Update ics-openvpn to rev 906.

1 files changed, 1899 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e8794d4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ics-openvpn-stripped/main/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1899 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX		0
+#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX	1
+#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX		2
+#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX		3
+#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX	4
+#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX	5
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX	6
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX	7
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX	8
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX	9
+#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX	10
+#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX    	11
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX	12
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX	13
+#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX		14
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]={
+	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
+	};
+
+#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX	0
+#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX	1
+#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX	2
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods=NULL;
+
+#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX	0
+#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX	1
+#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
+#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
+#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
+#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
+/*Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be 
+ * defined in the
+ * ssl_locl.h */
+#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX	SSL_MAX_DIGEST 
+static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+	NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
+	};
+/* PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because
+ * implementation is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if
+ * corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is found 
+ */
+static int  ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,NID_undef,
+	EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC
+	};
+
+static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+	0,0,0,0,0,0
+	};
+
+static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5,SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384
+	};
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD	1
+#define CIPHER_KILL	2
+#define CIPHER_DEL	3
+#define CIPHER_ORD	4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL	5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st
+	{
+	const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+	int active;
+	int dead;
+	struct cipher_order_st *next,*prev;
+	} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
+	/* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_ALL,0,     0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	/* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_CMPALL,0,  0,0,SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in ALL!) */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_CMPDEF,0,  SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* key exchange aliases
+	 * (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+	 * multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs,
+	 * e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kRSA,0,    SSL_kRSA,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kDHr,0,    SSL_kDHr,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kDHd,0,    SSL_kDHd,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kDH,0,     SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kEDH,0,    SSL_kEDH,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_DH,0,      SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kKRB5,0,   SSL_kKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDHr,0,  SSL_kECDHr,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDHe,0,  SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kECDH,0,   SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kEECDH,0,  SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_ECDH,0,    SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+        {0,SSL_TXT_kPSK,0,    SSL_kPSK,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kSRP,0,    SSL_kSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_kGOST,0, SSL_kGOST,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* server authentication aliases */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aRSA,0,    0,SSL_aRSA,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aDSS,0,    0,SSL_aDSS,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_DSS,0,     0,SSL_aDSS,   0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aKRB5,0,   0,SSL_aKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aNULL,0,   0,SSL_aNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aDH,0,     0,SSL_aDH,   0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aECDH,0,   0,SSL_aECDH, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aECDSA,0,  0,SSL_aECDSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_ECDSA,0,   0,SSL_aECDSA, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+        {0,SSL_TXT_aPSK,0,    0,SSL_aPSK,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0,     SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EECDH,0,   SSL_kEECDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_NULL,0,    0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_KRB5,0,    SSL_kKRB5,SSL_aKRB5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_RSA,0,     SSL_kRSA,SSL_aRSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_ADH,0,     SSL_kEDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AECDH,0,   SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+        {0,SSL_TXT_PSK,0,     SSL_kPSK,SSL_aPSK,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SRP,0,     SSL_kSRP,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+
+	/* symmetric encryption aliases */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_DES,0,     0,0,SSL_DES,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_3DES,0,    0,0,SSL_3DES,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_RC4,0,     0,0,SSL_RC4,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_RC2,0,     0,0,SSL_RC2,   0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_IDEA,0,    0,0,SSL_IDEA,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SEED,0,    0,0,SSL_SEED,  0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_eNULL,0,   0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES128,0,  0,0,SSL_AES128|SSL_AES128GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES256,0,  0,0,SSL_AES256|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES,0,     0,0,SSL_AES,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_AES_GCM,0, 0,0,SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA   ,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* MAC aliases */	
+	{0,SSL_TXT_MD5,0,     0,0,0,SSL_MD5,   0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA1,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA1,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA,0,     0,0,0,SSL_SHA1,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST94,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST94,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC,0,     0,0,0,SSL_GOST89MAC,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA256,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA256,  0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SHA384,0,    0,0,0,SSL_SHA384,  0,0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* protocol version aliases */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV2,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV2, 0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_SSLV3,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV3, 0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1,0,   0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1, 0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1_2, 0,0,0,0},
+
+	/* export flag */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EXPORT,0,  0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
+
