Updated ics-openvpn to last rev 14 Nov 2014.

Material design!

It still doesn't run properly on my tablet, openvpn keeps getting down
and exiting.

58 files changed, 0 insertions, 58219 deletions

diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 06a13de4..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/bio_ssl.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
-static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
-static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
-static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
-static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
-static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
-static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
-typedef struct bio_ssl_st
-	{
-	SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */
-	/* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
-	int num_renegotiates;
-	unsigned long renegotiate_count;
-	unsigned long byte_count;
-	unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
-	unsigned long last_time;
-	} BIO_SSL;
-
-static BIO_METHOD methods_sslp=
-	{
-	BIO_TYPE_SSL,"ssl",
-	ssl_write,
-	ssl_read,
-	ssl_puts,
-	NULL, /* ssl_gets, */
-	ssl_ctrl,
-	ssl_new,
-	ssl_free,
-	ssl_callback_ctrl,
-	};
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
-	{
-	return(&methods_sslp);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
-	{
-	BIO_SSL *bs;
-
-	bs=(BIO_SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_SSL));
-	if (bs == NULL)
-		{
-		BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	memset(bs,0,sizeof(BIO_SSL));
-	bi->init=0;
-	bi->ptr=(char *)bs;
-	bi->flags=0;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
-	{
-	BIO_SSL *bs;
-
-	if (a == NULL) return(0);
-	bs=(BIO_SSL *)a->ptr;
-	if (bs->ssl != NULL) SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
-	if (a->shutdown)
-		{
-		if (a->init && (bs->ssl != NULL))
-			SSL_free(bs->ssl);
-		a->init=0;
-		a->flags=0;
-		}
-	if (a->ptr != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
-	return(1);
-	}
-	
-static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
-	{
-	int ret=1;
-	BIO_SSL *sb;
-	SSL *ssl;
-	int retry_reason=0;
-	int r=0;
-
-	if (out == NULL) return(0);
-	sb=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
-	ssl=sb->ssl;
-
-	BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
-#if 0
-	if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl))
-		{
-/*		ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); */
-		if (ret > 0)
-			{
-
-			outflags=(BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-/*	if (ret > 0) */
-	ret=SSL_read(ssl,out,outl);
-
-	switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,ret))
-		{
-	case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
-		if (ret <= 0) break;
-		if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0)
-			{
-			sb->byte_count+=ret;
-			if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count)
-				{
-				sb->byte_count=0;
-				sb->num_renegotiates++;
-				SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
-				r=1;
-				}
-			}
-		if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r))
-			{
-			unsigned long tm;
-
-			tm=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-			if (tm > sb->last_time+sb->renegotiate_timeout)
-				{
-				sb->last_time=tm;
-				sb->num_renegotiates++;
-				SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
-				}
-			}
-
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
-		BIO_set_retry_read(b);
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
-		BIO_set_retry_write(b);
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_CONNECT;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
-	case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
-	case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
-	default:
-		break;
-		}
-
-	b->retry_reason=retry_reason;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
-	{
-	int ret,r=0;
-	int retry_reason=0;
-	SSL *ssl;
-	BIO_SSL *bs;
-
-	if (out == NULL) return(0);
-	bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
-	ssl=bs->ssl;
-
-	BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
-/*	ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
-	if (ret > 0) */
-	ret=SSL_write(ssl,out,outl);
-
-	switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,ret))
-		{
-	case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
-		if (ret <= 0) break;
-		if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0)
-			{
-			bs->byte_count+=ret;
-			if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count)
-				{
-				bs->byte_count=0;
-				bs->num_renegotiates++;
-				SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
-				r=1;
-				}
-			}
-		if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r))
-			{
-			unsigned long tm;
-
-			tm=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-			if (tm > bs->last_time+bs->renegotiate_timeout)
-				{
-				bs->last_time=tm;
-				bs->num_renegotiates++;
-				SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
-				}
-			}
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
-		BIO_set_retry_write(b);
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
-		BIO_set_retry_read(b);
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
-		break;
-	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
-		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
-		retry_reason=BIO_RR_CONNECT;
-	case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
-	case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
-	default:
-		break;
-		}
-
-	b->retry_reason=retry_reason;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
-	{
-	SSL **sslp,*ssl;
-	BIO_SSL *bs;
-	BIO *dbio,*bio;
-	long ret=1;
-
-	bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
-	ssl=bs->ssl;
-	if ((ssl == NULL)  && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
-		return(0);
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
-		SSL_shutdown(ssl);
-
-		if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
-			SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
-		else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
-			SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
-
-		SSL_clear(ssl);
-
-		if (b->next_bio != NULL)
-			ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
-			ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		else
-			ret=1;
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
-		ret=0;
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
-		if (num) /* client mode */
-			SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
-		else
-			SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
-		ret=bs->renegotiate_timeout;
-		if (num < 60) num=5;
-		bs->renegotiate_timeout=(unsigned long)num;
-		bs->last_time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
-		ret=bs->renegotiate_count;
-		if ((long)num >=512)
-			bs->renegotiate_count=(unsigned long)num;
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
-		ret=bs->num_renegotiates;
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
-		if (ssl != NULL)
-			{
-			ssl_free(b);
-			if (!ssl_new(b))
-				return 0;
-			}
-		b->shutdown=(int)num;
-		ssl=(SSL *)ptr;
-		((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl=ssl;
-		bio=SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
-		if (bio != NULL)
-			{
-			if (b->next_bio != NULL)
-				BIO_push(bio,b->next_bio);
-			b->next_bio=bio;
-			CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
-			}
-		b->init=1;
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
-		if (ptr != NULL)
-			{
-			sslp=(SSL **)ptr;
-			*sslp=ssl;
-			}
-		else
-			ret=0;
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
-		ret=b->shutdown;
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
-		b->shutdown=(int)num;
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
-		ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
-		ret=SSL_pending(ssl);
-		if (ret == 0)
-			ret=BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
-		BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-		ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
-		if ((b->next_bio != NULL) && (b->next_bio != ssl->rbio))
-			{
-			SSL_set_bio(ssl,b->next_bio,b->next_bio);
-			CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
-			}
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_POP:
-		/* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
-		if (b == ptr)
-			{
-			/* Shouldn't happen in practice because the
-			 * rbio and wbio are the same when pushed.
-			 */
-			if (ssl->rbio != ssl->wbio)
-				BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
-			if (b->next_bio != NULL)
-				CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
-			ssl->wbio=NULL;
-			ssl->rbio=NULL;
-			}
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
-		BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
-		b->retry_reason=0;
-		ret=(int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
-
-		switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,(int)ret))
-			{
-		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
-			BIO_set_flags(b,
-				BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
-			break;
-		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
-			BIO_set_flags(b,
-				BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
-			break;
-		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
-			BIO_set_flags(b,
-				BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
-			b->retry_reason=b->next_bio->retry_reason;
-			break;
-		default:
-			break;
-			}
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
-		dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
-		if (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL)
-			SSL_free(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl);
-		((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl=SSL_dup(ssl);
-		((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_count=
-			((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_count;
-		((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->byte_count=
-			((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->byte_count;
-		((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout=
-			((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout;
-		((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->last_time=
-			((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->last_time;
-		ret=(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL);
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_GET_FD:
-		ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
-		{
-#if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used?  -- Richard Levitte */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		ret = -1;
-#else
-		ret=0;
-#endif
-		}
-		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK:
-		{
-		void (**fptr)(const SSL *xssl,int type,int val);
-
-		fptr=(void (**)(const SSL *xssl,int type,int val))ptr;
-		*fptr=SSL_get_info_callback(ssl);
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
-	{
-	SSL *ssl;
-	BIO_SSL *bs;
-	long ret=1;
-
-	bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
-	ssl=bs->ssl;
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
-		{
-		/* FIXME: setting this via a completely different prototype
-		   seems like a crap idea */
-		SSL_set_info_callback(ssl,(void (*)(const SSL *,int,int))fp);
-		}
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret=BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,fp);
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
-	{
-	int n,ret;
-
-	n=strlen(str);
-	ret=BIO_write(bp,str,n);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-	BIO *ret=NULL,*buf=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
-
-	if ((buf=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
-	if ((ssl=BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	if ((ret=BIO_push(buf,ssl)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	return(ret);
-err:
-	if (buf != NULL) BIO_free(buf);
-	if (ssl != NULL) BIO_free(ssl);
-#endif
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-	BIO *ret=NULL,*con=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
-
-	if ((con=BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
-	if ((ssl=BIO_new_ssl(ctx,1)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	if ((ret=BIO_push(ssl,con)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	return(ret);
-err:
-	if (con != NULL) BIO_free(con);
-#endif
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
-	{
-	BIO *ret;
-	SSL *ssl;
-
-	if ((ret=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
-	if ((ssl=SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
-		{
-		BIO_free(ret);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	if (client)
-		SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
-	else
-		SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
-		
-	BIO_set_ssl(ret,ssl,BIO_CLOSE);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
-	{
-	t=BIO_find_type(t,BIO_TYPE_SSL);
-	f=BIO_find_type(f,BIO_TYPE_SSL);
-	if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	if (	(((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl == NULL) || 
-		(((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	SSL_copy_session_id(((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl,((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
-	{
-	SSL *s;
-
-	while (b != NULL)
-		{
-		if (b->method->type == BIO_TYPE_SSL)
-			{
-			s=((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl;
-			SSL_shutdown(s);
-			break;
-			}
-		b=b->next_bio;
-		}
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e4250fc..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1636 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_both.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
-			if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
-				long ii; \
-				for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
-			} else { \
-				long ii; \
-				bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
-				for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
-				bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
-			} }
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
-			long ii; \
-			OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
-			is_complete = 1; \
-			if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
-			if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
-				if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
-
-#if 0
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
-			long ii; \
-			printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
-			printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
-			printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-
-static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
-static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
-
-/* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
-
-static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
-static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
-	unsigned long frag_len);
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
-	unsigned char *p);
-static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
-	unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 
-	unsigned long frag_len);
-static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 
-	long max, int *ok);
-
-static hm_fragment *
-dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
-	{
-	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-	unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
-
-	frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
-	if ( frag == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-
-	if (frag_len)
-		{
-		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
-		if ( buf == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(frag);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
-	frag->fragment = buf;
-
-	/* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
-	if (reassembly)
-		{
-		bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
-		if (bitmask == NULL)
-			{
-			if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-			OPENSSL_free(frag);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
-		}
-
-	frag->reassembly = bitmask;
-
-	return frag;
-	}
-
-static void
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
-	{
-
-	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
-		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
-		}
-	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
-	OPENSSL_free(frag);
-	}
-
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	int curr_mtu;
-	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
-
-	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
-		{
-		s->d1->mtu = 
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-
-		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
-		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = 0;
-			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 
-				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
-			}
-		}
-#if 0 
-	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
-
-	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-
-	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
-		mtu = curr_mtu;
-	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
-		{
-		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		if ( ret <= 0)
-			return ret;
-		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
-	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
-			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	if (s->write_hash)
-		mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-	else
-		mac_size = 0;
-
-	if (s->enc_write_ctx && 
-		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
-		blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
-	else
-		blocksize = 0;
-
-	frag_off = 0;
-	while( s->init_num)
-		{
-		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
-			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
-
-		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
-			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-			if ( ret <= 0)
-				return ret;
-			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
-				mac_size - blocksize;
-			}
-
-		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
-			len = curr_mtu;
-		else
-			len = s->init_num;
-
-
-		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
-		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-			{
-			if ( s->init_off != 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
-					len = curr_mtu;
-				else
-					len = s->init_num;
-				}
-
-			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
-				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
-
-			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-			}
-
-		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
-			len);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			{
-			/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
-			 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
-			 * really retransmit anything.  continue as if everything
-			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
-			 * retransmit 
-			 */
-			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
-				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-			else
-				return(-1);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-
-			/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
-			 * message got sent.  but why would this happen? */
-			OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
-
-			if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
-				{
-				/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
-				 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
-				unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
-				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-				int xlen;
-
-				if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-					{
-					/* reconstruct message header is if it
-					 * is being sent in single fragment */
-					*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
-					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
-					s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
-					l2n3(0,p);
-					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
-					p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					xlen = ret;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-					}
-
-				ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
-				}
-
-			if (ret == s->init_num)
-				{
-				if (s->msg_callback)
-					s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, 
-						(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, 
-						s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-				s->init_off = 0;  /* done writing this message */
-				s->init_num = 0;
-
-				return(1);
-				}
-			s->init_off+=ret;
-			s->init_num-=ret;
-			frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-			}
-		}
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
- * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
- * Read an entire handshake message.  Handshake messages arrive in
- * fragments.
- */
-long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	int i, al;
-	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned long msg_len;
-
-	/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
-	 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
-	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
-		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		*ok=1;
-		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
-		return s->init_num;
-		}
-
-	msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
-	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-again:
-	i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
-	if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
-		i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)  /* bad fragment received */
-		goto again;
-	else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
-		return i;
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-
-	/* reconstruct message header */
-	*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
-	l2n3(msg_len,p);
-	s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
-	l2n3(0,p);
-	l2n3(msg_len,p);
-	if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
-		p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	}
-
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-			p, msg_len,
-			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-	/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
-	if (!s->d1->listen)
-		s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
-	s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	return s->init_num;
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	*ok = 0;
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-
-static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
-	{
-	size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
-
-	msg_len  = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-	frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
-	frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
-	/* sanity checking */
-	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
-		{
-		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
-		 * against max above */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			}
-
-		s->s3->tmp.message_size  = msg_len;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_type  = msg_hdr->type;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type    = msg_hdr->type;
-		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq     = msg_hdr->seq;
-		}
-	else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
-		{
-		/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
-		 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		}
-
-	return 0; /* no error */
-	}
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
-	 * if so:
-	 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
-	 * (2) update s->init_num
-	 */
-	pitem *item;
-	hm_fragment *frag;
-	int al;
-
-	*ok = 0;
-	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-	if ( item == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-	
-	/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
-	if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
-		{
-		unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
-		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-
-		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
-
-		if (al==0) /* no alert */
-			{
-			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
-				frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
-			}
-
-		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-		pitem_free(item);
-
-		if (al==0)
-			{
-			*ok = 1;
-			return frag_len;
-			}
-
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		s->init_num = 0;
-		*ok = 0;
-		return -1;
-		}
-	else
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
- * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
- * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
-static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
-		return s->max_cert_list;
-	return max_len;
-	}
-
-static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
-	{
-	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	pitem *item = NULL;
-	int i = -1, is_complete;
-	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
-	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (frag_len == 0)
-		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
-	/* Try to find item in queue */
-	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
-	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
-
-	if (item == NULL)
-		{
-		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
-		if ( frag == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
-		frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
-		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
-		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
-			{
-			item = NULL;
-			frag = NULL;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-
-	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
-	 * does not need to be freed.
-	 */
-	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
-		{
-		unsigned char devnull [256];
-
-		while (frag_len)
-			{
-			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-				devnull,
-				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0) goto err;
-			frag_len -= i;
-			}
-		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-		}
-
-	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
-	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
-	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
-		i=-1;
-	if (i<=0)
-		goto err;
-
-	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
-	                    (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
-
-	RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
-	                           is_complete);
-
-	if (is_complete)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
-		frag->reassembly = NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (item == NULL)
-		{
-		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
-		if (item == NULL)
-			{
-			i = -1;
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
-		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
-		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
-		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
-		 * would never have reached this branch. */
-		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
-		}
-
-	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
-err:
-	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	*ok = 0;
-	return i;
-	}
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
-{
-	int i=-1;
-	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	pitem *item = NULL;
-	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
-		goto err;
-
-	/* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
-	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
-	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
-
-	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
-	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
-	 */
-	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
-		item = NULL;
-
-	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
-	 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
-	 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
-	 * retransmit.
-	 */
-	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
-		msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
-		(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
-		{
-		unsigned char devnull [256];
-
-		while (frag_len)
-			{
-			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-				devnull,
-				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0) goto err;
-			frag_len -= i;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
-			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
-
-		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
-			goto err;
-
-		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
-		if ( frag == NULL)
-			goto err;
-
-		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
-
-		if (frag_len)
-			{
-			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
-			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
-				i = -1;
-			if (i<=0)
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
-		if ( item == NULL)
-			goto err;
-
-		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
-		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
-		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
-		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
-		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
-		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
-		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
-		 * been discarded. */
-		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
-		}
-
-	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
-err:
-	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	*ok = 0;
-	return i;
-	}
-
-
-static long
-dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
-	unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
-	int i,al;
-	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-
-	redo:
-	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
-	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
-		{
-		if (*ok)	s->init_num = frag_len;
-		return frag_len;
-		}
-
-	/* read handshake message header */
-	i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
-		DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
-	if (i <= 0) 	/* nbio, or an error */
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-		*ok = 0;
-		return i;
-		}
-	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
-	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* parse the message fragment header */
-	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
-
-	/* 
-	 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
-	 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
-	 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
-	 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
-	 */
-	if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
-		return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
-
-	len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
-	frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
-	frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
-
-	if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
-		return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
-
-	if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
-		wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
-		{
-		/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
-		 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
-		 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
-		 * 'Finished' MAC. */
-		if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
-			{
-			if (s->msg_callback)
-				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 
-					wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 
-					s->msg_callback_arg);
-			
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			goto redo;
-			}
-		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
-		goto f_err;
-
-	/* XDTLS:  ressurect this when restart is in place */
-	s->state=stn;
-
-	if ( frag_len > 0)
-		{
-		unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-			&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
-		/* XDTLS:  fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			*ok = 0;
-			return i;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		i = 0;
-
-	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
-	 * handshake to fail */
-	if (i != (int)frag_len)
-		{
-		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	*ok = 1;
-
-	/* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
-	 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
-	 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
-	 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
-	s->init_num = frag_len;
-	return frag_len;
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	s->init_num = 0;
-
-	*ok=0;
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state == a)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
-		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
-		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-		p+=i;
-		l=i;
-
-	/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
-	 * renegotiation checks
-	 */
-	if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-		memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
-		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-		memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
-		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
-		}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
-		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
-		 * I do this.
-		 */
-		l&=0xffff;
-#endif
-
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
-		s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
-		s->state=b;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-/* for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
- * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
- * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
- */
-int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
-	{ 
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == a)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
-		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
-		s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
-			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
-			s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
-			s->init_num+=2;
-		}
-
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, 
-			s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
-
-		s->state=b;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
-	}
-
-static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
-	{
-	int n;
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
-	l2n3(n,p);
-	i2d_X509(x,&p);
-	*l+=n+3;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-
-	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
-	buf=s->init_buf;
-	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (x != NULL)
-		{
-		X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
-
-		if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
-  			{
-  			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-  			return(0);
-  			}
-  
-		X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
-		/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
-		ERR_clear_error();
-		for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
-  			{
-			x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
-
-			if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
-  				{
-				X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
-				return 0;
-  				}
-  			}
-  		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
-  		}
-  	/* Thawte special :-) */
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
-		{
-		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
-		if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-	l2n3(l,p);
-	l+=3;
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
-	p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
-
-	l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	return(l);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
-	{
-	if ( code > 0)
-		{
-		fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
-		{
-		/* not a timeout, none of our business, 
-		   let higher layers handle this.  in fact it's probably an error */
-		return code;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
-#else
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s))  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
-#endif
-		{
-		BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
-		return code;
-		}
-
-#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
-	item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
-	if ( item )
-		{
-		/* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
-		}
-	else
-#endif
-
-#if 0  /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
-	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
-			DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
-
-	return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
-	{
-	/* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
-	 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
-	 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
-	 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
-	 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
-	 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
-	 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
-	 */	
-	return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
-	{
-	pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
-	piterator iter;
-	pitem *item;
-	hm_fragment *frag;
-	int found = 0;
-
-	iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
-
-	for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
-		{
-		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-			if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
-				(unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
-				0, &found) <= 0 && found)
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
-	{
-	pitem *item;
-	hm_fragment *frag;
-	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-
-	/* this function is called immediately after a message has 
-	 * been serialized */
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
-
-	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
-	if (!frag)
-		return 0;
-
-	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
-
-	if ( is_ccs)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
-			       ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
-			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
-		}
-
-	frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
-	frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
-	frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
-	frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
-	frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
-	frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
-
-	/* save current state*/
-	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
-	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
-	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
-	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
-	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
-	
-	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
-														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
-	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
-														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
-
-	item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
-	if ( item == NULL)
-		{
-		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-#if 0
-	fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
-	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
-	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
-#endif
-
-	pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
-	int *found)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	/* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
-	pitem *item;
-	hm_fragment *frag ;
-	unsigned long header_length;
-	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
-	unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
-
-	/*
-	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
-	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
-	 */
-
-	/* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
-	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
-	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
-
-	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
-	if ( item == NULL)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr, "retransmit:  message %d non-existant\n", seq);
-		*found = 0;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	*found = 1;
-	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-
-	if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
-		header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	else
-		header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-	memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, 
-		frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
-		s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
-
-	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, 
-		frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, 
-		frag->msg_header.frag_len);
-
-	/* save current state */
-	saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
-	saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
-	saved_state.compress = s->compress;
-	saved_state.session = s->session;
-	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
-	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
-	
-	s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
-	
-	/* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
-	s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
-	s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
-	s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
-	s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
-	s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
-	
-	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
-	{
-		memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-	}
-	
-	ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? 
-						 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-	
-	/* restore current state */
-	s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
-	s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
-	s->compress = saved_state.compress;
-	s->session = saved_state.session;
-	s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
-	
-	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
-	{
-		memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-	}
-
-	s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
-
-	(void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
-void
-dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	pitem *item;
-
-	for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
-		item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
-		{
-		dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		}
-	}
-
-
-unsigned char *
-dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
-			unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
-	{
-	/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
-	if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
-		{
-		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
-		s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
-		}
-
-	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
-		frag_off, frag_len);
-
-	return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	}
-
-
-/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
-static void
-dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
-			    unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
-			    unsigned long frag_len)
-	{
-	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
-	msg_hdr->type = mt;
-	msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
-	msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
-	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
-	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
-	}
-
-static void
-dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
-			unsigned long frag_len)
-	{
-	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
-	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
-	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
-	}
-
-static unsigned char *
-dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
-	*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
-	l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
-
-	s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
-	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
-	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
-
-	return p;
-	}
-
-unsigned int 
-dtls1_min_mtu(void)
-	{
-	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 
-		sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
-	}
-
-static unsigned int 
-dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
-	{
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
-		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
-
-	for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
-		if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
-			return g_probable_mtu[i];
-
-	return curr_mtu;
-	}
-
-void
-dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
-	{
-	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-	msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
-	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
-
-	n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
-	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
-	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
-	}
-
-void
-dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
-	{
-	memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
-
-	ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
-	    !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
-		{
-		ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		if (ret < 0) return -1;
-
-		if (ret == 0)
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
-		}
-#endif
-	ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
-#endif
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int
-dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
-	unsigned short hbtype;
-	unsigned int payload;
-	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
-			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
-		return 0; /* silently discard */
-	if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
-
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
-		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
-	pl = p;
-
-	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
-		{
-		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
-		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
-					    2 /* heartbeat length */ +
-					    payload + padding;
-		int r;
-
-		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-			return 0;
-
-		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
-		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
-		 * payload, plus padding
-		 */
-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
-		bp = buffer;
-
-		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
-		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
-		s2n(payload, bp);
-		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
-		bp += payload;
-		/* Random padding */
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
-
-		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
-
-		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buffer, write_length,
-				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
-		}
-	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
-		{
-		unsigned int seq;
-
-		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
-		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
-		 * sequence number */
-		n2s(pl, seq);
-
-		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
-			{
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf, *p;
-	int ret;
-	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
-	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
-	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
-	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
-	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
-	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
-	 */
-	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
-	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
-	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
-	 * some random stuff.
-	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
-	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
-	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
-	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
-	 *  - Padding
-	 */
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
-	p = buf;
-	/* Message Type */
-	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
-	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
-	s2n(payload, p);
-	/* Sequence number */
-	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
-	/* 16 random bytes */
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
-	p += 16;
-	/* Random padding */
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
-
-	ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
-	if (ret >= 0)
-		{
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
-				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		dtls1_start_timer(s);
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
-		}
-
-	OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 37dd5483..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1738 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#endif
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		return(DTLSv1_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			dtls1_connect,
-			dtls1_get_client_method)
-
-int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
-	char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
-#endif
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
-	 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
-	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
-	 */
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
-	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
-	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
-			/* break */
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
-			s->server=0;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
-			    (s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-				
-			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* setup buffing BIO */
-			if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			/* mark client_random uninitialized */
-			memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
-			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
-			s->hit = 0;
-			break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK:
-
-			if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-			{
-				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-			}
-
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK:
-			/* read app data until dry event */
-
-			ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-			if (ret < 0) goto end;
-
-			if (ret == 0)
-			{
-				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-			}
-
-			s->state=s->d1->next_state;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-
-			/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if ( s->d1->send_cookie)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-				}
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			/* Disable buffering for SCTP */
-			if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-				{
-#endif
-				/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
-				if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
-					s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				}
-#endif
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			else
-				{
-				if (s->hit)
-					{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-					/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
-					 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-					 */
-					snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
-					         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
-					SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
-					                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-					                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
-					BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
-							 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-					}
-				else
-					s->state=DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
-		case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-
-			ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
-			if ( ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-			if ( s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			else
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
-			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-#else
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* at this point we check that we have the
-			 * required stuff from the server */
-			if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP			
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
-			    state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
-				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK;
-			else
-#endif			
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
-			 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-			 */
-			snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
-			         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
-			SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
-			                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-			                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
-					 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
-			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
-			 * sent back */
-			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
-			 * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-					s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-				else
-#endif
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-				}
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-			{
-				s->d1->next_state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-			}
-			else
-#endif
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
-			if (!s->hit)
-				dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-			s->session->compress_meth=0;
-#else
-			if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-				s->session->compress_meth=0;
-			else
-				s->session->compress_meth=
-					s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (s->hit)
-					{
-					/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
-					 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-					 */
-					BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
-					}
-#endif
-
-			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
-			if (!s->hit)
-				dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
-			/* clear flags */
-			s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-						s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-						s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-#endif
-				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-					{
-					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-					if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-						{
-							s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-							s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-						}
-#endif
-					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
-				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-				 */
-				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-#endif
-				
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
-				state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
-				{
-				s->d1->next_state=s->state;
-				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-				}
-#endif
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
-				if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
-					{
-					s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-					s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-					}
-				
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-#if 0
-			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
-				{
-				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-				s->init_buf=NULL;
-				}
-#endif
-
-			/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
-			 * remove the buffering now */
-			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
-				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->renegotiate=0;
-			s->new_session=0;
-
-			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-			ret=1;
-			/* s->server=0; */
-			s->handshake_func=dtls1_connect;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
-			/* done with handshaking */
-			s->d1->handshake_read_seq  = 0;
-			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		/* did we do anything */
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if (s->debug)
-				{
-				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
-					goto end;
-				}
-
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake
-	 * mode and allow stream identifier other
-	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
-	 */
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	unsigned int i,j;
-	unsigned long l;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
-		if ((s->session == NULL) ||
-			(s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			!sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
-			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
-			(s->session->not_resumable))
-			{
-		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
-		p=s->s3->client_random;
-
-		/* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
-		 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
-		for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++)
-			;
-		if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
-			ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
-					      sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
-
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-		s->client_version=s->version;
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* Session ID */
-		if (s->new_session)
-			i=0;
-		else
-			i=s->session->session_id_length;
-		*(p++)=i;
-		if (i != 0)
-			{
-			if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
-			p+=i;
-			}
-		
-		/* cookie stuff */
-		if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
-		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
-		p += s->d1->cookie_len;
-
-		/* Ciphers supported */
-		i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		s2n(i,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* COMPRESSION */
-		if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
-			j=0;
-		else
-			j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
-		*(p++)=1+j;
-		for (i=0; i<j; i++)
-			{
-			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
-			*(p++)=comp->id;
-			}
-		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* TLS extensions*/
-		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-#endif
-
-		l=(p-d);
-		d=buf;
-
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int n, al, ok = 0;
-	unsigned char *data;
-	unsigned int cookie_len;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
-		DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
-		{
-		s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((data[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (data[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-		s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|data[1];
-		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	data+=2;
-
-	cookie_len = *(data++);
-	if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
-	s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
-
-	s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
-	return 1;
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int n;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
-	const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-	BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-		
-		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
-                /* Fool emacs indentation */
-                if (0) {}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			RSA *rsa;
-			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-				if ((pkey == NULL) ||
-					(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
-					(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-				EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-				}
-				
-			tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
-			tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
-			if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
-					goto err;
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
-
-			q=p;
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				p+=2;
-			n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
-				tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
-#endif
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s2n(n,q);
-				n+=2;
-				}
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-                        {
-                        krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
-                        KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
-                        /*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
-                        krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
-                        krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
-			const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
-			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
-						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-                        printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
-                                alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-			authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
-			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
-#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
-                        krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
-				&kssl_err);
-			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
-                        if (enc == NULL)
-                            goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-                        {
-                        printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
-                        if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
-                        }
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-                        if (krb5rc)
-                                {
-                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-						kssl_err.reason);
-                                goto err;
-                                }
-
-			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
-			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
-			**
-                        **  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-                        **  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-                        **  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-                        **  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
-                        **    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-                        **
-			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
-			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
-			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
-			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
-			**  Example:
-			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
-			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
-			**  optional authenticator omitted.
-			*/
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
-			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
-			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
-			p+= enc_ticket->length;
-			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
-			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
-				{
-				s2n(authp->length,p);
-				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
-				p+= authp->length;
-				n+= authp->length + 2;
-				
-				free(authp->data);
-				authp->data = NULL;
-				authp->length = 0;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
-				n+=2;
-				}
- 
-			if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
-			    goto err;
-
-			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-			**				kssl_ctx->length);
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-			*/
-
-			memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);  /* per RFC 1510 */
-			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
-				kssl_ctx->key,iv);
-			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
-				sizeof tmp_buf);
-			EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
-			outl += padl;
-			if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
-			s2n(outl,p);
-			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
-			p+=outl;
-			n+=outl + 2;
-
-                        s->session->master_key_length=
-                                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
-                        }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			{
-			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
-				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				/* we get them from the cert */
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			
-			/* generate a new random key */
-			if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
-
-			n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
-
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* generate master key from the result */
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,p,n);
-			/* clean up */
-			memset(p,0,n);
-
-			/* send off the data */
-			n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
-			s2n(n,p);
-			BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
-			n+=2;
-
-			DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
-			/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
-			EC_KEY *tkey;
-			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
-			int field_size = 0;
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Did we send out the client's
-			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
-			 * computation as part of client certificate?
-			 * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-			 */
-			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) 
-				{
-				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
-				 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
-				 * To add such support, one needs to add
-				 * code that checks for appropriate 
-				 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-				 * For example, the cert have an ECC
-				 * key on the same curve as the server's
-				 * and the key should be authorized for
-				 * key agreement.
-				 *
-				 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
-				 * to skip sending the certificate verify
-				 * message.
-				 *
-				 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
-				 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
-				 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
-				 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
-				 */
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-				{
-				tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
-				srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
-				    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-				if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
-				}
-
-			srvr_group   = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
-			srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
-			if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
-				{ 
-				/* Reuse key info from our certificate
-				 * We only need our private key to perform
-				 * the ECDH computation.
-				 */
-				const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-				tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
-				priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-				if (priv_key == NULL)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
-				if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards
-			 */
-
-			field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
-			if (field_size <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* generate master key from the result */
-			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-			    -> generate_master_secret(s, 
-				s->session->master_key,
-				p, n);
-
-			memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
-				{
-				/* Send empty client key exch message */
-				n = 0;
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* First check the size of encoding and
-				 * allocate memory accordingly.
-				 */
-				encoded_pt_len = 
-				    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
-					EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
-					POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-					NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-				encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-				    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * 
-					sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-				bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-				if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || 
-				    (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				/* Encode the public key */
-				n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
-				    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
-				    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-				    encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-
-				*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
-				/* Encoded point will be copied here */
-				p += 1; 
-				/* copy the point */
-				memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
-				/* increment n to account for length field */
-				n += 1; 
-				}
-
-			/* Free allocated memory */
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-			if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
-				 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-			}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
-			{
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
-			unsigned char *t = NULL;
-			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
-			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
-			int psk_err = 1;
-
-			n = 0;
-			if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
-				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			else if (psk_len == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-
-			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
-			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
-			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
-			memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-			t+=psk_len;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-
-			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
-			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-
-			s->session->master_key_length =
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
-			n = strlen(identity);
-			s2n(n, p);
-			memcpy(p, identity, n);
-			n+=2;
-			psk_err = 0;
-		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-			if (psk_err != 0)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		else
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
-		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
-		/*
-		 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
-		 l2n3(n,d);
-		 l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
-		 s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
-		*/
-		
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-	
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
-		EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-#endif
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned u=0;
-#endif
-	unsigned long n;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
-	int j;
-#endif
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-		pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
-
-		s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-		NID_sha1,
-			&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-			{
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-				NID_md5,
-				&(data[0]));
-			if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
-					 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(u,p);
-			n=u+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-			{
-			if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-			{
-			if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-				    ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
-			SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n) ;
-
-		s->init_num=(int)n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
-		}
-
-	/* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	X509 *x509=NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state ==	SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-		else
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	/* We need to get a client cert */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
-		{
-		/* If we get an error, we need to
-		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
-		 * We then get retied later */
-		i=0;
-		i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
-		if (i < 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
-			{
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
-				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
-				i=0;
-			}
-		else if (i == 1)
-			{
-			i=0;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
-			}
-
-		if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
-		if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-				return(1);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
-				}
-			}
-
-		/* Ok, we have a cert */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
-		{
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
-		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
-			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
-		s->init_num=(int)l;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 712c4647..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_enc.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-#include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occured. */
-int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
-			{
-			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			if (mac_size < 0)
-				return -1;
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			{
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			if ( rec->data != rec->input)
-				/* we can't write into the input stream */
-				fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-					__FILE__, __LINE__);
-			else if ( EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher) > 1)
-				{
-				if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)) <= 0)
-					return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
-			{
-			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("dtls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
-		{
-		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-		rec->input=rec->data;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		l=rec->length;
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		if ((bs != 1) && send)
-			{
-			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
-			/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-			/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-			j=i-1;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					j++;
-				}
-			for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
-				rec->input[k]=j;
-			l+=i;
-			rec->length+=i;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-                unsigned long ui;
-		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
-		printf("\t\tIV: ");
-		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-		printf("\n");
-		printf("\trec->input=");
-		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-		printf("\n");
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		if (!send)
-			{
-			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return 0;
-			}
-		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
-		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 82ca6539..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,496 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_lib.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-#include <sys/timeb.h>
-#endif
-
-static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
-const char dtls1_version_str[]="DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={
-    dtls1_enc,
-	tls1_mac,
-	tls1_setup_key_block,
-	tls1_generate_master_secret,
-	tls1_change_cipher_state,
-	tls1_final_finish_mac,
-	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
-	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
-	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	tls1_alert_code,
-	tls1_export_keying_material,
-	};
-
-long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec
-	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
-	return(60*60*2);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
-	{
-	DTLS1_STATE *d1;
-
-	if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
-	if ((d1=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL) return (0);
-	memset(d1,0, sizeof *d1);
-
-	/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
-
-	d1->unprocessed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
-	d1->processed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
-	d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
-	d1->sent_messages=pqueue_new();
-	d1->buffered_app_data.q=pqueue_new();
-
-	if ( s->server)
-		{
-		d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
-		}
-
-	if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q 
-        || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
-		{
-        if ( d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
-        if ( d1->processed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
-        if ( d1->buffered_messages) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
-		if ( d1->sent_messages) pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
-		if ( d1->buffered_app_data.q) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
-		OPENSSL_free(d1);
-		return (0);
-		}
-
-	s->d1=d1;
-	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
-	{
-    pitem *item = NULL;
-    hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
-	DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
-
-    while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
-        {
-		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
-		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
-			}
-        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-        pitem_free(item);
-        }
-
-    while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
-        {
-		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
-		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
-			}
-        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-        pitem_free(item);
-        }
-
-    while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
-        {
-        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
-        pitem_free(item);
-        }
-
-    while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
-        {
-        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-        OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-        OPENSSL_free(frag);
-        pitem_free(item);
-        }
-
-	while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
-		{
-		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
-		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
-			}
-		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		}
-	}
-
-void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-	ssl3_free(s);
-
-	dtls1_clear_queues(s);
-
-    pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
-    pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q);
-    pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-	pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
-	pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
-
-	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
-	s->d1 = NULL;
-	}
-
-void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-    pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
-    pqueue processed_rcds;
-    pqueue buffered_messages;
-	pqueue sent_messages;
-	pqueue buffered_app_data;
-	unsigned int mtu;
-
-	if (s->d1)
-		{
-		unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q;
-		processed_rcds = s->d1->processed_rcds.q;
-		buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
-		sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
-		buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
-		mtu = s->d1->mtu;
-
-		dtls1_clear_queues(s);
-
-		memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1)));
-
-		if (s->server)
-			{
-			s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
-			}
-
-		if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = mtu;
-			}
-
-		s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
-		s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
-		s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
-		s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
-		s->d1->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
-		}
-
-	ssl3_clear(s);
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
-		s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
-	else
-		s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
-	}
-
-long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
-		if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval*) parg) != NULL)
-			{
-			ret = 1;
-			}
-		break;
-	case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
-		ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
-		break;
-	case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
-		ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
-		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
-		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
-		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
-#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
-#  error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
-#endif
-		/* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
-		 * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
-		return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
-
-	default:
-		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-/*
- * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
- * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
- * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
- * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
- * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
- */
-const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
-
-	if (ciph != NULL)
-		{
-		if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-			return NULL;
-		}
-
-	return ciph;
-	}
-
-void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Disable timer for SCTP */
-	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-		{
-		memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
-		return;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
-	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
-		{
-		s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
-		}
-	
-	/* Set timeout to current time */
-	get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
-
-	/* Add duration to current time */
-	s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
-	}
-
-struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft)
-	{
-	struct timeval timenow;
-
-	/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
-	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
-		{
-		return NULL;
-		}
-
-	/* Get current time */
-	get_current_time(&timenow);
-
-	/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
-	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
-		(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
-		 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec))
-		{
-		memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
-		return timeleft;
-		}
-
-	/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
-	memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
-	timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
-	timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
-	if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0)
-		{
-		timeleft->tv_sec--;
-		timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
-		}
-
-	/* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0
-	 * to prevent issues because of small devergences with
-	 * socket timeouts.
-	 */
-	if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000)
-		{
-		memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
-		}
-	
-
-	return timeleft;
-	}
-
-int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
-	{
-	struct timeval timeleft;
-
-	/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
-	if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL)
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
-	if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0)
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Timer expired, so return true */	
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
-	{
-	s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
-	if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
-		s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
-	dtls1_start_timer(s);
-	}
-
-void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	/* Reset everything */
-	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
-	memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
-	s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
-	/* Clear retransmission buffer */
-	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
-	{
-	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
-
-	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
-	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
-		{
-		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
-		}
-
-	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
-		{
-		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
-	{
-	/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
-	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	dtls1_double_timeout(s);
-
-	if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
-	if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
-		{
-		s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	dtls1_start_timer(s);
-	return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
-	}
-
-static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-	struct _timeb tb;
-	_ftime(&tb);
-	t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
-	t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-	struct timeb tb;
-	ftime(&tb);
-	t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
-	t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
-#else
-	gettimeofday(t, NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
-	s->d1->listen = 1;
-
-	ret = SSL_accept(s);
-	if (ret <= 0) return ret;
-	
-	(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
-	return 1;
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c4004bf..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_meth.h */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
-		return(DTLSv1_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_method,
-			dtls1_accept,
-			dtls1_connect,
-			dtls1_get_method)
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 363fc8c8..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1865 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
-static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
-{	int ret,sat,brw,i;
-
-	if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
-	{	const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
-		long l;
-
-		if (is_endian.little)			break;
-		/* not reached on little-endians */
-		/* following test is redundant, because input is
-		 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
-		if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7)	break;
-
-		l  = *((long *)v1);
-		l -= *((long *)v2);
-		if (l>128)		return 128;
-		else if (l<-128)	return -128;
-		else			return (int)l;
-	} while (0);
-
-	ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
-	sat = 0;
-	brw = ret>>8;	/* brw is either 0 or -1 */
-	if (ret & 0x80)
-	{	for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
-		{	brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
-			sat |= ~brw;
-			brw >>= 8;
-		}
-	}
-	else
-	{	for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
-		{	brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
-			sat |= brw;
-			brw >>= 8;
-		}
-	}
-	brw <<= 8;	/* brw is either 0 or -256 */
-
-	if (sat&0xff)	return brw | 0x80;
-	else		return brw + (ret&0xFF);
-}
-
-static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, 
-	int len, int peek);
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
-static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, 
-    unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
-#if 0
-static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
-	unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
-#endif
-static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
-	unsigned char *priority);
-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			  unsigned int len);
-
-/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
-static int
-dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
-    {
-    DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
-
-    rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
-    
-    if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
-        OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-    
-    s->packet = rdata->packet;
-    s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
-    memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
-    memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
-	
-	/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
-	memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
-    
-    return(1);
-    }
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
-	{
-	DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
-	pitem *item;
-
-	/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
-	if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
-		return 0;
-		
-	rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
-	item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
-	if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
-		{
-		if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
-		if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
-		
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	
-	rdata->packet = s->packet;
-	rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
-	memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
-	memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
-
-	item->data = rdata;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
-	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
-	    (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
-		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
-	}
-#endif
-
-	s->packet = NULL;
-	s->packet_length = 0;
-	memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
-	memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
-	
-	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
-	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
-    {
-    pitem *item;
-
-    item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
-    if (item)
-        {
-        dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
-
-        OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-		pitem_free(item);
-
-        return(1);
-        }
-
-    return(0);
-    }
-
-
-/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed 
- * yet */
-#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
-                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
-                   &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
-
-/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
-#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
-                   dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
-                   &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
-    {
-    pitem *item;
-    
-    item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
-    if (item)
-        {
-        /* Check if epoch is current. */
-        if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
-            return(1);  /* Nothing to do. */
-        
-        /* Process all the records. */
-        while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
-            {
-            dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
-            if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
-                return(0);
-            dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), 
-                s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
-            }
-        }
-
-    /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records 
-     * have been processed */
-    s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
-    s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
-
-    return(1);
-    }
-
-
-#if 0
-
-static int
-dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
-	{
-	pitem *item;
-	PQ_64BIT priority = 
-		(((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | 
-		((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
-	
-	if ( ! SSL_in_init(s))  /* if we're not (re)negotiating, 
-							   nothing buffered */
-		return 0;
-
-
-	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
-	if (item && item->priority == priority)
-		{
-		/* Check if we've received the record of interest.  It must be
-		 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
-		 * buffering */
-		DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
-		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
-		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
-		
-		if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-		
-		s->packet = rdata->packet;
-		s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
-		memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
-		memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
-		
-		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		
-		/* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
-		return(1);
-		}
-	
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-#endif
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
-{
-	int i,al;
-	int enc_err;
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
-	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
-	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
-	sess = s->session;
-
-	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
-	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
-	 */
-	rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
-	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
-	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
-	 * the decryption or by the decompression
-	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
-	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
-
-	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
-	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
-
-	/* check is not needed I believe */
-	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
-	rr->data=rr->input;
-
-	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	/* enc_err is:
-	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
-	 *    1: if the padding is valid
-	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
-	if (enc_err == 0)
-		{
-		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length = 0;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
-{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
-	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if ((sess != NULL) &&
-	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
-	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
-		{
-		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
-		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
-
-		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
-		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
-		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
-		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
-		 */
-		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
-		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
-		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-			{
-			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
-			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
-			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
-			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
-			 * */
-			mac = mac_tmp;
-			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
-			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
-			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
-			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
-			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
-			}
-
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-			enc_err = -1;
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
-			enc_err = -1;
-		}
-
-	if (enc_err < 0)
-		{
-		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length = 0;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* r->length is now just compressed */
-	if (s->expand != NULL)
-		{
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	rr->off=0;
-	/* So at this point the following is true
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
-	 *			   after use :-).
-	 */
-
-	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
-	s->packet_length=0;
-	dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
-	return(1);
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(0);
-}
-
-
-/* Call this to get a new input record.
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
- * or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
- */
-/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
-int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
-	int i,n;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned char *p = NULL;
-	unsigned short version;
-	DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
-	unsigned int is_next_epoch;
-
-	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
-
-	/* The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the
-	 * pending records.  This is a non-blocking operation. */
-	dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
-
-	/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
-	if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
-		return 1;
-
-	/* get something from the wire */
-again:
-	/* check if we have the header */
-	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
-		(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
-		{
-		n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
-		/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
-
-		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
-		if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			goto again;
-			}
-
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
-		p=s->packet;
-
-		/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
-		rr->type= *(p++);
-		ssl_major= *(p++);
-		ssl_minor= *(p++);
-		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
-
-		/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ 
-		n2s(p,rr->epoch);
-
-		memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
-		p+=6;
-
-		n2s(p,rr->length);
-
-		/* Lets check version */
-		if (!s->first_packet)
-			{
-			if (version != s->version)
-				{
-				/* unexpected version, silently discard */
-				rr->length = 0;
-				s->packet_length = 0;
-				goto again;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
-			{
-			/* wrong version, silently discard record */
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			goto again;
-			}
-
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
-			{
-			/* record too long, silently discard it */
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			goto again;
-			}
-
-		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
-		}
-
-	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
-	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-		{
-		/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
-		i=rr->length;
-		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-
-		/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
-		if ( n != i)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			goto again;
-			}
-
-		/* now n == rr->length,
-		 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
-		}
-	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
-	/* match epochs.  NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
-	bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
-	if ( bitmap == NULL)
-		{
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
-		goto again;   /* get another record */
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
-	if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-  		{
-#endif
-		/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
-		 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
-		 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
-		 * since they arrive from different connections and
-		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
-		 */
-		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
-			goto again;     /* get another record */
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-  		}
-#endif
-
-	/* just read a 0 length packet */
-	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
-
-	/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
-	 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
-	 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
-	 * anything while listening.
-	 */
-	if (is_next_epoch)
-		{
-		if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
-			{
-			dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
-			}
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length = 0;
-		goto again;
-		}
-
-	if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
-		{
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
-		goto again;   /* get another record */
-		}
-
-	return(1);
-
-	}
-
-/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
- *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
- * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- *     Change cipher spec protocol
- *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- *     Alert protocol
- *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- *     Handshake protocol
- *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- *     Application data protocol
- *             none of our business
- */
-int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
-	{
-	int al,i,j,ret;
-	unsigned int n;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
-
-	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
-		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
-			return(-1);
-
-    /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
-	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 
-		(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
-	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
-	if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
-		return ret;
-
-	/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
-	 * app data with SCTP.
-	 */
-	if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
-	    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
-	     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
-	     s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
-#else
-	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
-#endif
-		{
-		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-
-start:
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
-	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
-	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
-	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
-	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
-
-	/* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
-	 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
-	 * in advance, if any.
-	 */
-	if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
-		{
-		pitem *item;
-		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
-		if (item)
-			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-				{
-				DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
-				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
-				}
-#endif
-
-			dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
-
-			OPENSSL_free(item->data);
-			pitem_free(item);
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Check for timeout */
-	if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
-		goto start;
-
-	/* get new packet if necessary */
-	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
-		{
-		ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
-		if (ret <= 0) 
-			{
-			ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
-			/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
-			if (ret <= 0)  
-				return(ret);
-			else
-				goto start;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-		{
-		rr->length = 0;
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
-
-	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
-	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
-		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
-		{
-		/* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
-		 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
-		 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
-		 * than dropping the connection.
-		 */
-		dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
-		rr->length = 0;
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
-	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		rr->length=0;
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-
-	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
-		{
-		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
-		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
-		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
-			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
-		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
-			n = rr->length;
-		else
-			n = (unsigned int)len;
-
-		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
-		if (!peek)
-			{
-			rr->length-=n;
-			rr->off+=n;
-			if (rr->length == 0)
-				{
-				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-				rr->off=0;
-				}
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			/* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
-			 * belated application data first, so retry.
-			 */
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
-			    rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
-			    (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
-				{
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				}
-
-			/* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
-			 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
-			 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
-			 */
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
-			    s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-				{
-				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
-				return(0);
-				}
-#endif			
-		return(n);
-		}
-
-
-	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
-	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
-
-	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
-	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
-	 */
-		{
-		unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
-		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
-		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
-
-		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
-			dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
-			}
-		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
-			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
-			dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
-			{
-			dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
-
-			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-			return(-1);
-			}
-#endif
-		/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
-		else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-			{
-			/* Application data while renegotiating
-			 * is allowed. Try again reading.
-			 */
-			if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
-				{
-				BIO *bio;
-				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
-				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-
-			/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
-			{
-            /* XDTLS:  In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
-             *  may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
-			if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
-				{
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
-				/*
-				 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
-				 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
-				 * non-existing alert...
-				 */
-				FIX ME
-#endif
-				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-				rr->length = 0;
-				goto start;
-				}
-
-			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
-			for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
-				{
-				dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
-				rr->length--;
-				}
-			*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-	 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
-	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
-
-	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
-	if ((!s->server) &&
-		(s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
-		(s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
-		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
-		{
-		s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
-
-		if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
-			(s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
-			(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 
-				s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
-			!s->s3->renegotiate)
-			{
-			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-			s->new_session = 1;
-			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
-			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
-				{
-				i=s->handshake_func(s);
-				if (i < 0) return(i);
-				if (i == 0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-					return(-1);
-					}
-
-				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
-					{
-					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
-						{
-						BIO *bio;
-						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
-						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
-						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
-						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
-						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
-						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
-						return(-1);
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
-		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
-		{
-		int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
-		int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
-
-		s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, 
-				s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->info_callback;
-		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-		if (cb != NULL)
-			{
-			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
-			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
-			}
-
-		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
-			{
-			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
-			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
-				{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				/* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
-				 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
-				 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
-				 */
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
-					BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
-					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-					return -1;
-					}
-#endif
-				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
-				return(0);
-				}
-#if 0
-            /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
-			/* now check if it's a missing record */
-			if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
-				{
-				unsigned short seq;
-				unsigned int frag_off;
-				unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
-
-				n2s(p, seq);
-				n2l3(p, frag_off);
-
-				dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
-										 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
-										 frag_off, &found);
-				if ( ! found  && SSL_in_init(s))
-					{
-					/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
-					/* requested a message not yet sent, 
-					   send an alert ourselves */
-					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
-						DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-					}
-				}
-#endif
-			}
-		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
-			{
-			char tmp[16];
-
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
-			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
-			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
-			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
-			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		rr->length=0;
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-		{
-		struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
-		unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-		dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
-
-		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			ccs_hdr_len = 3;
-
-		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
-		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
-		/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
-		if (	(rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || 
-			(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
-			{
-			i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		rr->length=0;
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 
-				rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		/* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
-		 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
-		 */
-		if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
-			{
-			goto start;
-			}
-
-		s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
-
-		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
-		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
-			goto err;
-
-		/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
-		dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
-
-		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-		/* Remember that a CCS has been received,
-		 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
-		 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
-		 * if no SCTP is used
-		 */
-		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
-#endif
-
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
-	if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && 
-		!s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-		
-		/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
-		dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
-		if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			goto start;
-			}
-
-		/* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
-		 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
-		 */
-		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-			{
-			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
-				return -1;
-
-			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
-			rr->length = 0;
-			goto start;
-			}
-
-		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
-			{
-#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
-       * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
-       * protocol violations): */
-			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
-				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
-				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#else
-			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#endif
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			s->new_session=1;
-			}
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
-			{
-			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
-				{
-				BIO *bio;
-				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
-				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
-				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
-				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
-				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	switch (rr->type)
-		{
-	default:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
-		/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
-		if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			goto start;
-			}
-#endif
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-		goto f_err;
-	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
-	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
-	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
-		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
-		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
-		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
-		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
-		 * but have application data.  If the library was
-		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
-		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
-		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
-		 * we will indulge it.
-		 */
-		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
-			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
-			((
-				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
-				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
-				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-				) || (
-					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
-					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
-					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-					)
-				))
-			{
-			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	/* not reached */
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int
-dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-		/* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
-		 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
-		 */
-		if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
-		    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
-		     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
-#else
-		if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
-#endif
-		{
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-		{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-	i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
-	return i;
-	}
-
-
-	/* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake 
-	 * is started. */
-static int
-have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, 
-	int len, int peek)
-	{
-	
-	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
-		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
-		{
-		unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
-		unsigned char *dst = buf;
-		unsigned int k,n;
-		
-		/* peek == 0 */
-		n = 0;
-		while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
-			{
-			*dst++ = *src++;
-			len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
-			n++;
-			}
-		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
-		for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
-			s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
-		return n;
-		}
-	
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-
-
-
-/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
- * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
- */
-int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
-	return i;
-	}
-
-static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			  unsigned int len)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*pseq;
-	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
-	int prefix_len = 0;
-	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
-	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	int bs;
-
-	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
-	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS:  want to see if we ever get here */
-		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
-		}
-
-	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
-	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
-		{
-		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			return(i);
-		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
-		}
-
-	if (len == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
-	wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
-	sess=s->session;
-
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (clear)
-		mac_size=0;
-	else
-		{
-		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-		if (mac_size < 0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
-
-	/* write the header */
-
-	*(p++)=type&0xff;
-	wr->type=type;
-
-	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
-	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
-	/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
-	pseq=p; 
-	p+=10;
-
-	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
-
-	/* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
-	 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
-	 */
-	if ( s->enc_write_ctx && 
-		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
-		bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
-	else
-		bs = 0;
-
-	wr->data=p + bs;  /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
-	wr->length=(int)len;
-	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
-
-	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
-	 * wr->data */
-
-	/* first we compress */
-	if (s->compress != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
-		wr->input=wr->data;
-		}
-
-	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
-	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
-	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
-
-	if (mac_size != 0)
-		{
-		if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
-			goto err;
-		wr->length+=mac_size;
-		}
-
-	/* this is true regardless of mac size */
-	wr->input=p;
-	wr->data=p;
-
-
-	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
-	if (bs)	/* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
-		{
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
-		/* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
-		 * the rest of randomness */
-		wr->length += bs;
-		}
-
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
-
-	/* record length after mac and block padding */
-/*	if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
-	(type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
-	
-	/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
-	
-	s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
-
-	/* XDTLS: ?? */
-/*	else
-	s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
-
-	memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
-	pseq+=6;
-	s2n(wr->length,pseq);
-
-	/* we should now have
-	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
-	 * wr->length long */
-	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
-	wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-#if 0  /* this is now done at the message layer */
-	/* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
-	if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-		dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, 
-			*((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
-#endif
-
-	ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
-
-	/* now let's set up wb */
-	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
-	wb->offset = 0;
-
-	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
-	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
-	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
-	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
-	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
-
-	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
-	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
-err:
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-
-
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
-	{
-	int cmp;
-	unsigned int shift;
-	const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-	cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
-	if (cmp > 0)
-		{
-		memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
-		return 1; /* this record in new */
-		}
-	shift = -cmp;
-	if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
-		return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
-	else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
-		return 0; /* record previously received */
-
-	memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
-	{
-	int cmp;
-	unsigned int shift;
-	const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-	cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
-	if (cmp > 0)
-		{
-		shift = cmp;
-		if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
-			bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
-		else
-			bitmap->map = 1UL;
-		memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
-		}
-	else	{
-		shift = -cmp;
-		if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
-			bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
-		}
-	}
-
-
-int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,j;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
-
-	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
-
-	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
-	*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
-	*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
-
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
-	if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
-		{	
-		s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
-#if 0
-		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)  /* waiting for a new msg */
-
-		else
-			s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-		fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
-#endif
-		l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
-	if (i <= 0)
-		{
-		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
-		/* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
-		    || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
-#endif
-		    )
-			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 
-				2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->info_callback;
-		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-		if (cb != NULL)
-			{
-			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
-			}
-		}
-	return(i);
-	}
-
-
-static DTLS1_BITMAP *
-dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
-    {
-    
-    *is_next_epoch = 0;
-
-    /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
-    if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
-        return &s->d1->bitmap;
-
-    /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
-    else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
-        (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
-            rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
-        {
-        *is_next_epoch = 1;
-        return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
-        }
-
-    return NULL;
-    }
-
-#if 0
-static int
-dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
-	unsigned long *offset)
-	{
-
-	/* alerts are passed up immediately */
-	if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
-		rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
-	 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
-	 * immediately) */
-	if ( SSL_in_init(s))
-		{
-		unsigned char *data = rr->data;
-		/* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
-		if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
-			rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-			{
-			unsigned short seq_num;
-			struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-			struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
-
-			if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-				{
-				dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
-				seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
-				*offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
-				seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
-				*offset = 0;
-				}
-				
-			/* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
-			 * retransmit of something we happened to previously 
-			 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
-			if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
-				return 0;
-			if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && 
-				seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
-				msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
-				return 0;
-			else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
-				(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
-					msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
-				return 0;
-			else
-				{
-				*priority = seq_num;
-				return 1;
-				}
-			}
-		else /* unknown record type */
-			return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-#endif
-
-void
-dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
-	{
-	unsigned char *seq;
-	unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
-
-	if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
-		{
-		seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
-		s->d1->r_epoch++;
-		memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
-		memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
-		memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-		s->d1->w_epoch++;
-		}
-
-	memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 535539ba..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,463 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/*
-  DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
-
-  Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc.
-  Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
-*/
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-
-#include "srtp.h"
-
-
-static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[]=
-    {
-    {
-    "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80",
-    SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80,
-    },
-    {
-    "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32",
-    SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32,
-    },
-#if 0
-    {
-    "SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80",
-    SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80,
-    },
-    {
-    "SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32",
-    SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32,
-    },
-#endif
-    {0}
-    };
-
-static int find_profile_by_name(char *profile_name,
-				SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr,unsigned len)
-	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
-	p=srtp_known_profiles;
-	while(p->name)
-		{
-		if((len == strlen(p->name)) && !strncmp(p->name,profile_name,
-							len))
-			{
-			*pptr=p;
-			return 0;
-			}
-
-		p++;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
-
-	char *col;
-	char *ptr=(char *)profiles_string;
-    
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
-
-	if(!(profiles=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null()))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
-		return 1;
-		}
-    
-	do
-		{
-		col=strchr(ptr,':');
-
-		if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
-					 col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
-			{
-			if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-				sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
-				return 1;
-				}
-
-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
-			sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
-			return 1;
-			}
-
-		if(col) ptr=col+1;
-		} while (col);
-
-	*out=profiles;
-    
-	return 0;
-	}
-    
-int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx,const char *profiles)
-	{
-	return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles,&ctx->srtp_profiles);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *s,const char *profiles)
-	{
-	return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles,&s->srtp_profiles);
-	}
-
-
-STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if(s != NULL)
-		{
-		if(s->srtp_profiles != NULL)
-			{
-			return s->srtp_profiles;
-			}
-		else if((s->ctx != NULL) &&
-			(s->ctx->srtp_profiles != NULL))
-			{
-			return s->ctx->srtp_profiles;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return s->srtp_profile;
-	}
-
-/* Note: this function returns 0 length if there are no 
-   profiles specified */
-int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
-	{
-	int ct=0;
-	int i;
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0;
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
-    
-	clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);    
-	ct=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); /* -1 if clnt == 0 */
-
-	if(p)
-		{
-		if(ct==0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-			return 1;
-			}
-
-		if((2 + ct*2 + 1) > maxlen)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
-			return 1;
-			}
-
-                /* Add the length */
-                s2n(ct * 2, p);
-		for(i=0;i<ct;i++)
-			{
-			prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i);
-			s2n(prof->id,p);
-			}
-
-                /* Add an empty use_mki value */
-                *p++ = 0;
-		}
-
-	*len=2 + ct*2 + 1;
-    
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
-	{
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
-        int ct;
-        int mki_len;
-	int i, srtp_pref;
-	unsigned int id;
-
-         /* Length value + the MKI length */
-        if(len < 3)
-		{            
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-                }
-
-        /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list */
-        n2s(d, ct);
-        len -= 2;
-        
-        /* Check that it is even */
-	if(ct%2)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-        
-        /* Check that lengths are consistent */
-	if(len < (ct + 1)) 
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-	s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-	/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
-	srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
-        
-	while(ct)
-		{
-		n2s(d,id);
-		ct-=2;
-                len-=2;
-
-		/*
-		 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
-		 * current match.
-		 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
-		 * does nothing.
-		 */
-		for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
-			{
-			sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
-			if (sprof->id == id)
-				{
-				s->srtp_profile = sprof;
-				srtp_pref = i;
-				break;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-        /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
-        mki_len = *d;
-        d++; len--;
-
-        if (mki_len != len)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
-	{
-	if(p)
-		{
-		if(maxlen < 5)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
-			return 1;
-			}
-
-		if(s->srtp_profile==0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED);
-			return 1;
-			}
-                s2n(2, p);
-		s2n(s->srtp_profile->id,p);
-                *p++ = 0;
-		}
-	*len=5;
-    
-	return 0;
-	}
-    
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned id;
-	int i;
-        int ct;
-
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
-
-	if(len!=5)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-        n2s(d, ct);
-	if(ct!=2)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	n2s(d,id);
-        if (*d)  /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
-		*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
-	/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
-	if (clnt == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
-		*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 1;
-		}
-    
-	/* Check to see if the server gave us something we support
-	   (and presumably offered)
-	*/
-	for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);i++)
-		{
-		prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i);
-	    
-		if(prof->id == id)
-			{
-			s->srtp_profile=prof;
-			*al=0;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-	*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 03b20a27..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1729 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
-		return(DTLSv1_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
-			dtls1_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			dtls1_get_server_method)
-
-int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-	int listen;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
-	char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
-#endif
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	listen = s->d1->listen;
-
-	/* init things to blank */
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
-	s->d1->listen = listen;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
-	 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
-	 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
-	 */
-	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
-	if (s->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
-	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
-	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch (s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
-			s->server=1;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
-				{
-				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
-				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
-				 * ...but not with SCTP :-)
-				 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-#endif
-					if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
-				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
-				}
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
-			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-
-			if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
-				s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
-			else
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
-			if (listen)
-				{
-				memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
-				}
-
-			/* If we're just listening, stop here */
-			if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-				{
-				ret = 2;
-				s->d1->listen = 0;
-				/* Set expected sequence numbers
-				 * to continue the handshake.
-				 */
-				s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
-				s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
-				s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			
-			break;
-			
-		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
-		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-
-			ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
-			if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-
-			/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
-			if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-			break;
-			
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
-			
-			if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))		
-				{
-				s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-			
-		case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
-			ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-			if (ret < 0) goto end;
-			
-			if (ret == 0)
-				{
-				if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK)
-					{
-					s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-					ret = -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				}
-
-			s->state=s->d1->next_state;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			s->renegotiate = 2;
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
-				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-				 */
-				snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
-				         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
-				SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
-				                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-				                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-				
-				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
-                         sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
-				}
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-			/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				dtls1_start_timer(s);
-				ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-#else
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
-
-			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
-			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
-			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
-			 * hint if provided */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->session->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
-			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
-				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
-					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
-					)
-				    )
-				)
-			    )
-				{
-				dtls1_start_timer(s);
-				ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
-			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
-				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
-				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
-				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
-				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
-				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
-				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
-				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
-				 * and in RFC 2246): */
-				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
-				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
-				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
-				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
-				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
-				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
-				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
-				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				/* no cert request */
-				skip=1;
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-					s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-#endif
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
-				dtls1_start_timer(s);
-				ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-					s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-#endif
-#else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-#endif
-#endif
-				s->init_num=0;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			dtls1_start_timer(s);
-			ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-		
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
-				if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
-					{
-					s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-					s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-					}
-				
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
-			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
-				}
-			else {
-				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
-					{
-					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-					if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_num=0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
-			 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-			 */
-			snprintf((char *) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
-			         DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
-			SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
-			                           sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
-			                           sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
-			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
-			         sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
-				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
-				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
-				 * message is not sent.
-				 */
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num = 0;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-
-				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
-				 * a client cert, it can be verified */ 
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-					NID_md5,
-					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-					NID_sha1,
-					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
-			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
-			    state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
-				s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
-			else
-#endif			
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-			if (!s->hit)
-				{
-				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
-				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-				 */
-				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
-				}
-#endif
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
-				 * will be ignored if no SCTP used.
-				 */
-				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
-#endif
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-					{
-					s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
-					}
-#endif
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-#if 0
-			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-			s->init_buf=NULL;
-#endif
-
-			/* remove buffering on output */
-			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
-				{
-				s->renegotiate=0;
-				s->new_session=0;
-				
-				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-				
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
-				/* s->server=1; */
-				s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
-
-				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-				}
-			
-			ret = 1;
-
-			/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
-			s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
-			/* next message is server hello */
-			s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
-			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-		
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if (s->debug)
-				{
-				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
-					goto end;
-				}
-
-
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
-end:
-	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
-	s->in_handshake--;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-		/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake
-		 * mode and prevent stream identifier other
-		 * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
-		 */
-		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit 
-		 * requests for it */
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned int msg_len;
-	unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
-
-	if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
-		{
-		buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-		msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-		*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
-		*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
-
-		if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
-		     s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
-			 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return 0;
-			}
-
-		*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
-		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
-		p += s->d1->cookie_len;
-		msg_len = p - msg;
-
-		dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
-			DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
-
-		s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned int sl;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p=s->s3->server_random;
-		ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
-		 * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the
-		 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
-		 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
-		 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
-		 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
-		 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
-		 */
-		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
-			s->session->session_id_length=0;
-
-		sl=s->session->session_id_length;
-		if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		*(p++)=sl;
-		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
-		p+=sl;
-
-		/* put the cipher */
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
-			return -1;
-		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* put the compression method */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		*(p++)=0;
-#else
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-			*(p++)=0;
-		else
-			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-#endif
-
-		/* do the header */
-		l=(p-d);
-		d=buf;
-
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q;
-	int j,num;
-	RSA *rsa;
-	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int u;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encodedlen = 0;
-	int curve_id = 0;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
-#endif
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int al,i;
-	unsigned long type;
-	int n;
-	CERT *cert;
-	BIGNUM *r[4];
-	int nr[4],kn;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-		cert=s->cert;
-
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
-		n=0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (type & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
-			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				{
-				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-				if(rsa == NULL)
-				{
-					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-					goto f_err;
-				}
-				RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
-				}
-			if (rsa == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			r[0]=rsa->n;
-			r[1]=rsa->e;
-			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-			if (type & SSL_kEDH)
-			{
-			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
-			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-			if (dhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-				{
-				DH_free(dh);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
-			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
-			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
-			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
-				{
-				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
-				    {
-				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
-				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
-				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
-					(dh->priv_key == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			r[0]=dh->p;
-			r[1]=dh->g;
-			r[2]=dh->pub_key;
-			}
-		else 
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-			if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *group;
-
-			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
-			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				{
-				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-				}
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-				{
-				EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
-			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
-				{
-				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
-				    {
-				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-
-			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
-			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
-			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
-			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
-			 */
-			if ((curve_id = 
-			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
-			    == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Encode the public key.
-			 * First check the size of encoding and
-			 * allocate memory accordingly.
-			 */
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
-			if (encodedlen == 0) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
-			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
-			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
-			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
-			 * structure. 
-			 */
-			n = 4 + encodedlen;
-
-			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
-			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
-			 */
-			r[0]=NULL;
-			r[1]=NULL;
-			r[2]=NULL;
-			r[3]=NULL;
-			}
-		else 
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			if (type & SSL_kPSK)
-				{
-				/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
-				n+=2+strlen(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-				}
-			else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-			n+=2+nr[i];
-			}
-
-		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-			{
-			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
-				== NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			pkey=NULL;
-			kn=0;
-			}
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-			s2n(nr[i],p);
-			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
-			p+=nr[i];
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 
-			{
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
-			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
-			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
-			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
-			 * the actual encoded point itself
-			 */
-			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = 0;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = curve_id;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = encodedlen;
-			p += 1;
-			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
-			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
-			    encodedlen);
-			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			encodedPoint = NULL;
-			p += encodedlen;
-			}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		if (type & SSL_kPSK)
-			{
-			/* copy PSK identity hint */
-			s2n(strlen(s->session->psk_identity_hint), p);
-			strncpy((char *)p, s->session->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->session->psk_identity_hint));
-			p+=strlen(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-			}
-#endif
-
-		/* not anonymous */
-		if (pkey != NULL)
-			{
-			/* n is the length of the params, they start at
-			 * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
-			 * at the end. */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-				{
-				q=md_buf;
-				j=0;
-				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
-					{
-					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
-						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
-					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
-						(unsigned int *)&i);
-					q+=i;
-					j+=i;
-					}
-				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
-					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s2n(u,p);
-				n+=u+2;
-				}
-			else
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
-				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-				{
-				/* lets do DSS */
-				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
-				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
-					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s2n(i,p);
-				n+=i+2;
-				}
-			else
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
-				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-				{
-				/* let's do ECDSA */
-				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
-				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
-					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s2n(i,p);
-				n+=i+2;
-				}
-			else
-#endif
-				{
-				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
-			SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
-
-		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
-		 * it off */
-		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,j,nl,off,n;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *name;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned int msg_len;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
-		{
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
-		p++;
-		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
-		d[0]=n;
-		p+=n;
-		n++;
-
-		off=n;
-		p+=2;
-		n+=2;
-
-		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
-		nl=0;
-		if (sk != NULL)
-			{
-			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-				{
-				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
-				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
-					{
-					s2n(j,p);
-					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
-					n+=2+j;
-					nl+=2+j;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					d=p;
-					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
-					j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
-					n+=j;
-					nl+=j;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		/* else no CA names */
-		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
-		s2n(nl,p);
-
-		d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-		s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
-		s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
-
-		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
-		 * it off */
-
-		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		s->init_off=0;
-#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-/* XXX: what to do about this? */
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		s->init_num += 4;
-#endif
-
-		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
-		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
-			SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long l;
-	X509 *x;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-			if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
-			    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return(0);
-				}
-			}
-
-		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
-		s->init_num=(int)l;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
-		{
-		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
-		int len, slen;
-		unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-		HMAC_CTX hctx;
-		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-		unsigned char key_name[16];
-
-		/* get session encoding length */
-		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
-		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
- 		 * too long
- 		 */
-		if (slen > 0xFF00)
-			return -1;
-		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- 		 * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
- 		 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
- 		 */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
-			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
-			EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
-			return -1;
-		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
-		if (!senc)
-			return -1;
-		p = senc;
-		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
-
-		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
-		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
-		 * from parent ctx.
-		 */
-		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
-			{
-			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
-							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_free(senc);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
-			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
-			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
-			}
-		l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
-		/* Skip ticket length for now */
-		p += 2;
-		/* Output key name */
-		macstart = p;
-		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
-		p += 16;
-		/* output IV */
-		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
-		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-		/* Encrypt session data */
-		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
-		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
-		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
-		p += hlen;
-		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
-		/* Total length */
-		len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
-		/* Ticket length */
-		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
-		s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
-
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num= len;
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		OPENSSL_free(senc);
-
-		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
-		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
-			SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
-
-		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
-	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 192c5def..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/dtls1.h */
-/* 
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H
-#define HEADER_DTLS1_H
-
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-#include <resource.h>
-#include <sys/timeb.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-/* Needed for struct timeval */
-#include <winsock.h>
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
-#include <sys/timeval.h>
-#else
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-#include <sys/times.h>
-#else
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#define DTLS1_VERSION			0xFEFF
-#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION		DTLS1_VERSION
-
-#define DTLS1_BAD_VER			0x0100
-
-#if 0
-/* this alert description is not specified anywhere... */
-#define DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE    110
-#endif
-
-/* lengths of messages */
-#define DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH                     256
-
-#define DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH                  13
-
-#define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH                  12
-
-#define DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT                   -2
-#define DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY                 -3
-
-#define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH                  1
-
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
-#define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH                   7
-#else
-#define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH                   2
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL	"EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP"
-#endif
-
-typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
-	{
-	unsigned long map;		/* track 32 packets on 32-bit systems
-					   and 64 - on 64-bit systems */
-	unsigned char max_seq_num[8];	/* max record number seen so far,
-					   64-bit value in big-endian
-					   encoding */
-	} DTLS1_BITMAP;
-
-struct dtls1_retransmit_state
-	{
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx;	/* cryptographic state */
-	EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash;			/* used for mac generation */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_CTX *compress;				/* compression */
-#else
-	char *compress;	
-#endif
-	SSL_SESSION *session;
-	unsigned short epoch;
-	};
-
-struct hm_header_st
-	{
-	unsigned char type;
-	unsigned long msg_len;
-	unsigned short seq;
-	unsigned long frag_off;
-	unsigned long frag_len;
-	unsigned int is_ccs;
-	struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state;
-	};
-
-struct ccs_header_st
-	{
-	unsigned char type;
-	unsigned short seq;
-	};
-
-struct dtls1_timeout_st
-	{
-	/* Number of read timeouts so far */
-	unsigned int read_timeouts;
-	
-	/* Number of write timeouts so far */
-	unsigned int write_timeouts;
-	
-	/* Number of alerts received so far */
-	unsigned int num_alerts;
-	};
-
-typedef struct record_pqueue_st
-	{
-	unsigned short epoch;
-	pqueue q;
-	} record_pqueue;
-
-typedef struct hm_fragment_st
-	{
-	struct hm_header_st msg_header;
-	unsigned char *fragment;
-	unsigned char *reassembly;
-	} hm_fragment;
-
-typedef struct dtls1_state_st
-	{
-	unsigned int send_cookie;
-	unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char rcvd_cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int cookie_len;
-
-	/* 
-	 * The current data and handshake epoch.  This is initially
-	 * undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is
-	 * completed 
-	 */
-	unsigned short r_epoch;
-	unsigned short w_epoch;
-
-	/* records being received in the current epoch */
-	DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap;
-
-	/* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */
-	DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap;
-
-	/* handshake message numbers */
-	unsigned short handshake_write_seq;
-	unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq;
-
-	unsigned short handshake_read_seq;
-
-	/* save last sequence number for retransmissions */
-	unsigned char last_write_sequence[8];
-
-	/* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */
-	record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
-	record_pqueue processed_rcds;
-
-	/* Buffered handshake messages */
-	pqueue buffered_messages;
-
-	/* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
-	pqueue sent_messages;
-
-	/* Buffered application records.
