From 1684c8f398922065a97e7da4dac4ac6a33cc5218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Parm=C3=A9nides=20GV?= Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 16:03:55 +0200 Subject: Back to the standard "app" module. This return to "app" instead of "bitmask_android" is due to this reading: https://developer.android.com/sdk/installing/studio-build.html#projectStructure I'll have to tweak the final apk name in build.gradle. --- app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 331 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 331 insertions(+) create mode 100644 app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (limited to 'app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c') diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bc9da07 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include +#include +#include "cryptlib.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) + { + int i; + X509_CINF *ai,*bi; + + ai=a->cert_info; + bi=b->cert_info; + i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber); + if (i) return(i); + return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) + { + unsigned long ret=0; + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + unsigned char md[16]; + char *f; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0); + ret=strlen(f); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,ret); + OPENSSL_free(f); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, + (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL); + ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| + ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) + )&0xffffffffL; + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return(ret); + } +#endif + +int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) + { + return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer)); + } + +int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) + { + return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject)); + } + +int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) + { + return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA +int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) + { + return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); + } +#endif + +X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) + { + return(a->cert_info->issuer); + } + +unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) + { + return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) + { + return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); + } +#endif + +X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) + { + return(a->cert_info->subject); + } + +ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) + { + return(a->cert_info->serialNumber); + } + +unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) + { + return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) + { + return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA +/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for + * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally + * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in + * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may + * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring + * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point + * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt + * with an evil cast. + */ +int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) +{ + /* ensure hash is valid */ + X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); + X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); + + return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); +} +#endif + + +int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) + { + int ret; + + /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ + + if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) + { + ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return -2; + } + + if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) + { + ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return -2; + } + + ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; + + if (ret) + return ret; + + return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); + + } + +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) + { + unsigned long ret=0; + unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ + i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); + EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); + + ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| + ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) + )&0xffffffffL; + return(ret); + } + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 +/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, + * this is reasonably efficient. */ + +unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) + { + unsigned long ret=0; + unsigned char md[16]; + + /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ + i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL); + EVP_Digest(x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL); + + ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)| + ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L) + )&0xffffffffL; + return(ret); + } +#endif + +/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ +X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, + ASN1_INTEGER *serial) + { + int i; + X509_CINF cinf; + X509 x,*x509=NULL; + + if(!sk) return NULL; + + x.cert_info= &cinf; + cinf.serialNumber=serial; + cinf.issuer=name; + + for (i=0; icert_info == NULL)) + return(NULL); + return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); + } + +ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) + { + if(!x) return NULL; + return x->cert_info->key->public_key; + } + +int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) + { + EVP_PKEY *xk; + int ret; + + xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); + + if (xk) + ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); + else + ret = -2; + + switch (ret) + { + case 1: + break; + case 0: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); + break; + case -1: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); + break; + case -2: + X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); + } + if (xk) + EVP_PKEY_free(xk); + if (ret > 0) + return 1; + return 0; + } -- cgit v1.2.3