+	/* strength classes */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP40,0,   0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP40, 0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_EXP56,0,   0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP56, 0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_LOW,0,     0,0,0,0,0,SSL_LOW,   0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_MEDIUM,0,  0,0,0,0,0,SSL_MEDIUM,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_HIGH,0,    0,0,0,0,0,SSL_HIGH,  0,0,0},
+	/* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
+	{0,SSL_TXT_FIPS,0,    0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,SSL_FIPS,  0,0,0},
+	};
+/* Search for public key algorithm with given name and 
+ * return its pkey_id if it is available. Otherwise return 0
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+	{
+	const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+	int pkey_id=0;
+	ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL,pkey_name,-1);
+	if (ameth) 
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
+		}		
+	return pkey_id;
+	}
+
+#else
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+	{
+	const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+	ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+	int pkey_id=0;
+	ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng,pkey_name,-1);
+	if (ameth)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
+		}
+	if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+	return pkey_id;
+	}
+
+#endif
+
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
+	{
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX]= 
+		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX]= 
+		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]= 
+		EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc);
+#else
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]= NULL;
+#endif
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
+
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm);
+	ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX]=
+	  EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm);
+
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
+	OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
+	OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
+	if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX])
+		{	
+		ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
+			EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
+		OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
+		}
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
+		ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
+		if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
+			ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=32;
+		}		
+
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]);
+	ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
+		EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384);
+	ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]=
+		EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]);
+	}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+
+static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP * const *a,
+			const SSL_COMP * const *b)
+	{
+	return((*a)->id-(*b)->id);
+	}
+
+static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
+	{
+	int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+	if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+		got_write_lock = 1;
+		
+		if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+			{
+			SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+
+			MemCheck_off();
+			ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
+			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
+				{
+				comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+				if (comp != NULL)
+					{
+					comp->method=COMP_zlib();
+					if (comp->method
+						&& comp->method->type == NID_undef)
+						OPENSSL_free(comp);
+					else
+						{
+						comp->id=SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
+						comp->name=comp->method->name;
+						sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
+						}
+					}
+					sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
+				}
+			MemCheck_on();
+			}
+		}
+	
+	if (got_write_lock)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+	else
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+	}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+	     const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size,SSL_COMP **comp)
+	{
+	int i;
+	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+	c=s->cipher;
+	if (c == NULL) return(0);
+	if (comp != NULL)
+		{
+		SSL_COMP ctmp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+		load_builtin_compressions();
+#endif
+
+		*comp=NULL;
+		ctmp.id=s->compress_meth;
+		if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
+			{
+			i=sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,&ctmp);
+			if (i >= 0)
+				*comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods,i);
+			else
+				*comp=NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) return(0);
+
+	switch (c->algorithm_enc)
+		{
+	case SSL_DES:
+		i=SSL_ENC_DES_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_3DES:
+		i=SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_RC4:
+		i=SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_RC2:
+		i=SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_IDEA:
+		i=SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_eNULL:
+		i=SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES128:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+		i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+		i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+		i=SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_SEED:
+		i=SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES128GCM:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256GCM:
+		i=SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX;
+		break;
+	default:
+		i= -1;
+		break;
+		}
+
+	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+		*enc=NULL;
+	else
+		{
+		if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
+			*enc=EVP_enc_null();
+		else
+			*enc=ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+		}
+
+	switch (c->algorithm_mac)
+		{
+	case SSL_MD5:
+		i=SSL_MD_MD5_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA1:
+		i=SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA256:
+		i=SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA384:
+		i=SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_GOST94:
+		i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
+		break;
+	case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+		i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX;
+		break;
+	default:
+		i= -1;
+		break;
+		}
+	if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
+	{
+		*md=NULL; 
+		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0;
+		if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+			mac_pkey_type = NULL;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		*md=ssl_digest_methods[i];
+		if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
+		if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
+	}
+
+	if ((*enc != NULL) &&
+	    (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) &&
+	    (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
+		{
+		const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
+		if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
+		    s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+			return 1;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			return 1;
+#endif
+
+		if	(c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+		return(1);
+		}
+	else
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md) 
+{
+	if (idx <0||idx>=SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) 
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+	*mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
+	if (*mask)
+		*md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+	else
+		*md = NULL;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+	(((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+	     CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+	{
+	if (curr == *tail) return;
+	if (curr == *head)
+		*head=curr->next;
+	if (curr->prev != NULL)
+		curr->prev->next=curr->next;
+	if (curr->next != NULL)
+		curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
+	(*tail)->next=curr;