-	 * Only for records between CCS and Finished
-	 * to prevent either protocol violation or
-	 * unnecessary message loss.
-	 */
-	record_pqueue buffered_app_data;
-
-	/* Is set when listening for new connections with dtls1_listen() */
-	unsigned int listen;
-
-	unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
-
-	struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
-	struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr;
-
-	struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout;
-
-	/* Indicates when the last handshake msg or heartbeat sent will timeout */
-	struct timeval next_timeout;
-
-	/* Timeout duration */
-	unsigned short timeout_duration;
-
-	/* storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not
-	 * yet processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */
-	unsigned char alert_fragment[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
-	unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
-
-	unsigned int retransmitting;
-	unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	/* used when SSL_ST_XX_FLUSH is entered */
-	int next_state;
-
-	int shutdown_received;
-#endif
-
-	} DTLS1_STATE;
-
-typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
-	{
-	unsigned char *packet;
-	unsigned int   packet_length;
-	SSL3_BUFFER    rbuf;
-	SSL3_RECORD    rrec;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-	struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo;
-#endif
-	} DTLS1_RECORD_DATA;
-
-#endif
-
-/* Timeout multipliers (timeout slice is defined in apps/timeouts.h */
-#define DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT                      2
-#define DTLS1_TMO_WRITE_COUNT                     2
-
-#define DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT                     12
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index fd7c67bb..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2221 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-
-/*  ssl/kssl.c  --  Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
-**
-**  19990701	VRS 	Started.
-**  200011??	Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte
-**          		Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32.
-**          		Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots.
-**  20010413	Simon Wilkinson, VRS
-**          		Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ.
-*/
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#define KRB5_PRIVATE	1
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#ifndef ENOMEM
-#define ENOMEM KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
-#endif
-
-/* 
- * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
- * the Kerberos DLLs be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
- * work.  Therefore, all Kerberos routines are loaded at run time
- * and we do not link to a .LIB file.
- */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-/* 
- * The purpose of the following pre-processor statements is to provide
- * compatibility with different releases of MIT Kerberos for Windows.
- * All versions up to 1.2 used macros.  But macros do not allow for
- * a binary compatible interface for DLLs.  Therefore, all macros are
- * being replaced by function calls.  The following code will allow
- * an OpenSSL DLL built on Windows to work whether or not the macro
- * or function form of the routines are utilized.
- */
-#ifdef  krb5_cc_get_principal
-#define NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
-#undef  krb5_cc_get_principal
-#endif
-#define krb5_cc_get_principal    kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
-
-#define krb5_free_data_contents  kssl_krb5_free_data_contents   
-#define krb5_free_context        kssl_krb5_free_context         
-#define krb5_auth_con_free       kssl_krb5_auth_con_free        
-#define krb5_free_principal      kssl_krb5_free_principal       
-#define krb5_mk_req_extended     kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended      
-#define krb5_get_credentials     kssl_krb5_get_credentials      
-#define krb5_cc_default          kssl_krb5_cc_default           
-#define krb5_sname_to_principal  kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal   
-#define krb5_init_context        kssl_krb5_init_context         
-#define krb5_free_ticket         kssl_krb5_free_ticket          
-#define krb5_rd_req              kssl_krb5_rd_req               
-#define krb5_kt_default          kssl_krb5_kt_default           
-#define krb5_kt_resolve          kssl_krb5_kt_resolve           
-/* macros in mit 1.2.2 and earlier; functions in mit 1.2.3 and greater */
-#ifndef krb5_kt_close
-#define krb5_kt_close            kssl_krb5_kt_close
-#endif /* krb5_kt_close */
-#ifndef krb5_kt_get_entry
-#define krb5_kt_get_entry        kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry
-#endif /* krb5_kt_get_entry */
-#define krb5_auth_con_init       kssl_krb5_auth_con_init        
-
-#define krb5_principal_compare   kssl_krb5_principal_compare
-#define krb5_decrypt_tkt_part    kssl_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part
-#define krb5_timeofday           kssl_krb5_timeofday
-#define krb5_rc_default          kssl_krb5_rc_default
-
-#ifdef krb5_rc_initialize
-#undef krb5_rc_initialize
-#endif
-#define krb5_rc_initialize   kssl_krb5_rc_initialize
-
-#ifdef krb5_rc_get_lifespan
-#undef krb5_rc_get_lifespan
-#endif
-#define krb5_rc_get_lifespan kssl_krb5_rc_get_lifespan
-
-#ifdef krb5_rc_destroy
-#undef krb5_rc_destroy
-#endif
-#define krb5_rc_destroy      kssl_krb5_rc_destroy
-
-#define valid_cksumtype      kssl_valid_cksumtype
-#define krb5_checksum_size   kssl_krb5_checksum_size
-#define krb5_kt_free_entry   kssl_krb5_kt_free_entry
-#define krb5_auth_con_setrcache  kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache
-#define krb5_auth_con_getrcache  kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache
-#define krb5_get_server_rcache   kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache
-
-/* Prototypes for built in stubs */
-void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context, krb5_data *);
-void kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context, krb5_principal );
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context,
-                                     krb5_const char *,
-                                     krb5_keytab *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_kt_default(krb5_context,
-                                     krb5_keytab *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context, krb5_ticket *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *, 
-                                 krb5_const krb5_data *,
-                                 krb5_const_principal, krb5_keytab, 
-                                 krb5_flags *,krb5_ticket **);
-
-krb5_boolean kssl_krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal,
-                                         krb5_const_principal);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context,
-                                          krb5_auth_context  *,
-                                          krb5_const krb5_flags,
-                                          krb5_data  *,
-                                          krb5_creds  *,
-                                          krb5_data  * );
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_init_context(krb5_context *);
-void kssl_krb5_free_context(krb5_context);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_cc_default(krb5_context,krb5_ccache  *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5_context,
-                                             krb5_const char  *,
-                                             krb5_const char  *,
-                                             krb5_int32,
-                                             krb5_principal  *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context,
-                                          krb5_const krb5_flags,
-                                          krb5_ccache,
-                                          krb5_creds  *,
-                                          krb5_creds  *  *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context,
-                                        krb5_auth_context  *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5_context context, 
-                                           krb5_ccache cache,
-                                           krb5_principal *principal);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context,krb5_auth_context);
-size_t kssl_krb5_checksum_size(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype);
-krb5_boolean kssl_valid_cksumtype(krb5_cksumtype ctype);
-krb5_error_code krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context,krb5_keytab_entry FAR * );
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context, 
-                                             krb5_auth_context, 
-                                             krb5_rcache);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5_context, 
-                                            krb5_const krb5_data *,
-                                            krb5_rcache *);
-krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5_context, 
-                                             krb5_auth_context,
-                                             krb5_rcache *);
-
-/* Function pointers (almost all Kerberos functions are _stdcall) */
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)
-	=NULL;
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )
-	=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_default)(krb5_context,
-                                                     krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_ticket)(krb5_context, 
-                                                      krb5_ticket *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rd_req)(krb5_context, 
-                                                 krb5_auth_context *, 
-                                                 krb5_const krb5_data *,
-                                                 krb5_const_principal, 
-                                                 krb5_keytab, krb5_flags *,
-                                                 krb5_ticket **)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
-			 krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_data *, krb5_creds *,
-			 krb5_data * )=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_init_context)(krb5_context *)=NULL;
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_context)(krb5_context)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_default)(krb5_context,
-                                                     krb5_ccache  *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_const char *,
-			 krb5_int32, krb5_principal *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_ccache,
-			 krb5_creds *, krb5_creds **)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)
-			(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
-			 krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)
-			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part)
-                        (krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *,
-                                           krb5_ticket *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_timeofday)
-                        (krb5_context context, krb5_int32 *timeret)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_default)
-                        (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache *rc)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_initialize)
-                        (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
-                                     krb5_deltat lifespan)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan)
-                        (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
-                                       krb5_deltat *lifespan)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_destroy)
-                        (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc)=NULL;
-static krb5_boolean (_stdcall *p_krb5_principal_compare)
-                     (krb5_context, krb5_const_principal, krb5_const_principal)=NULL;
-static size_t (_stdcall *p_krb5_checksum_size)(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype)=NULL;
-static krb5_boolean (_stdcall *p_valid_cksumtype)(krb5_cksumtype ctype)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_free_entry)
-                        (krb5_context,krb5_keytab_entry * )=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache)(krb5_context, 
-                                                               krb5_auth_context, 
-                                                               krb5_rcache)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_get_server_rcache)(krb5_context, 
-                                                              krb5_const krb5_data *, 
-                                                              krb5_rcache *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (* p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache)(krb5_context, 
-                                                      krb5_auth_context,
-                                                      krb5_rcache *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_kt_close)(krb5_context context, 
-                                                    krb5_keytab keytab)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_kt_get_entry)(krb5_context context, 
-                                                        krb5_keytab keytab,
-                       krb5_const_principal principal, krb5_kvno vno,
-                       krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_keytab_entry *entry)=NULL;
-static int krb5_loaded = 0;     /* only attempt to initialize func ptrs once */
-
-/* Function to Load the Kerberos 5 DLL and initialize function pointers */
-void
-load_krb5_dll(void)
-	{
-	HANDLE hKRB5_32;
-    
-	krb5_loaded++;
-	hKRB5_32 = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KRB5_32"));
-	if (!hKRB5_32)
-		return;
-
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_data_contents =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_data_contents" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_context =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_context" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_free =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_free" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_principal =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_principal" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_mk_req_extended =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_mk_req_extended" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_get_credentials =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_credentials" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_get_principal =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_get_principal" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_default =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_default" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_sname_to_principal =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_sname_to_principal" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_init_context =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_init_context" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_free_ticket =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_ticket" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rd_req =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rd_req" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_principal_compare =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_principal_compare" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_timeofday =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_timeofday" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_default =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_default" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_initialize =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_initialize" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_get_lifespan" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_destroy =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_destroy" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_default =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_default" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_resolve =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_resolve" );
-	(FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_init =
-		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_init" );
-        (FARPROC) p_valid_cksumtype =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "valid_cksumtype" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_checksum_size =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_checksum_size" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_free_entry =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_free_entry" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_setrcache" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_get_server_rcache =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_server_rcache" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_getrcache" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_close =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_close" );
-        (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_get_entry =
-                GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_get_entry" );
-	}
-
-/* Stubs for each function to be dynamicly loaded */
-void
-kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context CO, krb5_data  * data)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_free_data_contents )
-		p_krb5_free_data_contents(CO,data);
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended (krb5_context CO,
-                          krb5_auth_context  * pACO,
-                          krb5_const krb5_flags F,
-                          krb5_data  * pD1,
-                          krb5_creds  * pC,
-                          krb5_data  * pD2)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_mk_req_extended )
-		return(p_krb5_mk_req_extended(CO,pACO,F,pD1,pC,pD2));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context CO,
-                       krb5_auth_context  * pACO)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_auth_con_init )
-		return(p_krb5_auth_con_init(CO,pACO));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_auth_con_free (krb5_context CO,
-                        krb5_auth_context ACO)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_auth_con_free )
-		return(p_krb5_auth_con_free(CO,ACO));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context CO,
-                         krb5_const krb5_flags F,
-                         krb5_ccache CC,
-                         krb5_creds  * pCR,
-                         krb5_creds  ** ppCR)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_get_credentials )
-		return(p_krb5_get_credentials(CO,F,CC,pCR,ppCR));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5_context CO,
-                            krb5_const char  * pC1,
-                            krb5_const char  * pC2,
-                            krb5_int32 I,
-                            krb5_principal  * pPR)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_sname_to_principal )
-		return(p_krb5_sname_to_principal(CO,pC1,pC2,I,pPR));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_cc_default(krb5_context CO,
-                    krb5_ccache  * pCC)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_cc_default )
-		return(p_krb5_cc_default(CO,pCC));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_init_context(krb5_context * pCO)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_init_context )
-		return(p_krb5_init_context(pCO));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-void
-kssl_krb5_free_context(krb5_context CO)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_free_context )
-		p_krb5_free_context(CO);
-	}
-
-void
-kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context c, krb5_principal p)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_free_principal )
-		p_krb5_free_principal(c,p);
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context con,
-                    krb5_const char * sz,
-                    krb5_keytab * kt)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_kt_resolve )
-		return(p_krb5_kt_resolve(con,sz,kt));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_kt_default(krb5_context con,
-                    krb5_keytab * kt)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_kt_default )
-		return(p_krb5_kt_default(con,kt));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context con,
-                     krb5_ticket * kt)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_free_ticket )
-		return(p_krb5_free_ticket(con,kt));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context * pacon,
-                krb5_const krb5_data * data,
-                krb5_const_principal princ, krb5_keytab keytab,
-                krb5_flags * flags, krb5_ticket ** pptkt)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_rd_req )
-		return(p_krb5_rd_req(con,pacon,data,princ,keytab,flags,pptkt));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_boolean
-krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context con, krb5_const_principal princ1,
-                krb5_const_principal princ2)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_principal_compare )
-		return(p_krb5_principal_compare(con,princ1,princ2));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *keys,
-                krb5_ticket *ticket)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part )
-		return(p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(con,keys,ticket));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_timeofday(krb5_context con, krb5_int32 *timeret)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_timeofday )
-		return(p_krb5_timeofday(con,timeret));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_rc_default(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache *rc)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_rc_default )
-		return(p_krb5_rc_default(con,rc));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat lifespan)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_rc_initialize )
-		return(p_krb5_rc_initialize(con, rc, lifespan));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat *lifespanp)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan )
-		return(p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan(con, rc, lifespanp));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc)
-	{
-	if (!krb5_loaded)
-		load_krb5_dll();
-
-	if ( p_krb5_rc_destroy )
-		return(p_krb5_rc_destroy(con, rc));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-size_t 
-krb5_checksum_size(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype)
-        {
-        if (!krb5_loaded)
-                load_krb5_dll();
-
-        if ( p_krb5_checksum_size )
-                return(p_krb5_checksum_size(context, ctype));
-        else
-                return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-
-krb5_boolean 
-valid_cksumtype(krb5_cksumtype ctype)
-        {
-        if (!krb5_loaded)
-                load_krb5_dll();
-
-        if ( p_valid_cksumtype )
-                return(p_valid_cksumtype(ctype));
-        else
-                return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-
-krb5_error_code 
-krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context con,krb5_keytab_entry * entry)
-        {
-        if (!krb5_loaded)
-                load_krb5_dll();
-
-        if ( p_krb5_kt_free_entry )
-                return(p_krb5_kt_free_entry(con,entry));
-        else
-                return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-                 
-/* Structure definitions  */
-#ifndef NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
-#ifndef krb5_x
-#define krb5_x(ptr,args) ((ptr)?((*(ptr)) args):(abort(),1))
-#define krb5_xc(ptr,args) ((ptr)?((*(ptr)) args):(abort(),(char*)0))
-#endif 
-
-typedef	krb5_pointer	krb5_cc_cursor;	/* cursor for sequential lookup */
-
-typedef struct _krb5_ccache
-	{
-	krb5_magic magic;
-	struct _krb5_cc_ops FAR *ops;
-	krb5_pointer data;
-	} *krb5_ccache;
-
-typedef struct _krb5_cc_ops
-	{
-	krb5_magic magic;
-	char  *prefix;
-	char  * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *, const char  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_flags, krb5_creds  *, krb5_creds  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_cc_cursor  *, krb5_creds  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_flags, krb5_creds  *);
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags)
-		(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags);
-	} krb5_cc_ops;
-#endif /* NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE */
-
-krb5_error_code 
-kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
-    (krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
-      krb5_principal *principal)
-	{
-	if ( p_krb5_cc_get_principal )
-		return(p_krb5_cc_get_principal(context,cache,principal));
-	else
-		return(krb5_x
-			((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context acon,
-                             krb5_rcache rcache)
-        {
-        if ( p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache )
-                 return(p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(con,acon,rcache));
-        else
-                 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_data * data,
-                            krb5_rcache * rcache) 
-        {
-	if ( p_krb5_get_server_rcache )
-		return(p_krb5_get_server_rcache(con,data,rcache));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context acon,
-                             krb5_rcache * prcache)
-        {
-	if ( p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache )
-		return(p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(con,acon, prcache));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
- 
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_kt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab)
-	{
-	if ( p_krb5_kt_close )
-		return(p_krb5_kt_close(context,keytab));
-	else 
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	}
-
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab,
-                       krb5_const_principal principal, krb5_kvno vno,
-                       krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_keytab_entry *entry)
-	{
-	if ( p_krb5_kt_get_entry )
-		return(p_krb5_kt_get_entry(context,keytab,principal,vno,enctype,entry));
-	else
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        }
-#endif  /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS || OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-
-
-/* memory allocation functions for non-temporary storage
- * (e.g. stuff that gets saved into the kssl context) */
-static void* kssl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
-{
-	void* p;
-	
-	p=OPENSSL_malloc(nmemb*size);
-	if (p){
-		memset(p, 0, nmemb*size);
-	}
-	return p;
-}
-
-#define kssl_malloc(size) OPENSSL_malloc((size))
-#define kssl_realloc(ptr, size) OPENSSL_realloc(ptr, size)
-#define kssl_free(ptr) OPENSSL_free((ptr))
-
-
-char
-*kstring(char *string)
-        {
-        static char	*null = "[NULL]";
-
-	return ((string == NULL)? null: string);
-        }
-
-/*	Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES),
-**	return closest match openssl EVP_ encryption algorithm.
-**	Return NULL for unknown or problematic (krb5_dk_encrypt) enctypes.
-**	Assume ENCTYPE_*_RAW (krb5_raw_encrypt) are OK.
-*/
-const EVP_CIPHER *
-kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
-        {
-	switch (enctype)
-		{
-	case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1:		/*    EVP_des_cbc();       */
-	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
-	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
-	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
-	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
-				return EVP_des_cbc();
-				break;
-	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:		/*    EVP_des_ede3_cbc();  */
-	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
-	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
-				return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
-				break;
-	default:                return NULL;
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-
-
-/*	Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
-**	described in kssl_skip_confound() below.  The ASN.1 pattern is
-**	"62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
-**	xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
-*/
-static int 	kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	int 	len = 2;
-	int 	xx = 0, yy = 0;
-
-	if (*p++ != 0x62)  return 0;
-	if (*p > 0x82)  return 0;
-	switch(*p)  {
-		case 0x82:  p++;          xx = (*p++ << 8);  xx += *p++;  break;
-		case 0x81:  p++;          xx =  *p++;  break;
-		case 0x80:  return 0;
-		default:    xx = *p++;  break;
-		}
-	if (*p++ != 0x30)  return 0;
-	if (*p > 0x82)  return 0;
-	switch(*p)  {
-		case 0x82:  p++; len+=2;  yy = (*p++ << 8);  yy += *p++;  break;
-		case 0x81:  p++; len++;   yy =  *p++;  break;
-		case 0x80:  return 0;
-		default:    yy = *p++;  break;
-		}
-
-	return (xx - len == yy)? 1: 0;
-	}
-
-/*	Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths.
-**	This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[].
-**	array[n] == 0 signals end of data.
-**
-**      The krb5_cksumarray[] was an internal variable that has since been
-**      replaced by a more general method for storing the data.  It should
-**      not be used.  Instead we use real API calls and make a guess for 
-**      what the highest assigned CKSUMTYPE_ constant is.  As of 1.2.2
-**      it is 0x000c (CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3).  So we will use 0x0010.
-*/
-static size_t  *populate_cksumlens(void)
-	{
-	int 		i, j, n;
-	static size_t 	*cklens = NULL;
-
-#ifdef KRB5_MIT_OLD11
-	n = krb5_max_cksum;
-#else
-	n = 0x0010;
-#endif	/* KRB5_MIT_OLD11 */
- 
-#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH
-	if (!cklens && !(cklens = (size_t *) calloc(sizeof(int),n+1)))  return NULL;
-
-	for (i=0; i < n; i++)  {
-		if (!valid_cksumtype(i))  continue;	/*  array has holes  */
-		for (j=0; j < n; j++)  {
-			if (cklens[j] == 0)  {
-				cklens[j] = krb5_checksum_size(NULL,i);
-				break;		/*  krb5 elem was new: add   */
-				}
-			if (cklens[j] == krb5_checksum_size(NULL,i))  {
-				break;		/*  ignore duplicate elements */
-				}
-			}
-		}
-#endif	/* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
-
-	return cklens;
-	}
-
-/*	Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or
-**	return NULL on error.
-**	Decrypted authenticator looks like this:
-**		[0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r]
-**	This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the
-**	krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h.
-*/
-unsigned char	*kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
-	{
-	int 		i, conlen;
-	size_t		cklen;
-	static size_t 	*cksumlens = NULL;
-	unsigned char	*test_auth;
-
-	conlen = (etype)? 8: 0;
-
-	if (!cksumlens  &&  !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens()))  return NULL;
-	for (i=0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++)
-		{
-		test_auth = a + conlen + cklen;
-		if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth))  return test_auth;
-		}
-
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-
-/*	Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
-**		kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1]; }
-*/
-void
-kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text)
-        {
-	if (kssl_err == NULL)  return;
-
-	kssl_err->reason = reason;
-	BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text);
-	return;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Display contents of krb5_data struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
-        {
-	int i;
-
-	printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
-	for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
-                {
-		if (0 &&  isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
-                        printf(	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
-		else
-                        printf(	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
-		}
-	printf("\n");
-        }
-
-
-/*	Display contents of krb5_authdata struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
-        {
-	if (adata == NULL)
-                {
-		printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
-		return;
-		}
-	printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
-#if 0
-	{
-        int 	i;
-	printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
-	for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
-                {
-                printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
-                        adata->contents[i]);
-		}
-	printf("\n");
-	}
-#endif
-	}
-
-
-/*	Display contents of krb5_keyblock struct, for debugging
-*/
-void
-print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
-        {
-	int i;
-
-	if (keyblk == NULL)
-                {
-		printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
-		return;
-		}
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
-					   keyblk->keyvalue->length);
-	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
-                {
-		printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
-		}
-	printf("\n");
-#else
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
-	for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
-                {
-		printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
-		}
-	printf("\n");
-#endif
-        }
-
-
-/*	Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
-**	(krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
-*/
-static void
-print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
-        {
-	int i, ui, uj;
-
-	printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
-	if (princ == NULL)  return;
-	for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++)  putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
-	printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
-	for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
-                {
-		printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
-		for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++)  {
-			putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
-			}
-		printf("\n");
-		}
-	return;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
-**	Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
-**	If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
-**	whose data should be freed by caller.
-**	(Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
-**
-**	19990628	VRS 	Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
-**	20010409	VRS 	Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
-**	20010606	VRS 	May also return optional authenticator.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
-                /* OUT    */	krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
-                /* UPDATE */	krb5_data *authenp,
-                /* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
-	{
-	krb5_error_code		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
-	krb5_auth_context	krb5auth_context = NULL;
-	krb5_ccache 		krb5ccdef = NULL;
-	krb5_creds		krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
-	krb5_data		krb5_app_req;
-
-	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
-	memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
-
-	if (!kssl_ctx)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-	else if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "kssl_ctx service_host undefined.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
-                {
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-                        "krb5_init_context() fails: %d\n", krb5rc);
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
-                kssl_ctx->service_host,
-                (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
-                KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
-                {
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-                        "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
-                        kssl_ctx->service_host,
-                        (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name:
-						  KRB5SVC);
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
-                        "krb5_cc_default fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
-                &krb5creds.client)) != 0)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
-                        "krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
-                &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED,
-                        "krb5_get_credentials() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	*enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
-#else
-	kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
-#endif
-
-	krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	/*	caller should free data of krb5_app_req  */
-	/*  20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
-	**  20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
-	*/
-	krb5_app_req.length = 0;
-	if (authenp)
-                {
-		krb5_data	krb5in_data;
-		const unsigned char	*p;
-		long		arlen;
-		KRB5_APREQBODY	*ap_req;
-
-		authenp->length = 0;
-		krb5in_data.data = NULL;
-		krb5in_data.length = 0;
-		if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
-			&krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
-			&krb5_app_req)) != 0)
-			{
-			kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
-				"krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
-		p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data;
-		ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
-		if (ap_req)
-			{
-			authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
-					ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
-			if (authenp->length  && 
-				(authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
-				{
-				unsigned char	*adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data;
-				authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
-						ap_req->authenticator, &adp);
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (ap_req)  KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
-		if (krb5_app_req.length)  
-                        kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5context,&krb5_app_req);
-		}
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
-                        "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
-		}
-#else
-	if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
-                        "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
-		}
-#endif
-	else	krb5rc = 0;
-
- err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (krb5creds.client)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
-							krb5creds.client);
-	if (krb5creds.server)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
-							krb5creds.server);
-	if (krb5auth_context)	krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context,
-							krb5auth_context);
-	if (krb5context)	krb5_free_context(krb5context);
-	return (krb5rc);
-	}
-
-
-/*  Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
-**  Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
-**  Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
-**
-**	20010410	VRS	Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
-**				old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
-**	20010615	VRS 	Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
-**				Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
-**				code here.  This tkt should alloc/free just
-**				like the real thing.
-*/
-static krb5_error_code
-kssl_TKT2tkt(	/* IN     */	krb5_context	krb5context,
-		/* IN     */	KRB5_TKTBODY	*asn1ticket,
-		/* OUT    */	krb5_ticket	**krb5ticket,
-		/* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR *kssl_err  )
-        {
-        krb5_error_code			krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-	krb5_ticket 			*new5ticket = NULL;
-	ASN1_GENERALSTRING		*gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
-
-	*krb5ticket = NULL;
-
-	if (asn1ticket == NULL  ||  asn1ticket->realm == NULL  ||
-		asn1ticket->sname == NULL  || 
-		sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_num(asn1ticket->sname->namestring) < 2)
-		{
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-		}
-
-	if ((new5ticket = (krb5_ticket *) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket)))==NULL)
-		{
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		return ENOMEM;		/*  or  KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;	*/
-		}
-
-	gstr_svc  = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 0);
-	gstr_host = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 1);
-
-	if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context,
-			&new5ticket->server,
-			asn1ticket->realm->length, (char *)asn1ticket->realm->data,
-			gstr_svc->length,  (char *)gstr_svc->data,
-			gstr_host->length, (char *)gstr_host->data)) != 0)
-		{
-		free(new5ticket);
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"Error building ticket server principal.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		return krb5rc;		/*  or  KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;	*/
-		}
-
-	krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
-			asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
-	new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
-	new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
-	new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
-			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
-	if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
-		calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
-		{
-		free(new5ticket);
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
-			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
-			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
-		}
-
-	*krb5ticket = new5ticket;
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-
-/*	Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
-**		and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
-**	Return Kerberos session key and client principle
-**		to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
-**
-**	19990702	VRS 	Started.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
-		/* IN     */	krb5_data		*indata,
-		/* OUT    */	krb5_ticket_times	*ttimes,
-		/* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR		*kssl_err  )
-        {
-        krb5_error_code			krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        static krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
-	static krb5_auth_context	krb5auth_context = NULL;
-	krb5_ticket 			*krb5ticket = NULL;
-	KRB5_TKTBODY 			*asn1ticket = NULL;
-	const unsigned char		*p;
-	krb5_keytab 			krb5keytab = NULL;
-	krb5_keytab_entry		kt_entry;
-	krb5_principal			krb5server;
-        krb5_rcache                     rcache = NULL;
-
-	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
-
-	if (!kssl_ctx)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-			"No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (!krb5context  &&  (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "krb5_init_context() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (krb5auth_context  &&
-		(krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context)))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "krb5_auth_con_free() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-	else  krb5auth_context = NULL;
-	if (!krb5auth_context  &&
-		(krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_init(krb5context, &krb5auth_context)))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "krb5_auth_con_init() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
- 
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context,
-		&rcache)))
-		{
- 		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-			"krb5_auth_con_getrcache() fails.\n");
- 		goto err;
-		}
- 
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
-                (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
-                KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5server)) != 0)
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (rcache == NULL) 
-                {
-                if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5context,
-			krb5_princ_component(krb5context, krb5server, 0),
-			&rcache)))
-                        {
-		        kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                                "krb5_get_server_rcache() fails.\n");
-                  	goto err;
-                        }
-                }
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context, rcache)))
-                {
-                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-			"krb5_auth_con_setrcache() fails.\n");
-                goto err;
-                }
-
-
-	/*	kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
-	*/
-	if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
-		{
-		krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
-                        &krb5keytab);
-		if (krb5rc)
-			{
-			kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-				"krb5_kt_resolve() fails.\n");
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-                krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
-                if (krb5rc)
-			{
-			kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, 
-				"krb5_kt_default() fails.\n");
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/*	Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
-	**	o	check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
-	**		unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
-	**	o	check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
-	**	o	send "0" msg if all OK
-	*/
-
-	/*  20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
-	**
-	**  if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
-	**			&krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
-	**			&ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)  { Error }
-	*/
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
-	if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
-						(long) indata->length)) == NULL)
-		{
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	/* Was:  krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
-	if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
-					kssl_err)) != 0)
-		{
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (! krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
-						  krb5ticket->server))  {
-		krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"server principal != ticket principal\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
-			krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
-			krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0)  {
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
-			krb5ticket)) != 0)  {
-		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-			"krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
-		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	else  {
-		krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-		int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
-		printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
-		printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
-		print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
-			&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
-		printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
-		if (paddr)
-			{
-			printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
-			for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
-				{
-				krb5_data d;
-				d.length=paddr[i]->length;
-				d.data=paddr[i]->contents;
-				print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
-				}
-			}
-		printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
-			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-		}
-
-	krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
-	if (!krb5ticket  ||	!krb5ticket->enc_part2  ||
-                !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client  ||
-                !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data  ||
-                !krb5ticket->enc_part2->session)
-                {
-                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
-                        "bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
-		}
-	else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT,
-		 &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
-		 krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data,
-		 krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
-                        "kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n");
-		}
-	else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, krb5ticket->enc_part2->session))
-                {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
-                        "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
-		}
-	else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID)
-                {
-		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
-                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
-                        "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
-		}
-	else	krb5rc = 0;
-
-	kssl_ctx->enctype	= krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
-	ttimes->authtime	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
-	ttimes->starttime	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
-	ttimes->endtime 	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
-	ttimes->renew_till	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
-
- err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (asn1ticket) 	KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
-        if (krb5keytab)         krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
-	if (krb5ticket) 	krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
-	if (krb5server) 	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
-	return (krb5rc);
-        }
-
-
-/*	Allocate & return a new kssl_ctx struct.
-*/
-KSSL_CTX	*
-kssl_ctx_new(void)
-        {
-	return ((KSSL_CTX *) kssl_calloc(1, sizeof(KSSL_CTX)));
-        }
-
-
-/*	Frees a kssl_ctx struct and any allocated memory it holds.
-**	Returns NULL.
-*/
-KSSL_CTX	*
-kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-        {
-	if (kssl_ctx == NULL)  return kssl_ctx;
-
-	if (kssl_ctx->key)  		OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key,
-							      kssl_ctx->length);
-	if (kssl_ctx->key)  		kssl_free(kssl_ctx->key);
-	if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 	kssl_free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
-	if (kssl_ctx->service_host) 	kssl_free(kssl_ctx->service_host);
-	if (kssl_ctx->service_name) 	kssl_free(kssl_ctx->service_name);
-	if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) 	kssl_free(kssl_ctx->keytab_file);
-
-	kssl_free(kssl_ctx);
-	return (KSSL_CTX *) NULL;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
-**	set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member
-**	of the kssl_ctx struct.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
-        krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities)
-        {
-	char	**princ;
-	int 	length;
-	int i;
-
-	if (kssl_ctx == NULL  ||  entity == NULL)  return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
-	switch (which)
-                {
-        case KSSL_CLIENT:	princ = &kssl_ctx->client_princ;	break;
-        case KSSL_SERVER:	princ = &kssl_ctx->service_host;	break;
-        default:		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;			break;
-		}
-	if (*princ)  kssl_free(*princ);
-
-	/* Add up all the entity->lengths */
-	length = 0;
-	for (i=0; i < nentities; i++)
-		{
-		length += entity[i].length;
-		}
-	/* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */
-	length += nentities-1;
-	/* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */
-	length += ((realm)? realm->length + 2: 1);
-
-	if ((*princ = kssl_calloc(1, length)) == NULL)
-		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-	else
-		{
-		for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++)
-			{
-			strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length);
-			if (i < nentities-1)
-				{
-				strcat (*princ, "/");
-				}
-			}
-		if (realm)
-                        {
-			strcat (*princ, "@");
-			(void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length);
-			}
-		}
-
-	return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Set one of the plain (char *) string members of the kssl_ctx struct.
-**	Default values should be:
-**		which == KSSL_SERVICE	=>	"khost" (KRB5SVC)
-**		which == KSSL_KEYTAB	=>	"/etc/krb5.keytab" (KRB5KEYTAB)
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text)
-        {
-	char	**string;
-
-	if (!kssl_ctx)  return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
-	switch (which)
-                {
-        case KSSL_SERVICE:	string = &kssl_ctx->service_name;	break;
-        case KSSL_SERVER:	string = &kssl_ctx->service_host;	break;
-        case KSSL_CLIENT:	string = &kssl_ctx->client_princ;	break;
-        case KSSL_KEYTAB:	string = &kssl_ctx->keytab_file;	break;
-        default:		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;			break;
-		}
-	if (*string)  kssl_free(*string);
-
-	if (!text)
-                {
-		*string = '\0';
-		return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-		}
-
-	if ((*string = kssl_calloc(1, strlen(text) + 1)) == NULL)
-		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-	else
-		strcpy(*string, text);
-
-	return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Copy the Kerberos session key from a (krb5_keyblock *) to a kssl_ctx
-**	struct.  Clear kssl_ctx->key if Kerberos session key is NULL.
-*/
-krb5_error_code
-kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
-        {
-	int 		length;
-	krb5_enctype	enctype;
-	krb5_octet FAR	*contents = NULL;
-
-	if (!kssl_ctx)  return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-
-	if (kssl_ctx->key)
-                {
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
-		kssl_free(kssl_ctx->key);
-		}
-
-	if (session)
-                {
-
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-		length = session->keyvalue->length;
-		enctype = session->keytype;
-		contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
-#else
-		length = session->length;
-		enctype = session->enctype;
-		contents = session->contents;
-#endif
-		kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
-		kssl_ctx->length  = length;
-		}
-	else
-                {
-		kssl_ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
-		kssl_ctx->length  = 0;
-		return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-		}
-
-	if ((kssl_ctx->key =
-                (krb5_octet FAR *) kssl_calloc(1, kssl_ctx->length)) == NULL)
-                {
-		kssl_ctx->length  = 0;
-		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
-		}
-	else
-		memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
-
-	return KSSL_CTX_OK;
-        }
-
-
-/*	Display contents of kssl_ctx struct
-*/
-void
-kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-        {
-	int 	i;
-
-	printf("kssl_ctx: ");
-	if (kssl_ctx == NULL)
-                {
-		printf("NULL\n");
-		return;
-		}
-	else
-		printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx);
-
-	printf("\tservice:\t%s\n",
-                (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: "NULL");
-	printf("\tclient:\t%s\n",
-                (kssl_ctx->client_princ)? kssl_ctx->client_princ: "NULL");
-	printf("\tserver:\t%s\n",
-                (kssl_ctx->service_host)? kssl_ctx->service_host: "NULL");
-	printf("\tkeytab:\t%s\n",
-                (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)? kssl_ctx->keytab_file: "NULL");
-	printf("\tkey [%d:%d]:\t",
-                kssl_ctx->enctype, kssl_ctx->length);
-
-	for (i=0; i < kssl_ctx->length  &&  kssl_ctx->key; i++)
-                {
-		printf("%02x", kssl_ctx->key[i]);
-		}
-	printf("\n");
-	return;
-        }
-
-    int 
-    kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-{
-    krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
-    krb5_keytab 		krb5keytab = NULL;
-    krb5_keytab_entry           entry;
-    krb5_principal              princ = NULL;
-    krb5_error_code  		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-    int rc = 0;
-
-    if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
-        return(0);
-
-    /*	kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
-    */
-    if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
-    {
-        krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
-                                  &krb5keytab);
-        if (krb5rc)
-            goto exit;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
-        if (krb5rc)
-            goto exit;
-    }
-
-    /* the host key we are looking for */
-    krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL, 
-                                     kssl_ctx->service_name ? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
-                                     KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ);
-
-    if (krb5rc)
-	goto exit;
-
-    krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab, 
-                                princ,
-                                0 /* IGNORE_VNO */,
-                                0 /* IGNORE_ENCTYPE */,
-                                &entry);
-    if ( krb5rc == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND ) {
-        rc = 1;
-        goto exit;
-    } else if ( krb5rc )
-        goto exit;
-    
-    krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &entry);
-    rc = 1;
-
-  exit:
-    if (krb5keytab)     krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
-    if (princ)          krb5_free_principal(krb5context, princ);
-    if (krb5context)	krb5_free_context(krb5context);
-    return(rc);
-}
-
-int 
-kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
-        {
-        krb5_error_code		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-        krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
-        krb5_ccache 		krb5ccdef = NULL;
-        krb5_creds		krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
-        int                     rc = 0;
-
-        memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
-
-        if (!kssl_ctx)
-            return(0);
-
-        if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
-            return(0);
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
-                                              kssl_ctx->service_host,
-                                              (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
-                                              KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
-                                             &krb5creds.client)) != 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
-                                            &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
-            goto err;
-
-        rc = 1;
-
-      err:
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (krb5creds.client)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
-	if (krb5creds.server)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
-	if (krb5context)	krb5_free_context(krb5context);
-        return(rc);
-	}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
-	{
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	data->length = 0;
-        if (data->data)
-            free(data->data);
-#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
-	if (data->data)  {
-		krb5_xfree(data->data);
-		data->data = 0;
-		}
-#else
-	krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data);
-#endif
-	}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS && !OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-
-
-/*  Given pointers to KerberosTime and struct tm structs, convert the
-**  KerberosTime string to struct tm.  Note that KerberosTime is a
-**  ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME value, constrained to GMT with no fractional
-**  seconds as defined in RFC 1510.
-**  Return pointer to the (partially) filled in struct tm on success,
-**  return NULL on failure.
-*/
-static struct tm *k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime, struct tm *k_tm)
-	{
-	char 		c, *p;
-
-	if (!k_tm)  return NULL;
-	if (gtime == NULL  ||  gtime->length < 14)  return NULL;
-	if (gtime->data == NULL)  return NULL;
-
-	p = (char *)&gtime->data[14];
-
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_sec  = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_min  = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_hour = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_mday = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_mon  = atoi(p)-1;    *(p+2) = c;
-	c = *p;	 *p = '\0';  p -= 4;  k_tm->tm_year = atoi(p)-1900; *(p+4) = c;
-
-	return k_tm;
-	}
-
-
-/*  Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
-**  We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
-**  So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
-**	If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
-*/
-static krb5_deltat get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
-	{
-	krb5_rcache 	rc;
-	krb5_deltat 	clockskew;
-
-	if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc))  return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
-	if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0))  return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
-	if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew))  {
-		clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
-		}
-	(void) krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
-	return clockskew;
-	}
-
-
-/*  kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
-**  the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
-**  in_clock_skew() macro.  The authenticator client time is checked
-**  to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
-**  time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
-**  Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
-**  Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
-**  See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
-**  20010420 VRS
-*/
-krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(	krb5_timestamp atime,
-					krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
-	{
-	krb5_deltat 	skew;
-	krb5_timestamp	start, now;
-	krb5_error_code	rc;
-	krb5_context	context;
-
-	if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context)))	 return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
-	skew = get_rc_clockskew(context); 
-	if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context,&now))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
-	krb5_free_context(context);
-
-	if (atime  &&  labs(atime - now) >= skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
-
-	if (! ttimes)  return 0;
-
-	start = (ttimes->starttime != 0)? ttimes->starttime: ttimes->authtime;
-	if (start - now > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
-	if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
-		start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-
-/*  Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
-**  authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
-**  Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error.  A NULL 
-**  authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
-**  Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
-**  you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
-*/
-krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
-			/* IN     */	KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx,
-                        /* IN     */   	krb5_data	*authentp,
-			/* OUT    */	krb5_timestamp	*atimep,
-			/* OUT    */    KSSL_ERR	*kssl_err  )
-	{
-        krb5_error_code		krb5rc = 0;
-	KRB5_ENCDATA		*dec_authent = NULL;
-	KRB5_AUTHENTBODY	*auth = NULL;
-	krb5_enctype		enctype;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;
-	const EVP_CIPHER	*enc = NULL;
-	unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-	const unsigned char	*p;
-	unsigned char		*unenc_authent;
-	int 			outl, unencbufsize;
-	struct tm		tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
-	time_t			now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
-
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-	*atimep = 0;
-	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
-
-#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
-	authentp = NULL;
-#else
-#if	KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
-	authentp = NULL;
-#endif
-#endif	/* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
-
-	if (authentp == NULL  ||  authentp->length == 0)  return 0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-        {
-        unsigned int ui;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
-	p = authentp->data; 
-	for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++)  printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
-	printf("\n");
-        }
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
-	if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL)
-		{
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-			"Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
-		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data;
-	if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
-					(long) authentp->length)) == NULL) 
-		{
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "Error decoding authenticator.\n");
-		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0];	/* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
-#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
-            switch ( enctype ) {
-            case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:		/*    EVP_des_ede3_cbc();  */
-            case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
-            case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
-                krb5rc = 0;                     /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */
-                goto err;
-            }
-#endif
-	enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
-	memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);       /* per RFC 1510 */
-
-	if (enc == NULL)
-		{
-		/*  Disable kssl_check_authent for ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1.
-		**  This enctype indicates the authenticator was encrypted
-		**  using key-usage derived keys which openssl cannot decrypt.
-		*/
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-        if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv,0))
-                {
-                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n");
-                krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-                goto err;
-                }
-        outl = dec_authent->cipher->length;
-        if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx,unenc_authent,dec_authent->cipher->data,outl))
-                {
-                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n");
-                krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-                goto err;
-                }
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	{
-	int padl;
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
-	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
-	printf("\n");
-	}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL)
-		{
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "confounded by authenticator.\n");
-		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	outl -= p - unenc_authent;
-
-	if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
-							  (long) outl))==NULL)
-		{
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
-                        "Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
-		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	memset(&tm_time,0,sizeof(struct tm));
-	if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time)  &&
-		((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1)))
- 		{
- 		now  = time(&now);
- 		tm_l = localtime(&now); 	tl = mktime(tm_l);
- 		tm_g = gmtime(&now);		tg = mktime(tm_g);
- 		tz_offset = tg - tl;
-
-		*atimep = (krb5_timestamp)(tr - tz_offset);
- 		}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
-	if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
-		printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
-	else	printf("NULL\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- err:
-	if (auth)		KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
-	if (dec_authent)	KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
-	if (unenc_authent)	free(unenc_authent);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-	return krb5rc;
-	}
-
-
-/*  Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
-**  because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
-**  Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
-**  passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
-*/
-krb5_error_code  kssl_build_principal_2(
-			/* UPDATE */	krb5_context	context,
-			/* OUT    */	krb5_principal	*princ,
-			/* IN     */	int rlen,  const char *realm,
-			/* IN	  */	int slen,  const char *svc,
-			/* IN	  */	int hlen,  const char *host)
-	{
-	krb5_data		*p_data = NULL;
-	krb5_principal		new_p = NULL;
-        char			*new_r = NULL;
-
-	if ((p_data = (krb5_data *) calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL  ||
-	    (new_p = (krb5_principal) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)))
-			== NULL)  goto err;
-	new_p->length = 2;
-	new_p->data = p_data;
-
-	if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
-	memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
-	krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
-	krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
-
-	if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
-	memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
-	new_p->data[0].length = slen;
-
-	if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
-	memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
-	new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
-	
-	krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
-	*princ = new_p;
-	return 0;
-
- err:
-	if (new_p  &&  new_p[0].data)	free(new_p[0].data);
-	if (new_p  &&  new_p[1].data)	free(new_p[1].data);
-	if (new_p)	free(new_p);
-	if (new_r)	free(new_r);
-	return ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx)
-	{
-	s->kssl_ctx = kctx;
-	} 
-
-KSSL_CTX * SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return s->kssl_ctx;
-	}
-
-char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx)
-	{
-	if (kctx)
-		return kctx->client_princ;
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-#endif
-
-#endif	/* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5	*/
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e4df8430..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
- * project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/*
-**	19990701	VRS 	Started.
-*/
-
-#ifndef	KSSL_H
-#define	KSSL_H
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <krb5.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-/* These can sometimes get redefined indirectly by krb5 header files
- * after they get undefed in ossl_typ.h
- */
-#undef X509_NAME
-#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
-#undef OCSP_REQUEST
-#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
-#endif
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
-**	Depending on which KRB5 implementation used, some types from
-**	the other may be missing.  Resolve that here and now
-*/
-#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
-#define FAR
-#else
-
-#ifndef FAR
-#define FAR
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-/*	Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
-**	to trace usage of the Kerberos session key
-**
-**	#define		KSSL_DEBUG
-*/
-
-#ifndef	KRB5SVC
-#define KRB5SVC	"host"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef	KRB5KEYTAB
-#define KRB5KEYTAB	"/etc/krb5.keytab"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH
-#define KRB5SENDAUTH	1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
-#define KRB5CHECKAUTH	1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW
-#define	KSSL_CLOCKSKEW	300;
-#endif
-
-#define	KSSL_ERR_MAX	255
-typedef struct kssl_err_st  {
-	int  reason;
-	char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1];
-	} KSSL_ERR;
-
-
-/*	Context for passing
-**		(1) Kerberos session key to SSL, and
-**		(2)	Config data between application and SSL lib
-*/
-typedef struct kssl_ctx_st
-        {
-                                /*	used by:    disposition:            */
-	char *service_name;	/*	C,S	    default ok (kssl)       */
-	char *service_host;	/*	C	    input, REQUIRED         */
-	char *client_princ;	/*	S	    output from krb5 ticket */
-	char *keytab_file;	/*      S	    NULL (/etc/krb5.keytab) */
-	char *cred_cache;	/*	C	    NULL (default)          */
-	krb5_enctype enctype;
-	int length;
-	krb5_octet FAR *key;
-	} KSSL_CTX;
-
-#define	KSSL_CLIENT 	1
-#define KSSL_SERVER 	2
-#define	KSSL_SERVICE	3
-#define	KSSL_KEYTAB 	4
-
-#define KSSL_CTX_OK 	0
-#define KSSL_CTX_ERR	1
-#define KSSL_NOMEM	2
-
-/* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text);
-KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_new(void);
-KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
-        krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities);
-krb5_error_code	kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  krb5_data **enc_tktp,
-        krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code	kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  krb5_data *indata,
-        krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session);
-void	kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text);
-void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data);
-krb5_error_code  kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context,
-			krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm,
-			int slen, const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host);
-krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime,
-					krb5_ticket_times *ttimes);
-krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
-			            krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-unsigned char	*kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
-
-void SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s, KSSL_CTX *kctx);
-KSSL_CTX * SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(SSL *s);
-char *kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(KSSL_CTX *kctx);
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5	*/
-#endif	/* KSSL_H 	*/
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c039c91b..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
- * project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef	KSSL_LCL_H
-#define	KSSL_LCL_H
-
-#include <openssl/kssl.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* Private (internal to OpenSSL) */
-void print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata);
-void print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata);
-void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk);
-
-char *kstring(char *string);
-char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
-
-int kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-int kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5	*/
-#endif	/* KSSL_LCL_H 	*/
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f02c275c..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,815 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_client_method());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-#endif
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_client_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_2_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl23_connect,
-			ssl23_get_client_method)
-
-int ssl23_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
-			if (s->session != NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE);
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->server=0;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			/* s->version=TLS1_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl23_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl23_get_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		if (s->debug) { (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); }
-
-		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-			{
-			new_state=s->state;
-			s->state=state;
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
-			s->state=new_state;
-			}
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
-	int i;
-	ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
-		{
-		cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-		if (cipher->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
-			return 0;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0
- * on failure, 1 on success. */
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
-	{
-	int send_time = 0;
-
-	if (len < 4)
-		return 0;
-	if (server)
-		send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
-	else
-		send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
-	if (send_time)
-		{
-		unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
-		unsigned char *p = result;
-		l2n(Time, p);
-		return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len-4);
-		}
-	else
-		return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
-	}
-
-static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,ch_len;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int ssl2_compat;
-	int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	int j;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-	int ret;
-	unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
-
-	ssl2_compat = (options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
-
-	if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
-		ssl2_compat = 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
-	 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
-	 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
-	 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
-	 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
-	 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
-	 */
-	mask =	SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1|SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-		|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-		|(ssl2_compat?SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2:0)
-#endif
-		;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
-	version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-
-	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && (options & mask) != mask)
-		version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#else
-	version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#endif
-	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
-	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
-		version = TLS1_VERSION;
-	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
-		version = SSL3_VERSION;
-	mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & mask) != mask)
-		version = SSL2_VERSION;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (version != SSL2_VERSION)
-		{
-		/* have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions */
-
-		if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-			ssl2_compat = 0;
-		if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
-			ssl2_compat = 0;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0 || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-			ssl2_compat = 0;
-#endif
-		}
-#endif
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-#if 0
-		/* don't reuse session-id's */
-		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-			{
-			return(-1);
-			}
-#endif
-
-		p=s->s3->client_random;
-		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
-			return -1;
-
-		if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
-			version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
-			}
-		else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			{
-			version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
-			version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
-			}
-		else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
-			version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-			}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		else if(FIPS_mode())
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
-			{
-			version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
-			version_minor = SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
-			}
-		else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
-			{
-			version_major = SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR;
-			version_minor = SSL2_VERSION_MINOR;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		s->client_version = version;
-
-		if (ssl2_compat)
-			{
-			/* create SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello */
-
-			/* two byte record header will be written last */
-			d = &(buf[2]);
-			p = d + 9; /* leave space for message type, version, individual length fields */
-
-			*(d++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-			*(d++) = version_major;
-			*(d++) = version_minor;
-			
-			/* Ciphers supported */
-			i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),p,0);
-			if (i == 0)
-				{
-				/* no ciphers */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			s2n(i,d);
-			p+=i;
-			
-			/* put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse) */
-#if 0
-			s->session->session_id_length=0;
-#endif
-			s2n(0,d);
-
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
-				ch_len=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-			else
-				ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-
-			/* write out sslv2 challenge */
-			/* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32),
-			   because it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32)
-			   or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the
-			   check in for futurproofing */
-			if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
-				i=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-			else
-				i=ch_len;
-			s2n(i,d);
-			memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]),0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i) <= 0)
-				return -1;
-
-			memcpy(p,&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i);
-			p+=i;
-
-			i= p- &(buf[2]);
-			buf[0]=((i>>8)&0xff)|0x80;
-			buf[1]=(i&0xff);
-
-			/* number of bytes to write */
-			s->init_num=i+2;
-			s->init_off=0;
-
-			ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[2]),i);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
-
-			/* do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4 bytes) last */
-			d = p = &(buf[9]);
-			
-			*(p++) = version_major;
-			*(p++) = version_minor;
-
-			/* Random stuff */
-			memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-			/* Session ID (zero since there is no reuse) */
-			*(p++) = 0;
-
-			/* Ciphers supported (using SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format) */
-			i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),ssl3_put_cipher_by_char);
-			if (i == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-				return -1;
-				}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
-			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
-			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
-			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
-			 */
-			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
-				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
-				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
-			s2n(i,p);
-			p+=i;
-
-			/* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-			*(p++)=1;
-#else
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-						|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
-				j=0;
-			else
-				j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
-			*(p++)=1+j;
-			for (i=0; i<j; i++)
-				{
-				comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
-				*(p++)=comp->id;
-				}
-#endif
-			*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			/* TLS extensions*/
-			if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return -1;
-				}
-#endif
-			
-			l = p-d;
-
-			/* fill in 4-byte handshake header */
-			d=&(buf[5]);
-			*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-			l2n3(l,d);
-
-			l += 4;
-
-			if (l > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			
-			/* fill in 5-byte record header */
-			d=buf;
-			*(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-			*(d++) = version_major;
-			/* Some servers hang if we use long client hellos
-			 * and a record number > TLS 1.0.
-			 */
-			if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
-				*(d++) = 1;
-			else
-				*(d++) = version_minor;
-			s2n((int)l,d);
-
-			/* number of bytes to write */
-			s->init_num=p-buf;
-			s->init_off=0;
-
-			ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[5]), s->init_num - 5);
-			}
-
-		s->state=SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
-	ret = ssl23_write_bytes(s);
-
-	if ((ret >= 2) && s->msg_callback)
-		{
-		/* Client Hello has been sent; tell msg_callback */
-
-		if (ssl2_compat)
-			s->msg_callback(1, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data+2, ret-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-		else
-			s->msg_callback(1, version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data+5, ret-5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-		}
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	char buf[8];
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	int n;
-
-	n=ssl23_read_bytes(s,7);
-
-	if (n != 7) return(n);
-	p=s->packet;
-
-	memcpy(buf,p,n);
-
-	if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO) &&
-		(p[5] == 0x00) && (p[6] == 0x02))
-		{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
-#else
-		/* we are talking sslv2 */
-		/* we need to clean up the SSLv3 setup and put in the
-		 * sslv2 stuff. */
-		int ch_len;
-
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (s->s2 == NULL)
-			{
-			if (!ssl2_new(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			ssl2_clear(s);
-
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
-			ch_len=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-		else
-			ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-
-		/* write out sslv2 challenge */
-		/* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because
-		   it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or
-		   SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the check in for
-		   futurproofing */
-		i=(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
-			?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:ch_len;
-		s->s2->challenge_length=i;
-		memcpy(s->s2->challenge,
-			&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i);
-
-		if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
-			SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
-		if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
-			/* use special padding (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
-			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
-
-		/* setup the 7 bytes we have read so we get them from
-		 * the sslv2 buffer */
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-		s->packet_length=n;
-		s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
-		memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
-
-		/* we have already written one */
-		s->s2->write_sequence=1;
-
-		s->method=SSLv2_client_method();
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
-#endif
-		}
-	else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
-	         p[2] <= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
-	         ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-	          (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2)))
-		{
-		/* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-		if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
-			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-			{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-			if(FIPS_mode())
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-#endif
-			s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-			s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-		if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
-			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-			{
-			s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-			s->method=TLSv1_client_method();
-			}
-		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
-			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-			{
-			s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-			s->method=TLSv1_1_client_method();
-			}
-		else if ((p[2] == TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR) &&
-			!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-			{
-			s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-			s->method=TLSv1_2_client_method();
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
-
-		if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
-			{
-			/* fatal alert */
-
-			void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-			int j;
-
-			if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-				cb=s->info_callback;
-			else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-				cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
- 
-			i=p[5];
-			if (cb != NULL)
-				{
-				j=(i<<8)|p[6];
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_READ_ALERT,j);
-				}
-			
-			if (s->msg_callback)
-				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, p+5, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET+p[6]);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
-
-		/* we are in this state */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
-		/* put the 7 bytes we have read into the input buffer
-		 * for SSLv3 */
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-		s->packet_length=n;
-		if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
-			if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-				goto err;
-		s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-		memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-		s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
-		s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
-
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	s->init_num=0;
-
-	/* Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not
-	 * reusing a session-id */
-        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-		{
-		if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-		goto err;
-
-	return(SSL_connect(s));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f3c29d1d..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-long ssl23_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	return(300);
-	}
-
-int ssl23_num_ciphers(void)
-	{
-	return(ssl3_num_ciphers()
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	       + ssl2_num_ciphers()
-#endif
-	    );
-	}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-	{
-	unsigned int uu=ssl3_num_ciphers();
-
-	if (u < uu)
-		return(ssl3_get_cipher(u));
-	else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-		return(ssl2_get_cipher(u-uu));
-#else
-		return(NULL);
-#endif
-	}
-
-/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
- * available */
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
-
-	cp=ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(p);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (cp == NULL)
-		cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
-#endif
-	return(cp);
-	}
-
-int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	/* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
-	/* but no ECC ciphers */
-	if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr ||
-		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe ||
-		c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH ||
-		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH ||
-		c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA)
-		return 0;
-	if (p != NULL)
-		{
-		l=c->id;
-		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
-		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
-		p[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
-		}
-	return(3);
-	}
-
-int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int n;
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
-		{
-		n=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (n < 0) return(n);
-		if (n == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_READ,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		return(SSL_read(s,buf,len));
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ssl_undefined_function(s);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int n;
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
-		{
-		n=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (n < 0) return(n);
-		if (n == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		return(SSL_peek(s,buf,len));
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ssl_undefined_function(s);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int n;
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
-		{
-		n=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (n < 0) return(n);
-		if (n == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		return(SSL_write(s,buf,len));
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ssl_undefined_function(s);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 40eae0f0..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_meth.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_method(int ver)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_method());
-	else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_method());
-	else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_1_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_2_method());
-	else
-#endif
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_method,
-			ssl23_accept,
-			ssl23_connect,
-			ssl23_get_method)
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4ca6a1b2..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_pkt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
-int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,num,tot;
-	char *buf;
-
-	buf=s->init_buf->data;
-	tot=s->init_off;
-	num=s->init_num;
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-		i=BIO_write(s->wbio,&(buf[tot]),num);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->init_off=tot;
-			s->init_num=num;
-			return(i);
-			}
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		if (i == num) return(tot+i);
-
-		num-=i;
-		tot+=i;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* return regularly only when we have read (at least) 'n' bytes */
-int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int j;
-
-	if (s->packet_length < (unsigned int)n)
-		{
-		p=s->packet;
-
-		for (;;)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			j=BIO_read(s->rbio,(char *)&(p[s->packet_length]),
-				n-s->packet_length);
-			if (j <= 0)
-				return(j);
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->packet_length+=j;
-			if (s->packet_length >= (unsigned int)n)
-				return(s->packet_length);
-			}
-		}
-	return(n);
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 93ca7d53..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,657 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_srvr.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
-int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_server_method());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_server_method());
-#endif
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
-	else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method,
-			ssl23_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl23_get_server_method)
-
-int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
-			s->server=1;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				}
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-			{
-			new_state=s->state;
-			s->state=state;
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-			s->state=new_state;
-			}
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-
-int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
-	                     * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
-	                     * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
-	                     * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
-	                     * the protocol specification:
-	                     * Byte  Content
-	                     *  0     type            \
-	                     *  1/2   version          > record header
-	                     *  3/4   length          /
-	                     *  5     msg_type        \
-	                     *  6-8   length           > Client Hello message
-	                     *  9/10  client_version  /
-	                     */
-	char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
-	unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
-	unsigned int i;
-	unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
-	int n=0,j;
-	int type=0;
-	int v[2];
-
-	if (s->state ==	SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		/* read the initial header */
-		v[0]=v[1]=0;
-
-		if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
-
-		n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
-		if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
-
-		p=s->packet;
-
-		memcpy(buf,p,n);
-
-		if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
-			{
-			/*
-			 * SSLv2 header
-			 */
-			if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
-				{
-				v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
-				/* SSLv2 */
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-					type=1;
-				}
-			else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-				{
-				v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
-				/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
-				if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
-					{
-					if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					   !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-						{
-						s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-						{
-						s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-						/* type=2; */
-						s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-						}
-					else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-						{
-						type=1;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					/* type=2; */
-					s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-					type=1;
-
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
-			 (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
-			 (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-			 ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
-				|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
-			{
-			/*
-			 * SSLv3 or tls1 header
-			 */
-			
-			v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
-			/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
-			 * to get the correct minor version.
-			 * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
-			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
-			 * to read more records to find out.
-			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
-			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
-			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
-			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
-			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
-			 * this....
-			 */
-			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-				v[1]=0xff;
-			else
-				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
-			if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
-				{
-				if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
-					!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-					{
-					s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-					{
-					s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-					{
-					/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
-					 * but this will send an appropriate alert */
-					s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-					type=3;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
-			 (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
-		{
-		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
-		 * (other cases skip this state) */
-
-		type=2;
-		p=s->packet;
-		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
-		v[1] = p[4];
-
-		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
-		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
-		 * record. It's format is:
-		 * Byte  Content
-		 * 0-1   msg_length
-		 * 2     msg_type
-		 * 3-4   version
-		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
-		 * 7-8   session_id_length
-		 * 9-10  challenge_length
-		 * ...   ...
-		 */
-		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
-		if (n > (1024*4))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (n < 9)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
-		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
-		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
-		 * packet bytes. */
-		if (j <= 0) return(j);
-
-		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
-
-		p=s->packet;
-		p+=5;
-		n2s(p,csl);
-		n2s(p,sil);
-		n2s(p,cl);
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
-		                                          * Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
-		                                          * '>' otherweise */
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* record header: msg_type ... */
-		*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
-		d_len = d;
-		d += 3;
-
-		/* client_version */
-		*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
-		*(d++) = v[1];
-
-		/* lets populate the random area */
-		/* get the challenge_length */
-		i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
-		memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
-		d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* no session-id reuse */
-		*(d++)=0;
-
-		/* ciphers */
-		j=0;
-		dd=d;
-		d+=2;
-		for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
-			{
-			if (p[i] != 0) continue;
-			*(d++)=p[i+1];
-			*(d++)=p[i+2];
-			j+=2;
-			}
-		s2n(j,dd);
-
-		/* COMPRESSION */
-		*(d++)=1;
-		*(d++)=0;
-		
-#if 0
-                /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
-	        p = p+csl+sil+cl;
-		while (p <  s->packet+s->packet_length)
-			{
-			*(d++)=*(p++);
-			}
-#endif
-
-		i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
-		l2n3((long)i, d_len);
-
-		/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
-		}
-
-	/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
-	/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
-
-	if (type == 1)
-		{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
-#else
-		/* we are talking sslv2 */
-		/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
-		 * sslv2 stuff. */
-
-		if (s->s2 == NULL)
-			{
-			if (!ssl2_new(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			ssl2_clear(s);
-
-		if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
-			SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-			{
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
-			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
-		else
-			/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
-			 * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
-			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
-
-		/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
-		 * the sslv2 buffer */
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-		s->packet_length=n;
-		s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
-		memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
-
-		s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
-#endif
-		}
-
-	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
-		{
-		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
-                s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
-		if (s->method == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
-
-		/* we are in this state */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-
-		if (type == 3)
-			{
-			/* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
-			 * for SSLv3 */
-			s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-			s->packet_length=n;
-			if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
-				if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-					goto err;
-
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
-			s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
-			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s->packet_length=0;
-			s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
-			s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
-			}
-#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
-		s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
-#endif
-		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
-		}
-	
-	if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
-		{
-		/* bad, very bad */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	s->init_num=0;
-
-	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-	return(SSL_accept(s));
-err:
-	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
-	return(-1);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 03b6cf96..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1127 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int get_server_finished(SSL *s);
-static int get_server_verify(SSL *s);
-static int get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int client_hello(SSL *s); 
-static int client_master_key(SSL *s);
-static int client_finished(SSL *s);
-static int client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
-	unsigned char *to,int padding);
-#define BREAK	break
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl2_connect,
-			ssl2_get_client_method)
-
-int ssl2_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int new_state,state;
-
-	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-	/* init things to blank */
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch (s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
-			s->server=0;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
-			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
-			buf=s->init_buf;
-			if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
-				SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-				{
-				if (buf == s->init_buf)
-					buf=NULL;
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->init_buf=buf;
-			buf=NULL;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-			s->handshake_func=ssl2_connect;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
-			BREAK;
-		
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B:
-			ret=get_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			if (!s->hit) /* new session */
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
-				BREAK; 
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
-				break;
-				}
-	
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
-			ret=client_master_key(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
-			/* Ok, we now have all the stuff needed to
-			 * start encrypting, so lets fire it up :-) */
-			if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,1))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->s2->clear_text=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=client_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
-			ret=get_server_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=get_server_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D:
-		case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
-			ret=client_certificate(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
-				{
-				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-				s->init_buf=NULL;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-		/*	ERR_clear_error();*/
-
-			/* If we want to cache session-ids in the client
-			 * and we successfully add the session-id to the
-			 * cache, and there is a callback, then pass it out.
-			 * 26/11/96 - eay - only add if not a re-used session.
-			 */
-
-			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-			ret=1;
-			/* s->server=0; */
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			return(-1);
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-			{
-			new_state=s->state;
-			s->state=state;
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
-			s->state=new_state;
-			}
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL) 
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i,j;
-	unsigned long len;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	p=buf;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),11-s->init_num);
-		if (i < (11-s->init_num)) 
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
-		s->init_num = 11;
-
-		if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
-			{
-			if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
-					SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-#if 0
-		s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
-		/* Some [PPC?] compilers fail to increment p in above
-		   statement, e.g. one provided with Rhapsody 5.5, but
-		   most recent example XL C 11.1 for AIX, even without
-		   optimization flag... */
-#else
-		s->hit=(*p)?1:0; p++;
-#endif
-		s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
-		n2s(p,i);
-		if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cert_length=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.csl=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length=i;
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B */
-	len = 11 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cert_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.csl + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
-	if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	j = (int)len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
-	if (i != j) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-HELLO */
-
-	/* things are looking good */
-
-	p = buf + 11;
-	if (s->hit)
-		{
-		if (s->s2->tmp.cert_length != 0) 
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		if (s->s2->tmp.cert_type != 0)
-			{
-			if (!(s->options &
-				SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		if (s->s2->tmp.csl != 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-#ifdef undef
-		/* very bad */
-		memset(s->session->session_id,0,
-			SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES);
-		s->session->session_id_length=0;
-		*/
-#endif
-
-		/* we need to do this in case we were trying to reuse a 
-		 * client session but others are already reusing it.
-		 * If this was a new 'blank' session ID, the session-id
-		 * length will still be 0 */
-		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
-			{
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (ssl2_set_certificate(s,s->s2->tmp.cert_type,
-			s->s2->tmp.cert_length,p) <= 0)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		p+=s->s2->tmp.cert_length;
-
-		if (s->s2->tmp.csl == 0)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		/* We have just received a list of ciphers back from the
-		 * server.  We need to get the ones that match, then select
-		 * the one we want the most :-). */
-
-		/* load the ciphers */
-		sk=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.csl,
-					    &s->session->ciphers);
-		p+=s->s2->tmp.csl;
-		if (sk == NULL)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-
-		/* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
-		cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-		(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-
-		/*
-		 * If server preference flag set, choose the first
-		 * (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
-		 * client preference has priority.
-		 */
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
-		    {
-		    prio = sk;
-		    allow = cl;
-		    }
-		else
-		    {
-		    prio = cl;
-		    allow = sk;
-		    }
-		/* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
-		 * don't want to use but that does not matter since we
-		 * will check against the list we originally sent and
-		 * for performance reasons we should not bother to match
-		 * the two lists up just to check. */
-		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
-			{
-			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
-					     sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
-				break;
-			}
-
-		if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
-
-
-		if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
-		/* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
-		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		}
-
-	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL 
-      || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
-		/* can't happen */
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-		
-	s->s2->conn_id_length=s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
-	if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	memcpy(s->s2->conn_id,p,s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-/*	CIPHER **cipher;*/
-	int i,n,j;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		if ((s->session == NULL) ||
-			(s->session->ssl_version != s->version))
-			{
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
-		p=buf;					/* header */
-		d=p+9;					/* data section */
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;		/* type */
-		s2n(SSL2_VERSION,p);			/* version */
-		n=j=0;
-
-		n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d,0);
-		d+=n;
-
-		if (n == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		s2n(n,p);			/* cipher spec num bytes */
-
-		if ((s->session->session_id_length > 0) &&
-			(s->session->session_id_length <=
-			SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
-			{
-			i=s->session->session_id_length;
-			s2n(i,p);		/* session id length */
-			memcpy(d,s->session->session_id,(unsigned int)i);
-			d+=i;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s2n(0,p);
-			}
-
-		s->s2->challenge_length=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-		s2n(SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH,p);		/* challenge length */
-		/*challenge id data*/
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
-			return -1;
-		memcpy(d,s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
-		d+=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
-		s->init_num=d-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B */
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int clear,enc,karg,i;
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
-		{
-
-		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		sess=s->session;
-		p=buf;
-		d=p+10;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY;/* type */
-
-		i=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,sess->cipher,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* make key_arg data */
-		i=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-		sess->key_arg_length=i;
-		if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		if (i > 0)
-			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg,i) <= 0)
-				return -1;
-
-		/* make a master key */
-		i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-		sess->master_key_length=i;
-		if (i > 0)
-			{
-			if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			if (RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i) <= 0)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (sess->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
-			enc=8;
-		else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(sess->cipher))
-			enc=5;
-		else
-			enc=i;
-
-		if ((int)i < enc)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		clear=i-enc;
-		s2n(clear,p);
-		memcpy(d,sess->master_key,(unsigned int)clear);
-		d+=clear;
-
-		enc=ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(sess->sess_cert,enc,
-			&(sess->master_key[clear]),d,
-			(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-		if (enc <= 0)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) d[1]++;
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
-			sess->master_key[clear]++;
-#endif
-		s2n(enc,p);
-		d+=enc;
-		karg=sess->key_arg_length;	
-		s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
-		if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(d,sess->key_arg,(unsigned int)karg);
-		d+=karg;
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
-		s->init_num=d-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-static int client_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
-		if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(p,s->s2->conn_id,(unsigned int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
-		s->init_num=s->s2->conn_id_length+1;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-/* read the data and then respond */
-static int client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned int n;
-	int cert_ch_len;
-	unsigned char *cert_ch;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-	/* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
-	 * the session if it does not have one */
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
-			SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
-		if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
-		s->init_num += i;
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
-
-		/* type=buf[0]; */
-		/* type eq x509 */
-		if (buf[1] != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
-			{
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
-			}
-		else
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
-		}
-
-	cert_ch = buf + 2;
-	cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
-		{
-		X509 *x509=NULL;
-		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-
-		/* If we get an error we need to
-		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-		 * return(error);
-		 * We should then be retried when things are ok and we
-		 * can get a cert or not */
-
-		i=0;
-		if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
-			{
-			i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
-			}
-
-		if (i < 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
-			{
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
-			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || 
-				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
-				{
-				i=0;
-				}
-			X509_free(x509);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-			}
-		else if (i == 1)
-			{
-			if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
-			if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
-			i=0;
-			}
-
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			/* We have no client certificate to respond with
-			 * so send the correct error message back */
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B;
-			p=buf;
-			*(p++)=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
-			s2n(SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE,p);
-			s->init_off=0;
-			s->init_num=3;
-			/* Write is done at the end */
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B)
-		{
-		return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C)
-		{
-		EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
-		/* ok, now we calculate the checksum
-		 * do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
-		p=buf;
-		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
-		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
-			       s->s2->key_material_length);
-		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
-		i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
-		/* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
-		if(i > 0)
-			EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
-
-		p=buf;
-		d=p+6;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
-		n=i2d_X509(s->cert->key->x509,&d);
-		s2n(n,p);
-
-		if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx,d,&n,s->cert->key->privatekey))
-			{
-			/* this is not good.  If things have failed it
-			 * means there so something wrong with the key.
