diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c | 834 |
1 files changed, 834 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27256eea --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -0,0 +1,834 @@ +/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> + +#include "e_os.h" +#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H +# include <sys/types.h> +#endif + +#include "o_dir.h" +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" + +int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) + { + static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1; + int got_write_lock = 0; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + + if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) + { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + got_write_lock = 1; + + if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) + { + ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index( + 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL); + } + } + + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; + } + +CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) + { + CERT *ret; + + ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); + if (ret == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(NULL); + } + memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT)); + + ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); + ret->references=1; + + return(ret); + } + +CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) + { + CERT *ret; + int i; + + ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); + if (ret == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(NULL); + } + + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); + + ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; + /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), + * if you find that more readable */ + + ret->valid = cert->valid; + ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; + ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; + ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k; + ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) + { + RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp); + ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp; + } + ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) + { + ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); + if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) + { + BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key); + if (!b) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b; + } + if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) + { + BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key); + if (!b) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b; + } + } + ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (cert->ecdh_tmp) + { + ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp); + if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb; +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + { + if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + { + ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509; + CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1, + CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + } + + if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) + { + ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey; + CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1, + CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); + + switch(i) + { + /* If there was anything special to do for + * certain types of keys, we'd do it here. + * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */ + + case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: + case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: + /* We have an RSA key. */ + break; + + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + /* We have a DSA key. */ + break; + + case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: + case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: + /* We have a DH key. */ + break; + + case SSL_PKEY_ECC: + /* We have an ECC key */ + break; + + default: + /* Can't happen. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + } + } + } + + /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate + * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */ + + ret->references=1; + + return(ret); + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) +err: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL) + RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL) + DH_free(ret->dh_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp); +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + { + if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509); + if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey); + } + + return NULL; + } + + +void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) + { + int i; + + if(c == NULL) + return; + + i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); +#ifdef REF_PRINT + REF_PRINT("CERT",c); +#endif + if (i > 0) return; +#ifdef REF_CHECK + if (i < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp); +#endif + + for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + { + if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509); + if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey); +#if 0 + if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey); +#endif + } + OPENSSL_free(c); + } + +int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) + { + /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one + * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in + * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one + * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might + * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm + * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with + * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the + * initialization in SSL_CTX_new). + */ + + if (o == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return(0); + } + if (*o == NULL) + { + if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(0); + } + } + return(1); + } + + +SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) + { + SESS_CERT *ret; + + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret); + if (ret == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret); + ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); + ret->references = 1; + + return ret; + } + +void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) + { + int i; + + if (sc == NULL) + return; + + i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT); +#ifdef REF_PRINT + REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc); +#endif + if (i > 0) + return; +#ifdef REF_CHECK + if (i < 0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); + abort(); /* ok */ + } +#endif + + /* i == 0 */ + if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free); + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + { + if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); +#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just + * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate + * data structure. */ + if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey); +#endif + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) + RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) + DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); +#endif + + OPENSSL_free(sc); + } + +int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type) + { + sc->peer_cert_type = type; + return(1); + } + +int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) + { + X509 *x; + int i; + X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + + if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) + return(0); + + x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); + if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return(0); + } +#if 0 + if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0) + X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s); + + /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by + * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates + * or vice versa. + */ + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, + s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); + /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the + * ctx. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); + + if (s->verify_callback) + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); + + if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) +#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */ + i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); +#else + i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */ +#endif + else + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY + i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx); +#else + i=0; + ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK); +#endif + } + + s->verify_result=ctx.error; + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + return(i); + } + +static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) + { + if (*ca_list != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free); + + *ca_list=name_list; + } + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) + { + int i; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; + X509_NAME *name; + + ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) + { + name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i)); + if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name)) + { + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free); + return(NULL); + } + } + return(ret); + } + +void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) + { + set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list); + } + +void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) + { + set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list); + } + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) + { + return(ctx->client_CA); + } + +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) + { + if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) + { /* we are in the client */ + if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && + (s->s3 != NULL)) + return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names); + else + return(NULL); + } + else + { + if (s->client_CA != NULL) + return(s->client_CA); + else + return(s->ctx->client_CA); + } + } + +static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x) + { + X509_NAME *name; + + if (x == NULL) return(0); + if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) + return(0); + + if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) + return(0); + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name)) + { + X509_NAME_free(name); + return(0); + } + return(1); + } + +int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x) + { + return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x)); + } + +int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x) + { + return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x)); + } + +static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) + { + return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO +/*! + * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; + * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use + * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have + * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. + * \param file the file containing one or more certs. + * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. + */ +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) + { + BIO *in; + X509 *x=NULL; + X509_NAME *xn=NULL; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk; + + sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); + + in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); + + if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) + goto err; + + for (;;) + { + if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) + break; + if (ret == NULL) + { + ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; + /* check for duplicates */ + xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); + if (xn == NULL) goto err; + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0) + X509_NAME_free(xn); + else + { + sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn); + sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn); + } + } + + if (0) + { +err: + if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free); + ret=NULL; + } + if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); + if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); + if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); + if (ret != NULL) + ERR_clear_error(); + return(ret); + } +#endif + +/*! + * Add a file of certs to a stack. + * \param stack the stack to add to. + * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not + * already in the stack will be added. + * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some + * certs may have been added to \c stack. + */ + +int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *file) + { + BIO *in; + X509 *x=NULL; + X509_NAME *xn=NULL; + int ret=1; + int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b); + + oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp); + + in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); + + if (in == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) + goto err; + + for (;;) + { + if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) + break; + if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; + xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); + if (xn == NULL) goto err; + if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0) + X509_NAME_free(xn); + else + sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn); + } + + ERR_clear_error(); + + if (0) + { +err: + ret=0; + } + if(in != NULL) + BIO_free(in); + if(x != NULL) + X509_free(x); + + (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); + + return ret; + } + +/*! + * Add a directory of certs to a stack. + * \param stack the stack to append to. + * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be + * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to + * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be + * included. + * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some + * certs may have been added to \c stack. + */ + +int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, + const char *dir) + { + OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; + const char *filename; + int ret = 0; + + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); + + /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ + + while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) + { + char buf[1024]; + int r; + + if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename); +#else + r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename); +#endif + if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) + goto err; + if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf)) + goto err; + } + + if (errno) + { + SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); + ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); + return ret; + } + |