+	curr->prev= *tail;
+	curr->next=NULL;
+	*tail=curr;
+	}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+	     CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+	{
+	if (curr == *head) return;
+	if (curr == *tail)
+		*tail=curr->prev;
+	if (curr->next != NULL)
+		curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
+	if (curr->prev != NULL)
+		curr->prev->next=curr->next;
+	(*head)->prev=curr;
+	curr->next= *head;
+	curr->prev=NULL;
+	*head=curr;
+	}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac, unsigned long *ssl)
+	{
+	*mkey = 0;
+	*auth = 0;
+	*enc = 0;
+	*mac = 0;
+	*ssl = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	*mkey |= SSL_kRSA;
+	*auth |= SSL_aRSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	*auth |= SSL_aDSS;
+#endif
+	*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd; /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+	*auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	*mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH;
+	*auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	*mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
+	*auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	*auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	*mkey |= SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kECDHr;
+	*auth |= SSL_aECDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	*mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
+	*auth |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	*mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
+#endif
+	/* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
+	 * do not present, disable  appropriate auth and key exchange */
+	if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
+		*auth |= SSL_aGOST94;
+	}
+	if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) {
+		*auth |= SSL_aGOST01;
+	}
+	/* Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */
+	if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) {
+		*mkey |= SSL_kGOST;
+	}	
+#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
+	*enc |= SSL_eNULL;
+#endif
+		
+
+
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_DES :0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 :0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 :0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:0;
+	*enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED:0;
+
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 :0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94:0;
+	*mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]==NID_undef)? SSL_GOST89MAC:0;
+
+	}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+                int num_of_ciphers,
+                unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
+                unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
+                unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+                CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+                CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+	{
+	int i, co_list_num;
+	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+	/*
+	 * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
+	 * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
+	 * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
+	 * entries.
+	 */
+
+	/* Get the initial list of ciphers */
+	co_list_num = 0;	/* actual count of ciphers */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++)
+		{
+		c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
+		/* drop those that use any of that is not available */
+		if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		    (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) &&
+#endif
+		    !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
+		    !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
+		    !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
+		    !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) &&
+		    !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl))
+			{
+			co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
+			co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+			co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+			co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+			co_list_num++;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+			printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+			/*
+			if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
+			*/
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare linked list from list entries
+	 */	
+	if (co_list_num > 0)
+		{
+		co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+		if (co_list_num > 1)
+			{
+			co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+			
+			for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++)
+				{
+				co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+				co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+				}
+
+			co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+			}
+		
+		co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+		*head_p = &co_list[0];
+		*tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+		}
+	}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
+                        int num_of_group_aliases,
+                        unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
+                        unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
+                        unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+			CIPHER_ORDER *head)
+	{
+	CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
+	const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
+	int i;
+	unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
+	unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
+	unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
+	unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
+	unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl;
+
+	/*
+	 * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
+	 */
+	ciph_curr = head;
+	ca_curr = ca_list;
+	while (ciph_curr != NULL)
+		{
+		*ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
+		ca_curr++;
+		ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
+	 * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
+	 * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
+	 * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
+		unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
+		unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
+		unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
+		unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl;
+
+		if (algorithm_mkey)
+			if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
+				continue;
+	
+		if (algorithm_auth)
+			if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
+				continue;
+		
+		if (algorithm_enc)
+			if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
+				continue;
+		
+		if (algorithm_mac)
+			if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
+				continue;
+		
+		if (algorithm_ssl)
+			if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0)
+				continue;
+		
+		*ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
+		ca_curr++;
+		}
+
+	*ca_curr = NULL;	/* end of list */
+	}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
+                unsigned long alg_mkey, unsigned long alg_auth,
+                unsigned long alg_enc, unsigned long alg_mac,
+                unsigned long alg_ssl,
+		unsigned long algo_strength,
+		int rule, int strength_bits,
+		CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+	{
+	CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *curr2, *last;
+	const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+	int reverse = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+	printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+		rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
+#endif
+
+	if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
+		reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */
+
+	head = *head_p;
+	tail = *tail_p;
+
+	if (reverse)
+		{
+		curr = tail;
+		last = head;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		curr = head;
+		last = tail;
+		}
+
+	curr2 = curr;
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		if ((curr == NULL) || (curr == last)) break;
+		curr = curr2;
+		curr2 = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+
+		cp = curr->cipher;
+
+		/*
+		 * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
+		 * or the algorithms used.
+		 */
+		if (strength_bits >= 0)
+			{
+			if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
+				continue;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+			printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
+#endif
+
+			if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
+				continue;
+			if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
+				continue;
+			if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
+				continue;
+			if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
+				continue;
+			if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl))
+				continue;
+			if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+				continue;
+			if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+				continue;
+			}
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+		printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
+#endif
+
+		/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+		if (rule == CIPHER_ADD)
+			{
+			/* reverse == 0 */
+			if (!curr->active)
+				{
+				ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+				curr->active = 1;
+				}
+			}
+		/* Move the added cipher to this location */
+		else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD)
+			{
+			/* reverse == 0 */
+			if (curr->active)
+				{
+				ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+				}
+			}
+		else if	(rule == CIPHER_DEL)
+			{
+			/* reverse == 1 */
+			if (curr->active)
+				{
+				/* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+				 * for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+				 * works in reverse to maintain the order) */
+				ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+				curr->active = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL)
+			{
+			/* reverse == 0 */
+			if (head == curr)
+				head = curr->next;
+			else
+				curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+			if (tail == curr)
+				tail = curr->prev;
+			curr->active = 0;
+			if (curr->next != NULL)
+				curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+			if (curr->prev != NULL)
+				curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+			curr->next = NULL;
+			curr->prev = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	*head_p = head;
+	*tail_p = tail;
+	}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+				    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+	{
+	int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
+	CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+	/*
+	 * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
+	 * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
+	 * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
+	 */
+	max_strength_bits = 0;
+	curr = *head_p;
+	while (curr != NULL)
+		{
+		if (curr->active &&
+		    (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
+		    max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
+		curr = curr->next;
+		}
+
+	number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+	if (!number_uses)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(0);
+		}
+	memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+	/*
+	 * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
+	 */
+	curr = *head_p;
+	while (curr != NULL)
+		{
+		if (curr->active)
+			number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
+		curr = curr->next;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
+	 * order.
+	 */
+	for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
+		if (number_uses[i] > 0)
+			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, tail_p);
+
+	OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+                CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
+                const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list)
+	{
+	unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength;
+	const char *l, *buf;
+	int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+	unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
+	char ch;
+
+	retval = 1;
+	l = rule_str;
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		ch = *l;
+
+		if (ch == '\0')
+			break;		/* done */
+		if (ch == '-')
+			{ rule = CIPHER_DEL; l++; }
+		else if (ch == '+')
+			{ rule = CIPHER_ORD; l++; }
+		else if (ch == '!')
+			{ rule = CIPHER_KILL; l++; }
+		else if (ch == '@')
+			{ rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; l++; }
+		else
+			{ rule = CIPHER_ADD; }
+
+		if (ITEM_SEP(ch))
+			{
+			l++;
+			continue;
+			}
+
+		alg_mkey = 0;
+		alg_auth = 0;
+		alg_enc = 0;
+		alg_mac = 0;
+		alg_ssl = 0;
+		algo_strength = 0;
+
+		for (;;)
+			{
+			ch = *l;
+			buf = l;
+			buflen = 0;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+			while (	((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
+				((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+				((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
+				 (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
+#else
+			while (	isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
+#endif
+				 {
+				 ch = *(++l);
+				 buflen++;
+				 }
+
+			if (buflen == 0)
+				{
+				/*
+				 * We hit something we cannot deal with,
+				 * it is no command or separator nor
+				 * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+				 */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+				       SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+				retval = found = 0;
+				l++;
+				break;
+				}
+
+			if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
+				{
+				found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
+				break;	/* special treatment */
+				}
+
+			/* check for multi-part specification */
+			if (ch == '+')
+				{
+				multi=1;
+				l++;
+				}
+			else
+				multi=0;
+
+			/*
+			 * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
+			 * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
+			 * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
+			 * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
+			 * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
+			 * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
+			 * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
+			 * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
+			 * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
+			 */
+			j = found = 0;
+			cipher_id = 0;
+			while (ca_list[j])
+				{
+				if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
+				    (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0'))
+					{
+					found = 1;
+					break;
+					}
+				else
+					j++;
+				}
+
+			if (!found)
+				break;	/* ignore this entry */
+
+			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey)
+				{
+				if (alg_mkey)
+					{
+					alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+					if (!alg_mkey) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+				}
+
+			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth)
+				{
+				if (alg_auth)
+					{
+					alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+					if (!alg_auth) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+				}
+			
+			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc)
+				{
+				if (alg_enc)
+					{
+					alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+					if (!alg_enc) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+				}
+						
+			if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac)
+				{
+				if (alg_mac)
+					{
+					alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+					if (!alg_mac) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+				}
+			
+			if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
+				{
+				if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
+					{
+					algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) | ~SSL_EXP_MASK;
+					if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK;
+				}
+
+			if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+				{
+				if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+					{
+					algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+					if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
+					}
+				else
+					algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+				}
+			
+			if (ca_list[j]->valid)
+				{
+				/* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version
+				 * does not become part of the search pattern!*/
+
+				cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
+				 * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern */
+
+				if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl)
+					{
+					if (alg_ssl)
+						{
+						alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+						if (!alg_ssl) { found = 0; break; }
+						}
+					else
+						alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+					}
+				}
+			
+			if (!multi) break;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
+		 */
+		if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
+			{	/* special command */
+			ok = 0;
+			if ((buflen == 8) &&
+				!strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8))
+				ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+			else
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+					SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+			if (ok == 0)
+				retval = 0;
+			/*
+			 * We do not support any "multi" options
+			 * together with "@", so throw away the
+			 * rest of the command, if any left, until
+			 * end or ':' is found.