-			 * We will continue with a 0 length signature
-			 */
-			}
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		s2n(n,p);
-		d+=n;
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D;
-		s->init_num=d-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	/* if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D) */
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i, n, len;
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
-		if (i < (1-s->init_num)) 
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
-		s->init_num += i;
-
-		s->state= SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
-		if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY)
-			{
-			if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,
-					SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-				/* try to read the error message */
-				i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
-				return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
-				}
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-	
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	len = 1 + s->s2->challenge_length;
-	n =  len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
-	if (i < n)
-		return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
-	p += 1;
-
-	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int get_server_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i, n, len;
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	p=buf;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
-		if (i < (1-s->init_num))
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
-		s->init_num += i;
-
-		if (*p == SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE)
-			{
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A;
-			return(1);
-			}
-		else if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED)
-			{
-			if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-				/* try to read the error message */
-				i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
-				return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
-				}
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
-		}
-
-	len = 1 + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-	n = len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]), n);
-	if (i < n) /* XXX could be shorter than SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, that's the maximum */
-		return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
-	s->init_num += i;
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-FINISHED */
-
-	if (!s->hit) /* new session */
-		{
-		/* new session-id */
-		/* Make sure we were not trying to re-use an old SSL_SESSION
-		 * or bad things can happen */
-		/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
-		s->session->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-		memcpy(s->session->session_id,p+1,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG))
-			{
-			if ((s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
-			    || (0 != memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
-			                    (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length)))
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-/* loads in the certificate from the server */
-int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	SESS_CERT *sc=NULL;
-	int i;
-	X509 *x509=NULL;
-	int ret=0;
-	
-	x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&data,(long)len);
-	if (x509 == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk,x509))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-		
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
-	/* server's cert for this session */
-	sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		{
-		ret= -1;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
-	s->session->sess_cert=sc;
-
-	sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509=x509;
-	sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
-	x509=NULL;
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!ssl_set_peer_cert_type(sc,SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE))
-		goto err;
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	sk_X509_free(sk);
-	X509_free(x509);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, int padding)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int i= -1;
-
-	if ((sc == NULL) || (sc->peer_key->x509 == NULL) ||
-		((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_key->x509)) == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	/* we have the public key */
-	i=RSA_public_encrypt(len,from,to,pkey->pkey.rsa,padding);
-	if (i < 0)
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-end:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(i);
-	}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ff3395f4..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
-	{
-	/* Max number of bytes needed */
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *rs,*ws;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	int num;
-
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,md);
-	ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,md);
-
-	if ((s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) &&
-		((s->enc_read_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
-		OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
-		goto err;
-
-	/* make sure it's intialized in case the malloc for enc_write_ctx fails
-	 * and we exit with an error */
-	rs= s->enc_read_ctx;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(rs);
-
-	if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
-		((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
-		OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
-		goto err;
-
-	ws= s->enc_write_ctx;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ws);
-
-	num=c->key_len;
-	s->s2->key_material_length=num*2;
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->s2->key_material_length <= sizeof s->s2->key_material);
-
-	if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
-	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
-		s->session->key_arg);
-	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),
-		s->session->key_arg);
-	s->s2->read_key=  &(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]);
-	s->s2->write_key= &(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]);
-	return(1);
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-/* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and 
- * decrypt.  It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
- * if we are encrypting */
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		l=s->s2->wlength;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		l=s->s2->rlength;
-		}
-
-	/* check for NULL cipher */
-	if (ds == NULL) return;
-
-
-	bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
-	/* This should be using (bs-1) and bs instead of 7 and 8, but
-	 * what the hell. */
-	if (bs == 8)
-		l=(l+7)/8*8;
-
-	EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
-	}
-
-void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *md, int send)
-	{
-	EVP_MD_CTX c;
-	unsigned char sequence[4],*p,*sec,*act;
-	unsigned long seq;
-	unsigned int len;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		seq=s->s2->write_sequence;
-		sec=s->s2->write_key;
-		len=s->s2->wact_data_length;
-		act=s->s2->wact_data;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		seq=s->s2->read_sequence;
-		sec=s->s2->read_key;
-		len=s->s2->ract_data_length;
-		act=s->s2->ract_data;
-		}
-
-	p= &(sequence[0]);
-	l2n(seq,p);
-
-	/* There has to be a MAC algorithm. */
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&c, s->read_hash);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,sec,
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(s->enc_read_ctx));
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,act,len); 
-	/* the above line also does the pad data */
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,sequence,4); 
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,md,NULL);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
-	}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c63be305..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,558 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-const char ssl2_version_str[]="SSLv2" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#define SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl2_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
-
-/* list of available SSLv2 ciphers (sorted by id) */
-OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={
-#if 0
-/* NULL_WITH_MD5 v3 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_NULL_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	0,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-#endif
-
-/* RC4_128_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	0,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	0,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_IDEA,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	0,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif
-
-/* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	0,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	0,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-#if 0
-/* RC4_64_WITH_MD5 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL2_TXT_RC4_64_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL2_CK_RC4_64_WITH_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC,
-	64,
-	64,
-	},
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-/* NULL SSLeay (testing) */
-	{	
-	0,
-	SSL2_TXT_NULL,
-	SSL2_CK_NULL,
-	0,
-	0,
-	0,
-	0,
-	SSL_SSLV2,
-	SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	0,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-#endif
-
-/* end of list :-) */
-	};
-
-long ssl2_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	return(300);
-	}
-
-int ssl2_num_ciphers(void)
-	{
-	return(SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS);
-	}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-	{
-	if (u < SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS)
-		return(&(ssl2_ciphers[SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS-1-u]));
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return SSL_in_init(s) ? 0 : s->s2->ract_data_length;
-	}
-
-int ssl2_new(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSL2_STATE *s2;
-
-	if ((s2=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s2)) == NULL) goto err;
-	memset(s2,0,sizeof *s2);
-
-#if SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER + 3 > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 2
-#  error "assertion failed"
-#endif
-
-	if ((s2->rbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(
-		SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2)) == NULL) goto err;
-	/* wbuf needs one byte more because when using two-byte headers,
-	 * we leave the first byte unused in do_ssl_write (s2_pkt.c) */
-	if ((s2->wbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(
-		SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+3)) == NULL) goto err;
-	s->s2=s2;
-
-	ssl2_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-err:
-	if (s2 != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s2->wbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
-		if (s2->rbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
-		OPENSSL_free(s2);
-		}
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-void ssl2_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSL2_STATE *s2;
-
-	if(s == NULL)
-	    return;
-
-	s2=s->s2;
-	if (s2->rbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
-	if (s2->wbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(s2,sizeof *s2);
-	OPENSSL_free(s2);
-	s->s2=NULL;
-	}
-
-void ssl2_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSL2_STATE *s2;
-	unsigned char *rbuf,*wbuf;
-
-	s2=s->s2;
-
-	rbuf=s2->rbuf;
-	wbuf=s2->wbuf;
-
-	memset(s2,0,sizeof *s2);
-
-	s2->rbuf=rbuf;
-	s2->wbuf=wbuf;
-	s2->clear_text=1;
-	s->packet=s2->rbuf;
-	s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
-	s->packet_length=0;
-	}
-
-long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-	switch(cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
-		ret=s->hit;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
-		return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
-	default:
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-	{
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
- * available */
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	SSL_CIPHER c;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
-	unsigned long id;
-
-	id=0x02000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<16L)|
-		((unsigned long)p[1]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[2];
-	c.id=id;
-	cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl2_ciphers, SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS);
-	if ((cp == NULL) || (cp->valid == 0))
-		return NULL;
-	else
-		return cp;
-	}
-
-int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	if (p != NULL)
-		{
-		l=c->id;
-		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
-		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
-		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
-		p[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
-		}
-	return(3);
-	}
-
-int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned int i;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	unsigned char *km;
-	unsigned char c='0';
-	const EVP_MD *md5;
-	int md_size;
-
-	md5 = EVP_md5();
-
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-	c = os_toascii['0']; /* Must be an ASCII '0', not EBCDIC '0',
-				see SSLv2 docu */
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	km=s->s2->key_material;
-
- 	if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
-			s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key))
- 		{
- 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- 		return 0;
- 		}
-	md_size = EVP_MD_size(md5);
-	if (md_size < 0)
-	    return 0;
-	for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += md_size)
-		{
-		if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + md_size) >
-				(int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
-			{
-			/* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return 0;
-			}
-
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md5, NULL);
-
-		OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
-		    && s->session->master_key_length
-		    < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
-		c++;
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,km,NULL);
-		km += md_size;
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int err)
-	{
-	if (!s->error)
-		{
-		s->error=3;
-		s->error_code=err;
-
-		ssl2_write_error(s);
-		}
-	}
-
-
-void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char buf[3];
-	int i,error;
-
-	buf[0]=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
-	buf[1]=(s->error_code>>8)&0xff;
-	buf[2]=(s->error_code)&0xff;
-
-/*	state=s->rwstate;*/
-
-	error=s->error; /* number of bytes left to write */
-	s->error=0;
-	OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= (int)sizeof(buf));
-	i=ssl2_write(s,&(buf[3-error]),error);
-
-/*	if (i == error) s->rwstate=state; */
-
-	if (i < 0)
-		s->error=error;
-	else
-		{
-		s->error=error-i;
-
-		if (s->error == 0)
-			if (s->msg_callback)
-				s->msg_callback(1, s->version, 0, buf, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s)
-	{
-	s->shutdown=(SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
-	return(1);
-	}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f0e8ca59..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_meth.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_method,
-			 ssl2_accept,
-			 ssl2_connect,
-			 ssl2_get_method)
-
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8bb6ab8b..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,743 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_pkt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-
-static int read_n(SSL *s,unsigned int n,unsigned int max,unsigned int extend);
-static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
-static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
-static int ssl_mt_error(int n);
-
-
-/* SSL 2.0 imlementation for SSL_read/SSL_peek -
- * This routine will return 0 to len bytes, decrypted etc if required.
- */
-static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
-	{
-	int n;
-	unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	int mac_size;
-
- ssl2_read_again:
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		n=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (n < 0) return(n);
-		if (n == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
-	if (s->s2->ract_data_length != 0) /* read from buffer */
-		{
-		if (len > s->s2->ract_data_length)
-			n=s->s2->ract_data_length;
-		else
-			n=len;
-
-		memcpy(buf,s->s2->ract_data,(unsigned int)n);
-		if (!peek)
-			{
-			s->s2->ract_data_length-=n;
-			s->s2->ract_data+=n;
-			if (s->s2->ract_data_length == 0)
-				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-			}
-
-		return(n);
-		}
-
-	/* s->s2->ract_data_length == 0
-	 * 
-	 * Fill the buffer, then goto ssl2_read_again.
-	 */
-
-	if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)
-		{
-		if (s->first_packet)
-			{
-			n=read_n(s,5,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
-			if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
-			s->first_packet=0;
-			p=s->packet;
-			if (!((p[0] & 0x80) && (
-				(p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
-				(p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO))))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			n=read_n(s,2,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
-			if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
-			}
-		/* part read stuff */
-
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-		p=s->packet;
-		/* Do header */
-		/*s->s2->padding=0;*/
-		s->s2->escape=0;
-		s->s2->rlength=(((unsigned int)p[0])<<8)|((unsigned int)p[1]);
-		if ((p[0] & TWO_BYTE_BIT))		/* Two byte header? */
-			{
-			s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
-			s->s2->rlength&=TWO_BYTE_MASK;	
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
-			s->s2->rlength&=THREE_BYTE_MASK;
-
-			/* security >s2->escape */
-			s->s2->escape=((p[0] & SEC_ESC_BIT))?1:0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
-		{
-		n=s->s2->rlength+2+s->s2->three_byte_header;
-		if (n > (int)s->packet_length)
-			{
-			n-=s->packet_length;
-			i=read_n(s,(unsigned int)n,(unsigned int)n,1);
-			if (i <= 0) return(i); /* ERROR */
-			}
-
-		p= &(s->packet[2]);
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-		if (s->s2->three_byte_header)
-			s->s2->padding= *(p++);
-		else	s->s2->padding=0;
-
-		/* Data portion */
-		if (s->s2->clear_text)
-			{
-			mac_size = 0;
-			s->s2->mac_data=p;
-			s->s2->ract_data=p;
-			if (s->s2->padding)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			if (mac_size < 0)
-				return -1;
-			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
-			s->s2->mac_data=p;
-			s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
-			if (s->s2->padding + mac_size > s->s2->rlength)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-
-		s->s2->ract_data_length=s->s2->rlength;
-		/* added a check for length > max_size in case
-		 * encryption was not turned on yet due to an error */
-		if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
-			(s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
-			{
-			ssl2_enc(s,0);
-			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
-			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
-			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
-			if (	(CRYPTO_memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,mac_size) != 0) ||
-				(s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		INC32(s->s2->read_sequence); /* expect next number */
-		/* s->s2->ract_data is now available for processing */
-
-		/* Possibly the packet that we just read had 0 actual data bytes.
-		 * (SSLeay/OpenSSL itself never sends such packets; see ssl2_write.)
-		 * In this case, returning 0 would be interpreted by the caller
-		 * as indicating EOF, so it's not a good idea.  Instead, we just
-		 * continue reading; thus ssl2_read_internal may have to process
-		 * multiple packets before it can return.
-		 *
-		 * [Note that using select() for blocking sockets *never* guarantees
-		 * that the next SSL_read will not block -- the available
-		 * data may contain incomplete packets, and except for SSL 2,
-		 * renegotiation can confuse things even more.] */
-
-		goto ssl2_read_again; /* This should really be
-		                       * "return ssl2_read(s,buf,len)",
-		                       * but that would allow for
-		                       * denial-of-service attacks if a
-		                       * C compiler is used that does not
-		                       * recognize end-recursion. */
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_STATE);
-			return(-1);
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	return ssl2_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
-	}
-
-int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	return ssl2_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
-	}
-
-static int read_n(SSL *s, unsigned int n, unsigned int max,
-	     unsigned int extend)
-	{
-	int i,off,newb;
-
-	/* if there is stuff still in the buffer from a previous read,
-	 * and there is more than we want, take some. */
-	if (s->s2->rbuf_left >= (int)n)
-		{
-		if (extend)
-			s->packet_length+=n;
-		else
-			{
-			s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[s->s2->rbuf_offs]);
-			s->packet_length=n;
-			}
-		s->s2->rbuf_left-=n;
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs+=n;
-		return(n);
-		}
-
-	if (!s->read_ahead) max=n;
-	if (max > (unsigned int)(SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2))
-		max=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2;
-	
-
-	/* Else we want more than we have.
-	 * First, if there is some left or we want to extend */
-	off=0;
-	if ((s->s2->rbuf_left != 0) || ((s->packet_length != 0) && extend))
-		{
-		newb=s->s2->rbuf_left;
-		if (extend)
-			{
-			off=s->packet_length;
-			if (s->packet != s->s2->rbuf)
-				memcpy(s->s2->rbuf,s->packet,
-					(unsigned int)newb+off);
-			}
-		else if (s->s2->rbuf_offs != 0)
-			{
-			memcpy(s->s2->rbuf,&(s->s2->rbuf[s->s2->rbuf_offs]),
-				(unsigned int)newb);
-			s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
-			}
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=0;
-		}
-	else
-		newb=0;
-
-	/* off is the offset to start writing too.
-	 * r->s2->rbuf_offs is the 'unread data', now 0. 
-	 * newb is the number of new bytes so far
-	 */
-	s->packet=s->s2->rbuf;
-	while (newb < (int)n)
-		{
-		clear_sys_error();
-		if (s->rbio != NULL)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,(char *)&(s->s2->rbuf[off+newb]),
-				max-newb);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
-			i= -1;
-			}
-#ifdef PKT_DEBUG
-		if (s->debug & 0x01) sleep(1);
-#endif
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->s2->rbuf_left+=newb;
-			return(i);
-			}
-		newb+=i;
-		}
-
-	/* record unread data */
-	if (newb > (int)n)
-		{
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs=n+off;
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=newb-n;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
-		s->s2->rbuf_left=0;
-		}
-	if (extend)
-		s->packet_length+=n;
-	else
-		s->packet_length=n;
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	return(n);
-	}
-
-int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *_buf, int len)
-	{
-	const unsigned char *buf=_buf;
-	unsigned int n,tot;
-	int i;
-
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->error)
-		{
-		ssl2_write_error(s);
-		if (s->error)
-			return(-1);
-		}
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
-	tot=s->s2->wnum;
-	s->s2->wnum=0;
-
-	n=(len-tot);
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		i=n_do_ssl_write(s,&(buf[tot]),n);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->s2->wnum=tot;
-			return(i);
-			}
-		if ((i == (int)n) ||
-			(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))
-			{
-			return(tot+i);
-			}
-		
-		n-=i;
-		tot+=i;
-		}
-	}
-
-static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	/* s->s2->wpend_len != 0 MUST be true. */
-
-	/* check that they have given us the same buffer to
-	 * write */
-	if ((s->s2->wpend_tot > (int)len) ||
-		((s->s2->wpend_buf != buf) &&
-		 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		clear_sys_error();
-		if (s->wbio != NULL)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
-				(char *)&(s->s2->write_ptr[s->s2->wpend_off]),
-				(unsigned int)s->s2->wpend_len);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET);
-			i= -1;
-			}
-#ifdef PKT_DEBUG
-		if (s->debug & 0x01) sleep(1);
-#endif
-		if (i == s->s2->wpend_len)
-			{
-			s->s2->wpend_len=0;
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			return(s->s2->wpend_ret);
-			}
-		else if (i <= 0)
-			return(i);
-		s->s2->wpend_off+=i;
-		s->s2->wpend_len-=i;
-		}
-	}
-
-static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
-	{
-	unsigned int j,k,olen,p,bs;
-	int mac_size;
-	register unsigned char *pp;
-
-	olen=len;
-
-	/* first check if there is data from an encryption waiting to
-	 * be sent - it must be sent because the other end is waiting.
-	 * This will happen with non-blocking IO.  We print it and then
-	 * return.
-	 */
-	if (s->s2->wpend_len != 0) return(write_pending(s,buf,len));
-
-	/* set mac_size to mac size */
-	if (s->s2->clear_text)
-		mac_size=0;
-	else
-		{
-		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-		if (mac_size < 0)
-			return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* lets set the pad p */
-	if (s->s2->clear_text)
-		{
-		if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
-			len=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER;
-		p=0;
-		s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
-		/* len=len; */
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		j=len+mac_size;
-		/* Two-byte headers allow for a larger record length than
-		 * three-byte headers, but we can't use them if we need
-		 * padding or if we have to set the escape bit. */
-		if ((j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) &&
-			(!s->s2->escape))
-			{
-			if (j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
-				j=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER;
-			/* set k to the max number of bytes with 2
-			 * byte header */
-			k=j-(j%bs);
-			/* how many data bytes? */
-			len=k-mac_size; 
-			s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
-			p=0;
-			}
-		else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape))
-			{
-			/* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
-			 * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER */
-			s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
-			p=0;
-			}
-		else /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
-			{
-			/* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
-			 * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
-			 * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. */
-			p=(j%bs);
-			p=(p == 0)?0:(bs-p);
-			if (s->s2->escape)
-				{
-				s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
-				if (j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-					j=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER;
-				}
-			else
-				s->s2->three_byte_header=(p == 0)?0:1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* Now
-	 *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
-	 * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
-	 *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
-	 */
-
-	/* mac_size is the number of MAC bytes
-	 * len is the number of data bytes we are going to send
-	 * p is the number of padding bytes
-	 * (if it is a two-byte header, then p == 0) */
-
-	s->s2->wlength=len;
-	s->s2->padding=p;
-	s->s2->mac_data= &(s->s2->wbuf[3]);
-	s->s2->wact_data= &(s->s2->wbuf[3+mac_size]);
-	/* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */
-	memcpy(s->s2->wact_data,buf,len);
-	if (p)
-		memset(&(s->s2->wact_data[len]),0,p); /* arbitrary padding */
-
-	if (!s->s2->clear_text)
-		{
-		s->s2->wact_data_length=len+p;
-		ssl2_mac(s,s->s2->mac_data,1);
-		s->s2->wlength+=p+mac_size;
-		ssl2_enc(s,1);
-		}
-
-	/* package up the header */
-	s->s2->wpend_len=s->s2->wlength;
-	if (s->s2->three_byte_header) /* 3 byte header */
-		{
-		pp=s->s2->mac_data;
-		pp-=3;
-		pp[0]=(s->s2->wlength>>8)&(THREE_BYTE_MASK>>8);
-		if (s->s2->escape) pp[0]|=SEC_ESC_BIT;
-		pp[1]=s->s2->wlength&0xff;
-		pp[2]=s->s2->padding;
-		s->s2->wpend_len+=3;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		pp=s->s2->mac_data;
-		pp-=2;
-		pp[0]=((s->s2->wlength>>8)&(TWO_BYTE_MASK>>8))|TWO_BYTE_BIT;
-		pp[1]=s->s2->wlength&0xff;
-		s->s2->wpend_len+=2;
-		}
-	s->s2->write_ptr=pp;
-	
-	INC32(s->s2->write_sequence); /* expect next number */
-
-	/* lets try to actually write the data */
-	s->s2->wpend_tot=olen;
-	s->s2->wpend_buf=buf;
-
-	s->s2->wpend_ret=len;
-
-	s->s2->wpend_off=0;
-	return(write_pending(s,buf,olen));
-	}
-
-int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int j;
-
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		/* ssl2_return_error(s); */
-		/* for non-blocking io,
-		 * this is not necessarily fatal */
-		return(i);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->init_num+=i;
-
-		/* Check for error.  While there are recoverable errors,
-		 * this function is not called when those must be expected;
-		 * any error detected here is fatal. */
-		if (s->init_num >= 3)
-			{
-			p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-			if (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				j=(p[1]<<8)|p[2];
-				SSLerr((int)f,ssl_mt_error(j));
-				s->init_num -= 3;
-				if (s->init_num > 0)
-					memmove(p, p+3, s->init_num);
-				}
-			}
-
-		/* If it's not an error message, we have some error anyway --
-		 * the message was shorter than expected.  This too is treated
-		 * as fatal (at least if SSL_get_error is asked for its opinion). */
-		return(0);
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret=ssl2_write(s,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],s->init_num);
-	if (ret == s->init_num)
-		{
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return(-1);
-	s->init_off+=ret;
-	s->init_num-=ret;
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_mt_error(int n)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	switch (n)
-		{
-	case SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER:
-		ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER;
-		break;
-	case SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE:
-		ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
-		break;
-	case SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
-		ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE;
-		break;
-	case SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE:
-		ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE;
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2cba426b..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1148 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s2_srvr.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s);
-static int get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int server_hello(SSL *s); 
-static int get_client_finished(SSL *s);
-static int server_verify(SSL *s);
-static int server_finish(SSL *s);
-static int request_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
-	unsigned char *to,int padding);
-#define BREAK	break
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv2_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_server_method,
-			ssl2_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl2_get_server_method)
-
-int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	long num1;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int new_state,state;
-
-	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-	/* init things to blank */
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
-	if (s->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	clear_sys_error();
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch (s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
-			s->server=1;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
-			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
-			buf=s->init_buf;
-			if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)
-				SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-			s->init_buf=buf;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-			s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C:
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=get_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B:
-			ret=server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			if (!s->hit)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
-				BREAK;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
-				BREAK;
-				}
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
-			ret=get_client_master_key(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION:
-			/* Ok we how have sent all the stuff needed to
-			 * start encrypting, the next packet back will
-			 * be encrypted. */
-			if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,0))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-			s->s2->clear_text=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
-			ret=server_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				/* If we are in here, we have been
-				 * buffering the output, so we need to
-				 * flush it and remove buffering from
-				 * future traffic */
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C;
-				BREAK;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
-				break;
-				}
-
- 		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C:
- 			/* get the number of bytes to write */
- 			num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
- 			if (num1 > 0)
- 				{
-				s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- 				num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- 				if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-				s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-				}
-
- 			/* flushed and now remove buffering */
- 			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-
- 			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
-  			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=get_client_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A;
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D:
-			/* don't do a 'request certificate' if we
-			 * don't want to, or we already have one, and
-			 * we only want to do it once. */
-			if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
-				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
-				(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)))
-				{
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
-				break;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				ret=request_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
-				}
-			BREAK;
-
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=server_finish(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-			s->init_buf=NULL;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		/*	ERR_clear_error();*/
-
-			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
-			/* s->server=1; */
-			ret=1;
-
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
-			goto end;
-			/* BREAK; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* BREAK; */
-			}
-		
-		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-			{
-			new_state=s->state;
-			s->state=state;
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-			s->state=new_state;
-			}
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int is_export,i,n,keya,ek;
-	unsigned long len;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),10-s->init_num);
-
-		if (i < (10-s->init_num))
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i));
-		s->init_num = 10;
-
-		if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY)
-			{
-			if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
-		if (cp == NULL)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->session->cipher= cp;
-
-		p+=3;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clear=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.enc=i;
-		n2s(p,i);
-		if(i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		s->session->key_arg_length=i;
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	keya=s->session->key_arg_length;
-	len = 10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc + (unsigned long)keya;
-	if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	n = (int)len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
-	if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i));
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
-	p += 10;
-
-	memcpy(s->session->key_arg,&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear+s->s2->tmp.enc]),
-		(unsigned int)keya);
-
-	if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
-		&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
-		(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
-	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
-	
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
-		{
-		is_export=1;
-		ek=8;
-		}
-	else
-		ek=5;
-
-	/* bad decrypt */
-#if 1
-	/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
-	 * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
-	if ((i < 0) ||
-		((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
-			(unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
-		{
-		ERR_clear_error();
-		if (is_export)
-			i=ek;
-		else
-			i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
-			return 0;
-		}
-#else
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		error=1;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-		}
-	/* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */
-	else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-		|| (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
-			EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))
-		{
-		error=1;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS);
-		}
-	if (error)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
-
-	if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	s->session->master_key_length=i;
-	memcpy(s->session->master_key,p,(unsigned int)i);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,n;
-	unsigned long len;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
-	int z;
-
-	/* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet
-	 * type the first time round. */
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		s->first_packet=1;
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
-		}
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),9-s->init_num);
-		if (i < (9-s->init_num)) 
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i));
-		s->init_num = 9;
-	
-		if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
-			{
-			if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.session_id_length=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->challenge_length=i;
-		if (	(i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
-			(i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	len = 9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
-	if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	n = (int)len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
-	if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i));
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
-	p += 9;
-
-	/* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session
-	 * structure if it is cached */
-	/* session-id */
-	if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) && 
-		(s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,&(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
-			s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
-		if (i == 1)
-			{ /* previous session */
-			s->hit=1;
-			}
-		else if (i == -1)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (s->cert == NULL)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (!s->hit)
-		{
-		cs=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
-			&s->session->ciphers);
-		if (cs == NULL) goto mem_err;
-
-		cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
-		    {
-		    prio=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
-		    if (prio == NULL) goto mem_err;
-		    allow = cs;
-		    }
-		else
-		    {
-		    prio = cs;
-		    allow = cl;
-		    }
-		for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++)
-			{
-			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0)
-				{
-				(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z);
-				z--;
-				}
-			}
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
-		    {
-		    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
-		    s->session->ciphers = prio;
-		    }
-		/* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of
-		 * ciphers that are on both the client and server.
-		 * This list is ordered by the order the client sent
-		 * the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
-		 * if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
-		 */
-		}
-	p+=s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
-	/* done cipher selection */
-
-	/* session id extracted already */
-	p+=s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
-
-	/* challenge */
-	if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	memcpy(s->s2->challenge,p,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
-	return(1);
-mem_err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-static int server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int n,hit;
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		d=p+11;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO;		/* type */
-		hit=s->hit;
-		*(p++)=(unsigned char)hit;
-#if 1
-		if (!hit)
-			{
-			if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
-				/* This can't really happen because get_client_hello
-				 * has called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set
-				 * sess_cert. */
-				ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
-			s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		/* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL,
-		 * depending on whether it survived in the internal cache
-		 * or was retrieved from an external cache.
-		 * If it is NULL, we cannot put any useful data in it anyway,
-		 * so we don't touch it.
-		 */
-
-#else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st and sess_cert_st were
-	   * the same. */
-		if (!hit)
-			{			/* else add cert to session */
-			CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-			if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
-				ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
-			s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;		
-			}
-		else	/* We have a session id-cache hit, if the
-			 * session-id has no certificate listed against
-			 * the 'cert' structure, grab the 'old' one
-			 * listed against the SSL connection */
-			{
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,
-					CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-				s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-
-		if (s->cert == NULL)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		if (hit)
-			{
-			*(p++)=0;		/* no certificate type */
-			s2n(s->version,p);	/* version */
-			s2n(0,p);		/* cert len */
-			s2n(0,p);		/* ciphers len */
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* EAY EAY */
-			/* put certificate type */
-			*(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
-			s2n(s->version,p);	/* version */
-			n=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
-			s2n(n,p);		/* certificate length */
-			i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&d);
-			n=0;
-			
-			/* lets send out the ciphers we like in the
-			 * prefered order */
-			n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,s->session->ciphers,d,0);
-			d+=n;
-			s2n(n,p);		/* add cipher length */
-			}
-
-		/* make and send conn_id */
-		s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH,p);	/* add conn_id length */
-		s->s2->conn_id_length=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id,(int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0)
-			return -1;
-		memcpy(d,s->s2->conn_id,SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
-		d+=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B;
-		s->init_num=d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */
- 	/* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2
- 	 * writes without a read between them.  This occurs when
- 	 * Session-id reuse is used, so I will put in a buffering module
- 	 */
- 	if (s->hit)
- 		{
-		if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) return(-1);
- 		}
- 
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-static int get_client_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i, n;
-	unsigned long len;
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
-		if (i < 1-s->init_num)
-			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i));
-		s->init_num += i;
-
-		if (*p != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-			{
-			if (*p != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
-				/* try to read the error message */
-				i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
-				return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
-				}
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B */
-	if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	len = 1 + (unsigned long)s->s2->conn_id_length;
-	n = (int)len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
-	if (i < n)
-		{
-		return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i));
-		}
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-FINISHED */
-	p += 1;
-	if (memcmp(p,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length) != 0)
-		{
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int server_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY;
-		if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(p,s->s2->challenge,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
-		/* p+=s->s2->challenge_length; */
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
-		s->init_num=s->s2->challenge_length+1;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-static int server_finish(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED;
-
-		if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id, (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length);
-		/* p+=s->session->session_id_length; */
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
-		s->init_num=s->session->session_id_length+1;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B */
-	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
-	}
-
-/* send the request and check the response */
-static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	const unsigned char *cp;
-	unsigned char *p,*p2,*buf2;
-	unsigned char *ccd;
-	int i,j,ctype,ret= -1;
-	unsigned long len;
-	X509 *x509=NULL;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-
-	ccd=s->s2->tmp.ccl;
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
-		*(p++)=SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
-			return -1;
-		memcpy(p,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
-
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B;
-		s->init_num=SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B)
-		{
-		i=ssl2_do_write(s);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			ret=i;
-			goto end;
-			}
-
-		s->init_num=0;
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C;
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),6-s->init_num); /* try to read 6 octets ... */
-		if (i < 3-s->init_num) /* ... but don't call ssl2_part_read now if we got at least 3
-		                        * (probably NO-CERTIFICATE-ERROR) */
-			{
-			ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		s->init_num += i;
-
-		if ((s->init_num >= 3) && (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR))
-			{
-			n2s(p,i);
-			if (i != SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE)
-				{
-				/* not the error message we expected -- let ssl2_part_read handle it */
-				s->init_num -= 3;
-				ret = ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, 3);
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (s->msg_callback)
-				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */
-
-			/* this is the one place where we can recover from an SSL 2.0 error */
-
-			if (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
-				{
-				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-				goto end;
-				}
-			ret=1;
-			goto end;
-			}
-		if ((*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) || (s->init_num < 6))
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_SHORT_READ);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		if (s->init_num != 6)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		
-		/* ok we have a response */
-		/* certificate type, there is only one right now. */
-		ctype= *(p++);
-		if (ctype != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
-			{
-			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT);
-			goto end;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clen=i;
-		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.rlen=i;
-		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D */
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	len = 6 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clen + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.rlen;
-	if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	j = (int)len - s->init_num;
-	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),j);
-	if (i < j) 
-		{
-		ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-CERTIFICATE */
-	p += 6;
-
-	cp = p;
-	x509=(X509 *)d2i_X509(NULL,&cp,(long)s->s2->tmp.clen);
-	if (x509 == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-		goto msg_end;
-		}
-
-	if (((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(sk,x509)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto msg_end;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-
-	if (i > 0)	/* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
-		{
-		EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-
-		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL)
-		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
-					 s->s2->key_material_length)
-		    || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,
-					 SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
-			goto msg_end;
-
-		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
-		buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
-		if (buf2 == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto msg_end;
-			}
-		p2=buf2;
-		i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
-		if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i))
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(buf2);
-			goto msg_end;
-			}
-		OPENSSL_free(buf2);
-
-		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
-		if (pkey == NULL) goto end;
-		i=EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,cp,s->s2->tmp.rlen,pkey);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-		if (i > 0)
-			{
-			if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-				X509_free(s->session->peer);
-			s->session->peer=x509;
-			CRYPTO_add(&x509->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-			s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-			ret=1;
-			goto end;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM);
-			goto msg_end;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-msg_end:
-		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-		}
-end:
-	sk_X509_free(sk);
-	X509_free(x509);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, int padding)
-	{
-	RSA *rsa;
-	int i;
-
-	if ((c == NULL) || (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	rsa=c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->pkey.rsa;
-
-	/* we have the public key */
-	i=RSA_private_decrypt(len,from,to,rsa,padding);
-	if (i < 0)
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-	return(i);
-	}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy=&dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 607990d0..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,861 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_both.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
-	                     s->init_num);
-	if (ret < 0) return(-1);
-	if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-		/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
-		 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
-		ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
-	
-	if (ret == s->init_num)
-		{
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-		return(1);
-		}
-	s->init_off+=ret;
-	s->init_num-=ret;
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state == a)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
-
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
-		if (i == 0)
-			return 0;
-		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
-		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-		p+=i;
-		l=i;
-
-                /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
-                   renegotiation checks */
-                if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-                        {
-                         OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-                         memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
-                             s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-                         s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
-                        }
-                else
-                        {
-                        OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-                        memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
-                            s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
-                        s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
-                        }
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
-		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
-		 * I do this.
-		 */
-		l&=0xffff;
-#endif
-
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
-		l2n3(l,d);
-		s->init_num=(int)l+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		s->state=b;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
-static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
-	{
-	const char *sender;
-	int slen;
-	/* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
-	 * set the appropriate error.
-	 */
-	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
-		return;
-	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-		{
-		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
-		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
-		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
-	{
-	int al,i,ok;
-	long n;
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
-	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md.
-	 */ 
-#endif
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		a,
-		b,
-		SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
-		64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
-	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
-
-	if (i != n)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-        /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
-           renegotiation checks */
-        if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-                {
-                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-                memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
-                    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
-                s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
-                }
-        else
-                {
-                OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-                memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
-                    s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
-                s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
-                }
-
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-/* for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
- * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
- * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
- */
-int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
-	{ 
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == a)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
-		s->init_num=1;
-		s->init_off=0;
-
-		s->state=b;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
-	}
-
-static int ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
-	{
-	int n;
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
-	l2n3(n,p);
-	i2d_X509(x,&p);
-	*l+=n+3;
-
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l=7;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	int no_chain;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
-
-	cert_chain = SSL_get_certificate_chain(s, x);
-
-	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs || cert_chain)
-		no_chain = 1;
-	else
-		no_chain = 0;
-
-	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
-	buf=s->init_buf;
-	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (x != NULL)
-		{
-		if (no_chain)
-			{
-			if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
-				return(0);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
-
-			if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-				return(0);
-				}
-			X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
-			/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
-				{
-				x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
-
-				if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
-					{
-					X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
-					return 0;
-					}
-				}
-			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
-			}
-		}
-	/* Thawte special :-) */
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
-		{
-		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
-		if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
-			return(0);
-		}
-
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(cert_chain); i++)
-		if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, sk_X509_value(cert_chain,i)))
-			return(0);
-
-	l-=7;
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
-	l2n3(l,p);
-	l+=3;
-	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
-	*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
-	l2n3(l,p);
-	l+=4;
-	return(l);
-	}
-
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
- * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
- * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
- * the body is read in state 'stn'.
- */
-long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned long l;
-	long n;
-	int i,al;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
-		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		*ok=1;
-		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
-		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
-		return s->init_num;
-		}
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-	if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
-		{
-		int skip_message;
-
-		do
-			{
-			while (s->init_num < 4)
-				{
-				i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-					&p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
-				if (i <= 0)
-					{
-					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-					*ok = 0;
-					return i;
-					}
-				s->init_num+=i;
-				}
-			
-			skip_message = 0;
-			if (!s->server)
-				if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
-					/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
-					 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
-					 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
-					 * 'Finished' MAC. */
-					if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
-						{
-						s->init_num = 0;
-						skip_message = 1;
-
-						if (s->msg_callback)
-							s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-						}
-			}
-		while (skip_message);
-
-		/* s->init_num == 4 */
-
-		if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-					(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
-					(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
-			{
-			/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
-			 * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
-			 * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
-			 * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
-			 * we have not completed the handshake. */
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-			}
-
-		s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
-
-		n2l3(p,l);
-		if (l > (unsigned long)max)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
-		s->state=stn;
-
-		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
-		s->init_num = 0;
-		}
-
-	/* next state (stn) */
-	p = s->init_msg;
-	n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
-	while (n > 0)
-		{
-		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			*ok = 0;
-			return i;
-			}
-		s->init_num += i;
-		n -= i;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
-	 * Finished verification. */
-	if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		ssl3_take_mac(s);
-#endif
-
-	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
-	if (*((unsigned char*) s->init_buf->data) != SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)
-		ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-	*ok=1;
-	return s->init_num;
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	*ok=0;
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *pk;
-	int ret= -1,i;
-
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
-	else
-		pk=pkey;
-	if (pk == NULL) goto err;
-
-	i=pk->type;
-	if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-		{
-		ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
-		}
-	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-		{
-		ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-		{
-		ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-		}	
-#endif
-	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) 
-		{
-		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
-		}
-	else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) 
-		{
-		ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
-		}
-err:
-	if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
-	{
-	int al;
-
-	switch(type)
-		{
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
-		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
-	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
-	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
-	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
-	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
-		al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
-		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
-		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
-		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
-	case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
-	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
-	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
-	case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
-	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
-		al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		break;
-	case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
-		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-		break;
-	default:
-		al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-		break;
-		}
-	return(al);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
- * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
- * unused buffers.  Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
- * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
- * This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
- * with a given context.  (The options affecting buffer size are
- * max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
- * SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
- * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.)  Using a separate freelist for every
- * possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
- * different values.
- *
- * If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
- * connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
- * use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
- *    - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
- *    - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
- *    - Improve this code.
- */
-static void *
-freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
-	{
-	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
-	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
-	void *result = NULL;
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
-	if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
-		ent = list->head;
-	if (ent != NULL)
-		{
-		list->head = ent->next;
-		result = ent;
-		if (--list->len == 0)
-			list->chunklen = 0;
-		}
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	if (!result)
-		result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
-	return result;
-}
-
-static void
-freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
-	{
-	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
-	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
-	if (list != NULL &&
-	    (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
-	    list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len &&
-	    sz >= sizeof(*ent))
-		{
-		list->chunklen = sz;
-		ent = mem;
-		ent->next = list->head;
-		list->head = ent;
-		++list->len;
-		mem = NULL;
-		}
-
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	if (mem)
-		OPENSSL_free(mem);
-	}
-#else
-#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
-#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
-	
-	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	else
-		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
-#endif
-
-	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
-		{
-		len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-			+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
-			+ headerlen + align;
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-			{
-			s->s3->init_extra = 1;
-			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
-			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
-#endif
-		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
-		s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
-		}
-
-	s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-	return 1;
-
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
-
-	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
-	else
-		headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-	align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
-#endif
-
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
-		{
-		len = s->max_send_fragment
-			+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
-			+ headerlen + align;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
-			len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
-#endif
-		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
-			len += headerlen + align
-				+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
-
-		if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-		s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-
-int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-		return 0;
-	if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
-		{
-		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
-		s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
-		{
-		freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-		s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 11f13adb..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
- * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
-#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
-
-/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
- * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
- * supported by TLS.) */
-#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-
-/* ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
- * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
- *
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
- * returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
- *   1: if the padding was valid
- *  -1: otherwise. */
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-			    unsigned block_size,
-			    unsigned mac_size)
-	{
-	unsigned padding_length, good;
-	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-
-	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
-	 * time. */
-	if (overhead > rec->length)
-		return 0;
-
-	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
-	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length+overhead);
-	/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
-	good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length+1);
-	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
-	rec->length -= padding_length;
-	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
-	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
-	}
-
-/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
- * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
- * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
- * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
- * padding was removed.
- *
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
- * returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
- *   1: if the padding was valid
- *  -1: otherwise. */
-int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-			    unsigned block_size,
-			    unsigned mac_size)
-	{
-	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
-	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
-		 * non-constant time.
-		 */
-		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
-			return 0;
-		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
-		rec->data += block_size;
-		rec->input += block_size;
-		rec->length -= block_size;
-		}
-	else if (overhead > rec->length)
-		return 0;
-
-	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
-
-	/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of
-	 * even length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
-	 * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
-	 * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
-	 */
-	if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand)
-		{
-		/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-		if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) &&
-		    !(padding_length & 1))
-			{
-			s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-			}
-		if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) &&
-		    padding_length > 0)
-			{
-			padding_length--;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-		{
-		/* padding is already verified */
-		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length);
-	/* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
-	 * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
-	 * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
-	 * bytes of padding.
-	 *
-	 * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
-	 * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
-	 * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
-	 * public information so we can use it.) */
-	to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
-	if (to_check > rec->length-1)
-		to_check = rec->length-1;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++)
-		{
-		unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
-		unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length-1-i];
-		/* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
-		 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
-		good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
-		}
-
-	/* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
-	 * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
-	 */
-	good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
-	padding_length = good & (padding_length+1);
-	rec->length -= padding_length;
-	rec->type |= padding_length<<8;	/* kludge: pass padding length */
-
-	return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
-	}
-
-/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
- * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
- * vary within a 256-byte window).
- *
- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
- * this function.
- *
- * On entry:
- *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
- *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
- *
- * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
- * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
- * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
- * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
- * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
- */
-#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
-
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
-		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len)
-	{
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
-	unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64+EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char *rotated_mac;
-#else
-	unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-#endif
-
-	/* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
-	unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
-	unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
-	/* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
-	 * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
-	unsigned scan_start = 0;
-	unsigned i, j;
-	unsigned div_spoiler;
-	unsigned rotate_offset;
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
-	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
-	rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0-(size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
-#endif
-
-	/* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
-	if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
-		scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
-	/* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
-	 * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
-	 * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
-	 *
-	 * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
-	 * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
-	 * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
-	div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
-	div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler)-1)*8;
-	rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
-
-	memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
-	for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++)
-		{
-		unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
-		unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
-		unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
-		rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
-		j &= constant_time_lt(j,md_size);
-		}
-
-	/* Now rotate the MAC */
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
-	j = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
-		{
-		/* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
-		((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
-		out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
-		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
-		}
-#else
-	memset(out, 0, md_size);
-	rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
-	rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
-	for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++)
-		{
-		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
-			out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
-		rotate_offset++;
-		rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset,md_size);
-		}
-#endif
-	}
-
-/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
- * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
-#define u32toLE(n, p) \
-	(*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
-	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
-	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
-	 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
-
-/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
- * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
- * typically does. */
-static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-	{
-	MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
-	u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
-	u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
-	u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
-	u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
-	}
-
-static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-	{
-	SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
-	l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
-	l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
-	l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
-	l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
-	l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
-	}
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-	{
-	SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
-	unsigned i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		{
-		l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
-		}
-	}
-#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-	{
-	SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
-	unsigned i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		{
-		l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
-		}
-	}
-#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
-#endif
-
-/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (FIPS_mode())
-		return 0;
-#endif
-	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
-		{
-		case NID_md5:
-		case NID_sha1:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-		case NID_sha224:
-		case NID_sha256:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-		case NID_sha384:
-		case NID_sha512:
-#endif
-			return 1;
-		default:
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
- * record.
- *
- *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
- *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
- *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
- *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
- *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
- *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
- *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
- *     once the padding has been removed.
- *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
- *     record, including padding.
- *   is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
- *
- * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
- * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
- * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
- * padding too. ) */
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-	unsigned char* md_out,
-	size_t* md_out_size,
-	const unsigned char header[13],
-	const unsigned char *data,
-	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
-	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
-	unsigned mac_secret_length,
-	char is_sslv3)
-	{
-	union {	double align;
-		unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state;
-	void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
-	void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
-	unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
-	unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
-		 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
-		 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
-	unsigned int bits;	/* at most 18 bits */
-	unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
-	/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
-	unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	/* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
-	* the hash. */
-	unsigned md_length_size = 8;
-	char length_is_big_endian = 1;
-
-	/* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
-	 * many possible overflows later in this function. */
-	OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);
-
-	switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx))
-		{
-		case NID_md5:
-			MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
-			md_size = 16;
-			sslv3_pad_length = 48;
-			length_is_big_endian = 0;
-			break;
-		case NID_sha1:
-			SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
-			md_size = 20;
-			break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-		case NID_sha224:
-			SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
-			md_size = 224/8;
-			break;
-		case NID_sha256:
-			SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
-			md_size = 32;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-		case NID_sha384:
-			SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
-			md_size = 384/8;
-			md_block_size = 128;
-			md_length_size = 16;
-			break;
-		case NID_sha512:
-			SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
-			md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
-			md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
-			md_size = 64;
-			md_block_size = 128;
-			md_length_size = 16;
-			break;
-#endif
-		default:
-			/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
-			 * called first to check that the hash function is
-			 * supported. */
-			OPENSSL_assert(0);
-			if (md_out_size)
-				*md_out_size = -1;
-			return;
-		}
-
-	OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
-	OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-	header_length = 13;
-	if (is_sslv3)
-		{
-		header_length =
-			mac_secret_length +
-			sslv3_pad_length +
-			8 /* sequence number */ +
-			1 /* record type */ +
-			2 /* record length */;
-		}
-
-	/* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
-	 * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
-	 * padding value.
-	 *
-	 * In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
-	 * varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
-	 * the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
-	 * termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
-	 * say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
-	 *
-	 * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
-	 * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
-	 * can vary based on the padding.
-	 *
-	 * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
-	 * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
-	variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
-	/* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
-	 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
-	 * (SSLv3) */
-	len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
-	/* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
-	* |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
-	max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
-	/* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
-	num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
-	/* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
-	 * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
-	 * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
-	 * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
-	 * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
-	 * they are plaintext. */
-	num_starting_blocks = 0;
-	/* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
-	 * we start processing. */
-	k = 0;
-	/* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
-	 * MACed. */
-	mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
-	/* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
-	 * contains application data. */
-	c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
-	/* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
-	 * value. */
-	index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
-	/* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
-	 * length, in bits. */
-	index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
-	/* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
-	 * block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
-	 * SSLv3. */
-
-	/* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
-	 * at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
-	if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0))
-		{
-		num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
-		k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
-		}
-
-	bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
-	if (!is_sslv3)
-		{
-		/* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
-		 * secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
-		 * than a single block. */
-		bits += 8*md_block_size;
-		memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
-		OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
-		memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
-		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
-			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
-
-		md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
-		}
-
-	if (length_is_big_endian)
-		{
-		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size-4);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-4] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-3] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-2] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-1] = (unsigned char)bits;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		memset(length_bytes,0,md_length_size);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-5] = (unsigned char)(bits>>24);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-6] = (unsigned char)(bits>>16);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-7] = (unsigned char)(bits>>8);
-		length_bytes[md_length_size-8] = (unsigned char)bits;
-		}
-
-	if (k > 0)
-		{
-		if (is_sslv3)
-			{
-			/* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
-			 * overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
-			 * block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
-			 * (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
-			unsigned overhang = header_length-md_block_size;
-			md_transform(md_state.c, header);
-			memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
-			memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size-overhang);
-			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
-			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
-				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
-			memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
-			memcpy(first_block+13, data, md_block_size-13);
-			md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
-			for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
-				md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
-			}
-		}
-
-	memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
-
-	/* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
-	 * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
-	 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
-	 * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
-	for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks+variance_blocks; i++)
-		{
-		unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
-		unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
-		for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++)
-			{
-			unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
-			if (k < header_length)
-				b = header[k];
-			else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
-				b = data[k-header_length];
-			k++;
-
-			is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
-			is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c+1);
-			/* If this is the block containing the end of the
-			 * application data, and we are at the offset for the
-			 * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
-                        b =  constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
-			/* If this the the block containing the end of the
-			 * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
-			 * just write zero. */
-			b = b&~is_past_cp1;
-			/* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
-			 * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
-			 * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
-			 * add an extra block of zeros. */
-			b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
-
-			/* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
-			 * length. */
-			if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size)
-				{
-				/* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
-				b = constant_time_select_8(
-					is_block_b, length_bytes[j-(md_block_size-md_length_size)], b);
-				}
-			block[j] = b;
-			}
-
-		md_transform(md_state.c, block);
-		md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
-		/* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
-		for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
-			mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */);
-	if (is_sslv3)
-		{
-		/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
-		memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
-
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
-		for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
-			hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
-
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
-		}
-	EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
-	if (md_out_size)
-		*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-
-/* Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
- * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases
- * by digesting additional data.
- */
-
-void tls_fips_digest_extra(
-	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
-	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
-	{
-	size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-		return;
-	block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
-	/* We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
-	 * digests and TLS to deal with.
-	 * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
-	 * otherwise.
-	 * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
-	 * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
-	 * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
-	 * So we have:
-	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
-	 * equivalently:
-	 * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
-	 * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
-	 * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
-	 * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
-	 * for SHA384/SHA512 and
-	 * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
-	 * otherwise.
-	 */
-	digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
-	blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
-	blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad)/block_size;
-	/* MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original
-	 * and actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a
-	 * no op. The "data" pointer should always have enough space to
-	 * perform this operation as it is large enough for a maximum
-	 * length TLS buffer. 
-	 */
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
-				(blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
-	}
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a81793e..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3808 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_client_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			ssl3_get_client_method)
-
-int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
-	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-	
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
-	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
-	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
-		{
-		/* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
-		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
-		}
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch(s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
-			/* break */
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
-			s->server=0;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-				
-			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
-			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* setup buffing BIO */
-			if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
-			if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
-				s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					{
-					/* receive renewed session ticket */
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-					}
-#endif
-				}
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				s->hit = 1;
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				break;
-				}
-#endif
-			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
-			/* or non-RSA PSK */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
-			    !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
-			      !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-#else
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			/* at this point we check that we have the
-			 * required stuff from the server */
-			if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
-				{
-				if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
-					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto end;
-					}
-				}
-#endif
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
-			 * sent back */
-			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
-			 * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
-			/* XXX: For now, we do not support client 
-			 * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
-			 * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
-			 * We need to skip the certificate verify 
-			 * message when client's ECDH public key is sent 
-			 * inside the client certificate.
-			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-				}
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-# endif
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-			s->session->compress_meth=0;
-#else
-			if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-				s->session->compress_meth=0;
-			else
-				s->session->compress_meth=
-					s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			break;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
-			/* clear flags */
-			s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
-				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-					{
-					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it
-				 * involves ChannelID, then record the
-				 * handshake hashes at this point in the
-				 * session so that any resumption of this
-				 * session with ChannelID can sign those
-				 * hashes. */
-				if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-					{
-					ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
-					if (ret <= 0)
-						goto end;
-					}
-				if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
-				    && ssl3_can_cutthrough(s)
-				    && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
-				   )
-					{
-					if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
-						{
-						s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
-						s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-						s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-						}
-					else
-						{
-						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
-						}
-					}
-				else
-					{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-					/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-					if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-					else
-#endif
-						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-					}
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-		break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
-
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
-			if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-			else
-#endif
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-
-			/* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
-			 * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
-			 */
-			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
-				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-			ret = 1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
-				{
-				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-				s->init_buf=NULL;
-				}
-
-			/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
-			 * remove the buffering now */
-			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
-				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->renegotiate=0;
-			s->new_session=0;
-
-			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-			ret=1;
-			/* s->server=0; */
-			s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
-			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-
-		/* did we do anything */
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if (s->debug)
-				{
-				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
-					goto end;
-				}
-
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
-end:
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-
-int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	int j;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-
-	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
-		if ((sess == NULL) ||
-			(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			!sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
-			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
-			(sess->not_resumable))
-			{
-		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
-		p=s->s3->client_random;
-
-		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= &(buf[4]);
-
-		/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
-		 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
-		 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
-		 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
-		 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
-		 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
-		 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
-		 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
-		 * 1.0.
-		 *
-		 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
-		 * 	1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
-		 * 	2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
-		 *	3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
-		 * 	4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
-		 *	5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
-		 *	6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
-		 *	   know that is maximum server supports.
-		 *	7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
-		 *	   containing version 1.0.
-		 *
-		 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
-		 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
-		 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
-		 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
-		 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
-		 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
-		 * the negotiated version.
-		 */
-#if 0
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-		s->client_version=s->version;
-#else
-		*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
-#endif
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* Session ID */
-		if (s->new_session)
-			i=0;
-		else
-			i=s->session->session_id_length;
-		*(p++)=i;
-		if (i != 0)
-			{
-			if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
-			p+=i;
-			}
-		
-		/* Ciphers supported */
-		i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
-			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
-			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
-			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
-			 */
-			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
-				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
-				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
-		s2n(i,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		*(p++)=1;
-#else
-
-		if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-					|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
-			j=0;
-		else
-			j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
-		*(p++)=1+j;
-		for (i=0; i<j; i++)
-			{
-			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
-			*(p++)=comp->id;
-			}
-#endif
-		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* TLS extensions*/
-		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-#endif
-		
-		l=(p-d);
-		d=buf;
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
-		l2n3(l,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,al,ok;
-	unsigned int j;
-	long n;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
-		-1,
-		20000, /* ?? */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
-			{
-			if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-				return 1;
-				}
-			else /* already sent a cookie */
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-		s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
-		al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p+=2;
-
-	/* load the server hello data */
-	/* load the server random */
-	memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	/* get the session-id */
-	j= *(p++);
-
-	if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
-		{
-		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
-		s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
-		if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
-					     &s->session->master_key_length,
-					     NULL, &pref_cipher,
-					     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
-			{
-			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
-				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
-	    		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			}
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
-	    && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
-	    {
-	    if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
-	       || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
-		{
-		/* actually a client application bug */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-	    s->hit=1;
-	    }
-	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
-		{
-		/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
-		 * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
-		s->hit=0;
-		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
-			{
-		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		s->session->session_id_length=j;
-		memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
-		}
-	p+=j;
-	c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
-	if (c == NULL)
-		{
-		/* unknown cipher */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
-	if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
-		(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
-		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
-
-	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
-	i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
-	   and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
-	   cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
-	if (s->session->cipher)
-		s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
-	if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
-		{
-/* Workaround is now obsolete */
-#if 0
-		if (!(s->options &
-			SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
-#endif
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-	/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
-	 * client authentication.
-	 */
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* lets get the compression algorithm */
-	/* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (*(p++) != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
-	 * using compression.
-	 */
-	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#else
-	j= *(p++);
-	if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (j == 0)
-		comp=NULL;
-	else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else
-		comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
-	
-	if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* TLS extensions*/
-	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
-			{
-			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-			goto f_err; 
-			}
-		if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (p != (d+n))
-		{
-		/* wrong packet length */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
-	unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	const unsigned char *q,*p;
-	unsigned char *d;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-	SESS_CERT *sc;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
-		((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && 
-		(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	n2l3(p,llen);
-	if (llen+3 != n)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
-		{
-		n2l3(p,l);
-		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		q=p;
-		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (q != (p+l))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		x=NULL;
-		nc+=l+3;
-		p=q;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	    && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
-		 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-		)
-		{
-		al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-		goto f_err; 
-		}
-	ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-
-	sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-	if (sc == NULL) goto err;
-
-	if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
-	s->session->sess_cert=sc;
-
-	sc->cert_chain=sk;
-	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
-	 * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
-	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
-	sk=NULL;
- 	/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
-
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
-	/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-	need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
-	            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-	            ? 0 : 1;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
-	printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
-	printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
-		{
-		x=NULL;
-		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
-			SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
-	if (need_cert && i < 0)
-		{
-		x=NULL;
-		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
-			SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (need_cert)
-		{
-		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
-		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		/* Why would the following ever happen?
-		 * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-		sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
-		sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
-		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-			X509_free(s->session->peer);
-		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-		s->session->peer=x;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
-		sc->peer_key= NULL;
-
-		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-			X509_free(s->session->peer);
-		s->session->peer=NULL;
-		}
-	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
-	x=NULL;
-	ret=1;
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	X509_free(x);
-	sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	unsigned char *param,*p;
-	int al,j,ok;
-	long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-	int curve_nid = 0;
-	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-#endif
-
-	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
-	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
-		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
-		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
-		   later.*/
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-				s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-			{
-			RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
-			{
-			DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
-			{
-			EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-			s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
-		}
-
-	/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
-	param_len=0;
-
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-	al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-		{
-		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
-
-		param_len = 2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-			s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-			}
-		if (i != 0)
-			{
-			/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
-			 * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the
-			 * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
-			 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
-			if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			if (i > n - param_len)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			param_len += i;
-
-			/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
-			 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
-			 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
-			 * NULL-terminated string. */
-			memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-			memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
-			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-	if (0) {}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-		{
-		param_len = 2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-
-		if (2 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 2;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-
-		if (1 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 1;
-
-		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
-		p++;
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		if (2 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 2;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-
-		if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-/* We must check if there is a certificate */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#else
-		if (0)
-			;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
-#endif
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-		{
-		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		param_len = 2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		if (2 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 2;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-
-		/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
-		rsa=NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
-		{
-		if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		param_len = 2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		if (2 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 2;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-
-		if (2 > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += 2;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-
-		if (i > n - param_len)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += i;
-
-		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p+=i;
-		n-=param_len;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#else
-		if (0)
-			;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
-#endif
-		/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
-		dh=NULL;
-		}
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-		{
-		EC_GROUP *ngroup;
-		const EC_GROUP *group;
-
-		if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
-		 * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
-		 * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
-		 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
-		 */
-
-		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
-		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
-		 * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
-		 */
-		param_len=4;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
-		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
-		if (ngroup == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
-
-		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
-		if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
-		    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		p+=3;
-
-		/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
-		if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
-		    ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
-		p+=1;
-
-		if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
-		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
-			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		param_len += encoded_pt_len;
-
-		n-=param_len;
-		p+=encoded_pt_len;
-
-		/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
-		 * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
-		 * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
-		 */
-		if (0) ;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
-			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-#endif
-		/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-		EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
-		s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
-		ecdh=NULL;
-		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-		bn_ctx = NULL;
-		EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
-		srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-	else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
-
-	/* if it was signed, check the signature */
-	if (pkey != NULL)
-		{
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			int sigalg;
-			if (2 > n)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
-			/* Should never happen */
-			if (sigalg == -1)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
-			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
-			if (md == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-			p += 2;
-			n -= 2;
-			}
-		else
-			md = EVP_sha1();
-
-		if (2 > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		n-=2;
-		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
-		/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
-		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
-			{
-			/* wrong packet length */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			int num;
-			unsigned int size;
-
-			j=0;
-			q=md_buf;
-			for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
-				{
-				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
-					EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-				EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
-					?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
-				q+=size;
-				j+=size;
-				}
-			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
-								pkey->pkey.rsa);
-			if (i < 0)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			if (i == 0)
-				{
-				/* bad signature */
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
-				{
-				/* bad signature */
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) &&
-			/* Among PSK ciphers only RSA_PSK needs a public key */
-			!((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		/* still data left over */
-		if (n != 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (rsa != NULL)
-		RSA_free(rsa);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (dh != NULL)
-		DH_free(dh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
-	if (ecdh != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,ret=0;
-	unsigned long n,nc,l;
-	unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	const unsigned char *p,*q;
-	unsigned char *d;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
-		 * as we wont be doing client auth.
-		 */
-		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-			{
-			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
-		{
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
-	if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* get the certificate types */
-	ctype_num= *(p++);
-	if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
-		ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
-	for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
-		s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
-	p+=ctype_num;
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		{
-		n2s(p, llen);
-		/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
-		 * following length value.
-		 */
-		if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (llen & 1)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen);
-		p += llen;
-		}
-
-	/* get the CA RDNs */
-	n2s(p,llen);
-#if 0
-{
-FILE *out;
-out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
-fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
-fclose(out);
-}
-#endif
-
-	if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
-		{
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
-		{
-		n2s(p,l);
-		if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
-			{
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
-				goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		q=p;
-
-		if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
-			{
-			/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
-				goto cont;
-			else
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (q != (p+l))
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		p+=l;
-		nc+=l+2;
-		}
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-cont:
-		ERR_clear_error();
-		}
-
-	/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
-	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
-	s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
-	s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
-	ca_sk=NULL;
-
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
-	{
-	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
-	}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
-	long n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char *d;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
-		-1,
-		16384,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (n < 6)
-		{
-		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
-	n2s(p, ticklen);
-	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
-	if (ticklen + 6 != n)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
-		s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
-		}
-	s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
-	s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
-	 * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
-	 * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
-	 * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
-	 * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
-	 * 
-	 * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
-	 * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
-	 * session resumption.
-	 *
-	 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
-	 * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
-	 * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
-	 * ticket.
-	 */ 
-	EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
-			s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-							EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-#else
-							EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-#endif
-	ret=1;
-	return(ret);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok, al;
-	unsigned long resplen,n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
-		SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
-		16384,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	if (n < 4)
-		{
-		/* need at least status type + length */
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	n2l3(p, resplen);
-	if (resplen + 4 != n)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
-	if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-		{
-		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
-	if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int ret;
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		if (ret == 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (ret < 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	return 1;
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok,ret=0;
-	long n;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
-		SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
-		30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	if (n > 0)
-		{
-		/* should contain no data */
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	ret=1;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-
-int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int n = 0;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
-	const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-	BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-	unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
-
-		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-		alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			/* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes
-			 * to return a \0-terminated identity. The last byte
-			 * is for us for simulating strnlen. */
-			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
-			size_t identity_len;
-			unsigned char *t = NULL;
-			unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
-			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
-			int psk_err = 1;
-
-			n = 0;
-			if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
-				identity, sizeof(identity - 1), psk, sizeof(psk));
-			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			else if (psk_len == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
-			identity_len = strlen(identity);
-			if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
-				{
-				/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
-				pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
-				t = pre_ms;
-				s2n(psk_len, t);
-				memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-				t+=psk_len;
-				s2n(psk_len, t);
-				memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-
-				s->session->master_key_length =
-					s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-						s->session->master_key,
-						pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-				s2n(identity_len, p);
-				memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
-				n = 2 + identity_len;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
-			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto psk_err;
-				}
-			psk_err = 0;
-		psk_err:
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
-			if (psk_err != 0)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		/* Fool emacs indentation */
-		if (0) {}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			RSA *rsa;
-			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-				{
-				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-				if ((pkey == NULL) ||
-					(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
-					(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-				EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-				}
-				
-			tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
-			tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
-			if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
-					goto err;
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
-
-			q=p;
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				p+=2;
-			n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
-				tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
-#endif
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
-			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s2n(n,q);
-				n+=2;
-				}
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-			{
-			krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
-			KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
-			/*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
-			krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
-			krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
-			const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
-			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
-						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
-				alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-			authp = NULL;
-#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
-			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
-#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
-			krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
-				&kssl_err);
-			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
-			if (enc == NULL)
-			    goto err;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			{
-			printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
-			if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
-			}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-			if (krb5rc)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-						kssl_err.reason);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
-			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
-			**
-			**  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-			**  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-			**  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-			**  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
-			**    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-			**
-			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
-			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
-			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
-			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
-			**  Example:
-			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
-			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
-			**  optional authenticator omitted.
-			*/
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
-			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
-			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
-			p+= enc_ticket->length;
-			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
-			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
-				{
-				s2n(authp->length,p);
-				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
-				p+= authp->length;
-				n+= authp->length + 2;
-				
-				free(authp->data);
-				authp->data = NULL;
-				authp->length = 0;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
-				n+=2;
-				}
- 
-			    tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
-			    tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
-			    if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
-				goto err;
-
-			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-			**				kssl_ctx->length);
-			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-			*/
-
-			memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);  /* per RFC 1510 */
-			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
-				kssl_ctx->key,iv);
-			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
-				sizeof tmp_buf);
-			EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
-			outl += padl;
-			if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
-			s2n(outl,p);
-			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
-			p+=outl;
-			n+=outl + 2;
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,
-					tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			{
-			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
-				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-			else
-				{
-				/* we get them from the cert */
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			
-			/* generate a new random key */
-			if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				DH_free(dh_clnt);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
-
-			n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
-
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				DH_free(dh_clnt);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* generate master key from the result */
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,p,n);
-			/* clean up */
-			memset(p,0,n);
-
-			/* send off the data */
-			n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
-			s2n(n,p);
-			BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
-			n+=2;
-
-			DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
-			/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
-			EC_KEY *tkey;
-			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
-			int field_size = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			unsigned char *pre_ms;
-			unsigned char *t;
-			unsigned int pre_ms_len;
-			unsigned int i;
-#endif
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Did we send out the client's
-			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
-			 * computation as part of client certificate?
-			 * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-			 */
-			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) 
-				{
-				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
-				 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
-				 * To add such support, one needs to add
-				 * code that checks for appropriate 
-				 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-				 * For example, the cert have an ECC
-				 * key on the same curve as the server's
-				 * and the key should be authorized for
-				 * key agreement.
-				 *
-				 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
-				 * to skip sending the certificate verify
-				 * message.
-				 *
-				 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
-				 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
-				 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
-				 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
-				 */
-				}
-
-			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-				{
-				tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
-				srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
-				    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-				if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
-				    (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
-				}
-
-			srvr_group   = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
-			srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
-			if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
-				{ 
-				/* Reuse key info from our certificate
-				 * We only need our private key to perform
-				 * the ECDH computation.
-				 */
-				const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-				tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
-				priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-				if (priv_key == NULL)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
-				if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-
-			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
-			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards
-			 */
-
-			field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
-			if (field_size <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
-			if (n <= 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
-			if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
-				{
-				pre_ms_len = 2+n+2+psk_len;
-				pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
-				if (pre_ms == NULL)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    		ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
-				t = pre_ms;
-				s2n(n, t);
-				memcpy(t, p, n);
-				t += n;
-				s2n(psk_len, t);
-				memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-				s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-					-> generate_master_secret(s,
-						s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-				OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-				OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
-				}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-			if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
-				{
-				/* generate master key from the result */
-				s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-					-> generate_master_secret(s,
-						s->session->master_key, p, n);
-				}
-			memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-			if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
-				{
-				/* Send empty client key exch message */
-				n = 0;
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				/* First check the size of encoding and
-				 * allocate memory accordingly.
-				 */
-				encoded_pt_len = 
-				    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
-					EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
-					POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-					NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-				encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-				    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * 
-					sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-				bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-				if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || 
-				    (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-					goto err;
-					}
-
-				/* Encode the public key */
-				encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
-				    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
-				    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-				    encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-				
-				n = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-				if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
-					{
-					i = strlen(s->session->psk_identity);
-					s2n(i, p);
-					memcpy(p, s->session->psk_identity, i);
-					p += i;
-					n = i + 2;
-					}
-#endif
-
-				*p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */
-				/* Encoded point will be copied here */
-				p += 1;
-				n += 1;
-				/* copy the point */
-				memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len);
-				/* increment n to account for length field */
-				n += encoded_pt_len;
-				}
-
-			/* Free allocated memory */
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-			if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
-				 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-			}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
-			{
-			/* GOST key exchange message creation */
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
-			X509 *peer_cert; 
-			size_t msglen;
-			unsigned int md_len;
-			int keytype;
-			unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
-			EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
-			EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
-
-			/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
-			peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
-			if (!peer_cert) 
-				peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
-			if (!peer_cert)		{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
-					goto err;
-				}	
-				
-			pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
-			/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
-
-			 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
-			 * certificate key for key exchange
-			 */
-
-			 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
-					
-			EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
-			  /* Generate session key */	
-		    RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
-			/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
-				if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
-					/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
-					* would be used
-					*/
-					ERR_clear_error();
-				}
-			}			
-			/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
-			 * context data */
-			ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-			EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
-			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
-			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
-				8,shared_ukm)<0) {
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-						SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-					goto err;
-				}	
-			/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
-			/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
-			*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-			msglen=255;
-			if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				goto err;
-			}
-			if (msglen >= 0x80)
-				{
-				*(p++)=0x81;
-				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
-				n=msglen+3;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
-				n=msglen+2;
-				}
-			memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
-			/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
-			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
-				{
-				/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
-				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
-				}
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
-
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-			{
-			if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
-				{
-				/* send off the data */
-				n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
-				s2n(n,p);
-				BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
-				n+=2;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
-			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
-			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK) || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && !(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)))
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-			    SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
-		EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-#endif
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
-	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
-	unsigned u=0;
-	unsigned long n;
-	int j;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
-		{
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
-		pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
-/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
-		pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
-		EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
-		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
-			{
-			if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-						NID_sha1,
-						&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			}
-		/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
-		 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
-		 */
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			long hdatalen = 0;
-			void *hdata;
-			const EVP_MD *md;
-			switch (ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey))
-				{
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
-				md = s->s3->digest_rsa;
-				break;
-			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
-				md = s->s3->digest_dsa;
-				break;
-			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
-				md = s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
-				break;
-			default:
-				md = NULL;
-				}
-			if (!md)
-				/* Unlike with the SignatureAlgorithm extension (sent by clients),
-				 * there are no default algorithms for the CertificateRequest message
-				 * (sent by servers). However, now that we've sent a certificate
-				 * for which we don't really know what hash to use for signing, the
-				 * best we can do is try a default algorithm. */
-				md = EVP_sha1();
-			hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
-								&hdata);
-			if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-						ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			p += 2;
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-			fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
-							EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-			if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
-				|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
-				|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-						ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(u,p);
-			n = u + 4;
-			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-			{
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-				NID_md5,
-			 	&(data[0]));
-			if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
-					 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(u,p);
-			n=u+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-			{
-			if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-			{
-			if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
-				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
-				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-				    ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s2n(j,p);
-			n=j+2;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-		if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 
-		{
-		unsigned char signbuf[64];
-		int i;
-		size_t sigsize=64;
-		s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-			NID_id_GostR3411_94,
-			data);
-		if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
-			ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
-			p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
-		}	
-		s2n(j,p);
-		n=j+2;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
-		s->init_num=(int)n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	X509 *x509=NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state ==	SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
-			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-		else
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	/* We need to get a client cert */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
-		{
-		/* If we get an error, we need to
-		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
-		 * We then get retied later */
-		i=0;
-		i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
-		if (i < 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
-			{
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
-			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
-				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
-				i=0;
-			}
-		else if (i == 1)
-			{
-			i=0;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
-			}
-
-		if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
-		if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-				return(1);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
-				}
-			}
-
-		/* Ok, we have a cert */
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
-		}
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
-		{
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
-		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
-			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
-		s->init_num=(int)l;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-#define has_bits(i,m)	(((i)&(m)) == (m))
-
-int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,idx;
-	long alg_k,alg_a;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	SESS_CERT *sc;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh;
-#endif
-
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-	/* we don't have a certificate */
-	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-		return(1);
-
-	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-#endif
-
-	/* This is the passed certificate */
-
-	idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
-		{
-		if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
-		    						s) == 0) 
-			{ /* check failed */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		else 
-			{
-			return 1;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
-	i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
-	
-	/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
-	if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif
-#endif
-
-	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			if (rsa == NULL
-			    || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-			if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-			    {
-			    if (dh == NULL
-				|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-err:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned int len, padding_len;
-	unsigned char *d;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
-		{
-		len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-		padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-		d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		d[4] = len;
-		memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
-		d[5 + len] = padding_len;
-		memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
-		l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
-		s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
-		s->init_off = 0;
-		}
-
-	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
-# endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-
-int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *d;
-	int ret = -1, public_key_len;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	size_t sig_len;
-	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-	unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
-
-	if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
-		return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-
-	if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
-		s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
-		if (key != NULL)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
-			}
-		}
-	if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
-		return (-1);
-		}
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-	d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
-	l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
-	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
-	else
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
-	s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-	public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
-	if (public_key_len <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	/* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
-	 * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
-	 * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
-	if (public_key_len != 65)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
-	if (!public_key)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	derp = public_key;
-	i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
-
-	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
-			       s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
-	if (!der_sig)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	derp = der_sig;
-	sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len);
-	if (sig == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
-	memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
-	d += 64;
-	memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
-	d += 32;
-	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
-	d += 32;
-
-	s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
-	s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
-	s->init_off = 0;
-
-	ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-
-err:
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	if (public_key)
-		OPENSSL_free(public_key);
-	if (der_sig)
-		OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
-	if (sig)
-		ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-	/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
-	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-		return 1;
-	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
-	 * message, so permit appropriate message length */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-		|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
-		return 2;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-	{
-	int i = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
-		{
-		i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
-						SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
-						px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-		if (i != 0)
-			return i;
-		}
-#endif
-	if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
-		i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
-	return i;
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index bcb65d48..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,905 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48]={
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
-	0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36 };
-
-static unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48]={
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
-	0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c };
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
-	const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
-static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
-	{
-	EVP_MD_CTX m5;
-	EVP_MD_CTX s1;
-	unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char c='A';
-	unsigned int i,j,k;
-
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-	c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
-#endif
-	k=0;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
-	for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-		{
-		k++;
-		if (k > sizeof buf)
-			{
-			/* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		
-		for (j=0; j<k; j++)
-			buf[j]=c;
-		c++;
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&s1,EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,buf,k);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->session->master_key,
-			s->session->master_key_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&s1,smd,NULL);
-
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&m5,EVP_md5(), NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
-			s->session->master_key_length);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-		if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
-			{
-			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
-			memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));
-			}
-		else
-			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,km,NULL);
-
-		km+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-		}
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
-	unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_METHOD *comp;
-#endif
-	const EVP_MD *m;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
-	int is_exp,n,i,j,k,cl;
-	int reuse_dd = 0;
-
-	is_exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
-	/* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
-	OPENSSL_assert(m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-		comp=NULL;
-	else
-		comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
-#endif
-
-	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
-		{
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
-			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
-
-		ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		/* COMPRESS */
-		if (s->expand != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-			s->expand=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp);
-			if (s->expand == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				goto err2;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
-					OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				goto err;
-			}
-#endif
-		memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
-			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-		ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		/* COMPRESS */
-		if (s->compress != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-			s->compress=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp);
-			if (s->compress == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				goto err2;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
-		}
-
-	if (reuse_dd)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
-	p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-	i=EVP_MD_size(m);
-	if (i < 0)
-		goto err2;
-	cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-	j=is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
-		 cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
-	/* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-	k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
-		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
-		{
-		ms=  &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
-		er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
-		er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		n=i;
-		ms=  &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k;
-		er1= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
-		er2= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
-		}
-
-	if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
-	memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-	if (is_exp)
-		{
-		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
-		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
-		 */
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md,EVP_md5(), NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,key,j);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er1,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er2,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md,&(exp_key[0]),NULL);
-		key= &(exp_key[0]);
-
-		if (k > 0)
-			{
-			EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md,EVP_md5(), NULL);
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er1,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er2,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md,&(exp_iv[0]),NULL);
-			iv= &(exp_iv[0]);
-			}
-		}
-
-	s->session->key_arg_length=0;
-
-	EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]),sizeof(exp_key));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]),sizeof(exp_iv));
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
-	return(1);
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-	const EVP_MD *hash;
-	int num;
-	int ret = 0;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-		return(1);
-
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,NULL,NULL,&comp))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
-#else
-	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
-#endif
-
-	num=EVP_MD_size(hash);
-	if (num < 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+num+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-	num*=2;
-
-	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-	if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block=p;
-
-	ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s,p,num);
-
-	/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-	 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-	if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
-		{
-		s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
-
-		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
-			{
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
-#endif
-			}
-		}
-
-	return ret;
-
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block,
-			s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
-		s->s3->tmp.key_block=NULL;
-		}
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
-	}
-
-/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
- *       occured.
