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Diffstat (limited to 'bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c1563
1 files changed, 1563 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a6a4c87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1563 @@
+/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return(DTLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
+ dtls1_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ dtls1_get_server_method)
+
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;
+ int listen;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ listen = s->d1->listen;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ s->d1->listen = listen;
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server=1;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+ {
+ /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+ * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+ * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
+ if (listen)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ /* If we're just listening, stop here */
+ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ ret = 2;
+ s->d1->listen = 0;
+ /* Set expected sequence numbers
+ * to continue the handshake.
+ */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
+ if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+ /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ s->new_session = 2;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+ * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+ * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+ * be able to handle this) */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
+ /* only send if a DH key exchange or
+ * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
+ * have not asked for it :-) */
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+ * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+ * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+ * message is not sent.
+ */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+ * a client cert, it can be verified */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_md5,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ /* next message is server hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
+ * requests for it */
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
+
+ if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
+ {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+ s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+ &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+ msg_len = p - msg;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int sl;
+ unsigned long l,Time;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=s->s3->server_random;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
+ * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
+ * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
+ * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
+ * session-id if we want it to be single use.
+ * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
+ * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
+
+ sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++)=sl;
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
+ p+=sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++)=0;
+ else
+ *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* do the header */
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j,num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int al,i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4],kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert=s->cert;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
+ n=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if(rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0]=rsa->n;
+ r[1]=rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+ {
+ dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
+ {
+ if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+ (dh->priv_key == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0]=dh->p;
+ r[1]=dh->g;
+ r[2]=dh->pub_key;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+ * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
+ * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key.
+ * First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
+ * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+ * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+ * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0]=NULL;
+ r[1]=NULL;
+ r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ n+=2+nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=NULL;
+ kn=0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ s2n(nr[i],p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
+ p+=nr[i];
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+ * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
+ encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ /* n is the length of the params, they start at
+ * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
+ * at the end. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ q=md_buf;
+ j=0;
+ for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
+ (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q+=i;
+ j+=i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n+=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,j,nl,off,n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
+ {
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
+ d[0]=n;
+ p+=n;
+ n++;
+
+ off=n;
+ p+=2;
+ n+=2;
+
+ sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl=0;
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+ j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ {
+ s2n(j,p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ n+=2+j;
+ nl+=2+j;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ d=p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
+ n+=j;
+ nl+=j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
+ s2n(nl,p);
+
+ d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+/* XXX: what to do about this? */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
+ * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
+ /* Ticket length */
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
+ s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+#endif