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-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c85
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c31
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c93
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c14
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c9
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c7
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c48
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c4
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c65
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c266
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c12
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c51
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c21
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c123
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h4
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h19
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c44
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c1
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c11
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h25
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c5
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c2
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c85
-rw-r--r--ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c48
24 files changed, 682 insertions, 391 deletions
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index 04aa2310..2e4250fc 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -587,29 +587,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
return 0;
}
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
- */
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
- else
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
@@ -639,7 +642,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
- * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
*/
if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
{
@@ -659,7 +663,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -676,10 +682,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
if (item == NULL)
{
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if (item == NULL)
{
@@ -687,21 +689,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
goto err;
}
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+ * would never have reached this branch. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -721,7 +727,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
* don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
*/
- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
item = NULL;
/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -746,9 +752,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
}
else
{
- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -760,26 +769,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
}
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if ( item == NULL)
goto err;
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+ * been discarded. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
@@ -1180,6 +1194,8 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+ if (!frag)
+ return 0;
memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
@@ -1476,6 +1492,9 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Read type and payload length first */
if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
+ if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 5ee8f58e..37dd5483 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -882,12 +882,18 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#endif
+#endif
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
@@ -996,6 +1002,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
@@ -1186,6 +1199,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
@@ -1245,6 +1265,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
@@ -1709,5 +1736,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index ab9c4192..535539ba 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
return 1;
}
-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
- {
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
- p=srtp_known_profiles;
- while(p->name)
- {
- if(p->id == profile_num)
- {
- *pptr=p;
- return 0;
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTE
if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
{
+ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
return 1;
}
@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
{
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
int ct;
int mki_len;
- int i,j;
- int id;
- int ret;
+ int i, srtp_pref;
+ unsigned int id;
/* Length value + the MKI length */
if(len < 3)
@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
return 1;
}
+ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
+ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
-
while(ct)
{
n2s(d,id);
ct-=2;
len-=2;
- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
+ /*
+ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
+ * current match.
+ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
+ * does nothing.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
{
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
- }
- else
- {
- ; /* Ignore */
+ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+ if (sprof->id == id)
+ {
+ s->srtp_profile = sprof;
+ srtp_pref = i;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
return 1;
}
- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
- configured then the outer loop doesn't run
- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
- and so we just return without doing anything */
- for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
- {
- sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
-
- for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
- {
- cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
-
- if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
- {
- s->srtp_profile=sprof;
- *al=0;
- ret=0;
- goto done;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ret=0;
-
-done:
- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
index c181db6d..03b20a27 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -598,10 +598,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
}
else {
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
@@ -980,6 +981,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 467adfea..f02c275c 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
@@ -698,6 +700,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
@@ -712,7 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
}
- else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ else
+#endif
+ if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
index 3bf72831..f3c29d1d 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
long l;
/* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
+ /* but no ECC ciphers */
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH ||
+ c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH ||
+ c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA)
+ return 0;
if (p != NULL)
{
l=c->id;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 82d6867b..93ca7d53 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -127,9 +127,11 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
@@ -348,23 +350,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
- * attacks. */
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
-#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
-#else
- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -447,14 +445,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+ if (n < 9)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+ * packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
@@ -584,6 +602,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+ s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+ if (s->method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
@@ -611,14 +635,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
- else
- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
index b9624b95..c63be305 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
0,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
if (p != NULL)
{
l=c->id;
- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 443a31e7..11f13adb 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
*
*/
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -67,37 +68,6 @@
* supported by TLS.) */
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-/* Some utility functions are needed:
- *
- * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
- * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
- * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
- * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
-#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
-
-/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- a -= b;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
- }
-
-/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- a -= b;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
- }
-
-/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
- {
- unsigned c = a ^ b;
- c--;
- return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
- }
-
/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
* record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
*
@@ -126,8 +96,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
rec->length -= padding_length;
rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
-}
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+ }
/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
* record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
@@ -208,7 +178,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
{
- unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
+ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
* |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
@@ -216,20 +186,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
}
/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
- * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
- * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
- * bits. */
- good &= good >> 4;
- good &= good >> 2;
- good &= good >> 1;
- good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
- good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
-
+ * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+ */
+ good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
rec->length -= padding_length;
rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
- return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
}
/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
@@ -296,8 +260,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
{
- unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
- unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
+ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
@@ -683,12 +647,12 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
b = data[k-header_length];
k++;
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c+1);
+ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
/* If this is the block containing the end of the
* application data, and we are at the offset for the
* 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
- b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
+ b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
/* If this the the block containing the end of the
* application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
* just write zero. */
@@ -704,7 +668,8 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
{
/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
- b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)]);
+ b = constant_time_select_8(
+ is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
}
block[j] = b;
}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 486f538b..8a81793e 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
break;
}
#endif
- /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or non-RSA PSK */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
!((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
{
@@ -530,6 +530,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
@@ -975,6 +976,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@@ -1032,6 +1034,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -1346,8 +1357,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
- int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
- long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+ int al,j,ok;
+ long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -1425,19 +1436,29 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
+ /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
+
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
@@ -1451,17 +1472,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (param_len > n)
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
@@ -1471,6 +1494,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1484,14 +1508,22 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1499,14 +1531,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1514,15 +1556,25 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+
+ if (1 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 1;
+
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
- param_len+=i+1;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1530,14 +1582,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1546,6 +1607,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
@@ -1568,14 +1635,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1583,14 +1659,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1619,14 +1704,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
+
+ param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1634,14 +1728,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1649,14 +1752,23 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
p+=i;
+ if (2 > n - param_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
n2s(p,i);
- param_len+=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
+
+ if (i > n - param_len)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += i;
+
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1708,12 +1820,19 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
- * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
+ * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
- param_len=3;
- if ((param_len > n) ||
- (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
+ param_len=4;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
@@ -1755,15 +1874,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
- param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
- if ((param_len > n) ||
+
+ if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
+ param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
@@ -1806,7 +1925,15 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ int sigalg;
+ if (2 > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (sigalg == -1)
{
@@ -1824,7 +1951,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (md == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
@@ -1835,15 +1961,21 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
-
+
+ if (2 > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ /* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1852,6 +1984,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
int num;
+ unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
@@ -1864,9 +1997,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
- q+=i;
- j+=i;
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
+ q+=size;
+ j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
@@ -1902,7 +2035,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
}
else
{
- if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
/* Among PSK ciphers only RSA_PSK needs a public key */
!((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
{
@@ -1912,7 +2045,6 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -2338,7 +2470,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
{
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ /* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
+ * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
+ * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
@@ -2355,7 +2490,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
- identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
+ identity, sizeof(identity - 1), psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -2368,14 +2503,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
- identity_len = strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+ identity_len = strlen(identity);
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
-
if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
{
/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
@@ -2407,7 +2542,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
@@ -2424,6 +2559,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
@@ -2820,7 +2962,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
- pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n;
+ pre_ms_len = 2+n+2+psk_len;
pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
if (pre_ms == NULL)
{
@@ -2830,11 +2972,11 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
t = pre_ms;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
s2n(n, t);
memcpy(t, p, n);
+ t += n;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
@@ -3341,7 +3483,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
+ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return(1);
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 3595cff4..bcb65d48 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -641,10 +641,18 @@ int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret, sha1len;
ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
+ if(ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+
p+=ret;
- ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+
+ sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+ if(sha1len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret+=sha1len;
return(ret);
}
static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index dca9858d..c378dd60 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2382,7 +2382,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2426,13 +2426,13 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_aSRP,
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2464,7 +2464,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
- 168,
+ 112,
168,
},
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_aSRP,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_aSRP,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -3952,10 +3952,15 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- mask_k=cert->mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
- emask_k=cert->export_mask_k | s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
+ if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
+ {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ }
#endif
-
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index df436cf7..4a2f5d6c 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -273,6 +273,12 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
return(n);
}
+/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
+ * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
+ * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
+ * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
/* Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
@@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
short version;
unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
size_t extra;
+ unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
@@ -523,7 +530,17 @@ printf("\n");
s->packet_length=0;
/* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ empty_record_count++;
+ if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ goto again;
+ }
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
@@ -979,7 +996,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return(-1);
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index f83c9366..a42fc9e3 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -414,11 +415,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* non-RSA PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK &&
- !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -524,7 +524,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
@@ -1905,7 +1907,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n+=2+nr[i];
}
- if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)
+ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */
&& !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
{
@@ -2325,6 +2327,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len;
+ unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
@@ -2372,54 +2378,61 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- al = -1;
-
- if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
- }
+ /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+ * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+ * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+ * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+ * case that the decrypt fails. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
- if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
- if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
- (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
-
- /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
- * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
- * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
- * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
- * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
- * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
- }
+ /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+ * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
+ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+ * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
+ * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+ * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+ * decryption error. */
+ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
+ version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
+
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+ * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+ * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+ * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+ * support the requested protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
+ {
+ unsigned char workaround_good;
+ workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
+ workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
+ version_good |= workaround_good;
+ }
+
+ /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
+ * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
+ decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+ /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+ {
+ p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
+ rand_premaster_secret[i]);
}
- if (al != -1)
- {
- /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
- * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
- ERR_clear_error();
- i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
- goto err;
- }
-
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
@@ -2837,7 +2850,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
{
- pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+i;
