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Diffstat (limited to 'app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c')
-rw-r--r--app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c628
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 628 deletions
diff --git a/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0348e98a..00000000
--- a/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,628 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
- * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
- * session authentication and key exchange,
- * packet encryption, packet authentication, and
- * packet compression.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. <sales@openvpn.net>
- * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. <openvpn@fox-it.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this
- * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
- * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
- */
-
-/**
- * @file Control Channel Verification Module OpenSSL implementation
- */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-#include "config.h"
-#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
-#include "config-msvc.h"
-#endif
-
-#include "syshead.h"
-
-#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
-
-#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h"
-
-#include "error.h"
-#include "ssl_openssl.h"
-#include "ssl_verify.h"
-#include "ssl_verify_backend.h"
-
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-int
-verify_callback (int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- struct tls_session *session;
- SSL *ssl;
- struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
-
- /* get the tls_session pointer */
- ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
- ASSERT (ssl);
- session = (struct tls_session *) SSL_get_ex_data (ssl, mydata_index);
- ASSERT (session);
-
- cert_hash_remember (session, ctx->error_depth,
- x509_get_sha1_hash(ctx->current_cert, &gc));
-
- /* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */
- if (!preverify_ok)
- {
- /* get the X509 name */
- char *subject = x509_get_subject(ctx->current_cert, &gc);
-
- if (subject)
- {
- /* Remote site specified a certificate, but it's not correct */
- msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, error=%s: %s",
- ctx->error_depth,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string (ctx->error),
- subject);
- }
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- session->verified = false;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if (SUCCESS != verify_cert(session, ctx->current_cert, ctx->error_depth))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ret = 1;
-
-cleanup:
- gc_free(&gc);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
-static
-bool extract_x509_extension(X509 *cert, char *fieldname, char *out, int size)
-{
- bool retval = false;
- char *buf = 0;
- GENERAL_NAMES *extensions;
- int nid = OBJ_txt2nid(fieldname);
-
- extensions = (GENERAL_NAMES *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, nid, NULL, NULL);
- if ( extensions )
- {
- int numalts;
- int i;
- /* get amount of alternatives,
- * RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
- * one, but we don't depend on it...
- */
-
- numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(extensions);
-
- /* loop through all alternatives */
- for (i=0; i<numalts; i++)
- {
- /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
- const GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value (extensions, i );
-
- switch (name->type)
- {
- case GEN_EMAIL:
- ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char**)&buf, name->d.ia5);
- if ( strlen (buf) != name->d.ia5->length )
- {
- msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "ASN1 ERROR: string contained terminating zero");
- OPENSSL_free (buf);
- } else {
- strncpynt(out, buf, size);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- retval = true;
- }
- break;
- default:
- msg (D_TLS_DEBUG, "%s: ignoring general name field type %i",
- __func__, name->type);
- break;
- }
- }
- sk_GENERAL_NAME_free (extensions);
- }
- return retval;
-}
-#endif /* ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME */
-
-/*
- * Extract a field from an X509 subject name.
- *
- * Example:
- *
- * /C=US/ST=CO/L=Denver/O=ORG/CN=First-CN/CN=Test-CA/Email=jim@yonan.net
- *
- * The common name is 'Test-CA'
- *
- * Return true on success, false on error (insufficient buffer size in 'out'
- * to contain result is grounds for error).
- */
-static result_t
-extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_NAME *x509, const char *field_name, char *out,
- int size)
-{
- int lastpos = -1;
- int tmp = -1;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *x509ne = 0;
- ASN1_STRING *asn1 = 0;
- unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */
- int nid = OBJ_txt2nid((char *)field_name);
-
- ASSERT (size > 0);
- *out = '\0';
- do {
- lastpos = tmp;
- tmp = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509, nid, lastpos);
- } while (tmp > -1);
-
- /* Nothing found */
- if (lastpos == -1)
- return FAILURE;
-
- x509ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509, lastpos);
- if (!x509ne)
- return FAILURE;
-
- asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(x509ne);
- if (!asn1)
- return FAILURE;
- tmp = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&buf, asn1);
- if (tmp <= 0)
- return FAILURE;
-
- strncpynt(out, (char *)buf, size);
-
- {
- const result_t ret = (strlen ((char *)buf) < size) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_free (buf);
- return ret;
- }
-}
-
-result_t
-backend_x509_get_username (char *common_name, int cn_len,
- char * x509_username_field, X509 *peer_cert)
-{
-#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
- if (strncmp("ext:",x509_username_field,4) == 0)
- {
- if (!extract_x509_extension (peer_cert, x509_username_field+4, common_name, cn_len))
- return FAILURE;
- } else
-#endif
- if (FAILURE == extract_x509_field_ssl (X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert),
- x509_username_field, common_name, cn_len))
- return FAILURE;
-
- return SUCCESS;
-}
-
-char *
-backend_x509_get_serial (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
-{
- ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i;
- BIGNUM *bignum;
- char *openssl_serial, *serial;
-
- asn1_i = X509_get_serialNumber(cert);
- bignum = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(asn1_i, NULL);
- openssl_serial = BN_bn2dec(bignum);
-
- serial = string_alloc(openssl_serial, gc);
-
- BN_free(bignum);
- OPENSSL_free(openssl_serial);
-
- return serial;
-}
-
-char *
-backend_x509_get_serial_hex (openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
-{
- const ASN1_INTEGER *asn1_i = X509_get_serialNumber(cert);
-
- return format_hex_ex(asn1_i->data, asn1_i->length, 0, 1, ":", gc);
-}
-
-unsigned char *
-x509_get_sha1_hash (X509 *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
-{
- unsigned char *hash = gc_malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, false, gc);
- memcpy(hash, cert->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return hash;
-}
-
-char *
-x509_get_subject (X509 *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
-{
- BIO *subject_bio = NULL;
- BUF_MEM *subject_mem;
- char *subject = NULL;
- int maxlen = 0;
-
- /*
- * Generate the subject string in OpenSSL proprietary format,
- * when in --compat-names mode
- */
- if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES))
- {
- subject = gc_malloc (256, false, gc);
- X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), subject, 256);
- subject[255] = '\0';
- return subject;
- }
-
- subject_bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
- if (subject_bio == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- X509_NAME_print_ex (subject_bio, X509_get_subject_name (cert),
- 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | XN_FLAG_FN_SN |
- ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL);
-
- if (BIO_eof (subject_bio))
- goto err;
-
- BIO_get_mem_ptr (subject_bio, &subject_mem);
-
- maxlen = subject_mem->length + 1;
- subject = gc_malloc (maxlen, false, gc);
-
- memcpy (subject, subject_mem->data, maxlen);
- subject[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
-
-err:
- if (subject_bio)
- BIO_free (subject_bio);
-
- return subject;
-}
-
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK
-
-void
-x509_track_add (const struct x509_track **ll_head, const char *name, int msglevel, struct gc_arena *gc)
-{
- struct x509_track *xt;
- ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR_GC (xt, struct x509_track, gc);
- if (*name == '+')
- {
- xt->flags |= XT_FULL_CHAIN;
- ++name;
- }
- xt->name = name;
- xt->nid = OBJ_txt2nid(name);
- if (xt->nid != NID_undef)
- {
- xt->next = *ll_head;
- *ll_head = xt;
- }
- else
- msg(msglevel, "x509_track: no such attribute '%s'", name);
-}
-
-/* worker method for setenv_x509_track */
-static void
-do_setenv_x509 (struct env_set *es, const char *name, char *value, int depth)
-{
- char *name_expand;
- size_t name_expand_size;
-
- string_mod (value, CC_ANY, CC_CRLF, '?');
- msg (D_X509_ATTR, "X509 ATTRIBUTE name='%s' value='%s' depth=%d", name, value, depth);
- name_expand_size = 64 + strlen (name);
- name_expand = (char *) malloc (name_expand_size);
- check_malloc_return (name_expand);
- openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, name_expand_size, "X509_%d_%s", depth, name);
- setenv_str (es, name_expand, value);
- free (name_expand);
-}
-
-void
-x509_setenv_track (const struct x509_track *xt, struct env_set *es, const int depth, X509 *x509)
-{
- X509_NAME *x509_name = X509_get_subject_name (x509);
- const char nullc = '\0';
- int i;
-
- while (xt)
- {
- if (depth == 0 || (xt->flags & XT_FULL_CHAIN))
- {
- i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509_name, xt->nid, -1);
- if (i >= 0)
- {
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509_name, i);
- if (ent)
- {
- ASN1_STRING *val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent);
- unsigned char *buf;
- buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */
- if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) > 0)
- {
- do_setenv_x509(es, xt->name, (char *)buf, depth);
- OPENSSL_free (buf);
- }
- }
- }
- else
- {
- i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x509, xt->nid, -1);
- if (i >= 0)
- {
- X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x509, i);
- if (ext)
- {
- BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if (bio)
- {
- if (X509V3_EXT_print(bio, ext, 0, 0))
- {
- if (BIO_write(bio, &nullc, 1) == 1)
- {
- char *str;
- BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &str);
- do_setenv_x509(es, xt->name, str, depth);
- }
- }
- BIO_free(bio);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- xt = xt->next;
- }
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention:
- *
- * X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value}
- */
-void
-x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert)
-{
- int i, n;
- int fn_nid;
- ASN1_OBJECT *fn;
- ASN1_STRING *val;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ent;
- const char *objbuf;
- unsigned char *buf;
- char *name_expand;
- size_t name_expand_size;
- X509_NAME *x509 = X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert);
-
- n = X509_NAME_entry_count (x509);
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
- {
- ent = X509_NAME_get_entry (x509, i);
- if (!ent)
- continue;
- fn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object (ent);
- if (!fn)
- continue;
- val = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data (ent);
- if (!val)
- continue;
- fn_nid = OBJ_obj2nid (fn);
- if (fn_nid == NID_undef)
- continue;
- objbuf = OBJ_nid2sn (fn_nid);
- if (!objbuf)
- continue;
- buf = (unsigned char *)1; /* bug in OpenSSL 0.9.6b ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 requires this workaround */
- if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 (&buf, val) <= 0)
- continue;
- name_expand_size = 64 + strlen (objbuf);
- name_expand = (char *) malloc (name_expand_size);
- check_malloc_return (name_expand);
- openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, name_expand_size, "X509_%d_%s", cert_depth,
- objbuf);
- string_mod (name_expand, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_');
- string_mod ((char*)buf, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_');
- setenv_str (es, name_expand, (char*)buf);
- free (name_expand);
- OPENSSL_free (buf);
- }
-}
-
-result_t
-x509_verify_ns_cert_type(const openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, const int usage)
-{
- if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE)
- return SUCCESS;
- if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT)
- return ((peer_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT)
- && (peer_cert->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE;
- if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER)
- return ((peer_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT)
- && (peer_cert->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_SERVER)) ? SUCCESS: FAILURE;
-
- return FAILURE;
-}
-
-result_t
-x509_verify_cert_ku (X509 *x509, const unsigned * const expected_ku,
- int expected_len)
-{
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ku = NULL;
- result_t fFound = FAILURE;
-
- if ((ku = (ASN1_BIT_STRING *) X509_get_ext_d2i (x509, NID_key_usage, NULL,
- NULL)) == NULL)
- {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have key usage extension");
- }
- else
- {
- unsigned nku = 0;
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- {
- if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit (ku, i))
- nku |= 1 << (7 - i);
- }
-
- /*
- * Fixup if no LSB bits
- */
- if ((nku & 0xff) == 0)
- {
- nku >>= 8;
- }
-
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate key usage");
- for (i = 0; fFound != SUCCESS && i < expected_len; i++)
- {
- if (expected_ku[i] != 0)
- {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has key usage %04x, expects "
- "%04x", nku, expected_ku[i]);
-
- if (nku == expected_ku[i])
- fFound = SUCCESS;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (ku != NULL)
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free (ku);
-
- return fFound;
-}
-
-result_t
-x509_verify_cert_eku (X509 *x509, const char * const expected_oid)
-{
- EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku = NULL;
- result_t fFound = FAILURE;
-
- if ((eku = (EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *) X509_get_ext_d2i (x509, NID_ext_key_usage,
- NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
- {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have extended key usage extension");
- }
- else
- {
- int i;
-
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate extended key usage");
- for (i = 0; SUCCESS != fFound && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num (eku); i++)
- {
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value (eku, i);
- char szOid[1024];
-
- if (SUCCESS != fFound && OBJ_obj2txt (szOid, sizeof(szOid), oid, 0) != -1)
- {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (str) %s, expects %s",
- szOid, expected_oid);
- if (!strcmp (expected_oid, szOid))
- fFound = SUCCESS;
- }
- if (SUCCESS != fFound && OBJ_obj2txt (szOid, sizeof(szOid), oid, 1) != -1)
- {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (oid) %s, expects %s",
- szOid, expected_oid);
- if (!strcmp (expected_oid, szOid))
- fFound = SUCCESS;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (eku != NULL)
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free (eku, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
-
- return fFound;
-}
-
-result_t
-x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, X509 *peercert)
-{
- if (PEM_write_X509(peercert_file, peercert) < 0)
- {
- msg (M_ERR, "Failed to write peer certificate in PEM format");
- return FAILURE;
- }
- return SUCCESS;
-}
-
-/*
- * check peer cert against CRL
- */
-result_t
-x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, X509 *peer_cert, const char *subject)
-{
- X509_CRL *crl=NULL;
- X509_REVOKED *revoked;
- BIO *in=NULL;
- int n,i;
- result_t retval = FAILURE;
-
- in = BIO_new_file (crl_file, "r");
-
- if (in == NULL) {
- msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot read: %s", crl_file);
- goto end;
- }
- crl=PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
- if (crl == NULL) {
- msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), X509_get_issuer_name(peer_cert)) != 0) {
- msg (M_WARN, "CRL: CRL %s is from a different issuer than the issuer of "
- "certificate %s", crl_file, subject);
- retval = SUCCESS;
- goto end;
- }
-
- n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- revoked = (X509_REVOKED *)sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber, X509_get_serialNumber(peer_cert)) == 0) {
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK FAILED: %s is REVOKED",subject);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- retval = SUCCESS;
- msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK OK: %s",subject);
-
-end:
- BIO_free(in);
- if (crl)
- X509_CRL_free (crl);
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-#endif /* defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO) && defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-09 18:37:50 +0000