From 3c3421afd8f74a3aa8d1011de07a8c18f9549210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Parm=C3=A9nides=20GV?= Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 12:04:17 +0200 Subject: Rename app->bitmask_android This way, gradle commands generate apks correctly named. --- app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 446 ------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 446 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c (limited to 'app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c') diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 415d67e6..00000000 --- a/app/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,446 +0,0 @@ -/* ocsp_vfy.c */ -/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL - * project 2000. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include -#include -#include - -static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags); -static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id); -static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags); -static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret); -static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp); -static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags); -static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags); - -/* Verify a basic response message */ - -int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) - { - X509 *signer, *x; - STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; - int i, ret = 0; - ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags); - if (!ret) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - goto end; - } - if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) - flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) - { - EVP_PKEY *skey; - skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); - ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - if(ret <= 0) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - goto end; - } - } - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) - { - int init_res; - if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL); - else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs); - if(!init_res) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto end; - } - - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - if (ret <= 0) - { - i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); - goto end; - } - if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) - { - ret = 1; - goto end; - } - /* At this point we have a valid certificate chain - * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria. - */ - ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags); - - /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */ - if (ret != 0) goto end; - - /* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and - * check for explicit trust - */ - if(flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end; - - x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); - if(X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED); - goto end; - } - ret = 1; - } - - - - end: - if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); - return ret; - } - - -static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) - { - X509 *signer; - OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId; - if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) - { - *psigner = signer; - return 2; - } - if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) && - (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) - { - *psigner = signer; - return 1; - } - /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */ - - *psigner = NULL; - return 0; - } - - -static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id) - { - int i; - unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash; - X509 *x; - - /* Easy if lookup by name */ - if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME) - return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName); - - /* Lookup by key hash */ - - /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */ - if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL; - keyhash = id->value.byKey->data; - /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */ - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) - { - x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); - X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL); - if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - return x; - } - return NULL; - } - - -static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags) - { - STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp; - X509 *signer, *sca; - OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL; - int i; - sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses; - - if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN); - return -1; - } - - /* See if the issuer IDs match. */ - i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid); - - /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */ - if (i <= 0) return i; - - signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); - /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */ - if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) - { - sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1); - i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp); - if (i < 0) return i; - if (i) - { - /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */ - if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */ - return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp); - } - - -/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same - * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer. - * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them. - */ - -static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret) - { - OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid; - int i, idcount; - - idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); - if (idcount <= 0) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA); - return -1; - } - - cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId; - - *ret = NULL; - - for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) - { - tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; - /* Check to see if IDs match */ - if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) - { - /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */ - if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm, - cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)) - return 2; - /* Else mismatch */ - return 0; - } - } - - /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */ - *ret = cid; - return 1; - } - - -static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, - STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp) - { - /* If only one ID to match then do it */ - if(cid) - { - const EVP_MD *dgst; - X509_NAME *iname; - int mdlen; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST); - return -1; - } - - mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst); - if (mdlen < 0) - return -1; - if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) || - (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen)) - return 0; - iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) - return -1; - if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen)) - return 0; - X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL); - if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen)) - return 0; - - return 1; - - } - else - { - /* We have to match the whole lot */ - int i, ret; - OCSP_CERTID *tmpid; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) - { - tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId; - ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL); - if (ret <= 0) return ret; - } - return 1; - } - - } - -static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags) - { - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); - if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && - (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN)) - return 1; - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE); - return 0; - } - -/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP - * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it - * against a given trust value. - */ - -int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags) - { - X509 *signer; - X509_NAME *nm; - GENERAL_NAME *gen; - int ret; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; - if (!req->optionalSignature) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED); - return 0; - } - gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName; - if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE); - return 0; - } - nm = gen->d.directoryName; - ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags); - if (ret <= 0) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - return 0; - } - if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) - flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) - { - EVP_PKEY *skey; - skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer); - ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey); - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); - if(ret <= 0) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - } - if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) - { - int init_res; - if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL); - else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, - req->optionalSignature->certs); - if(!init_res) - { - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return 0; - } - - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - if (ret <= 0) - { - ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); - OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", - X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); - return 0; - } - } - return 1; - } - -static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags) - { - X509 *signer; - if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) - { - signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm); - *psigner = signer; - return 1; - } - - signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm); - if (signer) - { - *psigner = signer; - return 2; - } - return 0; - } -- cgit v1.2.3