1 files changed, 344 insertions, 135 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/app/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 793ea43e..2ed2e076 100644
--- a/app/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/app/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
@@ -158,68 +159,75 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 			unsigned char *out, int olen)
 	{
 	int chunk;
-	unsigned int j;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
-	HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+	size_t j;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
 	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned int A1_len;
+	size_t A1_len;
 	int ret = 0;
 	
 	chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
 	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
 
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-	if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+	if (!mac_key)
 		goto err;
-	if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+		goto err;
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 		goto err;
 
 	for (;;)
 		{
-		if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+		/* Reinit mac contexts */
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
 			goto err;
 
 		if (olen > chunk)
 			{
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
 				goto err;
 			out+=j;
 			olen-=j;
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+			/* calc the next A1 value */
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
 				goto err;
 			}
 		else	/* last one */
 			{
-			if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
 				goto err;
 			memcpy(out,A1,olen);
 			break;
@@ -227,8 +235,9 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 		}
 	ret = 1;
 err:
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
 	return ret;
 	}
@@ -256,6 +265,8 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
 		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
 	}	
 	len=slen/count;
+	if (count == 1)
+		slen = 0;
 	S1=sec;
 	memset(out1,0,olen);
 	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
 	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
 	{
 	int ret;
-	ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
 		 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 		 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -350,7 +361,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -358,7 +369,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 		{
 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-			else
+		else
 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
 
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
@@ -403,15 +414,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
 			else
 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
 		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+			{
+			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+			if (!mac_ctx)
+				goto err;
+			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+			}
+		else
+			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 		if (s->compress != NULL)
 			{
@@ -445,7 +461,11 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
 	               cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
 	/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-	k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+	/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+	else
+		k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
 	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
 		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
 		{
@@ -474,10 +494,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 		}
 
 	memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-			mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-	EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+
+	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+		{
+		mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+				mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+		}
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -487,7 +511,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
 		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
 		 */
-		if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+		if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 				exp_label,exp_label_len,
 				s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 				s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -498,7 +522,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 
 		if (k > 0)
 			{
-			if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+			if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 					TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
 					s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 					s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -524,7 +548,19 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		{
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+		}
+	else	
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+				*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -606,21 +642,22 @@ printf("\nkey block\n");
 { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
 
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+	if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION &&
+	    (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
 		{
 		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
 		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 		 */
-		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+		s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
 
 		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
 			{
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 			
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
 #endif
 			}
 		}
@@ -635,19 +672,28 @@ err:
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -655,13 +701,34 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
 			enc=NULL;
 		else
+			{
+			int ivlen;
 			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+			else
+				ivlen = 0;
+			if (ivlen > 1)
+				{
+				if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+					/* we can't write into the input stream:
+					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+					 */
+					fprintf(stderr,
+						"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+						__FILE__, __LINE__);
+				else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+					return -1;
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	else
 		{
 		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
 			{
-			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
 			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
@@ -676,18 +743,54 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
 		{
 		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
 		rec->input=rec->data;
+		ret = 1;
 		}
 	else
 		{
 		l=rec->length;
 		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
-		if ((bs != 1) && send)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+			{
+			unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				{
+				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+				s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+				memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+				memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+				for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
+					{
+					++seq[i];
+					if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
+					}
+				}
+
+			buf[8]=rec->type;
+			buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+			buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+			buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+			buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+			pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+			if (send)
+				{
+				l+=pad;
+				rec->length+=pad;
+				}
+			}
+		else if ((bs != 1) && send)
 			{
 			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
 
@@ -708,13 +811,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long ui;
+		unsigned long ui;
 		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+			ds->cipher->iv_len);
 		printf("\t\tIV: ");
 		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
 		printf("\n");
@@ -727,68 +830,41 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			}
 		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+						?(i<0)
+						:(i==0))
+			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+			{
+			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+		unsigned long i;
+		printf("\trec->data=");
 		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+		ret = 1;
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-			 * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-			 * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-			 * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-			 * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-			 * [steve]
-			 */
-			if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				&& !s->expand)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-			}
+			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+		if (pad && !send)
+			rec->length -= pad;
 		}
-	return(1);
+	return ret;
 	}
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 	{
 	unsigned int ret;
@@ -841,26 +917,27 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
 
 	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
 		{
-		if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
 			{
 			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-			if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
 				{
 				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
 				err = 1;
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
-				if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
+					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
 					err = 1;
-				q+=i;
+				q+=hashsize;
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		
-	if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 			str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
 			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
 			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
@@ -878,10 +955,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	unsigned char *seq;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size;
+	size_t md_size, orig_len;
 	int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char buf[5]; 
+	unsigned char header[13];
 	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
 	int t;
 
@@ -902,12 +979,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
 	md_size=t;
 
-	buf[0]=rec->type;
-	buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-	buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
 	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
 	if (stream_mac) 
 		{
@@ -915,7 +986,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 		}
 		else
 		{
-			EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+			if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
+				return -1;
 			mac_ctx = &hmac;
 		}
 
@@ -926,17 +998,55 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
 		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 		}
 	else
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+	header[8]=rec->type;
+	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			mac_ctx,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+			tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+					mac_ctx, rec->input,
+					rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+		}
 		
-	if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+	if (!stream_mac)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
@@ -970,6 +1080,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 	const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
 	int col = 0, sol = 0;
 
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -986,7 +1097,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 		}
 #endif
 
-	tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
 		s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
 		co, col,
@@ -994,6 +1105,16 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 		so, sol,
 		p,len,
 		s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
@@ -1001,6 +1122,95 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
 	}
 
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buff;
+	unsigned char *val = NULL;
+	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+	int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+	/* construct PRF arguments
+	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+	 * does not create a prohibited label.
+	 */
+	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+		}
+
+	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+	currentvalpos = 0;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+	currentvalpos += llen;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+			{
+			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* disallow prohibited labels
+	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+		      val, vallen,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+		      out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+	goto ret;
+err1:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+	rv = 0;
+	goto ret;
+err2:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	rv = 0;
+ret:
+	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+	return(rv);
+	}
+
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	{
 	switch (code)
@@ -1042,4 +1252,3 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	default:			return(-1);
 		}
 	}
-