+			 */
+			while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+				l++;
+			}
+		else if (found)
+			{
+			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
+				alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength,
+				rule, -1, head_p, tail_p);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+				l++;
+			}
+		if (*l == '\0') break; /* done */
+		}
+
+	return(retval);
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
+		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
+		const char *rule_str)
+	{
+	int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
+	unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
+	const char *rule_p;
+	CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+	const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return with error if nothing to do.
+	 */
+	if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+	 * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
+	 */
+	ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc, &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl);
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
+	 * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
+	 * it is used for allocation.
+	 */
+	num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
+#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+	co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
+	if (co_list == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(NULL);	/* Failure */
+		}
+
+	ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
+	                           disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl,
+	                           co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+
+	/* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */
+
+	/* Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key exchange mechanisms */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* Low priority for MD5 */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* Move anonymous ciphers to the end.  Usually, these will remain disabled.
+	 * (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but we prefer
+	 * authenticated ciphers.) */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+	/* ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+	/* Now sort by symmetric encryption strength.  The above ordering remains
+	 * in force within each class */
+	if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+	ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
+	 * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
+	 * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
+	 * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
+	 * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
+	 * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
+	 */
+	num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
+	num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
+	ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
+	if (ca_list == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(NULL);	/* Failure */
+		}
+	ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
+	                           disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+				   disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
+	 * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+	 */
+	ok = 1;
+	rule_p = rule_str;
+	if (strncmp(rule_str,"DEFAULT",7) == 0)
+		{
+		ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+			&head, &tail, ca_list);
+		rule_p += 7;
+		if (*rule_p == ':')
+			rule_p++;
+		}
+
+	if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
+		ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
+
+	OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list);	/* Not needed anymore */
+
+	if (!ok)
+		{	/* Rule processing failure */
+		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+	
+	/*
+	 * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+	 * if we cannot get one.
+	 */
+	if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+		return(NULL);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+	 * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+	 */
+	for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next)
+		{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (curr->active && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
+#else
+		if (curr->active)
+#endif
+			{
+			sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+			printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
+#endif
+			}
+		}
+	OPENSSL_free(co_list);	/* Not needed any longer */
+
+	tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+	if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+		{
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	if (*cipher_list != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+	*cipher_list = cipherstack;
+	if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
+	*cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+	(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+	sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
+	return(cipherstack);
+	}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
+	{
+	int is_export,pkl,kl;
+	const char *ver,*exp_str;
+	const char *kx,*au,*enc,*mac;
+	unsigned long alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl,alg2;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
+#else
+	static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+	alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+	alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
+
+	alg2=cipher->algorithm2;
+
+	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
+	pkl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+	kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
+	exp_str=is_export?" export":"";
+	
+	if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
+		ver="SSLv2";
+	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
+		ver="SSLv3";
+	else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2)
+		ver="TLSv1.2";
+	else
+		ver="unknown";
+
+	switch (alg_mkey)
+		{
+	case SSL_kRSA:
+		kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)"):"RSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kDHr:
+		kx="DH/RSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kDHd:
+		kx="DH/DSS";
+		break;
+        case SSL_kKRB5:
+		kx="KRB5";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kEDH:
+		kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)"):"DH";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kECDHr:
+		kx="ECDH/RSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kECDHe:
+		kx="ECDH/ECDSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kEECDH:
+		kx="ECDH";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kPSK:
+		kx="PSK";
+		break;
+	case SSL_kSRP:
+		kx="SRP";
+		break;
+	default:
+		kx="unknown";
+		}
+
+	switch (alg_auth)
+		{
+	case SSL_aRSA:
+		au="RSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aDSS:
+		au="DSS";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aDH:
+		au="DH";
+		break;
+        case SSL_aKRB5:
+		au="KRB5";
+		break;
+        case SSL_aECDH:
+		au="ECDH";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aNULL:
+		au="None";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aECDSA:
+		au="ECDSA";
+		break;
+	case SSL_aPSK:
+		au="PSK";
+		break;
+	default:
+		au="unknown";
+		break;
+		}
+
+	switch (alg_enc)
+		{
+	case SSL_DES:
+		enc=(is_export && kl == 5)?"DES(40)":"DES(56)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_3DES:
+		enc="3DES(168)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_RC4:
+		enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
+		  :((alg2&SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)?"RC4(64)":"RC4(128)");
+		break;
+	case SSL_RC2:
+		enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)"):"RC2(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_IDEA:
+		enc="IDEA(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_eNULL:
+		enc="None";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES128:
+		enc="AES(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256:
+		enc="AES(256)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES128GCM:
+		enc="AESGCM(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AES256GCM:
+		enc="AESGCM(256)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+		enc="Camellia(128)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+		enc="Camellia(256)";
+		break;
+	case SSL_SEED:
+		enc="SEED(128)";
+		break;
+	default:
+		enc="unknown";
+		break;
+		}
+
+	switch (alg_mac)
+		{
+	case SSL_MD5:
+		mac="MD5";
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA1:
+		mac="SHA1";
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA256:
+		mac="SHA256";
+		break;
+	case SSL_SHA384:
+		mac="SHA384";
+		break;
+	case SSL_AEAD:
+		mac="AEAD";
+		break;
+	default:
+		mac="unknown";
+		break;
+		}
+
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		len=128;
+		buf=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+		if (buf == NULL) return("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
+		}
+	else if (len < 128)
+		return("Buffer too small");
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str,alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl);
+#else
+	BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+	return(buf);
+	}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (c == NULL) return("(NONE)");
+	i=(int)(c->id>>24L);
+	if (i == 3)
+		return("TLSv1/SSLv3");
+	else if (i == 2)
+		return("SSLv2");
+	else
+		return("unknown");
+	}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+	{
+	if (c != NULL)
+		return(c->name);
+	return("(NONE)");
+	}
+
+/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
+	{
+	int ret=0;
+
+	if (c != NULL)
+		{
+		if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
+		ret = c->strength_bits;
+		}
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+	{
+	return c->id;
+	}
+
+/* return string version of key exchange algorithm */
+const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher)
+	{
+	switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey)
+		{
+	case SSL_kRSA:
+		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+	case SSL_kDHr:
+		return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+	case SSL_kDHd:
+		return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
+	case SSL_kEDH:
+		switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
+			{
+		case SSL_aDSS:
+			return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
+		case SSL_aRSA:
+			return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+		case SSL_aNULL:
+			return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+                        }
+	case SSL_kKRB5:
+		return SSL_TXT_KRB5;
+	case SSL_kECDHr:
+		return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+	case SSL_kECDHe:
+		return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
+	case SSL_kEECDH:
+		switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
+			{
+		case SSL_aECDSA:
+			return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
+		case SSL_aRSA:
+			return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+		case SSL_aNULL:
+			return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+                        }
+        default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
+	{
+	SSL_COMP *ctmp;
+	int i,nn;
+
+	if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) return(NULL);
+	nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
+	for (i=0; i<nn; i++)
+		{
+		ctmp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk,i);
+		if (ctmp->id == n)
+			return(ctmp);
+		}
+	return(NULL);
+	}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+	{
+	return NULL;
+	}
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm)
+	{
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp)
+	{
+	return NULL;
+	}
+#else
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+	{
+	load_builtin_compressions();
+	return(ssl_comp_methods);
+	}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+	{
+	SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+        if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
+                return 1;
+
+	/* According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+	   compression number ranges should be the following:
+
+	   0 to 63:    methods defined by the IETF
+	   64 to 192:  external party methods assigned by IANA
+	   193 to 255: reserved for private use */
+	if (id < 193 || id > 255)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	MemCheck_off();
+	comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+	comp->id=id;
+	comp->method=cm;
+	load_builtin_compressions();
+	if (ssl_comp_methods
+		&& sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,comp) >= 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(comp);
+		MemCheck_on();
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
+		return(1);
+		}
+	else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+		|| !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(comp);
+		MemCheck_on();
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return(1);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		MemCheck_on();
+		return(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
+	{
+	if (comp)
+		return comp->name;
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+#endif