- */
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,mac_size=0;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		}
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
-		{
-		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-		rec->input=rec->data;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		l=rec->length;
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		/* COMPRESS */
-
-		if ((bs != 1) && send)
-			{
-			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
-			/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
-			l+=i;
-			/* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
-			 * with the padding length. */
-			memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
-			rec->length+=i;
-			rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
-			}
-		
-		if (!send)
-			{
-			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return 0;
-			/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
-			}
-		
-		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-    s->s3->handshake_buffer=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());	
-	(void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer,BIO_CLOSE);
-	}
-
-void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s) 
-	{
-	int i;
-	if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst) return;
-	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-		{
-		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
-			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
-		}
-	OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
-	s->s3->handshake_dgst=NULL;
-	}	
-
-
-
-void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
-	{
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) 
-		{
-		BIO_write (s->s3->handshake_buffer,(void *)buf,len);
-		} 
-	else 
-		{
-		int i;
-		for (i=0;i< SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-			{
-			if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]!= NULL)
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],buf,len);
-			}
-		}	
-	}
-
-int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i;
-	long mask;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	long hdatalen;
-	void *hdata;
-
-	/* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
-	ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-	s->s3->handshake_dgst = OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
-	memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst,0,SSL_MAX_DIGEST *sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
-	hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,&hdata);
-	if (hdatalen <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
-	for (i=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(i,&mask,&md); i++) 
-		{
-		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) 
-			{
-			s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-			if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5)
-				{
-				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
-						EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-				}
-#endif
-			EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],md,NULL);
-			EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],hdata,hdatalen);
-			} 
-		else 
-			{	
-			s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=NULL;
-			}
-		}
-	if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE))
-		{
-		/* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
-		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	return(ssl3_handshake_mac(s,md_nid,NULL,0,p));
-	}
-int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, 
-	     const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	int ret, sha1len;
-	ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
-	if(ret == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	p+=ret;
-
-	sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
-	if(sha1len == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	ret+=sha1len;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
-	     const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	unsigned int ret;
-	int npad,n;
-	unsigned int i;
-	unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx,*d=NULL;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	/* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst
-	 * array*/
-	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-		{
-		  if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
-		  	{
-		  	d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	if (!d) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-		return 0;
-	}	
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
-	n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
-	if (n < 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	npad=(48/n)*n;
-	if (sender != NULL)
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,sender,len);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
-		s->session->master_key_length);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,md_buf,&i);
-
-	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
-		s->session->master_key_length);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,md_buf,i);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,p,&ret);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	return((int)ret);
-	}
-
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-	const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	unsigned char *p,rec_char;
-	size_t md_size, orig_len;
-	int npad;
-	int t;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-		mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->write_hash;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-		mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->read_hash;
-		}
-
-	t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-	if (t < 0 || t > 20)
-		return -1;
-	md_size=t;
-	npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
-
-	/* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
-	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
-	rec->type &= 0xff;
-
-	if (!send &&
-	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
-		{
-		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
-		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
-		 * timing-oracle. */
-
-		/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
-		 *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
-		 *
-		 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
-		 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
-		 * total size. */
-		unsigned char header[75];
-		unsigned j = 0;
-		memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
-		j += md_size;
-		memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
-		j += npad;
-		memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
-		j += 8;
-		header[j++] = rec->type;
-		header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
-		header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
-
-		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-			hash,
-			md, &md_size,
-			header, rec->input,
-			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-			mac_sec, md_size,
-			1 /* is SSLv3 */);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		unsigned int md_size_u;
-		/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
-		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
-		rec_char=rec->type;
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
-		p=md;
-		s2n(rec->length,p);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
-
-		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
-		md_size = md_size_u;
-
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	}
-
-	ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
-	return(md_size);
-	}
-
-void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
-		{
-		++seq[i];
-		if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-	     int len)
-	{
-	static const unsigned char *salt[3]={
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-		(const unsigned char *)"A",
-		(const unsigned char *)"BB",
-		(const unsigned char *)"CCC",
-#else
-		(const unsigned char *)"\x41",
-		(const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
-		(const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
-#endif
-		};
-	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	int i,ret=0;
-	unsigned int n;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	for (i=0; i<3; i++)
-		{
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,salt[i],strlen((const char *)salt[i]));
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,p,len);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),
-			SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),
-			SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,buf,&n);
-
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->md5, NULL);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,p,len);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,buf,n);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&n);
-		out+=n;
-		ret+=n;
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
-	{
-	switch (code)
-		{
-	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:	return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:	return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:	return(SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:	return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:		return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:	return(-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-	default:			return(-1);
-		}
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c378dd60..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4441 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-#include "../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h"
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-const char ssl3_version_str[]="SSLv3" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS	(sizeof(ssl3_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
-
-/* list of available SSLv3 ciphers (sorted by id) */
-OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
-
-/* The RSA ciphers */
-/* Cipher 01 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 02 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 03 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 04 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 05 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 06 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 07 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_IDEA,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif
-
-/* Cipher 08 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 09 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 0A */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* The DH ciphers */
-/* Cipher 0B */
-	{
-	0,
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 0C */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 0D */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 0E */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 0F */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 10 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
-/* Cipher 11 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 12 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 13 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 14 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 15 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 16 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 17 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 18 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 19 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 1A */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 1B */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Fortezza ciphersuite from SSL 3.0 spec */
-#if 0
-/* Cipher 1C */
-	{
-	0,
-	SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kFZA,
-	SSL_aFZA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 1D */
-	{
-	0,
-	SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
-	SSL_kFZA,
-	SSL_aFZA,
-	SSL_eFZA,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 1E */
-	{
-	0,
-	SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
-	SSL_kFZA,
-	SSL_aFZA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
-/* Cipher 1E */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 1F */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 20 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 21 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_IDEA,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 22 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 23 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 24 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 25 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_IDEA,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 26 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 27 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 28 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 29 */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	56,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 2A */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 2B */
-	{
-	1,
-	SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
-	SSL_kKRB5,
-	SSL_aKRB5,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	40,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-/* New AES ciphersuites */
-/* Cipher 2F */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-/* Cipher 30 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-/* Cipher 31 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-/* Cipher 32 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-/* Cipher 33 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-/* Cipher 34 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 35 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-/* Cipher 36 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 37 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 38 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-/* Cipher 39 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 3A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-	/* Cipher 3B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 3C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 3D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 3E */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 3F */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 40 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
-	/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */
-
-	/* Cipher 41 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 42 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 43 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 44 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 45 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 46 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
-
-#if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES
-	/* New TLS Export CipherSuites from expired ID */
-#if 0
-	/* Cipher 60 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 61 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC2,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif
-
-	/* Cipher 62 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 63 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	56,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 64 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 65 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	56,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 66 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-#endif
-
-	/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-	/* Cipher 67 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 68 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 69 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 6A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 6B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 6C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 6D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* GOST Ciphersuites */
-
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST94-GOST89-GOST89",
-	0x3000080,
-	SSL_kGOST,
-	SSL_aGOST94,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_GOST89MAC,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
-	256,
-	256
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89",
-	0x3000081,
-	SSL_kGOST,
-	SSL_aGOST01,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_GOST89MAC,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
-	256,
-	256
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST94-NULL-GOST94",
-	0x3000082,
-	SSL_kGOST,
-	SSL_aGOST94,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_GOST94,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
-	0,
-	0
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST2001-NULL-GOST94",
-	0x3000083,
-	SSL_kGOST,
-	SSL_aGOST01,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_GOST94,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
-	0,
-	0
-	},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
-	/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (256-bit portion) */
-
-	/* Cipher 84 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-	/* Cipher 85 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 86 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 87 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 88 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 89 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_CAMELLIA256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	/* Cipher 8A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kPSK,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 8B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kPSK,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 8C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kPSK,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 8D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kPSK,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
-	/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-
-	/* Cipher 96 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 97 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 98 */
-	{
-	0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 99 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 9A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 9B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_SEED,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
-
-	/* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-
-	/* Cipher 9C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 9D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 9E */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher 9F */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A0 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A1 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kDHr,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A2 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A3 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A4 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A5 */
-	{
-	0,
-	TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kDHd,
-	SSL_aDH,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A6 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher A7 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	/* Cipher C001 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C002 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C003 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C004 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C005 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C006 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C007 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C008 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C009 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00E */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C00F */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C010 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C011 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C012 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C013 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C014 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C015 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_eNULL,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	0,
-	0,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C016 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_RC4,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C017 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C018 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C019 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aNULL,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	/* Cipher C01A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aSRP,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C01B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C01C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_3DES,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	112,
-	168,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C01D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aSRP,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C01E */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C01F */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C020 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aSRP,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C021 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C022 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aDSS,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-
-	/* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-	/* Cipher C023 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C024 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA384,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C025 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C026 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA384,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C027 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C028 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA384,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C029 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C02A */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA384,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-	/* Cipher C02B */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C02C */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aECDSA,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C02D */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C02E */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHe,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C02F */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C030 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C031 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES128GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256|TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C032 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-	SSL_kECDHr,
-	SSL_aECDH,
-	SSL_AES256GCM,
-	SSL_AEAD,
-	SSL_TLSV1_2,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384|TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-    /* ECDH PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
-	/* Cipher C035 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_AES128,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	128,
-	128,
-	},
-
-	/* Cipher C036 */
-	{
-	1,
-	TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-	SSL_kEECDH,
-	SSL_aPSK,
-	SSL_AES256,
-	SSL_SHA1,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-
-#ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
-/* Cipher FF00 */
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST-MD5",
-	0x0300ff00,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_MD5,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256,
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST-GOST94",
-	0x0300ff01,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_GOST94,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST-GOST89MAC",
-	0x0300ff02,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_GOST89MAC,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
-	256,
-	256
-	},
-	{
-	1,
-	"GOST-GOST89STREAM",
-	0x0300ff03,
-	SSL_kRSA,
-	SSL_aRSA,
-	SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
-	SSL_GOST89MAC,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
-	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
-	256,
-	256
-	},
-#endif
-
-/* end of list */
-	};
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={
-	ssl3_enc,
-	n_ssl3_mac,
-	ssl3_setup_key_block,
-	ssl3_generate_master_secret,
-	ssl3_change_cipher_state,
-	ssl3_final_finish_mac,
-	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-	ssl3_cert_verify_mac,
-	SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST,4,
-	SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST,4,
-	ssl3_alert_code,
-	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
-		 size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
-		 int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
-	};
-
-long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec
-	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
-	return(60*60*2);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
-	{
-	return(SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
-	}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-	{
-	if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
-		return(&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS-1-u]));
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
-		return 0;
-	
-	return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSL3_STATE *s3;
-
-	if ((s3=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL) goto err;
-	memset(s3,0,sizeof *s3);
-	memset(s3->rrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
-	memset(s3->wrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
-
-	s->s3=s3;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-	s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
-	if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup(s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
-#endif
-	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-err:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if(s == NULL)
-	    return;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
-#endif
-
-	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
-		ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
-		ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-	if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-#endif
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
-		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-	}
-	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
-#endif
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3,sizeof *s->s3);
-	OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
-	s->s3=NULL;
-	}
-
-void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *rp,*wp;
-	size_t rlen, wlen;
-	int init_extra;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
-	s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
-	s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-#endif
-
-	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
-
-	if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
-		s->s3->rrec.comp=NULL;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-		{
-		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-		s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-		{
-		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
-	wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
-	rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
- 	wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
-	init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
-		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
-	}
-	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) {
-		ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-	}	
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-		{
-		free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-	memset(s->s3,0,sizeof *s->s3);
-	s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
-	s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
-	s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
- 	s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
-	s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
-
-	ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
-	s->packet_length=0;
-	s->s3->renegotiate=0;
-	s->s3->total_renegotiations=0;
-	s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
-	s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
-	s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-		s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-		s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-	s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-#endif
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static char * MS_CALLBACK srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-	{
-	return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info) ;
-	}
-#endif
-
-long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-	if (
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA ||
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH ||
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
-#endif
-		0)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert))
-		    	{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
-		ret=s->hit;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
-		ret=s->s3->num_renegotiations;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
-		ret=s->s3->num_renegotiations;
-		s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
-		ret=s->s3->total_renegotiations;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
-		ret=(int)(s->s3->flags);
-		break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
-		if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
-		    ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
-		     (EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512/8))))
-			ret = 1;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
-		{
-			RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
-			if (rsa == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-				return(ret);
-				}
-			if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-				return(ret);
-				}
-			if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-				RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
-			s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
-			ret = 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(ret);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
-		{
-			DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
-			if (dh == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-				return(ret);
-				}
-			if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				return(ret);
-				}
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))
-				{
-				if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
-					{
-					DH_free(dh);
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-					return(ret);
-					}
-				}
-			if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
-				DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
-			s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
-			ret = 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(ret);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
-		{
-		EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- 			
-		if (parg == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-			return(ret);
-			}
-		if (!EC_KEY_up_ref((EC_KEY *)parg))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			return(ret);
-			}
-		ecdh = (EC_KEY *)parg;
-		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
-			{
-			if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
-				{
-				EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				return(ret);
-				}
-			}
-		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-			EC_KEY_free(s->cert->ecdh_tmp);
-		s->cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
-		ret = 1;
-		}
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(ret);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
- 		if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
-			{
-			if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 
-				OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
-			s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-
-			ret = 1;
-			if (parg == NULL) 
-				break;
-			if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE);
-			return 0;
-			}
- 		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG:
-		s->tlsext_debug_arg=parg;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT:
-		if (larg > 12288) /* actual internal limit is 2^16 for the complete hello message
-		                   * (including the cert chain and everything) */
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
-			break;
-			}
-		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
-		if ((size_t)larg == 0)
-			s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
-		else
-			s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
-		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg;
-			ret = 1;
-			}
-		else
-			s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = 0;
-		break;
-#endif
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
-		s->tlsext_status_type=larg;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
-		*(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
-		s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
-		*(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
-		s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
-		*(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
-		return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
-		
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
-		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-		s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg;
-		s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	case SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT:
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s);
-		else
-			ret = tls1_heartbeat(s);
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING:
-		ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS:
-		if (larg)
-			s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
-		else
-			s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-#endif
-	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
-		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
-		if (s->server)
-			break;
-		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
-		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
-			break;
-			}
-		if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
-		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup((EVP_PKEY*) parg);
-		ret = 1;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID:
-		if (!s->server)
-			break;
-		if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-			break;
-		memcpy(parg, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, larg < 64 ? larg : 64);
-		return 64;
-
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
-		/* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
-		 * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
-		 * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
-		if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
-			return 1;
-		/* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
-		 * (not at its highest protocol version). */
-		if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
-			{
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
-#  error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
-#endif
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
-				return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
-				return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
-				return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
-				return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
-				return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
-			}
-		return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
-
-	default:
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-	if (
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	    cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
-#endif
-		0)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
-		{
-		s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
-		{
-		s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
-		{
-		s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB:
-		s->tlsext_debug_cb=(void (*)(SSL *,int ,int,
-					unsigned char *, int, void *))fp;
-		break;
-#endif
-	default:
-		break;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-	{
-	CERT *cert;
-
-	cert=ctx->cert;
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
-		if (	(cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
-			((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
-			 (EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512/8)))
-			)
-			return(1);
-		else
-			return(0);
-		/* break; */
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
-		{
-		RSA *rsa;
-		int i;
-
-		rsa=(RSA *)parg;
-		i=1;
-		if (rsa == NULL)
-			i=0;
-		else
-			{
-			if ((rsa=RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
-				i=0;
-			}
-		if (!i)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-				RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp);
-			cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
-			return(1);
-			}
-		}
-		/* break; */
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
-		{
-		DH *new=NULL,*dh;
-
-		dh=(DH *)parg;
-		if ((new=DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))
-			{
-			if (!DH_generate_key(new))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				DH_free(new);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
-			DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
-		cert->dh_tmp=new;
-		return 1;
-		}
-		/*break; */
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
-		{
-		EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- 			
-		if (parg == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		ecdh = EC_KEY_dup((EC_KEY *)parg);
-		if (ecdh == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
-			{
-			if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
-				{
-				EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-			{
-			EC_KEY_free(cert->ecdh_tmp);
-			}
-		cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
-		return 1;
-		}
-		/* break; */
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-		break;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG:
-		ctx->tlsext_servername_arg=parg;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
-		{
-		unsigned char *keys = parg;
-		if (!keys)
-			return 48;
-		if (larg != 48)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS)
-			{
-			memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16);
-			memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16);
-			memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
-			memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16);
-			memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16);
-			}
-		return 1;
-		}
-	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
-		/* must be called on a server */
-		if (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)
-			return 0;
-		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled=1;
-		return 1;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
-		ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg = parg;
-		return 1;
-#endif
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
-		ctx->tlsext_status_arg=parg;
-		return 1;
-		break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
-		if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
-		ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-		if (parg == NULL)
-			break;
-		if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
-			return 0;
-			} 
-		if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback=srp_password_from_info_cb;
-		ctx->srp_ctx.info=parg;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
-		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg=parg;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.strength=larg;
-		break;
-#endif
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	/* A Thawte special :-) */
-	case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT:
-		if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL)
-			{
-			if ((ctx->extra_certs=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
-				return(0);
-			}
-		sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs,(X509 *)parg);
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
-		*(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg =  ctx->extra_certs;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
-		if (ctx->extra_certs)
-			{
-			sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
-			ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
-			}
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
-		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
-		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
-			break;
-			}
-		if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
-		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup((EVP_PKEY*) parg);
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	CERT *cert;
-
-	cert=ctx->cert;
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
-		{
-		cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
-		{
-		cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
-		{
-		cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
-		}
-		break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
-		ctx->tlsext_servername_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
-		break;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB:
-		ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback = (int (*)(SSL *,void *, size_t, void *))fp;
-		break;
-#endif
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
-		ctx->tlsext_status_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
-		break;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
-		ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,unsigned char  *,
-						unsigned char *,
-						EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
-						HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
-		break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
-		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
-		ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
-		ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask|=SSL_kSRP;
-		ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback=(char *(*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
-		break;
-#endif
-#endif
-
-	default:
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
- * available */
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	SSL_CIPHER c;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
-	unsigned long id;
-
-	id=0x03000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[1];
-	c.id=id;
-	cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
-if (cp == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
-#endif
-	if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
-		return NULL;
-	else
-		return cp;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	if (p != NULL)
-		{
-		l=c->id;
-		if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000) return(0);
-		p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
-		p[1]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xFF;
-		}
-	return(2);
-	}
-
-SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
-	     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr)
-	{
-	SSL_CIPHER *c,*ret=NULL;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
-	int i,ii,ok;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
-	unsigned int j;
-	int ec_ok, ec_nid;
-	unsigned char ec_search1 = 0, ec_search2 = 0;
-#endif
-	CERT *cert;
-	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
-
-	/* Let's see which ciphers we can support */
-	cert=s->cert;
-
-#if 0
-	/* Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a
-	 * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering.
-	 * We may pay a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(),
-	 * but would have to pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup().
-	 */
-	sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-	sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
-	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr) ; ++i)
-		{
-		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr,i);
-		printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
-		}
-	printf("Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
-	for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) ; ++i)
-	    {
-	    c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt,i);
-	    printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
-	    }
-#endif
-
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
-		{
-		prio = srvr;
-		allow = clnt;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		prio = clnt;
-		allow = srvr;
-		}
-
-	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
-		{
-		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
-
-		/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
-		if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
-			(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
-			continue;
-
-		ssl_set_cert_masks(cert,c);
-		mask_k = cert->mask_k;
-		mask_a = cert->mask_a;
-		emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
-		emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)
-			{
-			mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
-			emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
-			mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
-			emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
-			}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-/*		printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		alg_k=c->algorithm_mkey;
-		alg_a=c->algorithm_auth;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-			{
-			if ( !kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx) )
-			    continue;
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		/* with PSK there must be server callback set */
-		if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
-			continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-		if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
-			{
-			ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
-			       (void *)c,c->name);
-#endif
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
-			       c->name);
-#endif
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		if (
-			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
-			(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
-			/* and we have an ECC certificate */
-			&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
-			/* and the client specified a Supported Point Formats extension */
-			&& ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL))
-			/* and our certificate's point is compressed */
-			&& (
-				(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data != NULL)
-				&& (
-					(*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
-					|| (*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED + 1)
-					)
-				)
-		)
-			{
-			ec_ok = 0;
-			/* if our certificate's curve is over a field type that the client does not support
-			 * then do not allow this cipher suite to be negotiated */
-			if (
-				(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL)
-				&& (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
-			)
-				{
-				for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++)
-					{
-					if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime)
-						{
-						ec_ok = 1;
-						break;
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
-				{
-				for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++)
-					{
-					if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2)
-						{
-						ec_ok = 1;
-						break;
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			ok = ok && ec_ok;
-			}
-		if (
-			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
-			(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
-			/* and we have an ECC certificate */
-			&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
-			/* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
-			&& ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
-		)
-			{
-			ec_ok = 0;
-			if (
-				(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL)
-			)
-				{
-				ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group);
-				if ((ec_nid == 0)
-					&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL)
-				)
-					{
-					if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
-						{
-						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
-						ec_search2 = 0x01;
-						}
-					else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
-						{
-						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
-						ec_search2 = 0x02;
-						}
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					ec_search1 = 0x00;
-					ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
-					}
-				if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0))
-					{
-					for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++)
-						{
-						if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j+1] == ec_search2))
-							{
-							ec_ok = 1;
-							break;
-							}
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			ok = ok && ec_ok;
-			}
-		if (
-			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
-			(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			/* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
-			&& (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-			/* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
-			&& ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
-		)
-			{
-			ec_ok = 0;
-			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL)
-				{
-				ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group);
-				if ((ec_nid == 0)
-					&& (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL)
-				)
-					{
-					if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
-						{
-						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
-						ec_search2 = 0x01;
-						}
-					else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
-						{
-						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
-						ec_search2 = 0x02;
-						}
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					ec_search1 = 0x00;
-					ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
-					}
-				if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0))
-					{
-					for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++)
-						{
-						if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j+1] == ec_search2))
-							{
-							ec_ok = 1;
-							break;
-							}
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			ok = ok && ec_ok;
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-		if (!ok) continue;
-		ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
-		if (ii >= 0)
-			{
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-			if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
-				{
-				if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
-				continue;
-				}
-#endif
-			ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-
-	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
-			{
-			p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN;
-			p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
-			return(ret);
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kEDH))
-		{
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
-#  endif
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
-#  endif
-		}
-	if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) &&
-		(alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kDHr)))
-		{
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
-#  endif
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
-#  endif
-		}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION))
-		{
-		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
-		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	/* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well 
-	 * so we don't need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH
-	 */
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
-		}
-#endif	
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	/* Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or
-	 * we don't want to send messages :-) */
-	if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE))
-		{
-		s->shutdown=(SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
-		{
-		s->shutdown|=SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
-#if 1
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-#endif
-		/* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs
-	 	 * to be written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */
-	 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
-	 		return(-1);	/* return WANT_WRITE */
-		}
-	else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
-		{
-		/* resend it if not sent */
-#if 1
-		ret=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
-		if(ret == -1)
-			{
-			/* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth
-			 * invocation, we must  have already signalled
-			 * return 0 upon a previous invoation,
-			 * return WANT_WRITE */
-			return(ret);
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-	else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
-		{
-		/* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */
-		s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,0,NULL,0,0);
-		if(!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
-			{
-			return(-1);	/* return WANT_READ */
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
-		!s->s3->alert_dispatch)
-		return(1);
-	else
-		return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int ret,n;
-
-#if 0
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		return(0);
-		}
-#endif
-	clear_sys_error();
-	if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
-
-	/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
-	 * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
-	 * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
-	 * session-id reuse */
-	/* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
-	if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
-		{
-		/* First time through, we write into the buffer */
-		if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0)
-			{
-			ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
-					     buf,len);
-			if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
-
-			s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=ret;
-			}
-
-		s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-		n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n);
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-		/* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
-		ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-		s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-
-		ret=s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
-		s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ret=s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
-			buf,len);
-		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
-		}
-
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
-	{
-	int n,ret;
-	
-	clear_sys_error();
-	if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
-		{
-		/* Deal with an application that calls SSL_read() when handshake data
-		 * is yet to be written.
-		 */
-		if (BIO_wpending(s->wbio) > 0)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-			if (n <= 0) return(n);
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			}
-		}
-	if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
-	s->s3->in_read_app_data=1;
-	ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
-	if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2))
-		{
-		/* ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which
-		 * called ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data.
-		 * However, ssl3_read_bytes actually found application data
-		 * and thinks that application data makes sense here; so disable
-		 * handshake processing and try to read application data again. */
-		s->in_handshake++;
-		ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
-		s->in_handshake--;
-		}
-	else
-		s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
-
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-	{
-	return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
-		return(1);
-
-	if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
-		return(0);
-
-	s->s3->renegotiate=1;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-	if (s->s3->renegotiate)
-		{
-		if (	(s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) &&
-			(s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) &&
-			!SSL_in_init(s))
-			{
-/*
-if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' message, we
-need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
-*/
-			/* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
-			s->state=SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
-			s->s3->renegotiate=0;
-			s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
-			s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
-			ret=1;
-			}
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-/* If we are using TLS v1.2 or later and default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch
- * to new SHA256 PRF and handshake macs
- */
-long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
-	{
-	long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
-	if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
-	    alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
-		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
-	return alg2;
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cdddb17b..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_meth.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_method());
-	else 
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
-			 ssl3_accept,
-			 ssl3_connect,
-			 ssl3_get_method)
-
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a2f5d6c..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1585 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			 unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment);
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
-
-int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
-	{
-	/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
-	 * packet by another n bytes.
-	 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
-	 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
-	 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
-	 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
-	 */
-	int i,len,left;
-	long align=0;
-	unsigned char *pkt;
-	SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
-
-	if (n <= 0) return n;
-
-	rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
-	if (rb->buf == NULL)
-		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-			return -1;
-
-	left  = rb->left;
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-	align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-	align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
-#endif
-
-	if (!extend)
-		{
-		/* start with empty packet ... */
-		if (left == 0)
-			rb->offset = align;
-		else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			/* check if next packet length is large
-			 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
-			pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
-			if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
-			    && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
-				{
-				/* Note that even if packet is corrupted
-				 * and its length field is insane, we can
-				 * only be led to wrong decision about
-				 * whether memmove will occur or not.
-				 * Header values has no effect on memmove
-				 * arguments and therefore no buffer
-				 * overrun can be triggered. */
-				memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
-				rb->offset = align;
-				}
-			}
-		s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
-		s->packet_length = 0;
-		/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
-		}
-
-	/* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
-	 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
-	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
-	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		if (left > 0 && n > left)
-			n = left;
-		}
-
-	/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
-	if (left >= n)
-		{
-		s->packet_length+=n;
-		rb->left=left-n;
-		rb->offset+=n;
-		return(n);
-		}
-
-	/* else we need to read more data */
-
-	len = s->packet_length;
-	pkt = rb->buf+align;
-	/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
-	 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
-	 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
-	if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
-		{
-		memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
-		s->packet = pkt;
-		rb->offset = len + align;
-		}
-
-	if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (!s->read_ahead)
-		/* ignore max parameter */
-		max = n;
-	else
-		{
-		if (max < n)
-			max = n;
-		if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
-			max = rb->len - rb->offset;
-		}
-
-	while (left < n)
-		{
-		/* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
-		 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
-		 * len+max if possible) */
-
-		clear_sys_error();
-		if (s->rbio != NULL)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
-			i = -1;
-			}
-
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			rb->left = left;
-			if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
-			    SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				if (len+left == 0)
-					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
-			return(i);
-			}
-		left+=i;
-		/* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
-		 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
-		 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			if (n > left)
-				n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
-	rb->offset += n;
-	rb->left = left - n;
-	s->packet_length += n;
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	return(n);
-	}
-
-/* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
- * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
- * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
- * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
-#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
-
-/* Call this to get a new input record.
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
- * or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
- */
-/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
-static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
-	int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	short version;
-	unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
-	size_t extra;
-	unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
-
-	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
-	sess=s->session;
-
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-	else
-		extra=0;
-	if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
-		{
-		/* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
-		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-again:
-	/* check if we have the header */
-	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
-		(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
-		{
-		n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
-		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
-		p=s->packet;
-
-		/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
-		rr->type= *(p++);
-		ssl_major= *(p++);
-		ssl_minor= *(p++);
-		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
-		n2s(p,rr->length);
-#if 0
-fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
-#endif
-
-		/* Lets check version */
-		if (!s->first_packet)
-			{
-			if (version != s->version)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
-                                	/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
-					s->version = (unsigned short)version;
-				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
-		}
-
-	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
-	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-		{
-		/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
-		i=rr->length;
-		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
-		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
-		/* now n == rr->length,
-		 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
-		}
-
-	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
-	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
-	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
-	 */
-	rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
-	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
-	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
-	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
-	 * the decryption or by the decompression
-	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
-	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
-
-	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
-	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
-
-	/* check is not needed I believe */
-	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
-	rr->data=rr->input;
-
-	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	/* enc_err is:
-	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
-	 *    1: if the padding is valid
-	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
-	if (enc_err == 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
-{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
-	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if ((sess != NULL) &&
-	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
-	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
-		{
-		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
-		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
-
-		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
-		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
-		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
-		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
-		 */
-		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
-		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
-		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-			{
-			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
-			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
-			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
-			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
-			 * */
-			mac = mac_tmp;
-			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
-			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
-			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
-			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
-			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
-			}
-
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-			enc_err = -1;
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
-			enc_err = -1;
-		}
-
-	if (enc_err < 0)
-		{
-		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
-		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
-		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
-		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
-		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
-		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* r->length is now just compressed */
-	if (s->expand != NULL)
-		{
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	rr->off=0;
-	/* So at this point the following is true
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
-	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
-	 *			   after use :-).
-	 */
-
-	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
-	s->packet_length=0;
-
-	/* just read a 0 length packet */
-	if (rr->length == 0)
-		{
-		empty_record_count++;
-		if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		goto again;
-		}
-
-#if 0
-fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
-#endif
-
-	return(1);
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	int i;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-
-	rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-	i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
-		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
-	if (i < 0)
-		return(0);
-	else
-		rr->length=i;
-	rr->data=rr->comp;
-#endif
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	int i;
-	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
-
-	wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-	i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
-		SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
-		wr->input,(int)wr->length);
-	if (i < 0)
-		return(0);
-	else
-		wr->length=i;
-
-	wr->input=wr->data;
-#endif
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
- * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
- */
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
-	{
-	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
-	unsigned int n,nw;
-	int i,tot;
-
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
-	tot=s->s3->wnum;
-	s->s3->wnum=0;
-
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write 
-	 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete 
-	 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding 
-	 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
-	 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
-	 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
-	 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
-	 * will notice
-	 */
-	if (len < tot)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-
-	n=(len-tot);
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		/* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put
-		 * into a record. */
-		unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
-		/* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte
-		 * in its own record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */
-		int fragment = 0;
-
-		if (n > 1 &&
-		    s->s3->need_record_splitting &&
-		    type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
-		    !s->s3->record_split_done)
-			{
-			fragment = 1;
-			/* record_split_done records that the splitting has
-			 * been done in case we hit an SSL_WANT_WRITE condition.
-			 * In that case, we don't need to do the split again. */
-			s->s3->record_split_done = 1;
-			}
-
-		if (n > max)
-			nw=max;
-		else
-			nw=n;
-
-		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, fragment, 0);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			s->s3->wnum=tot;
-			/* Try to write the fragment next time. */
-			s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
-			return i;
-			}
-
-		if ((i == (int)n) ||
-			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
-			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
-			{
-			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended,
-			 * one-byte fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
-			 * weakness. */
-			s->s3->record_split_done = 0;
-			return tot+i;
-			}
-
-		n-=i;
-		tot+=i;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1
- * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest
- * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. If |is_fragment| is true then
- * this call resulted from do_ssl3_write calling itself in order to create that
- * one byte fragment. */
-static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-			 unsigned int len, char fragment, char is_fragment)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*plen;
-	int i,mac_size;
-	int prefix_len=0;
-	int eivlen;
-	long align=0;
-	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
-	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-
-
-	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
-	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
-	if (wb->left != 0)
-		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
-
-	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
-	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
-		{
-		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			return(i);
-		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
-		}
-
-	if (wb->buf == NULL)
-		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
-			return -1;
-
-	if (len == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
-	sess=s->session;
-
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
-		{
-		mac_size=0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-		if (mac_size < 0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (fragment)
-		{
-		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
-		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-		prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 1 /* length */,
-					   0 /* fragment */,
-					   1 /* is_fragment */);
-		if (prefix_len <= 0)
-			goto err;
-
-		if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
-				  SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
-			{
-			/* insufficient space */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (is_fragment)
-		{
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-		/* The extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, and
-		 * that will be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD. So, if we
-		 * want to align the real payload, we can just pretend that we
-		 * have two headers and a byte. */
-		align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
-		align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
-#endif
-		p = wb->buf + align;
-		wb->offset  = align;
-		}
-	else if (prefix_len)
-		{
-		p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
-		align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-		align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
-#endif
-		p = wb->buf + align;
-		wb->offset  = align;
-		}
-
-	/* write the header */
-
-	*(p++)=type&0xff;
-	wr->type=type;
-
-	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
-	/* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
-	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
-	 */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
-				&& !s->renegotiate
-				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
-		*(p++) = 0x1;
-	else
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
-	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
-	plen=p;
-	p+=2;
-	/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
-	if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		{
-		int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-			{
-			eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			if (eivlen <= 1)
-				eivlen = 0;
-			}
-		/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
-		else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-			eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-		else
-			eivlen = 0;
-		}
-	else 
-		eivlen = 0;
-
-	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
-	wr->data=p + eivlen;
-	wr->length=(int)(len - (fragment != 0));
-	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf + (fragment != 0);
-
-	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
-	 * wr->data */
-
-	/* first we compress */
-	if (s->compress != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
-		wr->input=wr->data;
-		}
-
-	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
-	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
-	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
-
-	if (mac_size != 0)
-		{
-		if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
-			goto err;
-		wr->length+=mac_size;
-		}
-
-	wr->input=p;
-	wr->data=p;
-
-	if (eivlen)
-		{
-	/*	if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
-			goto err; */
-		wr->length += eivlen;
-		}
-
-	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
-	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
-
-	/* record length after mac and block padding */
-	s2n(wr->length,plen);
-
-	/* we should now have
-	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
-	 * wr->length long */
-	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
-	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-	if (is_fragment)
-		{
-		/* we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't
-		 * write out anything. */
-		return wr->length;
-		}
-
-	/* now let's set up wb */
-	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
-
-	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
-	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
-	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
-	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
-	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
-
-	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
-	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
-err:
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
-int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-	unsigned int len)
-	{
-	int i;
-	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
-
-/* XXXX */
-	if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
-		|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
-			!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
-		|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		clear_sys_error();
-		if (s->wbio != NULL)
-			{
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
-				(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
-				(unsigned int)wb->left);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
-			i= -1;
-			}
-		if (i == wb->left)
-			{
-			wb->left=0;
-			wb->offset+=i;
-			if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
-			    SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
-			}
-		else if (i <= 0) {
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
-			    s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
-				/* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
-				   point in using a datagram service */
-				wb->left = 0;
-			}
-			return(i);
-		}
-		wb->offset+=i;
-		wb->left-=i;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
- * 'type' is one of the following:
- *
- *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
- *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
- *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
- *
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
- *
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
- * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
- *     Change cipher spec protocol
- *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
- *     Alert protocol
- *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
- *     Handshake protocol
- *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
- *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
- *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
- *     Application data protocol
- *             none of our business
- */
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
-	{
-	int al,i,j,ret;
-	unsigned int n;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
-
-	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
-		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
-			return(-1);
-
-	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
-	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
-		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
-		{
-		unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
-		unsigned char *dst = buf;
-		unsigned int k;
-
-		/* peek == 0 */
-		n = 0;
-		while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
-			{
-			*dst++ = *src++;
-			len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
-			n++;
-			}
-		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
-		for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
-			s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
-		return n;
-	}
-
-	/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
-
-	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
-		{
-		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		}
-start:
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
-	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
-	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
-	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
-	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
-
-	/* get new packet if necessary */
-	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
-		{
-		ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
-		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
-		}
-
-	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
-
-	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
-	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
-		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
-	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		rr->length=0;
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-
-	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
-		{
-		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
-		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
-		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
-			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
-		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
-			n = rr->length;
-		else
-			n = (unsigned int)len;
-
-		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
-		if (!peek)
-			{
-			rr->length-=n;
-			rr->off+=n;
-			if (rr->length == 0)
-				{
-				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-				rr->off=0;
-				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
-					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
-				}
-			}
-		return(n);
-		}
-
-
-	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
-	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
-
-	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
-	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
-	 */
-		{
-		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
-		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
-		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
-
-		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
-			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
-			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
-			}
-		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
-			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
-			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
-			{
-			tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
-
-			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
-			return(-1);
-			}
-#endif
-
-		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
-			{
-			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
-			if (rr->length < n)
-				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
-
-			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
-			while (n-- > 0)
-				{
-				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
-				rr->length--;
-				}
-
-			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
-				goto start; /* fragment was too small */
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
-	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
-
-	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
-	if ((!s->server) &&
-		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
-		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
-		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
-		{
-		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
-
-		if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
-			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
-			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
-			!s->s3->renegotiate)
-			{
-			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
-			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
-				{
-				i=s->handshake_func(s);
-				if (i < 0) return(i);
-				if (i == 0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-					return(-1);
-					}
-
-				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
-					{
-					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
-						{
-						BIO *bio;
-						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
-						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
-						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
-						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
-						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
-						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
-						return(-1);
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
-		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
-		goto start;
-		}
-	/* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
-	 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
-	 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
-	 */
-	if (s->server &&
-		SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
-    		!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
-		(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
-		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
-		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
-		!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-		
-		{
-		/*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
-		rr->length = 0;
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-		goto start;
-		}
-	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
-		{
-		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
-		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
-
-		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->info_callback;
-		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-		if (cb != NULL)
-			{
-			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
-			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
-			}
-
-		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
-			{
-			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
-			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
-				{
-				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
-				return(0);
-				}
-			/* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
-			 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
-			 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
-			 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
-			 * expects it to succeed.
-			 *
-			 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
-			 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
-			 */
-			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
-				{
-				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
-			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
-				return(0);
-#endif
-			}
-		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
-			{
-			char tmp[16];
-
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
-			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
-			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
-			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
-			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		rr->length=0;
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-		{
-		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
-		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
-		if (	(rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
-			(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
-		rr->length=0;
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
-		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
-			goto err;
-		else
-			goto start;
-		}
-
-	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
-	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
-			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
-			{
-#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
-       * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
-       * protocol violations): */
-			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
-				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
-				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#else
-			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#endif
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			s->new_session=1;
-			}
-		i=s->handshake_func(s);
-		if (i < 0) return(i);
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			return(-1);
-			}
-
-		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
-			{
-			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
-				{
-				BIO *bio;
-				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
-				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
-				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
-				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
-				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
-				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
-				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			}
-		goto start;
-		}
-
-	switch (rr->type)
-		{
-	default:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
-		/* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
-		 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
-		 */
-		if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			goto start;
-			}
-#endif
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-		goto f_err;
-	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
-	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
-	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
-		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
-		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
-		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto f_err;
-	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
-		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
-		 * but have application data.  If the library was
-		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
-		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
-		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
-		 * we will indulge it.
-		 */
-		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
-			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
-			((
-				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
-				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
-				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-				) || (
-					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
-					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
-					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-					)
-				))
-			{
-			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
-			return(-1);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	/* not reached */
-
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i;
-	const char *sender;
-	int slen;
-
-	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
-	else
-		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
-			{
-			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-			return (0);
-			}
-
-		s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-		if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
-		return(0);
-
-	/* we have to record the message digest at
-	 * this point so we can get it before we read
-	 * the finished message */
-	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-		{
-		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
-		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
-		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
-		}
-
-	i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-	if (i == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
-
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
-	{
-	/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
-	desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
-	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-		desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
-	if (desc < 0) return -1;
-	/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
-	if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
-		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-
-	s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
-	s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
-	s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
-		return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
-	/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
-	 * some time in the future */
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,j;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-
-	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
-	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0, 0);
-	if (i <= 0)
-		{
-		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
-		 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
-		 * we will not worry too much. */
-		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
-			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->info_callback;
-		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-		if (cb != NULL)
-			{
-			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
-			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
-			}
-		}
-	return(i);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a42fc9e3..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3839 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
-#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return(SSLv3_server_method());
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
-	{
-	int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
-	*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-	if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
-	    (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
-		{
-		if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
-			{
-			/* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 
-			   we do so if There is no srp login name */
-			ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-			*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
-			}
-		}
-	return ret;
-	}
-#endif
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_get_server_method)
-
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	int ret= -1;
-	int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
-	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
-	ERR_clear_error();
-	clear_sys_error();
-
-	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->info_callback;
-	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
-		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
-	/* init things to blank */
-	s->in_handshake++;
-	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
-	if (s->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
-	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
-	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		state=s->state;
-
-		switch (s->state)
-			{
-		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-			s->renegotiate=1;
-			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
-		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
-			s->server=1;
-			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
-			if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
-			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
-				{
-				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
-					{
-					ret= -1;
-					goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_buf=buf;
-				}
-
-			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-			s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
-
-			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
-				{
-				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
-				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
-				 */
-				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-				
-				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
-				}
-			else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
-				!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-				{
-				/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
-				 * client that doesn't support secure
-				 * renegotiation.
-				 */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				ret = -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
-				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
-			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
-			s->shutdown=0;
-			if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
-			{
-				ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			{
-			int al;
-			if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al))  < 0)
-					{
-					/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
-					s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-					goto end;
-					}
-			if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);	
-				/* This is not really an error but the only means to
-                                   for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
- 				   if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 	
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);			
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;			
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;	
-				}
-			}
-#endif		
-			
-			s->renegotiate = 2;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			if (s->hit)
-				{
-				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-				}
-#else
-			if (s->hit)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
-			/* non-RSA PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
-			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
-				/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */
-				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK &&
-					 !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)))
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				skip = 1;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-				}
-#else
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-			alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-			/* clear this, it may get reset by
-			 * send_server_key_exchange */
-			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-				)
-				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
-				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
-				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
-				 * be able to handle this) */
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
-
-
-			/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
-			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
-			 *
-			 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
-			 *
-			 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
-			 * message only if the cipher suite is either
-			 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
-			 * server certificate contains the server's
-			 * public key for key exchange.
-			 */
-			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
-			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if either:
-			 *   - PSK identity hint is provided, or
-			 *   - the key exchange is kEECDH.
-			 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			    || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || s->session->psk_identity_hint))
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			    /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
-			    || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-#endif
-			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
-			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
-				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
-					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
-					)
-				    )
-				)
-			    )
-				{
-				ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			else
-				skip=1;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
-			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
-				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
-				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
-				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
-				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
-				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
-				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
-				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
-				 * and in RFC 2246): */
-				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
-				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
-				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
-				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
-				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
-				/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
-				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
-				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
-				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
-				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
-				{
-				/* no cert request */
-				skip=1;
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-						return -1;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
-				ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-#endif
-				s->init_num=0;
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-		
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
-			/* This code originally checked to see if
-			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
-			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
-			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
-			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
-			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
-			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
-			 * unconditionally.
-			 */
-
-			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
-			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
-			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
-			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
-			else {
-				if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
-					{
-					ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
-					if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-					}
-				s->init_num=0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
-			if (ret <= 0)
-				goto end;
-			if (ret == 2)
-				{
-				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
-				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
-				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
-				 * message is not sent.
-				 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
-				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
-				 * for key exchange.
-				 */
-				s->init_num = 0;
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
-				}
-			else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-				{
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-				if (!s->session->peer)
-					break;
-				/* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
-				 * at this point and digest cached records.
-				 */
-				if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-					return -1;
-					}
-				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
-				if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-					return -1;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				int offset=0;
-				int dgst_num;
-
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-				s->init_num=0;
-
-				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
-				 * a client cert, it can be verified
-				 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
-				 * should be generalized. But it is next step
-				 */
-				if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-					if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-						return -1;
-				for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)	
-					if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 
-						{
-						int dgst_size;
-
-						s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
-						dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
-						if (dgst_size < 0)
-							{
-							ret = -1;
-							goto end;
-							}
-						offset+=dgst_size;
-						}		
-				}
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
-			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {
-			char next_proto_neg = 0;
-			char channel_id = 0;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-			next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-# endif
-			channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
-#endif
-
-			if (next_proto_neg)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-			else if (channel_id)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-		}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
-			ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->init_num = 0;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-			break;
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			/* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then
-			 * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case
-			 * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a
-			 * resumption of this session in the future. */
-			if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-				{
-				ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
-				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				}
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-#endif
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
-			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
-				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
-
-			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
-				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
-				{
-				ret= -1;
-				goto end;
-				}
-
-			break;
-
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
-			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
-			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-			if (s->hit)
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
-			s->init_num=0;
-			break;
-
-		case SSL_ST_OK:
-			/* clean a few things up */
-			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-			s->init_buf=NULL;
-
-			/* remove buffering on output */
-			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
-			s->init_num=0;
-
-			if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
-				{
-				s->renegotiate=0;
-				s->new_session=0;
-				
-				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-				
-				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
-				/* s->server=1; */
-				s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
-
-				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
-				}
-			
-			ret = 1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-
-		default:
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-			ret= -1;
-			goto end;
-			/* break; */
-			}
-		
-		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
-			{
-			if (s->debug)
-				{
-				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
-					goto end;
-				}
-
-
-			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
-				{
-				new_state=s->state;
-				s->state=state;
-				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
-				s->state=new_state;
-				}
-			}
-		skip=0;
-		}
-end:
-	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
-	s->in_handshake--;
-	if (cb != NULL)
-		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	long n;
-
-	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
-	 * so permit appropriate message length */
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
-		{
-		/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
-		 * negotiation. */
-		if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
-		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-			{
-			DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-			s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-			{
-			EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-			s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-			}
-#endif
-		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
-		return 2;
-		}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
-	unsigned int cookie_len;
-	long n;
-	unsigned long id;
-	unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
-	SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
-#endif
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
-
-	/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
-	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
-	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
-	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
-	 * TLSv1.
-	 */
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
-		)
-		{
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-		}
-	s->first_packet=1;
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
-		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
-		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	s->first_packet=0;
-	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
-	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
-	s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
-	p+=2;
-
-	if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
-	    (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-		if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 
-			!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
-			{
-			/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
-			s->version = s->client_version;
-			}
-		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
-	 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
-	 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
-	 */
-	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
-		{
-		unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-		
-		session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
-
-		if (cookie_length == 0)
-			return 1;
-		}
-
-	/* load the client random */
-	memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	/* get the session-id */
-	j= *(p++);
-
-	s->hit=0;
-	/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
-	 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
-	 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
-	 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
-	 * won't even compile against older library versions).
-	 *
-	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
-	 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
-	 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-	 * setting will be ignored.
-	 */
-	if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
-		{
-	        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-			{
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
-			goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
-		if (i == 1)
-			{ /* previous session */
-			s->hit=1;
-			}
-		else if (i == -1)
-			goto err;
-		else /* i == 0 */
-			{
-		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
-				{
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	p+=j;
-
-	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		/* cookie stuff */
-		cookie_len = *(p++);
-
-		/* 
-		 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
-		 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
-		 * does not cause an overflow.
-		 */
-		if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
-			{
-			/* too much data */
-			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
-		if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
-			cookie_len > 0)
-			{
-			memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
-
-			if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
-				{
-				if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
-					cookie_len) == 0)
-					{
-					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
-						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-					goto f_err;
-					}
-				/* else cookie verification succeeded */
-				}
-			else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 
-						  s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
-				{
-					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
-						SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-					goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			ret = 2;
-			}
-
-		p += cookie_len;
-		}
-
-	n2s(p,i);
-	if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
-		{
-		/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
-		{
-		/* not enough data */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
-		== NULL))
-		{
-		goto err;
-		}
-	p+=i;
-
-	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
-	if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
-		{
-		j=0;
-		id=s->session->cipher->id;
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
-#endif
-		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
-			{
-			c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
-				i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
-			if (c->id == id)
-				{
-				j=1;
-				break;
-				}
-			}
-/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
- * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
- */
-#if 0
-		if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
-			{
-			/* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
-			 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
-			 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
-			 * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
-			 * enabled, though. */
-			c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
-			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
-				{
-				s->session->cipher = c;
-				j = 1;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		if (j == 0)
-			{
-			/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
-			 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* compression */
-	i= *(p++);
-	if ((p+i) > (d+n))
-		{
-		/* not enough data */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	q=p;
-	for (j=0; j<i; j++)
-		{
-		if (p[j] == 0) break;
-		}
-
-	p+=i;
-	if (j >= i)
-		{
-		/* no compress */
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* TLS extensions*/
-	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
-			{
-			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
-	 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
-	 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
-	 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
-	{
-		unsigned char *pos;
-		pos=s->s3->server_random;
-		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-	}
-
-	if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
-		{
-		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
-
-		s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
-		if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
-			ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
-			{
-			s->hit=1;
-			s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
-			s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-
-			ciphers=NULL;
-
-			/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
-			pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
-			if (pref_cipher == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
-
-			if (s->cipher_list)
-				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-
-			if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
-				sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
-			s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
-			s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
-	 * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression
-	 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
-	s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
-	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
-		{
-		int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
-		/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
-		/* Can't disable compression */
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* Look for resumed compression method */
-		for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
-			{
-			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
-			if (comp_id == comp->id)
-				{
-				s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
-				break;
-				}
-			}
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
-		for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
-			{
-			if (q[m] == comp_id)
-				break;
-			}
-		if (m >= i)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else if (s->hit)
-		comp = NULL;
-	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
-		{ /* See if we have a match */
-		int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
-
-		nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
-		for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
-			{
-			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
-			v=comp->id;
-			for (o=0; o<i; o++)
-				{
-				if (v == q[o])
-					{
-					done=1;
-					break;
-					}
-				}
-			if (done) break;
-			}
-		if (done)
-			s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
-		else
-			comp=NULL;
-		}
-#else
-	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
-	 * using compression.
-	 */
-	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
-	 * pick a cipher */
-
-	if (!s->hit)
-		{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		s->session->compress_meth=0;
-#else
-		s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
-#endif
-		if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
-			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
-		s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
-		if (ciphers == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		ciphers=NULL;
-		c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
-				     SSL_get_ciphers(s));
-
-		if (c == NULL)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Session-id reuse */
-#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
-		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-		SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
-		SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
-
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
-			{
-			sk=s->session->ciphers;
-			for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
-				{
-				c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
-				if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
-					nc=c;
-				if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
-					ec=c;
-				}
-			if (nc != NULL)
-				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
-			else if (ec != NULL)
-				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
-			else
-				s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
-			}
-		else
-#endif
-		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
-		}
-
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
-		{
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	
-	/* we now have the following setup. 
-	 * client_random
-	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers
-	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers
-	 * compression		- basically ignored right now
-	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3
-	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.
-	 * s->hit		- session reuse flag
-	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
-	 */
-
-	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
-	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (ret < 0) ret=1;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
-err:
-	if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,sl;
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
-		{
-		/* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order
-		 * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
-		if (s->s3 &&
-		    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
-		    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
-		/* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't
-		 * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original
-		 * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with
-		 * ChannelIDs. */
-		if (s->hit &&
-		    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
-		    s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-
-		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		p=s->s3->server_random;
-		if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
-			return -1;
-#endif
-		/* Do the message type and length last */
-		d=p= &(buf[4]);
-
-		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
-		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
-		/* Random stuff */
-		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-		/* There are several cases for the session ID to send
-		 * back in the server hello:
-		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
-		 *   we send back the old session ID.
-		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
-		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
-		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
-		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
-		 *   session ID.
-		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
-		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
-		 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
-		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
-		 * to send back.
-		 */
-		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-			&& !s->hit)
-			s->session->session_id_length=0;
-
-		sl=s->session->session_id_length;
-		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		*(p++)=sl;
-		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
-		p+=sl;
-
-		/* put the cipher */
-		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
-		p+=i;
-
-		/* put the compression method */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-			*(p++)=0;
-#else
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
-			*(p++)=0;
-		else
-			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return -1;
-			}
-#endif
-		/* do the header */
-		l=(p-d);
-		d=buf;
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
-		l2n3(l,d);
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=p-buf;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
-		{
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num=4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	unsigned char *q;
-	int j,num;
-	RSA *rsa;
-	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int u;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
-	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
-	int encodedlen = 0;
-	int curve_id = 0;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	const char* psk_identity_hint;
-	size_t psk_identity_hint_len;
-#endif
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int al,i;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	int n;
-	CERT *cert;
-	BIGNUM *r[4];
-	int nr[4],kn;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
-		{
-		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-		alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-		cert=s->cert;
-
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
-		n=0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			/* size for PSK identity hint */
-			psk_identity_hint = s->session->psk_identity_hint;
-			if (psk_identity_hint)
-				psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
-			else
-				psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
-			n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len;
-			}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-			{
-			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
-			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				{
-				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-				if(rsa == NULL)
-				{
-					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-					goto f_err;
-				}
-				RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
-				}
-			if (rsa == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			r[0]=rsa->n;
-			r[1]=rsa->e;
-			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
-			{
-			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
-			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-			if (dhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
-			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
-			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
-			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
-				{
-				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
-				    {
-				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
-				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
-				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
-					(dh->priv_key == NULL))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			r[0]=dh->p;
-			r[1]=dh->g;
-			r[2]=dh->pub_key;
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			{
-			const EC_GROUP *group;
-
-			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
-			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
-				{
-				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
-				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
-				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
-				}
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
-			if (ecdhp == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
-			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
-			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
-				{
-				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
-				    {
-				    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				    goto err;
-				    }
-				}
-
-			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
-			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
-			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
-			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
-			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
-			 */
-			if ((curve_id = 
-			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
-			    == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Encode the public key.
-			 * First check the size of encoding and
-			 * allocate memory accordingly.
-			 */
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    NULL, 0, NULL);
-
-			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
-			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
-			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-
-			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
-			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
-			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
-			if (encodedlen == 0) 
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
-
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
-			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
-			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
-			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
-			 * structure. 
-			 */
-			n += 4 + encodedlen;
-
-			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
-			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
-			 */
-			r[0]=NULL;
-			r[1]=NULL;
-			r[2]=NULL;
-			r[3]=NULL;
-			}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-			{
-			if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
-				(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
-				(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
-				(s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
-			r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
-			r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
-			r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP))
-				n+=1+nr[i];
-			else
-#endif
-			n+=2+nr[i];
-			}
-
-		if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
-			/* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */
-			&& !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA)))
-			{
-			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
-				== NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			pkey=NULL;
-			kn=0;
-			}
-
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p= &(d[4]);
-
-		for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
-			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-			if ((i == 2) && (alg_k & SSL_kSRP))
-				{
-				*p = nr[i];
-				p++;
-				}
-			else
-#endif
-			s2n(nr[i],p);
-			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
-			p+=nr[i];
-			}
-
-/* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK.
- * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both
- * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-			{
-			/* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
-			s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
-			if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0)
-				{
-				memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
-				p+=psk_identity_hint_len;
-				}
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			{
-			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
-			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
-			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
-			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
-			 * the actual encoded point itself
-			 */
-			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = 0;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = curve_id;
-			p += 1;
-			*p = encodedlen;
-			p += 1;
-			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
-			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
-			    encodedlen);
-			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-			encodedPoint = NULL;
-			p += encodedlen;
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-		/* not anonymous */
-		if (pkey != NULL)
-			{
-			/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
-			 * and p points to the space at the end. */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
-					&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-				{
-				q=md_buf;
-				j=0;
-				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
-					{
-					EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
-						EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
-						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
-					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
-						(unsigned int *)&i);
-					q+=i;
-					j+=i;
-					}
-				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
-					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s2n(u,p);
-				n+=u+2;
-				}
-			else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-			if (md)
-				{
-				/* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
-				 * algorithm */
-				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-					{
-					if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
-						{
-						/* Should never happen */
-						al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-						SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-						goto f_err;
-						}
-					p+=2;
-					}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-				fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
-							EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
-				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
-					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s2n(i,p);
-				n+=i+2;
-				if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-					n+= 2;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
-		 * it off */
-		s->init_num=n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p,*d;
-	int i,j,nl,off,n;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *name;
-	BUF_MEM *buf;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
-		{
-		buf=s->init_buf;
-
-		d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
-
-		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
-		p++;
-		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
-		d[0]=n;
-		p+=n;
-		n++;
-
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
-			s2n(nl, p);
-			p += nl + 2;
-			n += nl + 2;
-			}
-
-		off=n;
-		p+=2;
-		n+=2;
-
-		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
-		nl=0;
-		if (sk != NULL)
-			{
-			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-				{
-				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
-				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
-					{
-					s2n(j,p);
-					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
-					n+=2+j;
-					nl+=2+j;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					d=p;
-					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
-					j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
-					n+=j;
-					nl+=j;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		/* else no CA names */
-		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
-		s2n(nl,p);
-
-		d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
-		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
-		l2n3(n,d);
-
-		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
-		 * it off */
-
-		s->init_num=n+4;
-		s->init_off=0;
-#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		*(p++)=0;
-		s->init_num += 4;
-#endif
-
-		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,al,ok;
-	long n;
-	unsigned long alg_k;
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	unsigned char *p;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
-	DH *dh_srvr;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
-	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
-	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-	unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#endif
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-		2048, /* ??? */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK)
-		{
-		unsigned char *t = NULL;
-		unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
-		unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0;
-		int psk_err = 1;
-		char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
-
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
-		n2s(p, i);
-		if (n != i+2 && !(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-		if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-		if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			       SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-
-		/* Create guaranteed NUL-terminated identity
-		 * string for the callback */
-		memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
-		memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
-		psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk, sizeof(psk));
-
-		if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-		else if (psk_len == 0)
-			{
-			/* PSK related to the given identity not found */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-			al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-		if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH))
-			{
-			/* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/
-			pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
-			t = pre_ms;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-			t+=psk_len;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-
-			s->session->master_key_length=
-				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-			}
-		if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-		s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(tmp_id);
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
-		if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto psk_err;
-			}
-
-		p += i;
-		n -= (i + 2);
-		psk_err = 0;
-	psk_err:
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms));
-		if (psk_err != 0)
-			goto f_err;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-	if (0) {}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
-		{
-		unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-		int decrypt_len;
-		unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
-
-		/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
-		if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
-			{
-			if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
-				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
-			/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
-			 * be sent already */
-			if (rsa == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
-				goto f_err;
-
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
-			if (	(pkey == NULL) ||
-				(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
-				(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
-			}
-
-		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
-		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			n2s(p,i);
-			if (n != i+2)
-				{
-				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
-					{
-					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					p-=2;
-				}
-			else
-				n=i;
-			}
-
-		/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
-		 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
-		 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
-		 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
-		 * case that the decrypt fails. See
-		 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
-
-		/* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
-				      sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-		decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-		ERR_clear_error();
-
-		/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
-		 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
-		decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-
-		/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
-		 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
-		 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
-		 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
-		 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
-		 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
-		 * decryption error. */
-		version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
-		version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
-
-		/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
-		 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
-		 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
-		 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
-		 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
-		 * support the requested protocol version. If
-		 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
-		if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
-			{
-			unsigned char workaround_good;
-			workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
-			workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
-			version_good |= workaround_good;
-			}
-
-		/* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
-		 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
-		decrypt_good &= version_good;
-
-		/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
-		 * decrypt_good_mask. */
-		for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
-			{
-			p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
-						      rand_premaster_secret[i]);
-			}
-
-		s->session->master_key_length=
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-				s->session->master_key,
-				p,i);
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
-		{
-		n2s(p,i);
-		if (n != i+2)
-			{
-			if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				p-=2;
-				i=(int)n;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			else
-				dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
-			}
-
-		pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
-		if (pub == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
-
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			BN_clear_free(pub);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-		s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
-
-		BN_clear_free(pub);
-		pub=NULL;
-		s->session->master_key_length=
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-				s->session->master_key,p,i);
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-		{
-		krb5_error_code		krb5rc;
-		krb5_data		enc_ticket;
-		krb5_data		authenticator;
-		krb5_data		enc_pms;
-		KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;
-		const EVP_CIPHER	*enc = NULL;
-		unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-		unsigned char		pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
-					       + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-		int		     padl, outl;
-		krb5_timestamp		authtime = 0;
-		krb5_ticket_times	ttimes;
-
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-		if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		enc_ticket.length = i;
-
-		if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
-		p+=enc_ticket.length;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		authenticator.length = i;
-
-		if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		authenticator.data = (char *)p;
-		p+=authenticator.length;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		enc_pms.length = i;
-		enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
-		p+=enc_pms.length;
-
-		/* Note that the length is checked again below,
-		** after decryption
-		*/
-		if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			       SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
-						enc_pms.length + 6))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
-					&kssl_err)) != 0)
-			{
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
-				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
-			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				kssl_err.reason);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
-		**  but will return authtime == 0.
-		*/
-		if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
-					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
-			{
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
-				krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
-			if (kssl_err.text)
-				printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				kssl_err.reason);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
-		if (enc == NULL)
-		    goto err;
-
-		memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);	/* per RFC 1510 */
-
-		if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
-					(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		outl += padl;
-		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
-		    {
-		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
-		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
-		     * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
-		     * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
-		     * the protocol version.
-		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
-		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
-		     */
-		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		    }
-
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
-		s->session->master_key_length=
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-				s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
-
-		if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
-			{
-			size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
-			if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
-				{
-				s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
-				memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
-				}
-			}
-
-
-		/*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
-		**  but it caused problems for apache.
-		**  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
-		**  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
-		*/
-		}
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-		{
-		int ret = 1;
-		int field_size = 0;
-		const EC_KEY   *tkey;
-		const EC_GROUP *group;
-		const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		unsigned char *pre_ms;
-		unsigned int pre_ms_len;
-		unsigned char *t;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-		/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
-		if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Let's get server private key and group information */
-		if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-			{ 
-			/* use the certificate */
-			tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
-			 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
-			 */
-			tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
-			}
-
-		group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
-		priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
-		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
-		    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			       ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		/* Let's get client's public key */
-		if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if (n == 0L) 
-			{
-			/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
-
-			 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-				 {
-				 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-				 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-				 goto f_err;
-				 }
-			if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
-			    == NULL) || 
-			    (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
-				{
-				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
-				 * authentication using ECDH certificates
-				 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
-				 * never executed. When that support is
-				 * added, we ought to ensure the key 
-				 * received in the certificate is 
-				 * authorized for key agreement.
-				 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
-				 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
-				 * group.
-				 */
-			   	al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			   	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
-			   	goto f_err;
-			   	}
-
-			if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
-			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			/* Get client's public key from encoded point
-			 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
-			 */
-			if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-
-			/* Get encoded point length */
-			i = *p;
-			p += 1;
-			if (n != 1 + i)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
-			    clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			/* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
-			 * currently, so set it to the start 
-			 */ 
-			p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-			}
-
-		/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
-		field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
-		if (field_size <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
-			       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
-		EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
-		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-		EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-		s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
-	    if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0)
-			{
-			pre_ms_len = 2+i+2+psk_len;
-			pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len);
-			if (pre_ms == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len);
-			t = pre_ms;
-			s2n(i, t);
-			memcpy(t, p, i);
-			t += i;
-			s2n(psk_len, t);
-			memcpy(t, psk, psk_len);
-			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-				-> generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-			OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
-			OPENSSL_free(pre_ms);
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))
-			{
-			/* Compute the master secret */
-			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-				-> generate_master_secret(s,
-					s->session->master_key, p, i);
-			}
-
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
-		}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-		{
-		int param_len;
-
-		n2s(p,i);
-		param_len=i+2;
-		if (param_len > n)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
-		s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
-		if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		p+=i;
-		}
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
-		{
-		int ret = 0;
-		EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
-		EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
-		unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
-		size_t outlen=32, inlen;
-		unsigned long alg_a;
-		int Ttag, Tclass;
-		long Tlen;
-
-		/* Get our certificate private key*/
-		alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-		if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
-			pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
-		else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
-			pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
-
-		pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
-		EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
-		/* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
-		 * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
-		 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
-		 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
-		client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
-		if (client_pub_pkey)
-			{
-			if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
-				ERR_clear_error();
-			}
-		/* Decrypt session key */
-		if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
-			Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
-			Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto gerr;
-			}
-		start = p;
-		inlen = Tlen;
-		if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-			goto gerr;
-			}
-		/* Generate master secret */
-		s->session->master_key_length=
-			s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-				s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
-		/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
-		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
-			ret = 2;
-		else
-			ret = 1;
-	gerr:
-		EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
-		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
-		if (ret)
-			return ret;
-		else
-			goto err;
-		}
-	else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-				SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	return(1);
-f_err:
-	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
-err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
-	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-	if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
-		EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
-	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
-	return(-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	int al,ok,ret=0;
-	long n;
-	int type=0,i,j;
-	X509 *peer;
-	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-		-1,
-		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if (s->session->peer != NULL)
-		{
-		peer=s->session->peer;
-		pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
-		type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		peer=NULL;
-		pkey=NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
-		{
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		ret=1;
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (peer == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
-		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-	/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
-	/* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
-	 * signature without length field */
-	if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
-		pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
-		{
-		i=64;
-		} 
-	else 
-		{	
-		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
-			/* Should never happen */
-			if (sigalg == -1)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
-			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
-			if (md == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
-				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				goto f_err;
-				}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-			p += 2;
-			n -= 2;
-			}
-		n2s(p,i);
-		n-=2;
-		if (i > n)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-    	}
-	j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-	if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		{
-		long hdatalen = 0;
-		void *hdata;
-		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
-		if (hdatalen <= 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-		fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
-							EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
-		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
-			|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
-	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
-		{
-		i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
-			MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 
-							pkey->pkey.rsa);
-		if (i < 0)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (i == 0)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
-		{
-		j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
-			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
-		if (j <= 0)
-			{
-			/* bad signature */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-		{
-		j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
-			&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
-			SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
-		if (j <= 0)
-			{
-			/* bad signature */
-			al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
-			    SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-#endif
-	if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
-		{   unsigned char signature[64];
-			int idx;
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
-			EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
-			if (i!=64) {
-				fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
-			}	
-			for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
-				signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
-			}	
-			j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
-			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-			if (j<=0) 
-				{
-				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
-					SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
-				goto f_err;
-				}	
-		}
-	else	
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-
-
-	ret=1;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
-end:
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		{
-		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
-		s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
-	const unsigned char *p,*q;
-	unsigned char *d;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-		-1,
-		s->max_cert_list,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
-	if	(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
-		{
-		if (	(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-			(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
-		if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
-			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		return(1);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	n2l3(p,llen);
-	if (llen+3 != n)
-		{
-		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-		goto f_err;
-		}
-	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
-		{
-		n2l3(p,l);
-		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-
-		q=p;
-		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (p != (q+l))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		x=NULL;
-		nc+=l+3;
-		}
-
-	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
-		{
-		/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
-		if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
-		else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
-			 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
-		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			{
-			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-		if (i <= 0)
-			{
-			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
-			goto f_err;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
-		X509_free(s->session->peer);
-	s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
-	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
-	/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
-	 * when we arrive here. */
-	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-		{
-		s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
-		if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
-	s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
-	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
-	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
-	sk=NULL;
-
-	ret=1;
-	if (0)
-		{
-f_err:
-		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-		}
-err:
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long l;
-	X509 *x;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
-		{
-		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-		if (x == NULL)
-			{
-			/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-			if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
-			    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				return(0);
-				}
-			}
-
-		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
-		s->init_num=(int)l;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
-int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
-		{
-		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
-		const unsigned char *const_p;
-		int len, slen_full, slen;
-		SSL_SESSION *sess;
-		unsigned int hlen;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-		HMAC_CTX hctx;
-		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-		unsigned char key_name[16];
-
-		/* get session encoding length */
-		slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
-		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
- 		 * too long
- 		 */
-		if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
-			return -1;
-		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
-		if (!senc)
-			return -1;
-		p = senc;
-		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
-
-		/* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
-		const_p = senc;
-		sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
-		if (sess == NULL)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(senc);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
-
-		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
-		if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(senc);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		p = senc;
-		i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
-		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
-
-		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- 		 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
- 		 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
- 		 */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
-			26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
-			EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
-			return -1;
-
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
-		/* Skip message length for now */
-		p += 3;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
-		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
-		 * from parent ctx.
-		 */
-		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
-			{
-			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
-							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
-				{
-				OPENSSL_free(senc);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
-			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
-			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
-			}
-
-		/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
-		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
-		 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
-		 * as their sessions. */
-		l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
-		/* Skip ticket length for now */
-		p += 2;
-		/* Output key name */
-		macstart = p;
-		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
-		p += 16;
-		/* output IV */
-		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
-		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-		/* Encrypt session data */
-		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
-		p += len;
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
-		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
-		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
-		p += hlen;
-		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
-		/* Total length */
-		len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
-		l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
-		p += 4;
-		s2n(len - 10, p);  /* Ticket length */
-
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num= len;
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
-		s->init_off=0;
-		OPENSSL_free(senc);
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
-		{
-		unsigned char *p;
-		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- 		 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- 		 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- 		 * + (ocsp response)
- 		 */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
-			return -1;
-
-		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-		/* do the header */
-		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
-		/* message length */
-		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
-		/* status type */
-		*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
-		/* length of OCSP response */
-		l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
-		/* actual response */
-		memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
-		/* number of bytes to write */
-		s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
-		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
-		s->init_off = 0;
-		}
-
-	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
-	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-	}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	int proto_len, padding_len;
-	long n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-
-	/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-	 * extension in their ClientHello */
-	if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-		SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-		514,  /* See the payload format below */
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (n < 2)
-		return 0;  /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-
-	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	/* The payload looks like:
-	 *   uint8 proto_len;
-	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-	 *   uint8 padding_len;
-	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
-	 */
-	proto_len = p[0];
-	if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
-		return 0;
-	padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-	if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
-		return 0;
-
-	s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
-	if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
-	s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-# endif
-
-/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
-int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret = -1, ok;
-	long n;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;
-	EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
-	EC_KEY* key = NULL;
-	EC_POINT* point = NULL;
-	ECDSA_SIG sig;
-	BIGNUM x, y;
-	unsigned short expected_extension_type;
-
-	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)
-		{
-		/* The first time that we're called we take the current
-		 * handshake hash and store it. */
-		EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-		unsigned int len;
-
-		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-		if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
-			return -1;
-		len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);
-		EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-		}
-
-	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
-		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
-		SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
-		2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
-		&ok);
-
-	if (!ok)
-		return((int)n);
-
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
-
-	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-	/* The payload looks like:
-	 *   uint16 extension_type
-	 *   uint16 extension_len;
-	 *   uint8 x[32];
-	 *   uint8 y[32];
-	 *   uint8 r[32];
-	 *   uint8 s[32];
-	 */
-	n2s(p, extension_type);
-	n2s(p, extension_len);
-
-	expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
-	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-		expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
-
-	if (extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
-	    extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
-	if (!p256)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	BN_init(&x);
-	BN_init(&y);
-	sig.r = BN_new();
-	sig.s = BN_new();
-
-	if (BN_bin2bn(p +  0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
-	    BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
-	if (!point ||
-	    !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
-		goto err;
-
-	key = EC_KEY_new();
-	if (!key ||
-	    !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
-	    !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
-		goto err;
-
-	/* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
-	 * that we were called. */
-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {
-	case 1:
-		break;
-	case 0:
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
-		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-		goto err;
-	default:
-		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	BN_free(&x);
-	BN_free(&y);
-	BN_free(sig.r);
-	BN_free(sig.s);
-	if (key)
-		EC_KEY_free(key);
-	if (point)
-		EC_POINT_free(point);
-	if (p256)
-		EC_GROUP_free(p256);
-	return ret;
-	}
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 24f23309..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/srtp.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/*
-  DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
-
-  Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc.
