + const unsigned char *sha1_hash); + +/* + * Library-specific functions. + * + * The following functions must be implemented on a library-specific basis. + */ + +/* + * Retrieve certificate's subject name. + * + * @param cert Certificate to retrieve the subject from. + * @param gc Garbage collection arena to use when allocating string. + * + * @return a string containing the subject + */ +char *x509_get_subject (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* Retrieve the certificate's SHA1 hash. + * + * @param cert Certificate to retrieve the hash from. + * @param gc Garbage collection arena to use when allocating string. + * + * @return a string containing the SHA1 hash of the certificate + */ +unsigned char *x509_get_sha1_hash (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Retrieve the certificate's username from the specified field. + * + * If the field is prepended with ext: and ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME is enabled, + * it will be loaded from an X.509 extension + * + * @param cn Buffer to return the common name in. + * @param cn_len Length of the cn buffer. + * @param x509_username_field Name of the field to load from + * @param cert Certificate to retrieve the common name from. + * + * @return \c FAILURE, \c or SUCCESS + */ +result_t x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len, + char * x509_username_field, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert); + +/* + * Return the certificate's serial number. + * + * The serial number is returned as a string, since it might be a bignum. + * + * @param cert Certificate to retrieve the serial number from. + * @param gc Garbage collection arena to use when allocating string. + * + * @return The certificate's serial number. + */ +char *x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention: + * + * X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value} + * + * @param es Environment set to save variables in + * @param cert_depth Depth of the certificate + * @param cert Certificate to set the environment for + */ +void x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert); + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + +/* + * Start tracking the given attribute. + * + * The tracked attributes are stored in ll_head. + * + * @param ll_head The x509_track to store tracked atttributes in + * @param name Name of the attribute to track + * @param msglevel Message level for errors + * @param gc Garbage collection arena for temp data + * + */ +void x509_track_add (const struct x509_track **ll_head, const char *name, + int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc); + +/* + * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention: + * + * X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value} + * + * This function differs from setenv_x509 below in the following ways: + * + * (1) Only explicitly named attributes in xt are saved, per usage + * of --x509-track program options. + * (2) Only the level 0 cert info is saved unless the XT_FULL_CHAIN + * flag is set in xt->flags (corresponds with prepending a '+' + * to the name when specified by --x509-track program option). + * (3) This function supports both X509 subject name fields as + * well as X509 V3 extensions. + * + * @param xt + * @param es Environment set to save variables in + * @param cert_depth Depth of the certificate + * @param cert Certificate to set the environment for + */ +void x509_setenv_track (const struct x509_track *xt, struct env_set *es, + const int depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *x509); + +#endif + +/* + * Check X.509 Netscape certificate type field, if available. + * + * @param cert Certificate to check. + * @param usage One of \c NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT, \c NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER, + * or \c NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE. + * + * @return \c SUCCESS if NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE or if the certificate has + * the expected bit set. \c FAILURE if the certificate does + * not have NS cert type verification or the wrong bit set. + */ +result_t x509_verify_ns_cert_type(const openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, const int usage); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L || ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL + +/* + * Verify X.509 key usage extension field. + * + * @param cert Certificate to check. + * @param expected_ku Array of valid key usage values + * @param expected_len Length of the key usage array + * + * @return \c SUCCESS if one of the key usage values matches, \c FAILURE + * if key usage is not enabled, or the values do not match. + */ +result_t x509_verify_cert_ku (openvpn_x509_cert_t *x509, const unsigned * const expected_ku, + int expected_len); + +/* + * Verify X.509 extended key usage extension field. + * + * @param cert Certificate to check. + * @param expected_oid String representation of the expected Object ID. May be + * either the string representation of the numeric OID + * (e.g. \c "1.2.3.4", or the descriptive string matching + * the OID. + * + * @return \c SUCCESS if one of the expected OID matches one of the + * extended key usage fields, \c FAILURE if extended key + * usage is not enabled, or the values do not match. + */ +result_t x509_verify_cert_eku (openvpn_x509_cert_t *x509, const char * const expected_oid); + +#endif + +/* + * Store the given certificate in pem format in a temporary file in tmp_dir + * + * @param cert Certificate to store + * @param tmp_dir Temporary directory to store the directory + * @param gc gc_arena to store temporary objects in + * + * + */ +result_t x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert); + +/* + * Check the certificate against a CRL file. + * + * @param crl_file File name of the CRL file + * @param cert Certificate to verify + * @param subject Subject of the given certificate + * + * @return \c SUCCESS if the CRL was not signed by the issuer of the + * certificate or does not contain an entry for it. + * \c FAILURE otherwise. + */ +result_t x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, + const char *subject); + +#endif /* SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..658f5f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module OpenSSL implementation + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) + +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include "ssl_verify_backend.h" +#include "ssl_openssl.h" +#include +#include + +int +verify_callback (int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tls_session *session; + SSL *ssl; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + + /* get the tls_session pointer */ + ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); + ASSERT (ssl); + session = (struct tls_session *) SSL_get_ex_data (ssl, mydata_index); + ASSERT (session); + + cert_hash_remember (session, ctx->error_depth, + x509_get_sha1_hash(ctx->current_cert, &gc)); + + /* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */ + if (!preverify_ok) + { + /* get the X509 name */ + char *subject = x509_get_subject(ctx->current_cert, &gc); + + if (subject) + { + /* Remote site specified a certificate, but it's not correct */ + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, error=%s: %s", + ctx->error_depth, + X509_verify_cert_error_string (ctx->error), + subject); + } + + ERR_clear_error(); + + session->verified = false; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (SUCCESS != verify_cert(session, ctx->current_cert, ctx->error_depth)) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 1; + +cleanup: + gc_free(&gc); + + return ret; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME +static +bool extract_x509_extension(X509 *cert, char *fieldname, char *out, int size) +{ + bool retval = false; + X509_EXTENSION *pExt; + char *buf = 0; + int length = 0; + GENERAL_NAMES *extensions; + int nid = OBJ_txt2nid(fieldname); + + extensions = (GENERAL_NAMES *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, nid, NULL, NULL); + if ( extensions ) + { + int numalts; + int i; + /* get amount of alternatives, + * RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least + * one, but we don't depend on it... + */ + + numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(extensions); + + /* loop through all alternatives */ + for (i=0; itype) + { + case GEN_EMAIL: + ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char**)&buf, name->d.ia5); + if ( strlen (buf) != name->d.ia5->length ) + { + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "ASN1 ERROR: string contained terminating zero"); + OPENSSL_free (buf); + } else { + strncpynt(out, buf, size); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + retval = true; + } + break; + default: + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "ASN1 ERROR: can not handle field type %i", + name->type); + break; + } + } + sk_GENERAL_NAME_free (extensions); + } + return retval; +} +#endif /* ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME */ + +/* + * Extract a field from an X509 subject name. + * + * Example: + * + * /C=US/ST=CO/L=Denver/O=ORG/CN=First-CN/CN=Test-CA/Email=jim@yonan.net + * + * The common name is 'Test-CA' + * + * Return true on success, false on error (insufficient buffer size in 'out' + * to contain result is grounds for error). + */ +static result_t +extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509, const char *field_name, char *out, + int size) +{ + int lastpos = -1; + int tmp = -1; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *x509ne = 0; + ASN1_STRING *asn1 = 0; + unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */ + int nid = OBJ_txt2nid((char *)field_name); + + ASSERT (size > 0); + *out = '\0'; + do { + lastpos = tmp; + tmp = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509, nid, lastpos); + } while (tmp > -1); + + /* Nothing found */ + if (lastpos == -1) + return FAILURE; + + x509ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509, lastpos); + if (!x509ne) + return FAILURE; + + asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(x509ne); + if (!asn1) + return FAILURE; + tmp = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&buf, asn1); + if (tmp <= 0) + return FAILURE; + + strncpynt(out, (char *)buf, size); + + { + const result_t ret = (strlen ((char *)buf) < size) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE; + OPENSSL_free (buf); + return ret; + } +} + +result_t +x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len, + char * x509_username_field, X509 *peer_cert) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME + if (strncmp("ext:",x509_username_field,4) == 0) + { + if (!extract_x509_extension (peer_cert, x509_username_field+4, common_name, cn_len)) + return FAILURE; + } else +#endif + if (FAILURE == extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert), + x509_username_field, common_name, cn_len)) + return FAILURE; + + return SUCCESS; +} + +char * +x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i; + BIGNUM *bignum; + char *openssl_serial, *serial; + + asn1_i = X509_get_serialNumber(cert); + bignum = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(asn1_i, NULL); + openssl_serial = BN_bn2dec(bignum); + + serial = string_alloc(openssl_serial, gc); + + BN_free(bignum); + OPENSSL_free(openssl_serial); + + return serial; +} + +unsigned char * +x509_get_sha1_hash (X509 *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char *hash = gc_malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, false, gc); + memcpy(hash, cert->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return hash; +} + +char * +x509_get_subject (X509 *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + BIO *subject_bio = NULL; + BUF_MEM *subject_mem; + char *subject = NULL; + int maxlen = 0; + + /* + * Generate the subject string in OpenSSL proprietary format, + * when in --compat-names mode + */ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES)) + { + subject = gc_malloc (256, false, gc); + X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), subject, 256); + subject[255] = '\0'; + return subject; + } + + subject_bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ()); + if (subject_bio == NULL) + goto err; + + X509_NAME_print_ex (subject_bio, X509_get_subject_name (cert), + 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | XN_FLAG_FN_SN | + ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL); + + if (BIO_eof (subject_bio)) + goto err; + + BIO_get_mem_ptr (subject_bio, &subject_mem); + + maxlen = subject_mem->length + 1; + subject = gc_malloc (maxlen, false, gc); + + memcpy (subject, subject_mem->data, maxlen); + subject[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; + +err: + if (subject_bio) + BIO_free (subject_bio); + + return subject; +} + + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK + +void +x509_track_add (const struct x509_track **ll_head, const char *name, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct x509_track *xt; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (xt, struct x509_track, gc); + if (*name == '+') + { + xt->flags |= XT_FULL_CHAIN; + ++name; + } + xt->name = name; + xt->nid = OBJ_txt2nid(name); + if (xt->nid != NID_undef) + { + xt->next = *ll_head; + *ll_head = xt; + } + else + msg(msglevel, "x509_track: no such attribute '%s'", name); +} + +/* worker method for setenv_x509_track */ +static void +do_setenv_x509 (struct env_set *es, const char *name, char *value, int depth) +{ + char *name_expand; + size_t name_expand_size; + + string_mod (value, CC_ANY, CC_CRLF, '?'); + msg (D_X509_ATTR, "X509 ATTRIBUTE name='%s' value='%s' depth=%d", name, value, depth); + name_expand_size = 64 + strlen (name); + name_expand = (char *) malloc (name_expand_size); + check_malloc_return (name_expand); + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, name_expand_size, "X509_%d_%s", depth, name); + setenv_str (es, name_expand, value); + free (name_expand); +} + +void +x509_setenv_track (const struct x509_track *xt, struct env_set *es, const int depth, X509 *x509) +{ + X509_NAME *x509_name = X509_get_subject_name (x509); + const char nullc = '\0'; + int i; + + while (xt) + { + if (depth == 0 || (xt->flags & XT_FULL_CHAIN)) + { + i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509_name, xt->nid, -1); + if (i >= 0) + { + X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509_name, i); + if (ent) + { + ASN1_STRING *val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent); + unsigned char *buf; + buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */ + if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) > 0) + { + do_setenv_x509(es, xt->name, (char *)buf, depth); + OPENSSL_free (buf); + } + } + } + else + { + i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x509, xt->nid, -1); + if (i >= 0) + { + X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x509, i); + if (ext) + { + BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + if (bio) + { + if (X509V3_EXT_print(bio, ext, 0, 0)) + { + if (BIO_write(bio, &nullc, 1) == 1) + { + char *str; + BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &str); + do_setenv_x509(es, xt->name, str, depth); + } + } + BIO_free(bio); + } + } + } + } + } + xt = xt->next; + } +} +#endif + +/* + * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention: + * + * X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value} + */ +void +x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert) +{ + int i, n; + int fn_nid; + ASN1_OBJECT *fn; + ASN1_STRING *val; + X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent; + const char *objbuf; + unsigned char *buf; + char *name_expand; + size_t name_expand_size; + X509_NAME *x509 = X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert); + + n = X509_NAME_entry_count (x509); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + ent = X509_NAME_get_entry (x509, i); + if (!ent) + continue; + fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object (ent); + if (!fn) + continue; + val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent); + if (!val) + continue; + fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid (fn); + if (fn_nid == NID_undef) + continue; + objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn (fn_nid); + if (!objbuf) + continue; + buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */ + if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) <= 0) + continue; + name_expand_size = 64 + strlen (objbuf); + name_expand = (char *) malloc (name_expand_size); + check_malloc_return (name_expand); + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, name_expand_size, "X509_%d_%s", cert_depth, + objbuf); + string_mod (name_expand, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + string_mod ((char*)buf, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + setenv_str (es, name_expand, (char*)buf); + free (name_expand); + OPENSSL_free (buf); + } +} + +result_t +x509_verify_ns_cert_type(const openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, const int usage) +{ + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE) + return SUCCESS; + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT) + return ((peer_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) + && (peer_cert->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE; + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER) + return ((peer_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) + && (peer_cert->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_SERVER)) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE; + + return FAILURE; +} + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + +result_t +x509_verify_cert_ku (X509 *x509, const unsigned * const expected_ku, + int expected_len) +{ + ASN1_BIT_STRING *ku = NULL; + result_t fFound = FAILURE; + + if ((ku = (ASN1_BIT_STRING *) X509_get_ext_d2i (x509, NID_key_usage, NULL, + NULL)) == NULL) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have key usage extension"); + } + else + { + unsigned nku = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + { + if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit (ku, i)) + nku |= 1 << (7 - i); + } + + /* + * Fixup if no LSB bits + */ + if ((nku & 0xff) == 0) + { + nku >>= 8; + } + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate key usage"); + for (i = 0; fFound != SUCCESS && i < expected_len; i++) + { + if (expected_ku[i] != 0) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has key usage %04x, expects " + "%04x", nku, expected_ku[i]); + + if (nku == expected_ku[i]) + fFound = SUCCESS; + } + } + } + + if (ku != NULL) + ASN1_BIT_STRING_free (ku); + + return fFound; +} + +result_t +x509_verify_cert_eku (X509 *x509, const char * const expected_oid) +{ + EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL; + result_t fFound = FAILURE; + + if ((eku = (EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *) X509_get_ext_d2i (x509, NID_ext_key_usage, + NULL, NULL)) == NULL) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have extended key usage extension"); + } + else + { + int i; + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate extended key usage"); + for (i = 0; SUCCESS != fFound && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num (eku); i++) + { + ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value (eku, i); + char szOid[1024]; + + if (SUCCESS != fFound && OBJ_obj2txt (szOid, sizeof(szOid), oid, 0) != -1) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (str) %s, expects %s", + szOid, expected_oid); + if (!strcmp (expected_oid, szOid)) + fFound = SUCCESS; + } + if (SUCCESS != fFound && OBJ_obj2txt (szOid, sizeof(szOid), oid, 1) != -1) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (oid) %s, expects %s", + szOid, expected_oid); + if (!strcmp (expected_oid, szOid)) + fFound = SUCCESS; + } + } + } + + if (eku != NULL) + sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free (eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free); + + return fFound; +} + +result_t +x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, X509 *peercert) +{ + if (PEM_write_X509(peercert_file, peercert) < 0) + { + msg (M_ERR, "Failed to write peer certificate in PEM format"); + return FAILURE; + } + return SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ + +/* + * check peer cert against CRL + */ +result_t +x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, X509 *peer_cert, const char *subject) +{ + X509_CRL *crl=NULL; + X509_REVOKED *revoked; + BIO *in=NULL; + int n,i; + result_t retval = FAILURE; + + in = BIO_new_file (crl_file, "r"); + + if (in == NULL) { + msg (M_ERR, "CRL: cannot read: %s", crl_file); + goto end; + } + crl=PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in,NULL,NULL,NULL); + if (crl == NULL) { + msg (M_ERR, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file); + goto end; + } + + if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), X509_get_issuer_name(peer_cert)) != 0) { + msg (M_WARN, "CRL: CRL %s is from a different issuer than the issuer of " + "certificate %s", crl_file, subject); + retval = SUCCESS; + goto end; + } + + n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + revoked = (X509_REVOKED *)sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i); + if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(peer_cert)) == 0) { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK FAILED: %s is REVOKED",subject); + goto end; + } + } + + retval = SUCCESS; + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK OK: %s",subject); + +end: + BIO_free(in); + if (crl) + X509_CRL_free (crl); + + return retval; +} + +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a7e0a19 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module OpenSSL backend + */ + + +#ifndef SSL_VERIFY_OPENSSL_H_ +#define SSL_VERIFY_OPENSSL_H_ + +#include + +#ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +#define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +typedef X509 openvpn_x509_cert_t; +#endif + +/** @name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer + * @{ */ + +/** + * Verify that the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate allows setting up a + * VPN tunnel. + * @ingroup control_tls + * + * This callback function is called every time a new TLS session is being + * setup to determine whether the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate is + * allowed to connect. It is called for once for every certificate in the chain. + * The callback functionality is configured in the \c init_ssl() function, which + * calls the OpenSSL library's \c SSL_CTX_set_verify() function with \c + * verify_callback() as its callback argument. + * + * It checks preverify_ok, and registers the certificate hash. If these steps + * succeed, it calls the \c verify_cert() function, which performs + * OpenVPN-specific verification. + * + * @param preverify_ok - Whether the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate + * past verification. A value of 1 means it + * verified successfully, 0 means it failed. + * @param ctx - The complete context used by the OpenSSL library + * to verify the certificate chain. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the supplied certificate is + * allowed to set up a VPN tunnel. The following values can be + * returned: + * - \c 0: failure, this certificate is not allowed to connect. + * - \c 1: success, this certificate is allowed to connect. + */ +int verify_callback (int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx); + +/** @} name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer */ + +#endif /* SSL_VERIFY_OPENSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a32db8df --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module PolarSSL backend + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#if defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) + +#include "ssl_verify.h" +#include + +#define MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH 256 + +int +verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth, + int preverify_ok) +{ + struct tls_session *session = (struct tls_session *) session_obj; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); + int ret = 1; + + ASSERT (cert); + ASSERT (session); + + session->verified = false; + + /* Remember certificate hash */ + cert_hash_remember (session, cert_depth, x509_get_sha1_hash(cert, &gc)); + + /* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */ + if (!preverify_ok) + { + char *subject = x509_get_subject(cert, &gc); + + if (subject) + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, %s", cert_depth, subject); + else + msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, could not extract X509 " + "subject string from certificate", cert_depth); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if (SUCCESS != verify_cert(session, cert, cert_depth)) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + gc_free(&gc); + + /* + * PolarSSL expects 1 on failure, 0 on success + */ + return ret; +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME +# warning "X509 alt user name not yet supported for PolarSSL" +#endif + +result_t +x509_get_username (char *cn, int cn_len, + char *x509_username_field, x509_cert *cert) +{ + x509_name *name; + + ASSERT( cn != NULL ); + + name = &cert->subject; + + /* Find common name */ + while( name != NULL ) + { + if( memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_CN, OID_SIZE(OID_CN) ) == 0) + break; + + name = name->next; + } + + /* Not found, return an error if this is the peer's certificate */ + if( name == NULL ) + return FAILURE; + + /* Found, extract CN */ + if (cn_len > name->val.len) + memcpy( cn, name->val.p, name->val.len ); + else + { + memcpy( cn, name->val.p, cn_len); + cn[cn_len-1] = '\0'; + } + + return SUCCESS; +} + +char * +x509_get_serial (x509_cert *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i = 0; + char *buf = NULL; + size_t len = cert->serial.len * 3 + 1; + + buf = gc_malloc(len, true, gc); + + if(x509parse_serial_gets(buf, len-1, &cert->serial) < 0) + buf = NULL; + + return buf; +} + +unsigned char * +x509_get_sha1_hash (x509_cert *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + unsigned char *sha1_hash = gc_malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, false, gc); + sha1(cert->tbs.p, cert->tbs.len, sha1_hash); + return sha1_hash; +} + +char * +x509_get_subject(x509_cert *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + char tmp_subject[MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH] = {0}; + char *subject = NULL; + + int ret = 0; + + ret = x509parse_dn_gets( tmp_subject, MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH-1, &cert->subject ); + if (ret > 0) + { + /* Allocate the required space for the subject */ + subject = string_alloc(tmp_subject, gc); + } + + return subject; +} + +/* + * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention: + * + * X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value} + */ +void +x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert) +{ + int i; + unsigned char c; + const x509_name *name; + char s[128]; + + name = &cert->subject; + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + while( name != NULL ) + { + char name_expand[64+8]; + + if( name->oid.len == 2 && memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_X520, 2 ) == 0 ) + { + switch( name->oid.p[2] ) + { + case X520_COMMON_NAME: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_CN", + cert_depth); break; + + case X520_COUNTRY: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_C", + cert_depth); break; + + case X520_LOCALITY: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_L", + cert_depth); break; + + case X520_STATE: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_ST", + cert_depth); break; + + case X520_ORGANIZATION: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_O", + cert_depth); break; + + case X520_ORG_UNIT: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_OU", + cert_depth); break; + + default: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), + "X509_%d_0x%02X", cert_depth, name->oid.p[2]); + break; + } + } + else if( name->oid.len == 8 && memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_PKCS9, 8 ) == 0 ) + { + switch( name->oid.p[8] ) + { + case PKCS9_EMAIL: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), + "X509_%d_emailAddress", cert_depth); break; + + default: + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), + "X509_%d_0x%02X", cert_depth, name->oid.p[8]); + break; + } + } + else + { + openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_\?\?", + cert_depth); + } + + for( i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++ ) + { + if( i >= (int) sizeof( s ) - 1 ) + break; + + c = name->val.p[i]; + if( c < 32 || c == 127 || ( c > 128 && c < 160 ) ) + s[i] = '?'; + else s[i] = c; + } + s[i] = '\0'; + + /* Check both strings, set environment variable */ + string_mod (name_expand, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + string_mod ((char*)s, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + setenv_str (es, name_expand, (char*)s); + + name = name->next; + } +} + +result_t +x509_verify_ns_cert_type(const x509_cert *cert, const int usage) +{ + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE) + return SUCCESS; + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT) + return ((cert->ext_types & EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) + && (cert->ns_cert_type & NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT)) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE; + if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER) + return ((cert->ext_types & EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) + && (cert->ns_cert_type & NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER)) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE; + + return FAILURE; +} + +result_t +x509_verify_cert_ku (x509_cert *cert, const unsigned * const expected_ku, + int expected_len) +{ + result_t fFound = FAILURE; + + if(!(cert->ext_types & EXT_KEY_USAGE)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have key usage extension"); + } + else + { + int i; + unsigned nku = cert->key_usage; + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate key usage"); + for (i=0; SUCCESS != fFound && iext_types & EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have extended key usage extension"); + } + else + { + x509_sequence *oid_seq = &(cert->ext_key_usage); + + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate extended key usage"); + while (oid_seq != NULL) + { + x509_buf *oid = &oid_seq->buf; + char oid_num_str[1024]; + const char *oid_str; + + oid_str = x509_oid_get_description(oid); + if (oid_str != NULL) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (str) %s, expects %s", + oid_str, expected_oid); + if (!strcmp (expected_oid, oid_str)) + { + fFound = SUCCESS; + break; + } + } + + if (0 == x509_oid_get_numeric_string( oid_num_str, + sizeof (oid_num_str), oid)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (oid) %s, expects %s", + oid_num_str, expected_oid); + if (!strcmp (expected_oid, oid_num_str)) + { + fFound = SUCCESS; + break; + } + } + oid_seq = oid_seq->next; + } + } + + return fFound; +} + +result_t +x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, x509_cert *peercert) +{ + msg (M_WARN, "PolarSSL does not support writing peer certificate in PEM format"); + return FAILURE; +} + +/* + * check peer cert against CRL + */ +result_t +x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, x509_cert *cert, const char *subject) +{ + result_t retval = FAILURE; + x509_crl crl = {0}; + + if (x509parse_crlfile(&crl, crl_file) != 0) + { + msg (M_ERR, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file); + goto end; + } + + if(cert->issuer_raw.len != crl.issuer_raw.len || + memcmp(crl.issuer_raw.p, cert->issuer_raw.p, crl.issuer_raw.len) != 0) + { + msg (M_WARN, "CRL: CRL %s is from a different issuer than the issuer of " + "certificate %s", crl_file, subject); + retval = SUCCESS; + goto end; + } + + if (0 != x509parse_revoked(cert, &crl)) + { + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK FAILED: %s is REVOKED", subject); + goto end; + } + + retval = SUCCESS; + msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK OK: %s",subject); + +end: + x509_crl_free(&crl); + return retval; +} + +#endif /* #if defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fceee667 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** + * @file Control Channel Verification Module PolarSSL backend + */ + +#ifndef SSL_VERIFY_POLARSSL_H_ +#define SSL_VERIFY_POLARSSL_H_ + +#include "syshead.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include + +#ifndef __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +#define __OPENVPN_X509_CERT_T_DECLARED +typedef x509_cert openvpn_x509_cert_t; +#endif + +/** @name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer + * @{ */ + +/** + * Verify that the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate allows setting up a + * VPN tunnel. + * @ingroup control_tls + * + * This callback function is called when a new TLS session is being setup to + * determine whether the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate is allowed to + * connect. It is called for once for every certificate in the chain. The + * callback functionality is configured in the \c init_ssl() function, which + * calls the PolarSSL library's \c ssl_set_verify_callback() function with \c + * verify_callback() as its callback argument. + * + * It checks preverify_ok, and registers the certificate hash. If these steps + * succeed, it calls the \c verify_cert() function, which performs + * OpenVPN-specific verification. + * + * @param session_obj - The OpenVPN \c tls_session associated with this object, + * as set during SSL session setup. + * @param cert - The certificate used by PolarSSL. + * @param cert_depth - The depth of the current certificate in the chain, with + * 0 being the actual certificate. + * @param preverify_ok - Whether the remote OpenVPN peer's certificate + * past verification. A value of 1 means it + * verified successfully, 0 means it failed. + * + * @return The return value indicates whether the supplied certificate is + * allowed to set up a VPN tunnel. The following values can be + * returned: + * - \c 0: failure, this certificate is not allowed to connect. + * - \c 1: success, this certificate is allowed to connect. + */ +int verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth, + int preverify_ok); + +/** @} name Function for authenticating a new connection from a remote OpenVPN peer */ + +#endif /* SSL_VERIFY_POLARSSL_H_ */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f9ab9ee --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.c @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "status.h" +#include "perf.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * printf-style interface for outputting status info + */ + +static const char * +print_status_mode (unsigned int flags) +{ + switch (flags) + { + case STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE: + return "WRITE"; + case STATUS_OUTPUT_READ: + return "READ"; + case STATUS_OUTPUT_READ|STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE: + return "READ/WRITE"; + default: + return "UNDEF"; + } +} + +struct status_output * +status_open (const char *filename, + const int refresh_freq, + const int msglevel, + const struct virtual_output *vout, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct status_output *so = NULL; + if (filename || msglevel >= 0 || vout) + { + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (so, struct status_output); + so->flags = flags; + so->msglevel = msglevel; + so->vout = vout; + so->fd = -1; + buf_reset (&so->read_buf); + event_timeout_clear (&so->et); + if (filename) + { + switch (so->flags) + { + case STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE: + so->fd = platform_open (filename, + O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + break; + case STATUS_OUTPUT_READ: + so->fd = platform_open (filename, + O_RDONLY, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + break; + case STATUS_OUTPUT_READ|STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE: + so->fd = platform_open (filename, + O_CREAT | O_RDWR, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + break; + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + if (so->fd >= 0) + { + so->filename = string_alloc (filename, NULL); + + /* allocate read buffer */ + if (so->flags & STATUS_OUTPUT_READ) + so->read_buf = alloc_buf (512); + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, "Note: cannot open %s for %s", filename, print_status_mode (so->flags)); + so->errors = true; + } + } + else + so->flags = STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE; + + if ((so->flags & STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE) && refresh_freq > 0) + { + event_timeout_init (&so->et, refresh_freq, 0); + } + } + return so; +} + +bool +status_trigger (struct status_output *so) +{ + if (so) + { + struct timeval null; + CLEAR (null); + return event_timeout_trigger (&so->et, &null, ETT_DEFAULT); + } + else + return false; +} + +bool +status_trigger_tv (struct status_output *so, struct timeval *tv) +{ + if (so) + return event_timeout_trigger (&so->et, tv, ETT_DEFAULT); + else + return false; +} + +void +status_reset (struct status_output *so) +{ + if (so && so->fd >= 0) + lseek (so->fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET); +} + +void +status_flush (struct status_output *so) +{ + if (so && so->fd >= 0 && (so->flags & STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE)) + { +#if defined(HAVE_FTRUNCATE) + { + const off_t off = lseek (so->fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_CUR); + if (ftruncate (so->fd, off) != 0) { + msg (M_WARN, "Failed to truncate status file: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + } +#elif defined(HAVE_CHSIZE) + { + const long off = (long) lseek (so->fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_CUR); + chsize (so->fd, off); + } +#else +#warning both ftruncate and chsize functions appear to be missing from this OS +#endif + + /* clear read buffer */ + if (buf_defined (&so->read_buf)) + { + ASSERT (buf_init (&so->read_buf, 0)); + } + } +} + +/* return false if error occurred */ +bool +status_close (struct status_output *so) +{ + bool ret = true; + if (so) + { + if (so->errors) + ret = false; + if (so->fd >= 0) + { + if (close (so->fd) < 0) + ret = false; + } + if (so->filename) + free (so->filename); + if (buf_defined (&so->read_buf)) + free_buf (&so->read_buf); + free (so); + } + else + ret = false; + return ret; +} + +#define STATUS_PRINTF_MAXLEN 512 + +void +status_printf (struct status_output *so, const char *format, ...) +{ + if (so && (so->flags & STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE)) + { + char buf[STATUS_PRINTF_MAXLEN+2]; /* leave extra bytes for CR, LF */ + va_list arglist; + int stat; + + va_start (arglist, format); + stat = vsnprintf (buf, STATUS_PRINTF_MAXLEN, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); + buf[STATUS_PRINTF_MAXLEN - 1] = 0; + + if (stat < 0 || stat >= STATUS_PRINTF_MAXLEN) + so->errors = true; + + if (so->msglevel >= 0 && !so->errors) + msg (so->msglevel, "%s", buf); + + if (so->fd >= 0 && !so->errors) + { + int len; + strcat (buf, "\n"); + len = strlen (buf); + if (len > 0) + { + if (write (so->fd, buf, len) != len) + so->errors = true; + } + } + + if (so->vout && !so->errors) + { + chomp (buf); + (*so->vout->func) (so->vout->arg, so->vout->flags_default, buf); + } + } +} + +bool +status_read (struct status_output *so, struct buffer *buf) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if (so && so->fd >= 0 && (so->flags & STATUS_OUTPUT_READ)) + { + ASSERT (buf_defined (&so->read_buf)); + ASSERT (buf_defined (buf)); + while (true) + { + const int c = buf_read_u8 (&so->read_buf); + + /* read more of file into buffer */ + if (c == -1) + { + int len; + + ASSERT (buf_init (&so->read_buf, 0)); + len = read (so->fd, BPTR (&so->read_buf), BCAP (&so->read_buf)); + if (len <= 0) + break; + + ASSERT (buf_inc_len (&so->read_buf, len)); + continue; + } + + ret = true; + + if (c == '\r') + continue; + + if (c == '\n') + break; + + buf_write_u8 (buf, c); + } + + buf_null_terminate (buf); + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af16fd2a --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/status.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef STATUS_H +#define STATUS_H + +#include "interval.h" + +/* + * virtual function interface for status output + */ +struct virtual_output { + void *arg; + unsigned int flags_default; + void (*func) (void *arg, const unsigned int flags, const char *str); +}; + +static inline void +virtual_output_print (const struct virtual_output *vo, const unsigned int flags, const char *str) +{ + (*vo->func) (vo->arg, flags, str); +} + +/* + * printf-style interface for inputting/outputting status info + */ + +struct status_output +{ +# define STATUS_OUTPUT_READ (1<<0) +# define STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE (1<<1) + unsigned int flags; + + char *filename; + int fd; + int msglevel; + const struct virtual_output *vout; + + struct buffer read_buf; + + struct event_timeout et; + + bool errors; +}; + +struct status_output *status_open (const char *filename, + const int refresh_freq, + const int msglevel, + const struct virtual_output *vout, + const unsigned int flags); + +bool status_trigger_tv (struct status_output *so, struct timeval *tv); +bool status_trigger (struct status_output *so); +void status_reset (struct status_output *so); +void status_flush (struct status_output *so); +bool status_close (struct status_output *so); +void status_printf (struct status_output *so, const char *format, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#if __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO + __attribute__ ((format (gnu_printf, 2, 3))) +#else + __attribute__ ((format (__printf__, 2, 3))) +#endif +#endif + ; + +bool status_read (struct status_output *so, struct buffer *buf); + +static inline unsigned int +status_rw_flags (const struct status_output *so) +{ + if (so) + return so->flags; + else + return 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/syshead.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/syshead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..163d2bb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/syshead.h @@ -0,0 +1,718 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef SYSHEAD_H +#define SYSHEAD_H + +#include "compat.h" +#include "compat-stdbool.h" + +/* branch prediction hints */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) +# define likely(x) __builtin_expect((x),1) +# define unlikely(x) __builtin_expect((x),0) +#else +# define likely(x) (x) +# define unlikely(x) (x) +#endif + +#ifdef WIN32 +#include +#include +#define sleep(x) Sleep((x)*1000) +#define random rand +#define srandom srand +#endif + +#if defined(__APPLE__) +#if __ENVIRONMENT_MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED__ >= 1070 +#define __APPLE_USE_RFC_3542 1 +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +# include +#endif + +#ifndef WIN32 +#ifndef WEXITSTATUS +# define WEXITSTATUS(stat_val) ((unsigned)(stat_val) >> 8) +#endif +#ifndef WIFEXITED +# define WIFEXITED(stat_val) (((stat_val) & 255) == 0) +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_DIRECT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_IO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_STDINT_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDARG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CTYPE_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX +#include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_LIBGEN_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef TARGET_SOLARIS +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +#include +#endif +#else +#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H +#include +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef TARGET_NETBSD +#include +#endif + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) || defined (TARGET_ANDROID) + +#if defined(HAVE_NETINET_IF_ETHER_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_SOCKIOS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_ERRQUEUE_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_LINUX */ + +#ifdef TARGET_SOLARIS + +#ifdef HAVE_STROPTS_H +#include +#undef S_ERROR +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_SOLARIS */ + +#ifdef TARGET_OPENBSD + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_OPENBSD */ + +#ifdef TARGET_FREEBSD + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_FREEBSD */ + +#ifdef TARGET_NETBSD + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_NETBSD */ + +#ifdef TARGET_DRAGONFLY + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_TUN_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +#endif /* TARGET_DRAGONFLY */ + +#ifdef WIN32 +#include +#include +#include +#include +/* The following two headers are needed of PF_INET6 */ +#include +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#ifdef TARGET_DARWIN +#define _P1003_1B_VISIBLE +#endif /* TARGET_DARWIN */ +#include +#endif + +/* + * Pedantic mode is meant to accomplish lint-style program checking, + * not to build a working executable. + */ +#ifdef __STRICT_ANSI__ +# define PEDANTIC 1 +# undef HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_GCC +# undef HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO +# undef EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE +# define EMPTY_ARRAY_SIZE 1 +# undef inline +# define inline +#else +# define PEDANTIC 0 +#endif + +/* + * Do we have the capability to support the --passtos option? + */ +#if defined(IPPROTO_IP) && defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) +#define PASSTOS_CAPABILITY 1 +#else +#define PASSTOS_CAPABILITY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Do we have nanoseconds gettimeofday? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY) || defined(WIN32) +#define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY_NANOSECONDS 1 +#endif + +/* + * Do we have the capability to report extended socket errors? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_LINUX_TYPES_H) && defined(HAVE_LINUX_ERRQUEUE_H) && defined(HAVE_SOCK_EXTENDED_ERR) && defined(HAVE_MSGHDR) && defined(HAVE_CMSGHDR) && defined(CMSG_FIRSTHDR) && defined(CMSG_NXTHDR) && defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) && defined(SOL_IP) && defined(HAVE_IOVEC) +#define EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY 1 +#else +#define EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Does this platform support linux-style IP_PKTINFO + * or bsd-style IP_RECVDSTADDR ? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_MULTIHOME) && ((defined(HAVE_IN_PKTINFO)&&defined(IP_PKTINFO)) || defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR)) && defined(HAVE_MSGHDR) && defined(HAVE_CMSGHDR) && defined(HAVE_IOVEC) && defined(CMSG_FIRSTHDR) && defined(CMSG_NXTHDR) && defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) +#define ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO 1 +#else +#define ENABLE_IP_PKTINFO 0 +#endif + +/* + * Does this platform define SOL_IP + * or only bsd-style IPPROTO_IP ? + */ +#ifndef SOL_IP +#define SOL_IP IPPROTO_IP +#endif + +/* + * Disable ESEC + */ +#if 0 +#undef EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY +#define EXTENDED_SOCKET_ERROR_CAPABILITY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Do we have a syslog capability? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG) && defined(HAVE_SYSLOG) +#define SYSLOG_CAPABILITY 1 +#else +#define SYSLOG_CAPABILITY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Does this OS draw a distinction between binary and ascii files? + */ +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + +/* + * Directory separation char + */ +#ifdef WIN32 +#define OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP '\\' +#else +#define OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP '/' +#endif + +/* + * Define a boolean value based + * on Win32 status. + */ +#ifdef WIN32 +#define WIN32_0_1 1 +#else +#define WIN32_0_1 0 +#endif + +/* + * Our socket descriptor type. + */ +#ifdef WIN32 +#define SOCKET_UNDEFINED (INVALID_SOCKET) +typedef SOCKET socket_descriptor_t; +#else +#define SOCKET_UNDEFINED (-1) +typedef int socket_descriptor_t; +#endif + +static inline int +socket_defined (const socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + return sd != SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +} + +/* + * Should statistics counters be 64 bits? + */ +#define USE_64_BIT_COUNTERS + +/* + * Should we enable the use of execve() for calling subprocesses, + * instead of system()? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_EXECVE) && defined(HAVE_FORK) +#define ENABLE_FEATURE_EXECVE +#endif + +/* + * Do we have point-to-multipoint capability? + */ + +#if defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_SERVER) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY_NANOSECONDS) +#define P2MP 1 +#else +#define P2MP 0 +#endif + +#if P2MP && !defined(ENABLE_CLIENT_ONLY) +#define P2MP_SERVER 1 +#else +#define P2MP_SERVER 0 +#endif + +/* + * HTTPS port sharing capability + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_PORT_SHARE) && P2MP_SERVER && defined(SCM_RIGHTS) && defined(HAVE_MSGHDR) && defined(HAVE_CMSGHDR) && defined(HAVE_IOVEC) && defined(CMSG_FIRSTHDR) && defined(CMSG_NXTHDR) && defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) +#define PORT_SHARE 1 +#else +#define PORT_SHARE 0 +#endif + +/* + * Enable deferred authentication? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_DEF_AUTH) && P2MP_SERVER && defined(ENABLE_PLUGIN) +#define PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH +#endif +#if defined(ENABLE_DEF_AUTH) && P2MP_SERVER && defined(ENABLE_MANAGEMENT) +#define MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH +#endif +#if !defined(PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH) && !defined(MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH) +#undef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH +#endif + +/* + * Enable external private key + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_MANAGEMENT) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL) +#define MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY +#endif + +/* Enable PolarSSL RNG prediction resistance support */ +#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL +#define ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE +#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_POLARSSL */ + +/* + * MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA allows the management interface to + * read multi-line inputs from clients. + */ +#if defined(MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH) || defined(MANAGMENT_EXTERNAL_KEY) +#define MANAGEMENT_IN_EXTRA +#endif + +/* + * Enable packet filter? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_PF) && P2MP_SERVER && defined(ENABLE_PLUGIN) && defined(HAVE_STAT) +#define PLUGIN_PF +#endif +#if defined(ENABLE_PF) && P2MP_SERVER && defined(MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH) +#define MANAGEMENT_PF +#endif +#if !defined(PLUGIN_PF) && !defined(MANAGEMENT_PF) +#undef ENABLE_PF +#endif + +/* + * Do we support Unix domain sockets? + */ +#if defined(PF_UNIX) && !defined(WIN32) +#define UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT 1 +#else +#define UNIX_SOCK_SUPPORT 0 +#endif + +/* + * Compile the struct buffer_list code + */ +#define ENABLE_BUFFER_LIST + +/* + * Should we include OCC (options consistency check) code? + */ +#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL +#define ENABLE_OCC +#endif + +/* + * Should we include NTLM proxy functionality + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) +#define NTLM 1 +#else +#define NTLM 0 +#endif + +/* + * Should we include proxy digest auth functionality + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) +#define PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH 1 +#else +#define PROXY_DIGEST_AUTH 0 +#endif + +/* + * Should we include code common to all proxy methods? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) || defined(ENABLE_SOCKS) +#define GENERAL_PROXY_SUPPORT +#endif + +/* + * Do we have CryptoAPI capability? + */ +#if defined(WIN32) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) +#define ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI +#endif + +/* + * Enable x509-track feature? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) && defined (ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) +#define ENABLE_X509_TRACK +#endif + +/* + * Is poll available on this platform? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_POLL) && defined(HAVE_SYS_POLL_H) +#define POLL 1 +#else +#define POLL 0 +#endif + +/* + * Is epoll available on this platform? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_EPOLL_CREATE) && defined(HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H) +#define EPOLL 1 +#else +#define EPOLL 0 +#endif + +/* Disable EPOLL */ +#if 0 +#undef EPOLL +#define EPOLL 0 +#endif + +/* + * Should we include http proxy override functionality + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_MANAGEMENT) && defined(ENABLE_HTTP_PROXY) +#define HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE 1 +#else +#define HTTP_PROXY_OVERRIDE 0 +#endif + +/* + * Reduce sensitivity to system clock instability + * and backtracks. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY_NANOSECONDS) +#define TIME_BACKTRACK_PROTECTION 1 +#endif + +/* + * Enable traffic shaper. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY_NANOSECONDS) +#define ENABLE_FEATURE_SHAPER 1 +#endif + +/* + * Is non-blocking connect() supported? + */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_ERROR) && defined(EINPROGRESS) && defined(ETIMEDOUT) +#define CONNECT_NONBLOCK +#endif + +/* + * Do we have the capability to support the AUTO_USERID feature? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_AUTO_USERID) +#define AUTO_USERID 1 +#else +#define AUTO_USERID 0 +#endif + +/* + * Do we support challenge/response authentication as client? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_MANAGEMENT) +#define ENABLE_CLIENT_CR +#endif + +/* + * Do we support pushing peer info? + */ +#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_SSL) +#define ENABLE_PUSH_PEER_INFO +#endif + +/* + * Do we support internal client-side NAT? + */ +#define ENABLE_CLIENT_NAT + +/* + * Enable --memstats option + */ +#ifdef TARGET_LINUX +#define ENABLE_MEMSTATS +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0754427 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.c @@ -0,0 +1,5236 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Support routines for configuring and accessing TUN/TAP + * virtual network adapters. + * + * This file is based on the TUN/TAP driver interface routines + * from VTun by Maxim Krasnyansky . + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#include "tun.h" +#include "fdmisc.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "socket.h" +#include "manage.h" +#include "route.h" +#include "win32.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" +#include + +#ifdef WIN32 + +/* #define SIMULATE_DHCP_FAILED */ /* simulate bad DHCP negotiation */ + +#define NI_TEST_FIRST (1<<0) +#define NI_IP_NETMASK (1<<1) +#define NI_OPTIONS (1<<2) + +static void netsh_ifconfig (const struct tuntap_options *to, + const char *flex_name, + const in_addr_t ip, + const in_addr_t netmask, + const unsigned int flags); +static void netsh_command (const struct argv *a, int n); + +static const char *netsh_get_id (const char *dev_node, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif + +#ifdef TARGET_SOLARIS +static void solaris_error_close (struct tuntap *tt, const struct env_set *es, const char *actual, bool unplumb_inet6); +#include +#endif + +bool +is_dev_type (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *match_type) +{ + ASSERT (match_type); + if (!dev) + return false; + if (dev_type) + return !strcmp (dev_type, match_type); + else + return !strncmp (dev, match_type, strlen (match_type)); +} + +int +dev_type_enum (const char *dev, const char *dev_type) +{ + if (is_dev_type (dev, dev_type, "tun")) + return DEV_TYPE_TUN; + else if (is_dev_type (dev, dev_type, "tap")) + return DEV_TYPE_TAP; + else if (is_dev_type (dev, dev_type, "null")) + return DEV_TYPE_NULL; + else + return DEV_TYPE_UNDEF; +} + +const char * +dev_type_string (const char *dev, const char *dev_type) +{ + switch (dev_type_enum (dev, dev_type)) + { + case DEV_TYPE_TUN: + return "tun"; + case DEV_TYPE_TAP: + return "tap"; + case DEV_TYPE_NULL: + return "null"; + default: + return "[unknown-dev-type]"; + } +} + +/* + * Try to predict the actual TUN/TAP device instance name, + * before the device is actually opened. + */ +const char * +guess_tuntap_dev (const char *dev, + const char *dev_type, + const char *dev_node, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + const int dt = dev_type_enum (dev, dev_type); + if (dt == DEV_TYPE_TUN || dt == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + return netsh_get_id (dev_node, gc); + } +#endif + + /* default case */ + return dev; +} + + +/* --ifconfig-nowarn disables some options sanity checking */ +static const char ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence[] = "(silence this warning with --ifconfig-nowarn)"; + +/* + * If !tun, make sure ifconfig_remote_netmask looks + * like a netmask. + * + * If tun, make sure ifconfig_remote_netmask looks + * like an IPv4 address. + */ +static void +ifconfig_sanity_check (bool tun, in_addr_t addr, int topology) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const bool looks_like_netmask = ((addr & 0xFF000000) == 0xFF000000); + if (tun) + { + if (looks_like_netmask && (topology == TOP_NET30 || topology == TOP_P2P)) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Since you are using --dev tun with a point-to-point topology, the second argument to --ifconfig must be an IP address. You are using something (%s) that looks more like a netmask. %s", + print_in_addr_t (addr, 0, &gc), + ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence); + } + else /* tap */ + { + if (!looks_like_netmask) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Since you are using --dev tap, the second argument to --ifconfig must be a netmask, for example something like 255.255.255.0. %s", + ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * For TAP-style devices, generate a broadcast address. + */ +static in_addr_t +generate_ifconfig_broadcast_addr (in_addr_t local, + in_addr_t netmask) +{ + return local | ~netmask; +} + +/* + * Check that --local and --remote addresses do not + * clash with ifconfig addresses or subnet. + */ +static void +check_addr_clash (const char *name, + int type, + in_addr_t public, + in_addr_t local, + in_addr_t remote_netmask) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); +#if 0 + msg (M_INFO, "CHECK_ADDR_CLASH type=%d public=%s local=%s, remote_netmask=%s", + type, + print_in_addr_t (public, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, 0, &gc)); +#endif + + if (public) + { + if (type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + const in_addr_t test_netmask = 0xFFFFFF00; + const in_addr_t public_net = public & test_netmask; + const in_addr_t local_net = local & test_netmask; + const in_addr_t remote_net = remote_netmask & test_netmask; + + if (public == local || public == remote_netmask) + msg (M_WARN, + "WARNING: --%s address [%s] conflicts with --ifconfig address pair [%s, %s]. %s", + name, + print_in_addr_t (public, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, 0, &gc), + ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence); + + if (public_net == local_net || public_net == remote_net) + msg (M_WARN, + "WARNING: potential conflict between --%s address [%s] and --ifconfig address pair [%s, %s] -- this is a warning only that is triggered when local/remote addresses exist within the same /24 subnet as --ifconfig endpoints. %s", + name, + print_in_addr_t (public, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, 0, &gc), + ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence); + } + else if (type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + const in_addr_t public_network = public & remote_netmask; + const in_addr_t virtual_network = local & remote_netmask; + if (public_network == virtual_network) + msg (M_WARN, + "WARNING: --%s address [%s] conflicts with --ifconfig subnet [%s, %s] -- local and remote addresses cannot be inside of the --ifconfig subnet. %s", + name, + print_in_addr_t (public, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote_netmask, 0, &gc), + ifconfig_warn_how_to_silence); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Issue a warning if ip/netmask (on the virtual IP network) conflicts with + * the settings on the local LAN. This is designed to flag issues where + * (for example) the OpenVPN server LAN is running on 192.168.1.x, but then + * an OpenVPN client tries to connect from a public location that is also running + * off of a router set to 192.168.1.x. + */ +void +check_subnet_conflict (const in_addr_t ip, + const in_addr_t netmask, + const char *prefix) +{ +#if 0 /* too many false positives */ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + in_addr_t lan_gw = 0; + in_addr_t lan_netmask = 0; + + if (get_default_gateway (&lan_gw, &lan_netmask) && lan_netmask) + { + const in_addr_t lan_network = lan_gw & lan_netmask; + const in_addr_t network = ip & netmask; + + /* do the two subnets defined by network/netmask and lan_network/lan_netmask intersect? */ + if ((network & lan_netmask) == lan_network + || (lan_network & netmask) == network) + { + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: potential %s subnet conflict between local LAN [%s/%s] and remote VPN [%s/%s]", + prefix, + print_in_addr_t (lan_network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (lan_netmask, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (network, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, &gc)); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +#endif +} + +void +warn_on_use_of_common_subnets (void) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct route_gateway_info rgi; + const int needed = (RGI_ADDR_DEFINED|RGI_NETMASK_DEFINED); + + get_default_gateway (&rgi); + if ((rgi.flags & needed) == needed) + { + const in_addr_t lan_network = rgi.gateway.addr & rgi.gateway.netmask; + if (lan_network == 0xC0A80000 || lan_network == 0xC0A80100) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: your local LAN uses the extremely common subnet address 192.168.0.x or 192.168.1.x. Be aware that this might create routing conflicts if you connect to the VPN server from public locations such as internet cafes that use the same subnet."); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Complain if --dev tap and --ifconfig is used on an OS for which + * we don't have a custom tap ifconfig template below. + */ +static void +no_tap_ifconfig () +{ + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry but you cannot use --dev tap and --ifconfig together on this OS because I have not yet been programmed to understand the appropriate ifconfig syntax to use for TAP-style devices on this OS. Your best alternative is to use an --up script and do the ifconfig command manually."); +} + +/* + * Return a string to be used for options compatibility check + * between peers. + */ +const char * +ifconfig_options_string (const struct tuntap* tt, bool remote, bool disable, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + if (tt->did_ifconfig_setup && !disable) + { + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + { + buf_printf (&out, "%s %s", + print_in_addr_t (tt->local & tt->remote_netmask, 0, gc), + print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, gc)); + } + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + const char *l, *r; + if (remote) + { + r = print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, gc); + l = print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, gc); + } + else + { + l = print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, gc); + r = print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, gc); + } + buf_printf (&out, "%s %s", r, l); + } + else + buf_printf (&out, "[undef]"); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Return a status string describing wait state. + */ +const char * +tun_stat (const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int rwflags, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, gc); + if (tt) + { + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + { + buf_printf (&out, "T%s", + (tt->rwflags_debug & EVENT_READ) ? "R" : "r"); +#ifdef WIN32 + buf_printf (&out, "%s", + overlapped_io_state_ascii (&tt->reads)); +#endif + } + if (rwflags & EVENT_WRITE) + { + buf_printf (&out, "T%s", + (tt->rwflags_debug & EVENT_WRITE) ? "W" : "w"); +#ifdef WIN32 + buf_printf (&out, "%s", + overlapped_io_state_ascii (&tt->writes)); +#endif + } + } + else + { + buf_printf (&out, "T?"); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Return true for point-to-point topology, false for subnet topology + */ +bool +is_tun_p2p (const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + bool tun = false; + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + tun = false; + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + tun = true; + else + msg (M_FATAL, "Error: problem with tun vs. tap setting"); /* JYFIXME -- needs to be caught earlier, in init_tun? */ + + return tun; +} + +/* + * Init tun/tap object. + * + * Set up tuntap structure for ifconfig, + * but don't execute yet. + */ +struct tuntap * +init_tun (const char *dev, /* --dev option */ + const char *dev_type, /* --dev-type option */ + int topology, /* one of the TOP_x values */ + const char *ifconfig_local_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 1 */ + const char *ifconfig_remote_netmask_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 2 */ + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 1 IPv6 */ + int ifconfig_ipv6_netbits_parm, + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_remote_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 2 IPv6 */ + struct addrinfo *local_public, + struct addrinfo *remote_public, + const bool strict_warn, + struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct tuntap *tt; + + ALLOC_OBJ (tt, struct tuntap); + clear_tuntap (tt); + + tt->type = dev_type_enum (dev, dev_type); + tt->topology = topology; + + if (ifconfig_local_parm && ifconfig_remote_netmask_parm) + { + bool tun = false; + const char *ifconfig_local = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_remote_netmask = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_broadcast = NULL; + + /* + * We only handle TUN/TAP devices here, not --dev null devices. + */ + tun = is_tun_p2p (tt); + + /* + * Convert arguments to binary IPv4 addresses. + */ + + tt->local = getaddr ( + GETADDR_RESOLVE + | GETADDR_HOST_ORDER + | GETADDR_FATAL_ON_SIGNAL + | GETADDR_FATAL, + ifconfig_local_parm, + 0, + NULL, + NULL); + + tt->remote_netmask = getaddr ( + (tun ? GETADDR_RESOLVE : 0) + | GETADDR_HOST_ORDER + | GETADDR_FATAL_ON_SIGNAL + | GETADDR_FATAL, + ifconfig_remote_netmask_parm, + 0, + NULL, + NULL); + + /* + * Look for common errors in --ifconfig parms + */ + if (strict_warn) + { + struct addrinfo *curele; + ifconfig_sanity_check (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN, tt->remote_netmask, tt->topology); + + /* + * If local_public or remote_public addresses are defined, + * make sure they do not clash with our virtual subnet. + */ + + for(curele=remote_public;curele;curele=curele->ai_next) { + if(curele->ai_family == AF_INET) + check_addr_clash ("local", + tt->type, + ((struct sockaddr_in*)curele->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr, + tt->local, + tt->remote_netmask); + } + + for(curele=remote_public;curele;curele=curele->ai_next) { + if(curele->ai_family == AF_INET) + check_addr_clash ("remote", + tt->type, + ((struct sockaddr_in*)curele->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr, + tt->local, + tt->remote_netmask); + } + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET)) + check_subnet_conflict (tt->local, tt->remote_netmask, "TUN/TAP adapter"); + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + check_subnet_conflict (tt->local, IPV4_NETMASK_HOST, "TUN/TAP adapter"); + } + + /* + * Set ifconfig parameters + */ + ifconfig_local = print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc); + ifconfig_remote_netmask = print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, &gc); + + /* + * If TAP-style interface, generate broadcast address. + */ + if (!tun) + { + tt->broadcast = generate_ifconfig_broadcast_addr (tt->local, tt->remote_netmask); + ifconfig_broadcast = print_in_addr_t (tt->broadcast, 0, &gc); + } + + /* + * Set environmental variables with ifconfig parameters. + */ + if (es) + { + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_local", ifconfig_local); + if (tun) + { + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_remote", ifconfig_remote_netmask); + } + else + { + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_netmask", ifconfig_remote_netmask); + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_broadcast", ifconfig_broadcast); + } + } + + tt->did_ifconfig_setup = true; + } + + if (ifconfig_ipv6_local_parm && ifconfig_ipv6_remote_parm) + { + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_remote = NULL; + + /* + * Convert arguments to binary IPv6 addresses. + */ + + if ( inet_pton( AF_INET6, ifconfig_ipv6_local_parm, &tt->local_ipv6 ) != 1 || + inet_pton( AF_INET6, ifconfig_ipv6_remote_parm, &tt->remote_ipv6 ) != 1 ) + { + msg( M_FATAL, "init_tun: problem converting IPv6 ifconfig addresses %s and %s to binary", ifconfig_ipv6_local_parm, ifconfig_ipv6_remote_parm ); + } + tt->netbits_ipv6 = ifconfig_ipv6_netbits_parm; + + /* + * Set ifconfig parameters + */ + ifconfig_ipv6_local = print_in6_addr (tt->local_ipv6, 0, &gc); + ifconfig_ipv6_remote = print_in6_addr (tt->remote_ipv6, 0, &gc); + + /* + * Set environmental variables with ifconfig parameters. + */ + if (es) + { + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_ipv6_local", ifconfig_ipv6_local); + setenv_int (es, "ifconfig_ipv6_netbits", tt->netbits_ipv6); + setenv_str (es, "ifconfig_ipv6_remote", ifconfig_ipv6_remote); + } + tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup = true; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return tt; +} + +/* + * Platform specific tun initializations + */ +void +init_tun_post (struct tuntap *tt, + const struct frame *frame, + const struct tuntap_options *options) +{ + tt->options = *options; +#ifdef WIN32 + overlapped_io_init (&tt->reads, frame, FALSE, true); + overlapped_io_init (&tt->writes, frame, TRUE, true); + tt->rw_handle.read = tt->reads.overlapped.hEvent; + tt->rw_handle.write = tt->writes.overlapped.hEvent; + tt->adapter_index = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; +#endif +} + +#if defined(WIN32) || \ + defined(TARGET_DARWIN) || defined(TARGET_NETBSD) || defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + +/* some of the platforms will auto-add a "network route" pointing + * to the interface on "ifconfig tunX 2001:db8::1/64", others need + * an extra call to "route add..." + * -> helper function to simplify code below + */ +void add_route_connected_v6_net(struct tuntap * tt, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct route_ipv6 r6; + + r6.defined = true; + r6.network = tt->local_ipv6; + r6.netbits = tt->netbits_ipv6; + r6.gateway = tt->local_ipv6; + r6.metric = 0; /* connected route */ + r6.metric_defined = true; + add_route_ipv6 (&r6, tt, 0, es); +} + +void delete_route_connected_v6_net(struct tuntap * tt, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct route_ipv6 r6; + + r6.defined = true; + r6.network = tt->local_ipv6; + r6.netbits = tt->netbits_ipv6; + r6.gateway = tt->local_ipv6; + r6.metric = 0; /* connected route */ + r6.metric_defined = true; + delete_route_ipv6 (&r6, tt, 0, es); +} +#endif + + +/* execute the ifconfig command through the shell */ +void +do_ifconfig (struct tuntap *tt, + const char *actual, /* actual device name */ + int tun_mtu, + const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (tt->did_ifconfig_setup) + { + bool tun = false; + const char *ifconfig_local = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_remote_netmask = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_broadcast = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local = NULL; + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_remote = NULL; + bool do_ipv6 = false; + struct argv argv; + + argv_init (&argv); + + msg( M_INFO, "do_ifconfig, tt->ipv6=%d, tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup=%d", + tt->ipv6, tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup ); + + /* + * We only handle TUN/TAP devices here, not --dev null devices. + */ + tun = is_tun_p2p (tt); + + /* + * Set ifconfig parameters + */ + ifconfig_local = print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc); + ifconfig_remote_netmask = print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, &gc); + + if ( tt->ipv6 && tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup ) + { + ifconfig_ipv6_local = print_in6_addr (tt->local_ipv6, 0, &gc); + ifconfig_ipv6_remote = print_in6_addr (tt->remote_ipv6, 0, &gc); + do_ipv6 = true; + } + + /* + * If TAP-style device, generate broadcast address. + */ + if (!tun) + ifconfig_broadcast = print_in_addr_t (tt->broadcast, 0, &gc); + +#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT + if (management) + { + management_set_state (management, + OPENVPN_STATE_ASSIGN_IP, + NULL, + tt->local, + 0); + } +#endif + + +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + /* + * Set the MTU for the device + */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s link set dev %s up mtu %d", + iproute_path, + actual, + tun_mtu + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ip link set failed"); + + if (tun) { + + /* + * Set the address for the device + */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s addr add dev %s local %s peer %s", + iproute_path, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ip addr add failed"); + } else { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s addr add dev %s %s/%d broadcast %s", + iproute_path, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + count_netmask_bits(ifconfig_remote_netmask), + ifconfig_broadcast + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ip addr add failed"); + } + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf( &argv, + "%s -6 addr add %s/%d dev %s", + iproute_path, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6, + actual + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ip -6 addr add failed"); + } + tt->did_ifconfig = true; +#else + if (tun) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s pointopoint %s mtu %d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d broadcast %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_broadcast + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ifconfig failed"); + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s add %s/%d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6 + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Linux ifconfig inet6 failed"); + } + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + +#endif /*ENABLE_IPROUTE*/ +#elif defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + + + if (do_ipv6) { + struct user_pass up6; + struct buffer out6 = alloc_buf_gc (64, &gc); + buf_printf (&out6, "%s/%d", ifconfig_ipv6_local,tt->netbits_ipv6); + strcpy(up6.username, buf_bptr(&out6)); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up6 , "IFCONFIG6", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + } + + struct user_pass up; + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (64, &gc); + char* top; + switch(tt->topology) { + case TOP_NET30: + top = "net30"; + break; + case TOP_P2P: + top="p2p"; + break; + case TOP_SUBNET: + top="subnet"; + break; + default: + top="undef"; + } + + buf_printf (&out, "%s %s %d %s", ifconfig_local, ifconfig_remote_netmask, tun_mtu,top); + strcpy(up.username, buf_bptr(&out)); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "IFCONFIG", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + + + +#elif defined(TARGET_SOLARIS) + + /* Solaris 2.6 (and 7?) cannot set all parameters in one go... + * example: + * ifconfig tun2 10.2.0.2 10.2.0.1 mtu 1450 up + * ifconfig tun2 netmask 255.255.255.255 + */ + if (tun) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + if (!openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig phase-1 failed")) + solaris_error_close (tt, es, actual, false); + + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s netmask 255.255.255.255", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual + ); + } + else + if (tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + } + else + argv_printf (&argv, + " %s %s %s netmask %s broadcast + up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask + ); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + if (!openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig phase-2 failed")) + solaris_error_close (tt, es, actual, false); + + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s inet6 unplumb", + IFCONFIG_PATH, actual ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, NULL); + + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 plumb %s/%d %s up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6, + ifconfig_ipv6_remote + ); + } + else /* tap mode */ + { + /* base IPv6 tap interface needs to be brought up first + */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s inet6 plumb up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, actual ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + if (!openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig IPv6 (prepare) failed")) + solaris_error_close (tt, es, actual, true); + + /* we might need to do "ifconfig %s inet6 auto-dhcp drop" + * after the system has noticed the interface and fired up + * the DHCPv6 client - but this takes quite a while, and the + * server will ignore the DHCPv6 packets anyway. So we don't. + */ + + /* static IPv6 addresses need to go to a subinterface (tap0:1) + */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 addif %s/%d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, tt->netbits_ipv6 ); + } + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + if (!openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig IPv6 failed")) + solaris_error_close (tt, es, actual, true); + } + + if (!tun && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + /* Add a network route for the local tun interface */ + struct route r; + CLEAR (r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED | RT_METRIC_DEFINED; + r.network = tt->local & tt->remote_netmask; + r.netmask = tt->remote_netmask; + r.gateway = tt->local; + r.metric = 0; + add_route (&r, tt, 0, NULL, es); + } + + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + + /* + * On OpenBSD, tun interfaces are persistent if created with + * "ifconfig tunX create", and auto-destroyed if created by + * opening "/dev/tunX" (so we just use the /dev/tunX) + */ + + /* example: ifconfig tun2 10.2.0.2 10.2.0.1 mtu 1450 netmask 255.255.255.255 up */ + if (tun) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask 255.255.255.255 up -link0", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else + if ( tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask %s up -link0", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_local, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_remote_netmask + ); + } + else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d broadcast %s link0", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_broadcast + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "OpenBSD ifconfig failed"); + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 %s/%d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6 + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "OpenBSD ifconfig inet6 failed"); + + /* and, hooray, we explicitely need to add a route... */ + add_route_connected_v6_net(tt, es); + } + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + +/* whether or not NetBSD can do IPv6 can be seen by the availability of + * the TUNSIFHEAD ioctl() - see next TARGET_NETBSD block for more details + */ +#ifdef TUNSIFHEAD +# define NETBSD_MULTI_AF +#endif + + if (tun) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask 255.255.255.255 up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else + if ( tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask %s up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_local, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_remote_netmask + ); + } + else + /* + * NetBSD has distinct tun and tap devices + * so we don't need the "link0" extra parameter to specify we want to do + * tunneling at the ethernet level + */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d broadcast %s", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_broadcast + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "NetBSD ifconfig failed"); + + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { +#ifdef NETBSD_MULTI_AF + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 %s/%d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6 + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "NetBSD ifconfig inet6 failed"); + + /* and, hooray, we explicitely need to add a route... */ + add_route_connected_v6_net(tt, es); +#else + msg( M_INFO, "no IPv6 support for tun interfaces on NetBSD before 4.0 (if your system is newer, recompile openvpn)" ); + tt->ipv6 = false; +#endif + } + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + /* + * Darwin (i.e. Mac OS X) seems to exhibit similar behaviour to OpenBSD... + */ + + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s delete", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, NULL); + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: Tried to delete pre-existing tun/tap instance -- No Problem if failure"); + + + /* example: ifconfig tun2 10.2.0.2 10.2.0.1 mtu 1450 netmask 255.255.255.255 up */ + if (tun) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask 255.255.255.255 up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else + { + if (tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + } + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "Mac OS X ifconfig failed"); + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + + /* Add a network route for the local tun interface */ + if (!tun && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + struct route r; + CLEAR (r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED; + r.network = tt->local & tt->remote_netmask; + r.netmask = tt->remote_netmask; + r.gateway = tt->local; + add_route (&r, tt, 0, NULL, es); + } + + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 %s/%d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6 + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "MacOS X ifconfig inet6 failed"); + + /* and, hooray, we explicitely need to add a route... */ + add_route_connected_v6_net(tt, es); + } + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD)||defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + + /* example: ifconfig tun2 10.2.0.2 10.2.0.1 mtu 1450 netmask 255.255.255.255 up */ + if (tun) + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask 255.255.255.255 up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + else if ( tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s %s mtu %d netmask %s up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_local, + tun_mtu, + ifconfig_remote_netmask + ); + } + else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s %s netmask %s mtu %d up", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_local, + ifconfig_remote_netmask, + tun_mtu + ); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "FreeBSD ifconfig failed"); + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + + /* Add a network route for the local tun interface */ + if (!tun && tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + struct route r; + CLEAR (r); + r.flags = RT_DEFINED; + r.network = tt->local & tt->remote_netmask; + r.netmask = tt->remote_netmask; + r.gateway = tt->local; + add_route (&r, tt, 0, NULL, es); + } + + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s inet6 %s/%d", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local, + tt->netbits_ipv6 + ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, S_FATAL, "FreeBSD ifconfig inet6 failed"); + } + +#elif defined (WIN32) + { + /* + * Make sure that both ifconfig addresses are part of the + * same .252 subnet. + */ + if (tun) + { + verify_255_255_255_252 (tt->local, tt->remote_netmask); + tt->adapter_netmask = ~3; + } + else + { + tt->adapter_netmask = tt->remote_netmask; + } + + switch (tt->options.ip_win32_type) + { + case IPW32_SET_MANUAL: + msg (M_INFO, "******** NOTE: Please manually set the IP/netmask of '%s' to %s/%s (if it is not already set)", + actual, + ifconfig_local, + print_in_addr_t (tt->adapter_netmask, 0, &gc)); + break; + case IPW32_SET_NETSH: + if (!strcmp (actual, "NULL")) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error: When using --ip-win32 netsh, if you have more than one TAP-Windows adapter, you must also specify --dev-node"); + + netsh_ifconfig (&tt->options, + actual, + tt->local, + tt->adapter_netmask, + NI_IP_NETMASK|NI_OPTIONS); + + break; + } + tt->did_ifconfig = true; + } + + /* IPv6 always uses "netsh" interface */ + if ( do_ipv6 ) + { + char * saved_actual; + + if (!strcmp (actual, "NULL")) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error: When using --tun-ipv6, if you have more than one TAP-Windows adapter, you must also specify --dev-node"); + + /* example: netsh interface ipv6 set address MyTap 2001:608:8003::d store=active */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s%sc interface ipv6 set address %s %s store=active", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + actual, + ifconfig_ipv6_local ); + + netsh_command (&argv, 4); + + /* explicit route needed */ + /* on windows, OpenVPN does ifconfig first, open_tun later, so + * tt->actual_name might not yet be initialized, but routing code + * needs to know interface name - point to "actual", restore later + */ + saved_actual = tt->actual_name; + tt->actual_name = (char*) actual; + add_route_connected_v6_net(tt, es); + tt->actual_name = saved_actual; + } +#else + msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry, but I don't know how to do 'ifconfig' commands on this operating system. You should ifconfig your TUN/TAP device manually or use an --up script."); +#endif + argv_reset (&argv); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +clear_tuntap (struct tuntap *tuntap) +{ + CLEAR (*tuntap); +#ifdef WIN32 + tuntap->hand = NULL; +#else + tuntap->fd = -1; +#endif +#ifdef TARGET_SOLARIS + tuntap->ip_fd = -1; +#endif + tuntap->ipv6 = false; +} + +static void +open_null (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + tt->actual_name = string_alloc ("null", NULL); +} + +#ifndef WIN32 +static void +open_tun_generic (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, + bool ipv6_explicitly_supported, bool dynamic, + struct tuntap *tt) +{ + char tunname[256]; + char dynamic_name[256]; + bool dynamic_opened = false; + + + if ( tt->ipv6 && ! ipv6_explicitly_supported ) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: explicit support for IPv6 tun devices is not provided for this OS"); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_NULL) + { + open_null (tt); + } + else + { + /* + * --dev-node specified, so open an explicit device node + */ + if (dev_node) + { + openvpn_snprintf (tunname, sizeof (tunname), "%s", dev_node); + } + else + { + /* + * dynamic open is indicated by --dev specified without + * explicit unit number. Try opening /dev/[dev]n + * where n = [0, 255]. + */ +#ifdef TARGET_NETBSD + /* on NetBSD, tap (but not tun) devices are opened by + * opening /dev/tap and then querying the system about the + * actual device name (tap0, tap1, ...) assigned + */ + if ( dynamic && strcmp( dev, "tap" ) == 0 ) + { + struct ifreq ifr; + if ((tt->fd = open ( "/dev/tap", O_RDWR)) < 0) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot allocate NetBSD TAP dev dynamically"); + } + if ( ioctl( tt->fd, TAPGIFNAME, (void*)&ifr ) < 0 ) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot query NetBSD TAP device name"); + } + CLEAR(dynamic_name); + strncpy( dynamic_name, ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(dynamic_name)-1 ); + dynamic_opened = true; + openvpn_snprintf (tunname, sizeof (tunname), "/dev/%s", dynamic_name ); + } + else +#endif + + if (dynamic && !has_digit((unsigned char *)dev)) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) + { + openvpn_snprintf (tunname, sizeof (tunname), + "/dev/%s%d", dev, i); + openvpn_snprintf (dynamic_name, sizeof (dynamic_name), + "%s%d", dev, i); + if ((tt->fd = open (tunname, O_RDWR)) > 0) + { + dynamic_opened = true; + break; + } + msg (D_READ_WRITE | M_ERRNO, "Tried opening %s (failed)", tunname); + } + if (!dynamic_opened) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot allocate TUN/TAP dev dynamically"); + } + /* + * explicit unit number specified + */ + else + { + openvpn_snprintf (tunname, sizeof (tunname), "/dev/%s", dev); + } + } + + if (!dynamic_opened) + { + /* has named device existed before? if so, don't destroy at end */ + if ( if_nametoindex( dev ) > 0 ) + { + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP device %s exists previously, keep at program end", dev ); + tt->persistent_if = true; + } + + if ((tt->fd = open (tunname, O_RDWR)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot open TUN/TAP dev %s", tunname); + } + + set_nonblock (tt->fd); + set_cloexec (tt->fd); /* don't pass fd to scripts */ + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP device %s opened", tunname); + + /* tt->actual_name is passed to up and down scripts and used as the ifconfig dev name */ + tt->actual_name = string_alloc (dynamic_opened ? dynamic_name : dev, NULL); + } +} + +static void +close_tun_generic (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt->fd >= 0) + close (tt->fd); + if (tt->actual_name) + free (tt->actual_name); + clear_tuntap (tt); +} + +#endif + +#if defined (TARGET_ANDROID) +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + int i; + struct user_pass up; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + for (i = 0; i < tt->options.dns_len; ++i) { + strcpy(up.username, print_in_addr_t(tt->options.dns[i], 0, &gc)); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "DNSSERVER", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + } + + if(tt->options.domain) { + strcpy(up.username , tt->options.domain); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "DNSDOMAIN", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + } + + strcpy(up.username , dev); + management_query_user_pass(management, &up , "OPENTUN", GET_USER_PASS_NEED_OK,(void*) 0); + + tt->fd = management->connection.lastfdreceived; + management->connection.lastfdreceived=-1; + + if( (tt->fd < 0) || ! (strcmp("ok",up.password)==0)) { + msg (M_ERR, "ERROR: Cannot open TUN"); + } + /* Set the actual name to a dummy name to enable scripts */ + tt->actual_name = (char *) malloc(32); + strncpy(tt->actual_name, "vpnservice-tun",32); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_LINUX) +#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H /* New driver support */ + +#ifndef HAVE_LINUX_SOCKIOS_H +#error header file linux/sockios.h required +#endif + +#if !PEDANTIC + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct ifreq ifr; + + /* + * We handle --dev null specially, we do not open /dev/null for this. + */ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_NULL) + { + open_null (tt); + } + else + { + /* + * Process --dev-node + */ + const char *node = dev_node; + if (!node) + node = "/dev/net/tun"; + + /* + * Open the interface + */ + if ((tt->fd = open (node, O_RDWR)) < 0) + { + msg (M_ERR, "ERROR: Cannot open TUN/TAP dev %s", node); + } + + /* + * Process --tun-ipv6 + */ + CLEAR (ifr); + if (!tt->ipv6) + ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_NO_PI; + +#if defined(IFF_ONE_QUEUE) && defined(SIOCSIFTXQLEN) + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_ONE_QUEUE; +#endif + + /* + * Figure out if tun or tap device + */ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_TUN; + } + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_TAP; + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, "I don't recognize device %s as a tun or tap device", + dev); + } + + /* + * Set an explicit name, if --dev is not tun or tap + */ + if (strcmp(dev, "tun") && strcmp(dev, "tap")) + strncpynt (ifr.ifr_name, dev, IFNAMSIZ); + + /* + * Use special ioctl that configures tun/tap device with the parms + * we set in ifr + */ + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSETIFF, (void *) &ifr) < 0) + { + msg (M_ERR, "ERROR: Cannot ioctl TUNSETIFF %s", dev); + } + + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP device %s opened", ifr.ifr_name); + + /* + * Try making the TX send queue bigger + */ +#if defined(IFF_ONE_QUEUE) && defined(SIOCSIFTXQLEN) + if (tt->options.txqueuelen) { + struct ifreq netifr; + int ctl_fd; + + if ((ctl_fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) >= 0) + { + CLEAR (netifr); + strncpynt (netifr.ifr_name, ifr.ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ); + netifr.ifr_qlen = tt->options.txqueuelen; + if (ioctl (ctl_fd, SIOCSIFTXQLEN, (void *) &netifr) >= 0) + msg (D_OSBUF, "TUN/TAP TX queue length set to %d", tt->options.txqueuelen); + else + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Note: Cannot set tx queue length on %s", ifr.ifr_name); + close (ctl_fd); + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Note: Cannot open control socket on %s", ifr.ifr_name); + } + } +#endif + + set_nonblock (tt->fd); + set_cloexec (tt->fd); + tt->actual_name = string_alloc (ifr.ifr_name, NULL); + } + return; +} + +#else + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + ASSERT (0); +} + +#endif + +#else + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, false, true, tt); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H */ + +#ifdef ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST + +/* + * This can be removed in future + * when all systems will use newer + * linux-headers + */ +#ifndef TUNSETOWNER +#define TUNSETOWNER _IOW('T', 204, int) +#endif +#ifndef TUNSETGROUP +#define TUNSETGROUP _IOW('T', 206, int) +#endif + +void +tuncfg (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, int persist_mode, const char *username, const char *groupname, const struct tuntap_options *options) +{ + struct tuntap *tt; + + ALLOC_OBJ (tt, struct tuntap); + clear_tuntap (tt); + tt->type = dev_type_enum (dev, dev_type); + tt->options = *options; + open_tun (dev, dev_type, dev_node, tt); + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSETPERSIST, persist_mode) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot ioctl TUNSETPERSIST(%d) %s", persist_mode, dev); + if (username != NULL) + { + struct platform_state_user platform_state_user; + + if (!platform_user_get (username, &platform_state_user)) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot get user entry for %s", username); + else + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSETOWNER, platform_state_user.pw->pw_uid) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot ioctl TUNSETOWNER(%s) %s", username, dev); + } + if (groupname != NULL) + { + struct platform_state_group platform_state_group; + + if (!platform_group_get (groupname, &platform_state_group)) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot get group entry for %s", groupname); + else + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSETGROUP, platform_state_group.gr->gr_gid) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot ioctl TUNSETOWNER(%s) %s", groupname, dev); + } + close_tun (tt); + msg (M_INFO, "Persist state set to: %s", (persist_mode ? "ON" : "OFF")); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_FEATURE_TUN_PERSIST */ + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + if (tt->type != DEV_TYPE_NULL && tt->did_ifconfig) + { + struct argv argv; + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + argv_init (&argv); + +#ifdef ENABLE_IPROUTE + if (is_tun_p2p (tt)) + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s addr del dev %s local %s peer %s", + iproute_path, + tt->actual_name, + print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, &gc) + ); + } + else + { + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s addr del dev %s %s/%d", + iproute_path, + tt->actual_name, + print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc), + count_netmask_bits(print_in_addr_t (tt->remote_netmask, 0, &gc)) + ); + } +#else + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s 0.0.0.0", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + tt->actual_name + ); +#endif + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "Linux ip addr del failed"); + + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); + } + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->ipv6) + { + struct tun_pi pi; + struct iphdr *iph; + struct iovec vect[2]; + int ret; + + iph = (struct iphdr *)buf; + + pi.flags = 0; + + if(iph->version == 6) + pi.proto = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); + else + pi.proto = htons(ETH_P_IP); + + vect[0].iov_len = sizeof(pi); + vect[0].iov_base = π + vect[1].iov_len = len; + vect[1].iov_base = buf; + + ret = writev(tt->fd, vect, 2); + return(ret - sizeof(pi)); + } + else + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->ipv6) + { + struct iovec vect[2]; + struct tun_pi pi; + int ret; + + vect[0].iov_len = sizeof(pi); + vect[0].iov_base = π + vect[1].iov_len = len; + vect[1].iov_base = buf; + + ret = readv(tt->fd, vect, 2); + return(ret - sizeof(pi)); + } + else + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_SOLARIS) + +#ifndef TUNNEWPPA +#error I need the symbol TUNNEWPPA from net/if_tun.h +#endif + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + int if_fd, ip_muxid, arp_muxid, arp_fd, ppa = -1; + struct lifreq ifr; + const char *ptr; + const char *ip_node, *arp_node; + const char *dev_tuntap_type; + int link_type; + bool is_tun; + struct strioctl strioc_if, strioc_ppa; + + /* improved generic TUN/TAP driver from + * http://www.whiteboard.ne.jp/~admin2/tuntap/ + * has IPv6 support + */ + CLEAR(ifr); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_NULL) + { + open_null (tt); + return; + } + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + ip_node = "/dev/udp"; + if (!dev_node) + dev_node = "/dev/tun"; + dev_tuntap_type = "tun"; + link_type = I_PLINK; + is_tun = true; + } + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + ip_node = "/dev/udp"; + if (!dev_node) + dev_node = "/dev/tap"; + arp_node = dev_node; + dev_tuntap_type = "tap"; + link_type = I_PLINK; /* was: I_LINK */ + is_tun = false; + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL, "I don't recognize device %s as a tun or tap device", + dev); + } + + if ((tt->ip_fd = open (ip_node, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't open %s", ip_node); + + if ((tt->fd = open (dev_node, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't open %s", dev_node); + + /* get unit number */ + if (*dev) + { + ptr = dev; + while (*ptr && !isdigit ((int) *ptr)) + ptr++; + ppa = atoi (ptr); + } + + /* Assign a new PPA and get its unit number. */ + strioc_ppa.ic_cmd = TUNNEWPPA; + strioc_ppa.ic_timout = 0; + strioc_ppa.ic_len = sizeof(ppa); + strioc_ppa.ic_dp = (char *)&ppa; + + if ( *ptr == '\0' ) /* no number given, try dynamic */ + { + bool found_one = false; + while( ! found_one && ppa < 64 ) + { + int new_ppa = ioctl (tt->fd, I_STR, &strioc_ppa); + if ( new_ppa >= 0 ) + { + msg( M_INFO, "open_tun: got dynamic interface '%s%d'", dev_tuntap_type, new_ppa ); + ppa = new_ppa; + found_one = true; + break; + } + if ( errno != EEXIST ) + msg (M_ERR, "open_tun: unexpected error trying to find free %s interface", dev_tuntap_type ); + ppa++; + } + if ( !found_one ) + msg (M_ERR, "open_tun: could not find free %s interface, give up.", dev_tuntap_type ); + } + else /* try this particular one */ + { + if ((ppa = ioctl (tt->fd, I_STR, &strioc_ppa)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't assign PPA for new interface (%s%d)", dev_tuntap_type, ppa ); + } + + if ((if_fd = open (dev_node, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't open %s (2)", dev_node); + + if (ioctl (if_fd, I_PUSH, "ip") < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't push IP module"); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + /* Assign ppa according to the unit number returned by tun device */ + if (ioctl (if_fd, IF_UNITSEL, (char *) &ppa) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't set PPA %d", ppa); + } + + tt->actual_name = (char *) malloc (32); + check_malloc_return (tt->actual_name); + + openvpn_snprintf (tt->actual_name, 32, "%s%d", dev_tuntap_type, ppa); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + if (ioctl(if_fd, SIOCGLIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't get flags\n"); + strncpynt (ifr.lifr_name, tt->actual_name, sizeof (ifr.lifr_name)); + ifr.lifr_ppa = ppa; + /* Assign ppa according to the unit number returned by tun device */ + if (ioctl (if_fd, SIOCSLIFNAME, &ifr) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't set PPA %d", ppa); + if (ioctl(if_fd, SIOCGLIFFLAGS, &ifr) <0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't get flags\n"); + /* Push arp module to if_fd */ + if (ioctl (if_fd, I_PUSH, "arp") < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't push ARP module"); + + /* Pop any modules on the stream */ + while (true) + { + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_POP, NULL) < 0) + break; + } + /* Push arp module to ip_fd */ + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_PUSH, "arp") < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't push ARP module\n"); + + /* Open arp_fd */ + if ((arp_fd = open (arp_node, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't open %s\n", arp_node); + /* Push arp module to arp_fd */ + if (ioctl (arp_fd, I_PUSH, "arp") < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't push ARP module\n"); + + /* Set ifname to arp */ + strioc_if.ic_cmd = SIOCSLIFNAME; + strioc_if.ic_timout = 0; + strioc_if.ic_len = sizeof(ifr); + strioc_if.ic_dp = (char *)𝔦 + if (ioctl(arp_fd, I_STR, &strioc_if) < 0){ + msg (M_ERR, "Can't set ifname to arp\n"); + } + } + + if ((ip_muxid = ioctl (tt->ip_fd, link_type, if_fd)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't link %s device to IP", dev_tuntap_type); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) { + if ((arp_muxid = ioctl (tt->ip_fd, link_type, arp_fd)) < 0) + msg (M_ERR, "Can't link %s device to ARP", dev_tuntap_type); + close (arp_fd); + } + + CLEAR (ifr); + strncpynt (ifr.lifr_name, tt->actual_name, sizeof (ifr.lifr_name)); + ifr.lifr_ip_muxid = ip_muxid; + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) { + ifr.lifr_arp_muxid = arp_muxid; + } + + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, SIOCSLIFMUXID, &ifr) < 0) + { + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_PUNLINK , arp_muxid); + } + ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_PUNLINK, ip_muxid); + msg (M_ERR, "Can't set multiplexor id"); + } + + set_nonblock (tt->fd); + set_cloexec (tt->fd); + set_cloexec (tt->ip_fd); + + msg (M_INFO, "TUN/TAP device %s opened", tt->actual_name); +} + +static void +solaris_close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + /* IPv6 interfaces need to be 'manually' de-configured */ + if ( tt->ipv6 && tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup ) + { + struct argv argv; + argv_init (&argv); + argv_printf( &argv, "%s %s inet6 unplumb", + IFCONFIG_PATH, tt->actual_name ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "Solaris ifconfig inet6 unplumb failed"); + argv_reset (&argv); + } + + if (tt->ip_fd >= 0) + { + struct lifreq ifr; + CLEAR (ifr); + strncpynt (ifr.lifr_name, tt->actual_name, sizeof (ifr.lifr_name)); + + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, SIOCGLIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't get iface flags"); + + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, SIOCGLIFMUXID, &ifr) < 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't get multiplexor id"); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP) + { + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_PUNLINK, ifr.lifr_arp_muxid) < 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't unlink interface(arp)"); + } + + if (ioctl (tt->ip_fd, I_PUNLINK, ifr.lifr_ip_muxid) < 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't unlink interface(ip)"); + + close (tt->ip_fd); + tt->ip_fd = -1; + } + + if (tt->fd >= 0) + { + close (tt->fd); + tt->fd = -1; + } + } +} + +/* + * Close TUN device. + */ +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + solaris_close_tun (tt); + + if (tt->actual_name) + free (tt->actual_name); + + clear_tuntap (tt); + free (tt); + } +} + +static void +solaris_error_close (struct tuntap *tt, const struct env_set *es, + const char *actual, bool unplumb_inet6 ) +{ + struct argv argv; + argv_init (&argv); + + if (unplumb_inet6) + { + argv_printf( &argv, "%s %s inet6 unplumb", + IFCONFIG_PATH, actual ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig inet6 unplumb failed"); + } + + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s %s unplumb", + IFCONFIG_PATH, + actual); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, "Solaris ifconfig unplumb failed"); + close_tun (tt); + msg (M_FATAL, "Solaris ifconfig failed"); + argv_reset (&argv); +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + struct strbuf sbuf; + sbuf.len = len; + sbuf.buf = (char *)buf; + return putmsg (tt->fd, NULL, &sbuf, 0) >= 0 ? sbuf.len : -1; +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + struct strbuf sbuf; + int f = 0; + + sbuf.maxlen = len; + sbuf.buf = (char *)buf; + return getmsg (tt->fd, NULL, &sbuf, &f) >= 0 ? sbuf.len : -1; +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + +/* + * OpenBSD has a slightly incompatible TUN device from + * the rest of the world, in that it prepends a + * uint32 to the beginning of the IP header + * to designate the protocol (why not just + * look at the version field in the IP header to + * determine v4 or v6?). + * + * We strip off this field on reads and + * put it back on writes. + * + * I have not tested TAP devices on OpenBSD, + * but I have conditionalized the special + * TUN handling code described above to + * go away for TAP devices. + */ + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, true, true, tt); + + /* Enable multicast on the interface */ + if (tt->fd >= 0) + { + struct tuninfo info; + + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNGIFINFO, &info) < 0) { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't get interface info: %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + +#ifdef IFF_MULTICAST /* openbsd 4.x doesn't have this */ + info.flags |= IFF_MULTICAST; +#endif + + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFINFO, &info) < 0) { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Can't set interface info: %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + } +} + +/* tun(4): "If the device was created by opening /dev/tunN, it will be + * automatically destroyed. Devices created via ifconfig(8) are + * only marked as not running and traffic will be dropped + * returning EHOSTDOWN." + * --> no special handling should be needed - *but* OpenBSD is misbehaving + * here: if the interface was put in tap mode ("ifconfig tunN link0"), it + * *will* stay around, and needs to be cleaned up manually + */ + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap* tt) +{ + /* only *TAP* devices need destroying, tun devices auto-self-destruct + */ + if (tt && (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN || tt->persistent_if ) ) + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free(tt); + } + else if (tt) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv; + + /* setup command, close tun dev (clears tt->actual_name!), run command + */ + + argv_init (&argv); + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s destroy", + IFCONFIG_PATH, tt->actual_name); + + close_tun_generic (tt); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "OpenBSD 'destroy tun interface' failed (non-critical)"); + + free (tt); + } +} + +static inline int +openbsd_modify_read_write_return (int len) +{ + if (len > 0) + return len > sizeof (u_int32_t) ? len - sizeof (u_int32_t) : 0; + else + return len; +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + struct ip *iph; + + iph = (struct ip *) buf; + + if (tt->ipv6 && iph->ip_v == 6) + type = htonl (AF_INET6); + else + type = htonl (AF_INET); + + iv[0].iov_base = &type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return openbsd_modify_read_write_return (writev (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + + iv[0].iov_base = &type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return openbsd_modify_read_write_return (readv (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + +/* + * NetBSD before 4.0 does not support IPv6 on tun out of the box, + * but there exists a patch (sys/net/if_tun.c, 1.79->1.80, see PR 32944). + * + * NetBSD 4.0 and up do, but we need to put the tun interface into + * "multi_af" mode, which will prepend the address family to all packets + * (same as OpenBSD and FreeBSD). If this is not enabled, the kernel + * silently drops all IPv6 packets on output and gets confused on input. + * + * On earlier versions, multi_af is not available at all, so we have + * two different NetBSD code variants here :-( + * + */ + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ +#ifdef NETBSD_MULTI_AF + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, true, true, tt); +#else + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, false, true, tt); +#endif + + if (tt->fd >= 0) + { + int i = IFF_POINTOPOINT|IFF_MULTICAST; + ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFMODE, &i); /* multicast on */ + i = 0; + ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSLMODE, &i); /* link layer mode off */ + +#ifdef NETBSD_MULTI_AF + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN ) + { + i = 1; + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &i) < 0) /* multi-af mode on */ + { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "ioctl(TUNSIFHEAD): %s", strerror(errno)); + } + } +#endif + } +} + +/* the current way OpenVPN handles tun devices on NetBSD leads to + * lingering tunX interfaces after close -> for a full cleanup, they + * need to be explicitely destroyed + */ +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + /* only tun devices need destroying, tap devices auto-self-destruct + */ + if (tt && ( tt->type != DEV_TYPE_TUN || tt->persistent_if ) ) + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free(tt); + } + else if (tt) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv; + + /* setup command, close tun dev (clears tt->actual_name!), run command + */ + + argv_init (&argv); + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s destroy", + IFCONFIG_PATH, tt->actual_name); + + close_tun_generic (tt); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "NetBSD 'destroy tun interface' failed (non-critical)"); + + free (tt); + } +} + +#ifdef NETBSD_MULTI_AF + +static inline int +netbsd_modify_read_write_return (int len) +{ + if (len > 0) + return len > sizeof (u_int32_t) ? len - sizeof (u_int32_t) : 0; + else + return len; +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + struct openvpn_iphdr *iph; + + iph = (struct openvpn_iphdr *) buf; + + if (tt->ipv6 && OPENVPN_IPH_GET_VER(iph->version_len) == 6) + type = htonl (AF_INET6); + else + type = htonl (AF_INET); + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return netbsd_modify_read_write_return (writev (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return netbsd_modify_read_write_return (readv (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#else /* not NETBSD_MULTI_AF -> older code, IPv4 only */ + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} +#endif /* NETBSD_MULTI_AF */ + +#elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD) + +static inline int +freebsd_modify_read_write_return (int len) +{ + if (len > 0) + return len > sizeof (u_int32_t) ? len - sizeof (u_int32_t) : 0; + else + return len; +} + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, true, true, tt); + + if (tt->fd >= 0 && tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + int i = IFF_POINTOPOINT | IFF_MULTICAST; + + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFMODE, &i) < 0) { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "ioctl(TUNSIFMODE): %s", strerror(errno)); + } + i = 1; + if (ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &i) < 0) { + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "ioctl(TUNSIFHEAD): %s", strerror(errno)); + } + } +} + +/* tun(4): "These network interfaces persist until the if_tun.ko module is + * unloaded, or until removed with the ifconfig(8) command." + * (verified for FreeBSD 6.3, 7.4, 8.2 and 9, same for tap(4)) + * + * so, to avoid lingering tun/tap interfaces after OpenVPN quits, + * we need to call "ifconfig ... destroy" for cleanup + */ +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt && tt->persistent_if ) /* keep pre-existing if around */ + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + } + else if (tt) /* close and destroy */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv; + + /* setup command, close tun dev (clears tt->actual_name!), run command + */ + + argv_init (&argv); + argv_printf (&argv, "%s %s destroy", + IFCONFIG_PATH, tt->actual_name); + + close_tun_generic (tt); + + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "FreeBSD 'destroy tun interface' failed (non-critical)"); + + free (tt); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + struct ip *iph; + + iph = (struct ip *) buf; + + if (tt->ipv6 && iph->ip_v == 6) + type = htonl (AF_INET6); + else + type = htonl (AF_INET); + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return freebsd_modify_read_write_return (writev (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return freebsd_modify_read_write_return (readv (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY) + +static inline int +dragonfly_modify_read_write_return (int len) +{ + if (len > 0) + return len > sizeof (u_int32_t) ? len - sizeof (u_int32_t) : 0; + else + return len; +} + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, true, true, tt); + + if (tt->fd >= 0) + { + int i = 0; + + /* Disable extended modes */ + ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSLMODE, &i); + i = 1; + ioctl (tt->fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &i); + } +} + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + struct ip *iph; + + iph = (struct ip *) buf; + + if (tt->ipv6 && iph->ip_v == 6) + type = htonl (AF_INET6); + else + type = htonl (AF_INET); + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return dragonfly_modify_read_write_return (writev (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + u_int32_t type; + struct iovec iv[2]; + + iv[0].iov_base = (char *)&type; + iv[0].iov_len = sizeof (type); + iv[1].iov_base = buf; + iv[1].iov_len = len; + + return dragonfly_modify_read_write_return (readv (tt->fd, iv, 2)); + } + else + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + +/* Darwin (MacOS X) is mostly "just use the generic stuff", but there + * is always one caveat...: + * + * If IPv6 is configured, and the tun device is closed, the IPv6 address + * configured to the tun interface changes to a lingering /128 route + * pointing to lo0. Need to unconfigure... (observed on 10.5) + */ + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, true, true, tt); +} + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap* tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv; + argv_init (&argv); + + if ( tt->ipv6 && tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup ) + { + const char * ifconfig_ipv6_local = + print_in6_addr (tt->local_ipv6, 0, &gc); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s delete -inet6 %s", + ROUTE_PATH, ifconfig_ipv6_local ); + argv_msg (M_INFO, &argv); + openvpn_execve_check (&argv, NULL, 0, "MacOS X 'remove inet6 route' failed (non-critical)"); + } + + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#elif defined(WIN32) + +int +tun_read_queue (struct tuntap *tt, int maxsize) +{ + if (tt->reads.iostate == IOSTATE_INITIAL) + { + DWORD len; + BOOL status; + int err; + + /* reset buf to its initial state */ + tt->reads.buf = tt->reads.buf_init; + + len = maxsize ? maxsize : BLEN (&tt->reads.buf); + ASSERT (len <= BLEN (&tt->reads.buf)); + + /* the overlapped read will signal this event on I/O completion */ + ASSERT (ResetEvent (tt->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + + status = ReadFile( + tt->hand, + BPTR (&tt->reads.buf), + len, + &tt->reads.size, + &tt->reads.overlapped + ); + + if (status) /* operation completed immediately? */ + { + /* since we got an immediate return, we must signal the event object ourselves */ + ASSERT (SetEvent (tt->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + + tt->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + tt->reads.status = 0; + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Read immediate return [%d,%d]", + (int) len, + (int) tt->reads.size); + } + else + { + err = GetLastError (); + if (err == ERROR_IO_PENDING) /* operation queued? */ + { + tt->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_QUEUED; + tt->reads.status = err; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Read queued [%d]", + (int) len); + } + else /* error occurred */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + ASSERT (SetEvent (tt->reads.overlapped.hEvent)); + tt->reads.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + tt->reads.status = err; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Read error [%d] : %s", + (int) len, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + } + } + } + return tt->reads.iostate; +} + +int +tun_write_queue (struct tuntap *tt, struct buffer *buf) +{ + if (tt->writes.iostate == IOSTATE_INITIAL) + { + BOOL status; + int err; + + /* make a private copy of buf */ + tt->writes.buf = tt->writes.buf_init; + tt->writes.buf.len = 0; + ASSERT (buf_copy (&tt->writes.buf, buf)); + + /* the overlapped write will signal this event on I/O completion */ + ASSERT (ResetEvent (tt->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + + status = WriteFile( + tt->hand, + BPTR (&tt->writes.buf), + BLEN (&tt->writes.buf), + &tt->writes.size, + &tt->writes.overlapped + ); + + if (status) /* operation completed immediately? */ + { + tt->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + + /* since we got an immediate return, we must signal the event object ourselves */ + ASSERT (SetEvent (tt->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + + tt->writes.status = 0; + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Write immediate return [%d,%d]", + BLEN (&tt->writes.buf), + (int) tt->writes.size); + } + else + { + err = GetLastError (); + if (err == ERROR_IO_PENDING) /* operation queued? */ + { + tt->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_QUEUED; + tt->writes.status = err; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Write queued [%d]", + BLEN (&tt->writes.buf)); + } + else /* error occurred */ + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + ASSERT (SetEvent (tt->writes.overlapped.hEvent)); + tt->writes.iostate = IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; + tt->writes.status = err; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Write error [%d] : %s", + BLEN (&tt->writes.buf), + strerror_win32 (err, &gc)); + gc_free (&gc); + } + } + } + return tt->writes.iostate; +} + +int +tun_finalize ( + HANDLE h, + struct overlapped_io *io, + struct buffer *buf) +{ + int ret = -1; + BOOL status; + + switch (io->iostate) + { + case IOSTATE_QUEUED: + status = GetOverlappedResult( + h, + &io->overlapped, + &io->size, + FALSE + ); + if (status) + { + /* successful return for a queued operation */ + if (buf) + *buf = io->buf; + ret = io->size; + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Completion success [%d]", ret); + } + else + { + /* error during a queued operation */ + ret = -1; + if (GetLastError() != ERROR_IO_INCOMPLETE) + { + /* if no error (i.e. just not finished yet), + then DON'T execute this code */ + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + msg (D_WIN32_IO | M_ERRNO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Completion error"); + } + } + break; + + case IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN: + io->iostate = IOSTATE_INITIAL; + ASSERT (ResetEvent (io->overlapped.hEvent)); + if (io->status) + { + /* error return for a non-queued operation */ + SetLastError (io->status); + ret = -1; + msg (D_WIN32_IO | M_ERRNO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Completion non-queued error"); + } + else + { + /* successful return for a non-queued operation */ + if (buf) + *buf = io->buf; + ret = io->size; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Completion non-queued success [%d]", ret); + } + break; + + case IOSTATE_INITIAL: /* were we called without proper queueing? */ + SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION); + ret = -1; + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO, "WIN32 I/O: TAP Completion BAD STATE"); + break; + + default: + ASSERT (0); + } + + if (buf) + buf->len = ret; + return ret; +} + +const struct tap_reg * +get_tap_reg (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + HKEY adapter_key; + LONG status; + DWORD len; + struct tap_reg *first = NULL; + struct tap_reg *last = NULL; + int i = 0; + + status = RegOpenKeyEx( + HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + ADAPTER_KEY, + 0, + KEY_READ, + &adapter_key); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error opening registry key: %s", ADAPTER_KEY); + + while (true) + { + char enum_name[256]; + char unit_string[256]; + HKEY unit_key; + char component_id_string[] = "ComponentId"; + char component_id[256]; + char net_cfg_instance_id_string[] = "NetCfgInstanceId"; + char net_cfg_instance_id[256]; + DWORD data_type; + + len = sizeof (enum_name); + status = RegEnumKeyEx( + adapter_key, + i, + enum_name, + &len, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS) + break; + else if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error enumerating registry subkeys of key: %s", + ADAPTER_KEY); + + openvpn_snprintf (unit_string, sizeof(unit_string), "%s\\%s", + ADAPTER_KEY, enum_name); + + status = RegOpenKeyEx( + HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + unit_string, + 0, + KEY_READ, + &unit_key); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + dmsg (D_REGISTRY, "Error opening registry key: %s", unit_string); + else + { + len = sizeof (component_id); + status = RegQueryValueEx( + unit_key, + component_id_string, + NULL, + &data_type, + component_id, + &len); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS || data_type != REG_SZ) + dmsg (D_REGISTRY, "Error opening registry key: %s\\%s", + unit_string, component_id_string); + else + { + len = sizeof (net_cfg_instance_id); + status = RegQueryValueEx( + unit_key, + net_cfg_instance_id_string, + NULL, + &data_type, + net_cfg_instance_id, + &len); + + if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS && data_type == REG_SZ) + { + if (!strcmp (component_id, TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID)) + { + struct tap_reg *reg; + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (reg, struct tap_reg, gc); + reg->guid = string_alloc (net_cfg_instance_id, gc); + + /* link into return list */ + if (!first) + first = reg; + if (last) + last->next = reg; + last = reg; + } + } + } + RegCloseKey (unit_key); + } + ++i; + } + + RegCloseKey (adapter_key); + return first; +} + +const struct panel_reg * +get_panel_reg (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + LONG status; + HKEY network_connections_key; + DWORD len; + struct panel_reg *first = NULL; + struct panel_reg *last = NULL; + int i = 0; + + status = RegOpenKeyEx( + HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + NETWORK_CONNECTIONS_KEY, + 0, + KEY_READ, + &network_connections_key); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error opening registry key: %s", NETWORK_CONNECTIONS_KEY); + + while (true) + { + char enum_name[256]; + char connection_string[256]; + HKEY connection_key; + char name_data[256]; + DWORD name_type; + const char name_string[] = "Name"; + + len = sizeof (enum_name); + status = RegEnumKeyEx( + network_connections_key, + i, + enum_name, + &len, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS) + break; + else if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + msg (M_FATAL, "Error enumerating registry subkeys of key: %s", + NETWORK_CONNECTIONS_KEY); + + openvpn_snprintf (connection_string, sizeof(connection_string), + "%s\\%s\\Connection", + NETWORK_CONNECTIONS_KEY, enum_name); + + status = RegOpenKeyEx( + HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + connection_string, + 0, + KEY_READ, + &connection_key); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + dmsg (D_REGISTRY, "Error opening registry key: %s", connection_string); + else + { + len = sizeof (name_data); + status = RegQueryValueEx( + connection_key, + name_string, + NULL, + &name_type, + name_data, + &len); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS || name_type != REG_SZ) + dmsg (D_REGISTRY, "Error opening registry key: %s\\%s\\%s", + NETWORK_CONNECTIONS_KEY, connection_string, name_string); + else + { + struct panel_reg *reg; + + ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (reg, struct panel_reg, gc); + reg->name = string_alloc (name_data, gc); + reg->guid = string_alloc (enum_name, gc); + + /* link into return list */ + if (!first) + first = reg; + if (last) + last->next = reg; + last = reg; + } + RegCloseKey (connection_key); + } + ++i; + } + + RegCloseKey (network_connections_key); + + return first; +} + +/* + * Check that two addresses are part of the same 255.255.255.252 subnet. + */ +void +verify_255_255_255_252 (in_addr_t local, in_addr_t remote) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const unsigned int mask = 3; + const char *err = NULL; + + if (local == remote) + { + err = "must be different"; + goto error; + } + if ((local & (~mask)) != (remote & (~mask))) + { + err = "must exist within the same 255.255.255.252 subnet. This is a limitation of --dev tun when used with the TAP-WIN32 driver"; + goto error; + } + if ((local & mask) == 0 + || (local & mask) == 3 + || (remote & mask) == 0 + || (remote & mask) == 3) + { + err = "cannot use the first or last address within a given 255.255.255.252 subnet. This is a limitation of --dev tun when used with the TAP-WIN32 driver"; + goto error; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return; + + error: + msg (M_FATAL, "There is a problem in your selection of --ifconfig endpoints [local=%s, remote=%s]. The local and remote VPN endpoints %s. Try '" PACKAGE " --show-valid-subnets' option for more info.", + print_in_addr_t (local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (remote, 0, &gc), + err); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +void show_valid_win32_tun_subnets (void) +{ + int i; + int col = 0; + + printf ("On Windows, point-to-point IP support (i.e. --dev tun)\n"); + printf ("is emulated by the TAP-Windows driver. The major limitation\n"); + printf ("imposed by this approach is that the --ifconfig local and\n"); + printf ("remote endpoints must be part of the same 255.255.255.252\n"); + printf ("subnet. The following list shows examples of endpoint\n"); + printf ("pairs which satisfy this requirement. Only the final\n"); + printf ("component of the IP address pairs is at issue.\n\n"); + printf ("As an example, the following option would be correct:\n"); + printf (" --ifconfig 10.7.0.5 10.7.0.6 (on host A)\n"); + printf (" --ifconfig 10.7.0.6 10.7.0.5 (on host B)\n"); + printf ("because [5,6] is part of the below list.\n\n"); + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 4) + { + printf("[%3d,%3d] ", i+1, i+2); + if (++col > 4) + { + col = 0; + printf ("\n"); + } + } + if (col) + printf ("\n"); +} + +void +show_tap_win_adapters (int msglev, int warnlev) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + bool warn_panel_null = false; + bool warn_panel_dup = false; + bool warn_tap_dup = false; + + int links; + + const struct tap_reg *tr; + const struct tap_reg *tr1; + const struct panel_reg *pr; + + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = get_tap_reg (&gc); + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg = get_panel_reg (&gc); + + msg (msglev, "Available TAP-WIN32 adapters [name, GUID]:"); + + /* loop through each TAP-Windows adapter registry entry */ + for (tr = tap_reg; tr != NULL; tr = tr->next) + { + links = 0; + + /* loop through each network connections entry in the control panel */ + for (pr = panel_reg; pr != NULL; pr = pr->next) + { + if (!strcmp (tr->guid, pr->guid)) + { + msg (msglev, "'%s' %s", pr->name, tr->guid); + ++links; + } + } + + if (links > 1) + { + warn_panel_dup = true; + } + else if (links == 0) + { + /* a TAP adapter exists without a link from the network + connections control panel */ + warn_panel_null = true; + msg (msglev, "[NULL] %s", tr->guid); + } + } + + /* check for TAP-Windows adapter duplicated GUIDs */ + for (tr = tap_reg; tr != NULL; tr = tr->next) + { + for (tr1 = tap_reg; tr1 != NULL; tr1 = tr1->next) + { + if (tr != tr1 && !strcmp (tr->guid, tr1->guid)) + warn_tap_dup = true; + } + } + + /* warn on registry inconsistencies */ + if (warn_tap_dup) + msg (warnlev, "WARNING: Some TAP-Windows adapters have duplicate GUIDs"); + + if (warn_panel_dup) + msg (warnlev, "WARNING: Some TAP-Windows adapters have duplicate links from the Network Connections control panel"); + + if (warn_panel_null) + msg (warnlev, "WARNING: Some TAP-Windows adapters have no link from the Network Connections control panel"); + + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Confirm that GUID is a TAP-Windows adapter. + */ +static bool +is_tap_win (const char *guid, const struct tap_reg *tap_reg) +{ + const struct tap_reg *tr; + + for (tr = tap_reg; tr != NULL; tr = tr->next) + { + if (guid && !strcmp (tr->guid, guid)) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +static const char * +guid_to_name (const char *guid, const struct panel_reg *panel_reg) +{ + const struct panel_reg *pr; + + for (pr = panel_reg; pr != NULL; pr = pr->next) + { + if (guid && !strcmp (pr->guid, guid)) + return pr->name; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static const char * +name_to_guid (const char *name, const struct tap_reg *tap_reg, const struct panel_reg *panel_reg) +{ + const struct panel_reg *pr; + + for (pr = panel_reg; pr != NULL; pr = pr->next) + { + if (name && !strcmp (pr->name, name) && is_tap_win (pr->guid, tap_reg)) + return pr->guid; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void +at_least_one_tap_win (const struct tap_reg *tap_reg) +{ + if (!tap_reg) + msg (M_FATAL, "There are no TAP-Windows adapters on this system. You should be able to create a TAP-Windows adapter by going to Start -> All Programs -> " PACKAGE_NAME " -> Add a new TAP-Windows virtual ethernet adapter."); +} + +/* + * Get an adapter GUID and optional actual_name from the + * registry for the TAP device # = device_number. + */ +static const char * +get_unspecified_device_guid (const int device_number, + char *actual_name, + int actual_name_size, + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg_src, + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg_src, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = tap_reg_src; + struct buffer ret = clear_buf (); + struct buffer actual = clear_buf (); + int i; + + ASSERT (device_number >= 0); + + /* Make sure we have at least one TAP adapter */ + if (!tap_reg) + return NULL; + + /* The actual_name output buffer may be NULL */ + if (actual_name) + { + ASSERT (actual_name_size > 0); + buf_set_write (&actual, actual_name, actual_name_size); + } + + /* Move on to specified device number */ + for (i = 0; i < device_number; i++) + { + tap_reg = tap_reg->next; + if (!tap_reg) + return NULL; + } + + /* Save Network Panel name (if exists) in actual_name */ + if (actual_name) + { + const char *act = guid_to_name (tap_reg->guid, panel_reg_src); + if (act) + buf_printf (&actual, "%s", act); + else + buf_printf (&actual, "%s", tap_reg->guid); + } + + /* Save GUID for return value */ + ret = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + buf_printf (&ret, "%s", tap_reg->guid); + return BSTR (&ret); +} + +/* + * Lookup a --dev-node adapter name in the registry + * returning the GUID and optional actual_name. + */ +static const char * +get_device_guid (const char *name, + char *actual_name, + int actual_name_size, + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg, + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg, + struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer ret = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + struct buffer actual = clear_buf (); + + /* Make sure we have at least one TAP adapter */ + if (!tap_reg) + return NULL; + + /* The actual_name output buffer may be NULL */ + if (actual_name) + { + ASSERT (actual_name_size > 0); + buf_set_write (&actual, actual_name, actual_name_size); + } + + /* Check if GUID was explicitly specified as --dev-node parameter */ + if (is_tap_win (name, tap_reg)) + { + const char *act = guid_to_name (name, panel_reg); + buf_printf (&ret, "%s", name); + if (act) + buf_printf (&actual, "%s", act); + else + buf_printf (&actual, "%s", name); + return BSTR (&ret); + } + + /* Lookup TAP adapter in network connections list */ + { + const char *guid = name_to_guid (name, tap_reg, panel_reg); + if (guid) + { + buf_printf (&actual, "%s", name); + buf_printf (&ret, "%s", guid); + return BSTR (&ret); + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Get adapter info list + */ +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO * +get_adapter_info_list (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + ULONG size = 0; + IP_ADAPTER_INFO *pi = NULL; + DWORD status; + + if ((status = GetAdaptersInfo (NULL, &size)) != ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetAdaptersInfo #1 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + else + { + pi = (PIP_ADAPTER_INFO) gc_malloc (size, false, gc); + if ((status = GetAdaptersInfo (pi, &size)) == NO_ERROR) + return pi; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetAdaptersInfo #2 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + } + return pi; +} + +const IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO * +get_per_adapter_info (const DWORD index, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + ULONG size = 0; + IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO *pi = NULL; + DWORD status; + + if (index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + if ((status = GetPerAdapterInfo (index, NULL, &size)) != ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetPerAdapterInfo #1 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + else + { + pi = (PIP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO) gc_malloc (size, false, gc); + if ((status = GetPerAdapterInfo ((ULONG)index, pi, &size)) == ERROR_SUCCESS) + return pi; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetPerAdapterInfo #2 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + } + } + return pi; +} + +static const IP_INTERFACE_INFO * +get_interface_info_list (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + ULONG size = 0; + IP_INTERFACE_INFO *ii = NULL; + DWORD status; + + if ((status = GetInterfaceInfo (NULL, &size)) != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetInterfaceInfo #1 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + else + { + ii = (PIP_INTERFACE_INFO) gc_malloc (size, false, gc); + if ((status = GetInterfaceInfo (ii, &size)) == NO_ERROR) + return ii; + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "GetInterfaceInfo #2 failed (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, gc)); + } + } + return ii; +} + +static const IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP * +get_interface_info (DWORD index, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const IP_INTERFACE_INFO *list = get_interface_info_list (gc); + if (list) + { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < list->NumAdapters; ++i) + { + const IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP *inter = &list->Adapter[i]; + if (index == inter->Index) + return inter; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Given an adapter index, return a pointer to the + * IP_ADAPTER_INFO structure for that adapter. + */ + +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO * +get_adapter (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, DWORD index) +{ + if (ai && index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *a; + + /* find index in the linked list */ + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->Next) + { + if (a->Index == index) + return a; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO * +get_adapter_info (DWORD index, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + return get_adapter (get_adapter_info_list (gc), index); +} + +static int +get_adapter_n_ip_netmask (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai) +{ + if (ai) + { + int n = 0; + const IP_ADDR_STRING *ip = &ai->IpAddressList; + + while (ip) + { + ++n; + ip = ip->Next; + } + return n; + } + else + return 0; +} + +static bool +get_adapter_ip_netmask (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, const int n, in_addr_t *ip, in_addr_t *netmask) +{ + bool ret = false; + *ip = 0; + *netmask = 0; + + if (ai) + { + const IP_ADDR_STRING *iplist = &ai->IpAddressList; + int i = 0; + + while (iplist) + { + if (i == n) + break; + ++i; + iplist = iplist->Next; + } + + if (iplist) + { + const unsigned int getaddr_flags = GETADDR_HOST_ORDER; + const char *ip_str = iplist->IpAddress.String; + const char *netmask_str = iplist->IpMask.String; + bool succeed1 = false; + bool succeed2 = false; + + if (ip_str && netmask_str && strlen (ip_str) && strlen (netmask_str)) + { + *ip = getaddr (getaddr_flags, ip_str, 0, &succeed1, NULL); + *netmask = getaddr (getaddr_flags, netmask_str, 0, &succeed2, NULL); + ret = (succeed1 == true && succeed2 == true); + } + } + } + + return ret; +} + +static bool +test_adapter_ip_netmask (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, const in_addr_t ip, const in_addr_t netmask) +{ + if (ai) + { + in_addr_t ip_adapter = 0; + in_addr_t netmask_adapter = 0; + const bool status = get_adapter_ip_netmask (ai, 0, &ip_adapter, &netmask_adapter); + return (status && ip_adapter == ip && netmask_adapter == netmask); + } + else + return false; +} + +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO * +get_tun_adapter (const struct tuntap *tt, const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list) +{ + if (list && tt) + return get_adapter (list, tt->adapter_index); + else + return NULL; +} + +bool +is_adapter_up (const struct tuntap *tt, const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list) +{ + int i; + bool ret = false; + + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai = get_tun_adapter (tt, list); + + if (ai) + { + const int n = get_adapter_n_ip_netmask (ai); + + /* loop once for every IP/netmask assigned to adapter */ + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + in_addr_t ip, netmask; + if (get_adapter_ip_netmask (ai, i, &ip, &netmask)) + { + if (tt->local && tt->adapter_netmask) + { + /* wait for our --ifconfig parms to match the actual adapter parms */ + if (tt->local == ip && tt->adapter_netmask == netmask) + ret = true; + } + else + { + /* --ifconfig was not defined, maybe using a real DHCP server */ + if (ip && netmask) + ret = true; + } + } + } + } + else + ret = true; /* this can occur when TAP adapter is bridged */ + + return ret; +} + +bool +is_ip_in_adapter_subnet (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, const in_addr_t ip, in_addr_t *highest_netmask) +{ + int i; + bool ret = false; + + if (highest_netmask) + *highest_netmask = 0; + + if (ai) + { + const int n = get_adapter_n_ip_netmask (ai); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + in_addr_t adapter_ip, adapter_netmask; + if (get_adapter_ip_netmask (ai, i, &adapter_ip, &adapter_netmask)) + { + if (adapter_ip && adapter_netmask && (ip & adapter_netmask) == (adapter_ip & adapter_netmask)) + { + if (highest_netmask && adapter_netmask > *highest_netmask) + *highest_netmask = adapter_netmask; + ret = true; + } + } + } + } + return ret; +} + +DWORD +adapter_index_of_ip (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list, + const in_addr_t ip, + int *count, + in_addr_t *netmask) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + DWORD ret = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + in_addr_t highest_netmask = 0; + bool first = true; + + if (count) + *count = 0; + + while (list) + { + in_addr_t hn; + + if (is_ip_in_adapter_subnet (list, ip, &hn)) + { + if (first || hn > highest_netmask) + { + highest_netmask = hn; + if (count) + *count = 1; + ret = list->Index; + first = false; + } + else if (hn == highest_netmask) + { + if (count) + ++*count; + } + } + list = list->Next; + } + + dmsg (D_ROUTE_DEBUG, "DEBUG: IP Locate: ip=%s nm=%s index=%d count=%d", + print_in_addr_t (ip, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (highest_netmask, 0, &gc), + (int)ret, + count ? *count : -1); + + if (ret == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID && count) + *count = 0; + + if (netmask) + *netmask = highest_netmask; + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Given an adapter index, return true if the adapter + * is DHCP disabled. + */ + +#define DHCP_STATUS_UNDEF 0 +#define DHCP_STATUS_ENABLED 1 +#define DHCP_STATUS_DISABLED 2 + +static int +dhcp_status (DWORD index) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + int ret = DHCP_STATUS_UNDEF; + if (index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai = get_adapter_info (index, &gc); + + if (ai) + { + if (ai->DhcpEnabled) + ret = DHCP_STATUS_ENABLED; + else + ret = DHCP_STATUS_DISABLED; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Delete all temporary address/netmask pairs which were added + * to adapter (given by index) by previous calls to AddIPAddress. + */ +static void +delete_temp_addresses (DWORD index) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *a = get_adapter_info (index, &gc); + + if (a) + { + const IP_ADDR_STRING *ip = &a->IpAddressList; + while (ip) + { + DWORD status; + const DWORD context = ip->Context; + + if ((status = DeleteIPAddress ((ULONG) context)) == NO_ERROR) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Successfully deleted previously set dynamic IP/netmask: %s/%s", + ip->IpAddress.String, + ip->IpMask.String); + } + else + { + const char *empty = "0.0.0.0"; + if (strcmp (ip->IpAddress.String, empty) + || strcmp (ip->IpMask.String, empty)) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: could not delete previously set dynamic IP/netmask: %s/%s (status=%u)", + ip->IpAddress.String, + ip->IpMask.String, + (unsigned int)status); + } + ip = ip->Next; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Get interface index for use with IP Helper API functions. + */ +static DWORD +get_adapter_index_method_1 (const char *guid) +{ + DWORD index; + ULONG aindex; + wchar_t wbuf[256]; + _snwprintf (wbuf, SIZE (wbuf), L"\\DEVICE\\TCPIP_%S", guid); + wbuf [SIZE(wbuf) - 1] = 0; + if (GetAdapterIndex (wbuf, &aindex) != NO_ERROR) + index = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + else + index = (DWORD)aindex; + return index; +} + +static DWORD +get_adapter_index_method_2 (const char *guid) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + DWORD index = TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID; + + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + + while (list) + { + if (!strcmp (guid, list->AdapterName)) + { + index = list->Index; + break; + } + list = list->Next; + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return index; +} + +static DWORD +get_adapter_index (const char *guid) +{ + DWORD index; + index = get_adapter_index_method_1 (guid); + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + index = get_adapter_index_method_2 (guid); + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: could not get adapter index for %s", guid); + return index; +} + +static DWORD +get_adapter_index_flexible (const char *name) /* actual name or GUID */ +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + DWORD index; + index = get_adapter_index_method_1 (name); + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + index = get_adapter_index_method_2 (name); + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = get_tap_reg (&gc); + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg = get_panel_reg (&gc); + const char *guid = name_to_guid (name, tap_reg, panel_reg); + index = get_adapter_index_method_1 (guid); + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + index = get_adapter_index_method_2 (guid); + } + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: could not get adapter index for name/GUID '%s'", name); + gc_free (&gc); + return index; +} + +/* + * Return a string representing a PIP_ADDR_STRING + */ +static const char * +format_ip_addr_string (const IP_ADDR_STRING *ip, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + while (ip) + { + buf_printf (&out, "%s", ip->IpAddress.String); + if (strlen (ip->IpMask.String)) + { + buf_printf (&out, "/"); + buf_printf (&out, "%s", ip->IpMask.String); + } + buf_printf (&out, " "); + ip = ip->Next; + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +/* + * Show info for a single adapter + */ +static void +show_adapter (int msglev, const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *a, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + msg (msglev, "%s", a->Description); + msg (msglev, " Index = %d", (int)a->Index); + msg (msglev, " GUID = %s", a->AdapterName); + msg (msglev, " IP = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&a->IpAddressList, gc)); + msg (msglev, " MAC = %s", format_hex_ex (a->Address, a->AddressLength, 0, 1, ":", gc)); + msg (msglev, " GATEWAY = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&a->GatewayList, gc)); + if (a->DhcpEnabled) + { + msg (msglev, " DHCP SERV = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&a->DhcpServer, gc)); + msg (msglev, " DHCP LEASE OBTAINED = %s", time_string (a->LeaseObtained, 0, false, gc)); + msg (msglev, " DHCP LEASE EXPIRES = %s", time_string (a->LeaseExpires, 0, false, gc)); + } + if (a->HaveWins) + { + msg (msglev, " PRI WINS = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&a->PrimaryWinsServer, gc)); + msg (msglev, " SEC WINS = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&a->SecondaryWinsServer, gc)); + } + + { + const IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO *pai = get_per_adapter_info (a->Index, gc); + if (pai) + { + msg (msglev, " DNS SERV = %s", format_ip_addr_string (&pai->DnsServerList, gc)); + } + } +} + +/* + * Show current adapter list + */ +void +show_adapters (int msglev) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + + msg (msglev, "SYSTEM ADAPTER LIST"); + if (ai) + { + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *a; + + /* find index in the linked list */ + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->Next) + { + show_adapter (msglev, a, &gc); + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Set a particular TAP-Windows adapter (or all of them if + * adapter_name == NULL) to allow it to be opened from + * a non-admin account. This setting will only persist + * for the lifetime of the device object. + */ + +static void +tap_allow_nonadmin_access_handle (const char *device_path, HANDLE hand) +{ + struct security_attributes sa; + BOOL status; + + if (!init_security_attributes_allow_all (&sa)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: init SA failed"); + + status = SetKernelObjectSecurity (hand, DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &sa.sd); + if (!status) + { + msg (M_ERRNO, "Error: SetKernelObjectSecurity failed on %s", device_path); + } + else + { + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "TAP-Windows device: %s [Non-admin access allowed]", device_path); + } +} + +void +tap_allow_nonadmin_access (const char *dev_node) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = get_tap_reg (&gc); + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg = get_panel_reg (&gc); + const char *device_guid = NULL; + HANDLE hand; + char actual_buffer[256]; + char device_path[256]; + + at_least_one_tap_win (tap_reg); + + if (dev_node) + { + /* Get the device GUID for the device specified with --dev-node. */ + device_guid = get_device_guid (dev_node, actual_buffer, sizeof (actual_buffer), tap_reg, panel_reg, &gc); + + if (!device_guid) + msg (M_FATAL, "TAP-Windows adapter '%s' not found", dev_node); + + /* Open Windows TAP-Windows adapter */ + openvpn_snprintf (device_path, sizeof(device_path), "%s%s%s", + USERMODEDEVICEDIR, + device_guid, + TAP_WIN_SUFFIX); + + hand = CreateFile ( + device_path, + MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, + 0, /* was: FILE_SHARE_READ */ + 0, + OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + 0 + ); + + if (hand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + msg (M_ERR, "CreateFile failed on TAP device: %s", device_path); + + tap_allow_nonadmin_access_handle (device_path, hand); + CloseHandle (hand); + } + else + { + int device_number = 0; + + /* Try opening all TAP devices */ + while (true) + { + device_guid = get_unspecified_device_guid (device_number, + actual_buffer, + sizeof (actual_buffer), + tap_reg, + panel_reg, + &gc); + + if (!device_guid) + break; + + /* Open Windows TAP-Windows adapter */ + openvpn_snprintf (device_path, sizeof(device_path), "%s%s%s", + USERMODEDEVICEDIR, + device_guid, + TAP_WIN_SUFFIX); + + hand = CreateFile ( + device_path, + MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, + 0, /* was: FILE_SHARE_READ */ + 0, + OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + 0 + ); + + if (hand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + msg (M_WARN, "CreateFile failed on TAP device: %s", device_path); + else + { + tap_allow_nonadmin_access_handle (device_path, hand); + CloseHandle (hand); + } + + device_number++; + } + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * DHCP release/renewal + */ +bool +dhcp_release_by_adapter_index(const DWORD adapter_index) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + const IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP *inter = get_interface_info (adapter_index, &gc); + + if (inter) + { + DWORD status = IpReleaseAddress ((IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP *)inter); + if (status == NO_ERROR) + { + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "TAP: DHCP address released"); + ret = true; + } + else + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: Release of DHCP-assigned IP address lease on TAP-Windows adapter failed: %s (code=%u)", + strerror_win32 (status, &gc), + (unsigned int)status); + } + + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static bool +dhcp_release (const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt && tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ && tt->adapter_index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + return dhcp_release_by_adapter_index (tt->adapter_index); + else + return false; +} + +bool +dhcp_renew_by_adapter_index (const DWORD adapter_index) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + bool ret = false; + const IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP *inter = get_interface_info (adapter_index, &gc); + + if (inter) + { + DWORD status = IpRenewAddress ((IP_ADAPTER_INDEX_MAP *)inter); + if (status == NO_ERROR) + { + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "TAP: DHCP address renewal succeeded"); + ret = true; + } + else + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: Failed to renew DHCP IP address lease on TAP-Windows adapter: %s (code=%u)", + strerror_win32 (status, &gc), + (unsigned int)status); + } + gc_free (&gc); + return ret; +} + +static bool +dhcp_renew (const struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt && tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ && tt->adapter_index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + return dhcp_renew_by_adapter_index (tt->adapter_index); + else + return false; +} + +/* + * netsh functions + */ + +static void +netsh_command (const struct argv *a, int n) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + bool status; + openvpn_sleep (1); + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + argv_msg_prefix (M_INFO, a, "NETSH"); + status = openvpn_execve_check (a, NULL, 0, "ERROR: netsh command failed"); + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + if (status) + return; + openvpn_sleep (4); + } + msg (M_FATAL, "NETSH: command failed"); +} + +void +ipconfig_register_dns (const struct env_set *es) +{ + struct argv argv; + bool status; + const char err[] = "ERROR: Windows ipconfig command failed"; + + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "Start net commands..."); + netcmd_semaphore_lock (); + + argv_init (&argv); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc stop dnscache", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_NET_PATH_SUFFIX); + argv_msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, err); + argv_reset(&argv); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc start dnscache", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_NET_PATH_SUFFIX); + argv_msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, err); + argv_reset(&argv); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc /flushdns", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_IPCONFIG_PATH_SUFFIX); + argv_msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, err); + argv_reset(&argv); + + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc /registerdns", + get_win_sys_path(), + WIN_IPCONFIG_PATH_SUFFIX); + argv_msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, &argv); + status = openvpn_execve_check (&argv, es, 0, err); + argv_reset(&argv); + + netcmd_semaphore_release (); + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "End net commands..."); +} + +void +ip_addr_string_to_array (in_addr_t *dest, int *dest_len, const IP_ADDR_STRING *src) +{ + int i = 0; + while (src) + { + const unsigned int getaddr_flags = GETADDR_HOST_ORDER; + const char *ip_str = src->IpAddress.String; + in_addr_t ip = 0; + bool succeed = false; + + if (i >= *dest_len) + break; + if (!ip_str || !strlen (ip_str)) + break; + + ip = getaddr (getaddr_flags, ip_str, 0, &succeed, NULL); + if (!succeed) + break; + dest[i++] = ip; + + src = src->Next; + } + *dest_len = i; + +#if 0 + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + msg (M_INFO, "ip_addr_string_to_array [%d]", *dest_len); + for (i = 0; i < *dest_len; ++i) + { + msg (M_INFO, "%s", print_in_addr_t (dest[i], 0, &gc)); + } + gc_free (&gc); + } +#endif +} + +static bool +ip_addr_one_to_one (const in_addr_t *a1, const int a1len, const IP_ADDR_STRING *ias) +{ + in_addr_t a2[8]; + int a2len = SIZE(a2); + int i; + + ip_addr_string_to_array (a2, &a2len, ias); + /*msg (M_INFO, "a1len=%d a2len=%d", a1len, a2len);*/ + if (a1len != a2len) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i < a1len; ++i) + { + if (a1[i] != a2[i]) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool +ip_addr_member_of (const in_addr_t addr, const IP_ADDR_STRING *ias) +{ + in_addr_t aa[8]; + int len = SIZE(aa); + int i; + + ip_addr_string_to_array (aa, &len, ias); + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + { + if (addr == aa[i]) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static void +netsh_ifconfig_options (const char *type, + const in_addr_t *addr_list, + const int addr_len, + const IP_ADDR_STRING *current, + const char *flex_name, + const bool test_first) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + bool delete_first = false; + + /* first check if we should delete existing DNS/WINS settings from TAP interface */ + if (test_first) + { + if (!ip_addr_one_to_one (addr_list, addr_len, current)) + delete_first = true; + } + else + delete_first = true; + + /* delete existing DNS/WINS settings from TAP interface */ + if (delete_first) + { + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc interface ip delete %s %s all", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + type, + flex_name); + netsh_command (&argv, 2); + } + + /* add new DNS/WINS settings to TAP interface */ + { + int count = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < addr_len; ++i) + { + if (delete_first || !test_first || !ip_addr_member_of (addr_list[i], current)) + { + const char *fmt = count ? + "%s%sc interface ip add %s %s %s" + : "%s%sc interface ip set %s %s static %s"; + + argv_printf (&argv, fmt, + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + type, + flex_name, + print_in_addr_t (addr_list[i], 0, &gc)); + netsh_command (&argv, 2); + + ++count; + } + else + { + msg (M_INFO, "NETSH: \"%s\" %s %s [already set]", + flex_name, + type, + print_in_addr_t (addr_list[i], 0, &gc)); + } + } + } + + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +init_ip_addr_string2 (IP_ADDR_STRING *dest, const IP_ADDR_STRING *src1, const IP_ADDR_STRING *src2) +{ + CLEAR (dest[0]); + CLEAR (dest[1]); + if (src1) + { + dest[0] = *src1; + dest[0].Next = NULL; + } + if (src2) + { + dest[1] = *src2; + dest[0].Next = &dest[1]; + dest[1].Next = NULL; + } +} + +static void +netsh_ifconfig (const struct tuntap_options *to, + const char *flex_name, + const in_addr_t ip, + const in_addr_t netmask, + const unsigned int flags) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct argv argv = argv_new (); + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai = NULL; + const IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO *pai = NULL; + + if (flags & NI_TEST_FIRST) + { + const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list = get_adapter_info_list (&gc); + const int index = get_adapter_index_flexible (flex_name); + ai = get_adapter (list, index); + pai = get_per_adapter_info (index, &gc); + } + + if (flags & NI_IP_NETMASK) + { + if (test_adapter_ip_netmask (ai, ip, netmask)) + { + msg (M_INFO, "NETSH: \"%s\" %s/%s [already set]", + flex_name, + print_in_addr_t (ip, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, &gc)); + } + else + { + /* example: netsh interface ip set address my-tap static 10.3.0.1 255.255.255.0 */ + argv_printf (&argv, "%s%sc interface ip set address %s static %s %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + flex_name, + print_in_addr_t (ip, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (netmask, 0, &gc)); + + netsh_command (&argv, 4); + } + } + + /* set WINS/DNS options */ + if (flags & NI_OPTIONS) + { + IP_ADDR_STRING wins[2]; + CLEAR (wins[0]); + CLEAR (wins[1]); + + netsh_ifconfig_options ("dns", + to->dns, + to->dns_len, + pai ? &pai->DnsServerList : NULL, + flex_name, + BOOL_CAST (flags & NI_TEST_FIRST)); + if (ai && ai->HaveWins) + init_ip_addr_string2 (wins, &ai->PrimaryWinsServer, &ai->SecondaryWinsServer); + + netsh_ifconfig_options ("wins", + to->wins, + to->wins_len, + ai ? wins : NULL, + flex_name, + BOOL_CAST (flags & NI_TEST_FIRST)); + } + + argv_reset (&argv); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +static void +netsh_enable_dhcp (const struct tuntap_options *to, + const char *actual_name) +{ + struct argv argv; + argv_init (&argv); + + /* example: netsh interface ip set address my-tap dhcp */ + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s%sc interface ip set address %s dhcp", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + actual_name); + + netsh_command (&argv, 4); + + argv_reset (&argv); +} + +/* + * Return a TAP name for netsh commands. + */ +static const char * +netsh_get_id (const char *dev_node, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = get_tap_reg (gc); + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg = get_panel_reg (gc); + struct buffer actual = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + const char *guid; + + at_least_one_tap_win (tap_reg); + + if (dev_node) + { + guid = get_device_guid (dev_node, BPTR (&actual), BCAP (&actual), tap_reg, panel_reg, gc); + } + else + { + guid = get_unspecified_device_guid (0, BPTR (&actual), BCAP (&actual), tap_reg, panel_reg, gc); + + if (get_unspecified_device_guid (1, NULL, 0, tap_reg, panel_reg, gc)) /* ambiguous if more than one TAP-Windows adapter */ + guid = NULL; + } + + if (!guid) + return "NULL"; /* not found */ + else if (strcmp (BPTR (&actual), "NULL")) + return BPTR (&actual); /* control panel name */ + else + return guid; /* no control panel name, return GUID instead */ +} + +/* + * Called iteratively on TAP-Windows wait-for-initialization polling loop + */ +void +tun_standby_init (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + tt->standby_iter = 0; +} + +bool +tun_standby (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + bool ret = true; + ++tt->standby_iter; + if (tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE) + { + if (tt->standby_iter == IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE_TRY_NETSH) + { + msg (M_INFO, "NOTE: now trying netsh (this may take some time)"); + netsh_ifconfig (&tt->options, + tt->actual_name, + tt->local, + tt->adapter_netmask, + NI_TEST_FIRST|NI_IP_NETMASK|NI_OPTIONS); + } + else if (tt->standby_iter >= IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE_TRY_NETSH*2) + { + ret = false; + } + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Convert DHCP options from the command line / config file + * into a raw DHCP-format options string. + */ + +static void +write_dhcp_u8 (struct buffer *buf, const int type, const int data, bool *error) +{ + if (!buf_safe (buf, 3)) + { + *error = true; + msg (M_WARN, "write_dhcp_u8: buffer overflow building DHCP options"); + return; + } + buf_write_u8 (buf, type); + buf_write_u8 (buf, 1); + buf_write_u8 (buf, data); +} + +static void +write_dhcp_u32_array (struct buffer *buf, const int type, const uint32_t *data, const unsigned int len, bool *error) +{ + if (len > 0) + { + int i; + const int size = len * sizeof (uint32_t); + + if (!buf_safe (buf, 2 + size)) + { + *error = true; + msg (M_WARN, "write_dhcp_u32_array: buffer overflow building DHCP options"); + return; + } + if (size < 1 || size > 255) + { + *error = true; + msg (M_WARN, "write_dhcp_u32_array: size (%d) must be > 0 and <= 255", size); + return; + } + buf_write_u8 (buf, type); + buf_write_u8 (buf, size); + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + buf_write_u32 (buf, data[i]); + } +} + +static void +write_dhcp_str (struct buffer *buf, const int type, const char *str, bool *error) +{ + const int len = strlen (str); + if (!buf_safe (buf, 2 + len)) + { + *error = true; + msg (M_WARN, "write_dhcp_str: buffer overflow building DHCP options"); + return; + } + if (len < 1 || len > 255) + { + *error = true; + msg (M_WARN, "write_dhcp_str: string '%s' must be > 0 bytes and <= 255 bytes", str); + return; + } + buf_write_u8 (buf, type); + buf_write_u8 (buf, len); + buf_write (buf, str, len); +} + +static bool +build_dhcp_options_string (struct buffer *buf, const struct tuntap_options *o) +{ + bool error = false; + if (o->domain) + write_dhcp_str (buf, 15, o->domain, &error); + + if (o->netbios_scope) + write_dhcp_str (buf, 47, o->netbios_scope, &error); + + if (o->netbios_node_type) + write_dhcp_u8 (buf, 46, o->netbios_node_type, &error); + + write_dhcp_u32_array (buf, 6, (uint32_t*)o->dns, o->dns_len, &error); + write_dhcp_u32_array (buf, 44, (uint32_t*)o->wins, o->wins_len, &error); + write_dhcp_u32_array (buf, 42, (uint32_t*)o->ntp, o->ntp_len, &error); + write_dhcp_u32_array (buf, 45, (uint32_t*)o->nbdd, o->nbdd_len, &error); + + /* the MS DHCP server option 'Disable Netbios-over-TCP/IP + is implemented as vendor option 001, value 002. + A value of 001 means 'leave NBT alone' which is the default */ + if (o->disable_nbt) + { + if (!buf_safe (buf, 8)) + { + msg (M_WARN, "build_dhcp_options_string: buffer overflow building DHCP options"); + return false; + } + buf_write_u8 (buf, 43); + buf_write_u8 (buf, 6); /* total length field */ + buf_write_u8 (buf, 0x001); + buf_write_u8 (buf, 4); /* length of the vendor specified field */ + buf_write_u32 (buf, 0x002); + } + return !error; +} + +static void +fork_dhcp_action (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt->options.dhcp_pre_release || tt->options.dhcp_renew) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer cmd = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + const int verb = 3; + const int pre_sleep = 1; + + buf_printf (&cmd, "openvpn --verb %d --tap-sleep %d", verb, pre_sleep); + if (tt->options.dhcp_pre_release) + buf_printf (&cmd, " --dhcp-pre-release"); + if (tt->options.dhcp_renew) + buf_printf (&cmd, " --dhcp-renew"); + buf_printf (&cmd, " --dhcp-internal %u", (unsigned int)tt->adapter_index); + + fork_to_self (BSTR (&cmd)); + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +void +fork_register_dns_action (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt && tt->options.register_dns) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer cmd = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + const int verb = 3; + + buf_printf (&cmd, "openvpn --verb %d --register-dns --rdns-internal", verb); + fork_to_self (BSTR (&cmd)); + gc_free (&gc); + } +} + +static uint32_t +dhcp_masq_addr (const in_addr_t local, const in_addr_t netmask, const int offset) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + in_addr_t dsa; /* DHCP server addr */ + + if (offset < 0) + dsa = (local | (~netmask)) + offset; + else + dsa = (local & netmask) + offset; + + if (dsa == local) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: There is a clash between the --ifconfig local address and the internal DHCP server address -- both are set to %s -- please use the --ip-win32 dynamic option to choose a different free address from the --ifconfig subnet for the internal DHCP server", print_in_addr_t (dsa, 0, &gc)); + + if ((local & netmask) != (dsa & netmask)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: --ip-win32 dynamic [offset] : offset is outside of --ifconfig subnet"); + + gc_free (&gc); + return htonl(dsa); +} + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char device_path[256]; + const char *device_guid = NULL; + DWORD len; + bool dhcp_masq = false; + bool dhcp_masq_post = false; + + /*netcmd_semaphore_lock ();*/ + + msg( M_INFO, "open_tun, tt->ipv6=%d", tt->ipv6 ); + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_NULL) + { + open_null (tt); + gc_free (&gc); + return; + } + else if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP || tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + ; + } + else + { + msg (M_FATAL|M_NOPREFIX, "Unknown virtual device type: '%s'", dev); + } + + /* + * Lookup the device name in the registry, using the --dev-node high level name. + */ + { + const struct tap_reg *tap_reg = get_tap_reg (&gc); + const struct panel_reg *panel_reg = get_panel_reg (&gc); + char actual_buffer[256]; + + at_least_one_tap_win (tap_reg); + + if (dev_node) + { + /* Get the device GUID for the device specified with --dev-node. */ + device_guid = get_device_guid (dev_node, actual_buffer, sizeof (actual_buffer), tap_reg, panel_reg, &gc); + + if (!device_guid) + msg (M_FATAL, "TAP-Windows adapter '%s' not found", dev_node); + + /* Open Windows TAP-Windows adapter */ + openvpn_snprintf (device_path, sizeof(device_path), "%s%s%s", + USERMODEDEVICEDIR, + device_guid, + TAP_WIN_SUFFIX); + + tt->hand = CreateFile ( + device_path, + GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, + 0, /* was: FILE_SHARE_READ */ + 0, + OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + 0 + ); + + if (tt->hand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + msg (M_ERR, "CreateFile failed on TAP device: %s", device_path); + } + else + { + int device_number = 0; + + /* Try opening all TAP devices until we find one available */ + while (true) + { + device_guid = get_unspecified_device_guid (device_number, + actual_buffer, + sizeof (actual_buffer), + tap_reg, + panel_reg, + &gc); + + if (!device_guid) + msg (M_FATAL, "All TAP-Windows adapters on this system are currently in use."); + + /* Open Windows TAP-Windows adapter */ + openvpn_snprintf (device_path, sizeof(device_path), "%s%s%s", + USERMODEDEVICEDIR, + device_guid, + TAP_WIN_SUFFIX); + + tt->hand = CreateFile ( + device_path, + GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, + 0, /* was: FILE_SHARE_READ */ + 0, + OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED, + 0 + ); + + if (tt->hand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "CreateFile failed on TAP device: %s", device_path); + else + break; + + device_number++; + } + } + + /* translate high-level device name into a device instance + GUID using the registry */ + tt->actual_name = string_alloc (actual_buffer, NULL); + } + + msg (M_INFO, "TAP-WIN32 device [%s] opened: %s", tt->actual_name, device_path); + tt->adapter_index = get_adapter_index (device_guid); + + /* get driver version info */ + { + ULONG info[3]; + CLEAR (info); + if (DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_GET_VERSION, + &info, sizeof (info), + &info, sizeof (info), &len, NULL)) + { + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "TAP-Windows Driver Version %d.%d %s", + (int) info[0], + (int) info[1], + (info[2] ? "(DEBUG)" : "")); + + } + if (!(info[0] == TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR && info[1] >= TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: This version of " PACKAGE_NAME " requires a TAP-Windows driver that is at least version %d.%d -- If you recently upgraded your " PACKAGE_NAME " distribution, a reboot is probably required at this point to get Windows to see the new driver.", + TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR, + TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR); + + /* usage of numeric constants is ugly, but this is really tied to + * *this* version of the driver + */ + if ( tt->ipv6 && tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && + info[0] == 9 && info[1] < 8) + { + msg( M_INFO, "WARNING: Tap-Win32 driver version %d.%d does not support IPv6 in TUN mode. IPv6 will be disabled. Upgrade to Tap-Win32 9.8 (2.2-beta3 release or later) or use TAP mode to get IPv6", (int) info[0], (int) info[1] ); + tt->ipv6 = false; + } + + /* tap driver 9.8 (2.2.0 and 2.2.1 release) is buggy + */ + if ( tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN && + info[0] == 9 && info[1] == 8) + { + msg( M_FATAL, "ERROR: Tap-Win32 driver version %d.%d is buggy regarding small IPv4 packets in TUN mode. Upgrade to Tap-Win32 9.9 (2.2.2 release or later) or use TAP mode", (int) info[0], (int) info[1] ); + } + } + + /* get driver MTU */ + { + ULONG mtu; + if (DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_GET_MTU, + &mtu, sizeof (mtu), + &mtu, sizeof (mtu), &len, NULL)) + { + tt->post_open_mtu = (int) mtu; + msg (D_MTU_INFO, "TAP-Windows MTU=%d", (int) mtu); + } + } + + /* + * Preliminaries for setting TAP-Windows adapter TCP/IP + * properties via --ip-win32 dynamic or --ip-win32 adaptive. + */ + if (tt->did_ifconfig_setup) + { + if (tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ) + { + /* + * If adapter is set to non-DHCP, set to DHCP mode. + */ + if (dhcp_status (tt->adapter_index) == DHCP_STATUS_DISABLED) + netsh_enable_dhcp (&tt->options, tt->actual_name); + dhcp_masq = true; + dhcp_masq_post = true; + } + else if (tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE) + { + /* + * If adapter is set to non-DHCP, use netsh right away. + */ + if (dhcp_status (tt->adapter_index) != DHCP_STATUS_ENABLED) + { + netsh_ifconfig (&tt->options, + tt->actual_name, + tt->local, + tt->adapter_netmask, + NI_TEST_FIRST|NI_IP_NETMASK|NI_OPTIONS); + } + else + { + dhcp_masq = true; + } + } + } + + /* set point-to-point mode if TUN device */ + + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + if (!tt->did_ifconfig_setup) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: --dev tun also requires --ifconfig"); + } + + if (tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + in_addr_t ep[3]; + BOOL status; + + ep[0] = htonl (tt->local); + ep[1] = htonl (tt->local & tt->remote_netmask); + ep[2] = htonl (tt->remote_netmask); + + status = DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_TUN, + ep, sizeof (ep), + ep, sizeof (ep), &len, NULL); + + msg (status ? M_INFO : M_FATAL, "Set TAP-Windows TUN subnet mode network/local/netmask = %s/%s/%s [%s]", + print_in_addr_t (ep[1], IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (ep[0], IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (ep[2], IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + status ? "SUCCEEDED" : "FAILED"); + + } else { + + in_addr_t ep[2]; + ep[0] = htonl (tt->local); + ep[1] = htonl (tt->remote_netmask); + + if (!DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_POINT_TO_POINT, + ep, sizeof (ep), + ep, sizeof (ep), &len, NULL)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: The TAP-Windows driver rejected a DeviceIoControl call to set Point-to-Point mode, which is required for --dev tun"); + } + } + + /* should we tell the TAP-Windows driver to masquerade as a DHCP server as a means + of setting the adapter address? */ + if (dhcp_masq) + { + uint32_t ep[4]; + + /* We will answer DHCP requests with a reply to set IP/subnet to these values */ + ep[0] = htonl (tt->local); + ep[1] = htonl (tt->adapter_netmask); + + /* At what IP address should the DHCP server masquerade at? */ + if (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TUN) + { + if (tt->topology == TOP_SUBNET) + { + if (tt->options.dhcp_masq_custom_offset) + ep[2] = dhcp_masq_addr (tt->local, tt->remote_netmask, tt->options.dhcp_masq_offset); + else + ep[2] = dhcp_masq_addr (tt->local, tt->remote_netmask, -1); + } + else + ep[2] = htonl (tt->remote_netmask); + } + else + { + ASSERT (tt->type == DEV_TYPE_TAP); + ep[2] = dhcp_masq_addr (tt->local, tt->adapter_netmask, tt->options.dhcp_masq_custom_offset ? tt->options.dhcp_masq_offset : 0); + } + + /* lease time in seconds */ + ep[3] = (uint32_t) tt->options.dhcp_lease_time; + + ASSERT (ep[3] > 0); + +#ifndef SIMULATE_DHCP_FAILED /* this code is disabled to simulate bad DHCP negotiation */ + if (!DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_DHCP_MASQ, + ep, sizeof (ep), + ep, sizeof (ep), &len, NULL)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: The TAP-Windows driver rejected a DeviceIoControl call to set TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_DHCP_MASQ mode"); + + msg (M_INFO, "Notified TAP-Windows driver to set a DHCP IP/netmask of %s/%s on interface %s [DHCP-serv: %s, lease-time: %d]", + print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (tt->adapter_netmask, 0, &gc), + device_guid, + print_in_addr_t (ep[2], IA_NET_ORDER, &gc), + ep[3] + ); + + /* user-supplied DHCP options capability */ + if (tt->options.dhcp_options) + { + struct buffer buf = alloc_buf (256); + if (build_dhcp_options_string (&buf, &tt->options)) + { + msg (D_DHCP_OPT, "DHCP option string: %s", format_hex (BPTR (&buf), BLEN (&buf), 0, &gc)); + if (!DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_DHCP_SET_OPT, + BPTR (&buf), BLEN (&buf), + BPTR (&buf), BLEN (&buf), &len, NULL)) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: The TAP-Windows driver rejected a TAP_WIN_IOCTL_CONFIG_DHCP_SET_OPT DeviceIoControl call"); + } + else + msg (M_WARN, "DHCP option string not set due to error"); + free_buf (&buf); + } +#endif + } + + /* set driver media status to 'connected' */ + { + ULONG status = TRUE; + if (!DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_SET_MEDIA_STATUS, + &status, sizeof (status), + &status, sizeof (status), &len, NULL)) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: The TAP-Windows driver rejected a TAP_WIN_IOCTL_SET_MEDIA_STATUS DeviceIoControl call."); + } + + /* possible wait for adapter to come up */ + { + int s = tt->options.tap_sleep; + if (s > 0) + { + msg (M_INFO, "Sleeping for %d seconds...", s); + openvpn_sleep (s); + } + } + + /* possibly use IP Helper API to set IP address on adapter */ + { + const DWORD index = tt->adapter_index; + + /* flush arp cache */ + if (index != TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + DWORD status; + + if ((status = FlushIpNetTable (index)) == NO_ERROR) + msg (M_INFO, "Successful ARP Flush on interface [%u] %s", + (unsigned int)index, + device_guid); + else + msg (D_TUNTAP_INFO, "NOTE: FlushIpNetTable failed on interface [%u] %s (status=%u) : %s", + (unsigned int)index, + device_guid, + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + } + + /* + * If the TAP-Windows driver is masquerading as a DHCP server + * make sure the TCP/IP properties for the adapter are + * set correctly. + */ + if (dhcp_masq_post) + { + /* check dhcp enable status */ + if (dhcp_status (index) == DHCP_STATUS_DISABLED) + msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: You have selected '--ip-win32 dynamic', which will not work unless the TAP-Windows TCP/IP properties are set to 'Obtain an IP address automatically'"); + + /* force an explicit DHCP lease renewal on TAP adapter? */ + if (tt->options.dhcp_pre_release) + dhcp_release (tt); + if (tt->options.dhcp_renew) + dhcp_renew (tt); + } + else + fork_dhcp_action (tt); + + if (tt->did_ifconfig_setup && tt->options.ip_win32_type == IPW32_SET_IPAPI) + { + DWORD status; + const char *error_suffix = "I am having trouble using the Windows 'IP helper API' to automatically set the IP address -- consider using other --ip-win32 methods (not 'ipapi')"; + + /* couldn't get adapter index */ + if (index == TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID) + { + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: unable to get adapter index for interface %s -- %s", + device_guid, + error_suffix); + } + + /* check dhcp enable status */ + if (dhcp_status (index) == DHCP_STATUS_DISABLED) + msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: You have selected (explicitly or by default) '--ip-win32 ipapi', which has a better chance of working correctly if the TAP-Windows TCP/IP properties are set to 'Obtain an IP address automatically'"); + + /* delete previously added IP addresses which were not + correctly deleted */ + delete_temp_addresses (index); + + /* add a new IP address */ + if ((status = AddIPAddress (htonl(tt->local), + htonl(tt->adapter_netmask), + index, + &tt->ipapi_context, + &tt->ipapi_instance)) == NO_ERROR) + msg (M_INFO, "Succeeded in adding a temporary IP/netmask of %s/%s to interface %s using the Win32 IP Helper API", + print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (tt->adapter_netmask, 0, &gc), + device_guid + ); + else + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: AddIPAddress %s/%s failed on interface %s, index=%d, status=%u (windows error: '%s') -- %s", + print_in_addr_t (tt->local, 0, &gc), + print_in_addr_t (tt->adapter_netmask, 0, &gc), + device_guid, + (int)index, + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc), + error_suffix); + tt->ipapi_context_defined = true; + } + } + /*netcmd_semaphore_release ();*/ + gc_free (&gc); +} + +const char * +tap_win_getinfo (const struct tuntap *tt, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + if (tt && tt->hand != NULL) + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + DWORD len; + if (DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_GET_INFO, + BSTR (&out), BCAP (&out), + BSTR (&out), BCAP (&out), + &len, NULL)) + { + return BSTR (&out); + } + } + return NULL; +} + +void +tun_show_debug (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + if (tt && tt->hand != NULL) + { + struct buffer out = alloc_buf (1024); + DWORD len; + while (DeviceIoControl (tt->hand, TAP_WIN_IOCTL_GET_LOG_LINE, + BSTR (&out), BCAP (&out), + BSTR (&out), BCAP (&out), + &len, NULL)) + { + msg (D_TAP_WIN_DEBUG, "TAP-Windows: %s", BSTR (&out)); + } + free_buf (&out); + } +} + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + + if (tt) + { + if ( tt->ipv6 && tt->did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup ) + { + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local; + struct argv argv; + argv_init (&argv); + + /* remove route pointing to interface */ + delete_route_connected_v6_net(tt, NULL); + + /* netsh interface ipv6 delete address \"%s\" %s */ + ifconfig_ipv6_local = print_in6_addr (tt->local_ipv6, 0, &gc); + argv_printf (&argv, + "%s%sc interface ipv6 delete address %s %s", + get_win_sys_path(), + NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX, + tt->actual_name, + ifconfig_ipv6_local ); + + netsh_command (&argv, 1); + argv_reset (&argv); + } +#if 1 + if (tt->ipapi_context_defined) + { + DWORD status; + if ((status = DeleteIPAddress (tt->ipapi_context)) != NO_ERROR) + { + msg (M_WARN, "Warning: DeleteIPAddress[%u] failed on TAP-Windows adapter, status=%u : %s", + (unsigned int)tt->ipapi_context, + (unsigned int)status, + strerror_win32 (status, &gc)); + } + } +#endif + + if (tt->options.dhcp_release) + dhcp_release (tt); + + if (tt->hand != NULL) + { + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO_LOW, "Attempting CancelIO on TAP-Windows adapter"); + if (!CancelIo (tt->hand)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: CancelIO failed on TAP-Windows adapter"); + } + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO_LOW, "Attempting close of overlapped read event on TAP-Windows adapter"); + overlapped_io_close (&tt->reads); + + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO_LOW, "Attempting close of overlapped write event on TAP-Windows adapter"); + overlapped_io_close (&tt->writes); + + if (tt->hand != NULL) + { + dmsg (D_WIN32_IO_LOW, "Attempting CloseHandle on TAP-Windows adapter"); + if (!CloseHandle (tt->hand)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: CloseHandle failed on TAP-Windows adapter"); + } + + if (tt->actual_name) + free (tt->actual_name); + + clear_tuntap (tt); + free (tt); + } + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* + * Convert --ip-win32 constants between index and ascii form. + */ + +struct ipset_names { + const char *short_form; +}; + +/* Indexed by IPW32_SET_x */ +static const struct ipset_names ipset_names[] = { + {"manual"}, + {"netsh"}, + {"ipapi"}, + {"dynamic"}, + {"adaptive"} +}; + +int +ascii2ipset (const char* name) +{ + int i; + ASSERT (IPW32_SET_N == SIZE (ipset_names)); + for (i = 0; i < IPW32_SET_N; ++i) + if (!strcmp (name, ipset_names[i].short_form)) + return i; + return -1; +} + +const char * +ipset2ascii (int index) +{ + ASSERT (IPW32_SET_N == SIZE (ipset_names)); + if (index < 0 || index >= IPW32_SET_N) + return "[unknown --ip-win32 type]"; + else + return ipset_names[index].short_form; +} + +const char * +ipset2ascii_all (struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, gc); + int i; + + ASSERT (IPW32_SET_N == SIZE (ipset_names)); + for (i = 0; i < IPW32_SET_N; ++i) + { + if (i) + buf_printf(&out, " "); + buf_printf(&out, "[%s]", ipset2ascii(i)); + } + return BSTR (&out); +} + +#else /* generic */ + +void +open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, struct tuntap *tt) +{ + open_tun_generic (dev, dev_type, dev_node, false, true, tt); +} + +void +close_tun (struct tuntap* tt) +{ + if (tt) + { + close_tun_generic (tt); + free (tt); + } +} + +int +write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return write (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +int +read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len) +{ + return read (tt->fd, buf, len); +} + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e7d941ab --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/tun.h @@ -0,0 +1,488 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifndef TUN_H +#define TUN_H + +#ifdef WIN32 +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "proto.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#if defined(WIN32) || defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + +#define TUN_ADAPTER_INDEX_INVALID ((DWORD)-1) + +/* time constants for --ip-win32 adaptive */ +#define IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE_DELAY_WINDOW 300 +#define IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE_TRY_NETSH 20 + +struct tuntap_options { + /* --ip-win32 options */ + bool ip_win32_defined; + +# define IPW32_SET_MANUAL 0 /* "--ip-win32 manual" */ +# define IPW32_SET_NETSH 1 /* "--ip-win32 netsh" */ +# define IPW32_SET_IPAPI 2 /* "--ip-win32 ipapi" */ +# define IPW32_SET_DHCP_MASQ 3 /* "--ip-win32 dynamic" */ +# define IPW32_SET_ADAPTIVE 4 /* "--ip-win32 adaptive" */ +# define IPW32_SET_N 5 + int ip_win32_type; + + /* --ip-win32 dynamic options */ + bool dhcp_masq_custom_offset; + int dhcp_masq_offset; + int dhcp_lease_time; + + /* --tap-sleep option */ + int tap_sleep; + + /* --dhcp-option options */ + + bool dhcp_options; + + const char *domain; /* DOMAIN (15) */ + + const char *netbios_scope; /* NBS (47) */ + + int netbios_node_type; /* NBT 1,2,4,8 (46) */ + +#define N_DHCP_ADDR 4 /* Max # of addresses allowed for + DNS, WINS, etc. */ + + /* DNS (6) */ + in_addr_t dns[N_DHCP_ADDR]; + int dns_len; + + /* WINS (44) */ + in_addr_t wins[N_DHCP_ADDR]; + int wins_len; + + /* NTP (42) */ + in_addr_t ntp[N_DHCP_ADDR]; + int ntp_len; + + /* NBDD (45) */ + in_addr_t nbdd[N_DHCP_ADDR]; + int nbdd_len; + + /* DISABLE_NBT (43, Vendor option 001) */ + bool disable_nbt; + + bool dhcp_renew; + bool dhcp_pre_release; + bool dhcp_release; + + bool register_dns; +}; + +#elif TARGET_LINUX + +struct tuntap_options { + int txqueuelen; +}; + +#else + +struct tuntap_options { + int dummy; /* not used */ +}; + +#endif + +/* + * Define a TUN/TAP dev. + */ + +struct tuntap +{ +# define TUNNEL_TYPE(tt) ((tt) ? ((tt)->type) : DEV_TYPE_UNDEF) + int type; /* DEV_TYPE_x as defined in proto.h */ + +# define TUNNEL_TOPOLOGY(tt) ((tt) ? ((tt)->topology) : TOP_UNDEF) + int topology; /* one of the TOP_x values */ + + bool did_ifconfig_setup; + bool did_ifconfig_ipv6_setup; + bool did_ifconfig; + + bool ipv6; + + bool persistent_if; /* if existed before, keep on program end */ + + struct tuntap_options options; /* options set on command line */ + + char *actual_name; /* actual name of TUN/TAP dev, usually including unit number */ + + /* number of TX buffers */ + int txqueuelen; + + /* ifconfig parameters */ + in_addr_t local; + in_addr_t remote_netmask; + in_addr_t broadcast; + + struct in6_addr local_ipv6; + struct in6_addr remote_ipv6; + int netbits_ipv6; + +#ifdef WIN32 + HANDLE hand; + struct overlapped_io reads; + struct overlapped_io writes; + struct rw_handle rw_handle; + + /* used for setting interface address via IP Helper API + or DHCP masquerade */ + bool ipapi_context_defined; + ULONG ipapi_context; + ULONG ipapi_instance; + in_addr_t adapter_netmask; + + /* Windows adapter index for TAP-Windows adapter, + ~0 if undefined */ + DWORD adapter_index; + + int standby_iter; +#else + int fd; /* file descriptor for TUN/TAP dev */ +#endif + +#ifdef TARGET_SOLARIS + int ip_fd; +#endif + + /* used for printing status info only */ + unsigned int rwflags_debug; + + /* Some TUN/TAP drivers like to be ioctled for mtu + after open */ + int post_open_mtu; +}; + +static inline bool +tuntap_defined (const struct tuntap *tt) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return tt && tt->hand != NULL; +#else + return tt && tt->fd >= 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Function prototypes + */ + +static void clear_tuntap (struct tuntap *tuntap); + +void open_tun (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, + struct tuntap *tt); + +void close_tun (struct tuntap *tt); + +int write_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len); + +int read_tun (struct tuntap* tt, uint8_t *buf, int len); + +void tuncfg (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *dev_node, + int persist_mode, const char *username, + const char *groupname, const struct tuntap_options *options); + +const char *guess_tuntap_dev (const char *dev, + const char *dev_type, + const char *dev_node, + struct gc_arena *gc); + +struct tuntap *init_tun (const char *dev, /* --dev option */ + const char *dev_type, /* --dev-type option */ + int topology, /* one of the TOP_x values */ + const char *ifconfig_local_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 1 */ + const char *ifconfig_remote_netmask_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 2 */ + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_local_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 1 / IPv6 */ + int ifconfig_ipv6_netbits_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 1 / bits */ + const char *ifconfig_ipv6_remote_parm, /* --ifconfig parm 2 / IPv6 */ + struct addrinfo *local_public, + struct addrinfo *remote_public, + const bool strict_warn, + struct env_set *es); + +void init_tun_post (struct tuntap *tt, + const struct frame *frame, + const struct tuntap_options *options); + +void do_ifconfig (struct tuntap *tt, + const char *actual, /* actual device name */ + int tun_mtu, + const struct env_set *es); + +bool is_dev_type (const char *dev, const char *dev_type, const char *match_type); +int dev_type_enum (const char *dev, const char *dev_type); +const char *dev_type_string (const char *dev, const char *dev_type); + +const char *ifconfig_options_string (const struct tuntap* tt, bool remote, bool disable, struct gc_arena *gc); + +bool is_tun_p2p (const struct tuntap *tt); + +void check_subnet_conflict (const in_addr_t ip, + const in_addr_t netmask, + const char *prefix); + +void warn_on_use_of_common_subnets (void); + +/* + * Inline functions + */ + +static inline void +tun_adjust_frame_parameters (struct frame* frame, int size) +{ + frame_add_to_extra_tun (frame, size); +} + +/* + * Should ifconfig be called before or after + * tun dev open? + */ + +#define IFCONFIG_BEFORE_TUN_OPEN 0 +#define IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN 1 + +#define IFCONFIG_DEFAULT IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN + +static inline int +ifconfig_order(void) +{ +#if defined(TARGET_LINUX) + return IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(TARGET_SOLARIS) + return IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(TARGET_OPENBSD) + return IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(TARGET_DARWIN) + return IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(TARGET_NETBSD) + return IFCONFIG_AFTER_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(WIN32) + return IFCONFIG_BEFORE_TUN_OPEN; +#elif defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + return IFCONFIG_BEFORE_TUN_OPEN; +#else + return IFCONFIG_DEFAULT; +#endif +} + +#define ROUTE_BEFORE_TUN 0 +#define ROUTE_AFTER_TUN 1 +#define ROUTE_ORDER_DEFAULT ROUTE_AFTER_TUN + +static inline int +route_order(void) +{ +#if defined(TARGET_ANDROID) + return ROUTE_BEFORE_TUN; +#else + return ROUTE_ORDER_DEFAULT; +#endif +} + + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#define TUN_PASS_BUFFER + +struct tap_reg +{ + const char *guid; + struct tap_reg *next; +}; + +struct panel_reg +{ + const char *name; + const char *guid; + struct panel_reg *next; +}; + +int ascii2ipset (const char* name); +const char *ipset2ascii (int index); +const char *ipset2ascii_all (struct gc_arena *gc); + +void verify_255_255_255_252 (in_addr_t local, in_addr_t remote); + +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *get_adapter_info_list (struct gc_arena *gc); +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *get_tun_adapter (const struct tuntap *tt, const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list); + +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *get_adapter_info (DWORD index, struct gc_arena *gc); +const IP_PER_ADAPTER_INFO *get_per_adapter_info (const DWORD index, struct gc_arena *gc); +const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *get_adapter (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, DWORD index); + +bool is_adapter_up (const struct tuntap *tt, const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list); +bool is_ip_in_adapter_subnet (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *ai, const in_addr_t ip, in_addr_t *highest_netmask); + +DWORD adapter_index_of_ip (const IP_ADAPTER_INFO *list, + const in_addr_t ip, + int *count, + in_addr_t *netmask); + +void show_tap_win_adapters (int msglev, int warnlev); +void show_adapters (int msglev); + +void tap_allow_nonadmin_access (const char *dev_node); + +void show_valid_win32_tun_subnets (void); +const char *tap_win_getinfo (const struct tuntap *tt, struct gc_arena *gc); +void tun_show_debug (struct tuntap *tt); + +bool dhcp_release_by_adapter_index(const DWORD adapter_index); +bool dhcp_renew_by_adapter_index (const DWORD adapter_index); + +void fork_register_dns_action (struct tuntap *tt); +void ipconfig_register_dns (const struct env_set *es); + +void tun_standby_init (struct tuntap *tt); +bool tun_standby (struct tuntap *tt); + +int tun_read_queue (struct tuntap *tt, int maxsize); +int tun_write_queue (struct tuntap *tt, struct buffer *buf); +int tun_finalize (HANDLE h, struct overlapped_io *io, struct buffer *buf); + +static inline bool +tuntap_stop (int status) +{ + /* + * This corresponds to the STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE + * error in tapdrvr.c. + */ + if (status < 0) + { + return openvpn_errno () == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + return false; +} + +static inline int +tun_write_win32 (struct tuntap *tt, struct buffer *buf) +{ + int err = 0; + int status = 0; + if (overlapped_io_active (&tt->writes)) + { + status = tun_finalize (tt->hand, &tt->writes, NULL); + if (status < 0) + err = GetLastError (); + } + tun_write_queue (tt, buf); + if (status < 0) + { + SetLastError (err); + return status; + } + else + return BLEN (buf); +} + +static inline int +read_tun_buffered (struct tuntap *tt, struct buffer *buf, int maxsize) +{ + return tun_finalize (tt->hand, &tt->reads, buf); +} + +static inline int +write_tun_buffered (struct tuntap *tt, struct buffer *buf) +{ + return tun_write_win32 (tt, buf); +} + +#else + +static inline bool +tuntap_stop (int status) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline void +tun_standby_init (struct tuntap *tt) +{ +} + +static inline bool +tun_standby (struct tuntap *tt) +{ + return true; +} + +#endif + +/* + * TUN/TAP I/O wait functions + */ + +static inline event_t +tun_event_handle (const struct tuntap *tt) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return &tt->rw_handle; +#else + return tt->fd; +#endif +} + +static inline unsigned int +tun_set (struct tuntap *tt, + struct event_set *es, + unsigned int rwflags, + void *arg, + unsigned int *persistent) +{ + if (tuntap_defined (tt)) + { + /* if persistent is defined, call event_ctl only if rwflags has changed since last call */ + if (!persistent || *persistent != rwflags) + { + event_ctl (es, tun_event_handle (tt), rwflags, arg); + if (persistent) + *persistent = rwflags; + } +#ifdef WIN32 + if (rwflags & EVENT_READ) + tun_read_queue (tt, 0); +#endif + tt->rwflags_debug = rwflags; + } + return rwflags; +} + +const char *tun_stat (const struct tuntap *tt, unsigned int rwflags, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif /* TUN_H */ diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2db96a8d --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.c @@ -0,0 +1,1011 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Win32-specific OpenVPN code, targetted at the mingw + * development environment. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif + +#include "syshead.h" + +#ifdef WIN32 + +#include "buffer.h" +#include "error.h" +#include "mtu.h" +#include "sig.h" +#include "win32.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "memdbg.h" + +/* + * Windows internal socket API state (opaque). + */ +static struct WSAData wsa_state; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Should we call win32_pause() on program exit? + */ +static bool pause_exit_enabled = false; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * win32_signal is used to get input from the keyboard + * if we are running in a console, or get input from an + * event object if we are running as a service. + */ + +struct win32_signal win32_signal; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Save our old window title so we can restore + * it on exit. + */ +struct window_title window_title; /* GLOBAL*/ + +/* + * Special global semaphore used to protect network + * shell commands from simultaneous instantiation. + */ + +struct semaphore netcmd_semaphore; /* GLOBAL */ + +/* + * Windows system pathname such as c:\windows + */ +static char *win_sys_path = NULL; /* GLOBAL */ + +void +init_win32 (void) +{ + if (WSAStartup(0x0101, &wsa_state)) + { + msg (M_ERR, "WSAStartup failed"); + } + window_title_clear (&window_title); + win32_signal_clear (&win32_signal); + netcmd_semaphore_init (); +} + +void +uninit_win32 (void) +{ + netcmd_semaphore_close (); + if (pause_exit_enabled) + { + if (win32_signal.mode == WSO_MODE_UNDEF) + { + struct win32_signal w; + win32_signal_open (&w, WSO_FORCE_CONSOLE, NULL, false); + win32_pause (&w); + win32_signal_close (&w); + } + else + win32_pause (&win32_signal); + } + window_title_restore (&window_title); + win32_signal_close (&win32_signal); + WSACleanup (); + free (win_sys_path); +} + +void +set_pause_exit_win32 (void) +{ + pause_exit_enabled = true; +} + +bool +init_security_attributes_allow_all (struct security_attributes *obj) +{ + CLEAR (*obj); + + obj->sa.nLength = sizeof (SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES); + obj->sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = &obj->sd; + obj->sa.bInheritHandle = FALSE; + if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor (&obj->sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) + return false; + if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl (&obj->sd, TRUE, NULL, FALSE)) + return false; + return true; +} + +void +overlapped_io_init (struct overlapped_io *o, + const struct frame *frame, + BOOL event_state, + bool tuntap_buffer) /* if true: tuntap buffer, if false: socket buffer */ +{ + CLEAR (*o); + + /* manual reset event, initially set according to event_state */ + o->overlapped.hEvent = CreateEvent (NULL, TRUE, event_state, NULL); + if (o->overlapped.hEvent == NULL) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: overlapped_io_init: CreateEvent failed"); + + /* allocate buffer for overlapped I/O */ + alloc_buf_sock_tun (&o->buf_init, frame, tuntap_buffer, 0); +} + +void +overlapped_io_close (struct overlapped_io *o) +{ + if (o->overlapped.hEvent) + { + if (!CloseHandle (o->overlapped.hEvent)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: CloseHandle failed on overlapped I/O event object"); + } + free_buf (&o->buf_init); +} + +char * +overlapped_io_state_ascii (const struct overlapped_io *o) +{ + switch (o->iostate) + { + case IOSTATE_INITIAL: + return "0"; + case IOSTATE_QUEUED: + return "Q"; + case IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN: + return "1"; + } + return "?"; +} + +/* + * Event-based notification of network events + */ + +void +init_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, long network_events, socket_descriptor_t sd, unsigned int flags) +{ + /* manual reset events, initially set to unsignaled */ + + /* initialize write event */ + if (!(flags & NE32_PERSIST_EVENT) || !event->write) + { + if (flags & NE32_WRITE_EVENT) + { + event->write = CreateEvent (NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + if (event->write == NULL) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: init_net_event_win32: CreateEvent (write) failed"); + } + else + event->write = NULL; + } + + /* initialize read event */ + if (!(flags & NE32_PERSIST_EVENT) || !event->read) + { + event->read = CreateEvent (NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + if (event->read == NULL) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: init_net_event_win32: CreateEvent (read) failed"); + } + + /* setup network events to change read event state */ + if (WSAEventSelect (sd, event->read, network_events) != 0) + msg (M_FATAL | M_ERRNO, "Error: init_net_event_win32: WSAEventSelect call failed"); +} + +long +reset_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + WSANETWORKEVENTS wne; + if (WSAEnumNetworkEvents (sd, event->read, &wne) != 0) + { + msg (M_FATAL | M_ERRNO, "Error: reset_net_event_win32: WSAEnumNetworkEvents call failed"); + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ + } + else + return wne.lNetworkEvents; +} + +void +close_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, socket_descriptor_t sd, unsigned int flags) +{ + if (event->read) + { + if (socket_defined (sd)) + { + if (WSAEventSelect (sd, event->read, 0) != 0) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: close_net_event_win32: WSAEventSelect call failed"); + } + if (!ResetEvent (event->read)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: ResetEvent (read) failed in close_net_event_win32"); + if (!(flags & NE32_PERSIST_EVENT)) + { + if (!CloseHandle (event->read)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: CloseHandle (read) failed in close_net_event_win32"); + event->read = NULL; + } + } + + if (event->write) + { + if (!ResetEvent (event->write)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: ResetEvent (write) failed in close_net_event_win32"); + if (!(flags & NE32_PERSIST_EVENT)) + { + if (!CloseHandle (event->write)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: CloseHandle (write) failed in close_net_event_win32"); + event->write = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* + * struct net_event_win32 + */ + +void +net_event_win32_init (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + CLEAR (*ne); + ne->sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; +} + +void +net_event_win32_start (struct net_event_win32 *ne, long network_events, socket_descriptor_t sd) +{ + ASSERT (!socket_defined (ne->sd)); + ne->sd = sd; + ne->event_mask = 0; + init_net_event_win32 (&ne->handle, network_events, sd, NE32_PERSIST_EVENT|NE32_WRITE_EVENT); +} + +void +net_event_win32_reset_write (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + BOOL status; + if (ne->event_mask & FD_WRITE) + status = SetEvent (ne->handle.write); + else + status = ResetEvent (ne->handle.write); + if (!status) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "Warning: SetEvent/ResetEvent failed in net_event_win32_reset_write"); +} + +void +net_event_win32_reset (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + ne->event_mask |= reset_net_event_win32 (&ne->handle, ne->sd); +} + +void +net_event_win32_stop (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + if (net_event_win32_defined (ne)) + close_net_event_win32 (&ne->handle, ne->sd, NE32_PERSIST_EVENT); + ne->sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED; + ne->event_mask = 0; +} + +void +net_event_win32_close (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + if (net_event_win32_defined (ne)) + close_net_event_win32 (&ne->handle, ne->sd, 0); + net_event_win32_init (ne); +} + +/* + * Simulate *nix signals on Windows. + * + * Two modes: + * (1) Console mode -- map keyboard function keys to signals + * (2) Service mode -- map Windows event object to SIGTERM + */ + +void +win32_signal_clear (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + CLEAR (*ws); +} + +void +win32_signal_open (struct win32_signal *ws, + int force, + const char *exit_event_name, + bool exit_event_initial_state) +{ + CLEAR (*ws); + + ws->mode = WSO_MODE_UNDEF; + ws->in.read = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + ws->in.write = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + ws->console_mode_save = 0; + ws->console_mode_save_defined = false; + + if (force == WSO_NOFORCE || force == WSO_FORCE_CONSOLE) + { + /* + * Try to open console. + */ + ws->in.read = GetStdHandle (STD_INPUT_HANDLE); + if (ws->in.read != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + { + if (GetConsoleMode (ws->in.read, &ws->console_mode_save)) + { + /* running on a console */ + const DWORD new_console_mode = ws->console_mode_save + & ~(ENABLE_WINDOW_INPUT + | ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT + | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT + | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT + | ENABLE_MOUSE_INPUT); + + if (new_console_mode != ws->console_mode_save) + { + if (!SetConsoleMode (ws->in.read, new_console_mode)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: win32_signal_open: SetConsoleMode failed"); + ws->console_mode_save_defined = true; + } + ws->mode = WSO_MODE_CONSOLE; + } + else + ws->in.read = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; /* probably running as a service */ + } + } + + /* + * If console open failed, assume we are running + * as a service. + */ + if ((force == WSO_NOFORCE || force == WSO_FORCE_SERVICE) + && !HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read) && exit_event_name) + { + struct security_attributes sa; + + if (!init_security_attributes_allow_all (&sa)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: win32_signal_open: init SA failed"); + + ws->in.read = CreateEvent (&sa.sa, + TRUE, + exit_event_initial_state ? TRUE : FALSE, + exit_event_name); + if (ws->in.read == NULL) + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "NOTE: CreateEvent '%s' failed", exit_event_name); + } + else + { + if (WaitForSingleObject (ws->in.read, 0) != WAIT_TIMEOUT) + msg (M_FATAL, "ERROR: Exit Event ('%s') is signaled", exit_event_name); + else + ws->mode = WSO_MODE_SERVICE; + } + } +} + +static bool +keyboard_input_available (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + ASSERT (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_CONSOLE); + if (HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read)) + { + DWORD n; + if (GetNumberOfConsoleInputEvents (ws->in.read, &n)) + return n > 0; + } + return false; +} + +static unsigned int +keyboard_ir_to_key (INPUT_RECORD *ir) +{ + if (ir->Event.KeyEvent.uChar.AsciiChar == 0) + return ir->Event.KeyEvent.wVirtualScanCode; + + if ((ir->Event.KeyEvent.dwControlKeyState + & (LEFT_ALT_PRESSED | RIGHT_ALT_PRESSED)) + && (ir->Event.KeyEvent.wVirtualKeyCode != 18)) + return ir->Event.KeyEvent.wVirtualScanCode * 256; + + return ir->Event.KeyEvent.uChar.AsciiChar; +} + +static unsigned int +win32_keyboard_get (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + ASSERT (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_CONSOLE); + if (HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read)) + { + INPUT_RECORD ir; + do { + DWORD n; + if (!keyboard_input_available (ws)) + return 0; + if (!ReadConsoleInput (ws->in.read, &ir, 1, &n)) + return 0; + } while (ir.EventType != KEY_EVENT || ir.Event.KeyEvent.bKeyDown != TRUE); + + return keyboard_ir_to_key (&ir); + } + else + return 0; +} + +void +win32_signal_close (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + if (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_SERVICE && HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read)) + CloseHandle (ws->in.read); + if (ws->console_mode_save_defined) + { + if (!SetConsoleMode (ws->in.read, ws->console_mode_save)) + msg (M_ERR, "Error: win32_signal_close: SetConsoleMode failed"); + } + CLEAR (*ws); +} + +/* + * Return true if interrupt occurs in service mode. + */ +bool +win32_service_interrupt (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + if (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_SERVICE) + { + if (HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read) + && WaitForSingleObject (ws->in.read, 0) == WAIT_OBJECT_0) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +int +win32_signal_get (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + int ret = 0; + if (siginfo_static.signal_received) + { + ret = siginfo_static.signal_received; + } + else + { + if (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_SERVICE) + { + if (win32_service_interrupt (ws)) + ret = SIGTERM; + } + else if (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_CONSOLE) + { + switch (win32_keyboard_get (ws)) + { + case 0x3B: /* F1 -> USR1 */ + ret = SIGUSR1; + break; + case 0x3C: /* F2 -> USR2 */ + ret = SIGUSR2; + break; + case 0x3D: /* F3 -> HUP */ + ret = SIGHUP; + break; + case 0x3E: /* F4 -> TERM */ + ret = SIGTERM; + break; + } + } + if (ret) + { + siginfo_static.signal_received = ret; + siginfo_static.hard = true; + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +win32_pause (struct win32_signal *ws) +{ + if (ws->mode == WSO_MODE_CONSOLE && HANDLE_DEFINED (ws->in.read)) + { + int status; + msg (M_INFO|M_NOPREFIX, "Press any key to continue..."); + do { + status = WaitForSingleObject (ws->in.read, INFINITE); + } while (!win32_keyboard_get (ws)); + } +} + +/* window functions */ + +void +window_title_clear (struct window_title *wt) +{ + CLEAR (*wt); +} + +void +window_title_save (struct window_title *wt) +{ + if (!wt->saved) + { + if (!GetConsoleTitle (wt->old_window_title, sizeof (wt->old_window_title))) + { + wt->old_window_title[0] = 0; + wt->saved = false; + } + else + wt->saved = true; + } +} + +void +window_title_restore (const struct window_title *wt) +{ + if (wt->saved) + SetConsoleTitle (wt->old_window_title); +} + +void +window_title_generate (const char *title) +{ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc (256, &gc); + if (!title) + title = ""; + buf_printf (&out, "[%s] " PACKAGE_NAME " " PACKAGE_VERSION " F4:EXIT F1:USR1 F2:USR2 F3:HUP", title); + SetConsoleTitle (BSTR (&out)); + gc_free (&gc); +} + +/* semaphore functions */ + +void +semaphore_clear (struct semaphore *s) +{ + CLEAR (*s); +} + +void +semaphore_open (struct semaphore *s, const char *name) +{ + struct security_attributes sa; + + s->locked = false; + s->name = name; + s->hand = NULL; + + if (init_security_attributes_allow_all (&sa)) + s->hand = CreateSemaphore(&sa.sa, 1, 1, name); + + if (s->hand == NULL) + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "WARNING: Cannot create Win32 semaphore '%s'", name); + else + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE, "Created Win32 semaphore '%s'", s->name); +} + +bool +semaphore_lock (struct semaphore *s, int timeout_milliseconds) +{ + bool ret = true; + + if (s->hand) + { + DWORD status; + ASSERT (!s->locked); + + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE_LOW, "Attempting to lock Win32 semaphore '%s' prior to net shell command (timeout = %d sec)", + s->name, + timeout_milliseconds / 1000); + status = WaitForSingleObject (s->hand, timeout_milliseconds); + if (status == WAIT_FAILED) + msg (M_ERR, "Wait failed on Win32 semaphore '%s'", s->name); + ret = (status == WAIT_TIMEOUT) ? false : true; + if (ret) + { + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE, "Locked Win32 semaphore '%s'", s->name); + s->locked = true; + } + else + { + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE, "Wait on Win32 semaphore '%s' timed out after %d milliseconds", + s->name, + timeout_milliseconds); + } + } + return ret; +} + +void +semaphore_release (struct semaphore *s) +{ + if (s->hand) + { + ASSERT (s->locked); + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE, "Releasing Win32 semaphore '%s'", s->name); + if (!ReleaseSemaphore(s->hand, 1, NULL)) + msg (M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "ReleaseSemaphore failed on Win32 semaphore '%s'", + s->name); + s->locked = false; + } +} + +void +semaphore_close (struct semaphore *s) +{ + if (s->hand) + { + if (s->locked) + semaphore_release (s); + dmsg (D_SEMAPHORE, "Closing Win32 semaphore '%s'", s->name); + CloseHandle (s->hand); + s->hand = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Special global semaphore used to protect network + * shell commands from simultaneous instantiation. + */ + +void +netcmd_semaphore_init (void) +{ + semaphore_open (&netcmd_semaphore, PACKAGE "_netcmd"); +} + +void +netcmd_semaphore_close (void) +{ + semaphore_close (&netcmd_semaphore); +} + +void +netcmd_semaphore_lock (void) +{ + const int timeout_seconds = 600; + if (!semaphore_lock (&netcmd_semaphore, timeout_seconds * 1000)) + msg (M_FATAL, "Cannot lock net command semaphore"); +} + +void +netcmd_semaphore_release (void) +{ + semaphore_release (&netcmd_semaphore); +} + +/* + * Return true if filename is safe to be used on Windows, + * by avoiding the following reserved names: + * + * CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1, COM2, COM3, COM4, COM5, COM6, COM7, COM8, COM9, + * LPT1, LPT2, LPT3, LPT4, LPT5, LPT6, LPT7, LPT8, LPT9, and CLOCK$ + * + * See: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa365247.aspx + * and http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/86k9f82k(VS.80).aspx + */ + +static bool +cmp_prefix (const char *str, const bool n, const char *pre) +{ + size_t i = 0; + + if (!str) + return false; + + while (true) + { + const int c1 = pre[i]; + int c2 = str[i]; + ++i; + if (c1 == '\0') + { + if (n) + { + if (isdigit (c2)) + c2 = str[i]; + else + return false; + } + return c2 == '\0' || c2 == '.'; + } + else if (c2 == '\0') + return false; + if (c1 != tolower(c2)) + return false; + } +} + +bool +win_safe_filename (const char *fn) +{ + if (cmp_prefix (fn, false, "con")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, false, "prn")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, false, "aux")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, false, "nul")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, true, "com")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, true, "lpt")) + return false; + if (cmp_prefix (fn, false, "clock$")) + return false; + return true; +} + +/* + * Service functions for openvpn_execve + */ + +static char * +env_block (const struct env_set *es) +{ + char * force_path = "PATH=C:\\Windows\\System32;C:\\WINDOWS;C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\Wbem"; + + if (es) + { + struct env_item *e; + char *ret; + char *p; + size_t nchars = 1; + bool path_seen = false; + + for (e = es->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + nchars += strlen (e->string) + 1; + + nchars += strlen(force_path)+1; + + ret = (char *) malloc (nchars); + check_malloc_return (ret); + + p = ret; + for (e = es->list; e != NULL; e = e->next) + { + if (env_allowed (e->string)) + { + strcpy (p, e->string); + p += strlen (e->string) + 1; + } + if ( strncmp(e->string, "PATH=", 5 ) == 0 ) + path_seen = true; + } + + /* make sure PATH is set */ + if ( !path_seen ) + { + msg( M_INFO, "env_block: add %s", force_path ); + strcpy( p, force_path ); + p += strlen(force_path) + 1; + } + + *p = '\0'; + return ret; + } + else + return NULL; +} + +static WCHAR * +wide_cmd_line (const struct argv *a, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + size_t nchars = 1; + size_t maxlen = 0; + size_t i; + struct buffer buf; + char *work = NULL; + + if (!a) + return NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < a->argc; ++i) + { + const char *arg = a->argv[i]; + const size_t len = strlen (arg); + nchars += len + 3; + if (len > maxlen) + maxlen = len; + } + + work = gc_malloc (maxlen + 1, false, gc); + check_malloc_return (work); + buf = alloc_buf_gc (nchars, gc); + + for (i = 0; i < a->argc; ++i) + { + const char *arg = a->argv[i]; + strcpy (work, arg); + string_mod (work, CC_PRINT, CC_DOUBLE_QUOTE|CC_CRLF, '_'); + if (i) + buf_printf (&buf, " "); + if (string_class (work, CC_ANY, CC_SPACE)) + buf_printf (&buf, "%s", work); + else + buf_printf (&buf, "\"%s\"", work); + } + + return wide_string (BSTR (&buf), gc); +} + +/* + * Attempt to simulate fork/execve on Windows + */ +int +openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags) +{ + int ret = -1; + static bool exec_warn = false; + + if (a && a->argv[0]) + { + if (openvpn_execve_allowed (flags)) + { + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + STARTUPINFOW start_info; + PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info; + + char *env = env_block (es); + WCHAR *cl = wide_cmd_line (a, &gc); + WCHAR *cmd = wide_string (a->argv[0], &gc); + + CLEAR (start_info); + CLEAR (proc_info); + + /* fill in STARTUPINFO struct */ + GetStartupInfoW(&start_info); + start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info); + start_info.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW; + start_info.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE; + + if (CreateProcessW (cmd, cl, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, env, NULL, &start_info, &proc_info)) + { + DWORD exit_status = 0; + CloseHandle (proc_info.hThread); + WaitForSingleObject (proc_info.hProcess, INFINITE); + if (GetExitCodeProcess (proc_info.hProcess, &exit_status)) + ret = (int)exit_status; + else + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: GetExitCodeProcess %S failed", cmd); + CloseHandle (proc_info.hProcess); + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: CreateProcess %S failed", cmd); + } + free (env); + gc_free (&gc); + } + else if (!exec_warn && (script_security < SSEC_SCRIPTS)) + { + msg (M_WARN, SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING); + exec_warn = true; + } + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN, "openvpn_execve: called with empty argv"); + } + return ret; +} + +WCHAR * +wide_string (const char* utf8, struct gc_arena *gc) +{ + int n = MultiByteToWideChar (CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, NULL, 0); + WCHAR *ucs16 = gc_malloc (n * sizeof (WCHAR), false, gc); + MultiByteToWideChar (CP_UTF8, 0, utf8, -1, ucs16, n); + return ucs16; +} + +/* + * call ourself in another process + */ +void +fork_to_self (const char *cmdline) +{ + STARTUPINFO start_info; + PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info; + char self_exe[256]; + char *cl = string_alloc (cmdline, NULL); + DWORD status; + + CLEAR (start_info); + CLEAR (proc_info); + CLEAR (self_exe); + + status = GetModuleFileName (NULL, self_exe, sizeof(self_exe)); + if (status == 0 || status == sizeof(self_exe)) + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "fork_to_self: CreateProcess failed: cannot get module name via GetModuleFileName"); + goto done; + } + + /* fill in STARTUPINFO struct */ + GetStartupInfo(&start_info); + start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info); + start_info.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW; + start_info.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE; + + if (CreateProcess (self_exe, cl, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &start_info, &proc_info)) + { + CloseHandle (proc_info.hThread); + CloseHandle (proc_info.hProcess); + } + else + { + msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "fork_to_self: CreateProcess failed: %s", cmdline); + } + + done: + free (cl); +} + +char * +get_win_sys_path (void) +{ + ASSERT (win_sys_path); + return win_sys_path; +} + +void +set_win_sys_path (const char *newpath, struct env_set *es) +{ + free (win_sys_path); + win_sys_path = string_alloc (newpath, NULL); + setenv_str (es, SYS_PATH_ENV_VAR_NAME, win_sys_path); /* route.exe needs this */ +} + +void +set_win_sys_path_via_env (struct env_set *es) +{ + char buf[256]; + DWORD status = GetEnvironmentVariable (SYS_PATH_ENV_VAR_NAME, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (!status) + msg (M_ERR, "Cannot find environmental variable %s", SYS_PATH_ENV_VAR_NAME); + if (status > sizeof (buf) - 1) + msg (M_FATAL, "String overflow attempting to read environmental variable %s", SYS_PATH_ENV_VAR_NAME); + set_win_sys_path (buf, es); +} + + +const char * +win_get_tempdir() +{ + static char buf[MAX_PATH]; + char *tmpdir = buf; + + CLEAR(buf); + + if (!GetTempPath(sizeof(buf),buf)) { + /* Warn if we can't find a valid temporary directory, which should + * be unlikely. + */ + msg (M_WARN, "Could not find a suitable temporary directory." + " (GetTempPath() failed). Consider to use --tmp-dir"); + tmpdir = NULL; + } + return tmpdir; +} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc18f027 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpn/win32.h @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef WIN32 +#ifndef OPENVPN_WIN32_H +#define OPENVPN_WIN32_H + +#include "mtu.h" + +/* location of executables */ +#define SYS_PATH_ENV_VAR_NAME "SystemRoot" /* environmental variable name that normally contains the system path */ +#define NETSH_PATH_SUFFIX "\\system32\\netsh.exe" +#define WIN_ROUTE_PATH_SUFFIX "\\system32\\route.exe" +#define WIN_IPCONFIG_PATH_SUFFIX "\\system32\\ipconfig.exe" +#define WIN_NET_PATH_SUFFIX "\\system32\\net.exe" + +/* + * Win32-specific OpenVPN code, targetted at the mingw + * development environment. + */ + +/* MSVC headers do not define this macro, so do it here */ +#ifndef IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL +#define IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(a,b) \ + (memcmp ((const void*)(a), (const void*)(b), sizeof (struct in6_addr)) == 0) +#endif + +void init_win32 (void); +void uninit_win32 (void); + +void set_pause_exit_win32 (void); + +struct security_attributes +{ + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa; + SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd; +}; + +#define HANDLE_DEFINED(h) ((h) != NULL && (h) != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + +/* + * Save old window title. + */ +struct window_title +{ + bool saved; + char old_window_title [256]; +}; + +struct rw_handle { + HANDLE read; + HANDLE write; +}; + +/* + * Event-based notification of incoming TCP connections + */ + +#define NE32_PERSIST_EVENT (1<<0) +#define NE32_WRITE_EVENT (1<<1) + +static inline bool +defined_net_event_win32 (const struct rw_handle *event) +{ + return event->read != NULL; +} + +void init_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, long network_events, socket_descriptor_t sd, unsigned int flags); +long reset_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, socket_descriptor_t sd); +void close_net_event_win32 (struct rw_handle *event, socket_descriptor_t sd, unsigned int flags); + +/* + * A stateful variant of the net_event_win32 functions above + */ + +struct net_event_win32 +{ + struct rw_handle handle; + socket_descriptor_t sd; + long event_mask; +}; + +void net_event_win32_init (struct net_event_win32 *ne); +void net_event_win32_start (struct net_event_win32 *ne, long network_events, socket_descriptor_t sd); +void net_event_win32_reset (struct net_event_win32 *ne); +void net_event_win32_reset_write (struct net_event_win32 *ne); +void net_event_win32_stop (struct net_event_win32 *ne); +void net_event_win32_close (struct net_event_win32 *ne); + +static inline bool +net_event_win32_defined (const struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + return defined_net_event_win32 (&ne->handle); +} + +static inline struct rw_handle * +net_event_win32_get_event (struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + return &ne->handle; +} + +static inline long +net_event_win32_get_event_mask (const struct net_event_win32 *ne) +{ + return ne->event_mask; +} + +static inline void +net_event_win32_clear_selected_events (struct net_event_win32 *ne, long selected_events) +{ + ne->event_mask &= ~selected_events; +} + +/* + * Signal handling + */ +struct win32_signal { +# define WSO_MODE_UNDEF 0 +# define WSO_MODE_SERVICE 1 +# define WSO_MODE_CONSOLE 2 + int mode; + struct rw_handle in; + DWORD console_mode_save; + bool console_mode_save_defined; +}; + +extern struct win32_signal win32_signal; /* static/global */ +extern struct window_title window_title; /* static/global */ + +void win32_signal_clear (struct win32_signal *ws); + +/* win32_signal_open startup type */ +#define WSO_NOFORCE 0 +#define WSO_FORCE_SERVICE 1 +#define WSO_FORCE_CONSOLE 2 + +void win32_signal_open (struct win32_signal *ws, + int force, /* set to WSO force parm */ + const char *exit_event_name, + bool exit_event_initial_state); + +void win32_signal_close (struct win32_signal *ws); + +int win32_signal_get (struct win32_signal *ws); + +void win32_pause (struct win32_signal *ws); + +bool win32_service_interrupt (struct win32_signal *ws); + +/* + * Set the text on the window title bar + */ + +void window_title_clear (struct window_title *wt); +void window_title_save (struct window_title *wt); +void window_title_restore (const struct window_title *wt); +void window_title_generate (const char *title); + +/* + * We try to do all Win32 I/O using overlapped + * (i.e. asynchronous) I/O for a performance win. + */ +struct overlapped_io { +# define IOSTATE_INITIAL 0 +# define IOSTATE_QUEUED 1 /* overlapped I/O has been queued */ +# define IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN 2 /* I/O function returned immediately without queueing */ + int iostate; + OVERLAPPED overlapped; + DWORD size; + DWORD flags; + int status; + bool addr_defined; + union { + struct sockaddr_in addr; + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6; + }; + int addrlen; + struct buffer buf_init; + struct buffer buf; +}; + +void overlapped_io_init (struct overlapped_io *o, + const struct frame *frame, + BOOL event_state, + bool tuntap_buffer); + +void overlapped_io_close (struct overlapped_io *o); + +static inline bool +overlapped_io_active (struct overlapped_io *o) +{ + return o->iostate == IOSTATE_QUEUED || o->iostate == IOSTATE_IMMEDIATE_RETURN; +} + +char *overlapped_io_state_ascii (const struct overlapped_io *o); + +/* + * Use to control access to resources that only one + * OpenVPN process on a given machine can access at + * a given time. + */ + +struct semaphore +{ + const char *name; + bool locked; + HANDLE hand; +}; + +void semaphore_clear (struct semaphore *s); +void semaphore_open (struct semaphore *s, const char *name); +bool semaphore_lock (struct semaphore *s, int timeout_milliseconds); +void semaphore_release (struct semaphore *s); +void semaphore_close (struct semaphore *s); + +/* + * Special global semaphore used to protect network + * shell commands from simultaneous instantiation. + * + * It seems you can't run more than one instance + * of netsh on the same machine at the same time. + */ + +extern struct semaphore netcmd_semaphore; +void netcmd_semaphore_init (void); +void netcmd_semaphore_close (void); +void netcmd_semaphore_lock (void); +void netcmd_semaphore_release (void); + +/* Set Win32 security attributes structure to allow all access */ +bool init_security_attributes_allow_all (struct security_attributes *obj); + +/* return true if filename is safe to be used on Windows */ +bool win_safe_filename (const char *fn); + +/* add constant environmental variables needed by Windows */ +struct env_set; + +/* get and set the current windows system path */ +void set_win_sys_path (const char *newpath, struct env_set *es); +void set_win_sys_path_via_env (struct env_set *es); +char *get_win_sys_path (void); + +/* call self in a subprocess */ +void fork_to_self (const char *cmdline); + +/* Find temporary directory */ +const char *win_get_tempdir(); + +/* Convert a string from UTF-8 to UCS-2 */ +WCHAR *wide_string (const char* utf8, struct gc_arena *gc); + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a989c25c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +include $(top_srcdir)/build/ltrc.inc + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +EXTRA_DIST = \ + openvpnserv.vcxproj \ + openvpnserv.vcxproj.filters + +if WIN32 +sbin_PROGRAMS = openvpnserv +endif + +openvpnserv_SOURCES = \ + openvpnserv.c \ + service.h service.c \ + openvpnserv_resources.rc diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.c new file mode 100755 index 00000000..56f5a025 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.c @@ -0,0 +1,534 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * This program allows one or more OpenVPN processes to be started + * as a service. To build, you must get the service sample from the + * Platform SDK and replace Simple.c with this file. + * + * You should also apply service.patch to + * service.c and service.h from the Platform SDK service sample. + * + * This code is designed to be built with the mingw compiler. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "service.h" + +/* bool definitions */ +#define bool int +#define true 1 +#define false 0 + +/* These are new for 2000/XP, so they aren't in the mingw headers yet */ +#ifndef BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS +#define BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS 0x00004000 +#endif +#ifndef ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS +#define ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS 0x00008000 +#endif + +struct security_attributes +{ + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa; + SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd; +}; + +/* + * This event is initially created in the non-signaled + * state. It will transition to the signaled state when + * we have received a terminate signal from the Service + * Control Manager which will cause an asynchronous call + * of ServiceStop below. + */ +#define EXIT_EVENT_NAME PACKAGE "_exit_1" + +/* + * Which registry key in HKLM should + * we get config info from? + */ +#define REG_KEY "SOFTWARE\\" PACKAGE_NAME + +static HANDLE exit_event = NULL; + +/* clear an object */ +#define CLEAR(x) memset(&(x), 0, sizeof(x)) + +/* + * Message handling + */ +#define M_INFO (0) /* informational */ +#define M_SYSERR (MSG_FLAGS_ERROR|MSG_FLAGS_SYS_CODE) /* error + system code */ +#define M_ERR (MSG_FLAGS_ERROR) /* error */ + +/* write error to event log */ +#define MSG(flags, ...) \ + { \ + char x_msg[256]; \ + openvpn_snprintf (x_msg, sizeof(x_msg), __VA_ARGS__); \ + AddToMessageLog ((flags), x_msg); \ + } + +/* get a registry string */ +#define QUERY_REG_STRING(name, data) \ + { \ + len = sizeof (data); \ + status = RegQueryValueEx(openvpn_key, name, NULL, &type, data, &len); \ + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS || type != REG_SZ) \ + { \ + SetLastError (status); \ + MSG (M_SYSERR, error_format_str, name); \ + RegCloseKey (openvpn_key); \ + goto finish; \ + } \ + } + +/* get a registry string */ +#define QUERY_REG_DWORD(name, data) \ + { \ + len = sizeof (DWORD); \ + status = RegQueryValueEx(openvpn_key, name, NULL, &type, (LPBYTE)&data, &len); \ + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS || type != REG_DWORD || len != sizeof (DWORD)) \ + { \ + SetLastError (status); \ + MSG (M_SYSERR, error_format_dword, name); \ + RegCloseKey (openvpn_key); \ + goto finish; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * This is necessary due to certain buggy implementations of snprintf, + * that don't guarantee null termination for size > 0. + * (copied from ../buffer.c, line 217) + * (git: 100644 blob e2f8caab0a5b2a870092c6cd508a1a50c21c3ba3 buffer.c) + */ + +int openvpn_snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list arglist; + int len = -1; + if (size > 0) + { + va_start (arglist, format); + len = vsnprintf (str, size, format, arglist); + va_end (arglist); + str[size - 1] = 0; + } + return (len >= 0 && len < size); +} + + +bool +init_security_attributes_allow_all (struct security_attributes *obj) +{ + CLEAR (*obj); + + obj->sa.nLength = sizeof (SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES); + obj->sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = &obj->sd; + obj->sa.bInheritHandle = TRUE; + if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor (&obj->sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) + return false; + if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl (&obj->sd, TRUE, NULL, FALSE)) + return false; + return true; +} + +HANDLE +create_event (const char *name, bool allow_all, bool initial_state, bool manual_reset) +{ + if (allow_all) + { + struct security_attributes sa; + if (!init_security_attributes_allow_all (&sa)) + return NULL; + return CreateEvent (&sa.sa, (BOOL)manual_reset, (BOOL)initial_state, name); + } + else + return CreateEvent (NULL, (BOOL)manual_reset, (BOOL)initial_state, name); +} + +void +close_if_open (HANDLE h) +{ + if (h != NULL) + CloseHandle (h); +} + +static bool +match (const WIN32_FIND_DATA *find, const char *ext) +{ + int i; + + if (find->dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) + return false; + + if (!strlen (ext)) + return true; + + i = strlen (find->cFileName) - strlen (ext) - 1; + if (i < 1) + return false; + + return find->cFileName[i] == '.' && !_stricmp (find->cFileName + i + 1, ext); +} + +/* + * Modify the extension on a filename. + */ +static bool +modext (char *dest, int size, const char *src, const char *newext) +{ + int i; + + if (size > 0 && (strlen (src) + 1) <= size) + { + strcpy (dest, src); + dest [size - 1] = '\0'; + i = strlen (dest); + while (--i >= 0) + { + if (dest[i] == '\\') + break; + if (dest[i] == '.') + { + dest[i] = '\0'; + break; + } + } + if (strlen (dest) + strlen(newext) + 2 <= size) + { + strcat (dest, "."); + strcat (dest, newext); + return true; + } + dest [0] = '\0'; + } + return false; +} + +VOID ServiceStart (DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR *lpszArgv) +{ + char exe_path[MAX_PATH]; + char config_dir[MAX_PATH]; + char ext_string[16]; + char log_dir[MAX_PATH]; + char priority_string[64]; + char append_string[2]; + + DWORD priority; + bool append; + + ResetError (); + + if (!ReportStatusToSCMgr(SERVICE_START_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 3000)) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "ReportStatusToSCMgr #1 failed"); + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Create our exit event + */ + exit_event = create_event (EXIT_EVENT_NAME, false, false, true); + if (!exit_event) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "CreateEvent failed"); + goto finish; + } + + /* + * If exit event is already signaled, it means we were not + * shut down properly. + */ + if (WaitForSingleObject (exit_event, 0) != WAIT_TIMEOUT) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "Exit event is already signaled -- we were not shut down properly"); + goto finish; + } + + if (!ReportStatusToSCMgr(SERVICE_START_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 3000)) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "ReportStatusToSCMgr #2 failed"); + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Read info from registry in key HKLM\SOFTWARE\OpenVPN + */ + { + HKEY openvpn_key; + LONG status; + DWORD len; + DWORD type; + + static const char error_format_str[] = + "Error querying registry key of type REG_SZ: HKLM\\" REG_KEY "\\%s"; + + static const char error_format_dword[] = + "Error querying registry key of type REG_DWORD: HKLM\\" REG_KEY "\\%s"; + + status = RegOpenKeyEx( + HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, + REG_KEY, + 0, + KEY_READ, + &openvpn_key); + + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) + { + SetLastError (status); + MSG (M_SYSERR, "Registry key HKLM\\" REG_KEY " not found"); + goto finish; + } + + /* get path to openvpn.exe */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("exe_path", exe_path); + + /* get path to configuration directory */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("config_dir", config_dir); + + /* get extension on configuration files */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("config_ext", ext_string); + + /* get path to log directory */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("log_dir", log_dir); + + /* get priority for spawned OpenVPN subprocesses */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("priority", priority_string); + + /* should we truncate or append to logfile? */ + QUERY_REG_STRING ("log_append", append_string); + + RegCloseKey (openvpn_key); + } + + /* set process priority */ + priority = NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS; + if (!_stricmp (priority_string, "IDLE_PRIORITY_CLASS")) + priority = IDLE_PRIORITY_CLASS; + else if (!_stricmp (priority_string, "BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS")) + priority = BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS; + else if (!_stricmp (priority_string, "NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS")) + priority = NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS; + else if (!_stricmp (priority_string, "ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS")) + priority = ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS; + else if (!_stricmp (priority_string, "HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS")) + priority = HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS; + else + { + MSG (M_ERR, "Unknown priority name: %s", priority_string); + goto finish; + } + + /* set log file append/truncate flag */ + append = false; + if (append_string[0] == '0') + append = false; + else if (append_string[0] == '1') + append = true; + else + { + MSG (M_ERR, "Log file append flag (given as '%s') must be '0' or '1'", append_string); + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Instantiate an OpenVPN process for each configuration + * file found. + */ + { + WIN32_FIND_DATA find_obj; + HANDLE find_handle; + BOOL more_files; + char find_string[MAX_PATH]; + + openvpn_snprintf (find_string, MAX_PATH, "%s\\*", config_dir); + + find_handle = FindFirstFile (find_string, &find_obj); + if (find_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "Cannot get configuration file list using: %s", find_string); + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Loop over each config file + */ + do { + HANDLE log_handle = NULL; + STARTUPINFO start_info; + PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info; + struct security_attributes sa; + char log_file[MAX_PATH]; + char log_path[MAX_PATH]; + char command_line[256]; + + CLEAR (start_info); + CLEAR (proc_info); + CLEAR (sa); + + if (!ReportStatusToSCMgr(SERVICE_START_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 3000)) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "ReportStatusToSCMgr #3 failed"); + FindClose (find_handle); + goto finish; + } + + /* does file have the correct type and extension? */ + if (match (&find_obj, ext_string)) + { + /* get log file pathname */ + if (!modext (log_file, sizeof (log_file), find_obj.cFileName, "log")) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "Cannot construct logfile name based on: %s", find_obj.cFileName); + FindClose (find_handle); + goto finish; + } + openvpn_snprintf (log_path, sizeof(log_path), + "%s\\%s", log_dir, log_file); + + /* construct command line */ + openvpn_snprintf (command_line, sizeof(command_line), PACKAGE " --service %s 1 --config \"%s\"", + EXIT_EVENT_NAME, + find_obj.cFileName); + + /* Make security attributes struct for logfile handle so it can + be inherited. */ + if (!init_security_attributes_allow_all (&sa)) + { + MSG (M_SYSERR, "InitializeSecurityDescriptor start_" PACKAGE " failed"); + goto finish; + } + + /* open logfile as stdout/stderr for soon-to-be-spawned subprocess */ + log_handle = CreateFile (log_path, + GENERIC_WRITE, + FILE_SHARE_READ, + &sa.sa, + append ? OPEN_ALWAYS : CREATE_ALWAYS, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + NULL); + + if (log_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + { + MSG (M_SYSERR, "Cannot open logfile: %s", log_path); + FindClose (find_handle); + goto finish; + } + + /* append to logfile? */ + if (append) + { + if (SetFilePointer (log_handle, 0, NULL, FILE_END) == INVALID_SET_FILE_POINTER) + { + MSG (M_SYSERR, "Cannot seek to end of logfile: %s", log_path); + FindClose (find_handle); + goto finish; + } + } + + /* fill in STARTUPINFO struct */ + GetStartupInfo(&start_info); + start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info); + start_info.dwFlags = STARTF_USESTDHANDLES|STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW; + start_info.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE; + start_info.hStdInput = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); + start_info.hStdOutput = start_info.hStdError = log_handle; + + /* create an OpenVPN process for one config file */ + if (!CreateProcess(exe_path, + command_line, + NULL, + NULL, + TRUE, + priority | CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, + NULL, + config_dir, + &start_info, + &proc_info)) + { + MSG (M_SYSERR, "CreateProcess failed, exe='%s' cmdline='%s' dir='%s'", + exe_path, + command_line, + config_dir); + + FindClose (find_handle); + CloseHandle (log_handle); + goto finish; + } + + /* close unneeded handles */ + Sleep (1000); /* try to prevent race if we close logfile + handle before child process DUPs it */ + if (!CloseHandle (proc_info.hProcess) + || !CloseHandle (proc_info.hThread) + || !CloseHandle (log_handle)) + { + MSG (M_SYSERR, "CloseHandle failed"); + goto finish; + } + } + + /* more files to process? */ + more_files = FindNextFile (find_handle, &find_obj); + + } while (more_files); + + FindClose (find_handle); + } + + /* we are now fully started */ + if (!ReportStatusToSCMgr(SERVICE_RUNNING, NO_ERROR, 0)) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "ReportStatusToSCMgr SERVICE_RUNNING failed"); + goto finish; + } + + /* wait for our shutdown signal */ + if (WaitForSingleObject (exit_event, INFINITE) != WAIT_OBJECT_0) + { + MSG (M_ERR, "wait for shutdown signal failed"); + } + + finish: + ServiceStop (); + if (exit_event) + CloseHandle (exit_event); +} + +VOID ServiceStop() +{ + if (exit_event) + SetEvent(exit_event); +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f2c00718 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ + + + + + Debug + Win32 + + + Release + Win32 + + + + {9C91EE0B-817D-420A-A1E6-15A5A9D98BAD} + openvpnserv + Win32Proj + + + + Application + MultiByte + true + + + Application + MultiByte + + + + + + + + + + + + + <_ProjectFileVersion>10.0.30319.1 + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + true + $(SolutionDir)$(Platform)-Output\$(Configuration)\ + $(Configuration)\ + false + + + + Disabled + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;_DEBUG;_CONSOLE;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + true + EnableFastChecks + MultiThreadedDebugDLL + + + Level3 + EditAndContinue + + + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + + + true + Console + MachineX86 + + + + + MaxSpeed + true + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;$(CPPFLAGS);%(PreprocessorDefinitions) + MultiThreadedDLL + true + + + Level3 + ProgramDatabase + + + $(SOURCEBASE);%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories) + + + true + Console + true + true + MachineX86 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + {8598c2c8-34c4-47a1-99b0-7c295a890615} + false + + + + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj.filters b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj.filters new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a6f8ecc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv.vcxproj.filters @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ + + + + + {4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF} + cpp;c;cc;cxx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx + + + {93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB} + h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl;inc;xsd + + + {67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01} + rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav + + + + + Source Files + + + Source Files + + + + + Header Files + + + + + Resource Files + + + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv_resources.rc b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv_resources.rc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7980193b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/openvpnserv_resources.rc @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#include + +#pragma code_page(65001) /* UTF8 */ + +LANGUAGE LANG_NEUTRAL, SUBLANG_NEUTRAL + +VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO + FILEVERSION OPENVPN_VERSION_RESOURCE + PRODUCTVERSION OPENVPN_VERSION_RESOURCE + FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL +#ifdef _DEBUG + FILEFLAGS 0x1L +#else + FILEFLAGS 0x0L +#endif + FILEOS 0x40004L + FILETYPE 0x2L + FILESUBTYPE 0x0L +BEGIN + BLOCK "StringFileInfo" + BEGIN + BLOCK "040904b0" + BEGIN + VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenVPN Project" + VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenVPN Service" + VALUE "FileVersion", PACKAGE_VERSION ".0" + VALUE "InternalName", "OpenVPN" + VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © The OpenVPN Project" + VALUE "OriginalFilename", "openvpnserv.exe" + VALUE "ProductName", "OpenVPN" + VALUE "ProductVersion", PACKAGE_VERSION ".0" + END + END + BLOCK "VarFileInfo" + BEGIN + VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200 + END +END diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7562b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.c @@ -0,0 +1,700 @@ +/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +THIS CODE AND INFORMATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF +ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED +TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Copyright (C) 1993 - 2000. Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + +MODULE: service.c + +PURPOSE: Implements functions required by all Windows NT services + +FUNCTIONS: + main(int argc, char **argv); + service_ctrl(DWORD dwCtrlCode); + service_main(DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR *lpszArgv); + CmdInstallService(); + CmdRemoveService(); + CmdStartService(); + CmdDebugService(int argc, char **argv); + ControlHandler ( DWORD dwCtrlType ); + GetLastErrorText( LPTSTR lpszBuf, DWORD dwSize ); + +---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include "config-msvc.h" +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "service.h" + +// internal variables +SERVICE_STATUS ssStatus; // current status of the service +SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE sshStatusHandle; +DWORD dwErr = 0; +BOOL bDebug = FALSE; +TCHAR szErr[256]; + +// internal function prototypes +VOID WINAPI service_ctrl(DWORD dwCtrlCode); +VOID WINAPI service_main(DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR *lpszArgv); +int CmdInstallService(); +int CmdRemoveService(); +int CmdStartService(); +VOID CmdDebugService(int argc, char **argv); +BOOL WINAPI ControlHandler ( DWORD dwCtrlType ); +LPTSTR GetLastErrorText( LPTSTR lpszBuf, DWORD dwSize ); + +// +// FUNCTION: main +// +// PURPOSE: entrypoint for service +// +// PARAMETERS: +// argc - number of command line arguments +// argv - array of command line arguments +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +// COMMENTS: +// main() either performs the command line task, or +// call StartServiceCtrlDispatcher to register the +// main service thread. When the this call returns, +// the service has stopped, so exit. +// +int __cdecl main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY dispatchTable[] = + { + { TEXT(SZSERVICENAME), (LPSERVICE_MAIN_FUNCTION)service_main}, + { NULL, NULL} + }; + + if ( (argc > 1) && + ((*argv[1] == '-') || (*argv[1] == '/')) ) + { + if ( _stricmp( "install", argv[1]+1 ) == 0 ) + { + return CmdInstallService(); + } + else if ( _stricmp( "remove", argv[1]+1 ) == 0 ) + { + return CmdRemoveService(); + } + else if ( _stricmp( "start", argv[1]+1 ) == 0) + { + return CmdStartService(); + } + else if ( _stricmp( "debug", argv[1]+1 ) == 0 ) + { + bDebug = TRUE; + CmdDebugService(argc, argv); + } + else + { + goto dispatch; + } + return 0; + } + + // if it doesn't match any of the above parameters + // the service control manager may be starting the service + // so we must call StartServiceCtrlDispatcher + dispatch: + // this is just to be friendly + printf( "%s -install to install the service\n", SZAPPNAME ); + printf( "%s -start to start the service\n", SZAPPNAME ); + printf( "%s -remove to remove the service\n", SZAPPNAME ); + printf( "%s -debug to run as a console app for debugging\n", SZAPPNAME ); + printf( "\nStartServiceCtrlDispatcher being called.\n" ); + printf( "This may take several seconds. Please wait.\n" ); + + if (!StartServiceCtrlDispatcher(dispatchTable)) + AddToMessageLog(MSG_FLAGS_ERROR, TEXT("StartServiceCtrlDispatcher failed.")); + + return 0; +} + + + +// +// FUNCTION: service_main +// +// PURPOSE: To perform actual initialization of the service +// +// PARAMETERS: +// dwArgc - number of command line arguments +// lpszArgv - array of command line arguments +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +// COMMENTS: +// This routine performs the service initialization and then calls +// the user defined ServiceStart() routine to perform majority +// of the work. +// +void WINAPI service_main(DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR *lpszArgv) +{ + + // register our service control handler: + // + sshStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( TEXT(SZSERVICENAME), service_ctrl); + + if (!sshStatusHandle) + goto cleanup; + + // SERVICE_STATUS members that don't change in example + // + ssStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS; + ssStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = 0; + + + // report the status to the service control manager. + // + if (!ReportStatusToSCMgr( + SERVICE_START_PENDING, // service state + NO_ERROR, // exit code + 3000)) // wait hint + goto cleanup; + + + ServiceStart( dwArgc, lpszArgv ); + + cleanup: + + // try to report the stopped status to the service control manager. + // + if (sshStatusHandle) + (VOID)ReportStatusToSCMgr( + SERVICE_STOPPED, + dwErr, + 0); + + return; +} + + + +// +// FUNCTION: service_ctrl +// +// PURPOSE: This function is called by the SCM whenever +// ControlService() is called on this service. +// +// PARAMETERS: +// dwCtrlCode - type of control requested +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +// COMMENTS: +// +VOID WINAPI service_ctrl(DWORD dwCtrlCode) +{ + // Handle the requested control code. + // + switch (dwCtrlCode) + { + // Stop the service. + // + // SERVICE_STOP_PENDING should be reported before + // setting the Stop Event - hServerStopEvent - in + // ServiceStop(). This avoids a race condition + // which may result in a 1053 - The Service did not respond... + // error. + case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP: + ReportStatusToSCMgr(SERVICE_STOP_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 0); + ServiceStop(); + return; + + // Update the service status. + // + case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE: + break; + + // invalid control code + // + default: + break; + + } + + ReportStatusToSCMgr(ssStatus.dwCurrentState, NO_ERROR, 0); +} + + + +// +// FUNCTION: ReportStatusToSCMgr() +// +// PURPOSE: Sets the current status of the service and +// reports it to the Service Control Manager +// +// PARAMETERS: +// dwCurrentState - the state of the service +// dwWin32ExitCode - error code to report +// dwWaitHint - worst case estimate to next checkpoint +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// TRUE - success +// FALSE - failure +// +// COMMENTS: +// +BOOL ReportStatusToSCMgr(DWORD dwCurrentState, + DWORD dwWin32ExitCode, + DWORD dwWaitHint) +{ + static DWORD dwCheckPoint = 1; + BOOL fResult = TRUE; + + + if ( !bDebug ) // when debugging we don't report to the SCM + { + if (dwCurrentState == SERVICE_START_PENDING) + ssStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0; + else + ssStatus.dwControlsAccepted = SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP; + + ssStatus.dwCurrentState = dwCurrentState; + ssStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = dwWin32ExitCode; + ssStatus.dwWaitHint = dwWaitHint; + + if ( ( dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING ) || + ( dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED ) ) + ssStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0; + else + ssStatus.dwCheckPoint = dwCheckPoint++; + + + // Report the status of the service to the service control manager. + // + if (!(fResult = SetServiceStatus( sshStatusHandle, &ssStatus))) + { + AddToMessageLog(MSG_FLAGS_ERROR, TEXT("SetServiceStatus")); + } + } + return fResult; +} + + + +// +// FUNCTION: AddToMessageLog(LPTSTR lpszMsg) +// +// PURPOSE: Allows any thread to log an error message +// +// PARAMETERS: +// lpszMsg - text for message +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +// COMMENTS: +// +void AddToMessageLog(DWORD flags, LPTSTR lpszMsg) +{ + TCHAR szMsg [(sizeof(SZSERVICENAME) / sizeof(TCHAR)) + 100 ]; + HANDLE hEventSource; + LPCSTR lpszStrings[2]; + + if ( !bDebug ) + { + if (flags & MSG_FLAGS_SYS_CODE) + dwErr = GetLastError(); + else + dwErr = 0; + + // Use event logging to log the error. + // + hEventSource = RegisterEventSource(NULL, TEXT(SZSERVICENAME)); + + _stprintf(szMsg, TEXT("%s error: %d"), TEXT(SZSERVICENAME), (int)dwErr); + lpszStrings[0] = szMsg; + lpszStrings[1] = lpszMsg; + + if (hEventSource != NULL) + { + ReportEvent(hEventSource, // handle of event source + // event type + (flags & MSG_FLAGS_ERROR) + ? EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE : EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE, + 0, // event category + 0, // event ID + NULL, // current user's SID + 2, // strings in lpszStrings + 0, // no bytes of raw data + lpszStrings, // array of error strings + NULL); // no raw data + + (VOID) DeregisterEventSource(hEventSource); + } + } +} + +void ResetError (void) +{ + dwErr = 0; +} + +/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// The following code handles service installation and removal +// + + +// +// FUNCTION: CmdInstallService() +// +// PURPOSE: Installs the service +// +// PARAMETERS: +// none +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// 0 if success +// +// COMMENTS: +// +int CmdInstallService() +{ + SC_HANDLE schService; + SC_HANDLE schSCManager; + + TCHAR szPath[512]; + + int ret = 0; + + if ( GetModuleFileName( NULL, szPath+1, 510 ) == 0 ) + { + _tprintf(TEXT("Unable to install %s - %s\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME), GetLastErrorText(szErr, 256)); + return 1; + } + szPath[0] = '\"'; + strcat(szPath, "\""); + + schSCManager = OpenSCManager( + NULL, // machine (NULL == local) + NULL, // database (NULL == default) + SC_MANAGER_CONNECT | SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE // access required + ); + if ( schSCManager ) + { + schService = CreateService( + schSCManager, // SCManager database + TEXT(SZSERVICENAME), // name of service + TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME), // name to display + SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS, // desired access + SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS, // service type + SERVICE_DEMAND_START, // start type -- alternative: SERVICE_AUTO_START + SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, // error control type + szPath, // service's binary + NULL, // no load ordering group + NULL, // no tag identifier + TEXT(SZDEPENDENCIES), // dependencies + NULL, // LocalSystem account + NULL); // no password + + if ( schService ) + { + _tprintf(TEXT("%s installed.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME) ); + CloseServiceHandle(schService); + } + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("CreateService failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr, 256)); + ret = 1; + } + + CloseServiceHandle(schSCManager); + } + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("OpenSCManager failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + return ret; +} + +// +// FUNCTION: CmdStartService() +// +// PURPOSE: Start the service +// +// PARAMETERS: +// none +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// 0 if success +// +// COMMENTS: + +int CmdStartService() +{ + int ret = 0; + + SC_HANDLE schSCManager; + SC_HANDLE schService; + + + // Open a handle to the SC Manager database. + schSCManager = OpenSCManager( + NULL, // local machine + NULL, // ServicesActive database + SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS); // full access rights + + if (NULL == schSCManager) { + _tprintf(TEXT("OpenSCManager failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + + schService = OpenService( + schSCManager, // SCM database + SZSERVICENAME, // service name + SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS); + + if (schService == NULL) { + _tprintf(TEXT("OpenService failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + + if (!StartService( + schService, // handle to service + 0, // number of arguments + NULL) ) // no arguments + { + _tprintf(TEXT("StartService failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("Service Started\n")); + ret = 0; + } + CloseServiceHandle(schService); + CloseServiceHandle(schSCManager); + return ret; +} + +// +// FUNCTION: CmdRemoveService() +// +// PURPOSE: Stops and removes the service +// +// PARAMETERS: +// none +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// 0 if success +// +// COMMENTS: +// +int CmdRemoveService() +{ + SC_HANDLE schService; + SC_HANDLE schSCManager; + + int ret = 0; + + schSCManager = OpenSCManager( + NULL, // machine (NULL == local) + NULL, // database (NULL == default) + SC_MANAGER_CONNECT // access required + ); + if ( schSCManager ) + { + schService = OpenService(schSCManager, TEXT(SZSERVICENAME), DELETE | SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS); + + if (schService) + { + // try to stop the service + if ( ControlService( schService, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &ssStatus ) ) + { + _tprintf(TEXT("Stopping %s."), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME)); + Sleep( 1000 ); + + while ( QueryServiceStatus( schService, &ssStatus ) ) + { + if ( ssStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOP_PENDING ) + { + _tprintf(TEXT(".")); + Sleep( 1000 ); + } + else + break; + } + + if ( ssStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED ) + _tprintf(TEXT("\n%s stopped.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME) ); + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("\n%s failed to stop.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME) ); + ret = 1; + } + + } + + // now remove the service + if ( DeleteService(schService) ) + _tprintf(TEXT("%s removed.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME) ); + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("DeleteService failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + + + CloseServiceHandle(schService); + } + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("OpenService failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + + CloseServiceHandle(schSCManager); + } + else + { + _tprintf(TEXT("OpenSCManager failed - %s\n"), GetLastErrorText(szErr,256)); + ret = 1; + } + return ret; +} + + + + +/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// The following code is for running the service as a console app +// + + +// +// FUNCTION: CmdDebugService(int argc, char ** argv) +// +// PURPOSE: Runs the service as a console application +// +// PARAMETERS: +// argc - number of command line arguments +// argv - array of command line arguments +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +// COMMENTS: +// +void CmdDebugService(int argc, char ** argv) +{ + DWORD dwArgc; + LPTSTR *lpszArgv; + +#ifdef UNICODE + lpszArgv = CommandLineToArgvW(GetCommandLineW(), &(dwArgc) ); + if (NULL == lpszArgv) + { + // CommandLineToArvW failed!! + _tprintf(TEXT("CmdDebugService CommandLineToArgvW returned NULL\n")); + return; + } +#else + dwArgc = (DWORD) argc; + lpszArgv = argv; +#endif + + _tprintf(TEXT("Debugging %s.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME)); + + SetConsoleCtrlHandler( ControlHandler, TRUE ); + + ServiceStart( dwArgc, lpszArgv ); + +#ifdef UNICODE +// Must free memory allocated for arguments + + GlobalFree(lpszArgv); +#endif // UNICODE + +} + + +// +// FUNCTION: ControlHandler ( DWORD dwCtrlType ) +// +// PURPOSE: Handled console control events +// +// PARAMETERS: +// dwCtrlType - type of control event +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// True - handled +// False - unhandled +// +// COMMENTS: +// +BOOL WINAPI ControlHandler ( DWORD dwCtrlType ) +{ + switch ( dwCtrlType ) + { + case CTRL_BREAK_EVENT: // use Ctrl+C or Ctrl+Break to simulate + case CTRL_C_EVENT: // SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP in debug mode + _tprintf(TEXT("Stopping %s.\n"), TEXT(SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME)); + ServiceStop(); + return TRUE; + break; + + } + return FALSE; +} + +// +// FUNCTION: GetLastErrorText +// +// PURPOSE: copies error message text to string +// +// PARAMETERS: +// lpszBuf - destination buffer +// dwSize - size of buffer +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// destination buffer +// +// COMMENTS: +// +LPTSTR GetLastErrorText( LPTSTR lpszBuf, DWORD dwSize ) +{ + DWORD dwRet; + LPTSTR lpszTemp = NULL; + + dwRet = FormatMessage( FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER | FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM |FORMAT_MESSAGE_ARGUMENT_ARRAY, + NULL, + GetLastError(), + LANG_NEUTRAL, + (LPTSTR)&lpszTemp, + 0, + NULL ); + + // supplied buffer is not long enough + if ( !dwRet || ( (long)dwSize < (long)dwRet+14 ) ) + lpszBuf[0] = TEXT('\0'); + else + { + lpszTemp[lstrlen(lpszTemp)-2] = TEXT('\0'); //remove cr and newline character + _stprintf( lpszBuf, TEXT("%s (0x%x)"), lpszTemp, (int)GetLastError() ); + } + + if ( lpszTemp ) + LocalFree((HLOCAL) lpszTemp ); + + return lpszBuf; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e89a89fb --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/openvpnserv/service.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +THIS CODE AND INFORMATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF +ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED +TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Copyright (C) 1993 - 2000. Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + + MODULE: service.h + + Comments: The use of this header file and the accompanying service.c + file simplifies the process of writting a service. You as a developer + simply need to follow the TODO's outlined in this header file, and + implement the ServiceStart() and ServiceStop() functions. + + There is no need to modify the code in service.c. Just add service.c + to your project and link with the following libraries... + + libcmt.lib kernel32.lib advapi.lib shell32.lib + + This code also supports unicode. Be sure to compile both service.c and + and code #include "service.h" with the same Unicode setting. + + Upon completion, your code will have the following command line interface + + -? to display this list + -install to install the service + -remove to remove the service + -debug to run as a console app for debugging + + Note: This code also implements Ctrl+C and Ctrl+Break handlers + when using the debug option. These console events cause + your ServiceStop routine to be called + + Also, this code only handles the OWN_SERVICE service type + running in the LOCAL_SYSTEM security context. + + To control your service ( start, stop, etc ) you may use the + Services control panel applet or the NET.EXE program. + + To aid in writing/debugging service, the + SDK contains a utility (MSTOOLS\BIN\SC.EXE) that + can be used to control, configure, or obtain service status. + SC displays complete status for any service/driver + in the service database, and allows any of the configuration + parameters to be easily changed at the command line. + For more information on SC.EXE, type SC at the command line. + + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + +#ifndef _SERVICE_H +#define _SERVICE_H + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +//// todo: change to desired strings +//// +// name of the executable +#define SZAPPNAME PACKAGE "serv" +// internal name of the service +#define SZSERVICENAME PACKAGE_NAME "Service" +// displayed name of the service +#define SZSERVICEDISPLAYNAME PACKAGE_NAME " Service" +// list of service dependencies - "dep1\0dep2\0\0" +#define SZDEPENDENCIES TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID "\0Dhcp\0\0" +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +//// todo: ServiceStart()must be defined by in your code. +//// The service should use ReportStatusToSCMgr to indicate +//// progress. This routine must also be used by StartService() +//// to report to the SCM when the service is running. +//// +//// If a ServiceStop procedure is going to take longer than +//// 3 seconds to execute, it should spawn a thread to +//// execute the stop code, and return. Otherwise, the +//// ServiceControlManager will believe that the service has +//// stopped responding +//// + VOID ServiceStart(DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR *lpszArgv); + VOID ServiceStop(); +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + + +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +//// The following are procedures which +//// may be useful to call within the above procedures, +//// but require no implementation by the user. +//// They are implemented in service.c + +// +// FUNCTION: ReportStatusToSCMgr() +// +// PURPOSE: Sets the current status of the service and +// reports it to the Service Control Manager +// +// PARAMETERS: +// dwCurrentState - the state of the service +// dwWin32ExitCode - error code to report +// dwWaitHint - worst case estimate to next checkpoint +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// TRUE - success +// FALSE - failure +// + BOOL ReportStatusToSCMgr(DWORD dwCurrentState, DWORD dwWin32ExitCode, DWORD dwWaitHint); + + +// +// FUNCTION: AddToMessageLog(LPTSTR lpszMsg) +// +// PURPOSE: Allows any thread to log an error message +// +// PARAMETERS: +// lpszMsg - text for message +// +// RETURN VALUE: +// none +// +# define MSG_FLAGS_ERROR (1<<0) +# define MSG_FLAGS_SYS_CODE (1<<1) + void AddToMessageLog(DWORD flags, LPTSTR lpszMsg); + void ResetError (void); +////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17b72b94 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +SUBDIRS = auth-pam down-root diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..701a7497 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# +# OpenVPN (TM) PAM Auth Plugin -- OpenVPN Plugin +# +# Copyright (C) 2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +AM_CFLAGS = \ + -I$(top_srcdir)/include + $(PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_CFLAGS) + +if ENABLE_PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM +plugin_LTLIBRARIES = openvpn-plugin-auth-pam.la +dist_doc_DATA = README.auth-pam +endif + +openvpn_plugin_auth_pam_la_SOURCES = \ + auth-pam.c \ + pamdl.c pamdl.h \ + auth-pam.exports +openvpn_plugin_auth_pam_la_LIBADD = \ + $(PLUGIN_AUTH_PAM_LIBS) +openvpn_plugin_auth_pam_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) \ + -export-symbols "$(srcdir)/auth-pam.exports" \ + -module -shared -avoid-version -no-undefined diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/README.auth-pam b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/README.auth-pam new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1236902 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/README.auth-pam @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +openvpn-auth-pam + +SYNOPSIS + +The openvpn-auth-pam module implements username/password +authentication via PAM, and essentially allows any authentication +method supported by PAM (such as LDAP, RADIUS, or Linux Shadow +passwords) to be used with OpenVPN. While PAM supports +username/password authentication, this can be combined with X509 +certificates to provide two indepedent levels of authentication. + +This module uses a split privilege execution model which will +function even if you drop openvpn daemon privileges using the user, +group, or chroot directives. + +BUILD + +To build openvpn-auth-pam, you will need to have the pam-devel +package installed. + +Build with the "make" command. The module will be named +openvpn-auth-pam.so + +USAGE + +To use this plugin module, add to your OpenVPN config file: + + plugin openvpn-auth-pam.so service-type + +The required service-type parameter corresponds to +the PAM service definition file usually found +in /etc/pam.d. + +This plugin also supports the usage of a list of name/value +pairs to answer PAM module queries. + +For example: + + plugin openvpn-auth-pam.so "login login USERNAME password PASSWORD" + +tells auth-pam to (a) use the "login" PAM module, (b) answer a +"login" query with the username given by the OpenVPN client, and +(c) answer a "password" query with the password given by the +OpenVPN client. This provides flexibility in dealing with the different +types of query strings which different PAM modules might generate. +For example, suppose you were using a PAM module called +"test" which queried for "name" rather than "login": + + plugin openvpn-auth-pam.so "test name USERNAME password PASSWORD" + +While "USERNAME" "COMMONNAME" and "PASSWORD" are special strings which substitute +to client-supplied values, it is also possible to name literal values +to use as PAM module query responses. For example, suppose that the +login module queried for a third parameter, "domain" which +is to be answered with the constant value "mydomain.com": + + plugin openvpn-auth-pam.so "login login USERNAME password PASSWORD domain mydomain.com" + +The following OpenVPN directives can also influence +the operation of this plugin: + + client-cert-not-required + username-as-common-name + +Run OpenVPN with --verb 7 or higher to get debugging output from +this plugin, including the list of queries presented by the +underlying PAM module. This is a useful debugging tool to figure +out which queries a given PAM module is making, so that you can +craft the appropriate plugin directive to answer it. + +CAVEATS + +This module will only work on *nix systems which support PAM, +not Windows. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd717927 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,806 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * OpenVPN plugin module to do PAM authentication using a split + * privilege model. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN +#include "pamdl.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#define DEBUG(verb) ((verb) >= 4) + +/* Command codes for foreground -> background communication */ +#define COMMAND_VERIFY 0 +#define COMMAND_EXIT 1 + +/* Response codes for background -> foreground communication */ +#define RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED 10 +#define RESPONSE_INIT_FAILED 11 +#define RESPONSE_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED 12 +#define RESPONSE_VERIFY_FAILED 13 + +/* + * Plugin state, used by foreground + */ +struct auth_pam_context +{ + /* Foreground's socket to background process */ + int foreground_fd; + + /* Process ID of background process */ + pid_t background_pid; + + /* Verbosity level of OpenVPN */ + int verb; +}; + +/* + * Name/Value pairs for conversation function. + * Special Values: + * + * "USERNAME" -- substitute client-supplied username + * "PASSWORD" -- substitute client-specified password + * "COMMONNAME" -- substitute client certificate common name + */ + +#define N_NAME_VALUE 16 + +struct name_value { + const char *name; + const char *value; +}; + +struct name_value_list { + int len; + struct name_value data[N_NAME_VALUE]; +}; + +/* + * Used to pass the username/password + * to the PAM conversation function. + */ +struct user_pass { + int verb; + + char username[128]; + char password[128]; + char common_name[128]; + + const struct name_value_list *name_value_list; +}; + +/* Background process function */ +static void pam_server (int fd, const char *service, int verb, const struct name_value_list *name_value_list); + +/* Read 'tosearch', replace all occurences of 'searchfor' with 'replacewith' and return + * a pointer to the NEW string. Does not modify the input strings. Will not enter an + * infinite loop with clever 'searchfor' and 'replacewith' strings. + * Daniel Johnson - Progman2000@usa.net / djohnson@progman.us + */ +static char * +searchandreplace(const char *tosearch, const char *searchfor, const char *replacewith) +{ + const char *searching=tosearch; + char *scratch; + char temp[strlen(tosearch)*10]; + temp[0]=0; + + if (!tosearch || !searchfor || !replacewith) return 0; + if (!strlen(tosearch) || !strlen(searchfor) || !strlen(replacewith)) return 0; + + scratch = strstr(searching,searchfor); + if (!scratch) return strdup(tosearch); + + while (scratch) { + strncat(temp,searching,scratch-searching); + strcat(temp,replacewith); + + searching=scratch+strlen(searchfor); + scratch = strstr(searching,searchfor); + } + return strdup(temp); +} + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Return the length of a string array + */ +static int +string_array_len (const char *array[]) +{ + int i = 0; + if (array) + { + while (array[i]) + ++i; + } + return i; +} + +/* + * Socket read/write functions. + */ + +static int +recv_control (int fd) +{ + unsigned char c; + const ssize_t size = read (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return c; + else + { + /*fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: DEBUG recv_control.read=%d\n", (int)size);*/ + return -1; + } +} + +static int +send_control (int fd, int code) +{ + unsigned char c = (unsigned char) code; + const ssize_t size = write (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return (int) size; + else + return -1; +} + +static int +recv_string (int fd, char *buffer, int len) +{ + if (len > 0) + { + ssize_t size; + memset (buffer, 0, len); + size = read (fd, buffer, len); + buffer[len-1] = 0; + if (size >= 1) + return (int)size; + } + return -1; +} + +static int +send_string (int fd, const char *string) +{ + const int len = strlen (string) + 1; + const ssize_t size = write (fd, string, len); + if (size == len) + return (int) size; + else + return -1; +} + +#ifdef DO_DAEMONIZE + +/* + * Daemonize if "daemon" env var is true. + * Preserve stderr across daemonization if + * "daemon_log_redirect" env var is true. + */ +static void +daemonize (const char *envp[]) +{ + const char *daemon_string = get_env ("daemon", envp); + if (daemon_string && daemon_string[0] == '1') + { + const char *log_redirect = get_env ("daemon_log_redirect", envp); + int fd = -1; + if (log_redirect && log_redirect[0] == '1') + fd = dup (2); + if (daemon (0, 0) < 0) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: daemonization failed\n"); + } + else if (fd >= 3) + { + dup2 (fd, 2); + close (fd); + } + } +} + +#endif + +/* + * Close most of parent's fds. + * Keep stdin/stdout/stderr, plus one + * other fd which is presumed to be + * our pipe back to parent. + * Admittedly, a bit of a kludge, + * but posix doesn't give us a kind + * of FD_CLOEXEC which will stop + * fds from crossing a fork(). + */ +static void +close_fds_except (int keep) +{ + int i; + closelog (); + for (i = 3; i <= 100; ++i) + { + if (i != keep) + close (i); + } +} + +/* + * Usually we ignore signals, because our parent will + * deal with them. + */ +static void +set_signals (void) +{ + signal (SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR1, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if query matches match. + */ +static int +name_value_match (const char *query, const char *match) +{ + while (!isalnum (*query)) + { + if (*query == '\0') + return 0; + ++query; + } + return strncasecmp (match, query, strlen (match)) == 0; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT openvpn_plugin_handle_t +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 (unsigned int *type_mask, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + pid_t pid; + int fd[2]; + + struct auth_pam_context *context; + struct name_value_list name_value_list; + + const int base_parms = 2; + + /* + * Allocate our context + */ + context = (struct auth_pam_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct auth_pam_context)); + if (!context) + goto error; + context->foreground_fd = -1; + + /* + * Intercept the --auth-user-pass-verify callback. + */ + *type_mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY); + + /* + * Make sure we have two string arguments: the first is the .so name, + * the second is the PAM service type. + */ + if (string_array_len (argv) < base_parms) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: need PAM service parameter\n"); + goto error; + } + + /* + * See if we have optional name/value pairs to match against + * PAM module queried fields in the conversation function. + */ + name_value_list.len = 0; + if (string_array_len (argv) > base_parms) + { + const int nv_len = string_array_len (argv) - base_parms; + int i; + + if ((nv_len & 1) == 1 || (nv_len / 2) > N_NAME_VALUE) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: bad name/value list length\n"); + goto error; + } + + name_value_list.len = nv_len / 2; + for (i = 0; i < name_value_list.len; ++i) + { + const int base = base_parms + i * 2; + name_value_list.data[i].name = argv[base]; + name_value_list.data[i].value = argv[base+1]; + } + } + + /* + * Get verbosity level from environment + */ + { + const char *verb_string = get_env ("verb", envp); + if (verb_string) + context->verb = atoi (verb_string); + } + + /* + * Make a socket for foreground and background processes + * to communicate. + */ + if (socketpair (PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: socketpair call failed\n"); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Fork off the privileged process. It will remain privileged + * even after the foreground process drops its privileges. + */ + pid = fork (); + + if (pid) + { + int status; + + /* + * Foreground Process + */ + + context->background_pid = pid; + + /* close our copy of child's socket */ + close (fd[1]); + + /* don't let future subprocesses inherit child socket */ + if (fcntl (fd[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: Set FD_CLOEXEC flag on socket file descriptor failed\n"); + + /* wait for background child process to initialize */ + status = recv_control (fd[0]); + if (status == RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) + { + context->foreground_fd = fd[0]; + return (openvpn_plugin_handle_t) context; + } + } + else + { + /* + * Background Process + */ + + /* close all parent fds except our socket back to parent */ + close_fds_except (fd[1]); + + /* Ignore most signals (the parent will receive them) */ + set_signals (); + +#ifdef DO_DAEMONIZE + /* Daemonize if --daemon option is set. */ + daemonize (envp); +#endif + + /* execute the event loop */ + pam_server (fd[1], argv[1], context->verb, &name_value_list); + + close (fd[1]); + + exit (0); + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + error: + if (context) + free (context); + return NULL; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct auth_pam_context *context = (struct auth_pam_context *) handle; + + if (type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY && context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + /* get username/password from envp string array */ + const char *username = get_env ("username", envp); + const char *password = get_env ("password", envp); + const char *common_name = get_env ("common_name", envp) ? get_env ("common_name", envp) : ""; + + if (username && strlen (username) > 0 && password) + { + if (send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_VERIFY) == -1 + || send_string (context->foreground_fd, username) == -1 + || send_string (context->foreground_fd, password) == -1 + || send_string (context->foreground_fd, common_name) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: Error sending auth info to background process\n"); + } + else + { + const int status = recv_control (context->foreground_fd); + if (status == RESPONSE_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + if (status == -1) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: Error receiving auth confirmation from background process\n"); + } + } + } + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct auth_pam_context *context = (struct auth_pam_context *) handle; + + if (DEBUG (context->verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: close\n"); + + if (context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + /* tell background process to exit */ + if (send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT) == -1) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: Error signaling background process to exit\n"); + + /* wait for background process to exit */ + if (context->background_pid > 0) + waitpid (context->background_pid, NULL, 0); + + close (context->foreground_fd); + context->foreground_fd = -1; + } + + free (context); +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct auth_pam_context *context = (struct auth_pam_context *) handle; + + /* tell background process to exit */ + if (context && context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT); + close (context->foreground_fd); + context->foreground_fd = -1; + } +} + +/* + * PAM conversation function + */ +static int +my_conv (int n, const struct pam_message **msg_array, + struct pam_response **response_array, void *appdata_ptr) +{ + const struct user_pass *up = ( const struct user_pass *) appdata_ptr; + struct pam_response *aresp; + int i; + int ret = PAM_SUCCESS; + + *response_array = NULL; + + if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + if ((aresp = calloc (n, sizeof *aresp)) == NULL) + return (PAM_BUF_ERR); + + /* loop through each PAM-module query */ + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + const struct pam_message *msg = msg_array[i]; + aresp[i].resp_retcode = 0; + aresp[i].resp = NULL; + + if (DEBUG (up->verb)) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: my_conv[%d] query='%s' style=%d\n", + i, + msg->msg ? msg->msg : "NULL", + msg->msg_style); + } + + if (up->name_value_list && up->name_value_list->len > 0) + { + /* use name/value list match method */ + const struct name_value_list *list = up->name_value_list; + int j; + + /* loop through name/value pairs */ + for (j = 0; j < list->len; ++j) + { + const char *match_name = list->data[j].name; + const char *match_value = list->data[j].value; + + if (name_value_match (msg->msg, match_name)) + { + /* found name/value match */ + aresp[i].resp = NULL; + + if (DEBUG (up->verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: name match found, query/match-string ['%s', '%s'] = '%s'\n", + msg->msg, + match_name, + match_value); + + if (strstr(match_value, "USERNAME")) + aresp[i].resp = searchandreplace(match_value, "USERNAME", up->username); + else if (strstr(match_value, "PASSWORD")) + aresp[i].resp = searchandreplace(match_value, "PASSWORD", up->password); + else if (strstr(match_value, "COMMONNAME")) + aresp[i].resp = searchandreplace(match_value, "COMMONNAME", up->common_name); + else + aresp[i].resp = strdup (match_value); + + if (aresp[i].resp == NULL) + ret = PAM_CONV_ERR; + break; + } + } + + if (j == list->len) + ret = PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + else + { + /* use PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_x hints */ + switch (msg->msg_style) + { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + aresp[i].resp = strdup (up->password); + if (aresp[i].resp == NULL) + ret = PAM_CONV_ERR; + break; + + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + aresp[i].resp = strdup (up->username); + if (aresp[i].resp == NULL) + ret = PAM_CONV_ERR; + break; + + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + break; + + default: + ret = PAM_CONV_ERR; + break; + } + } + } + + if (ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + *response_array = aresp; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 1 if authenticated and 0 if failed. + * Called once for every username/password + * to be authenticated. + */ +static int +pam_auth (const char *service, const struct user_pass *up) +{ + struct pam_conv conv; + pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; + int status = PAM_SUCCESS; + int ret = 0; + const int name_value_list_provided = (up->name_value_list && up->name_value_list->len > 0); + + /* Initialize PAM */ + conv.conv = my_conv; + conv.appdata_ptr = (void *)up; + status = pam_start (service, name_value_list_provided ? NULL : up->username, &conv, &pamh); + if (status == PAM_SUCCESS) + { + /* Call PAM to verify username/password */ + status = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); + if (status == PAM_SUCCESS) + status = pam_acct_mgmt (pamh, 0); + if (status == PAM_SUCCESS) + ret = 1; + + /* Output error message if failed */ + if (!ret) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: user '%s' failed to authenticate: %s\n", + up->username, + pam_strerror (pamh, status)); + } + + /* Close PAM */ + pam_end (pamh, status); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Background process -- runs with privilege. + */ +static void +pam_server (int fd, const char *service, int verb, const struct name_value_list *name_value_list) +{ + struct user_pass up; + int command; +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN + static const char pam_so[] = "libpam.so"; +#endif + + /* + * Do initialization + */ + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: INIT service='%s'\n", service); + +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN + /* + * Load PAM shared object + */ + if (!dlopen_pam (pam_so)) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: could not load PAM lib %s: %s\n", pam_so, dlerror()); + send_control (fd, RESPONSE_INIT_FAILED); + goto done; + } +#endif + + /* + * Tell foreground that we initialized successfully + */ + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [1]\n"); + goto done; + } + + /* + * Event loop + */ + while (1) + { + memset (&up, 0, sizeof (up)); + up.verb = verb; + up.name_value_list = name_value_list; + + /* get a command from foreground process */ + command = recv_control (fd); + + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: received command code: %d\n", command); + + switch (command) + { + case COMMAND_VERIFY: + if (recv_string (fd, up.username, sizeof (up.username)) == -1 + || recv_string (fd, up.password, sizeof (up.password)) == -1 + || recv_string (fd, up.common_name, sizeof (up.common_name)) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: read error on command channel: code=%d, exiting\n", + command); + goto done; + } + + if (DEBUG (verb)) + { +#if 0 + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: USER/PASS: %s/%s\n", + up.username, up.password); +#else + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: USER: %s\n", up.username); +#endif + } + + if (pam_auth (service, &up)) /* Succeeded */ + { + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [2]\n"); + goto done; + } + } + else /* Failed */ + { + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_VERIFY_FAILED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [3]\n"); + goto done; + } + } + break; + + case COMMAND_EXIT: + goto done; + + case -1: + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: read error on command channel\n"); + goto done; + + default: + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: unknown command code: code=%d, exiting\n", + command); + goto done; + } + } + done: + +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN + dlclose_pam (); +#endif + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: EXIT\n"); + + return; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b07937cc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 +openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26e98215 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN +/* + * If you want to dynamically load libpam using dlopen() or something, + * then dlopen( ' this shared object ' ); It takes care of exporting + * the right symbols to any modules loaded by libpam. + * + * Modified by JY for use with openvpn-pam-auth + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "pamdl.h" + +static void *libpam_h = NULL; + +#define RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(x, y, z, err) \ + { \ + union { const void *tpointer; y (*fn) z ; } fptr; \ + fptr.tpointer = dlsym(libpam_h, #x); real_##x = fptr.fn; \ + if (real_##x == NULL) { \ + fprintf (stderr, "PAMDL: unable to resolve '%s': %s\n", #x, dlerror()); \ + return err; \ + } \ + } + +int +dlopen_pam (const char *so) +{ + if (libpam_h == NULL) + { + libpam_h = dlopen(so, RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NOW); + } + return libpam_h != NULL; +} + +void +dlclose_pam (void) +{ + if (libpam_h != NULL) + { + dlclose(libpam_h); + libpam_h = NULL; + } +} + +int pam_start(const char *service_name, const char *user, + const struct pam_conv *pam_conversation, + pam_handle_t **pamh) +{ + int (*real_pam_start)(const char *, const char *, + const struct pam_conv *, + pam_handle_t **); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_start, int, (const char *, const char *, + const struct pam_conv *, + pam_handle_t **), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_start(service_name, user, pam_conversation, pamh); +} + +int pam_end(pam_handle_t *pamh, int pam_status) +{ + int (*real_pam_end)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_end, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_end(pamh, pam_status); +} + +int pam_set_item(pam_handle_t *pamh, int item_type, const void *item) +{ + int (*real_pam_set_item)(pam_handle_t *, int, const void *); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_set_item, int, + (pam_handle_t *, int, const void *), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_set_item(pamh, item_type, item); +} + +int pam_get_item(const pam_handle_t *pamh, int item_type, const void **item) +{ + int (*real_pam_get_item)(const pam_handle_t *, int, const void **); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_get_item, int, + (const pam_handle_t *, int, const void **), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_get_item(pamh, item_type, item); +} + +int pam_fail_delay(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int musec_delay) +{ + int (*real_pam_fail_delay)(pam_handle_t *, unsigned int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_fail_delay, int, (pam_handle_t *, unsigned int), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_fail_delay(pamh, musec_delay); +} + +typedef const char * const_char_pointer; + +const_char_pointer pam_strerror(pam_handle_t *pamh, int errnum) +{ + const_char_pointer (*real_pam_strerror)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_strerror, const_char_pointer, + (pam_handle_t *, int), NULL); + return real_pam_strerror(pamh, errnum); +} + +int pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value) +{ + int (*real_pam_putenv)(pam_handle_t *, const char *); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_putenv, int, (pam_handle_t *, const char *), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_putenv(pamh, name_value); +} + +const_char_pointer pam_getenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name) +{ + const_char_pointer (*real_pam_getenv)(pam_handle_t *, const char *); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_getenv, const_char_pointer, + (pam_handle_t *, const char *), NULL); + return real_pam_getenv(pamh, name); +} + +typedef char ** char_ppointer; +char_ppointer pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) +{ + char_ppointer (*real_pam_getenvlist)(pam_handle_t *); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_getenvlist, char_ppointer, (pam_handle_t *), + NULL); + return real_pam_getenvlist(pamh); +} + +/* Authentication management */ + +int pam_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_authenticate)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_authenticate, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_authenticate(pamh, flags); +} + +int pam_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_setcred)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_setcred, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_setcred(pamh, flags); +} + +/* Account Management API's */ + +int pam_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_acct_mgmt)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_acct_mgmt, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, flags); +} + +/* Session Management API's */ + +int pam_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_open_session)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_open_session, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_open_session(pamh, flags); +} + +int pam_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_close_session)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_close_session, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), + PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_close_session(pamh, flags); +} + +/* Password Management API's */ + +int pam_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int (*real_pam_chauthtok)(pam_handle_t *, int); + RESOLVE_PAM_FUNCTION(pam_chauthtok, int, (pam_handle_t *, int), PAM_ABORT); + return real_pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); +} +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.h b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12ba0684 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/auth-pam/pamdl.h @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +#ifdef USE_PAM_DLOPEN +/* Dynamically load and unload the PAM library */ +int dlopen_pam (const char *so); +void dlclose_pam (void); +#endif diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..064aa30c --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# +# OpenVPN (TM) Down Root Plugin -- OpenVPN Plugin +# +# Copyright (C) 2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +AM_CFLAGS = \ + -I$(top_srcdir)/include + +if ENABLE_PLUGIN_DOWN_ROOT +plugin_LTLIBRARIES = openvpn-plugin-down-root.la +dist_doc_DATA = README.down-root +endif + +openvpn_plugin_down_root_la_SOURCES = \ + down-root.c \ + down-root.exports +openvpn_plugin_down_root_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) \ + -export-symbols "$(srcdir)/down-root.exports" \ + -module -shared -avoid-version -no-undefined diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/README.down-root b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/README.down-root new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d337ffe9 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/README.down-root @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +down-root -- an OpenVPN Plugin Module + +SYNOPSIS + +The down-root module allows an OpenVPN configuration to +call a down script with root privileges, even when privileges +have been dropped using --user/--group/--chroot. + +This module uses a split privilege execution model which will +fork() before OpenVPN drops root privileges, at the point where +the --up script is usually called. The module will then remain +in a wait state until it receives a message from OpenVPN via +pipe to execute the down script. Thus, the down script will be +run in the same execution environment as the up script. + +BUILD + +Build this module with the "make" command. The plugin +module will be named openvpn-down-root.so + +USAGE + +To use this module, add to your OpenVPN config file: + + plugin openvpn-down-root.so "command ..." + +CAVEATS + +This module will only work on *nix systems, not Windows. diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.c b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d51d0e55 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.c @@ -0,0 +1,557 @@ +/* + * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks + * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based + * session authentication and key exchange, + * packet encryption, packet authentication, and + * packet compression. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this + * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * OpenVPN plugin module to do privileged down-script execution. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#define DEBUG(verb) ((verb) >= 7) + +/* Command codes for foreground -> background communication */ +#define COMMAND_RUN_SCRIPT 0 +#define COMMAND_EXIT 1 + +/* Response codes for background -> foreground communication */ +#define RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED 10 +#define RESPONSE_INIT_FAILED 11 +#define RESPONSE_SCRIPT_SUCCEEDED 12 +#define RESPONSE_SCRIPT_FAILED 13 + +/* Background process function */ +static void down_root_server (const int fd, char *command, const char *argv[], const char *envp[], const int verb); + +/* + * Plugin state, used by foreground + */ +struct down_root_context +{ + /* Foreground's socket to background process */ + int foreground_fd; + + /* Process ID of background process */ + pid_t background_pid; + + /* Verbosity level of OpenVPN */ + int verb; + + /* down command */ + char *command; +}; + +/* + * Given an environmental variable name, search + * the envp array for its value, returning it + * if found or NULL otherwise. + */ +static const char * +get_env (const char *name, const char *envp[]) +{ + if (envp) + { + int i; + const int namelen = strlen (name); + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + if (!strncmp (envp[i], name, namelen)) + { + const char *cp = envp[i] + namelen; + if (*cp == '=') + return cp + 1; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Return the length of a string array + */ +static int +string_array_len (const char *array[]) +{ + int i = 0; + if (array) + { + while (array[i]) + ++i; + } + return i; +} + +/* + * Socket read/write functions. + */ + +static int +recv_control (int fd) +{ + unsigned char c; + const ssize_t size = read (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return c; + else + return -1; +} + +static int +send_control (int fd, int code) +{ + unsigned char c = (unsigned char) code; + const ssize_t size = write (fd, &c, sizeof (c)); + if (size == sizeof (c)) + return (int) size; + else + return -1; +} + +/* + * Daemonize if "daemon" env var is true. + * Preserve stderr across daemonization if + * "daemon_log_redirect" env var is true. + */ +static void +daemonize (const char *envp[]) +{ + const char *daemon_string = get_env ("daemon", envp); + if (daemon_string && daemon_string[0] == '1') + { + const char *log_redirect = get_env ("daemon_log_redirect", envp); + int fd = -1; + if (log_redirect && log_redirect[0] == '1') + fd = dup (2); + if (daemon (0, 0) < 0) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: daemonization failed\n"); + } + else if (fd >= 3) + { + dup2 (fd, 2); + close (fd); + } + } +} + +/* + * Close most of parent's fds. + * Keep stdin/stdout/stderr, plus one + * other fd which is presumed to be + * our pipe back to parent. + * Admittedly, a bit of a kludge, + * but posix doesn't give us a kind + * of FD_CLOEXEC which will stop + * fds from crossing a fork(). + */ +static void +close_fds_except (int keep) +{ + int i; + closelog (); + for (i = 3; i <= 100; ++i) + { + if (i != keep) + close (i); + } +} + +/* + * Usually we ignore signals, because our parent will + * deal with them. + */ +static void +set_signals (void) +{ + signal (SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR1, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGUSR2, SIG_IGN); + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +} + +/* + * convert system() return into a success/failure value + */ +int +system_ok (int stat) +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + return stat == 0; +#else + return stat != -1 && WIFEXITED (stat) && WEXITSTATUS (stat) == 0; +#endif +} + +static char * +build_command_line (const char *argv[]) +{ + int size = 0; + int n = 0; + int i; + char *string; + + /* precompute size */ + if (argv) + { + for (i = 0; argv[i]; ++i) + { + size += (strlen (argv[i]) + 1); /* string length plus trailing space */ + ++n; + } + } + ++size; /* for null terminator */ + + /* allocate memory */ + string = (char *) malloc (size); + if (!string) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: out of memory\n"); + exit (1); + } + string[0] = '\0'; + + /* build string */ + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + strcat (string, argv[i]); + if (i + 1 < n) + strcat (string, " "); + } + return string; +} + +static void +free_context (struct down_root_context *context) +{ + if (context) + { + if (context->command) + free (context->command); + free (context); + } +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT openvpn_plugin_handle_t +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 (unsigned int *type_mask, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct down_root_context *context; + + /* + * Allocate our context + */ + context = (struct down_root_context *) calloc (1, sizeof (struct down_root_context)); + if (!context) + goto error; + context->foreground_fd = -1; + + /* + * Intercept the --up and --down callbacks + */ + *type_mask = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP) | OPENVPN_PLUGIN_MASK (OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN); + + /* + * Make sure we have two string arguments: the first is the .so name, + * the second is the script command. + */ + if (string_array_len (argv) < 2) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: need down script command\n"); + goto error; + } + + /* + * Save our argument in context + */ + context->command = build_command_line (&argv[1]); + + /* + * Get verbosity level from environment + */ + { + const char *verb_string = get_env ("verb", envp); + if (verb_string) + context->verb = atoi (verb_string); + } + + return (openvpn_plugin_handle_t) context; + + error: + free_context (context); + return NULL; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT int +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle, const int type, const char *argv[], const char *envp[]) +{ + struct down_root_context *context = (struct down_root_context *) handle; + + if (type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_UP && context->foreground_fd == -1) /* fork off a process to hold onto root */ + { + pid_t pid; + int fd[2]; + + /* + * Make a socket for foreground and background processes + * to communicate. + */ + if (socketpair (PF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: socketpair call failed\n"); + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Fork off the privileged process. It will remain privileged + * even after the foreground process drops its privileges. + */ + pid = fork (); + + if (pid) + { + int status; + + /* + * Foreground Process + */ + + context->background_pid = pid; + + /* close our copy of child's socket */ + close (fd[1]); + + /* don't let future subprocesses inherit child socket */ + if (fcntl (fd[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: Set FD_CLOEXEC flag on socket file descriptor failed\n"); + + /* wait for background child process to initialize */ + status = recv_control (fd[0]); + if (status == RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) + { + context->foreground_fd = fd[0]; + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + } + } + else + { + /* + * Background Process + */ + + /* close all parent fds except our socket back to parent */ + close_fds_except (fd[1]); + + /* Ignore most signals (the parent will receive them) */ + set_signals (); + + /* Daemonize if --daemon option is set. */ + daemonize (envp); + + /* execute the event loop */ + down_root_server (fd[1], context->command, argv, envp, context->verb); + + close (fd[1]); + exit (0); + return 0; /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + else if (type == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_DOWN && context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + if (send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_RUN_SCRIPT) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: Error sending script execution signal to background process\n"); + } + else + { + const int status = recv_control (context->foreground_fd); + if (status == RESPONSE_SCRIPT_SUCCEEDED) + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; + if (status == -1) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: Error receiving script execution confirmation from background process\n"); + } + } + return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct down_root_context *context = (struct down_root_context *) handle; + + if (DEBUG (context->verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: close\n"); + + if (context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + /* tell background process to exit */ + if (send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT) == -1) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: Error signaling background process to exit\n"); + + /* wait for background process to exit */ + if (context->background_pid > 0) + waitpid (context->background_pid, NULL, 0); + + close (context->foreground_fd); + context->foreground_fd = -1; + } + + free_context (context); +} + +OPENVPN_EXPORT void +openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle) +{ + struct down_root_context *context = (struct down_root_context *) handle; + + if (context && context->foreground_fd >= 0) + { + /* tell background process to exit */ + send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_EXIT); + close (context->foreground_fd); + context->foreground_fd = -1; + } +} + +/* + * Background process -- runs with privilege. + */ +static void +down_root_server (const int fd, char *command, const char *argv[], const char *envp[], const int verb) +{ + const char *p[3]; + char *command_line = NULL; + char *argv_cat = NULL; + int i; + + /* + * Do initialization + */ + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: INIT command='%s'\n", command); + + /* + * Tell foreground that we initialized successfully + */ + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [1]\n"); + goto done; + } + + /* + * Build command line + */ + if (string_array_len (argv) >= 2) + argv_cat = build_command_line (&argv[1]); + else + argv_cat = build_command_line (NULL); + p[0] = command; + p[1] = argv_cat; + p[2] = NULL; + command_line = build_command_line (p); + + /* + * Save envp in environment + */ + for (i = 0; envp[i]; ++i) + { + putenv ((char *)envp[i]); + } + + /* + * Event loop + */ + while (1) + { + int command_code; + int status; + + /* get a command from foreground process */ + command_code = recv_control (fd); + + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: received command code: %d\n", command_code); + + switch (command_code) + { + case COMMAND_RUN_SCRIPT: + status = system (command_line); + if (system_ok (status)) /* Succeeded */ + { + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_SCRIPT_SUCCEEDED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [2]\n"); + goto done; + } + } + else /* Failed */ + { + if (send_control (fd, RESPONSE_SCRIPT_FAILED) == -1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: write error on response socket [3]\n"); + goto done; + } + } + break; + + case COMMAND_EXIT: + goto done; + + case -1: + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: read error on command channel\n"); + goto done; + + default: + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: unknown command code: code=%d, exiting\n", + command_code); + goto done; + } + } + + done: + if (argv_cat) + free (argv_cat); + if (command_line) + free (command_line); + if (DEBUG (verb)) + fprintf (stderr, "DOWN-ROOT: BACKGROUND: EXIT\n"); + + return; +} diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.exports b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.exports new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b07937cc --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/src/plugins/down-root/down-root.exports @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +openvpn_plugin_open_v1 +openvpn_plugin_func_v1 +openvpn_plugin_close_v1 +openvpn_plugin_abort_v1 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/Makefile.am b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7980e04 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# +# OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks +# over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based +# session authentication and key exchange, +# packet encryption, packet authentication, and +# packet compression. +# +# Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2012 Alon Bar-Lev +# + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = \ + $(srcdir)/Makefile.in + +test_scripts = t_client.sh t_lpback.sh t_cltsrv.sh + +TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = top_srcdir="$(top_srcdir)" +TESTS = $(test_scripts) + +dist_noinst_SCRIPTS = \ + $(test_scripts) \ + t_cltsrv-down.sh + diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.rc-sample b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.rc-sample new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dcb3e4ae --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.rc-sample @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +# +# this is sourced from t_client.sh and defines which openvpn client tests +# to run +# +# (sample config, copy to t_client.rc and adapt to your environment) +# +# +# define these - if empty, no tests will run +# +top_srcdir="${top_srcdir:-..}" +CA_CERT="${top_srcdir}/sample/sample-keys/ca.crt" +CLIENT_KEY="${top_srcdir}/sample/sample-keys/client.key" +CLIENT_CERT="${top_srcdir}/sample/sample-keys/client.crt" +# +# remote host (used as macro below) +# +REMOTE=mytestserver +# +# tests to run (list suffixes for config stanzas below) +# +TEST_RUN_LIST="1 2" + +# +# use "sudo" (etc) to give openvpn the necessary privileges +# if this is not active, "make check" must be run as root +# +#RUN_SUDO=sudo + +# +# base confic that is the same for all the p2mp test runs +# +OPENVPN_BASE_P2MP="--client --ca $CA_CERT \ + --cert $CLIENT_CERT --key $CLIENT_KEY \ + --ns-cert-type server --nobind --comp-lzo --verb 3" + +# base config for p2p tests +# +OPENVPN_BASE_P2P="..." + +# +# +# now define the individual tests - all variables suffixed with _1, _2 etc +# will be used in test run "1", "2", etc. +# +# if something is not defined here, the corresponding test is not run +# +# possible test options: +# +# RUN_TITLE_x="what is being tested on here" (purely informational) +# OPENVPN_CONF_x = "how to call ./openvpn" [mandatory] +# EXPECT_IFCONFIG4_x = "this IPv4 address needs to show up in ifconfig" +# EXPECT_IFCONFIG6_x = "this IPv6 address needs to show up in ifconfig" +# PING4_HOSTS_x = "these hosts musts ping when openvpn is up (IPv4 fping)" +# PING6_HOSTS_x = "these hosts musts ping when openvpn is up (IPv6 fping6)" +# +# Test 1: UDP / p2mp tun +# specify IPv4+IPv6 addresses expected from server and ping targets +# +RUN_TITLE_1="testing tun/udp/ipv4+ipv6" +OPENVPN_CONF_1="$OPENVPN_BASE_P2MP --dev tun --proto udp --remote $REMOTE --port 51194" +EXPECT_IFCONFIG4_1="10.100.50.6" +EXPECT_IFCONFIG6_1="2001:dba:a050::1:0" +PING4_HOSTS_1="10.100.50.1 10.100.0.1" +PING6_HOSTS_1="2001:dba::1 2001:dba:a050::1" + +# Test 2: TCP / p2mp tun +# +RUN_TITLE_2="testing tun/tcp/ipv4+ipv6" +OPENVPN_CONF_2="$OPENVPN_BASE_P2MP --dev tun --proto tcp --remote $REMOTE --port 51194" +EXPECT_IFCONFIG4_2="10.100.51.6" +EXPECT_IFCONFIG6_2="2001:dba:a051::1:0" +PING4_HOSTS_2="10.100.51.1 10.100.0.1" +PING6_HOSTS_1="2001:dba::1 2001:dba:a051::1" + +# Test 3: UDP / p2p tun +# ... + +# Test 4: TCP / p2p tun +# ... + +# Test 5: UDP / p2mp tap +# ... + +# Test 6: TCP / p2mp tun +# ... + +# Test 7: UDP / p2p tap +# ... + +# Test 8: TCP / p2p tap +# ... + +# Test 9: whatever you want to test... :-) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.sh.in b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.sh.in new file mode 100755 index 00000000..189eecce --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_client.sh.in @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +#!@SHELL@ +# +# run OpenVPN client against ``test reference'' server +# - check that ping, http, ... via tunnel works +# - check that interface config / routes are properly cleaned after test end +# +# prerequisites: +# - openvpn binary in current directory +# - writable current directory to create subdir for logs +# - t_client.rc in current directory OR source dir that specifies tests +# - for "ping4" checks: fping binary in $PATH +# - for "ping6" checks: fping6 binary in $PATH +# + +srcdir="${srcdir:-.}" +top_builddir="${top_builddir:-..}" +if [ -r "${top_builddir}"/t_client.rc ] ; then + . "${top_builddir}"/t_client.rc +elif [ -r "${srcdir}"/t_client.rc ] ; then + . "${srcdir}"/t_client.rc +else + echo "$0: cannot find 't_client.rc' in build dir ('${top_builddir}')" >&2 + echo "$0: or source directory ('${srcdir}'). SKIPPING TEST." >&2 + exit 77 +fi + +if [ ! -x "${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" ] +then + echo "no (executable) openvpn binary in current build tree. FAIL." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [ ! -w . ] +then + echo "current directory is not writable (required for logging). FAIL." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if [ -z "$CA_CERT" ] ; then + echo "CA_CERT not defined in 't_client.rc'. SKIP test." >&2 + exit 77 +fi + +if [ -z "$TEST_RUN_LIST" ] ; then + echo "TEST_RUN_LIST empty, no tests defined. SKIP test." >&2 + exit 77 +fi + +# make sure we have permissions to run ifconfig/route from OpenVPN +# can't use "id -u" here - doesn't work on Solaris +ID=`id` +if expr "$ID" : "uid=0" >/dev/null +then : +else + if [ -z "$RUN_SUDO" ] + then + echo "$0: this test must run be as root, or RUN_SUDO=... " >&2 + echo " must be set correctly in 't_client.rc'. SKIP." >&2 + exit 77 + fi +fi + +LOGDIR=t_client-`hostname`-`date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S` +if mkdir $LOGDIR +then : +else + echo "can't create log directory '$LOGDIR'. FAIL." >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +exit_code=0 + +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +# helper functions +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +# print failure message, increase FAIL counter +fail() +{ + echo "" + echo "FAIL: $@" >&2 + fail_count=$(( $fail_count + 1 )) +} + +# print "all interface IP addresses" + "all routes" +# this is higly system dependent... +get_ifconfig_route() +{ + # linux / iproute2? (-> if configure got a path) + if [ -n "@IPROUTE@" ] + then + echo "-- linux iproute2 --" + @IPROUTE@ addr show | grep -v valid_lft + @IPROUTE@ route show + @IPROUTE@ -o -6 route show | grep -v ' cache' | sed -e 's/expires [0-9]*sec//' + return + fi + + # try uname + case `uname -s` in + Linux) + echo "-- linux / ifconfig --" + LANG=C @IFCONFIG@ -a |egrep "( addr:|encap:)" + LANG=C @NETSTAT@ -rn -4 -6 + return + ;; + FreeBSD|NetBSD|Darwin) + echo "-- FreeBSD/NetBSD/Darwin [MacOS X] --" + @IFCONFIG@ -a | egrep "(flags=|inet)" + @NETSTAT@ -rn | awk '$3 !~ /^UHL/ { print $1,$2,$3,$NF }' + return + ;; + OpenBSD) + echo "-- OpenBSD --" + @IFCONFIG@ -a | egrep "(flags=|inet)" | \ + sed -e 's/pltime [0-9]*//' -e 's/vltime [0-9]*//' + @NETSTAT@ -rn | awk '$3 !~ /^UHL/ { print $1,$2,$3,$NF }' + return + ;; + SunOS) + echo "-- Solaris --" + @IFCONFIG@ -a | egrep "(flags=|inet)" + @NETSTAT@ -rn | awk '$3 !~ /^UHL/ { print $1,$2,$3,$6 }' + return + ;; + esac + + echo "get_ifconfig_route(): no idea how to get info on your OS. FAIL." >&2 + exit 20 +} + +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +# check ifconfig +# arg1: "4" or "6" -> for message +# arg2: IPv4/IPv6 address that must show up in out of "get_ifconfig_route" +check_ifconfig() +{ + proto=$1 ; shift + expect_list="$@" + + if [ -z "$expect_list" ] ; then return ; fi + + for expect in $expect_list + do + if get_ifconfig_route | fgrep "$expect" >/dev/null + then : + else + fail "check_ifconfig(): expected IPv$proto address '$expect' not found in ifconfig output." + fi + done +} + +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +# run pings +# arg1: "4" or "6" -> fping/fing6 +# arg2: "want_ok" or "want_fail" (expected ping result) +# arg3... -> fping arguments (host list) +run_ping_tests() +{ + proto=$1 ; want=$2 ; shift ; shift + targetlist="$@" + + # "no targets" is fine + if [ -z "$targetlist" ] ; then return ; fi + + case $proto in + 4) cmd=fping ;; + 6) cmd=fping6 ;; + *) echo "internal error in run_ping_tests arg 1: '$proto'" >&2 + exit 1 ;; + esac + + case $want in + want_ok) sizes_list="64 1440 3000" ;; + want_fail) sizes_list="64" ;; + esac + + for bytes in $sizes_list + do + echo "run IPv$proto ping tests ($want), $bytes byte packets..." + + echo "$cmd -b $bytes -C 20 -p 250 -q $targetlist" >>$LOGDIR/$SUF:fping.out + $cmd -b $bytes -C 20 -p 250 -q $targetlist >>$LOGDIR/$SUF:fping.out 2>&1 + + # while OpenVPN is running, pings must succeed (want='want_ok') + # before OpenVPN is up, pings must NOT succeed (want='want_fail') + + rc=$? + if [ $rc = 0 ] # all ping OK + then + if [ $want = "want_fail" ] # not what we want + then + fail "IPv$proto ping test succeeded, but needs to *fail*." + fi + else # ping failed + if [ $want = "want_ok" ] # not what we wanted + then + fail "IPv$proto ping test ($bytes bytes) failed, but should succeed." + fi + fi + done +} + +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +# main test loop +# ---------------------------------------------------------- +SUMMARY_OK= +SUMMARY_FAIL= + +for SUF in $TEST_RUN_LIST +do + # get config variables + eval test_run_title=\"\$RUN_TITLE_$SUF\" + eval openvpn_conf=\"\$OPENVPN_CONF_$SUF\" + eval expect_ifconfig4=\"\$EXPECT_IFCONFIG4_$SUF\" + eval expect_ifconfig6=\"\$EXPECT_IFCONFIG6_$SUF\" + eval ping4_hosts=\"\$PING4_HOSTS_$SUF\" + eval ping6_hosts=\"\$PING6_HOSTS_$SUF\" + + echo -e "\n### test run $SUF: '$test_run_title' ###\n" + fail_count=0 + + echo "save pre-openvpn ifconfig + route" + get_ifconfig_route >$LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_pre.txt + + echo -e "\nrun pre-openvpn ping tests - targets must not be reachable..." + run_ping_tests 4 want_fail "$ping4_hosts" + run_ping_tests 6 want_fail "$ping6_hosts" + if [ "$fail_count" = 0 ] ; then + echo -e "OK.\n" + else + echo -e "FAIL: make sure that ping hosts are ONLY reachable via VPN, SKIP test $SUF". + exit_code=31 + continue + fi + + echo " run openvpn $openvpn_conf" + echo "# src/openvpn/openvpn $openvpn_conf" >$LOGDIR/$SUF:openvpn.log + $RUN_SUDO "${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" $openvpn_conf >>$LOGDIR/$SUF:openvpn.log & + opid=$! + + # make sure openvpn client is terminated in case shell exits + trap "$RUN_SUDO kill $opid" 0 + trap "$RUN_SUDO kill $opid ; trap - 0 ; exit 1" 1 2 3 15 + + echo "wait for connection to establish..." + sleep ${SETUP_TIME_WAIT:-10} + + # test whether OpenVPN process is still there + if $RUN_SUDO kill -0 $opid + then : + else + echo -e "OpenVPN process has failed to start up, check log ($LOGDIR/$SUF:openvpn.log). FAIL.\ntail of logfile follows:\n..." >&2 + tail $LOGDIR/$SUF:openvpn.log >&2 + trap - 0 1 2 3 15 + exit 10 + fi + + # compare whether anything changed in ifconfig/route setup? + echo "save ifconfig+route" + get_ifconfig_route >$LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route.txt + + echo -n "compare pre-openvpn ifconfig+route with current values..." + if diff $LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_pre.txt \ + $LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route.txt >/dev/null + then + fail "no differences between ifconfig/route before OpenVPN start and now." + else + echo -e " OK!\n" + fi + + # expected ifconfig values in there? + check_ifconfig 4 "$expect_ifconfig4" + check_ifconfig 6 "$expect_ifconfig6" + + run_ping_tests 4 want_ok "$ping4_hosts" + run_ping_tests 6 want_ok "$ping6_hosts" + echo -e "ping tests done.\n" + + echo "stopping OpenVPN" + $RUN_SUDO kill $opid + wait $! + rc=$? + if [ $rc != 0 ] ; then + fail "OpenVPN return code $rc, expect 0" + fi + + echo -e "\nsave post-openvpn ifconfig + route..." + get_ifconfig_route >$LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_post.txt + + echo -n "compare pre- and post-openvpn ifconfig + route..." + if diff $LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_pre.txt \ + $LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_post.txt >$LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_diff.txt + then + echo -e " OK.\n" + else + cat $LOGDIR/$SUF:ifconfig_route_diff.txt >&2 + fail "differences between pre- and post-ifconfig/route" + fi + if [ "$fail_count" = 0 ] ; then + echo -e "test run $SUF: all tests OK.\n" + SUMMARY_OK="$SUMMARY_OK $SUF" + else + echo -e "test run $SUF: $fail_count test failures. FAIL.\n"; + SUMMARY_FAIL="$SUMMARY_FAIL $SUF" + exit_code=30 + fi +done + +if [ -z "$SUMMARY_OK" ] ; then SUMMARY_OK=" none"; fi +if [ -z "$SUMMARY_FAIL" ] ; then SUMMARY_FAIL=" none"; fi +echo "Test sets succeded:$SUMMARY_OK." +echo "Test sets failed:$SUMMARY_FAIL." + +# remove trap handler +trap - 0 1 2 3 15 +exit $exit_code diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv-down.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv-down.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2ef852aa --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv-down.sh @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#! /bin/sh +echo "${role}:${signal}" >&3 diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..752251e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_cltsrv.sh @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# +# t_cltsrv.sh - script to test OpenVPN's crypto loopback +# Copyright (C) 2005, 2006, 2008 Matthias Andree +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 +# of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA +# 02110-1301, USA. + +set -e +srcdir="${srcdir:-.}" +top_srcdir="${top_srcdir:-..}" +top_builddir="${top_builddir:-..}" +trap "rm -f log.$$ log.$$.signal ; trap 0 ; exit 77" 1 2 15 +trap "rm -f log.$$ log.$$.signal ; exit 1" 0 3 +addopts= +case `uname -s` in + FreeBSD) + # FreeBSD jails map the outgoing IP to the jail IP - we need to + # allow the real IP unless we want the test to run forever. + if test "`sysctl 2>/dev/null -n security.jail.jailed`" = 1 \ + || ps -ostate= -p $$ | grep -q J; then + addopts="--float" + if test "x`ifconfig | grep inet`" = x ; then + echo "###" + echo "### To run the test in a FreeBSD jail, you MUST add an IP alias for the jail's IP." + echo "###" + exit 77 + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +# make sure that the --down script is executable -- fail (rather than +# skip) test if it isn't. +downscript="../tests/t_cltsrv-down.sh" +root="${top_srcdir}/sample" +test -x "${root}/${downscript}" || chmod +x "${root}/${downscript}" || { echo >&2 "${root}/${downscript} is not executable, failing." ; exit 1 ; } +echo "The following test will take about two minutes." >&2 +echo "If the addresses are in use, this test will retry up to two times." >&2 + +# go +success=0 +for i in 1 2 3 ; do + set +e + ( + "${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" --script-security 2 --cd "${root}" ${addopts} --setenv role srv --down "${downscript}" --tls-exit --ping-exit 180 --config "sample-config-files/loopback-server" & + "${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" --script-security 2 --cd "${top_srcdir}/sample" ${addopts} --setenv role clt --down "${downscript}" --tls-exit --ping-exit 180 --config "sample-config-files/loopback-client" + ) 3>log.$$.signal >log.$$ 2>&1 + e1=$? + wait $! + e2=$? + grep 'TCP/UDP: Socket bind failed on local address.*in use' log.$$ >/dev/null && { + echo 'address in use, retrying in 150 s' + sleep 150 + continue + } + grep -v ':inactive$' log.$$.signal >/dev/null && { cat log.$$.signal ; echo ; cat log.$$ ; exit 1 ; } + success=1 + break +done + +set -e + +# exit code - defaults to 0, PASS +ec=0 + +if [ $success != 1 ] ; then + # couldn't run test -- addresses in use, skip test + cat log.$$ + ec=77 +elif [ $e1 != 0 ] || [ $e2 != 0 ] ; then + # failure -- fail test + cat log.$$ + ec=1 +fi + +rm log.$$ log.$$.signal +trap 0 +exit $ec diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_lpback.sh b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_lpback.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..40767a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/tests/t_lpback.sh @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# +# t_lpback.sh - script to test OpenVPN's crypto loopback +# Copyright (C) 2005 Matthias Andree +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 +# of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA +# 02110-1301, USA. + +set -e +top_builddir="${top_builddir:-..}" +trap "rm -f key.$$ log.$$ ; trap 0 ; exit 77" 1 2 15 +trap "rm -f key.$$ log.$$ ; exit 1" 0 3 +"${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" --genkey --secret key.$$ +set +e +( "${top_builddir}/src/openvpn/openvpn" --test-crypto --secret key.$$ ) >log.$$ 2>&1 +e=$? +if [ $e != 0 ] ; then cat log.$$ ; fi +rm key.$$ log.$$ +trap 0 +exit $e diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.m4 b/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ea1c32f --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +dnl define the OpenVPN version +define([PRODUCT_NAME], [OpenVPN]) +define([PRODUCT_TARNAME], [openvpn]) +define([PRODUCT_VERSION], [2.3_master]) +define([PRODUCT_BUGREPORT], [openvpn-users@lists.sourceforge.net]) +define([PRODUCT_VERSION_RESOURCE], [2,3,0,0]) +dnl define the TAP version +define([PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_COMPONENT_ID], [tap0901]) +define([PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_MIN_MAJOR], [9]) +define([PRODUCT_TAP_WIN_MIN_MINOR], [9]) diff --git a/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.sh.in b/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.sh.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2af5a364 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openvpn/version.sh.in @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +OPENVPN_PACKAGE_NAME="@PACKAGE_NAME@" +OPENVPN_PACKAGE_TARNAME="@PACKAGE_TARNAME@" +OPENVPN_PACKAGE_VERSION="@PACKAGE_VERSION@" +OPENVPN_PACKAGE_HOST="@host@" -- cgit v1.2.3