diff options
author | Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> | 2012-04-16 19:21:14 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> | 2012-04-16 19:21:14 +0200 |
commit | 3e4d8f433239c40311037616b1b8833a06651ae0 (patch) | |
tree | 98ab7fce0d011d34677b0beb762d389cb5c39199 /openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c |
Initial import
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c | 1142 |
1 files changed, 1142 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc885e8e --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -0,0 +1,1142 @@ +/* ssl/s2_srvr.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver); +static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s); +static int get_client_hello(SSL *s); +static int server_hello(SSL *s); +static int get_client_finished(SSL *s); +static int server_verify(SSL *s); +static int server_finish(SSL *s); +static int request_certificate(SSL *s); +static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to,int padding); +#define BREAK break + +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver) + { + if (ver == SSL2_VERSION) + return(SSLv2_server_method()); + else + return(NULL); + } + +IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_server_method, + ssl2_accept, + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl2_get_server_method) + +int ssl2_accept(SSL *s) + { + unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL); + BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; + int ret= -1; + long num1; + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; + int new_state,state; + + RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb=s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* init things to blank */ + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); + + if (s->cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + return(-1); + } + + clear_sys_error(); + for (;;) + { + state=s->state; + + switch (s->state) + { + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + + s->server=1; + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); + + s->version=SSL2_VERSION; + s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; + + buf=s->init_buf; + if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)) + { ret= -1; goto end; } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int) + SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) + { ret= -1; goto end; } + s->init_buf=buf; + s->init_num=0; + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept; + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A: + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B: + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C: + s->shutdown=0; + ret=get_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B: + ret=server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + if (!s->hit) + { + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A; + BREAK; + } + else + { + s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION; + BREAK; + } + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: + ret=get_client_master_key(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION: + /* Ok we how have sent all the stuff needed to + * start encrypting, the next packet back will + * be encrypted. */ + if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,0)) + { ret= -1; goto end; } + s->s2->clear_text=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B: + ret=server_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + if (s->hit) + { + /* If we are in here, we have been + * buffering the output, so we need to + * flush it and remove buffering from + * future traffic */ + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C; + BREAK; + } + else + { + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A; + break; + } + + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C: + /* get the number of bytes to write */ + num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); + if (num1 > 0) + { + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; + num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); + if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + } + + /* flushed and now remove buffering */ + s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); + + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: + case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: + ret=get_client_finished(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A; + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D: + /* don't do a 'request certificate' if we + * don't want to, or we already have one, and + * we only want to do it once. */ + if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || + ((s->session->peer != NULL) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))) + { + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A; + break; + } + else + { + ret=request_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A; + } + BREAK; + + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A: + case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B: + ret=server_finish(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL_ST_OK; + break; + + case SSL_ST_OK: + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + s->init_buf=NULL; + s->init_num=0; + /* ERR_clear_error();*/ + + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + /* s->server=1; */ + ret=1; + + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); + + goto end; + /* BREAK; */ + + default: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret= -1; + goto end; + /* BREAK; */ + } + + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) + { + new_state=s->state; + s->state=state; + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); + s->state=new_state; + } + } +end: + s->in_handshake--; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); + return(ret); + } + +static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) + { + int is_export,i,n,keya,ek; + unsigned long len; + unsigned char *p; + const SSL_CIPHER *cp; + const EVP_CIPHER *c; + const EVP_MD *md; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A) + { + i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),10-s->init_num); + + if (i < (10-s->init_num)) + return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i)); + s->init_num = 10; + + if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY) + { + if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE); + } + else + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR); + return(-1); + } + + cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p); + if (cp == NULL) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); + return(-1); + } + s->session->cipher= cp; + + p+=3; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clear=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.enc=i; + n2s(p,i); + if(i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG); + return -1; + } + s->session->key_arg_length=i; + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B; + } + + /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */ + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + keya=s->session->key_arg_length; + len = 10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc + (unsigned long)keya; + if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG); + return -1; + } + n = (int)len - s->init_num; + i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n); + if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i)); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */ + p += 10; + + memcpy(s->session->key_arg,&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear+s->s2->tmp.enc]), + (unsigned int)keya); + + if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); + return(-1); + } + i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc, + &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), + (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); + + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS); + return(0); + } + + if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) + { + is_export=1; + ek=8; + } + else + ek=5; + + /* bad decrypt */ +#if 1 + /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a + * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ + if ((i < 0) || + ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) + || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i != + (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + if (is_export) + i=ek; + else + i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0) + return 0; + } +#else + if (i < 0) + { + error=1; + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + } + /* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */ + else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) + || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i != + EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))) + { + error=1; + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS); + } + if (error) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + return(-1); + } +#endif + + if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear; + + if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->session->master_key_length=i; + memcpy(s->session->master_key,p,(unsigned int)i); + return(1); + } + +static int get_client_hello(SSL *s) + { + int i,n; + unsigned long len; + unsigned char *p; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; + int z; + + /* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet + * type the first time round. */ + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A) + { + s->first_packet=1; + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B; + } + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B) + { + i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),9-s->init_num); + if (i < (9-s->init_num)) + return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i)); + s->init_num = 9; + + if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) + { + if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE); + } + else + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR); + return(-1); + } + n2s(p,i); + if (i < s->version) s->version=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.session_id_length=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->challenge_length=i; + if ( (i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) || + (i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + return(-1); + } + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C; + } + + /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */ + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + len = 9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length; + if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG); + return -1; + } + n = (int)len - s->init_num; + i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n); + if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i)); + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */ + p += 9; + + /* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session + * structure if it is cached */ + /* session-id */ + if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) && + (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); + return(-1); + } + + if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0) + { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + return(-1); + } + } + else + { + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,&(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]), + s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL); + if (i == 1) + { /* previous session */ + s->hit=1; + } + else if (i == -1) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + return(-1); + } + else + { + if (s->cert == NULL) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + return(-1); + } + + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + return(-1); + } + } + } + + if (!s->hit) + { + cs=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length, + &s->session->ciphers); + if (cs == NULL) goto mem_err; + + cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s); + + if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) + { + prio=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl); + if (prio == NULL) goto mem_err; + allow = cs; + } + else + { + prio = cs; + allow = cl; + } + for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) + { + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0) + { + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z); + z--; + } + } + if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) + { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); + s->session->ciphers = prio; + } + /* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of + * ciphers that are on both the client and server. + * This list is ordered by the order the client sent + * the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference + * if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set. + */ + } + p+=s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length; + /* done cipher selection */ + + /* session id extracted already */ + p+=s->s2->tmp.session_id_length; + + /* challenge */ + if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + memcpy(s->s2->challenge,p,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length); + return(1); +mem_err: + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(0); + } + +static int server_hello(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p,*d; + int n,hit; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A) + { + d=p+11; + *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO; /* type */ + hit=s->hit; + *(p++)=(unsigned char)hit; +#if 1 + if (!hit) + { + if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) + /* This can't really happen because get_client_hello + * has called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set + * sess_cert. */ + ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return(-1); + } + } + /* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL, + * depending on whether it survived in the internal cache + * or was retrieved from an external cache. + * If it is NULL, we cannot put any useful data in it anyway, + * so we don't touch it. + */ + +#else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st and sess_cert_st were + * the same. */ + if (!hit) + { /* else add cert to session */ + CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); + if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) + ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); + s->session->sess_cert=s->cert; + } + else /* We have a session id-cache hit, if the + * session-id has no certificate listed against + * the 'cert' structure, grab the 'old' one + * listed against the SSL connection */ + { + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) + { + CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1, + CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); + s->session->sess_cert=s->cert; + } + } +#endif + + if (s->cert == NULL) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED); + return(-1); + } + + if (hit) + { + *(p++)=0; /* no certificate type */ + s2n(s->version,p); /* version */ + s2n(0,p); /* cert len */ + s2n(0,p); /* ciphers len */ + } + else + { + /* EAY EAY */ + /* put certificate type */ + *(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE; + s2n(s->version,p); /* version */ + n=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL); + s2n(n,p); /* certificate length */ + i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&d); + n=0; + + /* lets send out the ciphers we like in the + * prefered order */ + n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,s->session->ciphers,d,0); + d+=n; + s2n(n,p); /* add cipher length */ + } + + /* make and send conn_id */ + s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH,p); /* add conn_id length */ + s->s2->conn_id_length=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id,(int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0) + return -1; + memcpy(d,s->s2->conn_id,SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH); + d+=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; + + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B; + s->init_num=d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + s->init_off=0; + } + /* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */ + /* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2 + * writes without a read between them. This occurs when + * Session-id reuse is used, so I will put in a buffering module + */ + if (s->hit) + { + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) return(-1); + } + + return(ssl2_do_write(s)); + } + +static int get_client_finished(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p; + int i, n; + unsigned long len; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A) + { + i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num); + if (i < 1-s->init_num) + return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i)); + s->init_num += i; + + if (*p != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED) + { + if (*p != SSL2_MT_ERROR) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE); + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR); + /* try to read the error message */ + i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num); + return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i); + } + return(-1); + } + s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B; + } + + /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B */ + if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + len = 1 + (unsigned long)s->s2->conn_id_length; + n = (int)len - s->init_num; + i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n); + if (i < n) + { + return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i)); + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-FINISHED */ + p += 1; + if (memcmp(p,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length) != 0) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT); + return(-1); + } + return(1); + } + +static int server_verify(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY; + if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + memcpy(p,s->s2->challenge,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length); + /* p+=s->s2->challenge_length; */ + + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B; + s->init_num=s->s2->challenge_length+1; + s->init_off=0; + } + return(ssl2_do_write(s)); + } + +static int server_finish(SSL *s) + { + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED; + + if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id, (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length); + /* p+=s->session->session_id_length; */ + + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B; + s->init_num=s->session->session_id_length+1; + s->init_off=0; + } + + /* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B */ + return(ssl2_do_write(s)); + } + +/* send the request and check the response */ +static int request_certificate(SSL *s) + { + const unsigned char *cp; + unsigned char *p,*p2,*buf2; + unsigned char *ccd; + int i,j,ctype,ret= -1; + unsigned long len; + X509 *x509=NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; + + ccd=s->s2->tmp.ccl; + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *(p++)=SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE; + *(p++)=SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) + return -1; + memcpy(p,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B; + s->init_num=SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2; + s->init_off=0; + } + + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B) + { + i=ssl2_do_write(s); + if (i <= 0) + { + ret=i; + goto end; + } + + s->init_num=0; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C; + } + + if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C) + { + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),6-s->init_num); /* try to read 6 octets ... */ + if (i < 3-s->init_num) /* ... but don't call ssl2_part_read now if we got at least 3 + * (probably NO-CERTIFICATE-ERROR) */ + { + ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i); + goto end; + } + s->init_num += i; + + if ((s->init_num >= 3) && (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)) + { + n2s(p,i); + if (i != SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE) + { + /* not the error message we expected -- let ssl2_part_read handle it */ + s->init_num -= 3; + ret = ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, 3); + goto end; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */ + + /* this is the one place where we can recover from an SSL 2.0 error */ + + if (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + goto end; + } + ret=1; + goto end; + } + if ((*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) || (s->init_num < 6)) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_SHORT_READ); + goto end; + } + if (s->init_num != 6) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + /* ok we have a response */ + /* certificate type, there is only one right now. */ + ctype= *(p++); + if (ctype != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION) + { + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT); + goto end; + } + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clen=i; + n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.rlen=i; + s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D; + } + + /* SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D */ + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + len = 6 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clen + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.rlen; + if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG); + goto end; + } + j = (int)len - s->init_num; + i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),j); + if (i < j) + { + ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i); + goto end; + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-CERTIFICATE */ + p += 6; + + cp = p; + x509=(X509 *)d2i_X509(NULL,&cp,(long)s->s2->tmp.clen); + if (x509 == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto msg_end; + } + + if (((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(sk,x509))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto msg_end; + } + + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); + + if (i > 0) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */ + { + EVP_MD_CTX ctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material, + s->s2->key_material_length); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + + i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL); + buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i); + if (buf2 == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto msg_end; + } + p2=buf2; + i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2); + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i); + OPENSSL_free(buf2); + + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509); + if (pkey == NULL) goto end; + i=EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,cp,s->s2->tmp.rlen,pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + if (i > 0) + { + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); + s->session->peer=x509; + CRYPTO_add(&x509->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + ret=1; + goto end; + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM); + goto msg_end; + } + } + else + { +msg_end: + ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + } +end: + sk_X509_free(sk); + X509_free(x509); + return(ret); + } + +static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, int padding) + { + RSA *rsa; + int i; + + if ((c == NULL) || (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); + return(-1); + } + if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA); + return(-1); + } + rsa=c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->pkey.rsa; + + /* we have the public key */ + i=RSA_private_decrypt(len,from,to,rsa,padding); + if (i < 0) + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + return(i); + } +#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */ + +# if PEDANTIC +static void *dummy=&dummy; +# endif + +#endif |