-  Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
-*/
-
-#ifndef HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
-#define HEADER_D1_SRTP_H
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-     
-#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80 0x0001
-#define SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32 0x0002
-#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_80 0x0003
-#define SRTP_AES128_F8_SHA1_32 0x0004
-#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_80      0x0005
-#define SRTP_NULL_SHA1_32      0x0006
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles);
-int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ctx, const char *profiles);
-SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
-
-STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl);
-SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s);
-
-#endif
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7a1fce89..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2754 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_H 
-#define HEADER_SSL_H 
-
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-
-#include <openssl/kssl.h>
-#include <openssl/safestack.h>
-#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
-/* Version 0 - initial version
- * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
- */
-#define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
-
-/* text strings for the ciphers */
-#define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5		SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5			
-#define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5	SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5		
-#define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	
-#define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5	SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		
-#define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	
-#define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5	SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		
-#define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5	SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5		
-#define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA	SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA		
-#define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5	
-#define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA	
-
-/*    VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
- */
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA      SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5       
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5       
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5      SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 
-
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA	      SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5	      SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5
-
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5   SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
-#define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH  256
-
-#define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH		32
-#define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH			32
-
-#define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES	(512/8)
-#define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH			8
-#define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH		48
-
-
-/* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */
-
-#define SSL_TXT_EXP40		"EXPORT40"
-#define SSL_TXT_EXP56		"EXPORT56"
-#define SSL_TXT_LOW		"LOW"
-#define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM		"MEDIUM"
-#define SSL_TXT_HIGH		"HIGH"
-#define SSL_TXT_FIPS		"FIPS"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_kFZA		"kFZA" /* unused! */
-#define	SSL_TXT_aFZA		"aFZA" /* unused! */
-#define SSL_TXT_eFZA		"eFZA" /* unused! */
-#define SSL_TXT_FZA		"FZA"  /* unused! */
-
-#define	SSL_TXT_aNULL		"aNULL"
-#define	SSL_TXT_eNULL		"eNULL"
-#define	SSL_TXT_NULL		"NULL"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_kRSA		"kRSA"
-#define SSL_TXT_kDHr		"kDHr" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define SSL_TXT_kDHd		"kDHd" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define SSL_TXT_kDH 		"kDH"  /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define SSL_TXT_kEDH		"kEDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_kKRB5     	"kKRB5"
-#define SSL_TXT_kECDHr		"kECDHr"
-#define SSL_TXT_kECDHe		"kECDHe"
-#define SSL_TXT_kECDH		"kECDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_kEECDH		"kEECDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_kPSK            "kPSK"
-#define SSL_TXT_kGOST		"kGOST"
-#define SSL_TXT_kSRP		"kSRP"
-
-#define	SSL_TXT_aRSA		"aRSA"
-#define	SSL_TXT_aDSS		"aDSS"
-#define	SSL_TXT_aDH		"aDH" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define	SSL_TXT_aECDH		"aECDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_aKRB5     	"aKRB5"
-#define SSL_TXT_aECDSA		"aECDSA"
-#define SSL_TXT_aPSK            "aPSK"
-#define SSL_TXT_aGOST94	"aGOST94"
-#define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
-#define SSL_TXT_aGOST  "aGOST"
-#define SSL_TXT_aSRP            "aSRP"
-
-#define	SSL_TXT_DSS		"DSS"
-#define SSL_TXT_DH		"DH"
-#define SSL_TXT_EDH		"EDH" /* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */
-#define SSL_TXT_ADH		"ADH"
-#define SSL_TXT_RSA		"RSA"
-#define SSL_TXT_ECDH		"ECDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_EECDH		"EECDH" /* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */
-#define SSL_TXT_AECDH		"AECDH"
-#define SSL_TXT_ECDSA		"ECDSA"
-#define SSL_TXT_KRB5      	"KRB5"
-#define SSL_TXT_PSK             "PSK"
-#define SSL_TXT_SRP		"SRP"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_DES		"DES"
-#define SSL_TXT_3DES		"3DES"
-#define SSL_TXT_RC4		"RC4"
-#define SSL_TXT_RC2		"RC2"
-#define SSL_TXT_IDEA		"IDEA"
-#define SSL_TXT_SEED		"SEED"
-#define SSL_TXT_AES128		"AES128"
-#define SSL_TXT_AES256		"AES256"
-#define SSL_TXT_AES		"AES"
-#define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM		"AESGCM"
-#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128	"CAMELLIA128"
-#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256	"CAMELLIA256"
-#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA	"CAMELLIA"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_MD5		"MD5"
-#define SSL_TXT_SHA1		"SHA1"
-#define SSL_TXT_SHA		"SHA" /* same as "SHA1" */
-#define SSL_TXT_GOST94		"GOST94" 
-#define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC		"GOST89MAC" 
-#define SSL_TXT_SHA256		"SHA256"
-#define SSL_TXT_SHA384		"SHA384"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_SSLV2		"SSLv2"
-#define SSL_TXT_SSLV3		"SSLv3"
-#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1		"TLSv1"
-#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1		"TLSv1.1"
-#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2		"TLSv1.2"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_EXP		"EXP"
-#define SSL_TXT_EXPORT		"EXPORT"
-
-#define SSL_TXT_ALL		"ALL"
-
-/*
- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select)
- * ciphers normally not being used.
- * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers
- * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due
- * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
- * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection.
- * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments
- * to the default cipher setup will also be included here.
- *
- * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that
- * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed
- * for DEFAULT.
- */
-#define SSL_TXT_CMPALL		"COMPLEMENTOFALL"
-#define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF		"COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
-
-/* The following cipher list is used by default.
- * It also is substituted when an application-defined cipher list string
- * starts with 'DEFAULT'. */
-#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST	"ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
-/* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
- * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
- * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites!
- * (The latter are not actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable
- * some of them.)
- */
-
-/* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
-#define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN	1
-#define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN	2
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-#endif
-
-#define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1	X509_FILETYPE_ASN1
-#define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM	X509_FILETYPE_PEM
-
-/* This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the
- * 'struct ssl_st *' function parameters used to prototype callbacks
- * in SSL_CTX. */
-typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
-typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
-typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
-typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER;
-typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
-
-/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
-typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st
-       {
-       const char *name;
-       unsigned long id;
-       } SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
-
-typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn)(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
-typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
-struct ssl_cipher_st
-	{
-	int valid;
-	const char *name;		/* text name */
-	unsigned long id;		/* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
-
-	/* changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value 'algorithms' */
-	unsigned long algorithm_mkey;	/* key exchange algorithm */
-	unsigned long algorithm_auth;	/* server authentication */
-	unsigned long algorithm_enc;	/* symmetric encryption */
-	unsigned long algorithm_mac;	/* symmetric authentication */
-	unsigned long algorithm_ssl;	/* (major) protocol version */
-
-	unsigned long algo_strength;	/* strength and export flags */
-	unsigned long algorithm2;	/* Extra flags */
-	int strength_bits;		/* Number of bits really used */
-	int alg_bits;			/* Number of bits for algorithm */
-	};
-
-
-/* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */
-struct ssl_method_st
-	{
-	int version;
-	int (*ssl_new)(SSL *s);
-	void (*ssl_clear)(SSL *s);
-	void (*ssl_free)(SSL *s);
-	int (*ssl_accept)(SSL *s);
-	int (*ssl_connect)(SSL *s);
-	int (*ssl_read)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len);
-	int (*ssl_peek)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len);
-	int (*ssl_write)(SSL *s,const void *buf,int len);
-	int (*ssl_shutdown)(SSL *s);
-	int (*ssl_renegotiate)(SSL *s);
-	int (*ssl_renegotiate_check)(SSL *s);
-	long (*ssl_get_message)(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long
-		max, int *ok);
-	int (*ssl_read_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, 
-		int peek);
-	int (*ssl_write_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len);
-	int (*ssl_dispatch_alert)(SSL *s);
-	long (*ssl_ctrl)(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg);
-	long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg);
-	const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char)(const unsigned char *ptr);
-	int (*put_cipher_by_char)(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,unsigned char *ptr);
-	int (*ssl_pending)(const SSL *s);
-	int (*num_ciphers)(void);
-	const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher)(unsigned ncipher);
-	const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method)(int version);
-	long (*get_timeout)(void);
-	struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
-	int (*ssl_version)(void);
-	long (*ssl_callback_ctrl)(SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
-	long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
-	};
-
-/* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
- * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
- *	version 		INTEGER,	-- structure version number
- *	SSLversion 		INTEGER,	-- SSL version number
- *	Cipher 			OCTET STRING,	-- the 3 byte cipher ID
- *	Session_ID 		OCTET STRING,	-- the Session ID
- *	Master_key 		OCTET STRING,	-- the master key
- *	KRB5_principal		OCTET STRING	-- optional Kerberos principal
- *	Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT	OCTET STRING,	-- the optional Key argument
- *	Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT	INTEGER,	-- optional Start Time
- *	Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT	INTEGER,	-- optional Timeout ins seconds
- *	Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT	X509,		-- optional Peer Certificate
- *	Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- the Session ID context
- *	Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER,   -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
- *	HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,   -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension 
- *	PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
- *	PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING,  -- optional PSK identity
- *	Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
- *	Ticket [10]             EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
- *	Compression_meth [11]   EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
- *	SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
- *	}
- * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
- * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
- */
-struct ssl_session_st
-	{
-	int ssl_version;	/* what ssl version session info is
-				 * being kept in here? */
-
-	/* only really used in SSLv2 */
-	unsigned int key_arg_length;
-	unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH];
-	int master_key_length;
-	unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-	/* session_id - valid? */
-	unsigned int session_id_length;
-	unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
-	/* this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in
-	 * the appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this,
-	 * via SSL_new */
-	unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
-	unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
-        unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	char *psk_identity_hint;
-	char *psk_identity;
-#endif
-	/* Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed.
-	 * Applications can also set this bit for a new session via
-	 * not_resumable_session_cb to disable session caching and tickets. */
-	int not_resumable;
-
-	/* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
-	struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert;
-
-	/* This is the cert for the other end.
-	 * On clients, it will be the same as sess_cert->peer_key->x509
-	 * (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is not retained
-	 * in the external representation of sessions, see ssl_asn1.c). */
-	X509 *peer;
-	/* when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's certificate
-	 * is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */
-	long verify_result; /* only for servers */
-
-	int references;
-	long timeout;
-	long time;
-
-	unsigned int compress_meth;	/* Need to lookup the method */
-
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
-	unsigned long cipher_id;	/* when ASN.1 loaded, this
-					 * needs to be used to load
-					 * the 'cipher' structure */
-
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
-
-	CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
-
-	/* These are used to make removal of session-ids more
-	 * efficient and to implement a maximum cache size. */
-	struct ssl_session_st *prev,*next;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	char *tlsext_hostname;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-	unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */
-	size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
-	unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-	/* RFC4507 info */
-	unsigned char *tlsext_tick;	/* Session ticket */
-	size_t tlsext_ticklen;		/* Session ticket length */
-	long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;	/* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	char *srp_username;
-#endif
-
-	/* original_handshake_hash contains the handshake hash (either
-	 * SHA-1+MD5 or SHA-2, depending on TLS version) for the original, full
-	 * handshake that created a session. This is used by Channel IDs during
-	 * resumption. */
-	unsigned char original_handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned int original_handshake_hash_len;
-	};
-
-#endif
-
-#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG			0x00000001L
-#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG			0x00000002L
-/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
-#define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT			0x00000004L
-#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L
-#define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING				0x00000010L
-#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER		0x00000020L
-#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG			0x00000040L
-#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG			0x00000080L
-#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG				0x00000100L
-#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG			0x00000200L
-
-/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
-#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING			0x0
-/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */
-#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x0
-
-/* SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS is vestigial. Previously it disabled the
- * insertion of empty records in CBC mode, but the empty records were commonly
- * misinterpreted as EOF by other TLS stacks and so this was disabled by
- * SSL_OP_ALL.
- *
- * This has been replaced by 1/n-1 record splitting, which is enabled by
- * SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING in SSL_set_mode. This involves sending a
- * one-byte record rather than an empty record and has much better
- * compatibility. */
-#define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS              0x00000800L /* added in 0.9.6e */
-
-/* SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless.
- *             This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */
-#define SSL_OP_ALL					0x80000BFFL
-
-/* DTLS options */
-#define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU                 0x00001000L
-/* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */
-#define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE              0x00002000L
-/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
-#define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET	            0x00004000L
-/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client)  */
-#define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT		    0x00008000L
-
-/* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
-#define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION	0x00010000L
-/* Don't use compression even if supported */
-#define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION				0x00020000L
-/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
-#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION	0x00040000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
-#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE				0x00080000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
-#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE				0x00100000L
-/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
- * even when this violates protocol specs */
-#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA				0x00200000L
-/* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
- * preferences */
-#define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE			0x00400000L
-/* If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number
- * as latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0
- * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is
- * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */
-#define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG				0x00800000L
-
-#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2					0x01000000L
-#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3					0x02000000L
-#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1					0x04000000L
-#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2				0x08000000L
-#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1				0x10000000L
-
-/* These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay
- * zap so we have some more flags.
- */
-/* The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check
- * for the PKCS#1 attack */
-#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1				0x0
-#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2				0x0
-
-#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG			0x20000000L
-#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x40000000L
-/* Make server add server-hello extension from early version of
- * cryptopro draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. 
- * Required for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x 
- */
-#define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG			0x80000000L
-
-/* Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
- * when just a single record has been written): */
-#define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE       0x00000001L
-/* Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location
- * (buffer contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid
- * the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like
- * non-blocking write(): */
-#define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L
-/* Never bother the application with retries if the transport
- * is blocking: */
-#define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L
-/* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
-#define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L
-/* Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and
- * TLS only.)  "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
- * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
-#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
-
-/* Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
- * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
- * that require it.
- */
-#define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
-#define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
-/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
- * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
- * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
-#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
-
-/* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
- * and Finished.  This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
- * one RTT. */
-#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000200L
-
-/* When set, TLS 1.0 and SSLv3, multi-byte, CBC records will be split in two:
- * the first record will contain a single byte and the second will contain the
- * rest of the bytes. This effectively randomises the IV and prevents BEAST
- * attacks. */
-#define SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING 0x00000100L
-
-/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
- * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_get_options(ssl) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
-#define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
-
-#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-#define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL)
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
-#define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-#define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct srp_ctx_st
-	{
-	/* param for all the callbacks */
-	void *SRP_cb_arg;
-	/* set client Hello login callback */
-	int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *);
-	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
-	int (*SRP_verify_param_callback)(SSL *, void *);
-	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
-	char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback)(SSL *, void *);
-
-	char *login;
-	BIGNUM *N,*g,*s,*B,*A;
-	BIGNUM *a,*b,*v;
-	char *info;
-	int strength;
-
-	unsigned long srp_Mask;
-	} SRP_CTX;
-
-#endif
-
-/* see tls_srp.c */
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
-int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key);
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
-int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key);
-
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */
-#else
-#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */
-#endif
-
-#define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT	(1024*20)
-
-/* This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that set
- * them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in a
- * server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. Also,
- * callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique otherwise
- * the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do this using the
- * 'ssl' value they're passed by;
- *      SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len)
- * The length value passed in is set at the maximum size the session ID can be.
- * In SSLv2 this is 16 bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback
- * can alter this length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are
- * supposed to be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback
- * returns in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to
- * zero. */
-typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
-				unsigned int *id_len);
-
-typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-struct ssl_comp_st
-	{
-	int id;
-	const char *name;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_METHOD *method;
-#else
-	char *method;
-#endif
-	};
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
-DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
-
-struct ssl_ctx_st
-	{
-	const SSL_METHOD *method;
-
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
-	/* same as above but sorted for lookup */
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
-
-	struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
-	LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
-	/* Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
-	 * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */
-	unsigned long session_cache_size;
-	struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
-	struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
-
-	/* This can have one of 2 values, ored together,
-	 * SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
-	 * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER,
-	 * Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which means only
-	 * SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */
-	int session_cache_mode;
-
-	/* If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set
-	 * when SSL_new() is called.  This has been put in to make
-	 * life easier to set things up */
-	long session_timeout;
-
-	/* If this callback is not null, it will be called each
-	 * time a session id is added to the cache.  If this function
-	 * returns 1, it means that the callback will do a
-	 * SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.  Otherwise,
-	 * on 0, it means the callback has finished with it.
-	 * If remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when
-	 * a session-id is removed from the cache.  After the call,
-	 * OpenSSL will SSL_SESSION_free() it. */
-	int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess);
-	void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess);
-	SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
-		unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy);
-
-	struct
-		{
-		int sess_connect;	/* SSL new conn - started */
-		int sess_connect_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */
-		int sess_connect_good;	/* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
-		int sess_accept;	/* SSL new accept - started */
-		int sess_accept_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */
-		int sess_accept_good;	/* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
-		int sess_miss;		/* session lookup misses  */
-		int sess_timeout;	/* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
-		int sess_cache_full;	/* session removed due to full cache */
-		int sess_hit;		/* session reuse actually done */
-		int sess_cb_hit;	/* session-id that was not
-					 * in the cache was
-					 * passed back via the callback.  This
-					 * indicates that the application is
-					 * supplying session-id's from other
-					 * processes - spooky :-) */
-		} stats;
-
-	int references;
-
-	/* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
-	int (*app_verify_callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
-	void *app_verify_arg;
-	/* before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
-	 * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */
-
-	/* Default password callback. */
-	pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
-
-	/* Default password callback user data. */
-	void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
-
-	/* get client cert callback */
-	int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-
-	/* get channel id callback */
-	void (*channel_id_cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-
-    /* cookie generate callback */
-    int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, 
-        unsigned int *cookie_len);
-
-    /* verify cookie callback */
-    int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, 
-        unsigned int cookie_len);
-
-	CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-
-	const EVP_MD *rsa_md5;/* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */
-	const EVP_MD *md5;	/* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
-	const EVP_MD *sha1;   /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
-
-	STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
-
-
-	/* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
-
-	void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
-
-	/* what we put in client cert requests */
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
-
-
-	/* Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by SSL_new) */
-
-	unsigned long options;
-	unsigned long mode;
-	long max_cert_list;
-
-	struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
-	int read_ahead;
-
-	/* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
-	void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
-	void *msg_callback_arg;
-
-	int verify_mode;
-	unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
-	unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-	int (*default_verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
-
-	/* Default generate session ID callback. */
-	GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
-
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-
-#if 0
-	int purpose;		/* Purpose setting */
-	int trust;		/* Trust setting */
-#endif
-
-	int quiet_shutdown;
-
-	/* Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment.
-	 * actual record size can be more than this due to
-	 * padding and MAC overheads.
-	 */
-	unsigned int max_send_fragment;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	/* Engine to pass requests for client certs to
-	 */
-	ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* TLS extensions servername callback */
-	int (*tlsext_servername_callback)(SSL*, int *, void *);
-	void *tlsext_servername_arg;
-	/* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
-	unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
-	unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16];
-	unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16];
-	/* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
-	int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl,
-					unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
-					EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx,
- 					HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
-
-	/* certificate status request info */
-	/* Callback for status request */
-	int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
-	void *tlsext_status_arg;
-
-	/* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
-	int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
-	void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	char *psk_identity_hint;
-	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
-		unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-		unsigned int max_psk_len);
-	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-#define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
-	unsigned int freelist_max_len;
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* Next protocol negotiation information */
-	/* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-
-	/* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-	 * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-	int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-			                 unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-	void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-	/* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-	 * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-	int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-				    unsigned char *outlen,
-				    const unsigned char *in,
-				    unsigned int inlen,
-				    void *arg);
-	void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-# endif
-
-	/* ALPN information
-	 * (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.) */
-
-	/* For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
-	 * server to select the protocol for the connection.
-	 *   out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
-	 *        name (without the length prefix).
-	 *   outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|.
-	 *   in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
-	 *       wire-format.
-	 *   inlen: the length of |in|. */
-	int (*alpn_select_cb)(SSL *s,
-			      const unsigned char **out,
-			      unsigned char *outlen,
-			      const unsigned char* in,
-			      unsigned int inlen,
-			      void *arg);
-	void *alpn_select_cb_arg;
-
-	/* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
-	 * format. */
-	unsigned char* alpn_client_proto_list;
-	unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
-
-        /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
-        STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;  
-
-	/* If true, a client will advertise the Channel ID extension and a
-	 * server will echo it. */
-	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
-	/* tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new is a hack to support both old and new
-	 * ChannelID signatures. It indicates that a client should advertise the
-	 * new ChannelID extension number. */
-	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new;
-	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
-	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
-#endif
-	};
-
-#endif
-
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF			0x0000
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT			0x0001
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER			0x0002
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH	(SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR		0x0080
-/* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP	0x0100
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE	0x0200
-#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \
-	(SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
-
-LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
-/* SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
- * IDs from clients. Returns 1 on success. */
-#define SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess));
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess));
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy));
-SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy);
-void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val));
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*channel_id_cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
-#endif
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-					   int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-						      const unsigned char **out,
-						      unsigned int *outlen,
-						      void *arg),
-					   void *arg);
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
-				      int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-						 unsigned char **out,
-						 unsigned char *outlen,
-						 const unsigned char *in,
-						 unsigned int inlen,
-						 void *arg),
-				      void *arg);
-
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-			  const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
-			  const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s,
-				    const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len);
-
-#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED	0
-#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED	1
-#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP	2
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
-			    unsigned protos_len);
-int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
-			unsigned protos_len);
-void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
-				int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-					   const unsigned char **out,
-					   unsigned char *outlen,
-					   const unsigned char *in,
-					   unsigned int inlen,
-					   void *arg),
-				void *arg);
-void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
-			    unsigned *len);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-/* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
- * resulting identity/psk */
-#define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128
-#define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, 
-	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, 
-		char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-		unsigned int max_psk_len));
-void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, 
-	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, 
-		char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-		unsigned int max_psk_len));
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, 
-	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
-void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
-	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
-int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint);
-int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint);
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-#define SSL_NOTHING	1
-#define SSL_WRITING	2
-#define SSL_READING	3
-#define SSL_X509_LOOKUP	4
-#define SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP	5
-
-/* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
-#define SSL_want_nothing(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING)
-#define SSL_want_read(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
-#define SSL_want_write(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
-#define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
-#define SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP)
-
-#define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
-#define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-struct ssl_st
-	{
-	/* protocol version
-	 * (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, DTLS1_VERSION)
-	 */
-	int version;
-	int type; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
-
-	const SSL_METHOD *method; /* SSLv3 */
-
-	/* There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the
-	 * same.  This is so data can be read and written to different
-	 * handlers */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-	BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */
-	BIO *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */
-	BIO *bbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate
-		    * messages */
-#else
-	char *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */
-	char *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */
-	char *bbio;
-#endif
-	/* This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing
-	 * when a 0 or -1 is returned.  This is needed for
-	 * non-blocking IO so we know what request needs re-doing when
-	 * in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */
-	int rwstate;
-
-	/* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
-	int in_handshake;
-	int (*handshake_func)(SSL *);
-
-	/* Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is
-	 * switched as soon as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state
-	 * is called for the first time, so that "state" and
-	 * "handshake_func" are properly initialized.  But as
-	 * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this
-	 * test instead of an "init" member.
-	 */
-
-	int server;	/* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear*/
-
-	int new_session;/* Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
-	                 * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
-	                 * cached session or even the previous session unless
-	                 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
-	int quiet_shutdown;/* don't send shutdown packets */
-	int shutdown;	/* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02
-			 * for received */
-	int state;	/* where we are */
-	int rstate;	/* where we are when reading */
-
-	BUF_MEM *init_buf;	/* buffer used during init */
-	void *init_msg;   	/* pointer to handshake message body, set by ssl3_get_message() */
-	int init_num;		/* amount read/written */
-	int init_off;		/* amount read/written */
-
-	/* used internally to point at a raw packet */
-	unsigned char *packet;
-	unsigned int packet_length;
-
-	struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */
-	struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
-	struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
-
-	int read_ahead;		/* Read as many input bytes as possible
-	               	 	 * (for non-blocking reads) */
-
-	/* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
-	void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
-	void *msg_callback_arg;
-
-	int hit;		/* reusing a previous session */
-
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-
-#if 0
-	int purpose;		/* Purpose setting */
-	int trust;		/* Trust setting */
-#endif
-
-	/* crypto */
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
-
-	/* These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are
-	 * the ones to be 'copied' into these ones */
-	int mac_flags; 
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx;		/* cryptographic state */
-	EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;		/* used for mac generation */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_CTX *expand;			/* uncompress */
-#else
-	char *expand;
-#endif
-
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx;		/* cryptographic state */
-	EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash;		/* used for mac generation */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_CTX *compress;			/* compression */
-#else
-	char *compress;	
-#endif
-
-	/* session info */
-
-	/* client cert? */
-	/* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
-	struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
-
-	/* the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused
-	 * in the appropriate context */
-	unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
-	unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-
-	/* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
-	SSL_SESSION *session;
-
-        /* This can be disabled to prevent the use of uncached sessions */
-	int session_creation_enabled;
-
-	/* Default generate session ID callback. */
-	GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
-
-	/* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */
-	int verify_mode;	/* 0 don't care about verify failure.
-				 * 1 fail if verify fails */
-	int (*verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* fail if callback returns 0 */
-
-	void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* optional informational callback */
-
-	int error;		/* error bytes to be written */
-	int error_code;		/* actual code */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx;     /* Kerberos 5 context */
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	/* PSK identity hint is stored here only to enable setting a hint on an SSL object before an
-	 * SSL_SESSION is associated with it. Once an SSL_SESSION is associated with this SSL object,
-	 * the psk_identity_hint from the session takes precedence over this one. */
-	char *psk_identity_hint;
-	unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
-		unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-		unsigned int max_psk_len);
-	unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-		unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
-#endif
-
-	SSL_CTX *ctx;
-	/* set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read()
-	 * and SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */
-	int debug;	
-
-	/* extra application data */
-	long verify_result;
-	CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-
-	/* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
-
-	int references;
-	unsigned long options; /* protocol behaviour */
-	unsigned long mode; /* API behaviour */
-	long max_cert_list;
-	int first_packet;
-	int client_version;	/* what was passed, used for
-				 * SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
-	unsigned int max_send_fragment;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	/* TLS extension debug callback */
-	void (*tlsext_debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
-					unsigned char *data, int len,
-					void *arg);
-	void *tlsext_debug_arg;
-	char *tlsext_hostname;
-	int servername_done;   /* no further mod of servername 
-	                          0 : call the servername extension callback.
-	                          1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
-	                          2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
-	                       */
-	/* certificate status request info */
-	/* Status type or -1 if no status type */
-	int tlsext_status_type;
-	/* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
-	int tlsext_status_expected;
-	/* OCSP status request only */
-	STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids;
-	X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts;
-	/* OCSP response received or to be sent */
-	unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp;
-	int tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
-
-	/* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
-	int tlsext_ticket_expected;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-	unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* our list */
-	size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
-	unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* our list */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	/* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for handshakes */
-	void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input;
-	size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-	/* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
-	TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket;
-
-	/* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
-	tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb;
-	void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg;
-
-	/* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
-	tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb;
-	void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
-
-	SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-	 * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-	 * extensions.
-	 *
-	 * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-	 * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-	 * before the Finished message. */
-	unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-	unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-#endif
-
-#define session_ctx initial_ctx
-
-	STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;  /* What we'll do */
-	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;            /* What's been chosen */
-
-	unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat;  /* Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated?
-	                                   0: disabled
-	                                   1: enabled
-	                                   2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests
-	                                 */
-	unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
-	unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;     /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
-
-	/* Copied from the SSL_CTX. For a server, means that we'll accept
-	 * Channel IDs from clients. For a client, means that we'll advertise
-	 * support. */
-	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
-	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
-	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
-
-	/* For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
-	 * format. */
-	unsigned char* alpn_client_proto_list;
-	unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len;
-#else
-#define session_ctx ctx
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	int renegotiate;/* 1 if we are renegotiating.
-	                 * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
-	                 * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-#endif
-	};
-
-#endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/ssl2.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
-#include <openssl/tls1.h> /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
-#include <openssl/dtls1.h> /* Datagram TLS */
-#include <openssl/ssl23.h>
-#include <openssl/srtp.h>  /* Support for the use_srtp extension */
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* compatibility */
-#define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg)		(SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg))
-#define SSL_get_app_data(s)		(SSL_get_ex_data(s,0))
-#define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a)	(SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a))
-#define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s)	(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0))
-#define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)	(SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0))
-#define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg)	(SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg))
-
-/* The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are
- * used to indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment.
- * The macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use
- * and even then, only when using non-blocking IO.
- * It can also be useful to work out where you were when the connection
- * failed */
-
-#define SSL_ST_CONNECT			0x1000
-#define SSL_ST_ACCEPT			0x2000
-#define SSL_ST_MASK			0x0FFF
-#define SSL_ST_INIT			(SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL_ST_BEFORE			0x4000
-#define SSL_ST_OK			0x03
-#define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE		(0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
-
-#define SSL_CB_LOOP			0x01
-#define SSL_CB_EXIT			0x02
-#define SSL_CB_READ			0x04
-#define SSL_CB_WRITE			0x08
-#define SSL_CB_ALERT			0x4000 /* used in callback */
-#define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT		(SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
-#define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT		(SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
-#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP		(SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
-#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT		(SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
-#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP		(SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
-#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT		(SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
-#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START		0x10
-#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE		0x20
-
-/* Is the SSL_connection established? */
-#define SSL_get_state(a)		SSL_state(a)
-#define SSL_is_init_finished(a)		(SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
-#define SSL_in_init(a)			((SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) && \
-					!SSL_cutthrough_complete(a))
-#define SSL_in_before(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
-#define SSL_in_connect_init(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL_in_accept_init(a)		(SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s);
-
-/* The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail,
- * you should not need these */
-#define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER			0xF0
-#define SSL_ST_READ_BODY			0xF1
-#define SSL_ST_READ_DONE			0xF2
-
-/* Obtain latest Finished message
- *   -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
- *   -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
- * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */
-size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
-size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
-
-/* use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options
- * are 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */
-#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE			0x00
-#define SSL_VERIFY_PEER			0x01
-#define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT	0x02
-#define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE		0x04
-
-#define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms()	SSL_library_init()
-#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms()	SSL_library_init()
-
-/* this is for backward compatibility */
-#if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */
-#define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c)
-#define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n)	SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n)
-#define SSL_add_session(a,b)            SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b))
-#define SSL_remove_session(a,b)		SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b))
-#define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b)		SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b))
-#endif
-/* More backward compatibility */
-#define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-#define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
-#define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-#define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-#define SSL_get_time(a)		SSL_SESSION_get_time(a)
-#define SSL_set_time(a,b)	SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b))
-#define SSL_get_timeout(a)	SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a)
-#define SSL_set_timeout(a,b)	SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b))
-
-#define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
-#define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
-
-DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
-
-#define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET		1000 /* offset to get SSL_R_... value from SSL_AD_... */
-
-/* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
-#define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY		SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
-#define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE	SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC		SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC     /* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED	TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
-#define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW		TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
-#define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE	SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE	SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE		SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE /* Not for TLS */
-#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE		SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
-#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE	SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
-#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED	SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
-#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED	SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
-#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN	SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
-#define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER	SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER   /* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA		TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA	/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED		TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED	/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR		TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR	/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR		TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
-#define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION	TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION		TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR		TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR	/* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED		TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED
-#define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION		TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
-#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION	TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
-#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
-#define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME	TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
-#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
-#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
-#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY     TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
-#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
-
-#define SSL_ERROR_NONE			0
-#define SSL_ERROR_SSL			1
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ		2
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE		3
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP	4
-#define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL		5 /* look at error stack/return value/errno */
-#define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN		6
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT		7
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT		8
-#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP	9
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA			1
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA			2
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH			3
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH			4
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB			5
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB			6
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB		7
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED		8
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST	9
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS		10
-#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS	11
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS	12
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS			13
-#define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT		14
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK               15
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG           16
-
-/* only applies to datagram connections */
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU                17
-/* Stats */
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER			20
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT			21
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD		22
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE	23
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT			24
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD		25
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE	26
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT			27
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT			28
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES			29
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS			30
-#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL		31
-#define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS			32
-#define SSL_CTRL_MODE				33
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD			40
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD			41
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE		42
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE		43
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE		44
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE		45
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST		50
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST		51
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT		52
-
-/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB	53
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG	54
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME		55
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB		56
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG		57
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS		58
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS		59
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT	60
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB	61
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB	63
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG	64
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE	65
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS	66
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS	67
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS	68
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS	69
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP	70
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP	71
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB	72
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB	75
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB		76
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB		77
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG		78
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME		79
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH		80
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD		81
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-#define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT				85
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING		86
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS	87
-#endif
-#define SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID			88
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID			89
-#define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID			90
-#endif
-
-#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT		73
-#define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT	74
-#define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN			75
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT			76
-#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS			77
-#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE			78
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS		82
-#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS	83
-
-#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION		119
-
-#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
-#define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL)
-#define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer)
-
-#define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
-
-#define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
-#define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
-#define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
-
-/* SSL_enable_tls_channel_id either configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
- * IDs from clients, or configure a client to send TLS client IDs to server.
- * Returns 1 on success. */
-#define SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(s) \
-	SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
-/* SSL_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID to
- * compatible servers. private_key must be a P-256 EVP_PKEY*. Returns 1 on
- * success. */
-#define SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(s, private_key) \
-	SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
-#define SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(ctx, private_key) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
-/* SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server SSL*
- * and copies up to the first |channel_id_len| bytes into |channel_id|. The
- * Channel ID consists of the client's P-256 public key as an (x,y) pair where
- * each is a 32-byte, big-endian field element. Returns 0 if the client didn't
- * offer a Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise. */
-#define SSL_get_tls_channel_id(ctx, channel_id, channel_id_len) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID,channel_id_len,(void*)channel_id)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
-#define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client);
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to,BIO *from);
-void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio);
-
-#endif
-
-int	SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *,const char *str);
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
-void	SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
-long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx,long t);
-long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *);
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *,X509_STORE *);
-int SSL_want(const SSL *s);
-int	SSL_clear(SSL *s);
-
-void	SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx,long tm);
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
-int	SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits);
-char *	SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-const char *	SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-unsigned long 	SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-const char *	SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher);
-
-int	SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
-int	SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
-int	SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
-const char  * SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n);
-char *	SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
-int	SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL * s);
-int	SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
-const char *	SSL_authentication_method(const SSL *c);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-int	SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
-int	SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
-int	SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-void	SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio);
-BIO *	SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
-BIO *	SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
-#endif
-int	SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
-int	SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk);
-void	SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
-int	SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
-int	SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
-int	(*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *);
-void	SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
-		       int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx));
-void	SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int	SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
-#endif
-int	SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
-int	SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int	SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len);
-int	SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
-int	SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
-int	SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain);
-STACK_OF(X509) * SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int	SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-int	SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); /* PEM type */
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
-int	SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
-					    const char *file);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */
-int	SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
-					   const char *dir);
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-void	SSL_load_error_strings(void );
-const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s);
-long	SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-long	SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
-long	SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-long	SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
-void	SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const SSL *from);
-X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
-int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
-					unsigned int *len);
-const char *	SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int	SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-int	SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
-#endif
-void	SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
-int	i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp);
-int	SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
-void	SSL_set_session_creation_enabled(SSL *, int);
-int	SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
-int	SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c);
-int	SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
-int	SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
-int	SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
-					unsigned int id_len);
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a,const unsigned char **pp,
-			     long length);
-
-#ifdef HEADER_X509_H
-X509 *	SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *);
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,
-			int (*callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth);
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
-#endif
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len);
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	const unsigned char *d, long len);
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d);
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
-
-int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx);
-
-int	SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-				       unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-SSL *	SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int	SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-				   unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose);
-int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose);
-int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
-int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *name);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *password);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-					char *(*cb)(SSL *,void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-					  int (*cb)(SSL *,void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-				      int (*cb)(SSL *,int *,void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
-			     BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
-				const char *grp);
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
-char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-void	SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
-int 	SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
-int 	SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
-int 	SSL_read(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num);
-int 	SSL_peek(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num);
-int 	SSL_write(SSL *ssl,const void *buf,int num);
-long	SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void));
-long	SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void));
-
-int	SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int ret_code);
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
-
-/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void);		/* SSLv2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void);	/* SSLv2 */
-#endif
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);		/* SSLv3 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);	/* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.0 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void);		/* TLSv1.1 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.1 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.1 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);		/* TLSv1.2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void);	/* TLSv1.2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void);	/* TLSv1.2 */
-
-
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void);		/* DTLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void);	/* DTLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void);	/* DTLSv1.0 */
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
-int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s);
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x);
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x);
-
-void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s);
-void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s);
-
-long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_library_init(void );
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *,char *buf,int size);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk);
-
-SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl);
-
-X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
-/* EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl);
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode);
-int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode);
-int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
-void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode);
-int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
-	const char *CApath);
-#define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session /* just peek at pointer */
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */
-SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
-SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx);
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
-			   void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val));
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
-int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl);
-void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state);
-
-void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long v);
-long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
-
-int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl,int idx,void *data);
-void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl,int idx);
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-	CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx,void *data);
-void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx);
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-	CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx,void *data);
-void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx);
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-	CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void );
-
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
-#define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
-	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
-
-     /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-				  RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					     int keylength));
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,
-				  RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					     int keylength));
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-				 DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					   int keylength));
-void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,
-				 DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					   int keylength));
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-				 EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					   int keylength));
-void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
-				 EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-					   int keylength));
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp);
-STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,COMP_METHOD *cm);
-#else
-const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
-const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp);
-void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,void *cm);
-#endif
-
-/* TLS extensions functions */
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len);
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
-				  void *arg);
-
-/* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
-int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg);
-
-void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
-int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
-#endif
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
- * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
- */
-void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
-
-/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-#define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE			 100
-#define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED				 167
-#define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO				 101
-#define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY				 102
-#define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION				 103
-#define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE				 245
-#define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE				 104
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT				 246
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF			 295
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD			 247
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM			 316
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO			 248
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT				 249
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC					 250
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY			 251
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE				 252
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT		 253
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD				 254
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT			 297
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT				 305
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN			 255
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT			 288
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE		 256
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD			 257
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES				 258
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED				 259
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 260
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 261
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 262
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY			 263
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST		 264
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE		 265
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO			 266
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE		 267
-#define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES		 268
-#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED			 105
-#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO				 106
-#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY			 107
-#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED			 108
-#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO				 109
-#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY				 110
-#define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION				 111
-#define SSL_F_READ_N					 112
-#define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE			 113
-#define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH				 239
-#define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO				 114
-#define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY				 240
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT				 115
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO			 116
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT				 117
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO			 118
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO			 119
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK				 237
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_READ				 120
-#define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE				 121
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT				 122
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT				 123
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT				 124
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL		 241
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK					 234
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_READ					 125
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL			 236
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE			 126
-#define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE				 127
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT				 128
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF			 296
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL			 233
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE			 129
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM		 130
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO			 304
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO				 131
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT				 132
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL					 213
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL				 133
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS		 293
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC		 292
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC					 134
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK			 238
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 135
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS			 289
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY			 136
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID			 317
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 137
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO			 138
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 139
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED				 140
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE			 141
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE				 142
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET		 283
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO			 306
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD				 143
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE		 144
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE			 145
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO			 146
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC			 285
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET			 287
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN			 147
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK					 235
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES				 148
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N				 149
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 150
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID			 318
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 151
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 152
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY			 153
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE		 154
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO			 242
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE		 155
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK			 157
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER			 156
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER			 291
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES				 158
-#define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING			 159
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 298
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 277
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT		 307
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK	 215
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK	 216
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 299
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 278
-#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT		 308
-#define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD				 160
-#define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST			 161
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP				 221
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST				 222
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE			 214
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW				 162
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY			 163
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 280
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG		 279
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR		 230
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT			 231
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR					 164
-#define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD		 165
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST			 166
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL					 232
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY			 168
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES			 309
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW				 169
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST			 269
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE		 290
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE			 226
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT		 219
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION			 170
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST				 229
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE			 171
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1		 172
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE	 220
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE		 173
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY			 174
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1		 175
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE		 176
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT		 272
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY			 177
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1		 178
-#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE		 179
-#define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE				 180
-#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION			 181
-#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION			 217
-#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT			 182
-#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY			 317
-#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY				 183
-#define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER			 184
-#define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE			 185
-#define SSL_F_SSL_NEW					 186
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 300
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 302
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT	 310
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 301
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 303
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT	 311
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK					 270
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 281
-#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 282
-#define SSL_F_SSL_READ					 223
-#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT			 187
-#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT			 188
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW				 189
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP			 190
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT		 312
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW				 225
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT				 191
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST			 271
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD				 192
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY				 193
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE				 227
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD				 194
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION				 195
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT		 218
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT		 294
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST				 228
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD				 196
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN				 224
-#define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT				 313
-#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION		 243
-#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION			 197
-#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION		 244
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE			 198
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1			 199
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN			 2000
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE			 200
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY			 201
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1			 202
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE			 203
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT			 273
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY			 204
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1		 205
-#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE		 206
-#define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN			 207
-#define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE					 208
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC			 286
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE			 209
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 274
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC					 210
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL		 314
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT				 315
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 275
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT		 276
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF					 284
-#define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK			 211
-#define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING				 212
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-#define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE			 100
-#define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272
-#define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD				 101
-#define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE			 102
-#define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC			 103
-#define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM				 104
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK		 106
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION				 107
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH				 108
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH			 109
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH				 110
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH				 111
-#define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE				 112
-#define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT				 304
-#define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE			 305
-#define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT				 306
-#define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH			 332
-#define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST				 105
-#define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH				 271
-#define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE				 113
-#define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH				 333
-#define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE				 114
-#define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH				 115
-#define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER		 116
-#define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH		 316
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT			 117
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT				 118
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT				 119
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH				 120
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH			 121
-#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE				 122
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE				 123
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH				 347
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH				 348
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH				 349
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH				 350
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS			 371
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH				 351
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE			 352
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST		 353
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE				 124
-#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH			 125
-#define SSL_R_BAD_STATE					 126
-#define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY				 127
-#define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET				 128
-#define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG			 129
-#define SSL_R_BN_LIB					 130
-#define SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY		 376
-#define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 131
-#define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG				 132
-#define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY			 133
-#define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED			 134
-#define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 135
-#define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT			 136
-#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256			 375
-#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID		 371
-#define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH			 137
-#define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE		 138
-#define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR			 139
-#define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT			 226
-#define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG		 140
-#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED			 343
-#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE			 141
-#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE	 307
-#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR			 142
-#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT		 143
-#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET			 144
-#define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH				 308
-#define SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG				 379
-#define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED		 145
-#define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
-#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
-#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC	 281
-#define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG		 148
-#define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED			 149
-#define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG			 334
-#define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID			 309
-#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT		 317
-#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING			 318
-#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE	 322
-#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE	 323
-#define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER		 310
-#define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST	 354
-#define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 150
-#define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY		 282
-#define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST		 151
-#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED		 377
-#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED			 378
-#define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE			 152
-#define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE			 153
-#define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS			 154
-#define SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS		 372
-#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS		 355
-#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION		 356
-#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
-#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
-#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
-#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK			 373
-#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 341
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE				 374
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE				 278
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME			 357
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE			 328
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH		 325
-#define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST				 279
-#define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG				 284
-#define SSL_R_KRB5					 285
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC				 286
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED				 287
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT				 288
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ				 289
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET				 290
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT				 291
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ				 292
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED			 293
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV				 294
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW				 295
-#define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH				 159
-#define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT				 160
-#define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG				 274
-#define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS			 161
-#define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG				 296
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT			 162
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY				 163
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT			 164
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT			 165
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY			 166
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY		 167
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE			 168
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT		 169
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT			 170
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM				 358
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY			 171
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY			 311
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY			 172
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY			 173
-#define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE			 174
-#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS			 346
-#define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET			 175
-#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED			 176
-#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED			 177
-#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED			 178
-#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET			 179
-#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED			 180
-#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE			 181
-#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED				 182
-#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED			 183
-#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST				 184
-#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH				 185
-#define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD			 331
-#define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED			 186
-#define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED			 187
-#define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER		 330
-#define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED			 188
-#define SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT				 373
-#define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY				 189
-#define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED			 190
-#define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE			 191
-#define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY				 192
-#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION				 339
-#define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST			 324
-#define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER				 193
-#define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES				 359
-#define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK			 194
-#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX				 195
-#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED			 196
-#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED		 197
-#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
-#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE		 297
-#define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG			 327
-#define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 198
-#define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT				 227
-#define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG				 270
-#define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE		 199
-#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR				 200
-#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE			 201
-#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE			 202
-#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER			 203
-#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE	 204
-#define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 205
-#define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS		 206
-#define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN			 207
-#define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND			 223
-#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB				 224
-#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB				 225
-#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR			 208
-#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA			 209
-#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA			 210
-#define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET				 211
-#define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED			 312
-#define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE			 212
-#define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 213
-#define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE				 214
-#define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL				 298
-#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG			 335
-#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR		 336
-#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH			 337
-#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING			 215
-#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING	 342
-#define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO		 216
-#define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO			 217
-#define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO		 218
-#define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING		 345
-#define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT			 275
-#define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED		 277
-#define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED		 2000
-#define SSL_R_SHORT_READ				 219
-#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR		 360
-#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE	 220
-#define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC				 361
-#define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES		 362
-#define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG	 363
-#define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE		 364
-#define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE		 221
-#define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG		 299
-#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT		 321
-#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME		 319
-#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE		 320
-#define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG			 300
-#define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT			 222
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE		 1042
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC		 1020
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED		 1045
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED		 1044
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN		 1046
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE		 1030
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE		 1040
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER		 1047
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE		 1041
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE		 1010
-#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE	 1043
-#define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION	 228
-#define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE			 229
-#define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS		 230
-#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED		 301
-#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT			 302
-#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG		 273
-#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH		 303
-#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT		 231
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED			 1049
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR			 1050
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED		 1021
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR			 1051
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION		 1060
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	 1086
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY		 1071
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR		 1080
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION		 1100
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION		 1070
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW		 1022
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA			 1048
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED		 1090
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE		 1114
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE	 1113
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE		 1111
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME			 1112
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION		 1110
-#define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER	 232
-#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT		 365
-#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING			 366
-#define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL		 367
-#define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST		 157
-#define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
-#define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG	 234
-#define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER		 235
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS			 236
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS		 313
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY		 237
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS		 238
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS		 314
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS	 239
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD			 240
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES		 241
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES		 242
-#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES		 243
-#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE			 244
-#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD				 245
-#define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED				 276
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE			 246
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE			 247
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED			 248
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE			 249
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST				 368
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE			 250
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE				 251
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL				 252
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE			 253
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION			 254
-#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE				 255
-#define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED	 338
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER			 256
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 257
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE			 326
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE		 315
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL			 258
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION			 259
-#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE			 329
-#define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED			 369
-#define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET				 260
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED			 261
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE			 262
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS			 263
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH			 264
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE			 265
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE			 370
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION				 266
-#define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER			 267
-#define SSL_R_X509_LIB					 268
-#define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS		 269
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
deleted file mode 100644
index eb25dcb0..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl2.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL2_H 
-#define HEADER_SSL2_H 
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* Protocol Version Codes */
-#define SSL2_VERSION		0x0002
-#define SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR	0x00
-#define SSL2_VERSION_MINOR	0x02
-/* #define SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION	0x0002 */
-/* #define SSL2_SERVER_VERSION	0x0002 */
-
-/* Protocol Message Codes */
-#define SSL2_MT_ERROR			0
-#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO		1
-#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY	2
-#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED		3
-#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO		4
-#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY		5
-#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED		6
-#define SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE	7
-#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE	8
-
-/* Error Message Codes */
-#define SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR		0x0000
-#define SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER		0x0001
-#define SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE		0x0002
-#define SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE		0x0004
-#define SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x0006
-
-/* Cipher Kind Values */
-#define SSL2_CK_NULL_WITH_MD5			0x02000000 /* v3 */
-#define SSL2_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5		0x02010080
-#define SSL2_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	0x02020080
-#define SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		0x02030080
-#define SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	0x02040080
-#define SSL2_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		0x02050080
-#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5		0x02060040
-#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA		0x02060140 /* v3 */
-#define SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5	0x020700c0
-#define SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA	0x020701c0 /* v3 */
-#define SSL2_CK_RC4_64_WITH_MD5			0x02080080 /* MS hack */
- 
-#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CFB64_WITH_MD5_1		0x02ff0800 /* SSLeay */
-#define SSL2_CK_NULL				0x02ff0810 /* SSLeay */
-
-#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CFB64_WITH_MD5_1	"DES-CFB-M1"
-#define SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5			"NULL-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5		"RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	"EXP-RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		"RC2-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	"EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5		"IDEA-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5		"DES-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA		"DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5	"DES-CBC3-MD5"
-#define SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA	"DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_64_WITH_MD5		"RC4-64-MD5"
-
-#define SSL2_TXT_NULL				"NULL"
-
-/* Flags for the SSL_CIPHER.algorithm2 field */
-#define SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC			0x01
-#define SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC			0x02
-
-/* Certificate Type Codes */
-#define SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE		0x01
-
-/* Authentication Type Code */
-#define SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION		0x01
-
-#define SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH		32
-
-/* Upper/Lower Bounds */
-#define SSL2_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH_IN_BITS	256
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MPE
-#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER	29998u
-#else
-#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER	32767u  /* 2^15-1 */
-#endif
-#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER	16383 /* 2^14-1 */
-
-#define SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	16
-/*#define SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	32 */
-#define SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	16
-#define SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	32
-#define SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH	16
-#define SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH	16
-#define SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH	16
-#define SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	32
-#define SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH	16
-#define SSL2_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH	24
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
-#define  CERT		char
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct ssl2_state_st
-	{
-	int three_byte_header;
-	int clear_text;		/* clear text */
-	int escape;		/* not used in SSLv2 */
-	int ssl2_rollback;	/* used if SSLv23 rolled back to SSLv2 */
-
-	/* non-blocking io info, used to make sure the same
-	 * args were passwd */
-	unsigned int wnum;	/* number of bytes sent so far */
-	int wpend_tot;
-	const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
-
-	int wpend_off;	/* offset to data to write */
-	int wpend_len; 	/* number of bytes passwd to write */
-	int wpend_ret; 	/* number of bytes to return to caller */
-
-	/* buffer raw data */
-	int rbuf_left;
-	int rbuf_offs;
-	unsigned char *rbuf;
-	unsigned char *wbuf;
-
-	unsigned char *write_ptr;/* used to point to the start due to
-				  * 2/3 byte header. */
-
-	unsigned int padding;
-	unsigned int rlength; /* passed to ssl2_enc */
-	int ract_data_length; /* Set when things are encrypted. */
-	unsigned int wlength; /* passed to ssl2_enc */
-	int wact_data_length; /* Set when things are decrypted. */
-	unsigned char *ract_data;
-	unsigned char *wact_data;
-	unsigned char *mac_data;
-
-	unsigned char *read_key;
-	unsigned char *write_key;
-
-		/* Stuff specifically to do with this SSL session */
-	unsigned int challenge_length;
-	unsigned char challenge[SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int conn_id_length;
-	unsigned char conn_id[SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH];
-	unsigned int key_material_length;
-	unsigned char key_material[SSL2_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH*2];
-
-	unsigned long read_sequence;
-	unsigned long write_sequence;
-
-	struct	{
-		unsigned int conn_id_length;
-		unsigned int cert_type;	
-		unsigned int cert_length;
-		unsigned int csl; 
-		unsigned int clear;
-		unsigned int enc; 
-		unsigned char ccl[SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH];
-		unsigned int cipher_spec_length;
-		unsigned int session_id_length;
-		unsigned int clen;
-		unsigned int rlen;
-		} tmp;
-	} SSL2_STATE;
-
-#endif
-
-/* SSLv2 */
-/* client */
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A		(0x10|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B		(0x11|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A		(0x20|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B		(0x21|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A	(0x30|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B	(0x31|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A		(0x40|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B		(0x41|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A	(0x50|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B	(0x51|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C	(0x52|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D	(0x53|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A		(0x60|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B		(0x61|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A		(0x70|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B		(0x71|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION		(0x80|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE	(0x90|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* server */
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A		(0x10|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B		(0x11|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C		(0x12|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A		(0x20|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B		(0x21|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A		(0x30|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B		(0x31|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A		(0x40|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B		(0x41|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C		(0x42|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A		(0x50|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B		(0x51|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A		(0x60|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B		(0x61|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A	(0x70|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B	(0x71|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C	(0x72|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D	(0x73|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION		(0x80|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE	(0x90|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h
deleted file mode 100644
index d3228983..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl23.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL23_H 
-#define HEADER_SSL23_H 
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*client */
-/* write to server */
-#define SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A	(0x210|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B	(0x211|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* read from server */
-#define SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A	(0x220|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B	(0x221|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-
-/* server */
-/* read from client */
-#define SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A	(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B	(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
deleted file mode 100644
index cba94345..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,741 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl3.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H 
-#define HEADER_SSL3_H 
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
- * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
-#define SSL3_CK_SCSV				0x030000FF
-
-/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
- * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
-#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV			0x03005600
-
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5			0x03000001
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA			0x03000002
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 			0x03000003
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5			0x03000004
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA			0x03000005
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5			0x03000006
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA		0x03000007
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x03000008
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x03000009
-#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA		0x0300000A
-
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x0300000B
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x0300000C
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 	0x0300000D
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x0300000E
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x0300000F
-#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 	0x03000010
-
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x03000011
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x03000012
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA	0x03000013
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x03000014
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x03000015
-#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA	0x03000016
-
-#define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5			0x03000017
-#define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5			0x03000018
-#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA		0x03000019
-#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x0300001A
-#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA		0x0300001B
-
-#if 0
-	#define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA		0x0300001C
-	#define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA			0x0300001D
-	#if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe
-		 to remove according to David Hopwood <david.hopwood@zetnet.co.uk>
-		 of the ietf-tls list */
-	#define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA			0x0300001E
-	#endif
-#endif
-
-/*    VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
- */
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA		0x0300001E
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA		0x0300001F
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA		0x03000020
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA	       	0x03000021
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5       	0x03000022
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5       	0x03000023
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5	       	0x03000024
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 		0x03000025
-
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 		0x03000026
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 		0x03000027
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA	 		0x03000028
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 		0x03000029
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 		0x0300002A
-#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5	 		0x0300002B
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5			"NULL-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA			"NULL-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 		"EXP-RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5		"RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA		"RC4-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5			"EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA		"IDEA-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA		"DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 	"DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 	"DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA	"EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA	"EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5			"EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5		"ADH-RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA		"EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA		"ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-#if 0
-	#define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA		"FZA-NULL-SHA"
-	#define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA		"FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA"
-	#define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA		"FZA-RC4-SHA"
-#endif
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA		"KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA		"KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA		"KRB5-RC4-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA	       	"KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5       	"KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5       	"KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5		"KRB5-RC4-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 		"KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5"
-
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 		"EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 		"EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA	 	"EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 		"EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 		"EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5	 	"EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5"
-
-#define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH		32
-#define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH		32
-
-#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE			48
-#define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE			32
-#define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE			32
-#define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH			5
-
-#ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- /* Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's
-  * not actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least
-  * 64-bit aligned pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes
-  * 3 bytes in either case. Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these
-  * wasted bytes from the end of allocated region to its front,
-  * but makes data payload aligned, which improves performance:-) */
-# define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD			8
-#else
-# if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0
-#  error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD"
-#  undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library.
- * Currently maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for
- * future extension for 512-bit hashes.
- */
-
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE			64
-
-/* Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES.
- */
-
-#define	SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE		16
-
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA			(16384)
-
-/* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH		16384
-/* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD		1024
-
-/* The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes.
- * In practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum
- * number of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size.
- */
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD	(256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
-
-/* OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so
- * the send overhead is smaller.
- */
-
-#define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
-			(SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
-
-/* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-#else
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH	\
-		(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
-#endif
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH	\
-		(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
-#define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE		\
-		(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-
-#define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST	"\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
-#define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST	"\x53\x52\x56\x52"
-
-#define SSL3_VERSION			0x0300
-#define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR		0x00
-
-#define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC	20
-#define SSL3_RT_ALERT			21
-#define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE		22
-#define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA	23
-#define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT		24
-
-#define SSL3_AL_WARNING			1
-#define SSL3_AL_FATAL			2
-
-#define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY		 0
-#define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE	10	/* fatal */
-#define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC		20	/* fatal */
-#define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE	30	/* fatal */
-#define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE	40	/* fatal */
-#define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE		41
-#define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE		42
-#define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE	43
-#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED	44
-#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED	45
-#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN	46
-#define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER	47	/* fatal */
-
-#define TLS1_HB_REQUEST		1
-#define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE	2
-	
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct ssl3_record_st
-	{
-/*r */	int type;               /* type of record */
-/*rw*/	unsigned int length;    /* How many bytes available */
-/*r */	unsigned int off;       /* read/write offset into 'buf' */
-/*rw*/	unsigned char *data;    /* pointer to the record data */
-/*rw*/	unsigned char *input;   /* where the decode bytes are */
-/*r */	unsigned char *comp;    /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
-/*r */  unsigned long epoch;    /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
-/*r */  unsigned char seq_num[8]; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
-	} SSL3_RECORD;
-
-typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf;     /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes,
-	                         * see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
-	size_t len;             /* buffer size */
-	int offset;             /* where to 'copy from' */
-	int left;               /* how many bytes left */
-	} SSL3_BUFFER;
-
-#endif
-
-#define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN			1
-#define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN			2
-#define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH			3
-#define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH			4
-#define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH		5
-#define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH		6
-#define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS			20
-/* SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large
- * enough to contain all of the cert types defined either for
- * SSLv3 and TLSv1.
- */
-#define SSL3_CT_NUMBER			9
-
-
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS	0x0001
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED	0x0002
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER			0x0004
-#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
-#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
-#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
- 
-/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
- * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
- * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
- * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
- * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
- * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
- * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
- * effected, but we can't prevent that.
- */
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE		0x0040
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct ssl3_state_st
-	{
-	long flags;
-	int delay_buf_pop_ret;
-
-	unsigned char read_sequence[8];
-	int read_mac_secret_size;
-	unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char write_sequence[8];
-	int write_mac_secret_size;
-	unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
-	unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-	unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-
-	/* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
-	int need_record_splitting;
-	int record_split_done;
-
-	/* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
-	int init_extra;
-
-	SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;	/* read IO goes into here */
-	SSL3_BUFFER wbuf;	/* write IO goes into here */
-
-	SSL3_RECORD rrec;	/* each decoded record goes in here */
-	SSL3_RECORD wrec;	/* goes out from here */
-
-	/* storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not
-	 * yet processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */
-	unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
-	unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
-	unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
-	unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
-
-	/* partial write - check the numbers match */
-	unsigned int wnum;	/* number of bytes sent so far */
-	int wpend_tot;		/* number bytes written */
-	int wpend_type;
-	int wpend_ret;		/* number of bytes submitted */
-	const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
-
-	/* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
-	BIO *handshake_buffer;
-	/* When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed
-	 * and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
-	 * this array */
-	EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
-	/* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
-	 * come in when we are not looking for one */
-	int change_cipher_spec;
-
-	int warn_alert;
-	int fatal_alert;
-	/* we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding,
-	 * send close alert via the warning alert */
-	int alert_dispatch;
-	unsigned char send_alert[2];
-
-	/* This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when
-	 * there is no more data in the read or write buffers */
-	int renegotiate;
-	int total_renegotiations;
-	int num_renegotiations;
-
-	int in_read_app_data;
-
-	/* Opaque PRF input as used for the current handshake.
-	 * These fields are used only if TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input is defined
-	 * (otherwise, they are merely present to improve binary compatibility) */
-	void *client_opaque_prf_input;
-	size_t client_opaque_prf_input_len;
-	void *server_opaque_prf_input;
-	size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
-	struct	{
-		/* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
-		unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-
-		/* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
-		unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-		int finish_md_len;
-		unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-		int peer_finish_md_len;
-
-		unsigned long message_size;
-		int message_type;
-
-		/* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
-		const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-		DH *dh;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */
-#endif
-
-		/* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */
-		int next_state;			
-
-		int reuse_message;
-
-		/* used for certificate requests */
-		int cert_req;
-		int ctype_num;
-		char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
-		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
-
-		int use_rsa_tmp;
-
-		int key_block_length;
-		unsigned char *key_block;
-
-		const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
-		const EVP_MD *new_hash;
-		int new_mac_pkey_type;
-		int new_mac_secret_size;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
-#else
-		char *new_compression;
-#endif
-		int cert_request;
-		} tmp;
-
-        /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
-        unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
-        unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
-        int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
-	int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
-	 * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
-	 * on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
-	char is_probably_safari;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-	/* In a client, this means that the server supported Channel ID and that
-	 * a Channel ID was sent. In a server it means that we echoed support
-	 * for Channel IDs and that tlsext_channel_id will be valid after the
-	 * handshake. */
-	char tlsext_channel_id_valid;
-	/* tlsext_channel_id_new means that the updated Channel ID extension
-	 * was negotiated. This is a temporary hack in the code to support both
-	 * forms of Channel ID extension while we transition to the new format,
-	 * which fixed a security issue. */
-	char tlsext_channel_id_new;
-	/* For a server:
-	 *     If |tlsext_channel_id_valid| is true, then this contains the
-	 *     verified Channel ID from the client: a P256 point, (x,y), where
-	 *     each are big-endian values. */
-	unsigned char tlsext_channel_id[64];
-
-	/* ALPN information
-	 * (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.) */
-
-	/* In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
-	 * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the
-	 * protocol that the server selected once the ServerHello has been
-	 * processed. */
-	unsigned char *alpn_selected;
-	unsigned alpn_selected_len;
-
-	/* These point to the digest function to use for signatures made with
-	 * each type of public key. A NULL value indicates that the default
-	 * digest should be used, which is SHA1 as of TLS 1.2.
-	 *
-	 * (These should be in the tmp member, but we have to put them here to
-	 * ensure binary compatibility with earlier OpenSSL 1.0.* releases.) */
-	const EVP_MD *digest_rsa;
-	const EVP_MD *digest_dsa;
-	const EVP_MD *digest_ecdsa;
-	} SSL3_STATE;
-
-#endif
-
-/* SSLv3 */
-/*client */
-/* extra state */
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH		(0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE	(0x101|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK			(0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK			(0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#endif	
-/* write to server */
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A		(0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B		(0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* read from server */
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A		(0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B		(0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A		(0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B		(0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A		(0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B		(0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A		(0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B		(0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A		(0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B		(0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* write to server */
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A		(0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B		(0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C		(0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D		(0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A		(0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B		(0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A		(0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A		(0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#endif
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* read from server */
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A		(0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B		(0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A	(0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B	(0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A	(0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B	(0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-
-/* server */
-/* extra state */
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH		(0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK			(0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK			(0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#endif	
-/* read from client */
-/* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A		(0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B		(0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C		(0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* write to client */
-#define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A		(0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B		(0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C		(0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A		(0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B		(0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A		(0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B		(0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A		(0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B		(0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A		(0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B		(0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A		(0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B		(0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* read from client */
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A		(0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B		(0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A		(0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B		(0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A		(0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#endif
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT	(0x1BF|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x220|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x221|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* write to client */
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A		(0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B		(0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A		(0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B		(0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A	(0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B	(0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A	(0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B	(0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-
-#define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST			0
-#define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO			1
-#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO			2
-#define	SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET		4
-#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE			11
-#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE		12
-#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		13
-#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE			14
-#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY		15
-#define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		16
-#define SSL3_MT_FINISHED			20
-#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS		22
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO			67
-#endif
-#define SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS		203
-#define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
-
-
-#define SSL3_MT_CCS				1
-
-/* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */
-#define SSL3_CC_READ		0x01
-#define SSL3_CC_WRITE		0x02
-#define SSL3_CC_CLIENT		0x10
-#define SSL3_CC_SERVER		0x20
-#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE	(SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE)	
-#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ	(SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ)
-#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ	(SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ)
-#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE	(SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c34d197..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_algs.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-int SSL_library_init(void)
-	{
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
-#endif
-#endif  
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
-	/* Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work
-	 * if an application only calls SSL_library_init().
-	 */
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
-#endif
-
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
-	EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
-#endif
-  
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl3-md5");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1,"ssl3-sha1");
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption,SN_sha1WithRSA);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss1()); /* DSA with sha1 */
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,SN_dsaWithSHA1_2);
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"DSS1");
-	EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"dss1");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_ecdsa());
-#endif
-	/* If you want support for phased out ciphers, add the following */
-#if 0
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha());
-	EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	/* This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms.
-	   The value returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can
-	   be discarded safely */
-	(void)SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
-#endif
-	/* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
-	ssl_load_ciphers();
-	return(1);
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f83e18f8..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,669 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_asn1.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st
-	{
-	ASN1_INTEGER version;
-	ASN1_INTEGER ssl_version;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING key_arg;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-	ASN1_INTEGER time;
-	ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
-	ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname;
-	ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING original_handshake_hash;
-	} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
-
-int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
-	{
-#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
-	int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0,v7=0,v8=0,v14=0;
-	unsigned char buf[4],ibuf1[LSIZE2],ibuf2[LSIZE2];
-	unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2],ibuf4[LSIZE2],ibuf5[LSIZE2];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	int v6=0,v9=0,v10=0;
-	unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	unsigned char cbuf;
-	int v11=0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	int v12=0;
-#endif
-	long l;
-	SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
-	M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
-
-	if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
-		return(0);
-
-	/* Note that I cheat in the following 2 assignments.  I know
-	 * that if the ASN1_INTEGER passed to ASN1_INTEGER_set
-	 * is > sizeof(long)+1, the buffer will not be re-OPENSSL_malloc()ed.
-	 * This is a bit evil but makes things simple, no dynamic allocation
-	 * to clean up :-) */
-	a.version.length=LSIZE2;
-	a.version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-	a.version.data=ibuf1;
-	ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.version),SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION);
-
-	a.ssl_version.length=LSIZE2;
-	a.ssl_version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-	a.ssl_version.data=ibuf2;
-	ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.ssl_version),in->ssl_version);
-
-	a.cipher.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-	a.cipher.data=buf;
-
-	if (in->cipher == NULL)
-		l=in->cipher_id;
-	else
-		l=in->cipher->id;
-	if (in->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
-		{
-		a.cipher.length=3;
-		buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xff;
-		buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xff;
-		buf[2]=((unsigned char)(l     ))&0xff;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		a.cipher.length=2;
-		buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>8L))&0xff;
-		buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l    ))&0xff;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (in->compress_meth)
-		{
-		cbuf = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
-		a.comp_id.length = 1;
-		a.comp_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.comp_id.data = &cbuf;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	a.master_key.length=in->master_key_length;
-	a.master_key.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-	a.master_key.data=in->master_key;
-
-	a.session_id.length=in->session_id_length;
-	a.session_id.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-	a.session_id.data=in->session_id;
-
-	a.session_id_context.length=in->sid_ctx_length;
-	a.session_id_context.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-	a.session_id_context.data=in->sid_ctx;
-
-	a.key_arg.length=in->key_arg_length;
-	a.key_arg.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-	a.key_arg.data=in->key_arg;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
-		{
-		a.krb5_princ.length=in->krb5_client_princ_len;
-		a.krb5_princ.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.krb5_princ.data=in->krb5_client_princ;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-	if (in->time != 0L)
-		{
-		a.time.length=LSIZE2;
-		a.time.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-		a.time.data=ibuf3;
-		ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.time),in->time);
-		}
-
-	if (in->timeout != 0L)
-		{
-		a.timeout.length=LSIZE2;
-		a.timeout.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-		a.timeout.data=ibuf4;
-		ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.timeout),in->timeout);
-		}
-
-	if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
-		{
-		a.verify_result.length=LSIZE2;
-		a.verify_result.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-		a.verify_result.data=ibuf5;
-		ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result,in->verify_result);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (in->tlsext_hostname)
-                {
-                a.tlsext_hostname.length=strlen(in->tlsext_hostname);
-                a.tlsext_hostname.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-                a.tlsext_hostname.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname;
-                }
-	if (in->tlsext_tick)
-                {
-                a.tlsext_tick.length= in->tlsext_ticklen;
-                a.tlsext_tick.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-                a.tlsext_tick.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick;
-                }
-	if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
-		{
-		a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length=LSIZE2;
-		a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-		a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data=ibuf6;
-		ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (in->psk_identity_hint)
-		{
-		a.psk_identity_hint.length=strlen(in->psk_identity_hint);
-		a.psk_identity_hint.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.psk_identity_hint.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity_hint);
-		}
-	if (in->psk_identity)
-		{
-		a.psk_identity.length=strlen(in->psk_identity);
-		a.psk_identity.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.psk_identity.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
-		}
-
-	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
-		{
-		a.original_handshake_hash.length = in->original_handshake_hash_len;
-		a.original_handshake_hash.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.original_handshake_hash.data = in->original_handshake_hash;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (in->srp_username)
-		{
-		a.srp_username.length=strlen(in->srp_username);
-		a.srp_username.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-		a.srp_username.data=(unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version),		i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version),	i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ),	i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-	if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (in->time != 0L)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
-	if (in->timeout != 0L)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
-	if (in->peer != NULL)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,v4);
-	if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
-      	 	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
-	if (in->tlsext_tick)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
-	if (in->tlsext_hostname)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (in->compress_meth)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11,v11);
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (in->psk_identity_hint)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
-	if (in->psk_identity)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (in->srp_username)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12,v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
-
-	M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
-
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version),		i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.ssl_version),	i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key),		i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ),	i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-	if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0);
-	if (in->time != 0L)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
-	if (in->timeout != 0L)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
-	if (in->peer != NULL)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,
-			       v4);
-	if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result,i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (in->tlsext_hostname)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (in->psk_identity_hint)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
-	if (in->psk_identity)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
-      	 	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
-	if (in->tlsext_tick)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (in->compress_meth)
-        	M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11,v11);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (in->srp_username)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12,v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
-		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
-	M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
-	}
-
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
-			     long length)
-	{
-	int ssl_version=0,i;
-	long id;
-	ASN1_INTEGER ai,*aip;
-	ASN1_OCTET_STRING os,*osp;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,SSL_SESSION *,SSL_SESSION_new);
-
-	aip= &ai;
-	osp= &os;
-
-	M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
-	M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
-
-	ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
-
-	/* we don't care about the version right now :-) */
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
-	ssl_version=(int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
-	ret->ssl_version=ssl_version;
-	if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
-
-	os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (os.length != 3)
-			{
-			c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
-			c.line=__LINE__;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		id=0x02000000L|
-			((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<16L)|
-			((unsigned long)os.data[1]<< 8L)|
-			 (unsigned long)os.data[2];
-		}
-	else if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-		{
-		if (os.length != 2)
-			{
-			c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
-			c.line=__LINE__;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		id=0x03000000L|
-			((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<8L)|
-			 (unsigned long)os.data[1];
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		c.error=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
-		c.line=__LINE__;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	ret->cipher=NULL;
-	ret->cipher_id=id;
-
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-		i=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-	else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */
-		i=SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-
-	if (os.length > i)
-		os.length = i;
-	if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
-		os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
-
-	ret->session_id_length=os.length;
-	OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
-	memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
-
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
-		ret->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-	else
-		ret->master_key_length=os.length;
-	memcpy(ret->master_key,os.data,ret->master_key_length);
-
-	os.length=0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	os.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-        	if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
-            		ret->krb5_client_princ_len=0;
-		else
-			ret->krb5_client_princ_len=os.length;
-		memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ,os.data,ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->krb5_client_princ_len=0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-	if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
-		ret->key_arg_length=SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
-	else
-		ret->key_arg_length=os.length;
-	memcpy(ret->key_arg,os.data,ret->key_arg_length);
-	if (os.data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-
-	ai.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,1);
-	if (ai.data != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->time=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
-		OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-
-	ai.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,2);
-	if (ai.data != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->timeout=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
-		OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->timeout=3;
-
-	if (ret->peer != NULL)
-		{
-		X509_free(ret->peer);
-		ret->peer=NULL;
-		}
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(ret->peer,d2i_X509,3);
-
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4);
-
-	if(os.data != NULL)
-	    {
-	    if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
-		{
-		c.error=SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
-		c.line=__LINE__;
-		goto err;
-		}
-	    else
-		{
-		ret->sid_ctx_length=os.length;
-		memcpy(ret->sid_ctx,os.data,os.length);
-		}
-	    OPENSSL_free(os.data); os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
-	    }
-	else
-	    ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
-
-	ai.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,5);
-	if (ai.data != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->verify_result=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
-		OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->tlsext_hostname=NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
-
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->psk_identity=NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	ai.length=0;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,9);
-	if (ai.data != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
-		OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
-		}
-	else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length)
-		ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1;
-	else
-		ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=0;
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->tlsext_tick = os.data;
-		ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->tlsext_tick=NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->compress_meth = os.data[0];
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,12);
-	if (os.data)
-		{
-		ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		os.length = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ret->srp_username=NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-
-	os.length=0;
-	os.data=NULL;
-	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14);
-	if (os.data && os.length < (int)sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash))
-		{
-		memcpy(ret->original_handshake_hash, os.data, os.length);
-		ret->original_handshake_hash_len = os.length;
-		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-		os.data = NULL;
-		}
-
-	M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
deleted file mode 100644
index bc4150b0..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,833 +0,0 @@
-/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
-	{
-	static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
-
-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
-	if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-		
-		if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
-			{
-			ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
-				0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	
-	return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
-	}
-
-CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
-	{
-	CERT *ret;
-
-	ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-
-	ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-	ret->references=1;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
-	{
-	CERT *ret;
-	int i;
-
-	ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-	memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
-	ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
-	/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
-	 * if you find that more readable */
-
-	ret->valid = cert->valid;
-	ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
-	ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
-	ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
-	ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		{
-		RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
-		ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
-		}
-	ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
-		{
-		ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
-		if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
-			{
-			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
-			if (!b)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
-			}
-		if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
-			{
-			BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
-			if (!b)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
-			}
-		}
-	ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
-		{
-		ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
-		if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			{
-			ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
-			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
-				CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-			}
-		
-		if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			{
-			ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
-			CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
-				CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
-			switch(i) 
-				{
-				/* If there was anything special to do for
-				 * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
-				 * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
-			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have an RSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
-				/* We have a DSA key. */
-				break;
-				
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
-			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
-				/* We have a DH key. */
-				break;
-
-			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
-				/* We have an ECC key */
-				break;
-
-			default:
-				/* Can't happen. */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	
-	/* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
-	 * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
-
-	ret->references=1;
-
-	return(ret);
-	
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
-err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
-		DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
-		if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-		}
-
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-
-void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if(c == NULL)
-	    return;
-
-	i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
-#endif
-	if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
-	for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
-		if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#if 0
-		if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
-#endif
-		}
-	OPENSSL_free(c);
-	}
-
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
-	{
-	/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
-	 * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
-	 * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
-	 * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
-	 * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
-	 * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
-	 * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
-	 * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
-	 */
-	
-	if (o == NULL) 
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (*o == NULL)
-		{
-		if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
-	{
-	SESS_CERT *ret;
-
-	ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-
-	memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
-	ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-	ret->references = 1;
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
-#endif
-	if (i > 0)
-		return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* i == 0 */
-	if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		{
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
-	   * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
-	   * data structure. */
-		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-			EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
-		DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
-		EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_free(sc);
-	}
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
-	{
-	sc->peer_cert_type = type;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-	{
-	X509 *x;
-	int i;
-	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
-		return(0);
-
-	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
-	if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-#if 0
-	if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
-#endif
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
-
-	/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
-	 * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
-	 * or vice versa.
