Initial import

1 files changed, 867 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..508e3902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+/* ssl/s3_both.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+	{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+	                     s->init_num);
+	if (ret < 0) return(-1);
+	if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+		 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+		ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
+	
+	if (ret == s->init_num)
+		{
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		return(1);
+		}
+	s->init_off+=ret;
+	s->init_num-=ret;
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	if (s->state == a)
+		{
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[4]);
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+		p+=i;
+		l=i;
+
+                /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+                   renegotiation checks */
+                if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+                        {
+                         OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                         memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
+                             s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+                         s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
+                            s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+                        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+                        }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
+		 * I do this.
+		 */
+		l&=0xffff;
+#endif
+
+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
+		l2n3(l,d);
+		s->init_num=(int)l+4;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		s->state=b;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+	{
+	const char *sender;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+		{
+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+		}
+
+	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+	}
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+	{
+	int al,i,ok;
+	long n;
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
+	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
+	 */ 
+#endif
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		a,
+		b,
+		SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+		64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+	/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+	i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+	if (i != n)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+        /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+           renegotiation checks */
+        if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+                {
+                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
+                    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+                s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+                memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
+                    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+                s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+                }
+
+	return(1);
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
+ */
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+	{ 
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == a)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
+		s->init_num=1;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		s->state=b;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+	}
+
+static int ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int n;
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+	l2n3(n,p);
+	i2d_X509(x,&p);
+	*l+=n+3;
+
+	return(0);
+	}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int i;
+	unsigned long l=7;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	int no_chain;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
+
+	cert_chain = SSL_get_certificate_chain(s, x);
+
+	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs || cert_chain)
+		no_chain = 1;
+	else
+		no_chain = 0;
+
+	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+	buf=s->init_buf;
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	if (x != NULL)
+		{
+		if (no_chain)
+			{
+			if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+				return(0);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+			if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+			/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+			ERR_clear_error();
+			for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+				{
+				x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+				if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+					{
+					X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+			}
+		}
+	/* Thawte special :-) */
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
+		{
+		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
+		if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+			return(0);
+		}
+
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(cert_chain); i++)
+		if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, sk_X509_value(cert_chain,i)))
+			return(0);
+
+	l-=7;
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+	l2n3(l,p);
+	l+=3;
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+	*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
+	l2n3(l,p);
+	l+=4;
+	return(l);
+	}
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
+ * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+ */
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned long l;
+	long n;
+	int i,al;
+
+	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
+		{
+		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
+		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		*ok=1;
+		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+		return s->init_num;
+		}
+
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+	if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
+		{
+		int skip_message;
+
+		do
+			{
+			while (s->init_num < 4)
+				{
+				i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+					&p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
+				if (i <= 0)
+					{
+					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+					*ok = 0;
+					return i;
+					}
+				s->init_num+=i;
+				}
+			
+			skip_message = 0;
+			if (!s->server)
+				if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+					/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+					 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+					 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+					 * 'Finished' MAC. */
+					if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
+						{
+						s->init_num = 0;
+						skip_message = 1;
+
+						if (s->msg_callback)
+							s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+						}
+			}
+		while (skip_message);
+
+		/* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+		if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+					(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
+					(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
+			{
+			/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
+			 * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
+			 * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
+			 * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
+			 * we have not completed the handshake. */
+			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+			}
+
+		s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
+
+		n2l3(p,l);
+		if (l > (unsigned long)max)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
+		s->state=stn;
+
+		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+		s->init_num = 0;
+		}
+
+	/* next state (stn) */
+	p = s->init_msg;
+	n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+	while (n > 0)
+		{
+		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			*ok = 0;
+			return i;
+			}
+		s->init_num += i;
+		n -= i;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+	 * Finished verification. */
+	if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+		ssl3_take_mac(s);
+#endif
+
+	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+	*ok=1;
+	return s->init_num;
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+	*ok=0;
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pk;
+	int ret= -1,i;
+
+	if (pkey == NULL)
+		pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+	else
+		pk=pkey;
+	if (pk == NULL) goto err;
+
+	i=pk->type;
+	if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+		{
+		ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+		}
+	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+		{
+		ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+		}	
+#endif
+	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) 
+		{
+		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+		}
+	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) 
+		{
+		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+		}
+err:
+	if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+	{
+	int al;
+
+	switch(type)
+		{
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+		al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+	case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+	case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+		break;
+		}
+	return(al);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
+ * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
+ * unused buffers.  Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
+ * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
+ * This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
+ * with a given context.  (The options affecting buffer size are
+ * max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
+ * SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
+ * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.)  Using a separate freelist for every
+ * possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
+ * different values.
+ *
+ * If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
+ * connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
+ * use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
+ *    - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
+ *    - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
+ *    - Improve this code.
+ */
+static void *
+freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
+	{
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
+	void *result = NULL;
+
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+	if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
+		ent = list->head;
+	if (ent != NULL)
+		{
+		list->head = ent->next;
+		result = ent;
+		if (--list->len == 0)
+			list->chunklen = 0;
+		}
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	if (!result)
+		result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void
+freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
+	{
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
+
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+	if (list != NULL &&
+	    (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
+	    list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len &&
+	    sz >= sizeof(*ent))
+		{
+		list->chunklen = sz;
+		ent = mem;
+		ent->next = list->head;
+		list->head = ent;
+		++list->len;
+		mem = NULL;
+		}
+
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+	if (mem)
+		OPENSSL_free(mem);
+	}
+#else
+#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
+#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
+	
+	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	else
+		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+		{
+		if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
+			{
+			len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
+			}
+  		else
+			{
+			len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+				+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+				+ headerlen + align;
+			if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+				{
+				s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+				len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+				}
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+		s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+		}
+
+	s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+	return 1;
+
+err:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
+
+	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+	else
+		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
+		{
+		if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
+			{
+			len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
+			}
+  		else
+			{
+			len = s->max_send_fragment;
+			}
+		len += 0
+			+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+			+ headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+			len += headerlen + align
+				+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+		s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+
+err:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+		return 0;
+	if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
+		{
+		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+		s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+		{
+		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+		s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}