diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c | 1102 |
1 files changed, 1102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93954e48 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -0,0 +1,1102 @@ +/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/lhash.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif +#include "ssl_locl.h" + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s); +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) +/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ + { + return(ssl->session); + } + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) +/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ + { + SSL_SESSION *sess; + /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that + * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's + * non-null and when we up the reference count. */ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + sess = ssl->session; + if(sess) + sess->references++; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + return(sess); + } + +int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) + { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, + new_func, dup_func, free_func); + } + +int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) + { + return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); + } + +void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) + { + return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); + } + +SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + { + SSL_SESSION *ss; + + ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + if (ss == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(0); + } + memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); + + ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ + ss->references=1; + ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ + ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); + ss->prev=NULL; + ss->next=NULL; + ss->compress_meth=0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; +#endif +#endif + CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL; + ss->psk_identity=NULL; +#endif + return(ss); + } + +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if(len) + *len = s->session_id_length; + return s->session_id; + } + +/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1 + * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly + * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much + * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations + * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call + * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly + * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might + * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ + +#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 +static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, + unsigned int *id_len) +{ + unsigned int retry = 0; + do + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) + return 0; + while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && + (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)); + if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) + return 1; + /* else - woops a session_id match */ + /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- + * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and + * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions + * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means + * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists + * and make a reservation for it if it does not + * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). + */ + return 0; +} + +void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled (SSL *s, int creation_enabled) + { + s->session_creation_enabled = creation_enabled; + } + +int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) + { + /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ + + unsigned int tmp; + SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; + GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; + + /* caller should check this if they can do better error handling */ + if (!s->session_creation_enabled) return(0); + if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); + + /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ + if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) + ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); + else + ss->timeout=s->session_ctx->session_timeout; + + if (s->session != NULL) + { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=NULL; + } + + if (session) + { + if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) + { + ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + { + ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) + { + ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER; + ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) + { + ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION; + ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + { + ss->session_id_length = 0; + goto sess_id_done; + } +#endif + /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if(s->generate_session_id) + cb = s->generate_session_id; + else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) + cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + /* Choose a session ID */ + tmp = ss->session_id_length; + if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) + { + /* The callback failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } + /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. + * nor set it higher than it was. */ + if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) + { + /* The callback set an illegal length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } + /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ + if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) + memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); + else + ss->session_id_length = tmp; + /* Finally, check for a conflict */ + if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, + ss->session_id_length)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return(0); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + sess_id_done: + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) + { + if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); + } + if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) + { + if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); + if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); + } +#endif +#endif + } + else + { + ss->session_id_length=0; + } + + if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSL_SESSION_free(ss); + return 0; + } + memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length); + ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length; + s->session=ss; + ss->ssl_version=s->version; + ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; + + return(1); + } + +int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + const unsigned char *limit) + { + /* This is used only by servers. */ + + SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL; + int fatal = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + int r; +#endif + + if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) + goto err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); + if (r == -1) + { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + else if (r == 0 || (!ret && !len)) + goto err; + else if (!ret && !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) +#else + if (len == 0) + goto err; + if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) +#endif + { + SSL_SESSION data; + data.ssl_version=s->version; + data.session_id_length=len; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data); + if (ret != NULL) + /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + } + + if (ret == NULL) + { + int copy=1; + + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++; + ret=NULL; + if (s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL + && (ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©)) + != NULL) + { + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; + + /* Increment reference count now if the session callback + * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures + * returned by the callback are shared between threads, + * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], + * or things won't be thread-safe). */ + if (copy) + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + + /* Add the externally cached session to the internal + * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */ + if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) + /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, + * things are very strange */ + SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret); + } + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + } + + /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */ + + if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)) + { + /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't + * want to use it in this context. */ + +#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate, + * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */ + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); +#endif + goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ + } + + if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) + { + /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of + * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. + * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. + * + * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating + * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for + * applications to effectively disable the session cache by + * accident without anyone noticing). + */ + + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } + + if (ret->cipher == NULL) + { + unsigned char buf[5],*p; + unsigned long l; + + p=buf; + l=ret->cipher_id; + l2n(l,p); + if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) + ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2])); + else + ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1])); + if (ret->cipher == NULL) + goto err; + } + + +#if 0 /* This is way too late. */ + + /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got + * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could + * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement + * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */ + CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); +#endif + + if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */ + { + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; + /* remove it from the cache */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret); + goto err; + } + + s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */ + /* again, just leave the session + * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and + * then decremented the reference count :-) */ + if (s->session != NULL) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=ret; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; + return(1); + + err: + if (ret != NULL) + SSL_SESSION_free(ret); + if (fatal) + return -1; + else + return 0; + } + +int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) + { + int ret=0; + SSL_SESSION *s; + + /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache + * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a + * doubly linked list and an lhash */ + CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + s=lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions,c); + + /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. + * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify + * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ + if (s != NULL && s != c) + { + /* We *are* in trouble ... */ + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache + * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical + * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when + * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external + * cache) */ + s = NULL; + } + + /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ + if (s == NULL) + SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c); + + if (s != NULL) + { + /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference + * count because it already takes into account the cache */ + + SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ + ret=0; + } + else + { + /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ + + ret=1; + + if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) + { + while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > + SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) + { + if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, + ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) + break; + else + ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; + } + } + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return(ret); + } + +int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) +{ + return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); +} + +static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) + { + SSL_SESSION *r; + int ret=0; + + if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) + { + if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c) + { + ret=1; + r=lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions,c); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c); + } + + if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + + if (ret) + { + r->not_resumable=1; + if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r); + SSL_SESSION_free(r); + } + } + else + ret=0; + return(ret); + } + +void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) + { + int i; + + if(ss == NULL) + return; + + i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); +#ifdef REF_PRINT + REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss); +#endif + if (i > 0) return; +#ifdef REF_CHECK + if (i < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } +#endif + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key); + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id); + if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert); + if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer); + if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname); + if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); + ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; + if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); + if (ss->psk_identity != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); +#endif + OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss)); + OPENSSL_free(ss); + } + +int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) + { + int ret=0; + const SSL_METHOD *meth; + + if (session != NULL) + { + meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); + if (meth == NULL) + meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); + if (meth == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD); + return(0); + } + + if (meth != s->method) + { + if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) + return(0); + if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0) + session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); + else + session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ && + session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) + { + s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1); + memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ, + session->krb5_client_princ_len); + s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0'; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + + /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ + CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); + if (s->session != NULL) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=session; + s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; + /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ + ret=1; + } + else + { + if (s->session != NULL) + { + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session=NULL; + } + + meth=s->ctx->method; + if (meth != s->method) + { + if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) + return(0); + } + ret=1; + } + return(ret); + } + +long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + s->timeout=t; + return(1); + } + +long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + return(s->timeout); + } + +long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + return(s->time); + } + +long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + s->time=t; + return(t); + } + +long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) + { + long l; + if (s == NULL) return(0); + l=s->session_timeout; + s->session_timeout=t; + return(l); + } + +long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + return(s->session_timeout); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb; + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg; + return(1); + } + +int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, + void *arg) + { + if (s == NULL) return(0); + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb; + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg; + return(1); + } + +int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len) + { + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) + { + if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) + { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); + s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL; + } + + s->tlsext_session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len); + if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + if (ext_data) + { + s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len; + s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1; + memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len); + } + else + { + s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0; + s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL; + } + + return 1; + } + + return 0; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + +typedef struct timeout_param_st + { + SSL_CTX *ctx; + long time; + LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache; + } TIMEOUT_PARAM; + +static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) + { + if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */ + { + /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to + * save on locking overhead */ + (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache,s); + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s); + s->not_resumable=1; + if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s); + SSL_SESSION_free(s); + } + } + +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM) + +void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) + { + unsigned long i; + TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; + + tp.ctx=s; + tp.cache=s->sessions; + if (tp.cache == NULL) return; + tp.time=t; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + i=CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load; + CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=0; + lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), + TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp); + CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=i; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + } + +int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) + { + if ( (s->session != NULL) && + !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && + !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) + { + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); + return(1); + } + else + return(0); + } + +/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ +static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) + { + if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return; + + if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) + { /* last element in list */ + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) + { /* only one element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head=NULL; + ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL; + } + else + { + ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev; + s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } + } + else + { + if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) + { /* first element in list */ + ctx->session_cache_head=s->next; + s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + } + else + { /* middle of list */ + s->next->prev=s->prev; + s->prev->next=s->next; + } + } + s->prev=s->next=NULL; + } + +static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) + { + if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) + SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); + + if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) + { + ctx->session_cache_head=s; + ctx->session_cache_tail=s; + s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); + } + else + { + s->next=ctx->session_cache_head; + s->next->prev=s; + s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); + ctx->session_cache_head=s; + } + } + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess)) + { + ctx->new_session_cb=cb; + } + +int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) + { + return ctx->new_session_cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess)) + { + ctx->remove_session_cb=cb; + } + +void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess) + { + return ctx->remove_session_cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, + unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy)) + { + ctx->get_session_cb=cb; + } + +SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, + unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy) + { + return ctx->get_session_cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) + { + ctx->info_callback=cb; + } + +void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val) + { + return ctx->info_callback; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) + { + ctx->client_cert_cb=cb; + } + +int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey) + { + return ctx->client_cert_cb; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e) + { + if (!ENGINE_init(e)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + return 0; + } + if(!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD); + ENGINE_finish(e); + return 0; + } + ctx->client_cert_engine = e; + return 1; + } +#endif + +void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)) + { + ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb=cb; + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)) + { + ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb=cb; + } + +IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) |