-	 */
-
-	X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
-				s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
-	/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
-	 * ctx.
-	 */
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-
-	if (s->verify_callback)
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-
-	if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
-		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); 
-#else
-		i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
-#endif
-	else
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
-		i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-#else
-		i=0;
-		ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
-#endif
-		}
-
-	s->verify_result=ctx.error;
-	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	return(i);
-	}
-
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	if (*ca_list != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
-
-	*ca_list=name_list;
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
-	{
-	int i;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
-	X509_NAME *name;
-
-	ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
-	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-		{
-		name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
-		if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
-			{
-			sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
-			return(NULL);
-			}
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-	{
-	set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(ctx->client_CA);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-		{ /* we are in the client */
-		if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
-			(s->s3 != NULL))
-			return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
-		else
-			return(NULL);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->client_CA != NULL)
-			return(s->client_CA);
-		else
-			return(s->ctx->client_CA);
-		}
-	}
-
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
-	{
-	X509_NAME *name;
-
-	if (x == NULL) return(0);
-	if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-		
-	if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
-		return(0);
-
-	if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
-		{
-		X509_NAME_free(name);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
-	{
-	return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
-	{
-	return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
-	}
-
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
-	{
-	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/*!
- * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
- * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
- * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
- * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
- * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
- * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
- */
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
-	{
-	BIO *in;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
-
-	sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
-		goto err;
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
-			break;
-		if (ret == NULL)
-			{
-			ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
-			if (ret == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
-		/* check for duplicates */
-		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
-		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
-			X509_NAME_free(xn);
-		else
-			{
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-err:
-		if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
-		ret=NULL;
-		}
-	if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (ret != NULL)
-		ERR_clear_error();
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-/*!
- * Add a file of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to add to.
- * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
- * already in the stack will be added.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
-
-int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
-					const char *file)
-	{
-	BIO *in;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-	int ret=1;
-	int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
-	
-	oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
-	
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	
-	if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
-		goto err;
-	
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
-			break;
-		if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
-		xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
-		if (xn == NULL) goto err;
-		if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
-			X509_NAME_free(xn);
-		else
-			sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
-		}
-
-	ERR_clear_error();
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-err:
-		ret=0;
-		}
-	if(in != NULL)
-		BIO_free(in);
-	if(x != NULL)
-		X509_free(x);
-	
-	(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/*!
- * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to append to.
- * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
- * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
- * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
- * included.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
-
-int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
-				       const char *dir)
-	{
-	OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
-	const char *filename;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-
-	/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
-
-	while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
-		{
-		char buf[1024];
-		int r;
-
-		if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
-#else
-		r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
-#endif
-		if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
-			goto err;
-		if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (errno)
-		{
-		SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
-		ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cd9f1082..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1925 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX		0
-#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX	1
-#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX		2
-#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX		3
-#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX	4
-#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX	5
-#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX	6
-#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX	7
-#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX	8
-#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX	9
-#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX	10
-#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX    	11
-#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX	12
-#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX	13
-#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX		14
-
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]={
-	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
-	};
-
-#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX	0
-#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX	1
-#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX	2
-
-static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods=NULL;
-
-#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX	0
-#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX	1
-#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
-#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
-#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
-#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
-/*Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be 
- * defined in the
- * ssl_locl.h */
-#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX	SSL_MAX_DIGEST 
-static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
-	};
-/* PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because
- * implementation is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if
- * corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is found 
- */
-static int  ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,NID_undef,
-	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC
-	};
-
-static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	0,0,0,0,0,0
-	};
-
-static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5,SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
-	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384
-	};
-
-#define CIPHER_ADD	1
-#define CIPHER_KILL	2
-#define CIPHER_DEL	3
-#define CIPHER_ORD	4
-#define CIPHER_SPECIAL	5
-
-typedef struct cipher_order_st
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
-	int active;
-	int dead;
-	struct cipher_order_st *next,*prev;
-	} CIPHER_ORDER;
-
-static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
-	/* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_ALL,0,     0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	/* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_CMPALL,0,  0,0,SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in ALL!) */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_CMPDEF,0,  SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* key exchange aliases
-	 * (some of those using only a single bit here combine
-	 * multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs,
-	 * e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kRSA,0,    SSL_kRSA,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kDHr,0,    SSL_kDHr,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kDHd,0,    SSL_kDHd,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kDH,0,     SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kEDH,0,    SSL_kEDH,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_DH,0,      SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kKRB5,0,   SSL_kKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDHr,0,  SSL_kECDHr,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDHe,0,  SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDH,0,   SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kEECDH,0,  SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_ECDH,0,    SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-        {0,SSL_TXT_kPSK,0,    SSL_kPSK,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kSRP,0,    SSL_kSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_kGOST,0, SSL_kGOST,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* server authentication aliases */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aRSA,0,    0,SSL_aRSA,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aDSS,0,    0,SSL_aDSS,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_DSS,0,     0,SSL_aDSS,   0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aKRB5,0,   0,SSL_aKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aNULL,0,   0,SSL_aNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aDH,0,     0,SSL_aDH,   0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aECDH,0,   0,SSL_aECDH, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aECDSA,0,  0,SSL_aECDSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_ECDSA,0,   0,SSL_aECDSA, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-        {0,SSL_TXT_aPSK,0,    0,SSL_aPSK,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0,    0,SSL_aSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0,     SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EECDH,0,   SSL_kEECDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_NULL,0,    0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_KRB5,0,    SSL_kKRB5,SSL_aKRB5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_RSA,0,     SSL_kRSA,SSL_aRSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_ADH,0,     SSL_kEDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AECDH,0,   SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-        {0,SSL_TXT_PSK,0,     SSL_kPSK,SSL_aPSK,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SRP,0,     SSL_kSRP,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-
-	/* symmetric encryption aliases */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_DES,0,     0,0,SSL_DES,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_3DES,0,    0,0,SSL_3DES,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_RC4,0,     0,0,SSL_RC4,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_RC2,0,     0,0,SSL_RC2,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_IDEA,0,    0,0,SSL_IDEA,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SEED,0,    0,0,SSL_SEED,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_eNULL,0,   0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES128,0,  0,0,SSL_AES128|SSL_AES128GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES256,0,  0,0,SSL_AES256|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES,0,     0,0,SSL_AES,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_AES_GCM,0, 0,0,SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA   ,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* MAC aliases */	
-	{0,SSL_TXT_MD5,0,     0,0,0,SSL_MD5,   0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA1,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA1,  0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA,0,     0,0,0,SSL_SHA1,  0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST94,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST94,  0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST89MAC,  0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA256,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA256,  0,0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA384,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA384,  0,0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* protocol version aliases */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV2,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV2, 0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV3,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV3, 0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1, 0,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1_2, 0,0,0,0},
-
-	/* export flag */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EXPORT,0,  0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
-
-	/* strength classes */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP40,0,   0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP40, 0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP56,0,   0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP56, 0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_LOW,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_LOW,   0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_MEDIUM,0,  0,0,0,0,0,SSL_MEDIUM,0,0,0},
-	{0,SSL_TXT_HIGH,0,    0,0,0,0,0,SSL_HIGH,  0,0,0},
-	/* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
-	{0,SSL_TXT_FIPS,0,    0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,SSL_FIPS,  0,0,0},
-	};
-/* Search for public key algorithm with given name and 
- * return its pkey_id if it is available. Otherwise return 0
- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-
-static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
-	{
-	const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
-	int pkey_id=0;
-	ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL,pkey_name,-1);
-	if (ameth) 
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
-		}		
-	return pkey_id;
-	}
-
-#else
-
-static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
-	{
-	const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
-	ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
-	int pkey_id=0;
-	ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng,pkey_name,-1);
-	if (ameth)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
-		}
-	if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
-	return pkey_id;
-	}
-
-#endif
-
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
-	{
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX]= 
-		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX]= 
-		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]= 
-		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc);
-#else
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]= NULL;
-#endif
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
-
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm);
-	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX]=
-	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm);
-
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
-	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
-		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
-	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
-		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
-	OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
-	if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX])
-		{	
-		ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
-			EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
-		OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
-		}
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
-		ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
-		if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
-			ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=32;
-		}		
-
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256);
-	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
-		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]);
-	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
-		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384);
-	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
-		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]);
-	}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-
-static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP * const *a,
-			const SSL_COMP * const *b)
-	{
-	return((*a)->id-(*b)->id);
-	}
-
-static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
-	{
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
-
-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-	if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-		
-		if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
-			{
-			SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-
-			MemCheck_off();
-			ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
-			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
-				{
-				comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
-				if (comp != NULL)
-					{
-					comp->method=COMP_zlib();
-					if (comp->method
-						&& comp->method->type == NID_undef)
-						OPENSSL_free(comp);
-					else
-						{
-						comp->id=SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
-						comp->name=comp->method->name;
-						sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
-						}
-					}
-					sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
-				}
-			MemCheck_on();
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
-	     const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size,SSL_COMP **comp)
-	{
-	int i;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-
-	c=s->cipher;
-	if (c == NULL) return(0);
-	if (comp != NULL)
-		{
-		SSL_COMP ctmp;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		load_builtin_compressions();
-#endif
-
-		*comp=NULL;
-		ctmp.id=s->compress_meth;
-		if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
-			{
-			i=sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,&ctmp);
-			if (i >= 0)
-				*comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods,i);
-			else
-				*comp=NULL;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) return(0);
-
-	switch (c->algorithm_enc)
-		{
-	case SSL_DES:
-		i=SSL_ENC_DES_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_3DES:
-		i=SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_RC4:
-		i=SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_RC2:
-		i=SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_IDEA:
-		i=SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_eNULL:
-		i=SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES128:
-		i=SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES256:
-		i=SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
-		i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
-		i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
-		i=SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_SEED:
-		i=SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES128GCM:
-		i=SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES256GCM:
-		i=SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX;
-		break;
-	default:
-		i= -1;
-		break;
-		}
-
-	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
-		*enc=NULL;
-	else
-		{
-		if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
-			*enc=EVP_enc_null();
-		else
-			*enc=ssl_cipher_methods[i];
-		}
-
-	switch (c->algorithm_mac)
-		{
-	case SSL_MD5:
-		i=SSL_MD_MD5_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA1:
-		i=SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA256:
-		i=SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA384:
-		i=SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_GOST94:
-		i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
-		break;
-	case SSL_GOST89MAC:
-		i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX;
-		break;
-	default:
-		i= -1;
-		break;
-		}
-	if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
-	{
-		*md=NULL; 
-		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
-		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0;
-		if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
-			mac_pkey_type = NULL;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		*md=ssl_digest_methods[i];
-		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
-		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
-	}
-
-	if ((*enc != NULL) &&
-	    (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) &&
-	    (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
-		{
-		const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
-
-		if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
-		    s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
-			return 1;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (FIPS_mode())
-			return 1;
-#endif
-
-		if	(c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
-			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
-			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
-			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
-		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
-			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
-			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
-			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
-		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
-			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
-			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
-			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
-		return(1);
-		}
-	else
-		return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md) 
-{
-	if (idx <0||idx>=SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) 
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-	*mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
-	if (*mask)
-		*md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
-	else
-		*md = NULL;
-	return 1;
-}
-
-#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
-	(((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
-
-static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
-	     CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
-	{
-	if (curr == *tail) return;
-	if (curr == *head)
-		*head=curr->next;
-	if (curr->prev != NULL)
-		curr->prev->next=curr->next;
-	if (curr->next != NULL)
-		curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
-	(*tail)->next=curr;
-	curr->prev= *tail;
-	curr->next=NULL;
-	*tail=curr;
-	}
-
-static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
-	     CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
-	{
-	if (curr == *head) return;
-	if (curr == *tail)
-		*tail=curr->prev;
-	if (curr->next != NULL)
-		curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
-	if (curr->prev != NULL)
-		curr->prev->next=curr->next;
-	(*head)->prev=curr;
-	curr->next= *head;
-	curr->prev=NULL;
-	*head=curr;
-	}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac, unsigned long *ssl)
-	{
-	*mkey = 0;
-	*auth = 0;
-	*enc = 0;
-	*mac = 0;
-	*ssl = 0;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	*mkey |= SSL_kRSA;
-	*auth |= SSL_aRSA;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	*auth |= SSL_aDSS;
-#endif
-	*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd; /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-	*auth |= SSL_aDH;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH;
-	*auth |= SSL_aDH;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	*mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
-	*auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	*auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	*mkey |= SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kECDHr;
-	*auth |= SSL_aECDH;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	*mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
-	*auth |= SSL_aPSK;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	*mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
-#endif
-	/* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
-	 * do not present, disable  appropriate auth and key exchange */
-	if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
-		*auth |= SSL_aGOST94;
-	}
-	if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) {
-		*auth |= SSL_aGOST01;
-	}
-	/* Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */
-	if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) {
-		*mkey |= SSL_kGOST;
-	}	
-#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
-	*enc |= SSL_eNULL;
-#endif
-		
-
-
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_DES :0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 :0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 :0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:0;
-	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED:0;
-
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 :0;
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1:0;
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256:0;
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384:0;
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94:0;
-	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]==NID_undef)? SSL_GOST89MAC:0;
-
-	}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
-                int num_of_ciphers,
-                unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
-                unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
-                unsigned long disabled_ssl,
-                CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
-                CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-	{
-	int i, co_list_num;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-
-	/*
-	 * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
-	 * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
-	 * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
-	 * entries.
-	 */
-
-	/* Get the initial list of ciphers */
-	co_list_num = 0;	/* actual count of ciphers */
-	for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++)
-		{
-		c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
-		/* drop those that use any of that is not available */
-		if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		    (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) &&
-#endif
-		    !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
-		    !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
-		    !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
-		    !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) &&
-		    !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl))
-			{
-			co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
-			co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
-			co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
-			co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
-			co_list_num++;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-			printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-			/*
-			if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
-			*/
-			}
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * Prepare linked list from list entries
-	 */	
-	if (co_list_num > 0)
-		{
-		co_list[0].prev = NULL;
-
-		if (co_list_num > 1)
-			{
-			co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
-			
-			for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++)
-				{
-				co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
-				co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
-				}
-
-			co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
-			}
-		
-		co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
-
-		*head_p = &co_list[0];
-		*tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
-		}
-	}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
-                        int num_of_group_aliases,
-                        unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
-                        unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
-                        unsigned long disabled_ssl,
-			CIPHER_ORDER *head)
-	{
-	CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
-	const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
-	int i;
-	unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
-	unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
-	unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
-	unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
-	unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl;
-
-	/*
-	 * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
-	 */
-	ciph_curr = head;
-	ca_curr = ca_list;
-	while (ciph_curr != NULL)
-		{
-		*ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
-		ca_curr++;
-		ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
-	 * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
-	 * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
-	 * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
-	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++)
-		{
-		unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
-		unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
-		unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
-		unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
-		unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl;
-
-		if (algorithm_mkey)
-			if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
-				continue;
-	
-		if (algorithm_auth)
-			if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
-				continue;
-		
-		if (algorithm_enc)
-			if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
-				continue;
-		
-		if (algorithm_mac)
-			if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
-				continue;
-		
-		if (algorithm_ssl)
-			if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0)
-				continue;
-		
-		*ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
-		ca_curr++;
-		}
-
-	*ca_curr = NULL;	/* end of list */
-	}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
-                unsigned long alg_mkey, unsigned long alg_auth,
-                unsigned long alg_enc, unsigned long alg_mac,
-                unsigned long alg_ssl,
-		unsigned long algo_strength,
-		int rule, int strength_bits,
-		CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-	{
-	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
-	int reverse = 0;
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
-		rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
-#endif
-
-	if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
-		reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */
-
-	head = *head_p;
-	tail = *tail_p;
-
-	if (reverse)
-		{
-		next = tail;
-		last = head;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		next = head;
-		last = tail;
-		}
-
-	curr = NULL;
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		if (curr == last) break;
-
-		curr = next;
-
-		if (curr == NULL) break;
-
-		next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
-
-		cp = curr->cipher;
-
-		/*
-		 * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
-		 * or the algorithms used.
-		 */
-		if (strength_bits >= 0)
-			{
-			if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
-				continue;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
-#endif
-
-			if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
-				continue;
-			if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
-				continue;
-			if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
-				continue;
-			if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
-				continue;
-			if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl))
-				continue;
-			if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
-				continue;
-			if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
-				continue;
-			}
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-		printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
-#endif
-
-		/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
-		if (rule == CIPHER_ADD)
-			{
-			/* reverse == 0 */
-			if (!curr->active)
-				{
-				ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
-				curr->active = 1;
-				}
-			}
-		/* Move the added cipher to this location */
-		else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD)
-			{
-			/* reverse == 0 */
-			if (curr->active)
-				{
-				ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
-				}
-			}
-		else if	(rule == CIPHER_DEL)
-			{
-			/* reverse == 1 */
-			if (curr->active)
-				{
-				/* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
-				 * for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
-				 * works in reverse to maintain the order) */
-				ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
-				curr->active = 0;
-				}
-			}
-		else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL)
-			{
-			/* reverse == 0 */
-			if (head == curr)
-				head = curr->next;
-			else
-				curr->prev->next = curr->next;
-			if (tail == curr)
-				tail = curr->prev;
-			curr->active = 0;
-			if (curr->next != NULL)
-				curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
-			if (curr->prev != NULL)
-				curr->prev->next = curr->next;
-			curr->next = NULL;
-			curr->prev = NULL;
-			}
-		}
-
-	*head_p = head;
-	*tail_p = tail;
-	}
-
-static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
-				    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-	{
-	int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
-	CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
-
-	/*
-	 * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
-	 * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
-	 * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
-	 */
-	max_strength_bits = 0;
-	curr = *head_p;
-	while (curr != NULL)
-		{
-		if (curr->active &&
-		    (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
-		    max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
-		curr = curr->next;
-		}
-
-	number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
-	if (!number_uses)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
-
-	/*
-	 * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
-	 */
-	curr = *head_p;
-	while (curr != NULL)
-		{
-		if (curr->active)
-			number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
-		curr = curr->next;
-		}
-	/*
-	 * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
-	 * order.
-	 */
-	for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
-		if (number_uses[i] > 0)
-			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, tail_p);
-
-	OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
-                CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
-                const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list)
-	{
-	unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength;
-	const char *l, *buf;
-	int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
-	unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
-	char ch;
-
-	retval = 1;
-	l = rule_str;
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		ch = *l;
-
-		if (ch == '\0')
-			break;		/* done */
-		if (ch == '-')
-			{ rule = CIPHER_DEL; l++; }
-		else if (ch == '+')
-			{ rule = CIPHER_ORD; l++; }
-		else if (ch == '!')
-			{ rule = CIPHER_KILL; l++; }
-		else if (ch == '@')
-			{ rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; l++; }
-		else
-			{ rule = CIPHER_ADD; }
-
-		if (ITEM_SEP(ch))
-			{
-			l++;
-			continue;
-			}
-
-		alg_mkey = 0;
-		alg_auth = 0;
-		alg_enc = 0;
-		alg_mac = 0;
-		alg_ssl = 0;
-		algo_strength = 0;
-
-		for (;;)
-			{
-			ch = *l;
-			buf = l;
-			buflen = 0;
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-			while (	((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
-				((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
-				((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
-				 (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
-#else
-			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
-#endif
-				 {
-				 ch = *(++l);
-				 buflen++;
-				 }
-
-			if (buflen == 0)
-				{
-				/*
-				 * We hit something we cannot deal with,
-				 * it is no command or separator nor
-				 * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
-				 */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
-				       SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
-				retval = found = 0;
-				l++;
-				break;
-				}
-
-			if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
-				{
-				found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
-				break;	/* special treatment */
-				}
-
-			/* check for multi-part specification */
-			if (ch == '+')
-				{
-				multi=1;
-				l++;
-				}
-			else
-				multi=0;
-
-			/*
-			 * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
-			 * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
-			 * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
-			 * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
-			 * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
-			 * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
-			 * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
-			 * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
-			 * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
-			 */
-			j = found = 0;
-			cipher_id = 0;
-			while (ca_list[j])
-				{
-				if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
-				    (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0'))
-					{
-					found = 1;
-					break;
-					}
-				else
-					j++;
-				}
-
-			if (!found)
-				break;	/* ignore this entry */
-
-			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey)
-				{
-				if (alg_mkey)
-					{
-					alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
-					if (!alg_mkey) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
-				}
-
-			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth)
-				{
-				if (alg_auth)
-					{
-					alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
-					if (!alg_auth) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
-				}
-			
-			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc)
-				{
-				if (alg_enc)
-					{
-					alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
-					if (!alg_enc) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
-				}
-						
-			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac)
-				{
-				if (alg_mac)
-					{
-					alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
-					if (!alg_mac) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
-				}
-			
-			if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
-				{
-				if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
-					{
-					algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) | ~SSL_EXP_MASK;
-					if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK;
-				}
-
-			if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
-				{
-				if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
-					{
-					algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
-					if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
-					}
-				else
-					algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
-				}
-			
-			if (ca_list[j]->valid)
-				{
-				/* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version
-				 * does not become part of the search pattern!*/
-
-				cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				/* not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
-				 * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern */
-
-				if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl)
-					{
-					if (alg_ssl)
-						{
-						alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
-						if (!alg_ssl) { found = 0; break; }
-						}
-					else
-						alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
-					}
-				}
-			
-			if (!multi) break;
-			}
-
-		/*
-		 * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
-		 */
-		if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
-			{	/* special command */
-			ok = 0;
-			if ((buflen == 8) &&
-				!strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8))
-				ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
-			else
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
-					SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
-			if (ok == 0)
-				retval = 0;
-			/*
-			 * We do not support any "multi" options
-			 * together with "@", so throw away the
-			 * rest of the command, if any left, until
-			 * end or ':' is found.
-			 */
-			while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
-				l++;
-			}
-		else if (found)
-			{
-			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
-				alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength,
-				rule, -1, head_p, tail_p);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
-				l++;
-			}
-		if (*l == '\0') break; /* done */
-		}
-
-	return(retval);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
-		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
-		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
-		const char *rule_str)
-	{
-	int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
-	unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
-	const char *rule_p;
-	CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
-	const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
-
-	/*
-	 * Return with error if nothing to do.
-	 */
-	if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-
-	/*
-	 * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
-	 * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
-	 */
-	ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc, &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl);
-
-	/*
-	 * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
-	 * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
-	 * it is used for allocation.
-	 */
-	num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
-	if (co_list == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);	/* Failure */
-		}
-
-	ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
-	                           disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl,
-	                           co_list, &head, &tail);
-
-
-	/* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */
-
-	/* Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key exchange mechanisms */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* Low priority for MD5 */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* Move anonymous ciphers to the end.  Usually, these will remain disabled.
-	 * (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but we prefer
-	 * authenticated ciphers.) */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-	/* ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-	/* Now sort by symmetric encryption strength.  The above ordering remains
-	 * in force within each class */
-	if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-
-	/* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
-	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
-
-
-	/*
-	 * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
-	 * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
-	 * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
-	 * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
-	 * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
-	 * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
-	 */
-	num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
-	num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
-	ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
-	if (ca_list == NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(NULL);	/* Failure */
-		}
-	ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
-	                           disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
-				   disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head);
-
-	/*
-	 * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
-	 * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
-	 */
-	ok = 1;
-	rule_p = rule_str;
-	if (strncmp(rule_str,"DEFAULT",7) == 0)
-		{
-		ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
-			&head, &tail, ca_list);
-		rule_p += 7;
-		if (*rule_p == ':')
-			rule_p++;
-		}
-
-	if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
-		ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
-
-	OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list);	/* Not needed anymore */
-
-	if (!ok)
-		{	/* Rule processing failure */
-		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	
-	/*
-	 * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
-	 * if we cannot get one.
-	 */
-	if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
-	 * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
-	 */
-	for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next)
-		{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (curr->active && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
-#else
-		if (curr->active)
-#endif
-			{
-			sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-			printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
-#endif
-			}
-		}
-	OPENSSL_free(co_list);	/* Not needed any longer */
-
-	tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
-	if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
-		{
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-	if (*cipher_list != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
-	*cipher_list = cipherstack;
-	if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
-	*cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
-	(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-
-	sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
-	return(cipherstack);
-	}
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
-	{
-	int is_export,pkl,kl;
-	const char *ver,*exp_str;
-	const char *kx,*au,*enc,*mac;
-	unsigned long alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl,alg2;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
-#else
-	static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
-	alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
-	alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
-
-	alg2=cipher->algorithm2;
-
-	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
-	pkl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
-	kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
-	exp_str=is_export?" export":"";
-	
-	if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
-		ver="SSLv2";
-	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
-		ver="SSLv3";
-	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2)
-		ver="TLSv1.2";
-	else
-		ver="unknown";
-
-	switch (alg_mkey)
-		{
-	case SSL_kRSA:
-		kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)"):"RSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kDHr:
-		kx="DH/RSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kDHd:
-		kx="DH/DSS";
-		break;
-        case SSL_kKRB5:
-		kx="KRB5";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kEDH:
-		kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)"):"DH";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kECDHr:
-		kx="ECDH/RSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kECDHe:
-		kx="ECDH/ECDSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kEECDH:
-		kx="ECDH";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kPSK:
-		kx="PSK";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kSRP:
-		kx="SRP";
-		break;
-	case SSL_kGOST:
-		kx="GOST";
-		break;
-	default:
-		kx="unknown";
-		}
-
-	switch (alg_auth)
-		{
-	case SSL_aRSA:
-		au="RSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aDSS:
-		au="DSS";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aDH:
-		au="DH";
-		break;
-        case SSL_aKRB5:
-		au="KRB5";
-		break;
-        case SSL_aECDH:
-		au="ECDH";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aNULL:
-		au="None";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aECDSA:
-		au="ECDSA";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aPSK:
-		au="PSK";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aSRP:
-		au="SRP";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aGOST94:
-		au="GOST94";
-		break;
-	case SSL_aGOST01:
-		au="GOST01";
-		break;
-	default:
-		au="unknown";
-		break;
-		}
-
-	switch (alg_enc)
-		{
-	case SSL_DES:
-		enc=(is_export && kl == 5)?"DES(40)":"DES(56)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_3DES:
-		enc="3DES(168)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_RC4:
-		enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
-		  :((alg2&SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)?"RC4(64)":"RC4(128)");
-		break;
-	case SSL_RC2:
-		enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)"):"RC2(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_IDEA:
-		enc="IDEA(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_eNULL:
-		enc="None";
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES128:
-		enc="AES(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES256:
-		enc="AES(256)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES128GCM:
-		enc="AESGCM(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_AES256GCM:
-		enc="AESGCM(256)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
-		enc="Camellia(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
-		enc="Camellia(256)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_SEED:
-		enc="SEED(128)";
-		break;
-	case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
-		enc="GOST89(256)";
-		break;
-	default:
-		enc="unknown";
-		break;
-		}
-
-	switch (alg_mac)
-		{
-	case SSL_MD5:
-		mac="MD5";
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA1:
-		mac="SHA1";
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA256:
-		mac="SHA256";
-		break;
-	case SSL_SHA384:
-		mac="SHA384";
-		break;
-	case SSL_AEAD:
-		mac="AEAD";
-		break;
-	case SSL_GOST89MAC:
-		mac="GOST89";
-		break;
-	case SSL_GOST94:
-		mac="GOST94";
-		break;
-	default:
-		mac="unknown";
-		break;
-		}
-
-	if (buf == NULL)
-		{
-		len=128;
-		buf=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-		if (buf == NULL) return("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
-		}
-	else if (len < 128)
-		return("Buffer too small");
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str,alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl);
-#else
-	BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return(buf);
-	}
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if (c == NULL) return("(NONE)");
-	i=(int)(c->id>>24L);
-	if (i == 3)
-		return("TLSv1/SSLv3");
-	else if (i == 2)
-		return("SSLv2");
-	else
-		return("unknown");
-	}
-
-/* return the actual cipher being used */
-const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-	{
-	if (c != NULL)
-		return(c->name);
-	return("(NONE)");
-	}
-
-/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
-int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-
-	if (c != NULL)
-		{
-		if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
-		ret = c->strength_bits;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-	{
-	return c->id;
-	}
-
-/* return string version of key exchange algorithm */
-const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher)
-	{
-	switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey)
-		{
-	case SSL_kRSA:
-		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
-	case SSL_kDHr:
-		return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-	case SSL_kDHd:
-		return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
-	case SSL_kEDH:
-		switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
-			{
-		case SSL_aDSS:
-			return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
-		case SSL_aRSA:
-			return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-		case SSL_aNULL:
-			return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon";
-		default:
-			return "UNKNOWN";
-                        }
-	case SSL_kKRB5:
-		return SSL_TXT_KRB5;
-	case SSL_kECDHr:
-		return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-	case SSL_kECDHe:
-		return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
-	case SSL_kEECDH:
-		switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
-			{
-		case SSL_aECDSA:
-			return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
-		case SSL_aRSA:
-			return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
-		case SSL_aNULL:
-			return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon";
-		default:
-			return "UNKNOWN";
-                        }
-        default:
-		return "UNKNOWN";
-		}
-	}
-
-SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
-	{
-	SSL_COMP *ctmp;
-	int i,nn;
-
-	if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) return(NULL);
-	nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
-	for (i=0; i<nn; i++)
-		{
-		ctmp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk,i);
-		if (ctmp->id == n)
-			return(ctmp);
-		}
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
-	{
-	return NULL;
-	}
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm)
-	{
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp)
-	{
-	return NULL;
-	}
-#else
-STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
-	{
-	load_builtin_compressions();
-	return(ssl_comp_methods);
-	}
-
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
-	{
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-
-        if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
-                return 1;
-
-	/* According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
-	   compression number ranges should be the following:
-
-	   0 to 63:    methods defined by the IETF
-	   64 to 192:  external party methods assigned by IANA
-	   193 to 255: reserved for private use */
-	if (id < 193 || id > 255)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	MemCheck_off();
-	comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
-	comp->id=id;
-	comp->method=cm;
-	load_builtin_compressions();
-	if (ssl_comp_methods
-		&& sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,comp) >= 0)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(comp);
-		MemCheck_on();
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
-		return(1);
-		}
-	else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
-		|| !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp))
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(comp);
-		MemCheck_on();
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(1);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		MemCheck_on();
-		return(0);
-		}
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
-	{
-	if (comp)
-		return comp->name;
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e92ccb0..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,625 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
- * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
- * only reason strings will be preserved.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
-#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0)
-#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
-	{
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED),	"CLIENT_FINISHED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO),	"CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY),	"CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION),	"d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE),	"DO_DTLS1_WRITE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE),	"DO_SSL3_WRITE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT),	"DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF),	"DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD),	"DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM),	"DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO),	"DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT),	"DTLS1_CONNECT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC),	"DTLS1_ENC"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY),	"DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE),	"DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT),	"DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD),	"DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT),	"DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT),	"DTLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN),	"DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT),	"DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),	"DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD),	"DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES),	"DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED),	"DTLS1_READ_FAILED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY),	"DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST),	"DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),	"DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO),	"DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES),	"DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED),	"GET_CLIENT_FINISHED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO),	"GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY),	"GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED),	"GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO),	"GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY),	"GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION),	"i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N),	"READ_N"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE),	"REQUEST_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH),	"SERVER_FINISH"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO),	"SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY),	"SERVER_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT),	"SSL23_ACCEPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT),	"SSL23_CONNECT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO),	"SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK),	"SSL23_PEEK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_READ),	"SSL23_READ"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE),	"SSL23_WRITE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT),	"SSL2_ACCEPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT),	"SSL2_CONNECT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT),	"SSL2_ENC_INIT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL),	"SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK),	"SSL2_PEEK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ),	"SSL2_READ"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL),	"SSL2_READ_INTERNAL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE),	"SSL2_WRITE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT),	"SSL3_ACCEPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF),	"SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL),	"SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),	"SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),	"SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT),	"SSL3_CONNECT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL),	"SSL3_CTRL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL),	"SSL3_CTX_CTRL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS),	"SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),	"SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC),	"SSL3_ENC"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK),	"SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED),	"SSL3_GET_FINISHED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE),	"SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),	"SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO),	"SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD),	"SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE),	"SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO),	"SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC),	"ssl3_handshake_mac"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),	"SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN),	"SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK),	"SSL3_PEEK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES),	"SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N),	"SSL3_READ_N"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO),	"SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK),	"SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER),	"SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER),	"SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES),	"SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING),	"SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),	"SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),	"SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD),	"SSL_BAD_METHOD"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP),	"SSL_CERT_DUP"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST),	"SSL_CERT_INST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE),	"SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW),	"SSL_CERT_NEW"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY),	"SSL_check_private_key"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG),	"SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR),	"SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT),	"SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR),	"SSL_clear"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD),	"SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL),	"SSL_ctrl"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY),	"SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES),	"SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW),	"SSL_CTX_new"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE),	"SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE),	"SSL_CTX_set_purpose"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION),	"SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST),	"SSL_CTX_set_trust"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL_CTX_use_certificate"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1),	"SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE),	"SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE),	"SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY),	"SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1),	"SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE),	"SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT),	"SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY),	"SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),	"SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),	"SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE),	"SSL_do_handshake"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION),	"SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY),	"SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER),	"SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE),	"SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW),	"SSL_new"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK),	"SSL_peek"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ),	"SSL_read"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW),	"SSL_SESSION_new"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP),	"SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW),	"SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT),	"SSL_SET_CERT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST),	"SSL_set_cipher_list"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD),	"SSL_set_fd"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY),	"SSL_SET_PKEY"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE),	"SSL_set_purpose"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD),	"SSL_set_rfd"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION),	"SSL_set_session"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_set_session_id_context"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT),	"SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST),	"SSL_set_trust"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD),	"SSL_set_wfd"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN),	"SSL_shutdown"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT),	"SSL_SRP_CTX_init"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION),	"SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL_use_certificate"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1),	"SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE),	"SSL_use_certificate_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY),	"SSL_use_PrivateKey"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1),	"SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE),	"SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT),	"SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY),	"SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),	"SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),	"SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN),	"SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE),	"SSL_write"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC),	"tls1_cert_verify_mac"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE),	"TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC),	"TLS1_ENC"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL),	"TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT),	"SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),	"TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF),	"tls1_prf"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK),	"TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
-{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING),	"WRITE_PENDING"},
-{0,NULL}
-	};
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
-	{
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE) ,"app data in handshake"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),"attempt to reuse session in different context"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD)      ,"bad alert record"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE),"bad authentication type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),"bad change cipher spec"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM)          ,"bad checksum"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),"bad data returned by callback"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION)     ,"bad decompression"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH)       ,"bad dh g length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH) ,"bad dh pub key length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH)       ,"bad dh p length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH)     ,"bad digest length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE)     ,"bad dsa signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT)          ,"bad ecc cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE)   ,"bad ecdsa signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT)           ,"bad ecpoint"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH)  ,"bad handshake length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST)     ,"bad hello request"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH)            ,"bad length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE)        ,"bad mac decode"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH)        ,"bad mac length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE)      ,"bad message type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH)     ,"bad packet length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),"bad protocol version number"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH),"bad psk identity hint length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT) ,"bad response argument"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT)       ,"bad rsa decrypt"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT)       ,"bad rsa encrypt"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH)      ,"bad rsa e length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH),"bad rsa modulus length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE)     ,"bad rsa signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE)         ,"bad signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp a length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp b length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp g length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp n length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS)    ,"bad srp parameters"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp s length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE)    ,"bad srtp mki value"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE)      ,"bad ssl filetype"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),"bad ssl session id length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_STATE)             ,"bad state"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY)       ,"bad write retry"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET)           ,"bio not set"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),"block cipher pad is wrong"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB)                ,"bn lib"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY),"cannot serialize public key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"ca dn length mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG)        ,"ca dn too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY)    ,"ccs received early"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),"certificate verify failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH)  ,"cert length mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT),"challenge is different"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256)   ,"channel id not p256"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID),"Channel ID signature invalid"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),"cipher code wrong length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),"cipher or hash unavailable"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT)    ,"clienthello tlsext"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"compressed length too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED)  ,"compression disabled"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE)   ,"compression failure"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),"compression id not within private range"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),"compression library error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"connection id is different"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET),"connection type not set"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH)       ,"cookie mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG)         ,"d2i ecdsa sig"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),"data between ccs and finished"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED)   ,"digest check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG)  ,"dtls message too big"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID),"duplicate compression id"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT),"ecc cert not for key agreement"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING),"ecc cert not for signing"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have rsa signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have sha1 signature"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),"ecgroup too large for cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"empty srtp protection profile list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"encrypted length too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),"error generating tmp rsa key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),"error in received cipher list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED),"evp digestsignfinal failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED),"evp digestsigninit failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got Channel ID before a ccs"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"invalid compression algorithm"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE)       ,"invalid message"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE)       ,"invalid purpose"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME)  ,"invalid srp username"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),"invalid ticket keys length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST)         ,"invalid trust"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG)      ,"key arg too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5)                  ,"krb5"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC)       ,"krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED)       ,"krb5 client get cred"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT)           ,"krb5 client init"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ)         ,"krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET)     ,"krb5 server bad ticket"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT)           ,"krb5 server init"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ)         ,"krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED)    ,"krb5 server tkt expired"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV)        ,"krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW)       ,"krb5 server tkt skew"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH)       ,"length mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT)      ,"length too short"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG)           ,"library bug"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),"library has no ciphers"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG)      ,"message too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT)   ,"missing dh dsa cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY)        ,"missing dh key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT)   ,"missing dh rsa cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing dsa signing cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY),"missing export tmp dh key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY),"missing export tmp rsa key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE),"missing rsa certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),"missing rsa encrypting cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing rsa signing cert"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM)     ,"can't find SRP server param"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY)    ,"missing tmp dh key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY)  ,"missing tmp ecdh key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY)   ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY)  ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED),"no certificate returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET)    ,"no certificate set"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED),"no certificate specified"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE)  ,"no ciphers available"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED)     ,"no ciphers passed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED)  ,"no ciphers specified"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST)        ,"no cipher list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH)       ,"no cipher match"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD) ,"no client cert method"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED),"no client cert received"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED),"no compression specified"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED)   ,"no method specified"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT)       ,"no p256 support"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY)         ,"no privatekey"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY)          ,"no publickey"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION)      ,"no renegotiation"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST)    ,"digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER)      ,"no shared cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES)      ,"no srtp profiles"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK)    ,"no verify callback"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX)          ,"null ssl ctx"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT)          ,"parse tlsext"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG)         ,"path too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),"peer did not return a certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR)            ,"peer error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE),"peer error certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE),"peer error no certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER)  ,"peer error no cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"peer error unsupported certificate type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"pre mac length too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS),"problems mapping cipher functions"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN)  ,"protocol is shutdown"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND),"psk identity not found"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB)      ,"psk no client cb"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB)      ,"psk no server cb"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR),"public key encrypt error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA) ,"public key is not rsa"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA)    ,"public key not rsa"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET)      ,"read bio not set"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED)  ,"read timeout expired"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE),"read wrong packet type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),"record length mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE)      ,"record too large"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL)      ,"record too small"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG),"renegotiate ext too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),"renegotiation encoding err"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH),"renegotiation mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING),"required cipher missing"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),"required compresssion algorithm missing"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT)    ,"serverhello tlsext"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED),"session may not be created"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ)            ,"short read"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),"signature algorithms error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC)            ,"error with the srp params"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),"srtp could not allocate profiles"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),"srtp protection profile list too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),"srtp unknown protection profile"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl2 connection id too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT),"ssl3 ext invalid ecpointformat"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),"ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),"ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl3 session id too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT),"ssl3 session id too short"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),"sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),"sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),"sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),"sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),"sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),"sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert no certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),"sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),"ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) ,"ssl handshake failure"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),"ssl library has no ciphers"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),"ssl session id callback failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT),"ssl session id conflict"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),"ssl session id context too long"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),"ssl session id has bad length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"ssl session id is different"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),"tlsv1 alert access denied"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decode error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),"tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),"tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA),"tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),"tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),"tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),"tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),"tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),"tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),"tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbeats"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING) ,"heartbeat request already pending"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),"tls illegal exporter label"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),"tls peer did not respond with certificate list"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),"tried to use unsupported cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS),"unable to decode dh certs"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS),"unable to decode ecdh certs"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY),"unable to extract public key"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS),"unable to find dh parameters"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),"unable to find ecdh parameters"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),"unable to find public key parameters"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD),"unable to find ssl method"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl2 md5 routines"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)    ,"unexpected message"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD)     ,"unexpected record"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED)         ,"uninitialized"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE)    ,"unknown alert type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"unknown certificate type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED),"unknown cipher returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE)   ,"unknown cipher type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST)        ,"unknown digest"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),"unknown key exchange type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE)     ,"unknown pkey type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL)      ,"unknown protocol"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),"unknown remote error type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION)   ,"unknown ssl version"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE)         ,"unknown state"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),"unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER)    ,"unsupported cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported compression algorithm"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE),"unsupported digest type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),"unsupported elliptic curve"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL)  ,"unsupported protocol"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION),"unsupported ssl version"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),"unsupported status type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED),"use srtp not negotiated"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET)     ,"write bio not set"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED) ,"wrong cipher returned"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE)    ,"wrong message type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS),"wrong number of key bits"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE)  ,"wrong signature size"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE)  ,"wrong signature type"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION)     ,"wrong ssl version"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)  ,"wrong version number"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB)              ,"x509 lib"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),"x509 verification setup problems"},
-{0,NULL}
-	};
-
-#endif
-
-void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
-	if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL)
-		{
-		ERR_load_strings(0,SSL_str_functs);
-		ERR_load_strings(0,SSL_str_reasons);
-		}
-#endif
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ea95a5f9..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_err2.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-void SSL_load_error_strings(void)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-	ERR_load_SSL_strings();
-#endif
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index eb1ae782..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3539 +0,0 @@
-/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
- *  \brief Version independent SSL functions.
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-#  include <assert.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
-	/* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
-	(int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
-	0,	/* finish_mac_length */
-	(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
-	NULL,	/* client_finished_label */
-	0,	/* client_finished_label_len */
-	NULL,	/* server_finished_label */
-	0,	/* server_finished_label_len */
-	(int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
-		 size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
-		 int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
-	};
-
-int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-
-	if (s->method == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-		s->session=NULL;
-		}
-
-	s->error=0;
-	s->hit=0;
-	s->shutdown=0;
-
-#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
-       * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
-	/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
-	 * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
-	if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
-#else
-	if (s->renegotiate)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return 0;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	s->type=0;
-
-	s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
-
-	s->version=s->method->version;
-	s->client_version=s->version;
-	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-#if 0
-	s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
-#endif
-
-	if (s->init_buf != NULL)
-		{
-		BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-		s->init_buf=NULL;
-		}
-
-	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-
-	s->first_packet=0;
-
-#if 1
-	/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
-	 * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
-	if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
-		{
-		s->method->ssl_free(s);
-		s->method=s->ctx->method;
-		if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
-			return(0);
-		}
-	else
-#endif
-		s->method->ssl_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
-	ctx->method=meth;
-
-	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
-		&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
-		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	SSL *s;
-
-	if (ctx == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	if (ctx->method == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-	s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
-	if (s == NULL) goto err;
-	memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
-
-#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-	s->options=ctx->options;
-	s->mode=ctx->mode;
-	s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
-
-	if (ctx->cert != NULL)
-		{
-		/* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
-		 * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
-		 * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
-		 * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
-		 * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
-		 * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
-		 * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
-		 * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
-		 * duplicated it once. */
-
-		s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
-		if (s->cert == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
-
-	s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
-	s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
-	s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
-	s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
-#if 0
-	s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
-#endif
-	s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
-	OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
-	memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
-	s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
-	s->session_creation_enabled=1;
-	s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
-
-	s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-	if (!s->param)
-		goto err;
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
-#if 0
-	s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
-	s->trust = ctx->trust;
-#endif
-	s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
-	s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
-
-	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	s->ctx=ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
-	s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
-	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-	s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
-	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
-	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	s->initial_ctx=ctx;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-# endif
-
-	if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		{
-		s->alpn_client_proto_list =
-			OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
-		if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
-		       s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
-		s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-
-	s->method=ctx->method;
-
-	if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
-		goto err;
-
-	s->references=1;
-	s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
-
-	SSL_clear(s);
-
-	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-		{
-		s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-		if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
-	s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
-#endif
-
-	return(s);
-err:
-	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->cert != NULL)
-			ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
-		if (s->ctx != NULL)
-			SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
-		OPENSSL_free(s);
-		}
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-				   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-    {
-    if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
-	return 0;
-	}
-    ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
-    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
-
-    return 1;
-    }
-
-int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-    {
-    if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
-	return 0;
-	}
-    ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
-    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
-
-    return 1;
-    }
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
-	{
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
-	{
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-	ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
-				unsigned int id_len)
-	{
-	/* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
-	 * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
-	 * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
-	 * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
-	 * use by this SSL. */
-	SSL_SESSION r, *p;
-
-	if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
-		return 0;
-
-	r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
-	r.session_id_length = id_len;
-	memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
-	/* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
-	 * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
-	 * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
-	 * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
-	if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
-			(id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
-		{
-		memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
-			SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
-		r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-		}
-
-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
-	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	return (p != NULL);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
-	}
-
-void SSL_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if(s == NULL)
-	    return;
-
-	i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
-#endif
-	if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (s->param)
-		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
-
-	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
-
-	if (s->bbio != NULL)
-		{
-		/* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
-		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
-			{
-			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-			}
-		BIO_free(s->bbio);
-		s->bbio=NULL;
-		}
-	if (s->rbio != NULL)
-		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
-	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
-		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
-
-	if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-
-	/* add extra stuff */
-	if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
-	/* Make the next call work :-) */
-	if (s->session != NULL)
-		{
-		ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-		}
-
-	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-
-	if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
-	/* Free up if allocated */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (s->tlsext_hostname)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
-	if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-	if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
-	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
-		sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
-						X509_EXTENSION_free);
-	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
-		sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
-	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-		EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
-	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (s->psk_identity_hint)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
-#endif
-
-	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
-
-	if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
-
-	if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
-
-#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
-		kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if (s->srtp_profiles)
-            sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_free(s);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
-	{
-	/* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
-	 */
-	if (s->bbio != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
-			{
-			s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
-			s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
-			}
-		}
-	if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
-		BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
-	if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
-		BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
-	s->rbio=rbio;
-	s->wbio=wbio;
-	}
-
-BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
-	{ return(s->rbio); }
-
-BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
-	{ return(s->wbio); }
-
-int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret= -1;
-	BIO *b,*r;
-
-	b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
-	if (r != NULL)
-		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret= -1;
-	BIO *b,*r;
-
-	b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
-	r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
-	if (r != NULL)
-		BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	BIO *bio=NULL;
-
-	bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
-	if (bio == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-	SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	BIO *bio=NULL;
-
-	if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
-		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
-		{
-		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
-		if (bio == NULL)
-			{ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
-		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
-		}
-	else
-		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	BIO *bio=NULL;
-
-	if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
-		|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
-		{
-		bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
-		if (bio == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-		SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
-		}
-	else
-		SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-
-/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
-size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
-	{
-	size_t ret = 0;
-	
-	if (s->s3 != NULL)
-		{
-		ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
-		if (count > ret)
-			count = ret;
-		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
-		}
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
-size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
-	{
-	size_t ret = 0;
-	
-	if (s->s3 != NULL)
-		{
-		ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
-		if (count > ret)
-			count = ret;
-		memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
-		}
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-
-int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->verify_mode);
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
-	}
-
-int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
-	{
-	return(s->verify_callback);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(ctx->verify_mode);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
-	}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
-	{
-	return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
-		    int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
-	{
-	s->verify_mode=mode;
-	if (callback != NULL)
-		s->verify_callback=callback;
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
-	{
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
-	{
-	s->read_ahead=yes;
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->read_ahead);
-	}
-
-int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	/* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
-	 * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
-	 * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
-	 * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
-	 * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
-	 * so we'd better not return -1.)
-	 */
-	return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
-	}
-
-X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	X509 *r;
-	
-	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
-		r=NULL;
-	else
-		r=s->session->peer;
-
-	if (r == NULL) return(r);
-
-	CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(X509) *r;
-	
-	if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
-		r=NULL;
-	else
-		r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
-
-	/* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
-	 * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
-	
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
- * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
-void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
-	{
-	CERT *tmp;
-
-	/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
-	SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
-
-	/* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
-	 * vice-versa */
-	if (t->method != f->method)
-		{
-		t->method->ssl_free(t);	/* cleanup current */
-		t->method=f->method;	/* change method */
-		t->method->ssl_new(t);	/* setup new */
-		}
-
-	tmp=t->cert;
-	if (f->cert != NULL)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-		t->cert=f->cert;
-		}
-	else
-		t->cert=NULL;
-	if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
-	SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
-	}
-
-/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
-int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	if (	(ctx == NULL) ||
-		(ctx->cert == NULL) ||
-		(ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if 	(ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
-	}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
-	{
-	if (ssl == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
-		ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
-	}
-
-int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		/* Not properly initialized yet */
-		SSL_set_accept_state(s);
-
-	return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
-	}
-
-int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		/* Not properly initialized yet */
-		SSL_set_connect_state(s);
-
-	return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
-	}
-
-long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->method->get_timeout());
-	}
-
-int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
-	}
-
-int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
-	}
-
-int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
-	{
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
-		{
-		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-	return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
-	}
-
-int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
-	{
-	/* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
-	 * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
-	 * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
-	 * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
-	 */
-
-	if (s->handshake_func == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
-		return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
-	else
-		return(1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
-		s->renegotiate=1;
-
-	s->new_session=1;
-
-	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
-	}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->renegotiate == 0)
-		s->renegotiate=1;
-
-	s->new_session=0;
-
-	return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
-	}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
-	{
-	/* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
-	 * false again once a handshake has finished */
-	return (s->renegotiate != 0);
-	}
-
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
-		return(s->read_ahead);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
-		l=s->read_ahead;
-		s->read_ahead=larg;
-		return(l);
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
-		s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
-		return 1;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
-		return(s->options|=larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
-		return(s->options&=~larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
-		return(s->mode|=larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
-		return(s->mode &=~larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
-		return(s->max_cert_list);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
-		l=s->max_cert_list;
-		s->max_cert_list=larg;
-		return(l);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
-		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
-			return 0;
-#endif
-
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
-		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			s->d1->mtu = larg;
-			return larg;
-			}
-		return 0;
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
-		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-			return 0;
-		s->max_send_fragment = larg;
-		return 1;
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
-		if (s->s3)
-			return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
-		else return 0;
-	default:
-		return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
-		}
-	}
-
-long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	switch(cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
-		s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
-		return 1;
-		
-	default:
-		return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
-		}
-	}
-
-LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return ctx->sessions;
-	}
-
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	switch (cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
-		return(ctx->read_ahead);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
-		l=ctx->read_ahead;
-		ctx->read_ahead=larg;
-		return(l);
-		
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
-		ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
-		return 1;
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
-		return(ctx->max_cert_list);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
-		l=ctx->max_cert_list;
-		ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
-		return(l);
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
-		l=ctx->session_cache_size;
-		ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
-		return(l);
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
-		return(ctx->session_cache_size);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
-		l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
-		ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
-		return(l);
-	case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
-		return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
-
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
-		return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
-		return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
-	case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
-		return(ctx->options|=larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
-		return(ctx->options&=~larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
-		return(ctx->mode|=larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
-		return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
-		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
-			return 0;
-		ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
-		return 1;
-	default:
-		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
-		}
-	}
-
-long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
-	{
-	switch(cmd)
-		{
-	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
-		ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
-		return 1;
-
-	default:
-		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	l=a->id-b->id;
-	if (l == 0L)
-		return(0);
-	else
-		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
-	}
-
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
-			const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
-	{
-	long l;
-
-	l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
-	if (l == 0L)
-		return(0);
-	else
-		return((l > 0)?1:-1);
-	}
-
-/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
- * preference */
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
-			{
-			return(s->cipher_list);
-			}
-		else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
-			(s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
-			{
-			return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
-			}
-		}
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
- * algorithm id */
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-			{
-			return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-			}
-		else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
-			(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
-			{
-			return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
-			}
-		}
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
-const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
-	{
-	SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
-	if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
-	sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
-		return(NULL);
-	c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
-	if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
-	return(c->name);
-	}
-
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
-int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	
-	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
-		&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
-	/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
-	 * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
-	 * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
-	 * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
-	 * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
-	 * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
-	 * updated. */
-	if (sk == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	
-	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
-		&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
-	/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
-	if (sk == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
-
-	if (sk == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-        /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
-	tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
-	if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-	s->cipher_list = sk;
-	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-	s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
-	(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-
-	sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
-	{
-	char *p;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	int i;
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
-		(len < 2))
-		return(NULL);
-
-	p=buf;
-	sk=s->session->ciphers;
-
-	if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
-		return NULL;
-
-	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
-		{
-		int n;
-
-		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
-		n=strlen(c->name);
-		if (n+1 > len)
-			{
-			if (p != buf)
-				--p;
-			*p='\0';
-			return buf;
-			}
-		strcpy(p,c->name);
-		p+=n;
-		*(p++)=':';
-		len-=n+1;
-		}
-	p[-1]='\0';
-	return(buf);
-	}
-
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
-			     int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
-	{
-	int i,j=0;
-	SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	unsigned char *q;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
-	q=p;
-	if (put_cb == NULL)
-		put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
-
-	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
-		{
-		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
-		/* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
-		if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
-			(TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
-			continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
-		    nokrb5)
-		    continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
-		if ((c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
-		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
-			continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
-		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
-		    continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-		j = put_cb(c,p);
-		p+=j;
-		}
-	/* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
-	 * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
-	if (p != q)
-		{
-		if (!s->renegotiate)
-			{
-			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
-				{
-				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-				};
-			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
-			p+=j;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-			fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
-#endif
-			}
-
-		if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
-			{
-			static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
-				{
-				0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-				};
-			j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
-			p+=j;
-			}
- 		}
-
-	return(p-q);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
-					       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-	int i,n;
-
-	if (s->s3)
-		s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
-
-	n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
-	if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
-		sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
-	else
-		{
-		sk= *skp;
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
-		}
-
-	for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
-		{
-		/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
-		if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
-			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
-			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
-			{
-			/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
-			if (s->renegotiate)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
-				goto err;
-				}
-			s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
-			p += n;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-			fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
-#endif
-			continue;
-			}
-
-		/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
-		if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
-			(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
-			(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
-			{
-			/* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
-			 * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
-			if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-				if (s->s3)
-					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			continue;
-			}
-
-		c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
-		p+=n;
-		if (c != NULL)
-			{
-			if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (skp != NULL)
-		*skp=sk;
-	return(sk);
-err:
-	if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
- * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
- */
-
-const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
-	{
-	if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
-		return NULL;
-
-	return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
-		s->session->tlsext_hostname :
-		s->tlsext_hostname;
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
-		return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
- * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
- *
- * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
- * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
- * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
- *
- * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
- *
- * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
- * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
- * or have a default application level protocol.
- *
- * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
- * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
- * API that this fallback case was enacted.
- *
- * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
- * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
- * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
- * a client should use.
- *
- * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
- * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
- *
- * It returns either
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
- */
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
-	{
-	unsigned int i, j;
-	const unsigned char *result;
-	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-
-	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
-		{
-		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-			{
-			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-				{
-				/* We found a match */
-				result = &server[i];
-				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-				goto found;
-				}
-			j += client[j];
-			j++;
-			}
-		i += server[i];
-		i++;
-		}
-
-	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-	result = client;
-	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
-	found:
-	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-	*outlen = result[0];
-	return status;
-	}
-
-/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
- * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
- * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
- *
- * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
- * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
- * provided by the callback.
- */
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
-	{
-	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-	if (!*data) {
-		*len = 0;
-	} else {
-		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-	}
-}
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
- * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
- * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
- * it.
- *
- * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
- * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-	{
-	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-	}
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
- * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
- * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
- * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
- * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
- *
- * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
- * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
- */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-	{
-	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-	}
-# endif
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
- * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
- * length-prefixed strings).
- *
- * Returns 0 on success. */
-int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char* protos,
-			    unsigned protos_len)
-	{
-	if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
-
-	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
-	if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		return 1;
-	memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
-	ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
- * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
- * length-prefixed strings).
- *
- * Returns 0 on success. */
-int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char* protos,
-			unsigned protos_len)
-	{
-	if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
-
-	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
-	if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
-		return 1;
-	memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
-	ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called
- * during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the
- * client's list of offered protocols. */
-void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX* ctx,
-				int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-					   const unsigned char **out,
-					   unsigned char *outlen,
-					   const unsigned char *in,
-					   unsigned int inlen,
-					   void *arg),
-				void *arg)
-	{
-	ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
-	ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
-	}
-
-/* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
- * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name (not
- * including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't respond with
- * a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */
-void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
-			    unsigned *len)
-	{
-	*data = NULL;
-	if (ssl->s3)
-		*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
-	if (*data == NULL)
-		*len = 0;
-	else
-		*len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
-	int use_context)
-	{
-	if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
-		return -1;
-
-	return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
-							   llen, p, plen,
-							   use_context);
-	}
-
-static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
-	{
-	unsigned long l;
-
-	l=(unsigned long)
-		((unsigned int) a->session_id[0]     )|
-		((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
-		((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
-		((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
-	return(l);
-	}
-
-/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
- * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
- * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
- * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
- * with a matching session ID. */
-static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
-	{
-	if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
-		return(1);
-	if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
-		return(1);
-	return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
-	}
-
-/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
- * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
- * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
- * ssl.h. */
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-	{
-	SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
-
-	if (meth == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))	
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
-
-	ret->method=meth;
-
-	ret->cert_store=NULL;
-	ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
-	ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
-	ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
-	ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
-
-	/* We take the system default */
-	ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
-
-	ret->new_session_cb=0;
-	ret->remove_session_cb=0;
-	ret->get_session_cb=0;
-	ret->generate_session_id=0;
-
-	memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
-
-	ret->references=1;
-	ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
-
-/*	ret->cipher=NULL;*/
-/*	ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
-	ret->master_key=NULL;
-	ret->key_arg=NULL;
-	ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
-
-	ret->info_callback=NULL;
-
-	ret->app_verify_callback=0;
-	ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
-
-	ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
-	ret->read_ahead=0;
-	ret->msg_callback=0;
-	ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
-	ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
-#if 0
-	ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
-#endif
-	ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
-	ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
-	if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
-	ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
-	ret->client_cert_cb=0;
-	ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
-	ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
-
-	ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
-	if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
-	ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
-	if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
-
-	ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
-		&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
-		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
-	if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
-	    || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-
-	ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-	if (!ret->param)
-		goto err;
-
-	if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-	if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-	if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-
-	if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
-
-	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
-	/* No compression for DTLS */
-	if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-		ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
-
-	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
-	ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
-	/* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
-	if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
-		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
-		|| (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
-		ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
-
-	ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
-	ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
-	ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
-	ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
-	ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-	ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
-	ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
-	if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
-		goto err;
-	ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
-	ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
-	ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
-	ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
-	if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
-	ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
-	ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
-#define eng_strx(x)	#x
-#define eng_str(x)	eng_strx(x)
-	/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
-	{
-	ENGINE *eng;
-	eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
-	if (!eng)
-		{
-		ERR_clear_error();
-		ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-		eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
-		}
-	if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
-		ERR_clear_error();
-	}
-#endif
-#endif
-	/* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
-	 * deployed might change this.
-	 */
-	ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
-
-	return(ret);
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
-	if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-#if 0
-static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
-    { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-static void
-ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
-	{
-	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
-	for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
-		{
-		next = ent->next;
-		OPENSSL_free(ent);
-		}
-	OPENSSL_free(list);
-	}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if (a == NULL) return;
-
-	i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
-#endif
-	if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (a->param)
-		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
-
-	/*
-	 * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
-	 * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
-	 * after the sessions were flushed.
-	 * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
-	 * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
-	 * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
-	 * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
-	 */
-	if (a->sessions != NULL)
-		SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
-
-	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
-
-	if (a->sessions != NULL)
-		lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
-
-	if (a->cert_store != NULL)
-		X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
-	if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
-	if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
-	if (a->cert != NULL)
-		ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
-	if (a->client_CA != NULL)
-		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
-	if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
-#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
-	if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
-		sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
-#else
-	a->comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-        if (a->srtp_profiles)
-                sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
-		OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	if (a->client_cert_engine)
-		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-	if (a->wbuf_freelist)
-		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
-	if (a->rbuf_freelist)
-		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
-		EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
-	if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_free(a);
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
-	{
-	ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
-	{
-	ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
-	{
-	ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
-	ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-	{
-	ctx->verify_mode=mode;
-	ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
-	{
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-	}
-
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
-	{
-	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
-	int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
-	int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
-	int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
-	unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
-	int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	int have_ecdh_tmp;
-#endif
-	X509 *x = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
-	int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
-
-	if (c == NULL) return;
-
-	kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
-	rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
-		(rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
-#else
-	rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
-	dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
-		(dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
-#else
-	dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
-#endif
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
-	rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
-	rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
-	dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
-	dh_rsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
-/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
-	dh_dsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
-	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
-	have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	mask_k=0;
-	mask_a=0;
-	emask_k=0;
-	emask_a=0;
-
-	
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
-	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
-		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
-#endif
-	
-	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
-	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
-		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
-		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
-	}
-	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
-	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
-		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
-		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
-	}
-
-	if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
-		mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
-	if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
-		emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
-
-#if 0
-	/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
-	if (	(dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
-		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
-	if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
-		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
-#endif
-
-	if (dh_tmp_export)
-		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
-
-	if (dh_tmp)
-		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
-
-	if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
-	if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
-
-	if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
-	if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
-
-	if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
-		{
-		mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
-		emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
-		}
-
-	if (dsa_sign)
-		{
-		mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
-		emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
-		}
-
-	mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
-	emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
-	mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
-	emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
-	emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
-
-	/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
-	 * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
-	 */
-	if (have_ecc_cert)
-		{
-		/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
-		x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
-		X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
-		ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
-		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
-		ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
-		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
-		ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-		ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
-		    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
-		EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
-		if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
-			{
-			signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
-			OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-		if (ecdh_ok)
-			{
-
-			if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
-				{
-				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
-				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
-				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-					{
-					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
-					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
-					}
-				}
-
-			if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
-				{
-				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
-				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
-				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-					{
-					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
-					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-		if (ecdsa_ok)
-			{
-			mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
-			emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (have_ecdh_tmp)
-		{
-		mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
-		emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-	mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-	emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-	emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-#endif
-
-	c->mask_k=mask_k;
-	c->mask_a=mask_a;
-	c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
-	c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
-	c->valid=1;
-	}
-
-/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
-	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-	int keysize = 0;
-	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-
-	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
-
-	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
-		{
-		/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
-		pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-		if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
-		keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		if (keysize > 163) return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
-	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
-	if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
-		{
-		signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
-		OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
-		}
-	if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
-		{
-		/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
-		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
-			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			/* signature alg must be RSA */
-
-			if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
-		{
-		/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
-		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
-	}
-
-#endif
-
-/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
-CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
-	CERT *c;
-	int i;
-
-	c=s->cert;
-	ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	
-	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-	if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
-		{
-		/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
-		 * since no certificate is needed for
-		 * anon ECDH and for authenticated
-		 * EECDH, the check for the auth
-		 * algorithm will set i correctly
-		 * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
-		 * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
-		 * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
-		 * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
-		 * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
-		 */
-		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-		}
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
-		{
-		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-		}
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
-		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
-	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
-		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
-		i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-		{
-		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
-			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
-		else
-			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
-		}
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
-		{
-		/* VRS something else here? */
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 
-		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
-		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
-	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return(NULL);
-		}
-
-	return c->pkeys + i;
-	}
-
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
-	cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
-	if (!cpk)
-		return NULL;
-	return cpk->x509;
-	}
-
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
-	{
-	unsigned long alg_a;
-	CERT *c;
-
-	alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	c=s->cert;
-
-	/* SHA1 is the default for all signature algorithms up to TLS 1.2,
-	 * except RSA which is handled specially in s3_srvr.c */
-	if (pmd)
-		*pmd = EVP_sha1();
-
-	if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
-	    (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
-		{
-		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_dsa)
-			*pmd = s->s3->digest_dsa;
-		return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey;
-		}
-	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
-		{
-		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_rsa)
-			*pmd = s->s3->digest_rsa;
-		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
-			return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey;
-		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
-			return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
-		}
-	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
-	         (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
-		{
-		if (pmd && s->s3 && s->s3->digest_ecdsa)
-			*pmd = s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
-		return c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey;
-		}
-
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	/* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
-	 * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
-	if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
-
-	i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
-	if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
-		&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
-		    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
-		&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
-		{
-		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-		if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
-			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-		}
-
-	/* auto flush every 255 connections */
-	if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
-		((i & mode) == mode))
-		{
-		if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
-			?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
-			:s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
-			{
-			SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->method);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-	{
-	int conn= -1;
-	int ret=1;
-
-	if (s->method != meth)
-		{
-		if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
-			conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
-
-		if (s->method->version == meth->version)
-			s->method=meth;
-		else
-			{
-			s->method->ssl_free(s);
-			s->method=meth;
-			ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
-			}
-
-		if (conn == 1)
-			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
-		else if (conn == 0)
-			s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
-	{
-	int reason;
-	unsigned long l;
-	BIO *bio;
-
-	if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
-
-	/* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
-	 * etc, where we do encode the error */
-	if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
-		{
-		if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
-			return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
-		else
-			return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
-		}
-
-	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
-		{
-		bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
-		if (BIO_should_read(bio))
-			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
-		else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
-			/* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
-			 * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
-			 * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
-			 * should wait for.
-			 * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
-			 * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
-			 * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
-			 * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
-			 * to keep it. */
-			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
-		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
-			{
-			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
-			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
-				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
-			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
-				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
-			else
-				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
-		{
-		bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
-		if (BIO_should_write(bio))
-			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
-		else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
-			/* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
-			return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
-		else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
-			{
-			reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
-			if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
-				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
-			else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
-				return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
-			else
-				return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
-			}
-		}
-	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
-		{
-		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
-		}
-	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s))
-		{
-		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP);
-		}
-
-	if (i == 0)
-		{
-		if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
-			{
-			/* assume it is the socket being closed */
-			return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
-				(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
-				return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
-			}
-		}
-	return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
-	}
-
-int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=1;
-
-	if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
-		return(-1);
-		}
-
-	s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
-
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
-		{
-		ret=s->handshake_func(s);
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
- * one of these calls will reset it */
-void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
-	{
-	s->server=1;
-	s->shutdown=0;
-	s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
-	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
-	/* clear the current cipher */
-	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
-	{
-	s->server=0;
-	s->shutdown=0;
-	s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
-	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
-	/* clear the current cipher */
-	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-	}
-
-int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
-	{
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
-	{
-	if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return("TLSv1.2");
-	else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return("TLSv1.1");
-	else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return("TLSv1");
-	else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
-		return("SSLv3");
-	else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
-		return("SSLv2");
-	else
-		return("unknown");
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
-	{
-		return ssl_get_version(s->version);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-		return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
-	}
-
-const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
-	{
-	if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
-	switch (ssl->version)
-		{
-	case SSL2_VERSION:
-		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
-	default:
-		return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-		}
-	}
-
-SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
-	{
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
-	X509_NAME *xn;
-	SSL *ret;
-	int i;
-	
-	if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
-	    return(NULL);
-
-	ret->version = s->version;
-	ret->type = s->type;
-	ret->method = s->method;
-
-	if (s->session != NULL)
-		{
-		/* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
-		SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
-		 * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
-		 * they should not both point to the same object,
-		 * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
-
-		ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
-		ret->method = s->method;
-		ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
-
-		if (s->cert != NULL)
-			{
-			if (ret->cert != NULL)
-				{
-				ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
-				}
-			ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
-			if (ret->cert == NULL)
-				goto err;
-			}
-				
-		SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
-			s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
-		}
-
-	ret->options=s->options;
-	ret->mode=s->mode;
-	SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
-	SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
-	ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
-	ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
-	SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
-		SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
-	SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
-	ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
-
-	SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
-	
-	ret->debug=s->debug;
-
-	/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
-	if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
-		goto err;
-
-	/* setup rbio, and wbio */
-	if (s->rbio != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
-			goto err;
-		}
-	if (s->wbio != NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
-			{
-			if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
-		}
-	ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
-	ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
-	ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
-	ret->server = s->server;
-	ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
-	ret->new_session = s->new_session;
-	ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
-	ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
-	ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
-	ret->rstate=s->rstate;
-	ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
-	ret->hit=s->hit;
-
-	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
-
-	/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
-	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
-		{
-		if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
-		if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
-			== NULL)
-			goto err;
-
-	/* Dup the client_CA list */
-	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
-		{
-		if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
-		ret->client_CA=sk;
-		for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
-			{
-			xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
-			if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
-				{
-				X509_NAME_free(xn);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (0)
-		{
-err:
-		if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
-		ret=NULL;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
-		}
-	if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
-		s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (s->expand != NULL)
-		{
-		COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-		s->expand=NULL;
-		}
-	if (s->compress != NULL)
-		{
-		COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-		s->compress=NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-	}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->cert != NULL)
-		return(s->cert->key->x509);
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->cert != NULL)
-		return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
-	else
-		return(NULL);
-	}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
-		return(s->session->cipher);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return NULL;
-	}
-const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return NULL;
-	}
-#else
-
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->compress != NULL)
-		return(s->compress->meth);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->expand != NULL)
-		return(s->expand->meth);
-	return(NULL);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
-	{
-	BIO *bbio;
-
-	if (s->bbio == NULL)
-		{
-		bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
-		if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
-		s->bbio=bbio;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		bbio=s->bbio;
-		if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
-			s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-		}
-	(void)BIO_reset(bbio);
-/*	if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
-	if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (push)
-		{
-		if (s->wbio != bbio)
-			s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->wbio == bbio)
-			s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
-		}
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
-
-	if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
-		{
-		/* remove buffering */
-		s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
-		assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif
-	}
-	BIO_free(s->bbio);
-	s->bbio=NULL;
-	}
-	
-void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
-	{
-	ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
-	{
-	s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->quiet_shutdown);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
-	{
-	s->shutdown=mode;
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->shutdown);
-	}
-
-int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->version);
-	}
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
-	{
-	return(ssl->ctx);
-	}
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
-	{
-	if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
-		return ssl->ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (ctx == NULL)
-		ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
-#endif
-	if (ssl->cert != NULL)
-		ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
-	ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
-	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
-		SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
-	ssl->ctx = ctx;
-	return(ssl->ctx);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
-		const char *CApath)
-	{
-	return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
-	}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
-	{
-	ssl->info_callback=cb;
-	}
-
-/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
-   function pointer.  */
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
-	{
-	return ssl->info_callback;
-	}
-
-int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
-	{
-	return(ssl->state);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
-	{
-	ssl->state = state;
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
-	{
-	ssl->verify_result=arg;
-	}
-
-long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
-	{
-	return(ssl->verify_result);
-	}
-
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-			 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-	{
-	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
-				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
-	}
-
-void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-			     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-	{
-	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
-				new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
-	}
-
-void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
-	}
-
-int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	return(ctx->cert_store);
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
-	{
-	if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
-		X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
-	ctx->cert_store=store;
-	}
-
-int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return(s->rwstate);
-	}
-
-/*!
- * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
- * \param ctx the SSL context.
- * \param cb the callback
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
-							  int is_export,
-							  int keylength))
-    {
-    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
-    }
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
-						  int is_export,
-						  int keylength))
-    {
-    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
-    }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DOXYGEN
-/*!
- * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
- * \param ssl the SSL session.
- * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
- * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
- * of the required key in bits.
- * \return the temporary RSA key.
- * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
- */
-
-RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
-    {}
-#endif
-
-/*!
- * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
- * \param ctx the SSL context.
- * \param dh the callback
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                        int keylength))
-	{
-	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                int keylength))
-	{
-	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                                int keylength))
-	{
-	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                        int keylength))
-	{
-	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
-	{
-	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-	if (identity_hint != NULL)
-		{
-		ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
-		if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-			return 0;
-		}
-	else
-		ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* Clear hint in SSL and associated SSL_SESSION (if any). */
-	if (s->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->psk_identity_hint);
-		s->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-		}
-	if (s->session != NULL && s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-		s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (identity_hint != NULL)
-		{
-		/* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in
-		 * SSL_SESSION taking precedence. Thus, if SSL_SESSION is avaiable,
-		 * we store the hint there, otherwise we store it in SSL. */
-		if (s->session != NULL)
-			{
-			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
-			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-				return 0;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
-			if (s->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-				return 0;
-			}
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	/* The hint is stored in SSL and SSL_SESSION with the one in SSL_SESSION
-	 * taking precedence. */
-	if (s->session != NULL)
-		return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-	return(s->psk_identity_hint);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	return(s->session->psk_identity);
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
-    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
-                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
-	{
-	s->psk_client_callback = cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
-                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
-	{
-	ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
-    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
-	{
-	s->psk_server_callback = cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
-	{
-	ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
-	}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
-	{
-	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
-	{
-	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
-
-int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
-		!s->hit &&                        /* full-handshake */
-		s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
-		s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 &&   /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
-		(SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) &&  /* cutthrough enabled */
-		ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) &&                                   /* cutthrough allowed */
-		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 &&                 /* not a renegotiation handshake */
-		(s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A ||                 /* ready to write app-data*/
-			s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
-	}
-
-int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-
-	/* require a strong enough cipher */
-	if (SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) < 128)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* require ALPN or NPN extension */
-	if (!s->s3->alpn_selected
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		&& !s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen
-#endif
-	)
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	/* require a forward-secret cipher */
-	c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
-	if (!c || (c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEDH &&
-			c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEECDH))
-		{
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
- * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
- * Returns newly allocated ctx;
- */
-
-EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
-{
-	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
-	*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-	if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
-	return *hash;
-}
-void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
-{
-
-	if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
-	*hash=NULL;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
-	{
-	s->debug = debug;
-	}
-
-int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
-	{
-	return s->hit;
-	}
-
-#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
-#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
-#endif
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
-IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
-				    ssl_cipher_id);
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index ca399078..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1203 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_locl.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
-#define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/stack.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
-# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
-# define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
-#endif
-
-#undef PKCS1_CHECK
-
-#define c2l(c,l)	(l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))     , \
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
-
-/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
-#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n)	{ \
-			c+=n; \
-			l1=l2=0; \
-			switch (n) { \
-			case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
-			case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
-			case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
-			case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
-			case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
-			case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
-			case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
-			case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))));     \
-				} \
-			}
-
-#define l2c(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
-
-#define n2l(c,l)	(l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
-			 l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
-			 l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
-			 l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
-
-#define l2n(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
-
-#define l2n6(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
-
-#define l2n8(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff))
-
-#define n2l6(c,l)	(l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
-			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
-			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
-			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
-			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
-			 l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++))))
-
-/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
-#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n)	{ \
-			c+=n; \
-			switch (n) { \
-			case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
-			case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
-			case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
-			case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)    )&0xff); \
-			case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
-			case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
-			case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
-			case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)    )&0xff); \
-				} \
-			}
-
-#define n2s(c,s)	((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \
-			    (((unsigned int)(c[1]))    )),c+=2)
-#define s2n(s,c)	((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			  c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s)    )&0xff)),c+=2)
-
-#define n2l3(c,l)	((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \
-			     (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \
-			     (((unsigned long)(c[2]))    )),c+=3)
-
-#define l2n3(l,c)	((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
-			  c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
-			  c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff)),c+=3)
-
-/* LOCAL STUFF */
-
-#define SSL_DECRYPT	0
-#define SSL_ENCRYPT	1
-
-#define TWO_BYTE_BIT	0x80
-#define SEC_ESC_BIT	0x40
-#define TWO_BYTE_MASK	0x7fff
-#define THREE_BYTE_MASK	0x3fff
-
-#define INC32(a)	((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL)
-#define DEC32(a)	((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL)
-#define MAX_MAC_SIZE	20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */
-
-/*
- * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
- * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
- * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
- * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
- * can be publicly accessed.
- * Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
- *
- * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
- * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
- * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
- * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
- */
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
-#define SSL_kRSA		0x00000001L /* RSA key exchange */
-#define SSL_kDHr		0x00000002L /* DH cert, RSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define SSL_kDHd		0x00000004L /* DH cert, DSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuite supported! */
-#define SSL_kEDH		0x00000008L /* tmp DH key no DH cert */
-#define SSL_kKRB5		0x00000010L /* Kerberos5 key exchange */
-#define SSL_kECDHr		0x00000020L /* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */
-#define SSL_kECDHe		0x00000040L /* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */
-#define SSL_kEECDH		0x00000080L /* ephemeral ECDH */
-#define SSL_kPSK		0x00000100L /* PSK */
-#define SSL_kGOST       0x00000200L /* GOST key exchange */
-#define SSL_kSRP        0x00000400L /* SRP */
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
-#define SSL_aRSA		0x00000001L /* RSA auth */
-#define SSL_aDSS 		0x00000002L /* DSS auth */
-#define SSL_aNULL 		0x00000004L /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
-#define SSL_aDH 		0x00000008L /* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-#define SSL_aECDH 		0x00000010L /* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */
-#define SSL_aKRB5               0x00000020L /* KRB5 auth */
-#define SSL_aECDSA              0x00000040L /* ECDSA auth*/
-#define SSL_aPSK                0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
-#define SSL_aGOST94				0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
-#define SSL_aGOST01 			0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
-#define SSL_aSRP 		0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
-
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
-#define SSL_DES			0x00000001L
-#define SSL_3DES		0x00000002L
-#define SSL_RC4			0x00000004L
-#define SSL_RC2			0x00000008L
-#define SSL_IDEA		0x00000010L
-#define SSL_eNULL		0x00000020L
-#define SSL_AES128		0x00000040L
-#define SSL_AES256		0x00000080L
-#define SSL_CAMELLIA128		0x00000100L
-#define SSL_CAMELLIA256		0x00000200L
-#define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT	0x00000400L
-#define SSL_SEED		0x00000800L
-#define SSL_AES128GCM		0x00001000L
-#define SSL_AES256GCM		0x00002000L
-
-#define SSL_AES        		(SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM)
-#define SSL_CAMELLIA		(SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
-
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
-
-#define SSL_MD5			0x00000001L
-#define SSL_SHA1		0x00000002L
-#define SSL_GOST94      0x00000004L
-#define SSL_GOST89MAC   0x00000008L
-#define SSL_SHA256		0x00000010L
-#define SSL_SHA384		0x00000020L
-/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
-#define SSL_AEAD		0x00000040L
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
-#define SSL_SSLV2		0x00000001L
-#define SSL_SSLV3		0x00000002L
-#define SSL_TLSV1		SSL_SSLV3	/* for now */
-#define SSL_TLSV1_2		0x00000004L
-
-
-/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
-
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100
-#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA)
-
-/* When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX
- * make sure to update this constant too */
-#define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6
-
-#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK	(0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-
-#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10
-#define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-#define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-#define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-#define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-#define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-#define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1)
-
-/* Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft
- * (currently this also goes into algorithm2) */
-#define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
-
-#define TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE 128
-
-
-/*
- * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide
- * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change
- * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue.
- *
- * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes.
- * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now
- * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change
- * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more,
- * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW.
- * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the
- * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed
- * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would
- * be possible.
- */
-#define SSL_EXP_MASK		0x00000003L
-#define SSL_STRONG_MASK		0x000001fcL
-
-#define SSL_NOT_EXP		0x00000001L
-#define SSL_EXPORT		0x00000002L
-
-#define SSL_STRONG_NONE		0x00000004L
-#define SSL_EXP40		0x00000008L
-#define SSL_MICRO		(SSL_EXP40)
-#define SSL_EXP56		0x00000010L
-#define SSL_MINI		(SSL_EXP56)
-#define SSL_LOW			0x00000020L
-#define SSL_MEDIUM		0x00000040L
-#define SSL_HIGH		0x00000080L
-#define SSL_FIPS		0x00000100L
-
-/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
-
-/*
- * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.
- * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names,
- * their meaning is different:
- * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status.
- * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength
- *          is given.
- * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct
- * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no
- * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their
- * direct usage is discouraged.
- * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead.
- */
-#define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a)	((a)&SSL_EXPORT)
-#define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a)	((a)&SSL_EXP56)
-#define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a)	((a)&SSL_EXP40)
-#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)	SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength)
-#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c)	SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength)
-#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c)	SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength)
-
-#define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s)	(SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \
-				 (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7)
-#define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024)
-#define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c)	SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \
-				(c)->algo_strength)
-#define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c)	SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength)
-
-
-
-
-/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
-#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC	0
-#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN	1
-#define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN	2
-#define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA		3
-#define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA		4
-#define SSL_PKEY_ECC            5
-#define SSL_PKEY_GOST94		6
-#define SSL_PKEY_GOST01		7
-#define SSL_PKEY_NUM		8
-
-/* SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) |
- * 	    <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN)
- * SSL_kDH  <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
- * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
- * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
- * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
- */
-
-/*
-#define CERT_INVALID		0
-#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY		1
-#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY	2
-*/
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/* From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in 
- * ECParameters
- */
-#define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE  1   
-#define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE  2
-#define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE           3
-#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-typedef struct cert_pkey_st
-	{
-	X509 *x509;
-	STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
-	EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
-	} CERT_PKEY;
-
-typedef struct cert_st
-	{
-	/* Current active set */
-	CERT_PKEY *key; /* ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
-			 * Probably it would make more sense to store
-			 * an index, not a pointer. */
- 
-	/* The following masks are for the key and auth
-	 * algorithms that are supported by the certs below */
-	int valid;
-	unsigned long mask_k;
-	unsigned long mask_a;
-	unsigned long export_mask_k;
-	unsigned long export_mask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *rsa_tmp;
-	RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh_tmp;
-	DH *(*dh_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp;
-	/* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */
-	EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
-#endif
-
-	CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
-
-	int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
-	} CERT;
-
-
-typedef struct sess_cert_st
-	{
-	STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */
-
-	/* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */
-	int peer_cert_type;
-
-	CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never NULL!) */
-	CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
-	/* Obviously we don't have the private keys of these,
-	 * so maybe we shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp;
-#endif
-
-	int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */
-	} SESS_CERT;
-
-
-/*#define MAC_DEBUG	*/
-
-/*#define ERR_DEBUG	*/
-/*#define ABORT_DEBUG	*/
-/*#define PKT_DEBUG 1   */
-/*#define DES_DEBUG	*/
-/*#define DES_OFB_DEBUG	*/
-/*#define SSL_DEBUG	*/
-/*#define RSA_DEBUG	*/ 
-/*#define IDEA_DEBUG	*/ 
-
-#define FP_ICC  (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
-#define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \
-		((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr)))
-#define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \
-		((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr))
-
-/* This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff
- * It is a bit of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as
- * an opaque structure :-) */
-typedef struct ssl3_enc_method
-	{
-	int (*enc)(SSL *, int);
-	int (*mac)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int);
-	int (*setup_key_block)(SSL *);
-	int (*generate_master_secret)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int);
-	int (*change_cipher_state)(SSL *, int);
-	int (*final_finish_mac)(SSL *,  const char *, int, unsigned char *);
-	int finish_mac_length;
-	int (*cert_verify_mac)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *);
-	const char *client_finished_label;
-	int client_finished_label_len;
-	const char *server_finished_label;
-	int server_finished_label_len;
-	int (*alert_value)(int);
-	int (*export_keying_material)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
-				      const char *, size_t,
-				      const unsigned char *, size_t,
-				      int use_context);
-	} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
-typedef struct ssl3_comp_st
-	{
-	int comp_id;	/* The identifier byte for this compression type */
-	char *name;	/* Text name used for the compression type */
-	COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */
-	} SSL3_COMP;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st
-	{
-	size_t chunklen;
-	unsigned int len;
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head;
-	} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST;
-
-typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st
-	{
-	struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next;
-	} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY;
-#endif
-
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
-OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[];
-OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[];
-
-
-SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
-
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
-
-#define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-
-#define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
-				s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
-	{ \
-	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-		version, \
-		tls1_new, \
-		tls1_clear, \
-		tls1_free, \
-		s_accept, \
-		s_connect, \
-		ssl3_read, \
-		ssl3_peek, \
-		ssl3_write, \
-		ssl3_shutdown, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
-		ssl3_get_message, \
-		ssl3_read_bytes, \
-		ssl3_write_bytes, \
-		ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
-		ssl3_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_pending, \
-		ssl3_num_ciphers, \
-		ssl3_get_cipher, \
-		s_get_meth, \
-		tls1_default_timeout, \
-		&TLSv1_enc_data, \
-		ssl_undefined_void_function, \
-		ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
-	}; \
-	return &func_name##_data; \
-	}
-
-#define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
-	{ \
-	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-		SSL3_VERSION, \
-		ssl3_new, \
-		ssl3_clear, \
-		ssl3_free, \
-		s_accept, \
-		s_connect, \
-		ssl3_read, \
-		ssl3_peek, \
-		ssl3_write, \
-		ssl3_shutdown, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
-		ssl3_get_message, \
-		ssl3_read_bytes, \
-		ssl3_write_bytes, \
-		ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
-		ssl3_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_pending, \
-		ssl3_num_ciphers, \
-		ssl3_get_cipher, \
-		s_get_meth, \
-		ssl3_default_timeout, \
-		&SSLv3_enc_data, \
-		ssl_undefined_void_function, \
-		ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
-	}; \
-	return &func_name##_data; \
-	}
-
-#define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
-	{ \
-	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-	TLS1_2_VERSION, \
-	tls1_new, \
-	tls1_clear, \
-	tls1_free, \
-	s_accept, \
-	s_connect, \
-	ssl23_read, \
-	ssl23_peek, \
-	ssl23_write, \
-	ssl_undefined_function, \
-	ssl_undefined_function, \
-	ssl_ok, \
-	ssl3_get_message, \
-	ssl3_read_bytes, \
-	ssl3_write_bytes, \
-	ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
-	ssl3_ctrl, \
-	ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
-	ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \
-	ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \
-	ssl_undefined_const_function, \
-	ssl23_num_ciphers, \
-	ssl23_get_cipher, \
-	s_get_meth, \
-	ssl23_default_timeout, \
-	&ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
-	ssl_undefined_void_function, \
-	ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
-	ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
-	}; \
-	return &func_name##_data; \
-	}
-
-#define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
-	{ \
-	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-		SSL2_VERSION, \
-		ssl2_new,	/* local */ \
-		ssl2_clear,	/* local */ \
-		ssl2_free,	/* local */ \
-		s_accept, \
-		s_connect, \
-		ssl2_read, \
-		ssl2_peek, \
-		ssl2_write, \
-		ssl2_shutdown, \
-		ssl_ok,	/* NULL - renegotiate */ \
-		ssl_ok,	/* NULL - check renegotiate */ \
-		NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \
-		NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \
-		NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \
-		NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \
-		ssl2_ctrl,	/* local */ \
-		ssl2_ctx_ctrl,	/* local */ \
-		ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl2_pending, \
-		ssl2_num_ciphers, \
-		ssl2_get_cipher, \
-		s_get_meth, \
-		ssl2_default_timeout, \
-		&ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
-		ssl_undefined_void_function, \
-		ssl2_callback_ctrl,	/* local */ \
-		ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl,	/* local */ \
-	}; \
-	return &func_name##_data; \
-	}
-
-#define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void)  \
-	{ \
-	static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
-		DTLS1_VERSION, \
-		dtls1_new, \
-		dtls1_clear, \
-		dtls1_free, \
-		s_accept, \
-		s_connect, \
-		ssl3_read, \
-		ssl3_peek, \
-		ssl3_write, \
-		dtls1_shutdown, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate, \
-		ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
-		dtls1_get_message, \
-		dtls1_read_bytes, \
-		dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
-		dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
-		dtls1_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
-		ssl3_pending, \
-		ssl3_num_ciphers, \
-		dtls1_get_cipher, \
-		s_get_meth, \
-		dtls1_default_timeout, \
-		&DTLSv1_enc_data, \
-		ssl_undefined_void_function, \
-		ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
-		ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
-	}; \
-	return &func_name##_data; \
-	}
-
-struct openssl_ssl_test_functions
-	{
-	int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer)(SSL *s, int push);
-	int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers)(SSL *s);
-	int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
-	int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat)(SSL *s);
-	};
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
-
-void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
-int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
-CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
-CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o);
-void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void);
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
-int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
-int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
-DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
-				  ssl_cipher_id);
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
-			const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp);
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
-					       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp);
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
-                             int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *));
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
-					     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
-					     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
-					     const char *rule_str);
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
-int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
-		       const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
-int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i,long *mask,const EVP_MD **md);			   
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
-int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
-int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
-int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
-CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
-int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
-
-int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
-int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
-void ssl2_mac(SSL *s,unsigned char *mac,int send_data);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
-int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i);
-int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data);
-void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s,int reason);
-void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_num_ciphers(void);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int	ssl2_new(SSL *s);
-void	ssl2_free(SSL *s);
-int	ssl2_accept(SSL *s);
-int	ssl2_connect(SSL *s);
-int	ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s);
-void	ssl2_clear(SSL *s);
-long	ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
-long	ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
-int	ssl2_pending(const SSL *s);
-long	ssl2_default_timeout(void );
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
-void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b);
-int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b);
-int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s,int which);
-void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s,int type);
-int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s,int level, int desc);
-int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
-	unsigned char *p, int len);
-int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s,unsigned char *p);
-long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
-int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender,int slen);
-int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); 
-int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); 
-int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,unsigned char *p);
-int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
-void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
-void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
-SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
-			       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
-int	ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_new(SSL *s);
-void	ssl3_free(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_accept(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_connect(SSL *s);
-int	ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int	ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
-void	ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
-long	ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long	ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
-long	ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
-int	ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
-
-void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
-int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
-long ssl3_default_timeout(void );
-
-int ssl23_num_ciphers(void );
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-long ssl23_default_timeout(void );
-
-long tls1_default_timeout(void);
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s,int type);
-int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend);
-int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
-	unsigned int len);
-unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, 
-	unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,	unsigned long len, 
-	unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len);
-
-int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-
-int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
-unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
-int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
-int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, 
-	unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
-int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
-int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
-void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
-void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
-long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
-struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft);
-int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
-const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
-
-/* some client-only functions */
-int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
-int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s);
-# endif
-#endif
-
-int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-
-/* some server-only functions */
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
-#endif
-int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s);
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-
-
-
-int ssl23_accept(SSL *s);
-int ssl23_connect(SSL *s);
-int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n);
-int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s);
-
-int tls1_new(SSL *s);
-void tls1_free(SSL *s);
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s);
-long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
-
-int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
-int	dtls1_accept(SSL *s);
-int	dtls1_connect(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
-long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
-
-long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
-int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
-
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push);
-void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
-int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len);
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
-	const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
-	unsigned char *p, int len);
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	const char *label, size_t llen,
-	const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context);
-int tls1_alert_code(int code);
-int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
-int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit); 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-#define tlsext_tick_md	EVP_sha1
-#else
-#define tlsext_tick_md	EVP_sha256
-#endif
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-				const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret);
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
-				const EVP_MD *md);
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
-
-int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, SSL *s);
-int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s);
-EVP_MD_CTX* ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) ;
-void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
-int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
-					int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-					  int *al);
-int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
-					int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-					  int *al);
-long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
-void tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
-
-int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
-int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al);
-
-/* s3_cbc.c */
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out,
-		       const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-		       unsigned md_size,unsigned orig_len);
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-			    unsigned block_size,
-			    unsigned mac_size);
-int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
-			    SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-			    unsigned block_size,
-			    unsigned mac_size);
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-	const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
-	unsigned char* md_out,
-	size_t* md_out_size,
-	const unsigned char header[13],
-	const unsigned char *data,
-	size_t data_plus_mac_size,
-	size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-	const unsigned char *mac_secret,
-	unsigned mac_secret_length,
-	char is_sslv3);
-
-void tls_fips_digest_extra(
-	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
-	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
-
-int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
-
-#else
-
-#define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
-#define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
-#define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
-#define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
-
-#endif
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e98e862d..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,821 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_rsa.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
-static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
-	{
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert,x));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j;
-	BIO *in;
-	int ret=0;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		x=d2i_X509_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		x=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_use_certificate(ssl,x);
-end:
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
-	{
-	X509 *x;
-	int ret;
-
-	x=d2i_X509(NULL,&d,(long)len);
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_use_certificate(ssl,x);
-	X509_free(x);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (rsa == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if ((pkey=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-	EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa);
-
-	ret=ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	i=ssl_cert_type(NULL,pkey);
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
-		pktmp =	X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
-		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,pkey);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
-		ERR_clear_error();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		/* Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly
-		 * for smart cards. */
-		if ((pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
-			(RSA_flags(pkey->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
-			;
-		else
-#endif
-		if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509,pkey))
-			{
-			X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
-			c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-		EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-	CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-	c->pkeys[i].privatekey=pkey;
-	c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
-
-	c->valid=0;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j,ret=0;
-	BIO *in;
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if	(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		rsa=PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in,NULL,
-			ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (rsa == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	ret=SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl,rsa);
-	RSA_free(rsa);
-end:
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	RSA *rsa;
-
-	p=d;
-	if ((rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl,rsa);
-	RSA_free(rsa);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-	{
-	int ret;
-
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	ret=ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert,pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j,ret=0;
-	BIO *in;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,
-			ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	ret=SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-end:
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
-	p=d;
-	if ((pkey=d2i_PrivateKey(type,NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-	{
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x));
-	}
-
-static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
-	{
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-	int i;
-
-	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT,SSL_R_X509_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-		ERR_clear_error();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-		/* Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly
-		 * for smart cards. */
-		if ((c->pkeys[i].privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
-			(RSA_flags(c->pkeys[i].privatekey->pkey.rsa) &
-			 RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
-			 ;
-		else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-		if (!X509_check_private_key(x,c->pkeys[i].privatekey))
-			{
-			/* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free
-			 * current private key (when switching to a different
-			 * cert & key, first this function should be used,
-			 * then ssl_set_pkey */
-			EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-			c->pkeys[i].privatekey=NULL;
-			/* clear error queue */
-			ERR_clear_error();
-			}
-		}
-
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
-	if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
-		X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
-	CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-	c->pkeys[i].x509=x;
-	c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
-
-	c->valid=0;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j;
-	BIO *in;
-	int ret=0;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		x=d2i_X509_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		x=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
-end:
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d)
-	{
-	X509 *x;
-	int ret;
-
-	x=d2i_X509(NULL,&d,(long)len);
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
-	X509_free(x);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
-	if (rsa == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if ((pkey=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	RSA_up_ref(rsa);
-	EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa);
-
-	ret=ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j,ret=0;
-	BIO *in;
-	RSA *rsa=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if	(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		rsa=PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in,NULL,
-			ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (rsa == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx,rsa);
-	RSA_free(rsa);
-end:
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	RSA *rsa;
-
-	p=d;
-	if ((rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx,rsa);
-	RSA_free(rsa);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-	{
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	return(ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert,pkey));
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-	{
-	int j,ret=0;
-	BIO *in;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-
-	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
-		{
-		j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
-		pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,
-			ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-		}
-	else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
-		{
-		j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
-		pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	if (pkey == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
-		goto end;
-		}
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-end:
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
-	     long len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
-	p=d;
-	if ((pkey=d2i_PrivateKey(type,NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	ret=SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,pkey);
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-
-int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain)
-	{
-	if (ssl == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert->key == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	if (ssl->cert->key->cert_chain != NULL)
-		sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->cert->key->cert_chain, X509_free);
-	ssl->cert->key->cert_chain = cert_chain;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
-	{
-	int i;
-	if (x == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (ssl == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
-		if (ssl->cert->pkeys[i].x509 == x)
-			return ssl->cert->pkeys[i].cert_chain;
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format,
- * possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be
- * sent to the peer in the Certificate message.
- */
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
-	{
-	BIO *in;
-	int ret=0;
-	X509 *x=NULL;
-
-	ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
-
-	in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-	if (in == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,
-				ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
-	if (x == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
-
-	if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
-		ret = 0;  /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
-	if (ret)
-		{
-		/* If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to
-		 * the CA certificates.
-		 */
-		X509 *ca;
-		int r;
-		unsigned long err;
-		
-		if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
-			{
-			sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
-			ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
-			}
-
-		while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
-					ctx->default_passwd_callback,
-					ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
-			!= NULL)
-			{
-			r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
-			if (!r) 
-				{
-				X509_free(ca);
-				ret = 0;
-				goto end;
-				}
-			/* Note that we must not free r if it was successfully
-			 * added to the chain (while we must free the main
-			 * certificate, since its reference count is increased
-			 * by SSL_CTX_use_certificate). */
-			}
-		/* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
-		err = ERR_peek_last_error();
-		if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
-			ERR_clear_error();
-		else 
-			ret = 0; /* some real error */
-		}
-
-end:
-	if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
-	if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d170852..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1189 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
-static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
-/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
-	{
-	return(ssl->session);
-	}
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
-/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
-	{
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	/* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
-	 * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
-	 * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-	sess = ssl->session;
-	if(sess)
-		sess->references++;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-	return(sess);
-	}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
-	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-	{
-	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
-			new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-	}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
-	}
-
-void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
-	{
-	return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
-	}
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
-	{
-	SSL_SESSION *ss;
-
-	ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-	if (ss == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
-	ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
-	ss->references=1;
-	ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
-	ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
-	ss->prev=NULL;
-	ss->next=NULL;
-	ss->compress_meth=0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-	ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
-	ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-	ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-#endif
-#endif
-	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
-	ss->psk_identity=NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	ss->srp_username=NULL;
-#endif
-	return(ss);
-	}
-
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
-	{
-	if(len)
-		*len = s->session_id_length;
-	return s->session_id;
-	}
-
-unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	return s->compress_meth;
-	}
-
-/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
- * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
- * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
- * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
- * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
- * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
- * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
- * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
-
-#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
-static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
-				unsigned int *id_len)
-{
-	unsigned int retry = 0;
-	do
-		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
-			return 0;
-	while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
-		(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
-	if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
-		return 1;
-	/* else - woops a session_id match */
-	/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
-	 * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
-	 * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
-	 * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
-	 * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
-	 * and make a reservation for it if it does not
-	 * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
-	 */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled (SSL *s, int creation_enabled)
-	{
-	s->session_creation_enabled = creation_enabled;
-	}
-
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
-	{
-	/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
-	unsigned int tmp;
-	SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
-	GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
-
-	/* caller should check this if they can do better error handling */
-        if (!s->session_creation_enabled) return(0);
-	if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-
-	/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
-	if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
-		ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
-	else
-		ss->timeout=s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
-
-	if (s->session != NULL)
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-		s->session=NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (session)
-		{
-		if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;
-			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
-			SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-			return(0);
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
-		if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-			{
-			ss->session_id_length = 0;
-			goto sess_id_done;
-			}
-#endif
-		/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		if(s->generate_session_id)
-			cb = s->generate_session_id;
-		else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
-			cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		/* Choose a session ID */
-		tmp = ss->session_id_length;
-		if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
-			{
-			/* The callback failed */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-				SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
-			SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
-		 * nor set it higher than it was. */
-		if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
-			{
-			/* The callback set an illegal length */
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-				SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
-			SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		/* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
-		if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
-			memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
-		else
-			ss->session_id_length = tmp;
-		/* Finally, check for a conflict */
-		if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
-						ss->session_id_length))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
-				SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
-			SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-			return(0);
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		sess_id_done:
-		if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
-			ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
-			if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
-			{
-			if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-			if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-			memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-			}
-		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
-			{
-			if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-			if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
-			memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
-			}
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		if (s->psk_identity_hint)
-			{
-			ss->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->psk_identity_hint);
-			if (ss->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		ss->session_id_length=0;
-		}
-
-	if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
-	ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
-	s->session=ss;
-	ss->ssl_version=s->version;
-	ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
- * connection. It is only called by servers.
- *
- *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
- *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
- *       extension, if any.
- *   len: the length of the session ID.
- *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   -1: error
- *    0: a session may have been found.
- *
- * Side effects:
- *   - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
- *     existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
- *   - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
- *     if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
- */
-int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-			const unsigned char *limit)
-	{
-	/* This is used only by servers. */
-
-	SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL;
-	int fatal = 0;
-	int try_session_cache = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	int r;
-#endif
-
-	if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
-		goto err;
-
-	if (len == 0)
-		try_session_cache = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
-	switch (r)
-		{
-	case -1: /* Error during processing */
-		fatal = 1;
-		goto err;
-	case 0: /* No ticket found */
-	case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
-		break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
-	case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
-	case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
-		try_session_cache = 0;
-		break;
-	default:
-		abort();
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (try_session_cache &&
-	    ret == NULL &&
-	    !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION data;
-		data.ssl_version=s->version;
-		data.session_id_length=len;
-		if (len == 0)
-			return 0;
-		memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data);
-		if (ret != NULL)
-			{
-			/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
-			CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-			}
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		if (ret == NULL)
-			s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
-		}
-
-	if (try_session_cache &&
-	    ret == NULL &&
-	    s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL)
-		{
-		int copy=1;
-	
-		if ((ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy)))
-			{
-			s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
-
-			/* Increment reference count now if the session callback
-			 * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
-			 * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
-			 * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
-			 * or things won't be thread-safe). */
-			if (copy)
-				CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
-			/* Add the externally cached session to the internal
-			 * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
-			if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
-				/* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
-				 * things are very strange */
-				SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
-
-	if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
-	    || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
-		{
-		/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't
-		 * want to use it in this context. */
-		goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
-		}
-	
-	if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
-		{
-		/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
-		 * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
-		 * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
-		 *
-		 * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
-		 * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
-		 * applications to effectively disable the session cache by
-		 * accident without anyone noticing).
-		 */
-		
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
-		fatal = 1;
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (ret->cipher == NULL)
-		{
-		unsigned char buf[5],*p;
-		unsigned long l;
-
-		p=buf;
-		l=ret->cipher_id;
-		l2n(l,p);
-		if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
-			ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
-		else 
-			ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
-		if (ret->cipher == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
-		{
-		s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
-		if (try_session_cache)
-			{
-			/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
-			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
-			}
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
-	if (s->session != NULL)
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-	s->session=ret;
-	s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
-	return 1;
-
- err:
-	if (ret != NULL)
-		{
-		SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		if (!try_session_cache)
-			{
-			/* The session was from a ticket, so we should
-			 * issue a ticket for the new session */
-			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-	if (fatal)
-		return -1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	SSL_SESSION *s;
-
-	/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
-	 * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
-	 * doubly linked list and an lhash */
-	CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-	/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
-
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	s=lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
-	
-	/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
-	 * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
-	 * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
-	if (s != NULL && s != c)
-		{
-		/* We *are* in trouble ... */
-		SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s);
-		/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
-		 * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
-		 * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
-		 * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
-		 * cache) */
-		s = NULL;
-		}
-
- 	/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
-	if (s == NULL)
-		SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
-
-	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
-		 * count because it already takes into account the cache */
-
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
-		ret=0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
-		
-		ret=1;
-
-		if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
-			{
-			while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
-				SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
-				{
-				if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
-					ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
-					break;
-				else
-					ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
-{
-	return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
-}
-
-static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
-	{
-	SSL_SESSION *r;
-	int ret=0;
-
-	if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
-		{
-		if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
-			{
-			ret=1;
-			r=lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
-			SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
-			}
-
-		if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
-		if (ret)
-			{
-			r->not_resumable=1;
-			if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
-				ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
-			SSL_SESSION_free(r);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		ret=0;
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
-	{
-	int i;
-
-	if(ss == NULL)
-	    return;
-
-	i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-	REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
-#endif
-	if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-	if (i < 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
-		abort(); /* ok */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
-	if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
-	if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
-	if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
-	if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-	if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-	ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-	if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
-	if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
-#endif
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
-	OPENSSL_free(ss);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
-	{
-	int ret=0;
-	const SSL_METHOD *meth;
-
-	if (session != NULL)
-		{
-		meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
-		if (meth == NULL)
-			meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
-		if (meth == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
-			return(0);
-			}
-
-		if (meth != s->method)
-			{
-			if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
-				return(0);
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-                if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
-                    session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
-                {
-                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
-                    memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
-                            session->krb5_client_princ_len);
-                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
-                }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-		/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
-		CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-		if (s->session != NULL)
-			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-		s->session=session;
-		s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
-		/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
-		ret=1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->session != NULL)
-			{
-			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
-			s->session=NULL;
-			}
-
-		meth=s->ctx->method;
-		if (meth != s->method)
-			{
-			if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
-				return(0);
-			}
-		ret=1;
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	s->timeout=t;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	return(s->timeout);
-	}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	return(s->time);
-	}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	s->time=t;
-	return(t);
-	}
-
-X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	return s->peer;
-	}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
-			       unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-	{
-	if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	s->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
-	memcpy(s->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-	{
-	long l;
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	l=s->session_timeout;
-	s->session_timeout=t;
-	return(l);
-	}
-
-long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	return(s->session_timeout);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
-	s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
-				  void *arg)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL) return(0);
-	s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
-	s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
-	{
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
-			s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
-			}
-
-		s->tlsext_session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
-		if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return 0;
-			}
-
-		if (ext_data)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
-			s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
-			memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
-			s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
-			}
-
-		return 1;
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-typedef struct timeout_param_st
-	{
-	SSL_CTX *ctx;
-	long time;
-	LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
-	} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
-
-static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
-	{
-	if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
-		{
-		/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
-		 * save on locking overhead */
-		(void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache,s);
-		SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
-		s->not_resumable=1;
-		if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
-			p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
-		SSL_SESSION_free(s);
-		}
-	}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
-
-void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-	{
-	unsigned long i;
-	TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
-
-	tp.ctx=s;
-	tp.cache=s->sessions;
-	if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
-	tp.time=t;
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	i=CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
-	CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=0;
-	lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
-				 TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
-	CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=i;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	}
-
-int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (	(s->session != NULL) &&
-		!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
-		!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
-		{
-		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-		return(1);
-		}
-	else
-		return(0);
-	}
-
-/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
-
-	if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
-		{ /* last element in list */
-		if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
-			{ /* only one element in list */
-			ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
-			ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
-			s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
-			{ /* first element in list */
-			ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
-			s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-			}
-		else
-			{ /* middle of list */
-			s->next->prev=s->prev;
-			s->prev->next=s->next;
-			}
-		}
-	s->prev=s->next=NULL;
-	}
-
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-	{
-	if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
-		SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
-
-	if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
-		{
-		ctx->session_cache_head=s;
-		ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
-		s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-		s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
-		s->next->prev=s;
-		s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
-		ctx->session_cache_head=s;
-		}
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess))
-	{
-	ctx->new_session_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
-	{
-	return ctx->new_session_cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess))
-	{
-	ctx->remove_session_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess)
-	{
-	return ctx->remove_session_cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
-	         unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy))
-	{
-	ctx->get_session_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
-	         unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy)
-	{
-	return ctx->get_session_cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, 
-	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
-	{
-	ctx->info_callback=cb;
-	}
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)
-	{
-	return ctx->info_callback;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey))
-	{
-	ctx->client_cert_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-	{
-	return ctx->client_cert_cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey))
-	{
-	ctx->channel_id_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-	{
-	return ctx->channel_id_cb;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
-	{
-	if (!ENGINE_init(e))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	if(!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
-		ENGINE_finish(e);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len))
-	{
-	ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-	int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len))
-	{
-	ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb=cb;
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c5a15ce5..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,564 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_stat.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (s->state)
-		{
-case SSL_ST_BEFORE: str="before SSL initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="before accept initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="before connect initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_OK: str="SSL negotiation finished successfully"; break;
-case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:	str="SSL renegotiate ciphers"; break;
-case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="before/connect initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="ok/connect SSL initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="before/accept initialization"; break;
-case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="ok/accept SSL initialization"; break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION: str="SSLv2 client start encryption"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION: str="SSLv2 server start encryption"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 write client hello A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 write client hello B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 read server hello A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 read server hello B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="SSLv2 write client master key A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="SSLv2 write client master key B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 write client finished A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 write client finished B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A: str="SSLv2 write client certificate A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B: str="SSLv2 write client certificate B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C: str="SSLv2 write client certificate C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D: str="SSLv2 write client certificate D"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="SSLv2 read server verify A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="SSLv2 read server verify B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 read server finished A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 read server finished B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 read client hello A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 read client hello B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C: str="SSLv2 read client hello C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 write server hello A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 write server hello B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="SSLv2 read client master key A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="SSLv2 read client master key B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="SSLv2 write server verify A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="SSLv2 write server verify B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C: str="SSLv2 write server verify C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 read client finished A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 read client finished B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 write server finished A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 write server finished B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A: str="SSLv2 write request certificate A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B: str="SSLv2 write request certificate B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C: str="SSLv2 write request certificate C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D: str="SSLv2 write request certificate D"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: str="SSLv2 X509 read server certificate"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: str="SSLv2 X509 read client certificate"; break;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-/* SSLv3 additions */
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv3 write client hello A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv3 write client hello B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv3 read server hello A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv3 read server hello B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:		str="SSLv3 read server certificate A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:		str="SSLv3 read server certificate B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:	str="SSLv3 read server key exchange A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:	str="SSLv3 read server key exchange B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:	str="SSLv3 read server certificate request A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:	str="SSLv3 read server certificate request B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: str="SSLv3 read server session ticket A";break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: str="SSLv3 read server session ticket B";break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:	str="SSLv3 read server done A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:	str="SSLv3 read server done B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:		str="SSLv3 write client certificate A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:		str="SSLv3 write client certificate B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:		str="SSLv3 write client certificate C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:		str="SSLv3 write client certificate D"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:	str="SSLv3 write client key exchange A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:	str="SSLv3 write client key exchange B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:	str="SSLv3 write certificate verify A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:	str="SSLv3 write certificate verify B"; break;
-
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:	str="SSLv3 write change cipher spec A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:	
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:	str="SSLv3 write change cipher spec B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:	
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:	str="SSLv3 write finished A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:	
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:	str="SSLv3 write finished B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A:	
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:	str="SSLv3 read change cipher spec A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B:	
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:	str="SSLv3 read change cipher spec B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:	
-case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:	str="SSLv3 read finished A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:	
-case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:	str="SSLv3 read finished B"; break;
-
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:		str="SSLv3 flush data"; break;
-
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv3 read client hello A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv3 read client hello B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:	str="SSLv3 read client hello C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:	str="SSLv3 write hello request A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:	str="SSLv3 write hello request B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:	str="SSLv3 write hello request C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv3 write server hello A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv3 write server hello B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:		str="SSLv3 write certificate A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:		str="SSLv3 write certificate B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:	str="SSLv3 write key exchange A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:	str="SSLv3 write key exchange B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:	str="SSLv3 write certificate request A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:	str="SSLv3 write certificate request B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: str="SSLv3 write session ticket A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: str="SSLv3 write session ticket B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:	str="SSLv3 write server done A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:	str="SSLv3 write server done B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:		str="SSLv3 read client certificate A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:		str="SSLv3 read client certificate B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:	str="SSLv3 read client key exchange A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:	str="SSLv3 read client key exchange B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:	str="SSLv3 read certificate verify B"; break;
-#endif
-
-/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
-/* client */
-case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello A"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello B"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello A"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello B"; break;
-/* server */
-case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello A"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:	str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break;
-
-/* DTLS */
-case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request B"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request A"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request B"; break;
-
-default:	str="unknown state"; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (s->rstate)
-		{
-	case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: str="read header"; break;
-	case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: str="read body"; break;
-	case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: str="read done"; break;
-	default: str="unknown"; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (s->state)
-		{
-case SSL_ST_BEFORE:				str="PINIT "; break;
-case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:				str="AINIT "; break;
-case SSL_ST_CONNECT:				str="CINIT "; break;
-case SSL_ST_OK:			 		str="SSLOK "; break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:		str="2CSENC"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION:		str="2SSENC"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A:		str="2SCH_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B:		str="2SCH_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A:		str="2GSH_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B:		str="2GSH_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:		str="2SCMKA"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:		str="2SCMKB"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:		str="2SCF_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:		str="2SCF_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A:		str="2SCC_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B:		str="2SCC_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C:		str="2SCC_C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D:		str="2SCC_D"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A:		str="2GSV_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B:		str="2GSV_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A:		str="2GSF_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B:		str="2GSF_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A:		str="2GCH_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B:		str="2GCH_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C:		str="2GCH_C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A:		str="2SSH_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B:		str="2SSH_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:		str="2GCMKA"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:		str="2GCMKA"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A:		str="2SSV_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B:		str="2SSV_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C:		str="2SSV_C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:		str="2GCF_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:		str="2GCF_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A:		str="2SSF_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B:		str="2SSF_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A:	str="2SRC_A"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B:	str="2SRC_B"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C:	str="2SRC_C"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D:	str="2SRC_D"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:	str="2X9GSC"; break;
-case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:	str="2X9GCC"; break;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-/* SSLv3 additions */
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:				str="3FLUSH"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="3WCH_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="3WCH_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:			str="3RSH_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:			str="3RSH_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:				str="3RSC_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:				str="3RSC_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:			str="3RSKEA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:			str="3RSKEB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:			str="3RCR_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:			str="3RCR_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:			str="3RSD_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:			str="3RSD_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:				str="3WCC_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:				str="3WCC_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:				str="3WCC_C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:				str="3WCC_D"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:			str="3WCKEA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:			str="3WCKEB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:			str="3WCV_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:			str="3WCV_B"; break;
-
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:			str="3WCCSA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:			str="3WCCSB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:			str="3WFINA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
-case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:			str="3WFINB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A:			str="3RCCSA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
-case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B:			str="3RCCSB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:			str="3RFINA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
-case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:			str="3RFINB"; break;
-
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:			str="3WHR_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:			str="3WHR_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:			str="3WHR_C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="3RCH_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="3RCH_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:			str="3RCH_C"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:			str="3WSH_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:			str="3WSH_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:				str="3WSC_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:				str="3WSC_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:			str="3WSKEA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:			str="3WSKEB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:			str="3WCR_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:			str="3WCR_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:			str="3WSD_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:			str="3WSD_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:				str="3RCC_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:				str="3RCC_B"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:			str="3RCKEA"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:			str="3RCKEB"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:			str="3RCV_A"; break;
-case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:			str="3RCV_B"; break;
-#endif
-
-/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
-/* client */
-case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23WCHA"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="23WCHB"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:			str="23RSHA"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:			str="23RSHA"; break;
-/* server */
-case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:			str="23RCHA"; break;
-case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:			str="23RCHB"; break;
-
-/* DTLS */
-case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DWCHVA"; break;
-case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DWCHVB"; break;
-
-default:					str="UNKWN "; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value)
-	{
-	value>>=8;
-	if (value == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
-		return("warning");
-	else if (value == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
-		return("fatal");
-	else
-		return("unknown");
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value)
-	{
-	value>>=8;
-	if (value == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
-		return("W");
-	else if (value == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
-		return("F");
-	else
-		return("U");
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (value & 0xff)
-		{
-	case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:		str="CN"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:	str="UM"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:		str="BM"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:	str="DF"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:		str="HF"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:		str="NC"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:		str="BC"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:	str="UC"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:	str="CR"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:	str="CE"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:	str="CU"; break;
-	case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:		str="IP"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:		str="DC"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:		str="RO"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:		str="CA"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:		str="AD"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:		str="DE"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:		str="CY"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:	str="ER"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:		str="PV"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:	str="IS"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:		str="IE"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:		str="US"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:		str="NR"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:	str="UE"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:	str="CO"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:		str="UN"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: str="BR"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: str="BH"; break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:	str="UP"; break;
-	default:				str="UK"; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (value & 0xff)
-		{
-	case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
-		str="close notify";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
-		str="unexpected_message";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
-		str="bad record mac";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
-		str="decompression failure";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
-		str="handshake failure";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
-		str="no certificate";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
-		str="bad certificate";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
-		str="unsupported certificate";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
-		str="certificate revoked";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
-		str="certificate expired";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
-		str="certificate unknown";
-		break;
-	case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
-		str="illegal parameter";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
-		str="decryption failed";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
-		str="record overflow";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
-		str="unknown CA";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
-		str="access denied";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
-		str="decode error";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
-		str="decrypt error";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
-		str="export restriction";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
-		str="protocol version";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
-		str="insufficient security";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-		str="internal error";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
-		str="user canceled";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
-		str="no renegotiation";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
-		str="unsupported extension";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
-		str="certificate unobtainable";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
-		str="unrecognized name";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
-		str="bad certificate status response";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
-		str="bad certificate hash value";
-		break;
-	case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
-		str="unknown PSK identity";
-		break;
-	default: str="unknown"; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
-
-const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
-	{
-	const char *str;
-
-	switch (s->rstate)
-		{
-	case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:str="RH"; break;
-	case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:	str="RB"; break;
-	case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:	str="RD"; break;
-	default: str="unknown"; break;
-		}
-	return(str);
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6479d52c..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_txt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
-	{
-	BIO *b;
-	int ret;
-
-	if ((b=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal())) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-		return(0);
-		}
-	BIO_set_fp(b,fp,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-	ret=SSL_SESSION_print(b,x);
-	BIO_free(b);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
-	{
-	unsigned int i;
-	const char *s;
-
-	if (x == NULL) goto err;
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"SSL-Session:\n") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (x->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
-		s="SSLv2";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION)
-		s="SSLv3";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		s="TLSv1.2";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		s="TLSv1.1";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION)
-		s="TLSv1";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-		s="DTLSv1";
-	else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		s="DTLSv1-bad";
-	else
-		s="unknown";
-	if (BIO_printf(bp,"    Protocol  : %s\n",s) <= 0) goto err;
-
-	if (x->cipher == NULL)
-		{
-		if (((x->cipher_id) & 0xff000000) == 0x02000000)
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"    Cipher    : %06lX\n",x->cipher_id&0xffffff) <= 0)
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"    Cipher    : %04lX\n",x->cipher_id&0xffff) <= 0)
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp,"    Cipher    : %s\n",((x->cipher == NULL)?"unknown":x->cipher->name)) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"    Session-ID: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	for (i=0; i<x->session_id_length; i++)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->session_id[i]) <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    Session-ID-ctx: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	for (i=0; i<x->sid_ctx_length; i++)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->sid_ctx[i]) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    Master-Key: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	for (i=0; i<(unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->master_key[i]) <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    Key-Arg   : ") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (x->key_arg_length == 0)
-		{
-		if (BIO_puts(bp,"None") <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		for (i=0; i<x->key_arg_length; i++)
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->key_arg[i]) <= 0) goto err;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-       if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0) goto err;
-            if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0)
-            {
-		if (BIO_puts(bp,"None") <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		for (i=0; i<x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++)
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0) goto err;
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    PSK identity: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity ? x->psk_identity : "None") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    PSK identity hint: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0) goto err;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n    SRP username: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->srp_username ? x->srp_username : "None") <= 0) goto err;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp,
-			"\n    TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)",
-			x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) <=0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-	if (x->tlsext_tick)
-		{
-		if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n    TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0) goto err;
-		if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) <= 0)
-			goto err;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (x->compress_meth != 0)
-		{
-		SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-
-		ssl_cipher_get_evp(x,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,&comp);
-		if (comp == NULL)
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"\n    Compression: %d",x->compress_meth) <= 0) goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (BIO_printf(bp,"\n    Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id,comp->method->name) <= 0) goto err;
-			}
-		}	
-#endif
-	if (x->time != 0L)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Start Time: %ld",x->time) <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	if (x->timeout != 0L)
-		{
-		if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n    Timeout   : %ld (sec)",x->timeout) <= 0) goto err;
-		}
-	if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n") <= 0) goto err;
-
-	if (BIO_puts(bp, "    Verify return code: ") <= 0) goto err;
-	if (BIO_printf(bp, "%ld (%s)\n", x->verify_result,
-		X509_verify_cert_error_string(x->verify_result)) <= 0) goto err;
-		
-	return(1);
-err:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 28fa223f..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2595 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssltest.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#define _BSD_SOURCE 1		/* Or gethostname won't be declared properly
-				   on Linux and GNU platforms. */
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500	/* Or isascii won't be declared properly on
-				   VMS (at least with DECompHP C).  */
-#endif
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-#include <openssl/srp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED	1 /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly
-				     on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C).
-				     Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes
-				     get screwed...
-				  */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
-#include <winsock.h>
-#else
-#include OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-#  define TEST_SERVER_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]SERVER.PEM"
-#  define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]CLIENT.PEM"
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
-#  define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\server.pem"
-#  define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\client.pem"
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-#  define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\server.pem"
-#  define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\client.pem"
-#else
-#  define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../apps/server.pem"
-#  define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../apps/client.pem"
-#endif
-
-/* There is really no standard for this, so let's assign some tentative
-   numbers.  In any case, these numbers are only for this test */
-#define COMP_RLE	255
-#define COMP_ZLIB	1
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export,int keylength);
-static void free_tmp_rsa(void);
-#endif
-static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-#define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument"
-struct app_verify_arg
-	{
-	char *string;
-	int app_verify;
-	int allow_proxy_certs;
-	char *proxy_auth;
-	char *proxy_cond;
-	};
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static DH *get_dh512(void);
-static DH *get_dh1024(void);
-static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void);
-#endif
-
-
-static char *psk_key=NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
-	unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-	unsigned int max_psk_len);
-static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk,
-	unsigned int max_psk_len);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-/* SRP client */
-/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_client_arg_st
-	{
-	char *srppassin;
-	char *srplogin;
-	} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
-
-#define PWD_STRLEN 1024
-
-static char * MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-	{
-	SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
-	return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
-	}
-
-/* SRP server */
-/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_server_arg_st
-	{
-	char *expected_user;
-	char *pass;
-	} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-	{
-	SRP_SERVER_ARG * p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *) arg;
-
-	if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
-		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		}
-	if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s,p->expected_user,p->pass,"1024")<0)
-		{
-		*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		}
-	return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-	}
-#endif
-
-static BIO *bio_err=NULL;
-static BIO *bio_stdout=NULL;
-
-static char *cipher=NULL;
-static int verbose=0;
-static int debug=0;
-#if 0
-/* Not used yet. */
-#ifdef FIONBIO
-static int s_nbio=0;
-#endif
-#endif
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
-
-int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl,SSL *c_ssl,long bytes,clock_t *s_time,clock_t *c_time);
-int doit(SSL *s_ssl,SSL *c_ssl,long bytes);
-static int do_test_cipherlist(void);
-static void sv_usage(void)
-	{
-	fprintf(stderr,"usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
-	fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	fprintf(stderr,"-F             - run test in FIPS mode\n");
-#endif
-	fprintf(stderr," -server_auth  - check server certificate\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -client_auth  - do client authentication\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -proxy        - allow proxy certificates\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -proxy_auth <val> - set proxy policy rights\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -proxy_cond <val> - experssion to test proxy policy rights\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -v            - more output\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -d            - debug output\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -reuse        - use session-id reuse\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -num <val>    - number of connections to perform\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -bytes <val>  - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	fprintf(stderr," -dhe1024      - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -dhe1024dsa   - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -no_dhe       - disable DHE\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	fprintf(stderr," -no_ecdhe     - disable ECDHE\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-	fprintf(stderr," -psk arg      - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	fprintf(stderr," -srpuser user  - SRP username to use\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -srppass arg   - password for 'user'\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	fprintf(stderr," -ssl2         - use SSLv2\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	fprintf(stderr," -ssl3         - use SSLv3\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
-	fprintf(stderr," -tls1         - use TLSv1\n");
-#endif
-	fprintf(stderr," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -cert arg     - Server certificate file\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -key arg      - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -c_cert arg   - Client certificate file\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -c_key arg    - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -cipher arg   - The cipher list\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -bio_pair     - Use BIO pairs\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -f            - Test even cases that can't work\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -time         - measure processor time used by client and server\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -zlib         - use zlib compression\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -rle          - use rle compression\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	fprintf(stderr," -named_curve arg  - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n" \
-	               "                 Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"  \
-	               "                 (default is sect163r2).\n");
-#endif
-	fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
-	fprintf(stderr," -cutthrough      - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
-	}
-
-static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
-	{
-	const SSL_CIPHER *ciph;
-	X509 *cert;
-		
-	ciph=SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl);
-	BIO_printf(bio_stdout,"%s%s, cipher %s %s",
-		prefix,
-		SSL_get_version(c_ssl),
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph),
-		SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph));
-	cert=SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl);
-	if (cert != NULL)
-		{
-		EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
-		if (pkey != NULL)
-			{
-			if (0) 
-				;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL
-				&& pkey->pkey.rsa->n != NULL)
-				{
-				BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit RSA",
-					BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n));
-				}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL
-				&& pkey->pkey.dsa->p != NULL)
-				{
-				BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit DSA",
-					BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p));
-				}
-#endif
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-			}
-		X509_free(cert);
-		}
-	/* The SSL API does not allow us to look at temporary RSA/DH keys,
-	 * otherwise we should print their lengths too */
-	BIO_printf(bio_stdout,"\n");
-	}
-
-static void lock_dbg_cb(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
-	{
-	static int modes[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; /* = {0, 0, ... } */
-	const char *errstr = NULL;
-	int rw;
-	
-	rw = mode & (CRYPTO_READ|CRYPTO_WRITE);
-	if (!((rw == CRYPTO_READ) || (rw == CRYPTO_WRITE)))
-		{
-		errstr = "invalid mode";
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS)
-		{
-		errstr = "type out of bounds";
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
-		{
-		if (modes[type])
-			{
-			errstr = "already locked";
-			/* must not happen in a single-threaded program
-			 * (would deadlock) */
-			goto err;
-			}
-
-		modes[type] = rw;
-		}
-	else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK)
-		{
-		if (!modes[type])
-			{
-			errstr = "not locked";
-			goto err;
-			}
-		
-		if (modes[type] != rw)
-			{
-			errstr = (rw == CRYPTO_READ) ?
-				"CRYPTO_r_unlock on write lock" :
-				"CRYPTO_w_unlock on read lock";
-			}
-
-		modes[type] = 0;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		errstr = "invalid mode";
-		goto err;
-		}
-
- err:
-	if (errstr)
-		{
-		/* we cannot use bio_err here */
-		fprintf(stderr, "openssl (lock_dbg_cb): %s (mode=%d, type=%d) at %s:%d\n",
-			errstr, mode, type, file, line);
-		}
-	}
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-struct cb_info_st { void *input; size_t len; int ret; };
-struct cb_info_st co1 = { "C", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st co2 = { "C", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st so1 = { "S", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st so2 = { "S", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
-
-int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
-	{
-	struct cb_info_st *arg = arg_;
-
-	if (arg == NULL)
-		return 1;
-	
-	if (!SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, arg->input, arg->len))
-		return 0;
-	return arg->ret;
-	}
-#endif
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-	{
-	char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
-	int badop=0;
-	int bio_pair=0;
-	int force=0;
-	int tls1=0,ssl2=0,ssl3=0,ret=1;
-	int client_auth=0;
-	int server_auth=0,i;
-	struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
-		{ APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0, 0, NULL, NULL };
-	char *server_cert=TEST_SERVER_CERT;
-	char *server_key=NULL;
-	char *client_cert=TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
-	char *client_key=NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	char *named_curve = NULL;
-#endif
-	SSL_CTX *s_ctx=NULL;
-	SSL_CTX *c_ctx=NULL;
-	const SSL_METHOD *meth=NULL;
-	SSL *c_ssl,*s_ssl;
-	int number=1,reuse=0;
-	long bytes=256L;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	DH *dh;
-	int dhe1024 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	/* client */
-	SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = {NULL,NULL};
-	/* server */
-	SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = {NULL,NULL};
-#endif
-	int no_dhe = 0;
-	int no_ecdhe = 0;
-	int no_psk = 0;
-	int print_time = 0;
-	clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0;
-	int comp = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
-	int test_cipherlist = 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	int fips_mode=0;
-#endif
-	int cutthrough = 0;
-
-	verbose = 0;
-	debug = 0;
-	cipher = 0;
-
-	bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE|BIO_FP_TEXT);	
-
-	CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(lock_dbg_cb);
-
-	/* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
-	if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off"))))
-		{
-		CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
-		CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
-		CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-		}
-	CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
-
-	RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
-	bio_stdout=BIO_new_fp(stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE|BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
-	argc--;
-	argv++;
-
-	while (argc >= 1)
-		{
-		if(!strcmp(*argv,"-F"))
-			{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-			fips_mode=1;
-#else
-			fprintf(stderr,"not compiled with FIPS support, so exitting without running.\n");
-			EXIT(0);
-#endif
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-server_auth") == 0)
-			server_auth=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-client_auth") == 0)
-			client_auth=1;
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-proxy_auth") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			app_verify_arg.proxy_auth= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-proxy_cond") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			app_verify_arg.proxy_cond= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-v") == 0)
-			verbose=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
-			debug=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-reuse") == 0)
-			reuse=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-dhe1024") == 0)
-			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-			dhe1024=1;
-#else
-			fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
-#endif
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-dhe1024dsa") == 0)
-			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-			dhe1024dsa=1;
-#else
-			fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
-#endif
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-no_dhe") == 0)
-			no_dhe=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-no_ecdhe") == 0)
-			no_ecdhe=1;
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-psk") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			psk_key=*(++argv);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-			if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key))
-				{
-				BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
-				goto bad;
-				}
-#else
-			no_psk=1;
-#endif
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-srpuser") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin= *(++argv);
-			tls1=1;
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-srppass") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin= *(++argv);
-			tls1=1;
-			}
-#endif
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
-			ssl2=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
-			tls1=1;
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
-			ssl3=1;
-		else if	(strncmp(*argv,"-num",4) == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			number= atoi(*(++argv));
-			if (number == 0) number=1;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-bytes") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			bytes= atol(*(++argv));
-			if (bytes == 0L) bytes=1L;
-			i=strlen(argv[0]);
-			if (argv[0][i-1] == 'k') bytes*=1024L;
-			if (argv[0][i-1] == 'm') bytes*=1024L*1024L;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-cert") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			server_cert= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-s_cert") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			server_cert= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-key") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			server_key= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-s_key") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			server_key= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-c_cert") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			client_cert= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-c_key") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			client_key= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			cipher= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-CApath") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			CApath= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-CAfile") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			CAfile= *(++argv);
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-bio_pair") == 0)
-			{
-			bio_pair = 1;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-f") == 0)
-			{
-			force = 1;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-time") == 0)
-			{
-			print_time = 1;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-zlib") == 0)
-			{
-			comp = COMP_ZLIB;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-rle") == 0)
-			{
-			comp = COMP_RLE;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-named_curve") == 0)
-			{
-			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH		
-			named_curve = *(++argv);
-#else
-			fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -named_curve, since I'm compiled without ECDH\n");
-			++argv;
-#endif
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-app_verify") == 0)
-			{
-			app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1;
-			}
-		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-proxy") == 0)
-			{
-			app_verify_arg.allow_proxy_certs = 1;
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-test_cipherlist") == 0)
-			{
-			test_cipherlist = 1;
-			}
-		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cutthrough") == 0)
-			{
-			cutthrough = 1;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
-			badop=1;
-			break;
-			}
-		argc--;
-		argv++;
-		}
-	if (badop)
-		{
-bad:
-		sv_usage();
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (test_cipherlist == 1)
-		{
-		/* ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit */
-		if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
-			EXIT(1);
-		ret = 0;
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work.  Use -f to perform "
-			"the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
-			"or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
-			"to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
-		EXIT(1);
-		}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if(fips_mode)
-		{
-		if(!FIPS_mode_set(1))
-			{
-			ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-			ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE));
-			EXIT(1);
-			}
-		else
-			fprintf(stderr,"*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n");
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (print_time)
-		{
-		if (!bio_pair)
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n");
-			bio_pair = 1;
-			}
-		if (number < 50 && !force)
-			fprintf(stderr, "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n");
-		}
-
-/*	if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */
-
-	SSL_library_init();
-	SSL_load_error_strings();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	if (comp == COMP_ZLIB) cm = COMP_zlib();
-	if (comp == COMP_RLE) cm = COMP_rle();
-	if (cm != NULL)
-		{
-		if (cm->type != NID_undef)
-			{
-			if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0)
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr,
-					"Failed to add compression method\n");
-				ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr,
-				"Warning: %s compression not supported\n",
-				(comp == COMP_RLE ? "rle" :
-					(comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" :
-						"unknown")));
-			ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-			}
-		}
-	ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
-	fprintf(stderr, "Available compression methods:\n");
-	{
-	int j, n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods);
-	if (n == 0)
-		fprintf(stderr, "  NONE\n");
-	else
-		for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
-			{
-			SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j);
-			fprintf(stderr, "  %d: %s\n", c->id, c->name);
-			}
-	}
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	if (ssl2)
-		meth=SSLv2_method();
-	else 
-	if (tls1)
-		meth=TLSv1_method();
-	else
-	if (ssl3)
-		meth=SSLv3_method();
-	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	if (tls1)
-		meth=TLSv1_method();
-	else
-	if (ssl3)
-		meth=SSLv3_method();
-	else
-		meth=SSLv23_method();
-#else
-	meth=SSLv2_method();
-#endif
-#endif
-
-	c_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
-	s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
-	if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL))
-		{
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (cipher != NULL)
-		{
-		SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx,cipher);
-		SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx,cipher);
-		}
-	if (cutthrough)
-		{
-		int ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
-		ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
-		SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-	if (!no_dhe)
-		{
-		if (dhe1024dsa)
-			{
-			/* use SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE to avoid small subgroup attacks */
-			SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
-			dh=get_dh1024dsa();
-			}
-		else if (dhe1024)
-			dh=get_dh1024();
-		else
-			dh=get_dh512();
-		SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx,dh);
-		DH_free(dh);
-		}
-#else
-	(void)no_dhe;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-	if (!no_ecdhe)
-		{
-		int nid;
-
-		if (named_curve != NULL)
-			{
-			nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
-			if (nid == 0)
-			{
-				BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
-				goto end;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-			nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-#else
-			nid = NID_sect163r2;
-#endif
-
-		ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
-		if (ecdh == NULL)
-			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve\n");
-			goto end;
-			}
-
-		SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx, ecdh);
-		SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
-		EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-		}
-#else
-	(void)no_ecdhe;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx,tmp_rsa_cb);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(c_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
-	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
-	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(c_ctx, &co1); /* or &co2 or NULL */
-	SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx, &so1); /* or &so2 or NULL */
-#endif
-
-	if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx,server_cert,SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
-		{
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		}
-	else if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(s_ctx,
-		(server_key?server_key:server_cert), SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
-		{
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		goto end;
-		}
-
-	if (client_auth)
-		{
-		SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx,client_cert,
-			SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
-		SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c_ctx,
-			(client_key?client_key:client_cert),
-			SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
-		}
-
-	if (	(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
-		(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
-		(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
-		(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx)))
-		{
-		/* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		/* goto end; */
-		}
-
-	if (client_auth)
-		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"client authentication\n");
-		SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
-			SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
-			verify_callback);
-		SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg);
-		}
-	if (server_auth)
-		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"server authentication\n");
-		SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx,SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
-			verify_callback);
-		SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg);
-		}
-	
-	{
-		int session_id_context = 0;
-		SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context, sizeof session_id_context);
-	}
-
-	/* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
-	if (psk_key != NULL)
-		{
-		/* no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool */
-		if (no_psk)
-			{
-			/* if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is
-			 * given, do nothing and exit successfully */
-			ret=0;
-			goto end;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-		SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
-		SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
-		if (debug)
-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
-		if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint"))
-			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
-			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-			goto end;
-			}
-#endif
-		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-        if (srp_client_arg.srplogin)
-		{
-		if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin))
-			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"Unable to set SRP username\n");
-			goto end;
-			}
-		SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx,&srp_client_arg);
-		SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
-		/*SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);*/
-		}
-
-	if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL)
-		{
-		SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,SSL_VERIFY_NONE,verify_callback);
-		SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
-		SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	c_ssl=SSL_new(c_ctx);
-	s_ssl=SSL_new(s_ctx);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	if (c_ssl  &&  c_ssl->kssl_ctx)
-                {
-                char	localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN+2];
-
-		if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost-1) == 0)
-                        {
-			localhost[sizeof localhost-1]='\0';
-			if(strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost-1)
-				{
-				BIO_printf(bio_err,"localhost name too long\n");
-				goto end;
-				}
-			kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER,
-                                localhost);
-			}
-		}
-#endif    /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5  */
-
-	for (i=0; i<number; i++)
-		{
-		if (!reuse) SSL_set_session(c_ssl,NULL);
-		if (bio_pair)
-			ret=doit_biopair(s_ssl,c_ssl,bytes,&s_time,&c_time);
-		else
-			ret=doit(s_ssl,c_ssl,bytes);
-		}
-
-	if (!verbose)
-		{
-		print_details(c_ssl, "");
-		}
-	if ((number > 1) || (bytes > 1L))
-		BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%d handshakes of %ld bytes done\n",number,bytes);
-	if (print_time)
-		{
-#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
-		/* "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned
-		 * by the clock function should be divided by the value
-		 * of the macro CLOCKS_PER_SEC."
-		 *                                       -- ISO/IEC 9899 */
-		BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n"
-			"Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n",
-			(double)s_time/CLOCKS_PER_SEC,
-			(double)c_time/CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
-#else
-		/* "`CLOCKS_PER_SEC' undeclared (first use this function)"
-		 *                            -- cc on NeXTstep/OpenStep */
-		BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
-			"Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n"
-			"Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n",
-			(double)s_time,
-			(double)c_time);
-#endif
-		}
-
-	SSL_free(s_ssl);
-	SSL_free(c_ssl);
-
-end:
-	if (s_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
-	if (c_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
-
-	if (bio_stdout != NULL) BIO_free(bio_stdout);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	free_tmp_rsa();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE_cleanup();
-#endif
-	CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-	ERR_free_strings();
-	ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
-	EVP_cleanup();
-	CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
-	if (bio_err != NULL) BIO_free(bio_err);
-	EXIT(ret);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
-	clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
-	{
-	long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
-	BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
-	BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL;
-	int ret = 1;
-	
-	size_t bufsiz = 256; /* small buffer for testing */
-
-	if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz))
-		goto err;
-	if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz))
-		goto err;
-	
-	s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
-	if (!s_ssl_bio)
-		goto err;
-
-	c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
-	if (!c_ssl_bio)
-		goto err;
-
-	SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
-	SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
-	(void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
-	SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
-	SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
-	(void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
-	do
-		{
-		/* c_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
-		 *
-		 * client:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
-		 *
-		 * client_io:          client's SSL communication; usually to be
-		 *                     relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
-		 *                     test program, we're the server, too:
-		 *
-		 * server_io:          server's SSL communication
-		 *
-		 * server:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
-		 *
-		 * s_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
-		 *
-		 * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
-		 * client + client_io, server + server_io.
-		 * BIO pairs are symmetric.  A BIO pair behaves similar
-		 * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
-		 * be handled by the same thread).
-		 * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
-		 * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
-		 * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
-		 *
-		 * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
-		 *
-		 * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio)              number of bytes we can read now
-		 * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio)     number of bytes needed to fulfil
-		 *                                      other side's read attempt
-		 * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio)   number of bytes we can write now
-		 *
-		 * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
-		 * it depends on the application which one you should use.
-		 */
-
-		/* We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
-		 * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so
-		 * we don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE
-		 * -- we just try everything in each iteration
-		 */
-
-			{
-			/* CLIENT */
-		
-			MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024*8];
-			int i, r;
-			clock_t c_clock = clock();
-
-			memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
-
-			if (debug)
-				if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
-					printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
-						SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
-
-			if (cw_num > 0)
-				{
-				/* Write to server. */
-				
-				if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf)
-					i = sizeof cbuf;
-				else
-					i = (int)cw_num;
-				r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
-				if (r < 0)
-					{
-					if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio))
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					/* BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here.
-					 * The library expects us to call BIO_write with
-					 * the same arguments again, and that's what we will
-					 * do in the next iteration. */
-					}
-				else if (r == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
-					cw_num -= r;				
-					}
-				}
-
-			if (cr_num > 0)
-				{
-				/* Read from server. */
-
-				r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
-				if (r < 0)
-					{
-					if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio))
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					/* Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored. */
-					}
-				else if (r == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("client read %d\n", r);
-					cr_num -= r;
-					}
-				}
-
-			/* c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
-			 * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals),
-			 * but sampling over a large number of connections should
-			 * result in fairly accurate figures.  We cannot guarantee
-			 * a lot, however -- if each connection lasts for exactly
-			 * one clock tick, it will be counted only for the client
-			 * or only for the server or even not at all.
-			 */
-			*c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
-			}
-
-			{
-			/* SERVER */
-		
-			MS_STATIC char sbuf[1024*8];
-			int i, r;
-			clock_t s_clock = clock();
-
-			memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
-
-			if (debug)
-				if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
-					printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
-						SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
-
-			if (sw_num > 0)
-				{
-				/* Write to client. */
-				
-				if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf)
-					i = sizeof sbuf;
-				else
-					i = (int)sw_num;
-				r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
-				if (r < 0)
-					{
-					if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio))
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					/* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
-					}
-				else if (r == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
-					sw_num -= r;				
-					}
-				}
-
-			if (sr_num > 0)
-				{
-				/* Read from client. */
-
-				r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
-				if (r < 0)
-					{
-					if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio))
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					/* blah, blah */
-					}
-				else if (r == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("server read %d\n", r);
-					sr_num -= r;
-					}
-				}
-
-			*s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
-			}
-			
-			{
-			/* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */
-
-			size_t r1, r2;
-			BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io;
-			/* we use the non-copying interface for io1
-			 * and the standard BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2
-			 */
-			
-			static int prev_progress = 1;
-			int progress = 0;
-			
-			/* io1 to io2 */
-			do
-				{
-				size_t num;
-				int r;
-
-				r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1);
-				r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2);
-
-				num = r1;
-				if (r2 < num)
-					num = r2;
-				if (num)
-					{
-					char *dataptr;
-
-					if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */
-						num = INT_MAX;
-					
-					r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
-					assert(r > 0);
-					assert(r <= (int)num);
-					/* possibly r < num (non-contiguous data) */
-					num = r;
-					r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
-					if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write "
-							"BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					progress = 1;
-
-					if (debug)
-						printf((io1 == client_io) ?
-							"C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
-							"S->C relaying: %d bytes\n",
-							(int)num);
-					}
-				}
-			while (r1 && r2);
-
-			/* io2 to io1 */
-			{
-				size_t num;
-				int r;
-
-				r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2);
-				r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1);
-				/* here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of
-				 * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter
-				 * we test restartability of the SSL implementation
-				 * more thoroughly */
-				num = r1;
-				if (r2 < num)
-					num = r2;
-				if (num)
-					{
-					char *dataptr;
-					
-					if (INT_MAX < num)
-						num = INT_MAX;
-
-					if (num > 1)
-						--num; /* test restartability even more thoroughly */
-					
-					r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr);
-					assert(r > 0);
-					if (r < (int)num)
-						num = r;
-					r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
-					if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read "
-							"BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					progress = 1;
-					r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
-					if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept "
-							"BIO_nwrite0() bytes");
-						goto err;
-						}
-					
-					if (debug)
-						printf((io2 == client_io) ?
-							"C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
-							"S->C relaying: %d bytes\n",
-							(int)num);
-					}
-			} /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now returns 0 anyway */
-
-			if (!progress && !prev_progress)
-				if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n");
-					if (strcmp("SSLv2", SSL_get_version(c_ssl)) == 0)
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr, "This can happen for SSL2 because "
-							"CLIENT-FINISHED and SERVER-VERIFY are written \n"
-							"concurrently ...");
-						if (strncmp("2SCF", SSL_state_string(c_ssl), 4) == 0
-							&& strncmp("2SSV", SSL_state_string(s_ssl), 4) == 0)
-							{
-							fprintf(stderr, " ok.\n");
-							goto end;
-							}
-						}
-					fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-			prev_progress = progress;
-			}
-		}
-	while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
-
-	if (verbose)
-		print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: ");
-end:
-	ret = 0;
-
- err:
-	ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-	
-	if (server)
-		BIO_free(server);
-	if (server_io)
-		BIO_free(server_io);
-	if (client)
-		BIO_free(client);
-	if (client_io)
-		BIO_free(client_io);
-	if (s_ssl_bio)
-		BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
-	if (c_ssl_bio)
-		BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-
-#define W_READ	1
-#define W_WRITE	2
-#define C_DONE	1
-#define S_DONE	2
-
-int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
-	{
-	MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024*8],sbuf[1024*8];
-	long cw_num=count,cr_num=count;
-	long sw_num=count,sr_num=count;
-	int ret=1;
-	BIO *c_to_s=NULL;
-	BIO *s_to_c=NULL;
-	BIO *c_bio=NULL;
-	BIO *s_bio=NULL;
-	int c_r,c_w,s_r,s_w;
-	int i,j;
-	int done=0;
-	int c_write,s_write;
-	int do_server=0,do_client=0;
-
-	memset(cbuf,0,sizeof(cbuf));
-	memset(sbuf,0,sizeof(sbuf));
-
-	c_to_s=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
-	s_to_c=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
-	if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
-		{
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	c_bio=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
-	s_bio=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
-	if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL))
-		{
-		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
-	SSL_set_bio(c_ssl,s_to_c,c_to_s);
-	BIO_set_ssl(c_bio,c_ssl,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
-	SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
-	SSL_set_bio(s_ssl,c_to_s,s_to_c);
-	BIO_set_ssl(s_bio,s_ssl,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
-	c_r=0; s_r=1;
-	c_w=1; s_w=0;
-	c_write=1,s_write=0;
-
-	/* We can always do writes */
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		do_server=0;
-		do_client=0;
-
-		i=(int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
-		if ((i && s_r) || s_w) do_server=1;
-
-		i=(int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
-		if ((i && c_r) || c_w) do_client=1;
-
-		if (do_server && debug)
-			{
-			if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
-				printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
-					SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
-/*			else if (s_write)
-				printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
-			else
-				printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
-			}
-
-		if (do_client && debug)
-			{
-			if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
-				printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
-					SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
-/*			else if (c_write)
-				printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
-			else
-				printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
-			}
-
-		if (!do_client && !do_server)
-			{
-			fprintf(stdout,"ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
-			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-			break;
-			}
-		if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE))
-			{
-			if (c_write)
-				{
-				j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
-					(int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
-				i=BIO_write(c_bio,cbuf,j);
-				if (i < 0)
-					{
-					c_r=0;
-					c_w=0;
-					if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio))
-						{
-						if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
-							c_r=1;
-						if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
-							c_w=1;
-						}
-					else
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
-						ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-						goto err;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (i == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("client wrote %d\n",i);
-					/* ok */
-					s_r=1;
-					c_write=0;
-					cw_num-=i;
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				i=BIO_read(c_bio,cbuf,sizeof(cbuf));
-				if (i < 0)
-					{
-					c_r=0;
-					c_w=0;
-					if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio))
-						{
-						if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
-							c_r=1;
-						if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
-							c_w=1;
-						}
-					else
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
-						ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-						goto err;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (i == 0)
-					{
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("client read %d\n",i);
-					cr_num-=i;
-					if (sw_num > 0)
-						{
-						s_write=1;
-						s_w=1;
-						}
-					if (cr_num <= 0)
-						{
-						s_write=1;
-						s_w=1;
-						done=S_DONE|C_DONE;
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE))
-			{
-			if (!s_write)
-				{
-				i=BIO_read(s_bio,sbuf,sizeof(cbuf));
-				if (i < 0)
-					{
-					s_r=0;
-					s_w=0;
-					if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio))
-						{
-						if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
-							s_r=1;
-						if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
-							s_w=1;
-						}
-					else
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
-						ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-						goto err;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (i == 0)
-					{
-					ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("server read %d\n",i);
-					sr_num-=i;
-					if (cw_num > 0)
-						{
-						c_write=1;
-						c_w=1;
-						}
-					if (sr_num <= 0)
-						{
-						s_write=1;
-						s_w=1;
-						c_write=0;
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
-					(int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
-				i=BIO_write(s_bio,sbuf,j);
-				if (i < 0)
-					{
-					s_r=0;
-					s_w=0;
-					if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio))
-						{
-						if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
-							s_r=1;
-						if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
-							s_w=1;
-						}
-					else
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
-						ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-						goto err;
-						}
-					}
-				else if (i == 0)
-					{
-					ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-					fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n");
-					goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (debug)
-						printf("server wrote %d\n",i);
-					sw_num-=i;
-					s_write=0;
-					c_r=1;
-					if (sw_num <= 0)
-						done|=S_DONE;
-					}
-				}
-			}
-
-		if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE)) break;
-		}
-
-	if (verbose)
-		print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: ");
-	ret=0;
-err:
-	/* We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be
-	 * OPENSSL_free()ed twice.  Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and
-	 * again when c_ssl is SSL_free()ed.
-	 * This is a hack required because s_ssl and c_ssl are sharing the same
-	 * BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and SSL_free() automatically
-	 * BIO_free non NULL entries.
-	 * You should not normally do this or be required to do this */
-	if (s_ssl != NULL)
-		{
-		s_ssl->rbio=NULL;
-		s_ssl->wbio=NULL;
-		}
-	if (c_ssl != NULL)
-		{
-		c_ssl->rbio=NULL;
-		c_ssl->wbio=NULL;
-		}
-
-	if (c_to_s != NULL) BIO_free(c_to_s);
-	if (s_to_c != NULL) BIO_free(s_to_c);
-	if (c_bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(c_bio);
-	if (s_bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s_bio);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void)
-	{
-	static volatile int idx = -1;
-	if (idx < 0)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		if (idx < 0)
-			{
-			idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
-				"SSLtest for verify callback", NULL,NULL,NULL);
-			}
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-		}
-	return idx;
-	}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	char *s,buf[256];
-
-	s=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,
-			    sizeof buf);
-	if (s != NULL)
-		{
-		if (ok)
-			fprintf(stderr,"depth=%d %s\n",
-				ctx->error_depth,buf);
-		else
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr,"depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
-				ctx->error_depth,ctx->error,buf);
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (ok == 0)
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,"Error string: %s\n",
-			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
-		switch (ctx->error)
-			{
-		case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
-		case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
-		case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
-			fprintf(stderr,"  ... ignored.\n");
-			ok=1;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if (ok == 1)
-		{
-		X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert;
-#if 0
-		X509 *xi = ctx->current_issuer;
-#endif
-
-		if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
-			{
-			unsigned int *letters =
-				X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
-					get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
-
-			if (letters)
-				{
-				int found_any = 0;
-				int i;
-				PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
-					X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo,
-						NULL, NULL);
-
-				switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage))
-					{
-				case NID_Independent:
-					/* Completely meaningless in this
-					   program, as there's no way to
-					   grant explicit rights to a
-					   specific PrC.  Basically, using
-					   id-ppl-Independent is the perfect
-					   way to grant no rights at all. */
-					fprintf(stderr, "  Independent proxy certificate");
-					for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
-						letters[i] = 0;
-					break;
-				case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
-					/* This is basically a NOP, we
-					   simply let the current rights
-					   stand as they are. */
-					fprintf(stderr, "  Proxy certificate inherits all");
-					break;
-				default:
-					s = (char *)
-						pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data;
-					i = pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length;
-
-					/* The algorithm works as follows:
-					   it is assumed that previous
-					   iterations or the initial granted
-					   rights has already set some elements
-					   of `letters'.  What we need to do is
-					   to clear those that weren't granted
-					   by the current PrC as well.  The
-					   easiest way to do this is to add 1
-					   to all the elements whose letters
-					   are given with the current policy.
-					   That way, all elements that are set
-					   by the current policy and were
-					   already set by earlier policies and
-					   through the original grant of rights
-					   will get the value 2 or higher.
-					   The last thing to do is to sweep
-					   through `letters' and keep the
-					   elements having the value 2 as set,
-					   and clear all the others. */
-
-					fprintf(stderr, "  Certificate proxy rights = %*.*s", i, i, s);
-					while(i-- > 0)
-						{
-						int c = *s++;
-						if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
-							{
-							if (islower(c))
-								c = toupper(c);
-							letters[c - 'A']++;
-							}
-						}
-					for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
-						if (letters[i] < 2)
-							letters[i] = 0;
-						else
-							letters[i] = 1;
-					}
-
-				found_any = 0;
-				fprintf(stderr,
-					", resulting proxy rights = ");
-				for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
-					if (letters[i])
-						{
-						fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
-						found_any = 1;
-						}
-				if (!found_any)
-					fprintf(stderr, "none");
-				fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-
-				PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	return(ok);
-	}
-
-static void process_proxy_debug(int indent, const char *format, ...)
-	{
-	static const char indentation[] =
-		">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"
-		">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"; /* That's 80 > */
-	char my_format[256];
-	va_list args;
-
-	BIO_snprintf(my_format, sizeof(my_format), "%*.*s %s",
-		indent, indent, indentation, format);
-
-	va_start(args, format);
-	vfprintf(stderr, my_format, args);
-	va_end(args);
-	}
-/* Priority levels:
-   0	[!]var, ()
-   1	& ^
-   2	|
-*/
-static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
-	const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent);
-static int process_proxy_cond_val(unsigned int letters[26],
-	const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
-	{
-	int c;
-	int ok = 1;
-	int negate = 0;
-
-	while(isspace((int)*cond))
-		{
-		cond++; (*pos)++;
-		}
-	c = *cond;
-
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"Start process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s\n",
-			*pos, cond);
-
-	while(c == '!')
-		{
-		negate = !negate;
-		cond++; (*pos)++;
-		while(isspace((int)*cond))
-			{
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			}
-		c = *cond;
-		}
-
-	if (c == '(')
-		{
-		cond++; (*pos)++;
-		ok = process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
-			indent + 1);
-		cond = *cond_end;
-		if (ok < 0)
-			goto end;
-		while(isspace((int)*cond))
-			{
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			}
-		c = *cond;
-		if (c != ')')
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr,
-				"Weird condition character in position %d: "
-				"%c\n", *pos, c);
-			ok = -1;
-			goto end;
-			}
-		cond++; (*pos)++;
-		}
-	else if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
-		{
-		if (islower(c))
-			c = toupper(c);
-		ok = letters[c - 'A'];
-		cond++; (*pos)++;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		fprintf(stderr,
-			"Weird condition character in position %d: "
-			"%c\n", *pos, c);
-		ok = -1;
-		goto end;
-		}
- end:
-	*cond_end = cond;
-	if (ok >= 0 && negate)
-		ok = !ok;
-
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"End process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
-			*pos, cond, ok);
-
-	return ok;
-	}
-static int process_proxy_cond_multipliers(unsigned int letters[26],
-	const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	char c;
-
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"Start process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s\n",
-			*pos, cond);
-
-	ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters, cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
-	cond = *cond_end;
-	if (ok < 0)
-		goto end;
-
-	while(ok >= 0)
-		{
-		while(isspace((int)*cond))
-			{
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			}
-		c = *cond;
-
-		switch(c)
-			{
-		case '&':
-		case '^':
-			{
-			int save_ok = ok;
-
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters,
-				cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
-			cond = *cond_end;
-			if (ok < 0)
-				break;
-
-			switch(c)
-				{
-			case '&':
-				ok &= save_ok;
-				break;
-			case '^':
-				ok ^= save_ok;
-				break;
-			default:
-				fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
-					" STOPPING\n");
-				EXIT(1);
-				}
-			}
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto end;
-			}
-		}
- end:
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"End process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
-			*pos, cond, ok);
-
-	*cond_end = cond;
-	return ok;
-	}
-static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
-	const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
-	{
-	int ok;
-	char c;
-
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"Start process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s\n",
-			*pos, cond);
-
-	ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
-		indent + 1);
-	cond = *cond_end;
-	if (ok < 0)
-		goto end;
-
-	while(ok >= 0)
-		{
-		while(isspace((int)*cond))
-			{
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			}
-		c = *cond;
-
-		switch(c)
-			{
-		case '|':
-			{
-			int save_ok = ok;
-
-			cond++; (*pos)++;
-			ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters,
-				cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
-			cond = *cond_end;
-			if (ok < 0)
-				break;
-
-			switch(c)
-				{
-			case '|':
-				ok |= save_ok;
-				break;
-			default:
-				fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
-					" STOPPING\n");
-				EXIT(1);
-				}
-			}
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto end;
-			}
-		}
- end:
-	if (debug)
-		process_proxy_debug(indent,
-			"End process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
-			*pos, cond, ok);
-
-	*cond_end = cond;
-	return ok;
-	}
-
-static int process_proxy_cond(unsigned int letters[26],
-	const char *cond, const char **cond_end)
-	{
-	int pos = 1;
-	return process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, &pos, 1);
-	}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
-	{
-	int ok=1;
-	struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg;
-	unsigned int letters[26]; /* only used with proxy_auth */
-
-	if (cb_arg->app_verify)
-		{
-		char *s = NULL,buf[256];
-
-		fprintf(stderr, "In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. ");
-		fprintf(stderr, "Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string);
-		fprintf(stderr, "Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n",
-			(void *)ctx, (void *)ctx->cert);
-		if (ctx->cert)
-			s=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert),buf,256);
-		if (s != NULL)
-			{
-			fprintf(stderr,"cert depth=%d %s\n",ctx->error_depth,buf);
-			}
-		return(1);
-		}
-	if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
-		{
-		int found_any = 0, i;
-		char *sp;
-
-		for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
-			letters[i] = 0;
-		for(sp = cb_arg->proxy_auth; *sp; sp++)
-			{
-			int c = *sp;
-			if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
-				{
-				if (islower(c))
-					c = toupper(c);
-				letters[c - 'A'] = 1;
-				}
-			}
-
-		fprintf(stderr,
-			"  Initial proxy rights = ");
-		for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
-			if (letters[i])
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
-				found_any = 1;
-				}
-		if (!found_any)
-			fprintf(stderr, "none");
-		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
-			get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(),letters);
-		}
-	if (cb_arg->allow_proxy_certs)
-		{
-		X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
-	ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
-#endif
-
-	if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
-		{
-		if (ok > 0)
-			{
-			const char *cond_end = NULL;
-
-			ok = process_proxy_cond(letters,
-				cb_arg->proxy_cond, &cond_end);
-
-			if (ok < 0)
-				EXIT(3);
-			if (*cond_end)
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr, "Stopped processing condition before it's end.\n");
-				ok = 0;
-				}
-			if (!ok)
-				fprintf(stderr, "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved invalid\n",
-					cb_arg->proxy_cond);
-			else
-				fprintf(stderr, "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved valid\n",
-					cb_arg->proxy_cond);
-			}
-		}
-	return(ok);
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA *rsa_tmp=NULL;
-
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
-	if (rsa_tmp == NULL)
-		{
-		bn = BN_new();
-		rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
-		if(!bn || !rsa_tmp || !BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4))
-			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory error...");
-			goto end;
-			}
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...",keylength);
-		(void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
-		if(!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp,keylength,bn,NULL))
-			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error generating key.");
-			RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
-			rsa_tmp = NULL;
-			}
-end:
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
-		(void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
-		}
-	if(bn) BN_free(bn);
-	return(rsa_tmp);
-	}
-
-static void free_tmp_rsa(void)
-	{
-	if (rsa_tmp != NULL)
-		{
-		RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
-		rsa_tmp = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* These DH parameters have been generated as follows:
- *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512
- *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024
- *    $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024
- * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.)
- */
-static DH *get_dh512()
-	{
-	static unsigned char dh512_p[]={
-		0xCB,0xC8,0xE1,0x86,0xD0,0x1F,0x94,0x17,0xA6,0x99,0xF0,0xC6,
-		0x1F,0x0D,0xAC,0xB6,0x25,0x3E,0x06,0x39,0xCA,0x72,0x04,0xB0,
-		0x6E,0xDA,0xC0,0x61,0xE6,0x7A,0x77,0x25,0xE8,0x3B,0xB9,0x5F,
-		0x9A,0xB6,0xB5,0xFE,0x99,0x0B,0xA1,0x93,0x4E,0x35,0x33,0xB8,
-		0xE1,0xF1,0x13,0x4F,0x59,0x1A,0xD2,0x57,0xC0,0x26,0x21,0x33,
-		0x02,0xC5,0xAE,0x23,
-		};
-	static unsigned char dh512_g[]={
-		0x02,
-		};
-	DH *dh;
-
-	if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
-	dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh512_p,sizeof(dh512_p),NULL);
-	dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh512_g,sizeof(dh512_g),NULL);
-	if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
-		{ DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
-	return(dh);
-	}
-
-static DH *get_dh1024()
-	{
-	static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
-		0xF8,0x81,0x89,0x7D,0x14,0x24,0xC5,0xD1,0xE6,0xF7,0xBF,0x3A,
-		0xE4,0x90,0xF4,0xFC,0x73,0xFB,0x34,0xB5,0xFA,0x4C,0x56,0xA2,
-		0xEA,0xA7,0xE9,0xC0,0xC0,0xCE,0x89,0xE1,0xFA,0x63,0x3F,0xB0,
-		0x6B,0x32,0x66,0xF1,0xD1,0x7B,0xB0,0x00,0x8F,0xCA,0x87,0xC2,
-		0xAE,0x98,0x89,0x26,0x17,0xC2,0x05,0xD2,0xEC,0x08,0xD0,0x8C,
-		0xFF,0x17,0x52,0x8C,0xC5,0x07,0x93,0x03,0xB1,0xF6,0x2F,0xB8,
-		0x1C,0x52,0x47,0x27,0x1B,0xDB,0xD1,0x8D,0x9D,0x69,0x1D,0x52,
-		0x4B,0x32,0x81,0xAA,0x7F,0x00,0xC8,0xDC,0xE6,0xD9,0xCC,0xC1,
-		0x11,0x2D,0x37,0x34,0x6C,0xEA,0x02,0x97,0x4B,0x0E,0xBB,0xB1,
-		0x71,0x33,0x09,0x15,0xFD,0xDD,0x23,0x87,0x07,0x5E,0x89,0xAB,
-		0x6B,0x7C,0x5F,0xEC,0xA6,0x24,0xDC,0x53,
-		};
-	static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={
-		0x02,
-		};
-	DH *dh;
-
-	if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
-	dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p,sizeof(dh1024_p),NULL);
-	dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g,sizeof(dh1024_g),NULL);
-	if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
-		{ DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
-	return(dh);
-	}
-
-static DH *get_dh1024dsa()
-	{
-	static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
-		0xC8,0x00,0xF7,0x08,0x07,0x89,0x4D,0x90,0x53,0xF3,0xD5,0x00,
-		0x21,0x1B,0xF7,0x31,0xA6,0xA2,0xDA,0x23,0x9A,0xC7,0x87,0x19,
-		0x3B,0x47,0xB6,0x8C,0x04,0x6F,0xFF,0xC6,0x9B,0xB8,0x65,0xD2,
-		0xC2,0x5F,0x31,0x83,0x4A,0xA7,0x5F,0x2F,0x88,0x38,0xB6,0x55,
-		0xCF,0xD9,0x87,0x6D,0x6F,0x9F,0xDA,0xAC,0xA6,0x48,0xAF,0xFC,
-		0x33,0x84,0x37,0x5B,0x82,0x4A,0x31,0x5D,0xE7,0xBD,0x52,0x97,
-		0xA1,0x77,0xBF,0x10,0x9E,0x37,0xEA,0x64,0xFA,0xCA,0x28,0x8D,
-		0x9D,0x3B,0xD2,0x6E,0x09,0x5C,0x68,0xC7,0x45,0x90,0xFD,0xBB,
-		0x70,0xC9,0x3A,0xBB,0xDF,0xD4,0x21,0x0F,0xC4,0x6A,0x3C,0xF6,
-		0x61,0xCF,0x3F,0xD6,0x13,0xF1,0x5F,0xBC,0xCF,0xBC,0x26,0x9E,
-		0xBC,0x0B,0xBD,0xAB,0x5D,0xC9,0x54,0x39,
-		};
-	static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={
-		0x3B,0x40,0x86,0xE7,0xF3,0x6C,0xDE,0x67,0x1C,0xCC,0x80,0x05,
-		0x5A,0xDF,0xFE,0xBD,0x20,0x27,0x74,0x6C,0x24,0xC9,0x03,0xF3,
-		0xE1,0x8D,0xC3,0x7D,0x98,0x27,0x40,0x08,0xB8,0x8C,0x6A,0xE9,
-		0xBB,0x1A,0x3A,0xD6,0x86,0x83,0x5E,0x72,0x41,0xCE,0x85,0x3C,
-		0xD2,0xB3,0xFC,0x13,0xCE,0x37,0x81,0x9E,0x4C,0x1C,0x7B,0x65,
-		0xD3,0xE6,0xA6,0x00,0xF5,0x5A,0x95,0x43,0x5E,0x81,0xCF,0x60,
-		0xA2,0x23,0xFC,0x36,0xA7,0x5D,0x7A,0x4C,0x06,0x91,0x6E,0xF6,
-		0x57,0xEE,0x36,0xCB,0x06,0xEA,0xF5,0x3D,0x95,0x49,0xCB,0xA7,
-		0xDD,0x81,0xDF,0x80,0x09,0x4A,0x97,0x4D,0xA8,0x22,0x72,0xA1,
-		0x7F,0xC4,0x70,0x56,0x70,0xE8,0x20,0x10,0x18,0x8F,0x2E,0x60,
-		0x07,0xE7,0x68,0x1A,0x82,0x5D,0x32,0xA2,
-		};
-	DH *dh;
-
-	if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
-	dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p,sizeof(dh1024_p),NULL);
-	dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g,sizeof(dh1024_g),NULL);
-	if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
-		{ DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
-	dh->length = 160;
-	return(dh);
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-/* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */
-static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
-	unsigned int max_psk_len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
-
-	ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
-	if (!ret)
-		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n", pskkey); 
-		if (bn)
-			BN_free(bn);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len)
-		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
-			max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
-		BN_free(bn);
-		return 0;
-		}
-	ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
-	BN_free(bn);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
-	unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
-	unsigned int max_psk_len)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-
-	ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity");
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_err;
-	if (debug)
-		fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret);
-	ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_err;
-	psk_len = ret;
-out_err:
-	return psk_len;
-	}
-
-static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
-	unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)
-	{
-	unsigned int psk_len=0;
-
-	if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0)
-		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n");
-		return 0;
-		}
-	psk_len=psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
-	return psk_len;
-	}
-#endif
-
-static int do_test_cipherlist(void)
-	{
-	int i = 0;
-	const SSL_METHOD *meth;
-	const SSL_CIPHER *ci, *tci = NULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-	fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv2 cipher list order: ");
-	meth = SSLv2_method();
-	while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
-		{
-		if (tci != NULL)
-			if (ci->id >= tci->id)
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
-				return 0;
-				}
-		tci = ci;
-		}
-	fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
-	fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv3 cipher list order: ");
-	meth = SSLv3_method();
-	tci = NULL;
-	while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
-		{
-		if (tci != NULL)
-			if (ci->id >= tci->id)
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
-				return 0;
-				}
-		tci = ci;
-		}
-	fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
-	fprintf(stderr, "testing TLSv1 cipher list order: ");
-	meth = TLSv1_method();
-	tci = NULL;
-	while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
-		{
-		if (tci != NULL)
-			if (ci->id >= tci->id)
-				{
-				fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
-				return 0;
-				}
-		tci = ci;
-		}
-	fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-
-	return 1;
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 578617ed..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_2_client_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_1_client_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_client_method();
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_client_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_client_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_client_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_client_method)
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 455992ad..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1276 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-#include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-			int sec_len,
-			const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-			const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-			const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-			const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-			const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-			unsigned char *out, int olen)
-	{
-	int chunk;
-	size_t j;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
-	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	size_t A1_len;
-	int ret = 0;
-	
-	chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
-	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-	if (!mac_key)
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-		goto err;
-
-	for (;;)
-		{
-		/* Reinit mac contexts */
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
-			goto err;
-
-		if (olen > chunk)
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
-				goto err;
-			out+=j;
-			olen-=j;
-			/* calc the next A1 value */
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
-				goto err;
-			}
-		else	/* last one */
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
-				goto err;
-			memcpy(out,A1,olen);
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
-		     const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-		     const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-		     const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-		     const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-		     const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-		     const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
-		     unsigned char *out1,
-		     unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-	{
-	int len,i,idx,count;
-	const unsigned char *S1;
-	long m;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-	count=0;
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
-	}	
-	len=slen/count;
-	if (count == 1)
-		slen = 0;
-	S1=sec;
-	memset(out1,0,olen);
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
-			if (!md) {
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
-				SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-				goto err;				
-			}
-			if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
-					seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
-					out2,olen))
-				goto err;
-			S1+=len;
-			for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
-			{
-				out1[i]^=out2[i];
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	return ret;
-}
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
-	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-	{
-	int ret;
-	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 NULL,0,NULL,0,
-		 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		 km,tmp,num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
-                s->session->master_key_length);
-	{
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
-                {
-                printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
-                }
-        printf("\n");  }
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-	{
-	static const unsigned char empty[]="";
-	unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
-	unsigned char *exp_label;
-	unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-	unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-	unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
-	int client_write;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	const SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-	const EVP_MD *m;
-	int mac_type;
-	int *mac_secret_size;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
-	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-	int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
-	int reuse_dd = 0;
-
-	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
-	mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
-	printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
-	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
-	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
-	       comp);
-	printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
-	printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
-                c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
-	printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
-	{
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
-        }
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-		else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
-			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		else
-			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
-		mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (s->expand != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-			s->expand=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->expand == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				goto err2;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
-					OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
-			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				goto err;
-			}
-#endif
-		/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- 		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-		mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-			else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-			{
-			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-			if (!mac_ctx)
-				goto err;
-			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-			}
-		else
-			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (s->compress != NULL)
-			{
-			COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-			s->compress=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->compress == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
-				goto err2;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- 		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
-		mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
-		}
-
-	if (reuse_dd)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
-	p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-	i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
-	cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-	j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
-	               cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
-	/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-	/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-		k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-	else
-		k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
-		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
-		{
-		ms=  &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
-		exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-		exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-		client_write=1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		n=i;
-		ms=  &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k;
-		exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-		exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-		client_write=0;
-		}
-
-	if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err2;
-		}
-
-	memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-
-	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
-		{
-		mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-				mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-		}
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-	if (is_export)
-		{
-		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
-		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
-		 */
-		if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-				exp_label,exp_label_len,
-				s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				NULL,0,NULL,0,
-				key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-			goto err2;
-		key=tmp1;
-
-		if (k > 0)
-			{
-			if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-					TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
-					s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					NULL,0,NULL,0,
-					empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
-				goto err2;
-			if (client_write)
-				iv=iv1;
-			else
-				iv= &(iv1[k]);
-			}
-		}
-
-	s->session->key_arg_length=0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	{
-        int i;
-	printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
-	printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-		{
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
-		}
-	else	
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
-	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-				*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
-	return(1);
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err2:
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-	const EVP_MD *hash;
-	int num;
-	SSL_COMP *comp;
-	int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
-	int ret=0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-		return(1);
-
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-	num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-	num*=2;
-
-	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-	if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
-
-	if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("pre-master\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
-		goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-#endif
-
-	if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION &&
-	    (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0)
-		{
-		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
-		 */
-		s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
-
-		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
-			{
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
-			
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
-#endif
-			}
-		}
-		
-	ret = 1;
-err:
-	if (p2)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(p2);
-		}
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occured.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			{
-			int ivlen;
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
-			else
-				ivlen = 0;
-			if (ivlen > 1)
-				{
-				if ( rec->data != rec->input)
-					/* we can't write into the input stream:
-					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
-					 */
-					fprintf(stderr,
-						"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-						__FILE__, __LINE__);
-				else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
-					return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
-		{
-		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-		rec->input=rec->data;
-		ret = 1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		l=rec->length;
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-			{
-			unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
-
-			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				{
-				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-				s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
-				memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
-				memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				memcpy(buf,seq,8);
-				for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
-					{
-					++seq[i];
-					if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-					}
-				}
-
-			buf[8]=rec->type;
-			buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
-			buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
-			buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
-			buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
-			pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
-			if (send)
-				{
-				l+=pad;
-				rec->length+=pad;
-				}
-			}
-		else if ((bs != 1) && send)
-			{
-			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
-
-			/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-			/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-			j=i-1;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					j++;
-				}
-			for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
-				rec->input[k]=j;
-			l+=i;
-			rec->length+=i;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-		unsigned long ui;
-		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-			ds->cipher->iv_len);
-		printf("\t\tIV: ");
-		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-		printf("\n");
-		printf("\trec->input=");
-		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-		printf("\n");
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		if (!send)
-			{
-			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return 0;
-			}
-		
-		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-						?(i<0)
-						:(i==0))
-			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
-			{
-			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			}
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-		{
-		unsigned long i;
-		printf("\trec->data=");
-		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-		}
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-		ret = 1;
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-		if (pad && !send)
-			rec->length -= pad;
-		}
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-	{
-	unsigned int ret;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
-	int i;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-		{
-		  if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
-		  	{
-		  	d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	if (!d) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-		return 0;
-	}	
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	return((int)ret);
-	}
-
-/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
- * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
- * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
- * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
- * update etc. */
-int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
-	{
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	int i, err = 0, len = 0;
-	long mask;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-	for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++)
-		{
-		int hash_size;
-		unsigned int digest_len;
-		EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-
-		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0)
-			continue;
-
-		hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
-		if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len)
-			{
-			err = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-
-		if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-		    !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
-		    digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */
-			{
-			err = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-		out += digest_len;
-		out_len -= digest_len;
-		len += digest_len;
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	if (err != 0)
-		return -1;
-	return len;
-	}
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
-	     const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-	{
-	unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char buf2[12];
-	int err=0;
-	int digests_len;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (digests_len < 0)
-		{
-		err = 1;
-		digests_len = 0;
-		}
-
-	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-			str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
-			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
-		err = 1;
-
-	if (err)
-		return 0;
-	else
-		return sizeof buf2;
-	}
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-	{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	unsigned char *seq;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size, orig_len;
-	int i;
-	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char header[13];
-	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
-	int t;
-
-	if (send)
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->write_hash;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->read_hash;
-		}
-
-	t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-	md_size=t;
-
-	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-	if (stream_mac) 
-		{
-			mac_ctx = hash;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
-				return -1;
-			mac_ctx = &hmac;
-		}
-
-	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
-		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
-
-		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-		}
-	else
-		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
-	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
-	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
-	rec->type &= 0xff;
-
-	header[8]=rec->type;
-	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
-	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
-
-	if (!send &&
-	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
-		{
-		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
-		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
-		 * timing-oracle. */
-		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-			mac_ctx,
-			md, &md_size,
-			header, rec->input,
-			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
-			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
-			tls_fips_digest_extra(
-	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-					mac_ctx, rec->input,
-					rec->length, orig_len);
-#endif
-		}
-		
-	if (!stream_mac)
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-
-	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
-			{
-			++seq[i];
-			if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-			}
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-	return(md_size);
-	}
-
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-	     int len)
-	{
-	unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-	const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
-	int col = 0, sol = 0;
-
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
-	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
-		{
-		co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
-		col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-		so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
-		sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
-		}
-#endif
-
-	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-		s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		co, col,
-		s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		so, sol,
-		p,len,
-		s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-	fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
-	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-	}
-
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buff;
-	unsigned char *val = NULL;
-	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
-	int rv;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
-
-	/* construct PRF arguments
-	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
-	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
-	 * does not create a prohibited label.
-	 */
-	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-	if (use_context)
-		{
-		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-		}
-
-	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
-	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
-	currentvalpos = 0;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
-	currentvalpos += llen;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	if (use_context)
-		{
-		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
-			{
-			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-			}
-		}
-
-	/* disallow prohibited labels
-	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
-	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
-	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
-	 */
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
-
-	rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		      val, vallen,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		      out,buff,olen);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	goto ret;
-err1:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
-	rv = 0;
-	goto ret;
-err2:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	rv = 0;
-ret:
-	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
-	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
-	return(rv);
-	}
-
-int tls1_alert_code(int code)
-	{
-	switch (code)
-		{
-	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:	return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:	return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:	return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
-	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:	return(-1);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:	return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:		return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
-	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:	return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
-	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:	return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
-	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:	return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:	return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:	return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:	return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
-	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
-					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
-	default:			return(-1);
-		}
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d0b893b5..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2990 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
-				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
-				SSL_SESSION **psess);
-#endif
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
-	tls1_enc,
-	tls1_mac,
-	tls1_setup_key_block,
-	tls1_generate_master_secret,
-	tls1_change_cipher_state,
-	tls1_final_finish_mac,
-	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
-	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
-	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	tls1_alert_code,
-	tls1_export_keying_material,
-	};
-
-long tls1_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
-	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
-	return(60*60*2);
-	}
-
-int tls1_new(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
-	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-void tls1_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-	if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-	ssl3_free(s);
-	}
-
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version = s->method->version;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
-static int nid_list[] =
-	{
-		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
-		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
-		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
-		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
-		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
-		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
-		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
-		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-		NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
-	};
-
-static int pref_list[] =
-	{
-		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-		NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
-		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
-		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
-		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
-		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
-		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
-		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
-		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
-		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-	};
-
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
-	{
-	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
-	if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
-				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
-		return 0;
-	return nid_list[curve_id-1];
-	}
-
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
-	{
-	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
-	switch (nid)
-		{
-	case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
-		return 1;
-	case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
-		return 2;
-	case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
-		return 3;
-	case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-		return 4;
-	case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-		return 5;
-	case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
-		return 6;
-	case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-		return 7;
-	case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-		return 8;
-	case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
-		return 9;
-	case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-		return 10;
-	case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-		return 11;
-	case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
-		return 12;
-	case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-		return 13;
-	case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-		return 14;
-	case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
-		return 15;
-	case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-		return 16;
-	case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-		return 17;
-	case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
-		return 18;
-	case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-		return 19;
-	case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-		return 20;
-	case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
-		return 21;
-	case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-		return 22;
-	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-		return 23;
-	case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
-		return 24;
-	case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
-		return 25;
-	default:
-		return 0;
-		}
-	}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
-#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
-#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
-#else
-#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-#endif
-
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
-		tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
-		tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
-		tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
-static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
-	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
-	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
-#endif
-};
-
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-	{
-	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-	if (p)
-		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
-	return (int)slen;
-	}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
-	{
-	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *orig = buf;
-	unsigned char *ret = buf;
-
-	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
-	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
-					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return orig;
-
-	ret+=2;
-
-	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- 	if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-		{ 
-		/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
-		unsigned long size_str;
-		long lenmax; 
-
-		/* check for enough space.
-		   4 for the servername type and entension length
-		   2 for servernamelist length
-		   1 for the hostname type
-		   2 for hostname length
-		   + hostname length 
-		*/
-		   
-		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 
-		    || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 
-			return NULL;
-			
-		/* extension type and length */
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 
-		s2n(size_str+5,ret);
-		
-		/* length of servername list */
-		s2n(size_str+3,ret);
-	
-		/* hostname type, length and hostname */
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
-		s2n(size_str,ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
-		ret+=size_str;
-		}
-
-        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
-        if (s->renegotiate)
-          {
-          int el;
-          
-          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
-              {
-              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-              return NULL;
-              }
-
-          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-          
-          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
-          s2n(el,ret);
-
-          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
-              {
-              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-              return NULL;
-              }
-
-          ret += el;
-        }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	/* Add SRP username if there is one */
-	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
-		{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
-
-		int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);	
-		if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			} 
-
-		/* check for enough space.
-		   4 for the srp type type and entension length
-		   1 for the srp user identity
-		   + srp user identity length 
-		*/
-		if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 
-
-		/* fill in the extension */
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
-		s2n(login_len+1,ret);
-		(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
-		memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
-		ret+=login_len;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
-		{
-		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
-		long lenmax; 
-
-		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
-		{
-		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
-		long lenmax; 
-
-		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 
-		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
-
-		/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
-		 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
-		 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
-		 * resolves this to two bytes.
-		 */
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
-		ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
-		{
-		int ticklen;
-		if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
-			ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
-		else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
-			 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
-			{
-			ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
-			s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
-			if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
-				return NULL;
-			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
-			       s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
-			       ticklen);
-			s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-			}
-		else
-			ticklen = 0;
-		if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
-		    s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
-			goto skip_ext;
-		/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
- 		 * rest for ticket
-  		 */
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 
-		s2n(ticklen,ret);
-		if (ticklen)
-			{
-			memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
-			ret += ticklen;
-			}
-		}
-		skip_ext:
-
-	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		{
-		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
-			return NULL; 
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
-		memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
-		ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
-		
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
-			return NULL;
-		if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
-			return NULL;
-
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
-		s2n(col + 2, ret);
-		s2n(col, ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
-		ret += col;
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		int i;
-		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
-		OCSP_RESPID *id;
-
-		idlen = 0;
-		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
-			{
-			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
-			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
-			if (itmp <= 0)
-				return NULL;
-			idlen += itmp + 2;
-			}
-
-		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
-			{
-			extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
-			if (extlen < 0)
-				return NULL;
-			}
-		else
-			extlen = 0;
-			
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
-		if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
-		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
-		s2n(idlen, ret);
-		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
-			{
-			/* save position of id len */
-			unsigned char *q = ret;
-			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
-			/* skip over id len */
-			ret += 2;
-			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
-			/* write id len */
-			s2n(itmp, q);
-			}
-		s2n(extlen, ret);
-		if (extlen > 0)
-			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* Add Heartbeat extension */
-	if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
-		return NULL;
-	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
-	s2n(1,ret);
-	/* Set mode:
-	 * 1: peer may send requests
-	 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
-	 */
-	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
-		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
-	else
-		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
-		{
-		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
-		 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
-		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-#endif
-
-	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
-		{
-		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
-		 * support for Channel ID. */
-		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
-		else
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-
-	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
-		{
-		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
-		s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
-		s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
-		       s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
-		ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
-                {
-                int el;
-
-                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-                
-                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
-                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
-                s2n(el,ret);
-
-                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-                ret += el;
-                }
-#endif
-	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
-	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
-	 *
-	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
-	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
-	 */
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
-		{
-		int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-		/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
-		 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
-		 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
-		 */
-		if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-			hlen -= 5;
-		if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
-			{
-			hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
-			if (hlen >= 4)
-				hlen -= 4;
-			else
-				hlen = 0;
-
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
-			s2n(hlen, ret);
-			memset(ret, 0, hlen);
-			ret += hlen;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
-		return orig;
-
-	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
-	{
-	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *orig = buf;
-	unsigned char *ret = buf;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-
-	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
-	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-		return orig;
-	
-	ret+=2;
-	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
-	if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-		{ 
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
-
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-
-	if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-        {
-          int el;
-          
-          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
-              {
-              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-              return NULL;
-              }
-
-          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-          
-          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
-          s2n(el,ret);
-
-          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
-              {
-              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-              return NULL;
-              }
-
-          ret += el;
-        }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
-		{
-		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
-		long lenmax; 
-
-		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-		
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-
-		}
-	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
-		&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
-		{ 
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-
-	if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
-		{ 
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-		{
-		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-		
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
-			return NULL;
-
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
-		s2n(sol + 2, ret);
-		s2n(sol, ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
-		ret += sol;
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-	if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
-                {
-                int el;
-
-                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-                
-                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
-                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
-                s2n(el,ret);
-
-                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return NULL;
-			}
-                ret+=el;
-                }
-#endif
-
-	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
-		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
-		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
-			0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
-			0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
-			0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 
-			0x03,   0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 
-			0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 
-			0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
-			if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
-			memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
-			ret+=36;
-
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
-	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
-		{
-		if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
-		s2n(1,ret);
-		/* Set mode:
-		 * 1: peer may send requests
-		 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
-		 */
-		if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
-			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
-		else
-			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-
-		}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-	if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
-		{
-		const unsigned char *npa;
-		unsigned int npalen;
-		int r;
-
-		r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
-		if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-			{
-			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-			s2n(npalen,ret);
-			memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
-			ret += npalen;
-			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
-	 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
-	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
-		{
-		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
-		else
-			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-
-	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-		{
-		const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
-		unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-
-		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
-		s2n(3 + len,ret);
-		s2n(1 + len,ret);
-		*ret++ = len;
-		memcpy(ret, selected, len);
-		ret += len;
-		}
-
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
-		return orig;
-
-	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- *   SNI,
- *   elliptic_curves
- *   ec_point_formats
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
-	unsigned short type, size;
-	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
-		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
-		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
-		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
-		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
-		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
-		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
-
-		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
-		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
-		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
-		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
-	};
-
-	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
-	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
-		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
-		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
-		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
-		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
-		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
-		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
-		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
-		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
-	};
-
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		return;
-	data += 2;
-
-	if (data > (d+n-4))
-		return;
-	n2s(data,type);
-	n2s(data,size);
-
-	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-		return;
-
-	if (data+size > d+n)
-		return;
-	data += size;
-
-	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		{
-		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
-		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
-			return;
-		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
-			return;
-		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
-			return;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
-		if (data + len != d+n)
-			return;
-		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
-			return;
-		}
-
-	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello.
- *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
- *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
- *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
- *       return.
- *
- *   returns: 0 on success. */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-					 unsigned data_len, int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned i;
-	unsigned proto_len;
-	const unsigned char *selected;
-	unsigned char selected_len;
-	int r;
-
-	if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (data_len < 2)
-		goto parse_error;
-
-	/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
-	 * length-prefixed strings. */
-	i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
-	    ((unsigned) data[1]);
-	data_len -= 2;
-	data += 2;
-	if (data_len != i)
-		goto parse_error;
-
-	if (data_len < 2)
-		goto parse_error;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
-		{
-		proto_len = data[i];
-		i++;
-
-		if (proto_len == 0)
-			goto parse_error;
-
-		if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
-			goto parse_error;
-
-		i += proto_len;
-		}
-
-	r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
-				   s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
-	if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-		if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-		s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
-		if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
-			{
-			*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			return -1;
-			}
-		memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
-		s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-	}
-	return 0;
-
-parse_error:
-	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned short type;
-	unsigned short size;
-	unsigned short len;
-	unsigned char *data = *p;
-	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-	int sigalg_seen = 0;
-
-	s->servername_done = 0;
-	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-
-	/* Reset TLS 1.2 digest functions to defaults because they don't carry
-	 * over to a renegotiation. */
-	s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL;
-	s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL;
-	s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
-	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
-	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
-		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		goto ri_check;
-	n2s(data,len);
-
-	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-		goto ri_check;
-
-	while (data <= (d+n-4))
-		{
-		n2s(data,type);
-		n2s(data,size);
-
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		goto ri_check;
-#if 0
-		fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
-#endif
-		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
-						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
-   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
-   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
-     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
-   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
-   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
-     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
-   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
-     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
-     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
-     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
-     case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
-     a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
-     presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
-     the value of the Host: field. 
-   - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-     if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
-     i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 
-   - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 
-
-*/      
-
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata;
-			int servname_type;
-			int dsize; 
-		
-			if (size < 2) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			n2s(data,dsize);  
-			size -= 2;
-			if (dsize > size  ) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				} 
-
-			sdata = data;
-			while (dsize > 3) 
-				{
-	 			servname_type = *(sdata++); 
-				n2s(sdata,len);
-				dsize -= 3;
-
-				if (len > dsize) 
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				if (s->servername_done == 0)
-				switch (servname_type)
-					{
-				case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
-					if (!s->hit)
-						{
-						if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
-							{
-							*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-							return 0;
-							}
-						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
-							{
-							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-							return 0;
-							}
-						if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
-							{
-							*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-							return 0;
-							}
-						memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
-						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
-						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
-							OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
-							s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-							return 0;
-						}
-						s->servername_done = 1; 
-
-						}
-					else 
-						s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
-							&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
-							&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
-					
-					break;
-
-				default:
-					break;
-					}
-				 
-				dsize -= len;
-				}
-			if (dsize != 0) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
-			{
-			if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
-				return -1;
-			memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
-			s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
-  
-			if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata = data;
-			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (!s->hit)
-				{
-				if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
-					{
-					OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-					s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
-					}
-				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
-					{
-					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
-				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
-				}
-#if 0
-			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
-				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
-			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
-			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata = data;
-			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
-			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
-
-			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
-				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (!s->hit)
-				{
-				if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
-					{
-					*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-				if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
-					{
-					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
-				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
-				}
-#if 0
-			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
-			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
-			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
-				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
-			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
-			if (size < 2)
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
-				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
-				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
-			else
-				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
-			{
-			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
-			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
-			{
-			if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
-				return 0;
-			renegotiate_seen = 1;
-			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
-			{
-			int dsize;
-			if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			sigalg_seen = 1;
-			n2s(data,dsize);
-			size -= 2;
-			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize);
-			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-		
-			if (size < 5) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-
-			s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
-			size--;
-			if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
-				{
-				const unsigned char *sdata;
-				int dsize;
-				/* Read in responder_id_list */
-				n2s(data,dsize);
-				size -= 2;
-				if (dsize > size  ) 
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				while (dsize > 0)
-					{
-					OCSP_RESPID *id;
-					int idsize;
-					if (dsize < 4)
-						{
-						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					n2s(data, idsize);
-					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
-					size -= 2 + idsize;
-					if (dsize < 0)
-						{
-						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					sdata = data;
-					data += idsize;
-					id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
-								&sdata, idsize);
-					if (!id)
-						{
-						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					if (data != sdata)
-						{
-						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
-						&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
-						sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
-						{
-						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
-							s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
-						{
-						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
-						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					}
-
-				/* Read in request_extensions */
-				if (size < 2)
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				n2s(data,dsize);
-				size -= 2;
-				if (dsize != size)
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				sdata = data;
-				if (dsize > 0)
-					{
-					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
-						{
-						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
-									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
-						}
-
-					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
-						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
-							&sdata, dsize);
-					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
-						|| (data + dsize != sdata))
-						{
-						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-						return 0;
-						}
-					}
-				}
-				/* We don't know what to do with any other type
- 			 	* so ignore it.
- 			 	*/
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
-			{
-			switch(data[0])
-				{
-				case 0x01:	/* Client allows us to send HB requests */
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-							break;
-				case 0x02:	/* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
-							break;
-				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-							return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
-			 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
-			{
-			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
-			 * renegotiation.
-			 *
-			 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
-			 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
-			 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
-			 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
-			 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
-			 * anything like that, but this might change).
-
-			 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
-			 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
-			 * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
-			 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
-			 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
-			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-			}
-#endif
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
-			 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
-			{
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
-			}
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
-			 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
-			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
-			{
-			if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
-				return 0;
-			/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
-			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-			}
-
-		/* session ticket processed earlier */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
-			 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
-			{
-			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
-							      al))
-				return 0;
-			}
-#endif
-
-		data+=size;
-		}
-				
-	*p = data;
-
-	ri_check:
-
-	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
-	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
-		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
- * the length of the block. */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
-	{
-	unsigned int off = 0;
-
-	while (off < len)
-		{
-		if (d[off] == 0)
-			return 0;
-		off += d[off];
-		off++;
-		}
-
-	return off == len;
-	}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned short length;
-	unsigned short type;
-	unsigned short size;
-	unsigned char *data = *p;
-	int tlsext_servername = 0;
-	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
-	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-		}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
-	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
-
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		goto ri_check;
-
-	n2s(data,length);
-	if (data+length != d+n)
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	while(data <= (d+n-4))
-		{
-		n2s(data,type);
-		n2s(data,size);
-
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		goto ri_check;
-
-		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
-						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-			{
-			if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			tlsext_servername = 1;   
-			}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata = data;
-			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
-				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (!s->hit)
-				{
-				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
-					{
-					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
-				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
-				}
-#if 0
-			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
-			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
-				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
-			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
-#endif
-			}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
-			{
-			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
-			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				|| (size > 0))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-			}
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
-			if (size < 2)
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
-			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			
-			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
-				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
-			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
-				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
-			else
-				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
-
-			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			{
-			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
-			 * a status request message.
-			 */ 
-			if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
-			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
-			{
-			unsigned char *selected;
-			unsigned char selected_len;
-
-			/* We must have requested it. */
-			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			/* The data must be valid */
-			if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
-			if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
-			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
-			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-			}
-#endif
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
-			{
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
-			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
-			}
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
-			{
-			unsigned len;
-
-			/* We must have requested it. */
-			if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (size < 4)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			/* The extension data consists of:
-			 *   uint16 list_length
-			 *   uint8 proto_length;
-			 *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
-			len = data[0];
-			len <<= 8;
-			len |= data[1];
-			if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			len = data[2];
-			if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
-				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-			s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-			if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
-			s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
-			}
-
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
-			{
-			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
-				return 0;
-			renegotiate_seen = 1;
-			}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
-			{
-			switch(data[0])
-				{
-				case 0x01:	/* Server allows us to send HB requests */
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-							break;
-				case 0x02:	/* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
-							break;
-				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-							return 0;
-				}
-			}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
-			{
-                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
-							      al))
-                                return 0;
-			}
-#endif
-
-		data+=size;		
-		}
-
-	if (data != d+n)
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
-		{
- 		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
-			{
-			if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
-				{
-				s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);	
-				if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	*p = data;
-
-	ri_check:
-
-	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
-	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
-	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
-	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
-	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
-	 * absence on initial connect only.
-	 */
-	if (!renegotiate_seen
-		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
-		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 
-	 * and elliptic curves we support.
-	 */
-	int using_ecc = 0;
-	int i;
-	unsigned char *j;
-	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
-	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
-		{
-		SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
-		alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
-		alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-		if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
-			{
-			using_ecc = 1;
-			break;
-			}
-		}
-	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
-	if (using_ecc)
-		{
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-		if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-
-		/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
-		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
-		if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
-				sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
-			{
-			int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
-			s2n(id,j);
-			}
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- 	{
-		int r = 1;
-	
-		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
-			{
-			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
-			if (!r)
-				return -1;
-			}
-
-		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-			{
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
-				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
-
-			if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
-				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
-			else
-				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return -1;
-				}
-			s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
-			}
-
-		if (r == 2)
-			/* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
-			s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
-	}
-#endif
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 
-	 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension.  Note that the server is not
-	 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
-	 */
-
-	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-	
-	if (using_ecc)
-		{
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-		if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
-	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
-	 */
-	/* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
-	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
-	 */
-#endif
-
-	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
-		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- 	{
-		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
-		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-		 * so this has to happen here in
-		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
-
-		int r = 1;
-	
-		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
-			{
-			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
-			if (!r)
-				{
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
-			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
-		s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-
-		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
-			{
-			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
-				{
-				/* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
-				 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
-
-				if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
-					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
-				else
-					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
-				if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-					{
-					ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-					al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-					goto err;
-					}
-				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
-				}
-			}
-
-		if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-			{
-			/* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
-			 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
-			 * abort the handshake.
-			 */
-			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			}
-	}
-
- err:
-#endif
-	switch (ret)
-		{
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
-			return -1;
-
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
-			return 1; 
-					
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-			s->servername_done=0;
-			default:
-		return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-	int al;
-
-	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
-	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
-		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
-		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
-		if (certpkey == NULL)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-			return 1;
-			}
-		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
-		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
-		 */
-		s->cert->key = certpkey;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		switch (r)
-			{
-			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* status request response should be sent */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* something bad happened */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- err:
-	switch (ret)
-		{
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
-			return -1;
-
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
-			return 1; 
-
-		default:
-			return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
-	 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
-	 * it must contain uncompressed.
-	 */
-	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-	    (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-	    ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
-		{
-		/* we are using an ECC cipher */
-		size_t i;
-		unsigned char *list;
-		int found_uncompressed = 0;
-		list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-		for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
-			{
-			if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
-				{
-				found_uncompressed = 1;
-				break;
-				}
-			}
-		if (!found_uncompressed)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-	ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
-		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
-		{
-		/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
-		 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
-
-		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
-			{
-			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-			}
-		
-		/* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
-		 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
-		if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
-		    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
-			{
-			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
-
-	/* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
- 	 * tell the callback
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
-			&& s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		/* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
- 		 * there is no response.
- 		 */
-		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-			{
-			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-			s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
-			}
-		s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		if (r == 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
-			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-			}
-		if (r < 0)
-			{
-			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-			}
-		}
-
-	switch (ret)
-		{
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
-			return -1;
-
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
-			return 1; 
-					
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-			s->servername_done=0;
-			default:
-		return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
- *
- *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
- *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
- *       extension, if any.
- *   len: the length of the session ID.
- *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
- *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- *       point to the resulting session.
- *
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
- *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
- *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
- *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
- *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
- *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-			const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
-	{
-	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
-	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
-	unsigned short i;
-
-	*ret = NULL;
-	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
-	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
-	 * to permit stateful resumption.
-	 */
-	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-		return 0;
-	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
-		return 0;
-	if (p >= limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		i = *(p++);
-		p+= i;
-		if (p >= limit)
-			return -1;
-		}
-	/* Skip past cipher list */
-	n2s(p, i);
-	p+= i;
-	if (p >= limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
-	i = *(p++);
-	p += i;
-	if (p > limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Now at start of extensions */
-	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-		return 0;
-	n2s(p, i);
-	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
-		{
-		unsigned short type, size;
-		n2s(p, type);
-		n2s(p, size);
-		if (p + size > limit)
-			return 0;
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
-			{
-			int r;
-			if (size == 0)
-				{
-				/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
-				 * currently have one. */
-				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-				return 1;
-				}
-			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
-				{
-				/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
-				 * decrypted rather than generating the session
-				 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
-				 * handshake based on external mechanism to
-				 * calculate the master secret later. */
-				return 2;
-				}
-			r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
-			switch (r)
-				{
-				case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
-					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-					return 2;
-				case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
-					return r;
-				case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
-					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-					return 3;
-				default: /* fatal error */
-					return -1;
-				}
-			}
-		p += size;
-		}
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
- *
- *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
- *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
- *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
- *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- *       point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
- */
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
-				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
-				SSL_SESSION **psess)
-	{
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	unsigned char *sdec;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
-	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	HMAC_CTX hctx;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
-	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-	if (eticklen < 48)
-		return 2;
-	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
-		{
-		unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
-		int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
-							&ctx, &hctx, 0);
-		if (rv < 0)
-			return -1;
-		if (rv == 0)
-			return 2;
-		if (rv == 2)
-			renew_ticket = 1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* Check key name matches */
-		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-			return 2;
-		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
-		}
-	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
-	 * integrity checks on ticket.
-	 */
-	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
-	if (mlen < 0)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	eticklen -= mlen;
-	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
-	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		return 2;
-		}
-	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
-	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
-	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-	eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
-	if (!sdec)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
-	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		OPENSSL_free(sdec);
-		return 2;
-		}
-	slen += mlen;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	p = sdec;
-
-	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
-	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
-	if (sess)
-		{
-		/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
-		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
-		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
-		 * as required by standard.
-		 */
-		if (sesslen)
-			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
-		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
-		*psess = sess;
-		if (renew_ticket)
-			return 4;
-		else
-			return 3;
-		}
-        ERR_clear_error();
-	/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
-	 * ticket. */
-	return 2;
-	}
-
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-
-typedef struct 
-	{
-	int nid;
-	int id;
-	} tls12_lookup;
-
-static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-	{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-	{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-	{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
-	{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-	{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
-	{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
-#endif
-};
-
-static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
-#endif
-};
-
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-	{
-	size_t i;
-	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
-		{
-		if (table[i].nid == nid)
-			return table[i].id;
-		}
-	return -1;
-	}
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
-	{
-	int sig_id, md_id;
-	if (!md)
-		return 0;
-	md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
-				sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-	if (md_id == -1)
-		return 0;
-	sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
-	if (sig_id == -1)
-		return 0;
-	p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
-	p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-/* tls12_get_sigid returns the TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm value corresponding
- * to the given public key, or -1 if not known. */
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-	{
-	return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
-				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-	}
-
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
-	{
-	switch(hash_alg)
-		{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-	case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
-		return EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-	case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
-		return EVP_sha224();
-
-	case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
-		return EVP_sha256();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-	case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
-		return EVP_sha384();
-
-	case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
-		return EVP_sha512();
-#endif
-	default:
-		return NULL;
-
-		}
-	}
-
-/* tls1_process_sigalgs processes a signature_algorithms extension and sets the
- * digest functions accordingly for each key type.
- *
- * See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1.
- *
- * data: points to the content of the extension, not including type and length
- *     headers.
- * dsize: the number of bytes of |data|. Must be even.
- */
-void tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
-	{
-	int i;
-	const EVP_MD *md, **digest_ptr;
-	/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return;
-
-	s->s3->digest_rsa = NULL;
-	s->s3->digest_dsa = NULL;
-	s->s3->digest_ecdsa = NULL;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
-		{
-		unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
-
-		switch(sig_alg)
-			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_rsa;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_dsa;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-			digest_ptr = &s->s3->digest_ecdsa;
-			break;
-#endif
-			default:
-			continue;
-			}
-
-		if (*digest_ptr == NULL)
-			{
-			md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
-			if (md)
-				*digest_ptr = md;
-			}
-
-		}
-	}
-
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int
-tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
-	unsigned short hbtype;
-	unsigned int payload;
-	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
-	if (s->msg_callback)
-		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
-			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-	/* Read type and payload length first */
-	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
-		return 0; /* silently discard */
-	hbtype = *p++;
-	n2s(p, payload);
-	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
-		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
-	pl = p;
-
-	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
-		{
-		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
-		int r;
-
-		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
-		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
-		 * payload, plus padding
-		 */
-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
-		bp = buffer;
-		
-		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
-		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
-		s2n(payload, bp);
-		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
-		bp += payload;
-		/* Random padding */
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
-
-		r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
-
-		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
-				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
-		}
-	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
-		{
-		unsigned int seq;
-		
-		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
-		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
-		 * sequence number */
-		n2s(pl, seq);
-		
-		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
-			{
-			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
-			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
-			}
-		}
-
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-int
-tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *buf, *p;
-	int ret;
-	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
-	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
-	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
-	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
-	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
-	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
-		return -1;
-		}
-		
-	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-		
-	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
-	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
-	 */
-	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
-	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
-	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
-	 * some random stuff.
-	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
-	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
-	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
-	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
-	 *  - Padding
-	 */
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
-	p = buf;
-	/* Message Type */
-	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
-	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
-	s2n(payload, p);
-	/* Sequence number */
-	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
-	/* 16 random bytes */
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
-	p += 16;
-	/* Random padding */
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
-
-	ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
-	if (ret >= 0)
-		{
-		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
-				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
-				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
-		}
-		
-	OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
-	return ret;
-	}
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
- * SSL connection and writes it to |md|.
- */
-int
-tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
-	{
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned temp_digest_len;
-	int i;
-	static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
-
-	if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-		{
-		static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
-				 sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
-		if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
-			return 0;
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
-				 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
-		}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
-		{
-		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
-			continue;
-		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
-		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
-		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
-		}
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-#endif
-
-/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
- * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
-int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int digest_len;
-	/* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
-	 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
-	 * full handshake. */
-	if (s->hit)
-		return -1;
-	/* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
-	 * negotiated. */
-	if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
-		return -1;
-
-	digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
-		s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
-		sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
-	if (digest_len < 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 53c807de..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_meth.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_2_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_1_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_method();
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl3_connect,
-			tls1_get_method)
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c2cc3c7..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_reneg.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-/* Add the client's renegotiation binding */
-int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
-					int maxlen)
-    {
-    if(p)
-        {
-	if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len+1) > maxlen)
-            {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
-            return 0;
-            }
-            
-        /* Length byte */
-	*p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
-        p++;
-
-        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
-	       s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n",
-		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
-#endif
-        }
-    
-    *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
-
- 
-    return 1;
-    }
-
-/* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
-   right */
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-					  int *al)
-    {
-    int ilen;
-
-    /* Parse the length byte */
-    if(len < 1)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
-        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-        }
-    ilen = *d;
-    d++;
-
-    /* Consistency check */
-    if((ilen+1) != len)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
-        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-        }
-
-    /* Check that the extension matches */
-    if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
-        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        return 0;
-        }
-    
-    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
-	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
-        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        return 0;
-        }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n",
-				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
-#endif
-
-    s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
-
-    return 1;
-    }
-
-/* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
-int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
-					int maxlen)
-    {
-    if(p)
-        {
-        if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
-            s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen)
-            {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
-            return 0;
-            }
-        
-        /* Length byte */
-        *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
-        p++;
-
-        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
-	       s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
-        p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
-
-        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
-	       s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n",
-    		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
-#endif
-        }
-    
-    *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
-	+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1;
-    
-    return 1;
-    }
-
-/* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
-   right */
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
-					  int *al)
-    {
-    int expected_len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
-	+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
-    int ilen;
-
-    /* Check for logic errors */
-    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
-    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
-    
-    /* Parse the length byte */
-    if(len < 1)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
-        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-        }
-    ilen = *d;
-    d++;
-
-    /* Consistency check */
-    if(ilen+1 != len)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
-        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-        }
-    
-    /* Check that the extension matches */
-    if(ilen != expected_len)
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
-        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        return 0;
-        }
-
-    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
-	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
-        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        return 0;
-        }
-    d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
-
-    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
-	      s->s3->previous_server_finished_len))
-        {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
-        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 0;
-        }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n",
-				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
-#endif
-    s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
-
-    return 1;
-    }
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f1d15657..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_srvr.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver);
-static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver)
-	{
-	if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_2_server_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_1_server_method();
-	if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
-		return TLSv1_server_method();
-	return NULL;
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, TLSv1_2_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			tls1_get_server_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, TLSv1_1_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			tls1_get_server_method)
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, TLSv1_server_method,
-			ssl3_accept,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			tls1_get_server_method)
-
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index dc36f79f..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,761 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H 
-#define HEADER_TLS1_H 
-
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES	0
-
-#define TLS1_VERSION			0x0301
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION			0x0302
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION			0x0303
-#define TLS_MAX_VERSION			TLS1_2_VERSION
-
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR		0x01
-
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR		0x02
-
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR		0x03
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR		0x03
-
-#define TLS1_get_version(s) \
-		((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
-
-#define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \
-		((s->client_version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->client_version : 0)
-
-#define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED	21
-#define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW		22
-#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA		48	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED		49	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR		50	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR		51
-#define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION	60	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION	70	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	71	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR		80	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	86	/* fatal */
-#define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED		90
-#define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION	100
-/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
-#define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION	110
-#define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111
-#define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 	112
-#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113
-#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
-#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY	115	/* fatal */
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name			0
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length		1
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url	2
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys		3
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac		4
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request		5
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping		6
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz		7
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz		8
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type		9
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves		10
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats		11
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp				12
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms	13
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp	14
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat	15
-
-/* ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
- * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding	21
-
-/* ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket		35
-
-/* ExtensionType value from draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt */
-#if 0 /* will have to be provided externally for now ,
-       * i.e. build with -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=38183
-       * using whatever extension number you'd like to try */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input		?? */
-#endif
-
-/* Temporary extension type */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate                 0xff01
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg		13172
-#endif
-
-/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id			30031
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new		30032
-
-/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
-#define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
-/* status request value from RFC 3546 */
-#define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
-
-/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
-#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first			0
-#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed		0
-#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime	1
-#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2	2
-#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last			2
-
-/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
-
-#define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous			0
-#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa				1
-#define TLSEXT_signature_dsa				2
-#define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa				3
-
-#define TLSEXT_hash_none				0
-#define TLSEXT_hash_md5					1
-#define TLSEXT_hash_sha1				2
-#define TLSEXT_hash_sha224				3
-#define TLSEXT_hash_sha256				4
-#define TLSEXT_hash_sha384				5
-#define TLSEXT_hash_sha512				6
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-#define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
-
-const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type);
-int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
-/* SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret,
- * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and
- * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context|
- * flag controls whether a context is included.)
- *
- * It returns 1 on success and zero otherwise.
- */
-int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
-	int use_context);
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
-SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL)
-
-#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
-	SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(s, src, len) \
-SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT, len, src)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB, (void (*)(void))cb)
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG, 0, arg)
-
-#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED				0x01
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS	0x02
-#define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS	0x04
-
-#define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL)
-#define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
-        SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL)
-#endif
-#endif
-
-/* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
-#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                    0x0300008A
-#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA               0x0300008B
-#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                0x0300008C
-#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                0x0300008D
-
-/* Additional TLS ciphersuites from expired Internet Draft
- * draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt
- * (available if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES is defined, see
- * s3_lib.c).  We actually treat them like SSL 3.0 ciphers, which we probably
- * shouldn't.  Note that the first two are actually not in the IDs. */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5		0x03000060 /* not in ID */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5	0x03000061 /* not in ID */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA		0x03000062
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	0x03000063
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA		0x03000064
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA	0x03000065
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA		0x03000066
-
-/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA			0x0300002F
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA			0x03000030
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA			0x03000031
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA		0x03000032
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA		0x03000033
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA			0x03000034
-
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA			0x03000035
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA			0x03000036
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA			0x03000037
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA		0x03000038
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA		0x03000039
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA			0x0300003A
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256			0x0300003B
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256			0x0300003C
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256			0x0300003D
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x0300003E
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x0300003F
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x03000040
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		0x03000041
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000042
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000043
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000044
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	0x03000045
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		0x03000046
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		0x03000067
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x03000068
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x03000069
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x0300006A
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		0x0300006B
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256			0x0300006C
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256			0x0300006D
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA		0x03000084
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000085
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000086
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000087
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	0x03000088
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA		0x03000089
-
-/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                       0x03000096
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                    0x03000097
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                    0x03000098
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                   0x03000099
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                   0x0300009A
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                	0x0300009B
-
-/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x0300009C
-#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x0300009D
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x0300009E
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x0300009F
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A0
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A1
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A2
-#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A3
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A4
-#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A5
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		0x030000A6
-#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		0x030000A7
-
-/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with changes soon to be in draft 13 */
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                0x0300C001
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             0x0300C002
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        0x0300C003
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         0x0300C004
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         0x0300C005
-
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               0x0300C006
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            0x0300C007
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       0x0300C008
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        0x0300C009
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        0x0300C00A
-
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                  0x0300C00B
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               0x0300C00C
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA          0x0300C00D
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           0x0300C00E
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           0x0300C00F
-
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C010
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C011
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x0300C012
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C013
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C014
-
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C015
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C016
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         0x0300C017
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C018
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C019
-
-/* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA		0x0300C01A
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01B
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01C
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		0x0300C01D
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01E
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	0x0300C01F
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		0x0300C020
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	0x0300C021
-#define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	0x0300C022
-
-/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256         0x0300C023
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384         0x0300C024
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256          0x0300C025
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384          0x0300C026
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256           0x0300C027
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384           0x0300C028
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256            0x0300C029
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384            0x0300C02A
-
-/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	0x0300C02B
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	0x0300C02C
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      0x0300C02D
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      0x0300C02E
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       0x0300C02F
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       0x0300C030
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        0x0300C031
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        0x0300C032
-
-/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC5489
- * SHA-2 cipher suites are omitted because they cannot be used safely with
- * SSLv3. */
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C035
-#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C036
-
-/* XXX
- * Inconsistency alert:
- * The OpenSSL names of ciphers with ephemeral DH here include the string
- * "DHE", while elsewhere it has always been "EDH".
- * (The alias for the list of all such ciphers also is "EDH".)
- * The specifications speak of "EDH"; maybe we should allow both forms
- * for everything. */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5		"EXP1024-RC4-MD5"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5	"EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	"EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	"EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA		"EXP1024-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA	"EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA		"DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
-
-/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA			"AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA		"DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA		"DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA		"DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA		"DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA			"ADH-AES128-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA			"AES256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA		"DH-DSS-AES256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA		"DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA		"DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA		"DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA			"ADH-AES256-SHA"
-
-/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA            "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA       "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA              "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA           "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA      "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                 "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA         "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA                "AECDH-NULL-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA             "AECDH-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA        "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         "AECDH-AES128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         "AECDH-AES256-SHA"
-
-/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA			"PSK-RC4-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA		"PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		"PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		"PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
-
-/* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA		"SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA		"SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA		"SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	"SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	"SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		"CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	"DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	"DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	"DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA	"DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA		"ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA		"CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	"DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	"DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	"DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA	"DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA		"ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-
-/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "SEED-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                   "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                   "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                  "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                  "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256			"NULL-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"AES256-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256		"ADH-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256		"ADH-AES256-SHA256"
-
-/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	"DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	"DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	"DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	"DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256		"ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384		"ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-
-/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
-
-/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-
-/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC5489 */
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
-#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
-
-#define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN			1
-#define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN			2
-#define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH		3
-#define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH		4
-#define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN		64
-#define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH		65
-#define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH 	66
-#define TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN		21
-#define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN		22
-/* when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see
- * comment there) */
-#define TLS_CT_NUMBER			9
-
-#define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH		12
-
-#define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE			20
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST		"client finished"
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE		15
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST		"server finished"
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE		15
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST		"server write key"
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE	16
-#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST		"key expansion"
-#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE		13
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST		"client write key"
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE	16
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST		"server write key"
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE	16
-#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST			"IV block"
-#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE		8
-#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST		"master secret"
-#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE		13
-
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-#undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST    "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"  /*client finished*/
-#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST    "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"  /*server finished*/
-#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"  /*server write key*/
-#undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST    "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e"  /*key expansion*/
-#undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"  /*client write key*/
-#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"  /*server write key*/
-#undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST         "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b"  /*IV block*/
-#undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
-#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST    "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"  /*master secret*/
-#endif
-
-/* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */
-struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st
-	{
-	unsigned short length;
-	void *data;
-	};
-
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e7368a8f..00000000
--- a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,533 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/tls_srp.c */
-/* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with 
- * the precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) 
- * for the EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/srp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
-	{
-	if (ctx == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.N);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.g);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.s);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.B);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.A);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.a);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.b);
-	BN_free(ctx->srp_ctx.v);
-	ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
-	return (1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_st *s)
-	{
-	if (s == NULL)
-		return 0;
-	OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
-	s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
-	s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
-	return (1);
-	}
-
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_st *s)
-	{
-	SSL_CTX *ctx;
-
-	if ((s == NULL) || ((ctx = s->ctx) == NULL))
-		return 0;
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg;
-	/* set client Hello login callback */
-	s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback;
-	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback;
-	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
-	s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback;
-
-	s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-	s->srp_ctx.info = ctx->srp_ctx.info;
-	s->srp_ctx.strength = ctx->srp_ctx.strength;
-
-	if (((ctx->srp_ctx.N != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.N)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.g != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.g)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.s != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.s)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.B != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.B)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.A != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.A)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.a != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.a = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.a)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.v != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.v)) == NULL)) ||
-		((ctx->srp_ctx.b != NULL) &&
-		 ((s->srp_ctx.b = BN_dup(ctx->srp_ctx.b)) == NULL)))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL) && 
-		((s->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup(ctx->srp_ctx.login)) == NULL))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask;
-
-	return (1);
-err:
-	OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.B);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.A);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.a);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.b);
-	BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
-	return (0);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx)
-	{
-	if (ctx == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = NULL;
-	/* set client Hello login callback */
-	ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = NULL;
-	/* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = NULL;
-	/* set SRP client passwd callback */
-	ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = NULL;
-
-	ctx->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.B = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.A = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.a = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.b = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask = 0;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.info = NULL;
-	ctx->srp_ctx.strength = SRP_MINIMAL_N;
-
-	return (1);
-	}
-
-/* server side */
-int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad)
-	{
-	unsigned char b[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-	int al;
-
-	*ad = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-	if ((s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback !=NULL) &&
-		((al = s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback(s, ad, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))!=SSL_ERROR_NONE))
-			return al;
-
-	*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
-		(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
-		(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
-		(s->srp_ctx.v == NULL))
-		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-
-	if (RAND_bytes(b, sizeof(b)) <= 0)
-		return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-	s->srp_ctx.b = BN_bin2bn(b,sizeof(b),NULL);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(b,sizeof(b));
-
-	/* Calculate:  B = (kv + g^b) % N  */
-
-	return ((s->srp_ctx.B = SRP_Calc_B(s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g, s->srp_ctx.v)) != NULL)?
-			SSL_ERROR_NONE:SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-	}
-
-/* If the server just has the raw password, make up a verifier entry on the fly */
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass, const char *grp)
-	{
-	SRP_gN *GN = SRP_get_default_gN(grp);
-	if(GN == NULL) return -1;
-	s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(GN->N);
-	s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(GN->g);
-	if(s->srp_ctx.v != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
-		s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-		}
-	if(s->srp_ctx.s != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_clear_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
-		s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-		}
-	if(!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s->srp_ctx.s, &s->srp_ctx.v, GN->N, GN->g)) return -1;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
-			     BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info)
-	{
-	if (N!= NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
-			{
-			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.N,N))
-				{
-				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.N);
-				s->srp_ctx.N = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			s->srp_ctx.N = BN_dup(N);
-		}
-	if (g!= NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
-			{
-			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.g,g))
-				{
-				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.g);
-				s->srp_ctx.g = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			s->srp_ctx.g = BN_dup(g);
-		}
-	if (sa!= NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->srp_ctx.s != NULL)
-			{
-			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.s,sa))
-				{
-				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.s);
-				s->srp_ctx.s = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			s->srp_ctx.s = BN_dup(sa);
-		}
-	if (v!= NULL)
-		{
-		if (s->srp_ctx.v != NULL)
-			{
-			if (!BN_copy(s->srp_ctx.v,v))
-				{
-				BN_free(s->srp_ctx.v);
-				s->srp_ctx.v = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-		else
-			s->srp_ctx.v = BN_dup(v);
-		}
-	s->srp_ctx.info = info;
-
-	if (!(s->srp_ctx.N) ||
-		!(s->srp_ctx.g) ||
-		!(s->srp_ctx.s) ||
-		!(s->srp_ctx.v))
-		return -1;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *K = NULL, *u = NULL;
-	int ret = -1, tmp_len;
-	unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
-
-	if (!SRP_Verify_A_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.N))
-		goto err;
-	if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N)))
-		goto err;
-	if (!(K = SRP_Calc_server_key(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.v, u, s->srp_ctx.b, s->srp_ctx.N)))
-		goto err;
-
-	tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
-	if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL)
-		goto err;
-	BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
-	ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,master_key,tmp,tmp_len);
-err:
-	if (tmp)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,tmp_len) ;
-		OPENSSL_free(tmp);
-		}
-	BN_clear_free(K);
-	BN_clear_free(u);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-/* client side */
-int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s,unsigned char *master_key)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *u = NULL, *K = NULL;
-	int ret = -1, tmp_len;
-	char *passwd = NULL;
-	unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
-
-	/* Checks if b % n == 0
-	 */
-	if (SRP_Verify_B_mod_N(s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N)==0) goto err;
-	if (!(u = SRP_Calc_u(s->srp_ctx.A,s->srp_ctx.B,s->srp_ctx.N))) goto err;
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback == NULL) goto err;
-	if (!(passwd = s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) goto err;
-	if (!(x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s,s->srp_ctx.login,passwd))) goto err;
-	if (!(K = SRP_Calc_client_key(s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.B, s->srp_ctx.g, x, s->srp_ctx.a, u))) goto err;
-
-	tmp_len = BN_num_bytes(K);
-	if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(tmp_len)) == NULL) goto err;
-	BN_bn2bin(K, tmp);
-	ret = s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,master_key,tmp,tmp_len);
-err:
-	if (tmp)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,tmp_len) ;
-		OPENSSL_free(tmp);
-		}
-	BN_clear_free(K);
-	BN_clear_free(x);
-	if (passwd)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(passwd,strlen(passwd)) ;
-		OPENSSL_free(passwd);
-		}
-	BN_clear_free(u);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
-	{
-	SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
-	/* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
-	 * by checking B != 0 since B < N
-	 */
-	if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
-		|| BN_is_zero(srp->B))
-		{
-		*al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
-		{
-		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
-		{
-		if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
-			{
-			*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
-			return 0;
-			}
-		}
-	else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
-		{
-		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-	
-
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-	RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
-	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
-		return -1;
-
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->srp_ctx.g != NULL)
-		return s->srp_ctx.g;
-	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.g;
-	}
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->srp_ctx.N != NULL)
-		return s->srp_ctx.N;
-	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.N;
-	}
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
-		return s->srp_ctx.login;
-	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.login;
-	}
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (s->srp_ctx.info != NULL)
-		return s->srp_ctx.info;
-	return s->ctx->srp_ctx.info;
-	}
-
-#define tls1_ctx_ctrl ssl3_ctx_ctrl
-#define tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *name)
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME,0,name);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx,char *password)
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD,0,password);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength)
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH, strength,
-			     NULL);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *,void *))
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB,
-				      (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG,0,arg);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-				      int (*cb)(SSL *,int *,void *))
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB,
-				      (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *(*cb)(SSL *,void *))
-	{
-	return tls1_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB,
-				      (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
-
-#endif