diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 1271 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1271 deletions
diff --git a/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c deleted file mode 100644 index ad50458b..00000000 --- a/app/openvpn/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1271 +0,0 @@ -/* - * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks - * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based - * session authentication and key exchange, - * packet encryption, packet authentication, and - * packet compression. - * - * Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. <sales@openvpn.net> - * Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. <openvpn@fox-it.com> - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 - * as published by the Free Software Foundation. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this - * distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., - * 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA - */ - -/** - * @file Control Channel Verification Module - */ - -#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H -#include "config.h" -#elif defined(_MSC_VER) -#include "config-msvc.h" -#endif - -#include "syshead.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO - -#include "misc.h" -#include "manage.h" -#include "ssl_verify.h" -#include "ssl_verify_backend.h" - -#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL -#include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" -#endif - -/** Maximum length of common name */ -#define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64 - -/** Legal characters in an X509 name with --compat-names */ -#define X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH|CC_COLON|CC_EQUAL) - -/** Legal characters in a common name with --compat-names */ -#define COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH) - -static void -string_mod_remap_name (char *str, const unsigned int restrictive_flags) -{ - if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES) - && !compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING)) - string_mod (str, restrictive_flags, 0, '_'); - else - string_mod (str, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); -} - -/* - * Export the untrusted IP address and port to the environment - */ -static void -setenv_untrusted (struct tls_session *session) -{ - setenv_link_socket_actual (session->opt->es, "untrusted", &session->untrusted_addr, SA_IP_PORT); -} - -/* - * Remove authenticated state from all sessions in the given tunnel - */ -static void -tls_deauthenticate (struct tls_multi *multi) -{ - if (multi) - { - int i, j; - for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) - for (j = 0; j < KS_SIZE; ++j) - multi->session[i].key[j].authenticated = false; - } -} - -/* - * Set the given session's common_name - */ -static void -set_common_name (struct tls_session *session, const char *common_name) -{ - if (session->common_name) - { - free (session->common_name); - session->common_name = NULL; -#ifdef ENABLE_PF - session->common_name_hashval = 0; -#endif - } - if (common_name) - { - /* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ - session->common_name = string_alloc (common_name, NULL); -#ifdef ENABLE_PF - { - const uint32_t len = (uint32_t) strlen (common_name); - if (len) - session->common_name_hashval = hash_func ((const uint8_t*)common_name, len+1, 0); - else - session->common_name_hashval = 0; - } -#endif - } -} - -/* - * Retrieve the common name for the given tunnel's active session. If the - * common name is NULL or empty, return NULL if null is true, or "UNDEF" if - * null is false. - */ -const char * -tls_common_name (const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) -{ - const char *ret = NULL; - if (multi) - ret = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; - if (ret && strlen (ret)) - return ret; - else if (null) - return NULL; - else - return "UNDEF"; -} - -/* - * Lock the common name for the given tunnel. - */ -void -tls_lock_common_name (struct tls_multi *multi) -{ - const char *cn = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; - if (cn && !multi->locked_cn) - multi->locked_cn = string_alloc (cn, NULL); -} - -/* - * Lock the username for the given tunnel - */ -static bool -tls_lock_username (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *username) -{ - if (multi->locked_username) - { - if (!username || strcmp (username, multi->locked_username)) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: username attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", - multi->locked_username, - np(username)); - - /* disable the tunnel */ - tls_deauthenticate (multi); - return false; - } - } - else - { - if (username) - multi->locked_username = string_alloc (username, NULL); - } - return true; -} - -const char * -tls_username (const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) -{ - const char *ret = NULL; - if (multi) - ret = multi->locked_username; - if (ret && strlen (ret)) - return ret; - else if (null) - return NULL; - else - return "UNDEF"; -} - -void -cert_hash_remember (struct tls_session *session, const int error_depth, const unsigned char *sha1_hash) -{ - if (error_depth >= 0 && error_depth < MAX_CERT_DEPTH) - { - if (!session->cert_hash_set) - ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (session->cert_hash_set, struct cert_hash_set); - if (!session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]) - ALLOC_OBJ (session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth], struct cert_hash); - { - struct cert_hash *ch = session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]; - memcpy (ch->sha1_hash, sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); - } - } -} - -#if 0 -static void -cert_hash_print (const struct cert_hash_set *chs, int msglevel) -{ - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - msg (msglevel, "CERT_HASH"); - if (chs) - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) - { - const struct cert_hash *ch = chs->ch[i]; - if (ch) - msg (msglevel, "%d:%s", i, format_hex(ch->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, &gc)); - } - } - gc_free (&gc); -} -#endif - -void -cert_hash_free (struct cert_hash_set *chs) -{ - if (chs) - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) - free (chs->ch[i]); - free (chs); - } -} - -bool -cert_hash_compare (const struct cert_hash_set *chs1, const struct cert_hash_set *chs2) -{ - if (chs1 && chs2) - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) - { - const struct cert_hash *ch1 = chs1->ch[i]; - const struct cert_hash *ch2 = chs2->ch[i]; - - if (!ch1 && !ch2) - continue; - else if (ch1 && ch2 && !memcmp (ch1->sha1_hash, ch2->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - continue; - else - return false; - } - return true; - } - else if (!chs1 && !chs2) - return true; - else - return false; -} - -static struct cert_hash_set * -cert_hash_copy (const struct cert_hash_set *chs) -{ - struct cert_hash_set *dest = NULL; - if (chs) - { - int i; - ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR (dest, struct cert_hash_set); - for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) - { - const struct cert_hash *ch = chs->ch[i]; - if (ch) - { - ALLOC_OBJ (dest->ch[i], struct cert_hash); - memcpy (dest->ch[i]->sha1_hash, ch->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); - } - } - } - return dest; -} -void -tls_lock_cert_hash_set (struct tls_multi *multi) -{ - const struct cert_hash_set *chs = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].cert_hash_set; - if (chs && !multi->locked_cert_hash_set) - multi->locked_cert_hash_set = cert_hash_copy (chs); -} - -/* - * Returns the string associated with the given certificate type. - */ -static const char * -print_nsCertType (int type) -{ - switch (type) - { - case NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER: - return "SERVER"; - case NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT: - return "CLIENT"; - default: - return "?"; - } -} - -/* - * Verify the peer's certificate fields. - * - * @param opt the tls options to verify against - * @param peer_cert the peer's certificate - * @param subject the peer's extracted subject name - * @param subject the peer's extracted common name - */ -static result_t -verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, - const char *subject, const char *common_name) -{ - /* verify certificate nsCertType */ - if (opt->ns_cert_type != NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE) - { - if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_ns_cert_type (peer_cert, opt->ns_cert_type)) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: nsCertType=%s", - print_nsCertType (opt->ns_cert_type)); - } - else - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY nsCertType ERROR: %s, require nsCertType=%s", - subject, print_nsCertType (opt->ns_cert_type)); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ - } - } - - /* verify certificate ku */ - if (opt->remote_cert_ku[0] != 0) - { - if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_ku (peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_ku, MAX_PARMS)) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU OK"); - } - else - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU ERROR"); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ - } - } - - /* verify certificate eku */ - if (opt->remote_cert_eku != NULL) - { - if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_eku (peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_eku)) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU OK"); - } - else - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU ERROR"); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ - } - } - - /* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */ - if (opt->verify_x509_type != VERIFY_X509_NONE) - { - if ( (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN - && strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, subject) == 0) - || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN - && strcmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0) - || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX - && strncmp (opt->verify_x509_name, common_name, - strlen (opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0) ) - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", subject); - else - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME ERROR: %s, must be %s", - subject, opt->verify_x509_name); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ - } - } - - return SUCCESS; -} - -/* - * Export the subject, common_name, and raw certificate fields to the - * environment for later verification by scripts and plugins. - */ -static void -verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert_depth, - const char *subject, const char *common_name -#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK - , const struct x509_track *x509_track -#endif - ) -{ - char envname[64]; - char *serial = NULL; - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - - /* Save X509 fields in environment */ -#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK - if (x509_track) - x509_setenv_track (x509_track, es, cert_depth, peer_cert); - else -#endif - x509_setenv (es, cert_depth, peer_cert); - - /* export subject name string as environmental variable */ - openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_id_%d", cert_depth); - setenv_str (es, envname, subject); - -#if 0 - /* export common name string as environmental variable */ - openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_common_name_%d", cert_depth); - setenv_str (es, envname, common_name); -#endif - - /* export X509 cert SHA1 fingerprint */ - { - unsigned char *sha1_hash = x509_get_sha1_hash(peer_cert, &gc); - - openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_digest_%d", cert_depth); - setenv_str (es, envname, format_hex_ex(sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, 1, - ":", &gc)); - } - - /* export serial number as environmental variable */ - serial = backend_x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc); - openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth); - setenv_str (es, envname, serial); - - /* export serial number in hex as environmental variable */ - serial = backend_x509_get_serial_hex(peer_cert, &gc); - openvpn_snprintf (envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_hex_%d", cert_depth); - setenv_str (es, envname, serial); - - gc_free(&gc); -} - -/* - * call --tls-verify plug-in(s) - */ -static result_t -verify_cert_call_plugin(const struct plugin_list *plugins, struct env_set *es, - int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject) -{ - if (plugin_defined (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY)) - { - int ret; - struct argv argv = argv_new (); - - argv_printf (&argv, "%d %s", cert_depth, subject); - - ret = plugin_call_ssl (plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY, &argv, NULL, es, cert_depth, cert); - - argv_reset (&argv); - - if (ret == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN OK: depth=%d, %s", - cert_depth, subject); - } - else - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN ERROR: depth=%d, %s", - cert_depth, subject); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ - } - } - return SUCCESS; -} - -static const char * -verify_cert_export_cert(openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert, const char *tmp_dir, struct gc_arena *gc) -{ - FILE *peercert_file; - const char *peercert_filename=""; - - if(!tmp_dir) - return NULL; - - /* create tmp file to store peer cert */ - peercert_filename = create_temp_file (tmp_dir, "pcf", gc); - - /* write peer-cert in tmp-file */ - peercert_file = fopen(peercert_filename, "w+"); - if(!peercert_file) - { - msg (M_ERR, "Failed to open temporary file : %s", peercert_filename); - return NULL; - } - - if (SUCCESS != x509_write_pem(peercert_file, peercert)) - msg (M_ERR, "Error writing PEM file containing certificate"); - - fclose(peercert_file); - return peercert_filename; -} - - -/* - * run --tls-verify script - */ -static result_t -verify_cert_call_command(const char *verify_command, struct env_set *es, - int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject, const char *verify_export_cert) -{ - const char *tmp_file = NULL; - int ret; - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); - struct argv argv = argv_new (); - - setenv_str (es, "script_type", "tls-verify"); - - if (verify_export_cert) - { - if ((tmp_file=verify_cert_export_cert(cert, verify_export_cert, &gc))) - { - setenv_str(es, "peer_cert", tmp_file); - } - } - - argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %d %s", verify_command, cert_depth, subject); - - argv_msg_prefix (D_TLS_DEBUG, &argv, "TLS: executing verify command"); - ret = openvpn_run_script (&argv, es, 0, "--tls-verify script"); - - if (verify_export_cert) - { - if (tmp_file) - platform_unlink(tmp_file); - } - - gc_free(&gc); - argv_reset (&argv); - - if (ret) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT OK: depth=%d, %s", - cert_depth, subject); - return SUCCESS; - } - - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT ERROR: depth=%d, %s", - cert_depth, subject); - return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ -} - -/* - * check peer cert against CRL directory - */ -static result_t -verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - result_t ret = FAILURE; - char fn[256]; - int fd = -1; - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); - - char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc); - - if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial)) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: filename overflow"); - goto cleanup; - } - fd = platform_open (fn, O_RDONLY, 0); - if (fd >= 0) - { - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: certificate serial number %s is revoked", serial); - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = SUCCESS; - -cleanup: - - if (fd != -1) - close(fd); - gc_free(&gc); - return ret; -} - -result_t -verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_depth) -{ - result_t ret = FAILURE; - char *subject = NULL; - char common_name[TLS_USERNAME_LEN] = {0}; - const struct tls_options *opt; - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); - - opt = session->opt; - ASSERT (opt); - - session->verified = false; - - /* get the X509 name */ - subject = x509_get_subject(cert, &gc); - if (!subject) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, could not extract X509 " - "subject string from certificate", cert_depth); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* enforce character class restrictions in X509 name */ - string_mod_remap_name (subject, X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); - string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_'); - - /* extract the username (default is CN) */ - if (SUCCESS != backend_x509_get_username (common_name, TLS_USERNAME_LEN, - opt->x509_username_field, cert)) - { - if (!cert_depth) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: could not extract %s from X509 " - "subject string ('%s') -- note that the username length is " - "limited to %d characters", - opt->x509_username_field, - subject, - TLS_USERNAME_LEN); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* enforce character class restrictions in common name */ - string_mod_remap_name (common_name, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); - - /* warn if cert chain is too deep */ - if (cert_depth >= MAX_CERT_DEPTH) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Convoluted certificate chain detected with depth [%d] greater than %d", cert_depth, MAX_CERT_DEPTH); - goto cleanup; /* Reject connection */ - } - - /* verify level 1 cert, i.e. the CA that signed our leaf cert */ - if (cert_depth == 1 && opt->verify_hash) - { - unsigned char *sha1_hash = x509_get_sha1_hash(cert, &gc); - if (memcmp (sha1_hash, opt->verify_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: level-1 certificate hash verification failed"); - goto cleanup; - } - } - - /* save