+ pre_ms_len = 2+i+2+psk_len;
pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
if (pre_ms == NULL)
{
@@ -2847,11 +2860,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
t = pre_ms;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
s2n(i, t);
memcpy(t, p, i);
+ t += i;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
@@ -3009,7 +3022,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
- 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
index c0cf33ef..24f23309 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ extern "C" {
#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80 0x0005
#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32 0x0006
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+
int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
@@ -137,6 +139,8 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index a89ab237..7a1fce89 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94"
#define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
#define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST"
+#define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP"
#define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS"
#define SSL_TXT_DH "DH"
@@ -664,11 +665,15 @@ struct ssl_session_st
*/
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
/* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
* and Finished. This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
* one RTT. */
-#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000080L
+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000200L
/* When set, TLS 1.0 and SSLv3, multi-byte, CBC records will be split in two:
* the first record will contain a single byte and the second will contain the
@@ -676,11 +681,6 @@ struct ssl_session_st
* attacks. */
#define SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING 0x00000100L
-/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
-#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000200L
-
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -2199,6 +2199,10 @@ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secre
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
+#endif
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -2467,6 +2471,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353
@@ -2527,7 +2532,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
-#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 380
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
#define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index e8794d4b..cd9f1082 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0, 0,SSL_aSRP, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0, SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
@@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
break;
}
- if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+ if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
*enc=NULL;
else
{
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
i= -1;
break;
}
- if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
+ if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
{
*md=NULL;
if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
@@ -925,7 +926,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
int rule, int strength_bits,
CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
{
- CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *curr2, *last;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
int reverse = 0;
@@ -942,21 +943,25 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
if (reverse)
{
- curr = tail;
+ next = tail;
last = head;
}
else
{
- curr = head;
+ next = head;
last = tail;
}
- curr2 = curr;
+ curr = NULL;
for (;;)
{
- if ((curr == NULL) || (curr == last)) break;
- curr = curr2;
- curr2 = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+ if (curr == last) break;
+
+ curr = next;
+
+ if (curr == NULL) break;
+
+ next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
cp = curr->cipher;
@@ -1598,6 +1603,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
case SSL_kSRP:
kx="SRP";
break;
+ case SSL_kGOST:
+ kx="GOST";
+ break;
default:
kx="unknown";
}
@@ -1628,6 +1636,15 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
case SSL_aPSK:
au="PSK";
break;
+ case SSL_aSRP:
+ au="SRP";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aGOST94:
+ au="GOST94";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aGOST01:
+ au="GOST01";
+ break;
default:
au="unknown";
break;
@@ -1675,6 +1692,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
case SSL_SEED:
enc="SEED(128)";
break;
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+ enc="GOST89(256)";
+ break;
default:
enc="unknown";
break;
@@ -1697,6 +1717,12 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
case SSL_AEAD:
mac="AEAD";
break;
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+ mac="GOST89";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST94:
+ mac="GOST94";
+ break;
default:
mac="unknown";
break;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 816f6eef..0e92ccb0 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH) ,"bad srp b length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH) ,"bad srp g length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH) ,"bad srp n length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS) ,"bad srp parameters"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH) ,"bad srp s length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE) ,"bad srtp mki value"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index ec0ec2e5..eb1ae782 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1462,6 +1462,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
j = put_cb(c,p);
p+=j;
}
@@ -1492,6 +1497,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
p+=j;
}
}
+
return(p-q);
}
@@ -1542,7 +1548,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
}
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
{
@@ -1551,7 +1557,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
continue;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 6b7731a4..ca399078 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
#define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
#define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
#define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+#define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
@@ -809,6 +810,16 @@ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
return &func_name##_data; \
}
+struct openssl_ssl_test_functions
+ {
+ int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer)(SSL *s, int push);
+ int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers)(SSL *s);
+ int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+ int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
+ };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
@@ -1096,8 +1107,8 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit);
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit);
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit);
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit);
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
@@ -1179,4 +1190,14 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(
const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
+#else
+
+#define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
+#define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
+#define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
+#define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
+
+#endif
#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
index 144b81e5..c5a15ce5 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: str="SSLv3 read certificate verify A"; break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: str="SSLv3 read certificate verify B"; break;
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
/* client */
case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello A"; break;
@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello B"; break;
/* server */
case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello A"; break;
case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break;
-#endif
/* DTLS */
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break;
@@ -366,7 +364,6 @@ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: str="3RCV_A"; break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: str="3RCV_B"; break;
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
/* client */
case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="23WCHA"; break;
@@ -376,7 +373,7 @@ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="23RSHA"; break;
/* server */
case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="23RCHA"; break;
case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="23RCHB"; break;
-#endif
+
/* DTLS */
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break;
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index b8d497ec..455992ad 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
int rv;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+ printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 122a25f5..d0b893b5 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -352,15 +352,16 @@ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
return (int)slen;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -452,8 +453,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -472,8 +472,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -669,13 +668,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
{
int el;
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -718,24 +717,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
}
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -773,8 +773,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -832,13 +831,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if(s->srtp_profile)
+ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
{
int el;
ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -937,10 +936,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
ret += len;
}
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
@@ -1288,8 +1287,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1323,8 +1321,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -1600,7 +1597,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
@@ -1706,8 +1704,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1718,15 +1715,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ if (!s->hit)
{
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
@@ -2561,7 +2561,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
+ }
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -2574,7 +2577,11 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
}
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
+ }
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 2315a7c0..e7368a8f 100644
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -408,16 +408,46 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
{
- unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
+ /* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
+ * by checking B != 0 since B < N
+ */
+ if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
+ || BN_is_zero(srp->B))
+ {
+ *al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
- return -1;
+ if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL &&
- !SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
- return -1 ;
+ if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
+ {
+ if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
@@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
return -1;
- /* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL)
- return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
-
return 1;
}