diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'app/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | app/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 3153 |
1 files changed, 3153 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/app/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42bcd629 --- /dev/null +++ b/app/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3153 @@ +/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) + { + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) + return(SSLv3_client_method()); + else + return(NULL); + } + +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl3_connect, + ssl3_get_client_method) + +int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) + { + BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; + unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; + int ret= -1; + int new_state,state,skip=0; + + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->ctx->info_callback; + + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); +#if 0 /* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site + * (only one site so far) closes the socket. + * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets + * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet, + * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though. + */ + if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) + { + /* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */ + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED; + } +#endif + + for (;;) + { + state=s->state; + + switch(s->state) + { + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: + s->new_session=1; + s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; + /* break */ + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_CONNECT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: + + s->server=0; + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); + + if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ + s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) + { + if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + s->init_buf=buf; + buf=NULL; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } + + /* setup buffing BIO */ + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } + + /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: + + s->shutdown=0; + ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; + s->init_num=0; + + /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ + if (s->bbio != s->wbio) + s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: + ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (ret == 2) + { + s->hit = 1; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + } +#endif + /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ + /* or PSK */ + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) + { + ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else + } + else + skip=1; + + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; + s->init_num=0; + + /* at this point we check that we have the + * required stuff from the server */ + if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: + ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: + ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert + * sent back */ + /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain + * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with + * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. + * We need to skip the certificate verify + * message when client's ECDH public key is sent + * inside the client certificate. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; + } + else + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; + } + + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: + ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->next_proto_negotiated) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; +#endif + + s->init_num=0; + + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + s->session->compress_meth=0; +#else + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + s->session->compress_meth=0; + else + s->session->compress_meth= + s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; +#endif + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + + break; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, + s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, + s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; + + /* clear flags */ + s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; + if (s->hit) + { + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) + { + s->state=SSL_ST_OK; + s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; + s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; + } + } + else + { + if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 + && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */ + ) + { + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE; + s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; + s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; + } + else + { + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE; + } + } + else + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else +#endif + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + } + } + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: + + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + else + s->state=SSL_ST_OK; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) + { + ret= -1; + goto end; + } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else +#endif + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + + /* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if + * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set. + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)) + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + ret = 1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + + case SSL_ST_OK: + /* clean a few things up */ + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if (s->init_buf != NULL) + { + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf=NULL; + } + + /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, + * remove the buffering now */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ + + s->init_num=0; + s->new_session=0; + + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + ret=1; + /* s->server=0; */ + s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); + + goto end; + /* break; */ + + default: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret= -1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + } + + /* did we do anything */ + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) + { + if (s->debug) + { + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) + goto end; + } + + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) + { + new_state=s->state; + s->state=state; + cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); + s->state=new_state; + } + } + skip=0; + } +end: + s->in_handshake--; + if (buf != NULL) + BUF_MEM_free(buf); + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); + return(ret); + } + + +int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p,*d; + int i; + unsigned long Time,l; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + int j; + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + + buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) + { + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + if ((sess == NULL) || + (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + !sess->session_id_length || +#else + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || +#endif + (sess->not_resumable)) + { + if (!s->session_creation_enabled) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) + goto err; + } + /* else use the pre-loaded session */ + + p=s->s3->client_random; + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ + l2n(Time,p); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) + goto err; + + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d=p= &(buf[4]); + + *(p++)=s->version>>8; + *(p++)=s->version&0xff; + s->client_version=s->version; + + /* Random stuff */ + memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* Session ID */ + if (s->new_session) + i=0; + else + i=s->session->session_id_length; + *(p++)=i; + if (i != 0) + { + if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); + p+=i; + } + + /* Ciphers supported */ + i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0); + if (i == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + goto err; + } + s2n(i,p); + p+=i; + + /* COMPRESSION */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + *(p++)=1; +#else + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + || !s->ctx->comp_methods) + j=0; + else + j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + *(p++)=1+j; + for (i=0; i<j; i++) + { + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i); + *(p++)=comp->id; + } +#endif + *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#endif + + l=(p-d); + d=buf; + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; + l2n3(l,d); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=p-buf; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +err: + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) + { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + unsigned char *p,*d; + int i,al,ok; + unsigned int j; + long n; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, + -1, + 20000, /* ?? */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) + { + if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return 1; + } + else /* already sent a cookie */ + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + } + + if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1]; + al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + p+=2; + + /* load the server hello data */ + /* load the server random */ + memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* get the session-id */ + j= *(p++); + + if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) + { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &s->session->master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) + { + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j); + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + + if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0) + { + if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length)) + { + /* actually a client application bug */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto f_err; + } + s->hit=1; + } + else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ + { + /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new + * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ + s->hit=0; + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) + { + if (!s->session_creation_enabled) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + s->session->session_id_length=j; + memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */ + } + p+=j; + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); + if (c == NULL) + { + /* unknown cipher */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); + + sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c); + if (i < 0) + { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that + cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ + if (s->session->cipher) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) + { +/* Workaround is now obsolete */ +#if 0 + if (!(s->options & + SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) +#endif + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + goto f_err; + + /* lets get the compression algorithm */ + /* COMPRESSION */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (*(p++) != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } +#else + j= *(p++); + if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + if (j == 0) + comp=NULL; + else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); + goto f_err; + } + else + comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j); + + if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + else + { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) + { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + + if (p != (d+n)) + { + /* wrong packet length */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + return(1); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +err: + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) + { + int al,i,ok,ret= -1; + unsigned long n,nc,llen,l; + X509 *x=NULL; + const unsigned char *q,*p; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; + SESS_CERT *sc; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + n2l3(p,llen); + if (llen+3 != n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) + { + n2l3(p,l); + if ((l+nc+3) > llen) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + q=p; + x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l); + if (x == NULL) + { + al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + if (q != (p+l)) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x=NULL; + nc+=l+3; + p=q; + } + + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); + if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + ) + { + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ + + sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (sc == NULL) goto err; + + if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); + s->session->sess_cert=sc; + + sc->cert_chain=sk; + /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's + * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ + x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); + sk=NULL; + /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ + + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); + + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) + ? 0 : 1; + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x); + printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); + printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) + { + x=NULL; + al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); + if (need_cert && i < 0) + { + x=NULL; + al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (need_cert) + { + sc->peer_cert_type=i; + CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + /* Why would the following ever happen? + * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ + if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); + sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; + sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); + CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + s->session->peer=x; + } + else + { + sc->peer_cert_type=i; + sc->peer_key= NULL; + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); + s->session->peer=NULL; + } + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + + x=NULL; + ret=1; + + if (0) + { +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + } +err: + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(x); + sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); + return(ret); + } + +int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; +#endif + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + unsigned char *param,*p; + int al,i,j,param_len,ok; + long n,alg_k,alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsa=NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh=NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + int curve_nid = 0; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; +#endif + + /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() + * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be + omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set + session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems + later.*/ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) + { + s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) + OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + } +#endif + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + + param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) + { + RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) + { + DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) + { + EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; + } +#endif + } + else + { + s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); + } + + param_len=0; + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) + { + char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; + + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + n2s(p,i); + param_len=i+2; + /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used + * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the + * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as + * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */ + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL + * characters, the hint is truncated from the first + * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a + * NULL-terminated string. */ + memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i); + memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + p+=i; + n-=param_len; + } + else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + { + if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + n2s(p,i); + param_len=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p+=i; + + n2s(p,i); + param_len+=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p+=i; + n-=param_len; + + /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; + rsa=NULL; + } +#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (0) + ; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) + { + if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + n2s(p,i); + param_len=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p+=i; + + n2s(p,i); + param_len+=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p+=i; + + n2s(p,i); + param_len+=i+2; + if (param_len > n) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p+=i; + n-=param_len; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); +#else + if (0) + ; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); +#endif + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; + dh=NULL; + } + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) + { + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) + { + EC_GROUP *ngroup; + const EC_GROUP *group; + + if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the + * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. + * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in + * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. + */ + + /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves + * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. + */ + param_len=3; + if ((param_len > n) || + (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || + ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) + { + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); + if (ngroup == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) + { + al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + p+=3; + + /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ + if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || + ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ + p+=1; + param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); + if ((param_len > n) || + (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, + p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + goto f_err; + } + + n-=param_len; + p+=encoded_pt_len; + + /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention + * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server + * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. + */ + if (0) ; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); +#endif + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; + ecdh=NULL; + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + } + else if (alg_k) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ + + + /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ + + /* if it was signed, check the signature */ + if (pkey != NULL) + { + n2s(p,i); + n-=2; + j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + + if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) + { + /* wrong packet length */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + { + int num; + + j=0; + q=md_buf; + for (num=2; num > 0; num--) + { + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) + ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i); + q+=i; + j+=i; + } + i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, + pkey->pkey.rsa); + if (i < 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + goto f_err; + } + if (i == 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) + { + /* lets do DSS */ + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + { + /* let's do ECDSA */ + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) + { + /* bad signature */ + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + else + { + if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) + /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */ + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* still data left over */ + if (n != 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return(1); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +err: + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (dh != NULL) + DH_free(dh); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + if (ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(ecdh); +#endif + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) + { + int ok,ret=0; + unsigned long n,nc,l; + unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i; + X509_NAME *xn=NULL; + const unsigned char *p,*q; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto err; + } + + /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + } + + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the certificate types */ + ctype_num= *(p++); + if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) + ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER; + for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++) + s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i]; + p+=ctype_num; + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + n2s(p,llen); +#if 0 +{ +FILE *out; +out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w"); +fwrite(p,1,llen,out); +fclose(out); +} +#endif + + if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) + { + n2s(p,l); + if ((l+nc+2) > llen) + { + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) + goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + q=p; + + if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL) + { + /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) + goto cont; + else + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if (q != (p+l)) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + p+=l; + nc+=l+2; + } + + if (0) + { +cont: + ERR_clear_error(); + } + + /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num; + if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; + ca_sk=NULL; + + ret=1; +err: + if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); + return(ret); + } + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) + { + return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) + { + int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *d; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, + -1, + 16384, + &ok); + + if (!ok) + return((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; + return(1); + } + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + if (n < 6) + { + /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); + n2s(p, ticklen); + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) + { + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->session->tlsext_tick) + { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. + * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server + * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal + * client session ID matching to work and we know much + * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. + * + * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the + * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine + * session resumption. + * + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with + * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set + * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the + * ticket. + */ + EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 + EVP_sha256(), NULL); +#else + EVP_sha1(), NULL); +#endif + ret=1; + return(ret); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); +err: + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) + { + int ok, al; + unsigned long resplen,n; + const unsigned char *p; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, + SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, + 16384, + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + if (n < 4) + { + /* need at least status type + length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + n2l3(p, resplen); + if (resplen + 4 != n) + { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; + if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) + { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + goto f_err; + } + if (ret < 0) + { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return 1; +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + return(-1); + } +#endif + +int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) + { + int ok,ret=0; + long n; + + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, + SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, + 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ + &ok); + + if (!ok) return((int)n); + if (n > 0) + { + /* should contain no data */ + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return -1; + } + ret=1; + return(ret); + } + + +int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p,*d; + int n; + unsigned long alg_k; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *q; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + KSSL_ERR kssl_err; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; + const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; + BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) + { + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p= &(d[4]); + + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* Fool emacs indentation */ + if (0) {} +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + { + RSA *rsa; + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) + rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; + else + { + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); + if ((pkey == NULL) || + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || + (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; + tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) + goto err; + + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; + + q=p; + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + p+=2; + n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, + tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70; +#endif + if (n <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + { + s2n(n,q); + n+=2; + } + + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, + tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) + { + krb5_error_code krb5rc; + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ + krb5_data *enc_ticket; + krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", + alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + authp = NULL; +#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH + if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; +#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ + + krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, + &kssl_err); + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); + if (enc == NULL) + goto err; +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { + printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); + if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) + printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); + } +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (krb5rc) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ + ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: + ** + ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) + ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; + ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); + ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) + ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); + ** + ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper + ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) + ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced + ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. + ** Example: + ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms + ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with + ** optional authenticator omitted. + */ + + /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ + s2n(enc_ticket->length,p); + memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); + p+= enc_ticket->length; + n = enc_ticket->length + 2; + + /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ + if (authp && authp->length) + { + s2n(authp->length,p); + memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); + p+= authp->length; + n+= authp->length + 2; + + free(authp->data); + authp->data = NULL; + authp->length = 0; + } + else + { + s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ + n+=2; + } + + tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; + tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) + goto err; + + /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. + ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); + ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, + ** kssl_ctx->length); + ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); + */ + + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL, + kssl_ctx->key,iv); + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf, + sizeof tmp_buf); + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl); + outl += padl; + if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); + + /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ + s2n(outl,p); + memcpy(p, epms, outl); + p+=outl; + n+=outl + 2; + + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, + tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); + OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + { + DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; + + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) + dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; + else + { + /* we get them from the cert */ + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + + /* generate a new random key */ + if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + + /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but + * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ + + n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); + + if (n <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + + /* generate master key from the result */ + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key,p,n); + /* clean up */ + memset(p,0,n); + + /* send off the data */ + n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); + s2n(n,p); + BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); + n+=2; + + DH_free(dh_clnt); + + /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) + { + const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; + EC_KEY *tkey; + int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; + int field_size = 0; + + /* Did we send out the client's + * ECDH share for use in premaster + * computation as part of client certificate? + * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + */ + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) + { + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication using ECDH certificates. + * To add such support, one needs to add + * code that checks for appropriate + * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + * For example, the cert have an ECC + * key on the same curve as the server's + * and the key should be authorized for + * key agreement. + * + * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect + * to skip sending the certificate verify + * message. + * + * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && + * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == + * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) + * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; + */ + } + + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) + { + tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; + } + else + { + /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ + srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); + if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || + (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || + (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; + } + + srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); + + if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) + { + /* Reuse key info from our certificate + * We only need our private key to perform + * the ECDH computation. + */ + const BIGNUM *priv_key; + tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + if (priv_key == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + else + { + /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ + if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but + * make sure to clear it out afterwards + */ + + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); + if (field_size <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); + if (n <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* generate master key from the result */ + s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ + -> generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, + p, n); + + memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ + + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) + { + /* Send empty client key exch message */ + n = 0; + } + else + { + /* First check the size of encoding and + * allocate memory accordingly. + */ + encoded_pt_len = + EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * + sizeof(unsigned char)); + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || + (bn_ctx == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Encode the public key */ + n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); + + *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ + /* Encoded point will be copied here */ + p += 1; + /* copy the point */ + memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); + /* increment n to account for length field */ + n += 1; + } + + /* Free allocated memory */ + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ + else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) + { + /* GOST key exchange message creation */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + X509 *peer_cert; + size_t msglen; + unsigned int md_len; + int keytype; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; + EVP_PKEY *pub_key; + + /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ + peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509; + if (!peer_cert) + peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509; + if (!peer_cert) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); + goto err; + } + + pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL); + /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key + + * parameters match those of server certificate, use + * certificate key for key exchange + */ + + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + + EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + /* Generate session key */ + RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32); + /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { + /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key + * would be used + */ + ERR_clear_error(); + } + } + /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific + * context data */ + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, + 8,shared_ukm)<0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ + /*Encapsulate it into sequence */ + *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + msglen=255; + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + if (msglen >= 0x80) + { + *(p++)=0x81; + *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; + n=msglen+3; + } + else + { + *(p++)= msglen & 0xff; + n=msglen+2; + } + memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + { + /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + s->session->master_key_length= + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); + EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); + + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) + { + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN]; + unsigned char *t = NULL; + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; + int psk_err = 1; + + n = 0; + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + goto err; + } + + psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, + identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN, + psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } + else if (psk_len == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + goto psk_err; + } + + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ + pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; + t = psk_or_pre_ms; + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); + s2n(psk_len, t); + memset(t, 0, psk_len); + t+=psk_len; + s2n(psk_len, t); + + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && + s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, + psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); + n = strlen(identity); + s2n(n, p); + memcpy(p, identity, n); + n+=2; + psk_err = 0; + psk_err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_err != 0) + { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + else + { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + l2n3(n,d); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num=n+4; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +err: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); +#endif + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p,*d; + unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned u=0; +#endif + unsigned long n; + int j; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) + { + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p= &(d[4]); + pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey; +/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); + EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0) + { + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_sha1, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); + } + else + { + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + { + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_md5, + &(data[0])); + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(u,p); + n=u+2; + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) + { + if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j,p); + n=j+2; + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + { + if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j,p); + n=j+2; + } + else +#endif + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) + { + unsigned char signbuf[64]; + int i; + size_t sigsize=64; + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_id_GostR3411_94, + data); + if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) { + p[2+j]=signbuf[i]; + } + s2n(j,p); + n=j+2; + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + l2n3(n,d); + + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; + s->init_num=(int)n+4; + s->init_off=0; + } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +err: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return(-1); + } + +int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) + { + X509 *x509=NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + int i; + unsigned long l; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) + { + if ((s->cert == NULL) || + (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) || + (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)) + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; + } + + /* We need to get a client cert */ + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) + { + /* If we get an error, we need to + * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); + * We then get retied later */ + i=0; + i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); + if (i < 0) + { + s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return(-1); + } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; + if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || + !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) + i=0; + } + else if (i == 1) + { + i=0; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); + } + + if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); + if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (i == 0) + { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return(1); + } + else + { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; + } + } + + /* Ok, we have a cert */ + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; + } + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) + { + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; + l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509); + s->init_num=(int)l; + s->init_off=0; + } + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) + +int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) + { + int i,idx; + long alg_k,alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + SESS_CERT *sc; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsa; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh; +#endif + + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + /* we don't have a certificate */ + if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) + return(1); + + sc=s->session->sess_cert; + if (sc == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; +#endif + + /* This is the passed certificate */ + + idx=sc->peer_cert_type; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) + { + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0) + { /* check failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); + goto f_err; + } + else + { + return 1; + } + } +#endif + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); + i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + + /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ + if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && + !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && + !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif +#endif + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP)) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + { + if (rsa == NULL + || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) + { + if (dh == NULL + || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } + else +#endif + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return(1); +f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); +err: + return(0); + } + +/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a + * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of + * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) + { + unsigned int len, padding_len; + unsigned char *d; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) + { + len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + d[4] = len; + memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); + d[5 + len] = padding_len; + memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; + s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); + } +# endif + +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) + { + int ok; + long n; + /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) + return 1; + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate + * message, so permit appropriate message length */ + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, + s->max_cert_list, + &ok); + if (!ok) return((int)n); + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) + return 2; + + return 1; + } +#endif + +int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) + { + int i = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) + { + i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, + SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), + px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i != 0) + return i; + } +#endif + if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) + i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); + return i; + } |