common name in session object */ - if (cert_depth == 0) - set_common_name (session, common_name); - - session->verify_maxlevel = max_int (session->verify_maxlevel, cert_depth); - - /* export certificate values to the environment */ - verify_cert_set_env(opt->es, cert, cert_depth, subject, common_name -#ifdef ENABLE_X509_TRACK - , opt->x509_track -#endif - ); - - /* export current untrusted IP */ - setenv_untrusted (session); - - /* If this is the peer's own certificate, verify it */ - if (cert_depth == 0 && SUCCESS != verify_peer_cert(opt, cert, subject, common_name)) - goto cleanup; - - /* call --tls-verify plug-in(s), if registered */ - if (SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_plugin(opt->plugins, opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject)) - goto cleanup; - - /* run --tls-verify script */ - if (opt->verify_command && SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_command(opt->verify_command, - opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject, opt->verify_export_cert)) - goto cleanup; - - /* check peer cert against CRL */ - if (opt->crl_file) - { - if (opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR) - { - if (SUCCESS != verify_check_crl_dir(opt->crl_file, cert)) - goto cleanup; - } - else - { - if (SUCCESS != x509_verify_crl(opt->crl_file, cert, subject)) - goto cleanup; - } - } - - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: depth=%d, %s", cert_depth, subject); - session->verified = true; - ret = SUCCESS; - -cleanup: - - if (ret != SUCCESS) - { - tls_clear_error(); /* always? */ - session->verified = false; /* double sure? */ - } - gc_free(&gc); - - return ret; -} - -/* *************************************************************************** - * Functions for the management of deferred authentication when using - * user/password authentication. - *************************************************************************** */ - -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH -/* key_state_test_auth_control_file return values, - NOTE: acf_merge indexing depends on these values */ -#define ACF_UNDEFINED 0 -#define ACF_SUCCEEDED 1 -#define ACF_DISABLED 2 -#define ACF_FAILED 3 -#endif - -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH -void -man_def_auth_set_client_reason (struct tls_multi *multi, const char *client_reason) -{ - if (multi->client_reason) - { - free (multi->client_reason); - multi->client_reason = NULL; - } - if (client_reason && strlen (client_reason)) - /* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ - multi->client_reason = string_alloc (client_reason, NULL); -} - -static inline unsigned int -man_def_auth_test (const struct key_state *ks) -{ - if (management_enable_def_auth (management)) - return ks->mda_status; - else - return ACF_DISABLED; -} -#endif - -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - -/* - * auth_control_file functions - */ - -void -key_state_rm_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks) -{ - if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) - { - platform_unlink (ks->auth_control_file); - free (ks->auth_control_file); - ks->auth_control_file = NULL; - } -} - -static void -key_state_gen_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks, const struct tls_options *opt) -{ - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - const char *acf; - - key_state_rm_auth_control_file (ks); - acf = create_temp_file (opt->tmp_dir, "acf", &gc); - if (acf) { - ks->auth_control_file = string_alloc (acf, NULL); - setenv_str (opt->es, "auth_control_file", ks->auth_control_file); - } /* FIXME: Should have better error handling? */ - - gc_free (&gc); -} - -static unsigned int -key_state_test_auth_control_file (struct key_state *ks) -{ - if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) - { - unsigned int ret = ks->auth_control_status; - if (ret == ACF_UNDEFINED) - { - FILE *fp = fopen (ks->auth_control_file, "r"); - if (fp) - { - const int c = fgetc (fp); - if (c == '1') - ret = ACF_SUCCEEDED; - else if (c == '0') - ret = ACF_FAILED; - fclose (fp); - ks->auth_control_status = ret; - } - } - return ret; - } - return ACF_DISABLED; -} - -#endif - -/* - * Return current session authentication state. Return - * value is TLS_AUTHENTICATION_x. - */ - -int -tls_authentication_status (struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency) -{ - bool deferred = false; - bool success = false; - bool active = false; - -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH - static const unsigned char acf_merge[] = - { - ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ - ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ - ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_FAILED */ - ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ - ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ - ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_FAILED */ - ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ - ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ - ACF_DISABLED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_FAILED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ - ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ - ACF_FAILED /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_FAILED */ - }; -#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ - - if (multi) - { - int i; - -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH - if (latency && multi->tas_last && multi->tas_last + latency >= now) - return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED; - multi->tas_last = now; -#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ - - for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) - { - struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; - if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED (multi, ks)) - { - active = true; - if (ks->authenticated) - { -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH - unsigned int s1 = ACF_DISABLED; - unsigned int s2 = ACF_DISABLED; -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - s1 = key_state_test_auth_control_file (ks); -#endif /* PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH */ -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH - s2 = man_def_auth_test (ks); -#endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ - ASSERT (s1 < 4 && s2 < 4); - switch (acf_merge[(s1<<2) + s2]) - { - case ACF_SUCCEEDED: - case ACF_DISABLED: - success = true; - ks->auth_deferred = false; - break; - case ACF_UNDEFINED: - if (now < ks->auth_deferred_expire) - deferred = true; - break; - case ACF_FAILED: - ks->authenticated = false; - break; - default: - ASSERT (0); - } -#else /* !ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ - success = true; -#endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ - } - } - } - } - -#if 0 - dmsg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TAS: a=%d s=%d d=%d", active, success, deferred); -#endif - - if (success) - return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED; - else if (!active || deferred) - return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED; - else - return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; -} - -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH -/* - * For deferred auth, this is where the management interface calls (on server) - * to indicate auth failure/success. - */ -bool -tls_authenticate_key (struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason) -{ - bool ret = false; - if (multi) - { - int i; - man_def_auth_set_client_reason (multi, client_reason); - for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) - { - struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; - if (ks->mda_key_id == mda_key_id) - { - ks->mda_status = auth ? ACF_SUCCEEDED : ACF_FAILED; - ret = true; - } - } - } - return ret; -} -#endif - - -/* **************************************************************************** - * Functions to verify username and password - * - * Authenticate a client using username/password. - * Runs on server. - * - * If you want to add new authentication methods, - * this is the place to start. - *************************************************************************** */ - -/* - * Verify the user name and password using a script - */ -static bool -verify_user_pass_script (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up) -{ - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - struct argv argv = argv_new (); - const char *tmp_file = ""; - bool ret = false; - - /* Is username defined? */ - if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) - { - /* Set environmental variables prior to calling script */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "script_type", "user-pass-verify"); - - if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) - { - struct status_output *so; - - tmp_file = create_temp_file (session->opt->tmp_dir, "up", &gc); - if( tmp_file ) { - so = status_open (tmp_file, 0, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); - status_printf (so, "%s", up->username); - status_printf (so, "%s", up->password); - if (!status_close (so)) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not write username/password to file: %s", - tmp_file); - goto done; - } - } else { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not create write " - "username/password to temp file"); - } - } - else - { - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); - } - - /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); - - /* setenv client real IP address */ - setenv_untrusted (session); - - /* format command line */ - argv_printf (&argv, "%sc %s", session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script, tmp_file); - - /* call command */ - ret = openvpn_run_script (&argv, session->opt->es, 0, - "--auth-user-pass-verify"); - - if (!session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) - setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); - } - else - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: peer provided a blank username"); - } - - done: - if (tmp_file && strlen (tmp_file) > 0) - platform_unlink (tmp_file); - - argv_reset (&argv); - gc_free (&gc); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Verify the username and password using a plugin - */ -static int -verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) -{ - int retval = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ -#endif - - /* Is username defined? */ - if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) - { - /* set username/password in private env space */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); - - /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); - - /* setenv client real IP address */ - setenv_untrusted (session); - -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - /* generate filename for deferred auth control file */ - key_state_gen_auth_control_file (ks, session->opt); -#endif - - /* call command */ - retval = plugin_call (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY, NULL, NULL, session->opt->es); - -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - /* purge auth control filename (and file itself) for non-deferred returns */ - if (retval != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) - key_state_rm_auth_control_file (ks); -#endif - - setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); - if (raw_username) - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); - } - else - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error (verify_user_pass_plugin): peer provided a blank username"); - } - - return retval; -} - - -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH -/* - * MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH internal ssl_verify.c status codes - */ -#define KMDA_ERROR 0 -#define KMDA_SUCCESS 1 -#define KMDA_UNDEF 2 -#define KMDA_DEF 3 - -static int -verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) -{ - int retval = KMDA_ERROR; - struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ - - /* Is username defined? */ - if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) - { - /* set username/password in private env space */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); - - /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); - - /* setenv client real IP address */ - setenv_untrusted (session); - - if (management) - management_notify_client_needing_auth (management, ks->mda_key_id, session->opt->mda_context, session->opt->es); - - setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); - if (raw_username) - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); - - retval = KMDA_SUCCESS; - } - else - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error (verify_user_pass_management): peer provided a blank username"); - } - - return retval; -} -#endif - -/* - * Main username/password verification entry point - */ -void -verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, - struct tls_session *session) -{ - int s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; - bool s2 = true; - struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ - - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - char *raw_username = NULL; - -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH - int man_def_auth = KMDA_UNDEF; - - if (management_enable_def_auth (management)) - man_def_auth = KMDA_DEF; -#endif - - /* - * Preserve the raw username before string_mod remapping, for plugins - * and management clients when in --compat-names mode - */ - if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES)) - { - ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (raw_username, char, USER_PASS_LEN, &gc); - strcpy (raw_username, up->username); - string_mod (raw_username, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); - } - - /* enforce character class restrictions in username/password */ - string_mod_remap_name (up->username, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); - string_mod (up->password, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); - - /* call plugin(s) and/or script */ -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH - if (man_def_auth == KMDA_DEF) - man_def_auth = verify_user_pass_management (session, up, raw_username); -#endif - if (plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY)) - s1 = verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up, raw_username); - if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) - s2 = verify_user_pass_script (session, up); - - /* check sizing of username if it will become our common name */ - if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) && strlen (up->username) >= TLS_USERNAME_LEN) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --username-as-common name specified and username is longer than the maximum permitted Common Name length of %d characters", TLS_USERNAME_LEN); - s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; - } - - /* auth succeeded? */ - if ((s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - || s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED -#endif - ) && s2 -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH - && man_def_auth != KMDA_ERROR -#endif - && tls_lock_username (multi, up->username)) - { - ks->authenticated = true; -#ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH - if (s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) - ks->auth_deferred = true; -#endif -#ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH - if (man_def_auth != KMDA_UNDEF) - ks->auth_deferred = true; -#endif - if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME)) - set_common_name (session, up->username); -#ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", - ks->auth_deferred ? "deferred" : "succeeded", - up->username, - (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : ""); -#else - msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", - "succeeded", - up->username, - (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : ""); -#endif - } - else - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: Auth Username/Password verification failed for peer"); - } - - gc_free (&gc); -} - -void -verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) -{ - struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ - - /* While it shouldn't really happen, don't allow the common name to be NULL */ - if (!session->common_name) - set_common_name (session, ""); - - /* Don't allow the CN to change once it's been locked */ - if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cn) - { - const char *cn = session->common_name; - if (cn && strcmp (cn, multi->locked_cn)) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", - multi->locked_cn, - cn); - - /* change the common name back to its original value and disable the tunnel */ - set_common_name (session, multi->locked_cn); - tls_deauthenticate (multi); - } - } - - /* Don't allow the cert hashes to change once they have been locked */ - if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cert_hash_set) - { - const struct cert_hash_set *chs = session->cert_hash_set; - if (chs && !cert_hash_compare (chs, multi->locked_cert_hash_set)) - { - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN=%s client-provided SSL certs unexpectedly changed during mid-session reauth", - session->common_name); - - /* disable the tunnel */ - tls_deauthenticate (multi); - } - } - - /* verify --client-config-dir based authentication */ - if (ks->authenticated && session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive) - { - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); - - const char *cn = session->common_name; - const char *path = gen_path (session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive, cn, &gc); - if (!cn || !strcmp (cn, CCD_DEFAULT) || !test_file (path)) - { - ks->authenticated = false; - msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --client-config-dir authentication failed for common name '%s' file='%s'", - session->common_name, - path ? path : "UNDEF"); - } - - gc_free (&gc); - } -} -#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */ |