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authorParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-04-08 12:04:17 +0200
committerParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-04-08 12:04:17 +0200
commit3c3421afd8f74a3aa8d1011de07a8c18f9549210 (patch)
tree49d52344661c23d7268b8ea69466a1cfef04bf8b /bitmask_android/openssl/ssl
parent5fc5d37330d3535a0f421632694d1e7918fc22d7 (diff)
Rename app->bitmask_android
This way, gradle commands generate apks correctly named.
Diffstat (limited to 'bitmask_android/openssl/ssl')
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/Android.mk78
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c603
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c1410
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c1542
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c289
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c443
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c77
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c1800
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c1563
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h267
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.c2205
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.h179
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h87
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c703
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c187
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c88
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c117
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c599
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c1125
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c193
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c556
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c84
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c744
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c1142
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c867
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c3153
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c849
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c3357
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c77
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c1502
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c3314
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl.h2382
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h268
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h83
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h664
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c140
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c592
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c834
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c1792
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c575
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c70
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c3242
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h1085
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c815
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c1102
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c567
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c240
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c2503
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c79
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c1045
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c1859
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c76
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c292
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c80
-rw-r--r--bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/tls1.h537
55 files changed, 50122 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/Android.mk b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/Android.mk
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1319d5e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/Android.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)
+
+local_c_includes := \
+ openssl \
+ openssl/include \
+ openssl/crypto
+
+local_src_files:= \
+ s2_meth.c \
+ s2_srvr.c \
+ s2_clnt.c \
+ s2_lib.c \
+ s2_enc.c \
+ s2_pkt.c \
+ s3_meth.c \
+ s3_srvr.c \
+ s3_clnt.c \
+ s3_lib.c \
+ s3_enc.c \
+ s3_pkt.c \
+ s3_both.c \
+ s23_meth.c \
+ s23_srvr.c \
+ s23_clnt.c \
+ s23_lib.c \
+ s23_pkt.c \
+ t1_meth.c \
+ t1_srvr.c \
+ t1_clnt.c \
+ t1_lib.c \
+ t1_enc.c \
+ t1_reneg.c \
+ ssl_lib.c \
+ ssl_err2.c \
+ ssl_cert.c \
+ ssl_sess.c \
+ ssl_ciph.c \
+ ssl_stat.c \
+ ssl_rsa.c \
+ ssl_asn1.c \
+ ssl_txt.c \
+ ssl_algs.c \
+ bio_ssl.c \
+ ssl_err.c \
+ kssl.c
+
+#######################################
+# target static library
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+include $(LOCAL_PATH)/../android-config.mk
+
+ifneq ($(TARGET_ARCH),x86)
+LOCAL_NDK_VERSION := 5
+LOCAL_SDK_VERSION := 9
+endif
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES += $(local_src_files)
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(local_c_includes)
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_MODULE:= libssl_static
+include $(BUILD_STATIC_LIBRARY)
+
+#######################################
+# target shared library
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+include $(LOCAL_PATH)/../android-config.mk
+
+ifneq ($(TARGET_ARCH),x86)
+LOCAL_NDK_VERSION := 5
+LOCAL_SDK_VERSION := 9
+endif
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES += $(local_src_files)
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(local_c_includes)
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcrypto
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_MODULE:= libssl
+include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eedac8a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/bio_ssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/* ssl/bio_ssl.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
+static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
+typedef struct bio_ssl_st
+ {
+ SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */
+ /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
+ int num_renegotiates;
+ unsigned long renegotiate_count;
+ unsigned long byte_count;
+ unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
+ unsigned long last_time;
+ } BIO_SSL;
+
+static BIO_METHOD methods_sslp=
+ {
+ BIO_TYPE_SSL,"ssl",
+ ssl_write,
+ ssl_read,
+ ssl_puts,
+ NULL, /* ssl_gets, */
+ ssl_ctrl,
+ ssl_new,
+ ssl_free,
+ ssl_callback_ctrl,
+ };
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
+ {
+ return(&methods_sslp);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
+ {
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ bs=(BIO_SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_SSL));
+ if (bs == NULL)
+ {
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ memset(bs,0,sizeof(BIO_SSL));
+ bi->init=0;
+ bi->ptr=(char *)bs;
+ bi->flags=0;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
+ {
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ if (a == NULL) return(0);
+ bs=(BIO_SSL *)a->ptr;
+ if (bs->ssl != NULL) SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
+ if (a->shutdown)
+ {
+ if (a->init && (bs->ssl != NULL))
+ SSL_free(bs->ssl);
+ a->init=0;
+ a->flags=0;
+ }
+ if (a->ptr != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+ {
+ int ret=1;
+ BIO_SSL *sb;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ int retry_reason=0;
+ int r=0;
+
+ if (out == NULL) return(0);
+ sb=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl=sb->ssl;
+
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+#if 0
+ if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl))
+ {
+/* ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); */
+ if (ret > 0)
+ {
+
+ outflags=(BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+/* if (ret > 0) */
+ ret=SSL_read(ssl,out,outl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,ret))
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (ret <= 0) break;
+ if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0)
+ {
+ sb->byte_count+=ret;
+ if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count)
+ {
+ sb->byte_count=0;
+ sb->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ r=1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r))
+ {
+ unsigned long tm;
+
+ tm=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ if (tm > sb->last_time+sb->renegotiate_timeout)
+ {
+ sb->last_time=tm;
+ sb->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason=BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason=BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ b->retry_reason=retry_reason;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
+ {
+ int ret,r=0;
+ int retry_reason=0;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ if (out == NULL) return(0);
+ bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl=bs->ssl;
+
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+/* ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret > 0) */
+ ret=SSL_write(ssl,out,outl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,ret))
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (ret <= 0) break;
+ if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0)
+ {
+ bs->byte_count+=ret;
+ if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count)
+ {
+ bs->byte_count=0;
+ bs->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ r=1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r))
+ {
+ unsigned long tm;
+
+ tm=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ if (tm > bs->last_time+bs->renegotiate_timeout)
+ {
+ bs->last_time=tm;
+ bs->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason=BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ b->retry_reason=retry_reason;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+ {
+ SSL **sslp,*ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+ BIO *dbio,*bio;
+ long ret=1;
+
+ bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl=bs->ssl;
+ if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
+ return(0);
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+ SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+ SSL_clear(ssl);
+
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ else
+ ret=1;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+ ret=0;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
+ if (num) /* client mode */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
+ ret=bs->renegotiate_timeout;
+ if (num < 60) num=5;
+ bs->renegotiate_timeout=(unsigned long)num;
+ bs->last_time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
+ ret=bs->renegotiate_count;
+ if ((long)num >=512)
+ bs->renegotiate_count=(unsigned long)num;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
+ ret=bs->num_renegotiates;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
+ if (ssl != NULL)
+ {
+ ssl_free(b);
+ if (!ssl_new(b))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ b->shutdown=(int)num;
+ ssl=(SSL *)ptr;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl=ssl;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+ if (bio != NULL)
+ {
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_push(bio,b->next_bio);
+ b->next_bio=bio;
+ CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ }
+ b->init=1;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
+ if (ptr != NULL)
+ {
+ sslp=(SSL **)ptr;
+ *sslp=ssl;
+ }
+ else
+ ret=0;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+ ret=b->shutdown;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+ b->shutdown=(int)num;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+ ret=SSL_pending(ssl);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret=BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+ if ((b->next_bio != NULL) && (b->next_bio != ssl->rbio))
+ {
+ SSL_set_bio(ssl,b->next_bio,b->next_bio);
+ CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+ /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
+ if (b == ptr)
+ {
+ /* Shouldn't happen in practice because the
+ * rbio and wbio are the same when pushed.
+ */
+ if (ssl->rbio != ssl->wbio)
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ ssl->wbio=NULL;
+ ssl->rbio=NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+ b->retry_reason=0;
+ ret=(int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl,(int)ret))
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_flags(b,
+ BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_flags(b,
+ BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_flags(b,
+ BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ b->retry_reason=b->next_bio->retry_reason;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+ dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
+ if (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL)
+ SSL_free(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl);
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl=SSL_dup(ssl);
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_count=
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_count;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->byte_count=
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->byte_count;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout=
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->last_time=
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->last_time;
+ ret=(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+#if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard Levitte */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ret = -1;
+#else
+ ret=0;
+#endif
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+ void (**fptr)(const SSL *xssl,int type,int val);
+
+ fptr=(void (**)(const SSL *xssl,int type,int val))ptr;
+ *fptr=SSL_get_info_callback(ssl);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret=BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,num,ptr);
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
+ {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+ long ret=1;
+
+ bs=(BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl=bs->ssl;
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+ /* FIXME: setting this via a completely different prototype
+ seems like a crap idea */
+ SSL_set_info_callback(ssl,(void (*)(const SSL *,int,int))fp);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret=BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio,cmd,fp);
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+ {
+ int n,ret;
+
+ n=strlen(str);
+ ret=BIO_write(bp,str,n);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ BIO *ret=NULL,*buf=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
+
+ if ((buf=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+ if ((ssl=BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((ret=BIO_push(buf,ssl)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return(ret);
+err:
+ if (buf != NULL) BIO_free(buf);
+ if (ssl != NULL) BIO_free(ssl);
+#endif
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BIO *ret=NULL,*con=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
+
+ if ((con=BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+ if ((ssl=BIO_new_ssl(ctx,1)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((ret=BIO_push(ssl,con)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return(ret);
+err:
+ if (con != NULL) BIO_free(con);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
+ {
+ BIO *ret;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ if ((ret=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+ if ((ssl=SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_free(ret);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if (client)
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+ BIO_set_ssl(ret,ssl,BIO_CLOSE);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
+ {
+ t=BIO_find_type(t,BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+ f=BIO_find_type(f,BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+ if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
+ return(0);
+ if ( (((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl == NULL) ||
+ (((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl == NULL))
+ return(0);
+ SSL_copy_session_id(((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl,((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
+ {
+ SSL *s;
+
+ while (b != NULL)
+ {
+ if (b->method->type == BIO_TYPE_SSL)
+ {
+ s=((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl;
+ SSL_shutdown(s);
+ break;
+ }
+ b=b->next_bio;
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2180c6d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1410 @@
+/* ssl/d1_both.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
+ if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+ long ii; \
+ for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+ } else { \
+ long ii; \
+ bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+ for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+ bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+ } }
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
+ long ii; \
+ OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+ is_complete = 1; \
+ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+ if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+
+#if 0
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
+ long ii; \
+ printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
+ printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
+ printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
+
+/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
+static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+
+static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
+ long max, int *ok);
+
+static hm_fragment *
+dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
+ {
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+ if ( buf == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+ frag->fragment = buf;
+
+ /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+ if (reassembly)
+ {
+ bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ if (bitmask == NULL)
+ {
+ if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ }
+
+ frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
+ return frag;
+ }
+
+static void
+dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+ {
+ if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ }
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ int curr_mtu;
+ unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+
+ /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+ if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu =
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+ * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+ if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu = 0;
+ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+ s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+#if 0
+ mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
+
+ mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+
+ if ( curr_mtu > 0)
+ mtu = curr_mtu;
+ else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
+ {
+ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */
+
+#endif
+
+ if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
+ (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ if (s->write_hash)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ else
+ mac_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
+ (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+ blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+ else
+ blocksize = 0;
+
+ frag_off = 0;
+ while( s->init_num)
+ {
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+
+ if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
+ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
+ mac_size - blocksize;
+ }
+
+ if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
+
+
+ /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
+ if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ if ( s->init_off != 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
+ if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
+ len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
+ * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
+ * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
+ * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
+ * retransmit
+ */
+ if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
+ s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ else
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+ /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
+ * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
+ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
+ {
+ /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+ int xlen;
+
+ if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ /* reconstruct message header is if it
+ * is being sent in single fragment */
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+ }
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+ s->init_off+=ret;
+ s->init_num-=ret;
+ frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+ }
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
+ * fragments.
+ */
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ int i, al;
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long msg_len;
+
+ /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
+ * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok=1;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+again:
+ i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+ if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
+ i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
+ goto again;
+ else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
+ return i;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+ /* reconstruct message header */
+ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ p, msg_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (!s->d1->listen)
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return s->init_num;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
+ {
+ size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
+
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ /* sanity checking */
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
+ {
+ /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
+ * against max above */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+ }
+ else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
+ {
+ /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
+ * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* no error */
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+ * if so:
+ * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+ * (2) update s->init_num
+ */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int al;
+
+ *ok = 0;
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+ if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
+ {
+ unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+ al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
+
+ if (al==0) /* no alert */
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
+ frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+ }
+
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ if (al==0)
+ {
+ *ok = 1;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ {
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+ * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+ */
+ if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+ max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+ else
+ max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ */
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+ while (frag_len)
+ {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0) goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ }
+
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+ (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
+ is_complete);
+
+ if (is_complete)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ frag->reassembly = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+ if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+ int i=-1;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
+ * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
+ */
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ item = NULL;
+
+ /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
+ * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
+ * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
+ * retransmit.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+ msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
+ (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+ while (frag_len)
+ {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0) goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+ if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+
+static long
+dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+ if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ /* read handshake message header */
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ /* parse the message fragment header */
+ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+
+ /*
+ * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
+ * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
+ * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
+ * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
+ return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
+ wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ {
+ /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+ * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+ * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+ * 'Finished' MAC. */
+ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+ max, ok);
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
+ s->state=stn;
+
+ if ( frag_len > 0)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
+ /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ i = 0;
+
+ /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
+ * handshake to fail */
+ OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+
+ *ok = 1;
+
+ /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+ * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
+ * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
+ * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
+ s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ *ok=0;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ p+=i;
+ l=i;
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+ * renegotiation checks
+ */
+ if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
+ * I do this.
+ */
+ l&=0xffff;
+#endif
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
+ s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+ */
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
+ s->init_num+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+ }
+
+static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n,p);
+ i2d_X509(x,&p);
+ *l+=n+3;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (x != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ /* Thawte special :-) */
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
+ {
+ x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ l2n3(l,p);
+ l+=3;
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
+
+ l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return(l);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+ {
+ if ( code > 0)
+ {
+ fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
+ {
+ /* not a timeout, none of our business,
+ let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
+ return code;
+ }
+
+ if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+ {
+ BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+ return code;
+ }
+
+#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
+ item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
+ if ( item )
+ {
+ /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+
+#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
+ if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+
+ return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+ {
+ /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
+ * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
+ * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
+ * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
+ * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
+ * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
+ * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+ */
+ return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+ piterator iter;
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+
+ for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
+ 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+
+ /* this function is called immediately after a message has
+ * been serialized */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+
+ memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+ if ( is_ccs)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ }
+
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+ frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+ /* save current state*/
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
+ fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
+ fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
+#endif
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
+ int *found)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag ;
+ unsigned long header_length;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+ unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
+
+ /*
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+ */
+
+ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
+
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
+ *found = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *found = 1;
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+ header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
+ s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+
+ /* save current state */
+ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+ saved_state.session = s->session;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+
+ /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+ s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
+ SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ /* restore current state */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+ s->session = saved_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
+
+ (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+void
+dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+
+ for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
+ {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+unsigned char *
+dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
+ {
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
+ frag_off, frag_len);
+
+ return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+static void
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->type = mt;
+ msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+ msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+ }
+
+static void
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+ }
+
+static unsigned char *
+dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+
+ s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
+
+ return p;
+ }
+
+static unsigned int
+dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+ {
+ return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
+ sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
+ }
+
+static unsigned int
+dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
+ return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
+ if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
+ return g_probable_mtu[i];
+
+ return curr_mtu;
+ }
+
+void
+dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+ {
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+ msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+ n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+ }
+
+void
+dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
+ {
+ memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
+
+ ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..57766717
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1542 @@
+/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#endif
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return(DTLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ dtls1_connect,
+ dtls1_get_client_method)
+
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
+ (s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ s->hit = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+
+ /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ }
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ else
+ {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->state=DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* at this point we check that we have the
+ * required stuff from the server */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
+ * sent back */
+ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
+ * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth=
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
+ * remove the buffering now */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret=1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func=dtls1_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ /* done with handshaking */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned int i,j;
+ unsigned long Time,l;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+ (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (s->session->not_resumable))
+ {
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p=s->s3->client_random;
+
+ /* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+ * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
+ for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
+ if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
+ {
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
+ }
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+ s->client_version=s->version;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i=0;
+ else
+ i=s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++)=i;
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
+ p+=i;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+ j=0;
+ else
+ j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++)=1+j;
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+ *(p++)=comp->id;
+ }
+ *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int n, al, ok = 0;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((data[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (data[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|data[1];
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ data+=2;
+
+ cookie_len = *(data++);
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+ (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q=p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p+=2;
+ n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
+#endif
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s2n(n,q);
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
+#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p+= enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length)
+ {
+ s2n(authp->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p+= authp->length;
+ n+= authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ ** kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
+ kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl,p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p+=outl;
+ n+=outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
+
+ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,p,n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p,0,n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n,p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
+ n+=2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+ /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+ * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Reuse key info from our certificate
+ * We only need our private key to perform
+ * the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+ -> generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
+ sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
+ (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ n = strlen(identity);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, n);
+ n+=2;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+ /*
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+ l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+ */
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned u=0;
+#endif
+ unsigned long n;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_md5,
+ &(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n) ;
+
+ s->init_num=(int)n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
+ {
+ /* If we get an error, we need to
+ * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
+ * We then get retied later */
+ i=0;
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+ i=0;
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ i=0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..becbab91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/* ssl/d1_enc.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+
+int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ {
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+ /* we can't write into the input stream */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ else if ( EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher) > 1)
+ {
+ if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("dtls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
+ (enc == NULL))
+ {
+ memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
+ rec->input=rec->data;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ l=rec->length;
+ bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ {
+ i=bs-((int)l%bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j=i-1;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
+ rec->input[k]=j;
+ l+=i;
+ rec->length+=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long ui;
+ printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ printf("\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("\trec->input=");
+ for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!send)
+ {
+ if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ {
+ ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
+ i++;
+ if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ {
+ /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
+ s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ i--;
+ }
+ /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
+ * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
+ if (i > (int)rec->length)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
+ * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
+ * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
+ {
+ if (rec->data[j] != ii)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ rec->length-=i;
+
+ rec->data += bs; /* skip the implicit IV */
+ rec->input += bs;
+ rec->length -= bs;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..48e8b6ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+/* ssl/d1_lib.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#endif
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
+const char dtls1_version_str[]="DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={
+ dtls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ };
+
+long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec
+ * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
+ return(60*60*2);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
+ {
+ DTLS1_STATE *d1;
+
+ if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
+ if ((d1=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL) return (0);
+ memset(d1,0, sizeof *d1);
+
+ /* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
+
+ d1->unprocessed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
+ d1->processed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
+ d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
+ d1->sent_messages=pqueue_new();
+ d1->buffered_app_data.q=pqueue_new();
+
+ if ( s->server)
+ {
+ d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
+ }
+
+ if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q
+ || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
+ {
+ if ( d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ if ( d1->processed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
+ if ( d1->buffered_messages) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
+ if ( d1->sent_messages) pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
+ if ( d1->buffered_app_data.q) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+ OPENSSL_free(d1);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->d1=d1;
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+
+ while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
+ {
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+ if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL)
+ {
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+ if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL)
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL)
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+ ssl3_free(s);
+
+ dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+ }
+
+void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
+ pqueue processed_rcds;
+ pqueue buffered_messages;
+ pqueue sent_messages;
+ pqueue buffered_app_data;
+
+ if (s->d1)
+ {
+ unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q;
+ processed_rcds = s->d1->processed_rcds.q;
+ buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
+ sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
+ buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q;
+
+ dtls1_clear_queues(s);
+
+ memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1)));
+
+ if (s->server)
+ {
+ s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
+ }
+
+ s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
+ s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
+ s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
+ s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
+ s->d1->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_clear(s);
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
+ s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+ else
+ s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
+ if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval*) parg) != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
+ ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+ break;
+ case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+ ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+/*
+ * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
+ * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
+ * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
+ * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
+ * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
+ */
+const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
+
+ if (ciph != NULL)
+ {
+ if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ciph;
+ }
+
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
+ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
+ {
+ s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Set timeout to current time */
+ get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
+
+ /* Add duration to current time */
+ s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ }
+
+struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft)
+ {
+ struct timeval timenow;
+
+ /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
+ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Get current time */
+ get_current_time(&timenow);
+
+ /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
+ if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
+ (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
+ s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec))
+ {
+ memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ return timeleft;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
+ memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
+ timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
+ timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
+ if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0)
+ {
+ timeleft->tv_sec--;
+ timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
+ }
+
+ /* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0
+ * to prevent issues because of small devergences with
+ * socket timeouts.
+ */
+ if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000)
+ {
+ memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ }
+
+
+ return timeleft;
+ }
+
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
+ {
+ struct timeval timeleft;
+
+ /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
+ if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
+ if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Timer expired, so return true */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
+ {
+ s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
+ if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
+ s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ }
+
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* Reset everything */
+ memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+ /* Clear retransmission buffer */
+ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+ {
+ DTLS1_STATE *state;
+
+ /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
+ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_double_timeout(s);
+ state = s->d1;
+ state->timeout.num_alerts++;
+ if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+ {
+ /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+ if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+ {
+ state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+ }
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ struct _timeb tb;
+ _ftime(&tb);
+ t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+ t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+ struct timeb tb;
+ ftime(&tb);
+ t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+ t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#else
+ gettimeofday(t, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+ s->d1->listen = 1;
+
+ ret = SSL_accept(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) return ret;
+
+ (void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
+ return 1;
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5c4004bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* ssl/d1_meth.h */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return(DTLSv1_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_method,
+ dtls1_accept,
+ dtls1_connect,
+ dtls1_get_method)
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..91562f35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1800 @@
+/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
+static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
+{ int ret,sat,brw,i;
+
+ if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
+ { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
+ long l;
+
+ if (is_endian.little) break;
+ /* not reached on little-endians */
+ /* following test is redundant, because input is
+ * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
+ if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
+
+ l = *((long *)v1);
+ l -= *((long *)v2);
+ if (l>128) return 128;
+ else if (l<-128) return -128;
+ else return (int)l;
+ } while (0);
+
+ ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
+ sat = 0;
+ brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
+ if (ret & 0x80)
+ { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
+ { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
+ sat |= ~brw;
+ brw >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
+ { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
+ sat |= brw;
+ brw >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
+
+ if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
+ else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
+}
+
+static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+ int len, int peek);
+static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
+static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
+#if 0
+static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
+#endif
+static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
+ unsigned char *priority);
+static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
+static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
+
+/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
+static int
+dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
+ {
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+
+ s->packet = rdata->packet;
+ s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
+ {
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ pitem *item;
+
+ /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
+ item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
+ if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
+ {
+ if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ rdata->packet = s->packet;
+ rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
+ memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ item->data = rdata;
+
+ /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
+ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ s->packet = NULL;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+
+ item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
+ if (item)
+ {
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
+ * yet */
+#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
+ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+ &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
+
+/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
+#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
+ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ if (item)
+ {
+ /* Check if epoch is current. */
+ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+ return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
+
+ /* Process all the records. */
+ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
+ {
+ dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+ if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
+ return(0);
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
+ s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
+ * have been processed */
+ s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
+ s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+#if 0
+
+static int
+dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ PQ_64BIT priority =
+ (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
+ ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
+
+ if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
+ nothing buffered */
+ return 0;
+
+
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
+ if (item && item->priority == priority)
+ {
+ /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
+ * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
+ * buffering */
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+
+ s->packet = rdata->packet;
+ s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i,al;
+ int clear=0;
+ int enc_err;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned int mac_size;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+
+ rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
+ * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
+ * need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression
+ * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
+ * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
+
+ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+ * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data=rr->input;
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+ if (enc_err <= 0)
+ {
+ /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+ if (enc_err < 0)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
+{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (s->read_hash == NULL))
+ clear=1;
+
+ if (!clear)
+ {
+ /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ int t;
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ mac_size=t;
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+ {
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
+ if (rr->length < mac_size)
+ {
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ }
+ rr->length-=mac_size;
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
+ if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off=0;
+ /* So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length=0;
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
+ return(1);
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(0);
+}
+
+
+/* Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
+ int i,n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ unsigned short version;
+ DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+
+ rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+ /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
+ * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
+ dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
+
+ /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* get something from the wire */
+again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
+ /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
+ rr->type= *(p++);
+ ssl_major= *(p++);
+ ssl_minor= *(p++);
+ version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
+
+ /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+ n2s(p,rr->epoch);
+
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
+ p+=6;
+
+ n2s(p,rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet)
+ {
+ if (version != s->version)
+ {
+ /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
+ {
+ /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* record too long, silently discard it */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
+ * allocate some memory for it.
+ */
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ unsigned char *pp;
+ unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen;
+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i=rr->length;
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if ( n != i)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /* now n == rr->length,
+ * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
+ }
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
+ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+ if ( bitmap == NULL)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
+ * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
+ * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
+ * since they arrive from different connections and
+ * would be dropped unnecessarily.
+ */
+ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+ *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+
+ /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
+ * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
+ * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
+ * anything while listening.
+ */
+ if (is_next_epoch)
+ {
+ if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
+ {
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+ }
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+
+ dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
+ return(1);
+
+ }
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
+ {
+ int al,i,j,ret;
+ unsigned int n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ return(-1);
+
+ /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
+ if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
+ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+start:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+ /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
+ * so process data buffered during the last handshake
+ * in advance, if any.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+ if (item)
+ {
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for timeout */
+ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
+ goto start;
+
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
+ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
+ {
+ ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ {
+ ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
+ /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return(ret);
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+ {
+ /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
+ * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
+ * buffer the application data for later processing rather
+ * than dropping the connection.
+ */
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+ * (even in 'peek' mode) */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ rr->length=0;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+ if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+ {
+ /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+ * are doing a handshake for the first time */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
+ if (!peek)
+ {
+ rr->length-=n;
+ rr->off+=n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+ }
+ }
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+
+ /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
+ * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
+ * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
+ }
+ else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
+ dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+ /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* Application data while renegotiating
+ * is allowed. Try again reading.
+ */
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0)
+ {
+ /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
+ * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
+ if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
+ {
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ /*
+ * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+ * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+ * non-existing alert...
+ */
+ FIX ME
+#endif
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
+ {
+ dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ rr->length--;
+ }
+ *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+ (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ {
+ s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ !s->s3->renegotiate)
+ {
+ ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
+ * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
+
+ s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
+ s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
+ {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+ {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return(0);
+ }
+#if 0
+ /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
+ /* now check if it's a missing record */
+ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
+ {
+ unsigned short seq;
+ unsigned int frag_off;
+ unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
+
+ n2s(p, seq);
+ n2l3(p, frag_off);
+
+ dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
+ frag_off, &found);
+ if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+ /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
+ /* requested a message not yet sent,
+ send an alert ourselves */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
+ {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
+ s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ rr->length=0;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+ unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ccs_hdr_len = 3;
+
+ /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+ * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+ /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
+ if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
+ (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
+ {
+ i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
+ * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
+ */
+ if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
+ {
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+ if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+ !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+ /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
+ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
+ if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
+ * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+ {
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+ * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+ * protocol violations): */
+ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
+ ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
+ :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (rr->type)
+ {
+ default:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+ /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+#endif
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
+ * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
+ * should not happen when type != rr->type */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
+ * but have application data. If the library was
+ * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
+ * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+ * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
+ * we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ ((
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ ) || (
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* not reached */
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
+ return i;
+ }
+
+
+ /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
+ * is started. */
+static int
+have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+ int len, int peek)
+ {
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k,n;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
+ * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
+ return i;
+ }
+
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*pseq;
+ int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+ int prefix_len = 0;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ int bs;
+ unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
+ return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead)
+ {
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead;
+ }
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ {
+ i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return(i);
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
+ wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
+ sess=s->session;
+
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+ clear=1;
+
+ if (clear)
+ mac_size=0;
+ else
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
+#if 0
+ /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
+ && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
+ * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
+ * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
+ * together with the actual payload) */
+ prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
+
+ /* write the header */
+
+ *(p++)=type&0xff;
+ wr->type=type;
+
+ *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
+ pseq=p;
+ p+=10;
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+
+ /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
+ * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
+ */
+ if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
+ (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+ else
+ bs = 0;
+
+ wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
+ wr->length=(int)len;
+ wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
+
+ /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
+ * wr->data */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
+ wr->input=wr->data;
+ }
+
+ /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
+ * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
+ * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
+
+ if (mac_size != 0)
+ {
+ if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ wr->length+=mac_size;
+ }
+
+ /* this is true regardless of mac size */
+ wr->input=p;
+ wr->data=p;
+
+
+ /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
+ if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
+ /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
+ * the rest of randomness */
+ wr->length += bs;
+ }
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+
+ /* record length after mac and block padding */
+/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
+
+ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
+
+ s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
+
+ /* XDTLS: ?? */
+/* else
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
+
+ memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
+ pseq+=6;
+ s2n(wr->length,pseq);
+
+ /* we should now have
+ * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+ * wr->length long */
+ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+ wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
+ /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
+ if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
+ *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
+#endif
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ /* we are in a recursive call;
+ * just return the length, don't write out anything here
+ */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+ wb->offset = 0;
+
+ /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
+ s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
+ s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
+ s->s3->wpend_type=type;
+ s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
+err:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+
+
+static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+ {
+ int cmp;
+ unsigned int shift;
+ const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
+ if (cmp > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
+ return 1; /* this record in new */
+ }
+ shift = -cmp;
+ if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
+ else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
+ return 0; /* record previously received */
+
+ memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
+ {
+ int cmp;
+ unsigned int shift;
+ const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
+ if (cmp > 0)
+ {
+ shift = cmp;
+ if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
+ else
+ bitmap->map = 1UL;
+ memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
+ }
+ else {
+ shift = -cmp;
+ if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,j;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
+
+ memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
+ *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
+ *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
+
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
+ {
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
+#if 0
+ if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
+
+ else
+ s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
+#endif
+ l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+ /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+#endif
+ )
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
+ 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
+ }
+ }
+ return(i);
+ }
+
+
+static DTLS1_BITMAP *
+dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
+ {
+
+ *is_next_epoch = 0;
+
+ /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
+ if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
+ return &s->d1->bitmap;
+
+ /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
+ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
+ (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
+ rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
+ {
+ *is_next_epoch = 1;
+ return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+static int
+dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
+ unsigned long *offset)
+ {
+
+ /* alerts are passed up immediately */
+ if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
+ rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
+ * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
+ * immediately) */
+ if ( SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+ unsigned char *data = rr->data;
+ /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
+ if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
+ rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ unsigned short seq_num;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+
+ if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
+ seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
+ *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
+ seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
+ *offset = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
+ * retransmit of something we happened to previously
+ * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
+ if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+ return 0;
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+ seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
+ msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
+ return 0;
+ else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
+ (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
+ msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ {
+ *priority = seq_num;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else /* unknown record type */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+void
+dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
+ {
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
+
+ if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ {
+ seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
+ s->d1->r_epoch++;
+ memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
+ memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ s->d1->w_epoch++;
+ }
+
+ memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
+ }
+
+
+static void
+dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
+ {
+ memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a6a4c87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1563 @@
+/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return(DTLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
+ dtls1_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ dtls1_get_server_method)
+
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;
+ int listen;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ listen = s->d1->listen;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ s->d1->listen = listen;
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server=1;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+ {
+ /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+ * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+ * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
+ if (listen)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ /* If we're just listening, stop here */
+ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ ret = 2;
+ s->d1->listen = 0;
+ /* Set expected sequence numbers
+ * to continue the handshake.
+ */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
+ if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+ /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ s->new_session = 2;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+ * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+ * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+ * be able to handle this) */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
+ /* only send if a DH key exchange or
+ * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
+ * have not asked for it :-) */
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+ * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+ * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+ * message is not sent.
+ */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+ * a client cert, it can be verified */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_md5,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ /* next message is server hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
+ * requests for it */
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
+
+ if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
+ {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+ s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+ &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+ msg_len = p - msg;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int sl;
+ unsigned long l,Time;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=s->s3->server_random;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
+ * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
+ * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
+ * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
+ * session-id if we want it to be single use.
+ * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
+ * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
+
+ sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++)=sl;
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
+ p+=sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++)=0;
+ else
+ *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* do the header */
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j,num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int al,i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4],kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert=s->cert;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
+ n=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if(rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0]=rsa->n;
+ r[1]=rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+ {
+ dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
+ {
+ if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+ (dh->priv_key == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0]=dh->p;
+ r[1]=dh->g;
+ r[2]=dh->pub_key;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+ * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
+ * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key.
+ * First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
+ * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+ * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+ * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0]=NULL;
+ r[1]=NULL;
+ r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ n+=2+nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=NULL;
+ kn=0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ s2n(nr[i],p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
+ p+=nr[i];
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+ * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
+ encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ /* n is the length of the params, they start at
+ * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
+ * at the end. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ q=md_buf;
+ j=0;
+ for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
+ (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q+=i;
+ j+=i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n+=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,j,nl,off,n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
+ {
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
+ d[0]=n;
+ p+=n;
+ n++;
+
+ off=n;
+ p+=2;
+ n+=2;
+
+ sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl=0;
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+ j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ {
+ s2n(j,p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ n+=2+j;
+ nl+=2+j;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ d=p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
+ n+=j;
+ nl+=j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
+ s2n(nl,p);
+
+ d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+
+ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+/* XXX: what to do about this? */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
+ * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
+ /* Ticket length */
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
+ s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2900d1d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/dtls1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/* ssl/dtls1.h */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_DTLS1_H
+#define HEADER_DTLS1_H
+
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#include <resource.h>
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+/* Needed for struct timeval */
+#include <winsock.h>
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
+#include <sys/timeval.h>
+#else
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
+#define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
+
+#if 0
+/* this alert description is not specified anywhere... */
+#define DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 110
+#endif
+
+/* lengths of messages */
+#define DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH 256
+
+#define DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 13
+
+#define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 12
+
+#define DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT -2
+#define DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY -3
+
+#define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH 1
+
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+#define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 7
+#else
+#define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 2
+#endif
+
+
+typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st
+ {
+ unsigned long map; /* track 32 packets on 32-bit systems
+ and 64 - on 64-bit systems */
+ unsigned char max_seq_num[8]; /* max record number seen so far,
+ 64-bit value in big-endian
+ encoding */
+ } DTLS1_BITMAP;
+
+struct dtls1_retransmit_state
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
+#else
+ char *compress;
+#endif
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ unsigned short epoch;
+ };
+
+struct hm_header_st
+ {
+ unsigned char type;
+ unsigned long msg_len;
+ unsigned short seq;
+ unsigned long frag_off;
+ unsigned long frag_len;
+ unsigned int is_ccs;
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state;
+ };
+
+struct ccs_header_st
+ {
+ unsigned char type;
+ unsigned short seq;
+ };
+
+struct dtls1_timeout_st
+ {
+ /* Number of read timeouts so far */
+ unsigned int read_timeouts;
+
+ /* Number of write timeouts so far */
+ unsigned int write_timeouts;
+
+ /* Number of alerts received so far */
+ unsigned int num_alerts;
+ };
+
+typedef struct record_pqueue_st
+ {
+ unsigned short epoch;
+ pqueue q;
+ } record_pqueue;
+
+typedef struct hm_fragment_st
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st msg_header;
+ unsigned char *fragment;
+ unsigned char *reassembly;
+ } hm_fragment;
+
+typedef struct dtls1_state_st
+ {
+ unsigned int send_cookie;
+ unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char rcvd_cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+
+ /*
+ * The current data and handshake epoch. This is initially
+ * undefined, and starts at zero once the initial handshake is
+ * completed
+ */
+ unsigned short r_epoch;
+ unsigned short w_epoch;
+
+ /* records being received in the current epoch */
+ DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap;
+
+ /* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */
+ DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap;
+
+ /* handshake message numbers */
+ unsigned short handshake_write_seq;
+ unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq;
+
+ unsigned short handshake_read_seq;
+
+ /* save last sequence number for retransmissions */
+ unsigned char last_write_sequence[8];
+
+ /* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */
+ record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
+ record_pqueue processed_rcds;
+
+ /* Buffered handshake messages */
+ pqueue buffered_messages;
+
+ /* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
+ pqueue sent_messages;
+
+ /* Buffered application records.
+ * Only for records between CCS and Finished
+ * to prevent either protocol violation or
+ * unnecessary message loss.
+ */
+ record_pqueue buffered_app_data;
+
+ /* Is set when listening for new connections with dtls1_listen() */
+ unsigned int listen;
+
+ unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
+
+ struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
+ struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr;
+
+ struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout;
+
+ /* Indicates when the last handshake msg sent will timeout */
+ struct timeval next_timeout;
+
+ /* Timeout duration */
+ unsigned short timeout_duration;
+
+ /* storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not
+ * yet processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */
+ unsigned char alert_fragment[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
+ unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
+
+ unsigned int retransmitting;
+ unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
+
+ } DTLS1_STATE;
+
+typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
+ {
+ unsigned char *packet;
+ unsigned int packet_length;
+ SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
+ SSL3_RECORD rrec;
+ } DTLS1_RECORD_DATA;
+
+
+/* Timeout multipliers (timeout slice is defined in apps/timeouts.h */
+#define DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT 2
+#define DTLS1_TMO_WRITE_COUNT 2
+
+#define DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT 12
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b820e374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2205 @@
+/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+
+/* ssl/kssl.c -- Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
+**
+** 19990701 VRS Started.
+** 200011?? Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte
+** Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32.
+** Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots.
+** 20010413 Simon Wilkinson, VRS
+** Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ.
+*/
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define KRB5_PRIVATE 1
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+
+#ifndef ENOMEM
+#define ENOMEM KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
+ * the Kerberos DLLs be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
+ * work. Therefore, all Kerberos routines are loaded at run time
+ * and we do not link to a .LIB file.
+ */
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+/*
+ * The purpose of the following pre-processor statements is to provide
+ * compatibility with different releases of MIT Kerberos for Windows.
+ * All versions up to 1.2 used macros. But macros do not allow for
+ * a binary compatible interface for DLLs. Therefore, all macros are
+ * being replaced by function calls. The following code will allow
+ * an OpenSSL DLL built on Windows to work whether or not the macro
+ * or function form of the routines are utilized.
+ */
+#ifdef krb5_cc_get_principal
+#define NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
+#undef krb5_cc_get_principal
+#endif
+#define krb5_cc_get_principal kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
+
+#define krb5_free_data_contents kssl_krb5_free_data_contents
+#define krb5_free_context kssl_krb5_free_context
+#define krb5_auth_con_free kssl_krb5_auth_con_free
+#define krb5_free_principal kssl_krb5_free_principal
+#define krb5_mk_req_extended kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended
+#define krb5_get_credentials kssl_krb5_get_credentials
+#define krb5_cc_default kssl_krb5_cc_default
+#define krb5_sname_to_principal kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal
+#define krb5_init_context kssl_krb5_init_context
+#define krb5_free_ticket kssl_krb5_free_ticket
+#define krb5_rd_req kssl_krb5_rd_req
+#define krb5_kt_default kssl_krb5_kt_default
+#define krb5_kt_resolve kssl_krb5_kt_resolve
+/* macros in mit 1.2.2 and earlier; functions in mit 1.2.3 and greater */
+#ifndef krb5_kt_close
+#define krb5_kt_close kssl_krb5_kt_close
+#endif /* krb5_kt_close */
+#ifndef krb5_kt_get_entry
+#define krb5_kt_get_entry kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry
+#endif /* krb5_kt_get_entry */
+#define krb5_auth_con_init kssl_krb5_auth_con_init
+
+#define krb5_principal_compare kssl_krb5_principal_compare
+#define krb5_decrypt_tkt_part kssl_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part
+#define krb5_timeofday kssl_krb5_timeofday
+#define krb5_rc_default kssl_krb5_rc_default
+
+#ifdef krb5_rc_initialize
+#undef krb5_rc_initialize
+#endif
+#define krb5_rc_initialize kssl_krb5_rc_initialize
+
+#ifdef krb5_rc_get_lifespan
+#undef krb5_rc_get_lifespan
+#endif
+#define krb5_rc_get_lifespan kssl_krb5_rc_get_lifespan
+
+#ifdef krb5_rc_destroy
+#undef krb5_rc_destroy
+#endif
+#define krb5_rc_destroy kssl_krb5_rc_destroy
+
+#define valid_cksumtype kssl_valid_cksumtype
+#define krb5_checksum_size kssl_krb5_checksum_size
+#define krb5_kt_free_entry kssl_krb5_kt_free_entry
+#define krb5_auth_con_setrcache kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache
+#define krb5_auth_con_getrcache kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache
+#define krb5_get_server_rcache kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache
+
+/* Prototypes for built in stubs */
+void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context, krb5_data *);
+void kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context, krb5_principal );
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context,
+ krb5_const char *,
+ krb5_keytab *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_kt_default(krb5_context,
+ krb5_keytab *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context, krb5_ticket *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
+ krb5_const krb5_data *,
+ krb5_const_principal, krb5_keytab,
+ krb5_flags *,krb5_ticket **);
+
+krb5_boolean kssl_krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal,
+ krb5_const_principal);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context *,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags,
+ krb5_data *,
+ krb5_creds *,
+ krb5_data * );
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_init_context(krb5_context *);
+void kssl_krb5_free_context(krb5_context);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_cc_default(krb5_context,krb5_ccache *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5_context,
+ krb5_const char *,
+ krb5_const char *,
+ krb5_int32,
+ krb5_principal *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags,
+ krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_creds *,
+ krb5_creds * *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_ccache cache,
+ krb5_principal *principal);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context,krb5_auth_context);
+size_t kssl_krb5_checksum_size(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype);
+krb5_boolean kssl_valid_cksumtype(krb5_cksumtype ctype);
+krb5_error_code krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context,krb5_keytab_entry FAR * );
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context,
+ krb5_rcache);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5_context,
+ krb5_const krb5_data *,
+ krb5_rcache *);
+krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context,
+ krb5_rcache *);
+
+/* Function pointers (almost all Kerberos functions are _stdcall) */
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)
+ =NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )
+ =NULL;
+static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_default)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_ticket)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_ticket *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rd_req)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context *,
+ krb5_const krb5_data *,
+ krb5_const_principal,
+ krb5_keytab, krb5_flags *,
+ krb5_ticket **)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_data *, krb5_creds *,
+ krb5_data * )=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_init_context)(krb5_context *)=NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_context)(krb5_context)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_default)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_ccache *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_const char *,
+ krb5_int32, krb5_principal *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_creds *, krb5_creds **)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
+ krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *,
+ krb5_ticket *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_timeofday)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_int32 *timeret)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_default)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache *rc)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_initialize)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+ krb5_deltat lifespan)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+ krb5_deltat *lifespan)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rc_destroy)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc)=NULL;
+static krb5_boolean (_stdcall *p_krb5_principal_compare)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const_principal, krb5_const_principal)=NULL;
+static size_t (_stdcall *p_krb5_checksum_size)(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype)=NULL;
+static krb5_boolean (_stdcall *p_valid_cksumtype)(krb5_cksumtype ctype)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_free_entry)
+ (krb5_context,krb5_keytab_entry * )=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context,
+ krb5_rcache)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_get_server_rcache)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_const krb5_data *,
+ krb5_rcache *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (* p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache)(krb5_context,
+ krb5_auth_context,
+ krb5_rcache *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_kt_close)(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab keytab)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall * p_krb5_kt_get_entry)(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_keytab keytab,
+ krb5_const_principal principal, krb5_kvno vno,
+ krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_keytab_entry *entry)=NULL;
+static int krb5_loaded = 0; /* only attempt to initialize func ptrs once */
+
+/* Function to Load the Kerberos 5 DLL and initialize function pointers */
+void
+load_krb5_dll(void)
+ {
+ HANDLE hKRB5_32;
+
+ krb5_loaded++;
+ hKRB5_32 = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KRB5_32"));
+ if (!hKRB5_32)
+ return;
+
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_free_data_contents =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_data_contents" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_free_context =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_context" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_free =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_free" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_free_principal =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_principal" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_mk_req_extended =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_mk_req_extended" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_get_credentials =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_credentials" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_get_principal =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_get_principal" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_cc_default =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_cc_default" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_sname_to_principal =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_sname_to_principal" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_init_context =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_init_context" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_free_ticket =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_ticket" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rd_req =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rd_req" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_principal_compare =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_principal_compare" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_timeofday =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_timeofday" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_default =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_default" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_initialize =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_initialize" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_get_lifespan" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_destroy =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_destroy" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_default =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_default" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_resolve =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_resolve" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_init =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_init" );
+ (FARPROC) p_valid_cksumtype =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "valid_cksumtype" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_checksum_size =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_checksum_size" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_free_entry =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_free_entry" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_setrcache" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_get_server_rcache =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_get_server_rcache" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_auth_con_getrcache" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_close =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_close" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_get_entry =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_get_entry" );
+ }
+
+/* Stubs for each function to be dynamicly loaded */
+void
+kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context CO, krb5_data * data)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_free_data_contents )
+ p_krb5_free_data_contents(CO,data);
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended (krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_auth_context * pACO,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags F,
+ krb5_data * pD1,
+ krb5_creds * pC,
+ krb5_data * pD2)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_mk_req_extended )
+ return(p_krb5_mk_req_extended(CO,pACO,F,pD1,pC,pD2));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_auth_context * pACO)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_auth_con_init )
+ return(p_krb5_auth_con_init(CO,pACO));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_auth_con_free (krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_auth_context ACO)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_auth_con_free )
+ return(p_krb5_auth_con_free(CO,ACO));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags F,
+ krb5_ccache CC,
+ krb5_creds * pCR,
+ krb5_creds ** ppCR)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_get_credentials )
+ return(p_krb5_get_credentials(CO,F,CC,pCR,ppCR));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_const char * pC1,
+ krb5_const char * pC2,
+ krb5_int32 I,
+ krb5_principal * pPR)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_sname_to_principal )
+ return(p_krb5_sname_to_principal(CO,pC1,pC2,I,pPR));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_cc_default(krb5_context CO,
+ krb5_ccache * pCC)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_cc_default )
+ return(p_krb5_cc_default(CO,pCC));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_init_context(krb5_context * pCO)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_init_context )
+ return(p_krb5_init_context(pCO));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+void
+kssl_krb5_free_context(krb5_context CO)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_free_context )
+ p_krb5_free_context(CO);
+ }
+
+void
+kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context c, krb5_principal p)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_free_principal )
+ p_krb5_free_principal(c,p);
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context con,
+ krb5_const char * sz,
+ krb5_keytab * kt)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_kt_resolve )
+ return(p_krb5_kt_resolve(con,sz,kt));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_kt_default(krb5_context con,
+ krb5_keytab * kt)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_kt_default )
+ return(p_krb5_kt_default(con,kt));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context con,
+ krb5_ticket * kt)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_free_ticket )
+ return(p_krb5_free_ticket(con,kt));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context * pacon,
+ krb5_const krb5_data * data,
+ krb5_const_principal princ, krb5_keytab keytab,
+ krb5_flags * flags, krb5_ticket ** pptkt)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rd_req )
+ return(p_krb5_rd_req(con,pacon,data,princ,keytab,flags,pptkt));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_boolean
+krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context con, krb5_const_principal princ1,
+ krb5_const_principal princ2)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_principal_compare )
+ return(p_krb5_principal_compare(con,princ1,princ2));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *keys,
+ krb5_ticket *ticket)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part )
+ return(p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(con,keys,ticket));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_timeofday(krb5_context con, krb5_int32 *timeret)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_timeofday )
+ return(p_krb5_timeofday(con,timeret));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_default(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache *rc)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_default )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_default(con,rc));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat lifespan)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_initialize )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_initialize(con, rc, lifespan));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat *lifespanp)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan(con, rc, lifespanp));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_destroy )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_destroy(con, rc));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+size_t
+krb5_checksum_size(krb5_context context,krb5_cksumtype ctype)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_checksum_size )
+ return(p_krb5_checksum_size(context, ctype));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_boolean
+valid_cksumtype(krb5_cksumtype ctype)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_valid_cksumtype )
+ return(p_valid_cksumtype(ctype));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context con,krb5_keytab_entry * entry)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_kt_free_entry )
+ return(p_krb5_kt_free_entry(con,entry));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+/* Structure definitions */
+#ifndef NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
+#ifndef krb5_x
+#define krb5_x(ptr,args) ((ptr)?((*(ptr)) args):(abort(),1))
+#define krb5_xc(ptr,args) ((ptr)?((*(ptr)) args):(abort(),(char*)0))
+#endif
+
+typedef krb5_pointer krb5_cc_cursor; /* cursor for sequential lookup */
+
+typedef struct _krb5_ccache
+ {
+ krb5_magic magic;
+ struct _krb5_cc_ops FAR *ops;
+ krb5_pointer data;
+ } *krb5_ccache;
+
+typedef struct _krb5_cc_ops
+ {
+ krb5_magic magic;
+ char *prefix;
+ char * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, const char *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_flags, krb5_creds *, krb5_creds *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_cc_cursor *, krb5_creds *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_flags, krb5_creds *);
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags);
+ } krb5_cc_ops;
+#endif /* NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE */
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
+ krb5_principal *principal)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_cc_get_principal )
+ return(p_krb5_cc_get_principal(context,cache,principal));
+ else
+ return(krb5_x
+ ((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context acon,
+ krb5_rcache rcache)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache )
+ return(p_krb5_auth_con_setrcache(con,acon,rcache));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_data * data,
+ krb5_rcache * rcache)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_get_server_rcache )
+ return(p_krb5_get_server_rcache(con,data,rcache));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context acon,
+ krb5_rcache * prcache)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache )
+ return(p_krb5_auth_con_getrcache(con,acon, prcache));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_kt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_kt_close )
+ return(p_krb5_kt_close(context,keytab));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab,
+ krb5_const_principal principal, krb5_kvno vno,
+ krb5_enctype enctype, krb5_keytab_entry *entry)
+ {
+ if ( p_krb5_kt_get_entry )
+ return(p_krb5_kt_get_entry(context,keytab,principal,vno,enctype,entry));
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS || OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+
+
+/* memory allocation functions for non-temporary storage
+ * (e.g. stuff that gets saved into the kssl context) */
+static void* kssl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+ void* p;
+
+ p=OPENSSL_malloc(nmemb*size);
+ if (p){
+ memset(p, 0, nmemb*size);
+ }
+ return p;
+}
+
+#define kssl_malloc(size) OPENSSL_malloc((size))
+#define kssl_realloc(ptr, size) OPENSSL_realloc(ptr, size)
+#define kssl_free(ptr) OPENSSL_free((ptr))
+
+
+char
+*kstring(char *string)
+ {
+ static char *null = "[NULL]";
+
+ return ((string == NULL)? null: string);
+ }
+
+/* Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES),
+** return closest match openssl EVP_ encryption algorithm.
+** Return NULL for unknown or problematic (krb5_dk_encrypt) enctypes.
+** Assume ENCTYPE_*_RAW (krb5_raw_encrypt) are OK.
+*/
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
+ {
+ switch (enctype)
+ {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_cbc(); */
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+ return EVP_des_cbc();
+ break;
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ break;
+ default: return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+/* Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
+** described in kssl_skip_confound() below. The ASN.1 pattern is
+** "62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
+** xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
+*/
+static int kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ int len = 2;
+ int xx = 0, yy = 0;
+
+ if (*p++ != 0x62) return 0;
+ if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
+ switch(*p) {
+ case 0x82: p++; xx = (*p++ << 8); xx += *p++; break;
+ case 0x81: p++; xx = *p++; break;
+ case 0x80: return 0;
+ default: xx = *p++; break;
+ }
+ if (*p++ != 0x30) return 0;
+ if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
+ switch(*p) {
+ case 0x82: p++; len+=2; yy = (*p++ << 8); yy += *p++; break;
+ case 0x81: p++; len++; yy = *p++; break;
+ case 0x80: return 0;
+ default: yy = *p++; break;
+ }
+
+ return (xx - len == yy)? 1: 0;
+ }
+
+/* Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths.
+** This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[].
+** array[n] == 0 signals end of data.
+**
+** The krb5_cksumarray[] was an internal variable that has since been
+** replaced by a more general method for storing the data. It should
+** not be used. Instead we use real API calls and make a guess for
+** what the highest assigned CKSUMTYPE_ constant is. As of 1.2.2
+** it is 0x000c (CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3). So we will use 0x0010.
+*/
+static size_t *populate_cksumlens(void)
+ {
+ int i, j, n;
+ static size_t *cklens = NULL;
+
+#ifdef KRB5_MIT_OLD11
+ n = krb5_max_cksum;
+#else
+ n = 0x0010;
+#endif /* KRB5_MIT_OLD11 */
+
+#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+ if (!cklens && !(cklens = (size_t *) calloc(sizeof(int),n+1))) return NULL;
+
+ for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (!valid_cksumtype(i)) continue; /* array has holes */
+ for (j=0; j < n; j++) {
+ if (cklens[j] == 0) {
+ cklens[j] = krb5_checksum_size(NULL,i);
+ break; /* krb5 elem was new: add */
+ }
+ if (cklens[j] == krb5_checksum_size(NULL,i)) {
+ break; /* ignore duplicate elements */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+ return cklens;
+ }
+
+/* Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or
+** return NULL on error.
+** Decrypted authenticator looks like this:
+** [0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r]
+** This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the
+** krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h.
+*/
+unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
+ {
+ int i, conlen;
+ size_t cklen;
+ static size_t *cksumlens = NULL;
+ unsigned char *test_auth;
+
+ conlen = (etype)? 8: 0;
+
+ if (!cksumlens && !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens())) return NULL;
+ for (i=0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++)
+ {
+ test_auth = a + conlen + cklen;
+ if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth)) return test_auth;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+/* Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
+** kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1]; }
+*/
+void
+kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text)
+ {
+ if (kssl_err == NULL) return;
+
+ kssl_err->reason = reason;
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text);
+ return;
+ }
+
+
+/* Display contents of krb5_data struct, for debugging
+*/
+void
+print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
+ for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
+ {
+ if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
+ printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
+ else
+ printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+
+
+/* Display contents of krb5_authdata struct, for debugging
+*/
+void
+print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata)
+ {
+ if (adata == NULL)
+ {
+ printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
+ return;
+ }
+ printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
+#if 0
+ {
+ int i;
+ printf("%s[at%d:%d] ", label, adata->ad_type, adata->length);
+ for (i=0; i < adata->length; i++)
+ {
+ printf((isprint(adata->contents[i]))? "%c ": "%02x",
+ adata->contents[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+
+/* Display contents of krb5_keyblock struct, for debugging
+*/
+void
+print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (keyblk == NULL)
+ {
+ printf("%s, keyblk==0\n", label);
+ return;
+ }
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+ keyblk->keyvalue->length);
+ for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#else
+ printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
+ for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+ }
+
+
+/* Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
+** (krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
+*/
+static void
+print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
+ {
+ int i, ui, uj;
+
+ printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+ if (princ == NULL) return;
+ for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++) putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
+ printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+ for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+ for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
+ putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+
+/* Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
+** Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
+** If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
+** whose data should be freed by caller.
+** (Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
+**
+** 19990628 VRS Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
+** 20010409 VRS Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
+** 20010606 VRS May also return optional authenticator.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_cget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
+ /* UPDATE */ krb5_data *authenp,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
+ krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
+ krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
+ krb5_data krb5_app_req;
+
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
+ memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "kssl_ctx service_host undefined.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_init_context() fails: %d\n", krb5rc);
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
+ kssl_ctx->service_host,
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
+ kssl_ctx->service_host,
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name:
+ KRB5SVC);
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
+ "krb5_cc_default fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
+ &krb5creds.client)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC,
+ "krb5_cc_get_principal() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
+ &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED,
+ "krb5_get_credentials() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
+#else
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
+#endif
+
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ /* caller should free data of krb5_app_req */
+ /* 20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
+ ** 20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
+ */
+ krb5_app_req.length = 0;
+ if (authenp)
+ {
+ krb5_data krb5in_data;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ long arlen;
+ KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req;
+
+ authenp->length = 0;
+ krb5in_data.data = NULL;
+ krb5in_data.length = 0;
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
+ &krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
+ &krb5_app_req)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
+ "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
+ p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data;
+ ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
+ if (ap_req)
+ {
+ authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+ ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
+ if (authenp->length &&
+ (authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
+ {
+ unsigned char *adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data;
+ authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+ ap_req->authenticator, &adp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ap_req) KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
+ if (krb5_app_req.length)
+ kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5context,&krb5_app_req);
+ }
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
+ "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
+ }
+#else
+ if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
+ "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ else krb5rc = 0;
+
+ err:
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+ krb5creds.client);
+ if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+ krb5creds.server);
+ if (krb5auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context,
+ krb5auth_context);
+ if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
+ return (krb5rc);
+ }
+
+
+/* Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
+** Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
+** Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
+**
+** 20010410 VRS Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
+** old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
+** 20010615 VRS Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
+** Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
+** code here. This tkt should alloc/free just
+** like the real thing.
+*/
+static krb5_error_code
+kssl_TKT2tkt( /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
+ /* IN */ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_ticket **krb5ticket,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ krb5_ticket *new5ticket = NULL;
+ ASN1_GENERALSTRING *gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
+
+ *krb5ticket = NULL;
+
+ if (asn1ticket == NULL || asn1ticket->realm == NULL ||
+ asn1ticket->sname == NULL ||
+ sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_num(asn1ticket->sname->namestring) < 2)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+ if ((new5ticket = (krb5_ticket *) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket)))==NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return ENOMEM; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
+ }
+
+ gstr_svc = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 0);
+ gstr_host = sk_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_value(asn1ticket->sname->namestring, 1);
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context,
+ &new5ticket->server,
+ asn1ticket->realm->length, (char *)asn1ticket->realm->data,
+ gstr_svc->length, (char *)gstr_svc->data,
+ gstr_host->length, (char *)gstr_host->data)) != 0)
+ {
+ free(new5ticket);
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error building ticket server principal.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
+ }
+
+ krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
+ asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
+ if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
+ calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ free(new5ticket);
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
+ }
+
+ *krb5ticket = new5ticket;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
+** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
+** Return Kerberos session key and client principle
+** to SSL Server in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx.
+**
+** 19990702 VRS Started.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
+ /* IN */ krb5_data *indata,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ static krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
+ static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
+ krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL;
+ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
+ krb5_principal krb5server;
+ krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
+
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("in kssl_sget_tkt(%s)\n", kstring(kssl_ctx->service_name));
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!krb5context && (krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_init_context() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (krb5auth_context &&
+ (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_auth_con_free() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else krb5auth_context = NULL;
+ if (!krb5auth_context &&
+ (krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_init(krb5context, &krb5auth_context)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_auth_con_init() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_getrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context,
+ &rcache)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_auth_con_getrcache() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5server)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rcache == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_server_rcache(krb5context,
+ krb5_princ_component(krb5context, krb5server, 0),
+ &rcache)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_get_server_rcache() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5context, krb5auth_context, rcache)))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_auth_con_setrcache() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
+ */
+ if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
+ {
+ krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
+ &krb5keytab);
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_kt_resolve() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "krb5_kt_default() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
+ ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
+ ** unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
+ ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
+ ** o send "0" msg if all OK
+ */
+
+ /* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
+ **
+ ** if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
+ ** &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
+ ** &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
+ */
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
+ if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
+ (long) indata->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Was: krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
+ kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (! krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
+ krb5ticket->server)) {
+ krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "server principal != ticket principal\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
+ krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0) {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
+ krb5ticket)) != 0) {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else {
+ krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
+ printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+ printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
+ print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
+ &(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
+ printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
+ if (paddr)
+ {
+ printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+ for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ krb5_data d;
+ d.length=paddr[i]->length;
+ d.data=paddr[i]->contents;
+ print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
+ }
+ }
+ printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ }
+
+ krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
+ if (!krb5ticket || !krb5ticket->enc_part2 ||
+ !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client ||
+ !krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data ||
+ !krb5ticket->enc_part2->session)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+ "bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
+ }
+ else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT,
+ &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+ "kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n");
+ }
+ else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, krb5ticket->enc_part2->session))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+ "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
+ }
+ else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID)
+ {
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+ "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
+ }
+ else krb5rc = 0;
+
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
+ ttimes->authtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
+ ttimes->starttime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
+ ttimes->endtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
+ ttimes->renew_till = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
+
+ err:
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (asn1ticket) KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
+ if (krb5keytab) krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
+ if (krb5ticket) krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
+ if (krb5server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
+ return (krb5rc);
+ }
+
+
+/* Allocate & return a new kssl_ctx struct.
+*/
+KSSL_CTX *
+kssl_ctx_new(void)
+ {
+ return ((KSSL_CTX *) kssl_calloc(1, sizeof(KSSL_CTX)));
+ }
+
+
+/* Frees a kssl_ctx struct and any allocated memory it holds.
+** Returns NULL.
+*/
+KSSL_CTX *
+kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ if (kssl_ctx == NULL) return kssl_ctx;
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->key) OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key,
+ kssl_ctx->length);
+ if (kssl_ctx->key) kssl_free(kssl_ctx->key);
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) kssl_free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if (kssl_ctx->service_host) kssl_free(kssl_ctx->service_host);
+ if (kssl_ctx->service_name) kssl_free(kssl_ctx->service_name);
+ if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file) kssl_free(kssl_ctx->keytab_file);
+
+ kssl_free(kssl_ctx);
+ return (KSSL_CTX *) NULL;
+ }
+
+
+/* Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
+** set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member
+** of the kssl_ctx struct.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
+ krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities)
+ {
+ char **princ;
+ int length;
+ int i;
+
+ if (kssl_ctx == NULL || entity == NULL) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+
+ switch (which)
+ {
+ case KSSL_CLIENT: princ = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; break;
+ case KSSL_SERVER: princ = &kssl_ctx->service_host; break;
+ default: return KSSL_CTX_ERR; break;
+ }
+ if (*princ) kssl_free(*princ);
+
+ /* Add up all the entity->lengths */
+ length = 0;
+ for (i=0; i < nentities; i++)
+ {
+ length += entity[i].length;
+ }
+ /* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */
+ length += nentities-1;
+ /* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */
+ length += ((realm)? realm->length + 2: 1);
+
+ if ((*princ = kssl_calloc(1, length)) == NULL)
+ return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++)
+ {
+ strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length);
+ if (i < nentities-1)
+ {
+ strcat (*princ, "/");
+ }
+ }
+ if (realm)
+ {
+ strcat (*princ, "@");
+ (void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return KSSL_CTX_OK;
+ }
+
+
+/* Set one of the plain (char *) string members of the kssl_ctx struct.
+** Default values should be:
+** which == KSSL_SERVICE => "khost" (KRB5SVC)
+** which == KSSL_KEYTAB => "/etc/krb5.keytab" (KRB5KEYTAB)
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text)
+ {
+ char **string;
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+
+ switch (which)
+ {
+ case KSSL_SERVICE: string = &kssl_ctx->service_name; break;
+ case KSSL_SERVER: string = &kssl_ctx->service_host; break;
+ case KSSL_CLIENT: string = &kssl_ctx->client_princ; break;
+ case KSSL_KEYTAB: string = &kssl_ctx->keytab_file; break;
+ default: return KSSL_CTX_ERR; break;
+ }
+ if (*string) kssl_free(*string);
+
+ if (!text)
+ {
+ *string = '\0';
+ return KSSL_CTX_OK;
+ }
+
+ if ((*string = kssl_calloc(1, strlen(text) + 1)) == NULL)
+ return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+ else
+ strcpy(*string, text);
+
+ return KSSL_CTX_OK;
+ }
+
+
+/* Copy the Kerberos session key from a (krb5_keyblock *) to a kssl_ctx
+** struct. Clear kssl_ctx->key if Kerberos session key is NULL.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
+ {
+ int length;
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ krb5_octet FAR *contents = NULL;
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->key)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
+ kssl_free(kssl_ctx->key);
+ }
+
+ if (session)
+ {
+
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ length = session->keyvalue->length;
+ enctype = session->keytype;
+ contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
+#else
+ length = session->length;
+ enctype = session->enctype;
+ contents = session->contents;
+#endif
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
+ kssl_ctx->length = length;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ kssl_ctx->length = 0;
+ return KSSL_CTX_OK;
+ }
+
+ if ((kssl_ctx->key =
+ (krb5_octet FAR *) kssl_calloc(1, kssl_ctx->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_ctx->length = 0;
+ return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
+ }
+ else
+ memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
+
+ return KSSL_CTX_OK;
+ }
+
+
+/* Display contents of kssl_ctx struct
+*/
+void
+kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ printf("kssl_ctx: ");
+ if (kssl_ctx == NULL)
+ {
+ printf("NULL\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx);
+
+ printf("\tservice:\t%s\n",
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: "NULL");
+ printf("\tclient:\t%s\n",
+ (kssl_ctx->client_princ)? kssl_ctx->client_princ: "NULL");
+ printf("\tserver:\t%s\n",
+ (kssl_ctx->service_host)? kssl_ctx->service_host: "NULL");
+ printf("\tkeytab:\t%s\n",
+ (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)? kssl_ctx->keytab_file: "NULL");
+ printf("\tkey [%d:%d]:\t",
+ kssl_ctx->enctype, kssl_ctx->length);
+
+ for (i=0; i < kssl_ctx->length && kssl_ctx->key; i++)
+ {
+ printf("%02x", kssl_ctx->key[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ int
+ kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
+{
+ krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab_entry entry;
+ krb5_principal princ = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)))
+ return(0);
+
+ /* kssl_ctx->keytab_file == NULL ==> use Kerberos default
+ */
+ if (kssl_ctx->keytab_file)
+ {
+ krb5rc = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5context, kssl_ctx->keytab_file,
+ &krb5keytab);
+ if (krb5rc)
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ krb5rc = krb5_kt_default(krb5context,&krb5keytab);
+ if (krb5rc)
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* the host key we are looking for */
+ krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context, NULL,
+ kssl_ctx->service_name ? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &princ);
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ goto exit;
+
+ krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
+ princ,
+ 0 /* IGNORE_VNO */,
+ 0 /* IGNORE_ENCTYPE */,
+ &entry);
+ if ( krb5rc == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND ) {
+ rc = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ } else if ( krb5rc )
+ goto exit;
+
+ krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &entry);
+ rc = 1;
+
+ exit:
+ if (krb5keytab) krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
+ if (princ) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, princ);
+ if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
+ return(rc);
+}
+
+int
+kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
+ krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
+ krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ return(0);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
+ return(0);
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
+ kssl_ctx->service_host,
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
+ &krb5creds.client)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
+ &krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = 1;
+
+ err:
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
+ if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
+ if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
+ return(rc);
+ }
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
+ {
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ data->length = 0;
+ if (data->data)
+ free(data->data);
+#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+ if (data->data) {
+ krb5_xfree(data->data);
+ data->data = 0;
+ }
+#else
+ krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data);
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS && !OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+
+
+/* Given pointers to KerberosTime and struct tm structs, convert the
+** KerberosTime string to struct tm. Note that KerberosTime is a
+** ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME value, constrained to GMT with no fractional
+** seconds as defined in RFC 1510.
+** Return pointer to the (partially) filled in struct tm on success,
+** return NULL on failure.
+*/
+static struct tm *k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime, struct tm *k_tm)
+ {
+ char c, *p;
+
+ if (!k_tm) return NULL;
+ if (gtime == NULL || gtime->length < 14) return NULL;
+ if (gtime->data == NULL) return NULL;
+
+ p = (char *)&gtime->data[14];
+
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 2; k_tm->tm_sec = atoi(p); *(p+2) = c;
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 2; k_tm->tm_min = atoi(p); *(p+2) = c;
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 2; k_tm->tm_hour = atoi(p); *(p+2) = c;
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 2; k_tm->tm_mday = atoi(p); *(p+2) = c;
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 2; k_tm->tm_mon = atoi(p)-1; *(p+2) = c;
+ c = *p; *p = '\0'; p -= 4; k_tm->tm_year = atoi(p)-1900; *(p+4) = c;
+
+ return k_tm;
+ }
+
+
+/* Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
+** We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
+** So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
+** If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
+*/
+static krb5_deltat get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
+ {
+ krb5_rcache rc;
+ krb5_deltat clockskew;
+
+ if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew)) {
+ clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ }
+ (void) krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
+ return clockskew;
+ }
+
+
+/* kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
+** the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
+** in_clock_skew() macro. The authenticator client time is checked
+** to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
+** time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
+** Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
+** Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
+** See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
+** 20010420 VRS
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times( krb5_timestamp atime,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
+ {
+ krb5_deltat skew;
+ krb5_timestamp start, now;
+ krb5_error_code rc;
+ krb5_context context;
+
+ if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+ skew = get_rc_clockskew(context);
+ if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context,&now))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+ krb5_free_context(context);
+
+ if (atime && labs(atime - now) >= skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
+
+ if (! ttimes) return 0;
+
+ start = (ttimes->starttime != 0)? ttimes->starttime: ttimes->authtime;
+ if (start - now > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
+ if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
+ start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
+** authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
+** Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error. A NULL
+** authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
+** Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
+** you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
+ /* IN */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
+ /* IN */ krb5_data *authentp,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_timestamp *atimep,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = 0;
+ KRB5_ENCDATA *dec_authent = NULL;
+ KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *auth = NULL;
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *unenc_authent;
+ int outl, unencbufsize;
+ struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
+ time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+ *atimep = 0;
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+ authentp = NULL;
+#else
+#if KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
+ authentp = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+ if (authentp == NULL || authentp->length == 0) return 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned int ui;
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+ p = authentp->data;
+ for (ui=0; ui < authentp->length; ui++) printf("%02x ",p[ui]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
+ if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data;
+ if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
+ (long) authentp->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Error decoding authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
+#if !defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+ switch ( enctype ) {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1: /* EVP_des_ede3_cbc(); */
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+ krb5rc = 0; /* Skip, can't handle derived keys */
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ {
+ /* Disable kssl_check_authent for ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1.
+ ** This enctype indicates the authenticator was encrypted
+ ** using key-usage derived keys which openssl cannot decrypt.
+ */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv,0))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl = dec_authent->cipher->length;
+ if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx,unenc_authent,dec_authent->cipher->data,outl))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int padl;
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+ for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "confounded by authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl -= p - unenc_authent;
+
+ if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
+ (long) outl))==NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(&tm_time,0,sizeof(struct tm));
+ if (k_gmtime(auth->ctime, &tm_time) &&
+ ((tr = mktime(&tm_time)) != (time_t)(-1)))
+ {
+ now = time(&now);
+ tm_l = localtime(&now); tl = mktime(tm_l);
+ tm_g = gmtime(&now); tg = mktime(tm_g);
+ tz_offset = tg - tl;
+
+ *atimep = (krb5_timestamp)(tr - tz_offset);
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: returns %d for client time ", *atimep);
+ if (auth && auth->ctime && auth->ctime->length && auth->ctime->data)
+ printf("%.*s\n", auth->ctime->length, auth->ctime->data);
+ else printf("NULL\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ err:
+ if (auth) KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
+ if (dec_authent) KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
+ if (unenc_authent) free(unenc_authent);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+ return krb5rc;
+ }
+
+
+/* Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
+** because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
+** Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
+** passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(
+ /* UPDATE */ krb5_context context,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_principal *princ,
+ /* IN */ int rlen, const char *realm,
+ /* IN */ int slen, const char *svc,
+ /* IN */ int hlen, const char *host)
+ {
+ krb5_data *p_data = NULL;
+ krb5_principal new_p = NULL;
+ char *new_r = NULL;
+
+ if ((p_data = (krb5_data *) calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL ||
+ (new_p = (krb5_principal) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)))
+ == NULL) goto err;
+ new_p->length = 2;
+ new_p->data = p_data;
+
+ if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
+
+ if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
+ new_p->data[0].length = slen;
+
+ if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
+ new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
+
+ krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
+ *princ = new_p;
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ if (new_p && new_p[0].data) free(new_p[0].data);
+ if (new_p && new_p[1].data) free(new_p[1].data);
+ if (new_p) free(new_p);
+ if (new_r) free(new_r);
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a3d20e1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+** 19990701 VRS Started.
+*/
+
+#ifndef KSSL_H
+#define KSSL_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+** Depending on which KRB5 implementation used, some types from
+** the other may be missing. Resolve that here and now
+*/
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
+#define FAR
+#else
+
+#ifndef FAR
+#define FAR
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* Uncomment this to debug kssl problems or
+** to trace usage of the Kerberos session key
+**
+** #define KSSL_DEBUG
+*/
+
+#ifndef KRB5SVC
+#define KRB5SVC "host"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KRB5KEYTAB
+#define KRB5KEYTAB "/etc/krb5.keytab"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH
+#define KRB5SENDAUTH 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+#define KRB5CHECKAUTH 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW
+#define KSSL_CLOCKSKEW 300;
+#endif
+
+#define KSSL_ERR_MAX 255
+typedef struct kssl_err_st {
+ int reason;
+ char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1];
+ } KSSL_ERR;
+
+
+/* Context for passing
+** (1) Kerberos session key to SSL, and
+** (2) Config data between application and SSL lib
+*/
+typedef struct kssl_ctx_st
+ {
+ /* used by: disposition: */
+ char *service_name; /* C,S default ok (kssl) */
+ char *service_host; /* C input, REQUIRED */
+ char *client_princ; /* S output from krb5 ticket */
+ char *keytab_file; /* S NULL (/etc/krb5.keytab) */
+ char *cred_cache; /* C NULL (default) */
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ int length;
+ krb5_octet FAR *key;
+ } KSSL_CTX;
+
+#define KSSL_CLIENT 1
+#define KSSL_SERVER 2
+#define KSSL_SERVICE 3
+#define KSSL_KEYTAB 4
+
+#define KSSL_CTX_OK 0
+#define KSSL_CTX_ERR 1
+#define KSSL_NOMEM 2
+
+/* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */
+krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text);
+KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_new(void);
+KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
+void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
+krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
+ krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities);
+krb5_error_code kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data **enc_tktp,
+ krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *indata,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session);
+void kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text);
+void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data);
+krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm,
+ int slen, const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host);
+krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes);
+krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
+ krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#endif /* KSSL_H */
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c039c91b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project 2000.
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef KSSL_LCL_H
+#define KSSL_LCL_H
+
+#include <openssl/kssl.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Private (internal to OpenSSL) */
+void print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata);
+void print_krb5_authdata(char *label, krb5_authdata **adata);
+void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk);
+
+char *kstring(char *string);
+char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
+
+int kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
+int kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#endif /* KSSL_LCL_H */
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f41fe3ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+/* ssl/s23_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_client_method());
+#endif
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_client_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl23_connect,
+ ssl23_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl23_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ /* s->version=TLS1_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl23_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl23_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (s->debug) { (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+ int i;
+ ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
+ {
+ cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ if (cipher->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,ch_len;
+ unsigned long Time,l;
+ int ssl2_compat;
+ int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ int ret;
+
+ ssl2_compat = (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
+
+ if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ {
+ version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (version != SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0 || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+#if 0
+ /* don't reuse session-id's */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ {
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ p=s->s3->client_random;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+ }
+ else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
+ }
+ else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ version_major = SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = SSL2_VERSION_MINOR;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s->client_version = version;
+
+ if (ssl2_compat)
+ {
+ /* create SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello */
+
+ /* two byte record header will be written last */
+ d = &(buf[2]);
+ p = d + 9; /* leave space for message type, version, individual length fields */
+
+ *(d++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ *(d++) = version_major;
+ *(d++) = version_minor;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),p,0);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ /* no ciphers */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s2n(i,d);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse) */
+#if 0
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
+#endif
+ s2n(0,d);
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
+ ch_len=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+ /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+ /* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32),
+ because it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32)
+ or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the
+ check in for futurproofing */
+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
+ i=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ else
+ i=ch_len;
+ s2n(i,d);
+ memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]),0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(p,&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i);
+ p+=i;
+
+ i= p- &(buf[2]);
+ buf[0]=((i>>8)&0xff)|0x80;
+ buf[1]=(i&0xff);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=i+2;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[2]),i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
+
+ /* do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4 bytes) last */
+ d = p = &(buf[9]);
+
+ *(p++) = version_major;
+ *(p++) = version_minor;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID (zero since there is no reuse) */
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported (using SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format) */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),ssl3_put_cipher_by_char);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=1;
+#else
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j=0;
+ else
+ j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++)=1+j;
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+ *(p++)=comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l = p-d;
+
+ /* fill in 4-byte handshake header */
+ d=&(buf[5]);
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l,d);
+
+ l += 4;
+
+ if (l > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* fill in 5-byte record header */
+ d=buf;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ *(d++) = version_major;
+ *(d++) = version_minor; /* arguably we should send the *lowest* suported version here
+ * (indicating, e.g., TLS 1.0 in "SSL 3.0 format") */
+ s2n((int)l,d);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(buf[5]), s->init_num - 5);
+ }
+
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ ret = ssl23_write_bytes(s);
+
+ if ((ret >= 2) && s->msg_callback)
+ {
+ /* Client Hello has been sent; tell msg_callback */
+
+ if (ssl2_compat)
+ s->msg_callback(1, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data+2, ret-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ else
+ s->msg_callback(1, version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data+5, ret-5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ char buf[8];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ int n;
+
+ n=ssl23_read_bytes(s,7);
+
+ if (n != 7) return(n);
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ memcpy(buf,p,n);
+
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO) &&
+ (p[5] == 0x00) && (p[6] == 0x02))
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+#else
+ /* we are talking sslv2 */
+ /* we need to clean up the SSLv3 setup and put in the
+ * sslv2 stuff. */
+ int ch_len;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->s2 == NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl2_new(s))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ ssl2_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
+ ch_len=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+ /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+ /* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because
+ it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or
+ SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the check in for
+ futurproofing */
+ i=(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
+ ?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:ch_len;
+ s->s2->challenge_length=i;
+ memcpy(s->s2->challenge,
+ &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),i);
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
+ if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ /* use special padding (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
+ s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
+
+ /* setup the 7 bytes we have read so we get them from
+ * the sslv2 buffer */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
+ s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
+
+ /* we have already written one */
+ s->s2->write_sequence=1;
+
+ s->method=SSLv2_client_method();
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ (p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR || p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
+ (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2)))
+ {
+ /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+
+ if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method=SSLv3_client_method();
+ }
+ else if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method=TLSv1_client_method();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ {
+ /* fatal alert */
+
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int j;
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ i=p[5];
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j=(i<<8)|p[6];
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_READ_ALERT,j);
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, p+5, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET+p[6]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
+
+ /* we are in this state */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ /* put the 7 bytes we have read into the input buffer
+ * for SSLv3 */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ goto err;
+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
+ s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
+
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not
+ * reusing a session-id */
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ goto err;
+
+ return(SSL_connect(s));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3bf72831
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/* ssl/s23_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+long ssl23_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ return(300);
+ }
+
+int ssl23_num_ciphers(void)
+ {
+ return(ssl3_num_ciphers()
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ + ssl2_num_ciphers()
+#endif
+ );
+ }
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+ {
+ unsigned int uu=ssl3_num_ciphers();
+
+ if (u < uu)
+ return(ssl3_get_cipher(u));
+ else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ return(ssl2_get_cipher(u-uu));
+#else
+ return(NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+
+/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
+ * available */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+
+ cp=ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+#endif
+ return(cp);
+ }
+
+int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ /* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+ }
+ return(3);
+ }
+
+int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int n;
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
+ {
+ n=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (n < 0) return(n);
+ if (n == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_READ,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(SSL_read(s,buf,len));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ssl_undefined_function(s);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int n;
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
+ {
+ n=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (n < 0) return(n);
+ if (n == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(SSL_peek(s,buf,len));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ssl_undefined_function(s);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int n;
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (!s->in_handshake))
+ {
+ n=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (n < 0) return(n);
+ if (n == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(SSL_write(s,buf,len));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ssl_undefined_function(s);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c6099efc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* ssl/s23_meth.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_method(int ver)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_method());
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_method());
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_method());
+ else
+#endif
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_method,
+ ssl23_accept,
+ ssl23_connect,
+ ssl23_get_method)
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4ca6a1b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/* ssl/s23_pkt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,num,tot;
+ char *buf;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf->data;
+ tot=s->init_off;
+ num=s->init_num;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ i=BIO_write(s->wbio,&(buf[tot]),num);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->init_off=tot;
+ s->init_num=num;
+ return(i);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if (i == num) return(tot+i);
+
+ num-=i;
+ tot+=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* return regularly only when we have read (at least) 'n' bytes */
+int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int j;
+
+ if (s->packet_length < (unsigned int)n)
+ {
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ j=BIO_read(s->rbio,(char *)&(p[s->packet_length]),
+ n-s->packet_length);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ return(j);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->packet_length+=j;
+ if (s->packet_length >= (unsigned int)n)
+ return(s->packet_length);
+ }
+ }
+ return(n);
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e22879c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+/* ssl/s23_srvr.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
+int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_server_method());
+#endif
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method,
+ ssl23_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl23_get_server_method)
+
+int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server=1;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
+ * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+ * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+ * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+ * the protocol specification:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0 type \
+ * 1/2 version > record header
+ * 3/4 length /
+ * 5 msg_type \
+ * 6-8 length > Client Hello message
+ * 9/10 client_version /
+ */
+ char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
+ unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
+ int n=0,j;
+ int type=0;
+ int v[2];
+
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ /* read the initial header */
+ v[0]=v[1]=0;
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
+
+ n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
+ if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
+
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ memcpy(buf,p,n);
+
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 header
+ */
+ if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
+ {
+ v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
+ /* SSLv2 */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ type=1;
+ }
+ else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
+ /* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+ if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ {
+ type=1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ type=1;
+
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
+ (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+ (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
+ || (p[9] >= p[1])))
+ {
+ /*
+ * SSLv3 or tls1 header
+ */
+
+ v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+ /* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+ * to get the correct minor version.
+ * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
+ * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ * to read more records to find out.
+ * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+ * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+ * attacks. */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ {
+#if 0
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+#else
+ v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+ else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
+ else
+ v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+ if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* client requests SSL 3.0 */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ /* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
+ * but this will send an appropriate alert */
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
+ * (other cases skip this state) */
+
+ type=2;
+ p=s->packet;
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ v[1] = p[4];
+
+/* The SSL2 protocol allows n to be larger, just pick
+ * a reasonable buffer size. */
+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE < 1024*4 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
+#error "SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE is too small."
+#endif
+ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
+ if (n > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - 2)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ if (j <= 0) return(j);
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
+
+ p=s->packet;
+ p+=5;
+ n2s(p,csl);
+ n2s(p,sil);
+ n2s(p,cl);
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
+ * Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
+ * '>' otherweise */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* record header: msg_type ... */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
+ d_len = d;
+ d += 3;
+
+ /* client_version */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
+ *(d++) = v[1];
+
+ /* lets populate the random area */
+ /* get the challenge_length */
+ i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
+ memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
+ d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* no session-id reuse */
+ *(d++)=0;
+
+ /* ciphers */
+ j=0;
+ dd=d;
+ d+=2;
+ for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
+ {
+ if (p[i] != 0) continue;
+ *(d++)=p[i+1];
+ *(d++)=p[i+2];
+ j+=2;
+ }
+ s2n(j,dd);
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ *(d++)=1;
+ *(d++)=0;
+
+#if 0
+ /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
+ p = p+csl+sil+cl;
+ while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
+ {
+ *(d++)=*(p++);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
+ l2n3((long)i, d_len);
+
+ /* get the data reused from the init_buf */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
+ }
+
+ /* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
+ /* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
+
+ if (type == 1)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+#else
+ /* we are talking sslv2 */
+ /* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
+ * sslv2 stuff. */
+
+ if (s->s2 == NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl2_new(s))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ ssl2_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
+ s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
+ else
+ /* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
+ * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
+ s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
+
+ /* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
+ * the sslv2 buffer */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
+ s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
+
+ s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
+ {
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
+
+ /* we are in this state */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+ if (type == 3)
+ {
+ /* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
+ * for SSLv3 */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
+ s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->packet_length=0;
+ s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
+ else
+ s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
+#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
+ s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
+#endif
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+ }
+
+ if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
+ {
+ /* bad, very bad */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return(SSL_accept(s));
+err:
+ if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return(-1);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..00ac158f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1125 @@
+/* ssl/s2_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int get_server_finished(SSL *s);
+static int get_server_verify(SSL *s);
+static int get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+static int client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int client_master_key(SSL *s);
+static int client_finished(SSL *s);
+static int client_certificate(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to,int padding);
+#define BREAK break
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl2_connect,
+ ssl2_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl2_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int new_state,state;
+
+ RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+ if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+ {
+ if (buf == s->init_buf)
+ buf=NULL;
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->handshake_func=ssl2_connect;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B:
+ ret=get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ if (!s->hit) /* new session */
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
+ BREAK;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
+ ret=client_master_key(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
+ /* Ok, we now have all the stuff needed to
+ * start encrypting, so lets fire it up :-) */
+ if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,1))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->s2->clear_text=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=client_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
+ ret=get_server_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=get_server_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D:
+ case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret=client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* ERR_clear_error();*/
+
+ /* If we want to cache session-ids in the client
+ * and we successfully add the session-id to the
+ * cache, and there is a callback, then pass it out.
+ * 26/11/96 - eay - only add if not a re-used session.
+ */
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret=1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ return(-1);
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i,j;
+ unsigned long len;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=buf;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),11-s->init_num);
+ if (i < (11-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+ s->init_num = 11;
+
+ if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
+ /* The Rhapsody 5.5 (a.k.a. MacOS X) compiler bug
+ * workaround. <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
+ s->hit=(i=*(p++))?1:0;
+#else
+ s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
+#endif
+ s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cert_length=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.csl=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length=i;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B */
+ len = 11 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cert_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.csl + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ j = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
+ if (i != j) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-HELLO */
+
+ /* things are looking good */
+
+ p = buf + 11;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ if (s->s2->tmp.cert_length != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (s->s2->tmp.cert_type != 0)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s2->tmp.csl != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#ifdef undef
+ /* very bad */
+ memset(s->session->session_id,0,
+ SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES);
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
+ */
+#endif
+
+ /* we need to do this in case we were trying to reuse a
+ * client session but others are already reusing it.
+ * If this was a new 'blank' session ID, the session-id
+ * length will still be 0 */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl2_set_certificate(s,s->s2->tmp.cert_type,
+ s->s2->tmp.cert_length,p) <= 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ p+=s->s2->tmp.cert_length;
+
+ if (s->s2->tmp.csl == 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* We have just received a list of ciphers back from the
+ * server. We need to get the ones that match, then select
+ * the one we want the most :-). */
+
+ /* load the ciphers */
+ sk=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.csl,
+ &s->session->ciphers);
+ p+=s->s2->tmp.csl;
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ /* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
+ cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ /*
+ * If server preference flag set, choose the first
+ * (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
+ * client preference has priority.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ prio = sk;
+ allow = cl;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ prio = cl;
+ allow = sk;
+ }
+ /* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
+ * don't want to use but that does not matter since we
+ * will check against the list we originally sent and
+ * for performance reasons we should not bother to match
+ * the two lists up just to check. */
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
+ {
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
+
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
+ /* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL
+ || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
+ /* can't happen */
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s->s2->conn_id_length=s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->s2->conn_id,p,s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+/* CIPHER **cipher;*/
+ int i,n,j;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+ (s->session->ssl_version != s->version))
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p=buf; /* header */
+ d=p+9; /* data section */
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; /* type */
+ s2n(SSL2_VERSION,p); /* version */
+ n=j=0;
+
+ n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d,0);
+ d+=n;
+
+ if (n == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s2n(n,p); /* cipher spec num bytes */
+
+ if ((s->session->session_id_length > 0) &&
+ (s->session->session_id_length <=
+ SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+ {
+ i=s->session->session_id_length;
+ s2n(i,p); /* session id length */
+ memcpy(d,s->session->session_id,(unsigned int)i);
+ d+=i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);
+ }
+
+ s->s2->challenge_length=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+ s2n(SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH,p); /* challenge length */
+ /*challenge id data*/
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(d,s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+ d+=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
+ s->init_num=d-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ /* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B */
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int clear,enc,karg,i;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
+ {
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ sess=s->session;
+ p=buf;
+ d=p+10;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY;/* type */
+
+ i=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,sess->cipher,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* make key_arg data */
+ i=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ sess->key_arg_length=i;
+ if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg,i) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* make a master key */
+ i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ sess->master_key_length=i;
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i) <= 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sess->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
+ enc=8;
+ else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(sess->cipher))
+ enc=5;
+ else
+ enc=i;
+
+ if ((int)i < enc)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ clear=i-enc;
+ s2n(clear,p);
+ memcpy(d,sess->master_key,(unsigned int)clear);
+ d+=clear;
+
+ enc=ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(sess->sess_cert,enc,
+ &(sess->master_key[clear]),d,
+ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (enc <= 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) d[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ sess->master_key[clear]++;
+#endif
+ s2n(enc,p);
+ d+=enc;
+ karg=sess->key_arg_length;
+ s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
+ if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(d,sess->key_arg,(unsigned int)karg);
+ d+=karg;
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
+ s->init_num=d-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+static int client_finished(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->s2->conn_id,(unsigned int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
+ s->init_num=s->s2->conn_id_length+1;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+/* read the data and then respond */
+static int client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int n;
+ int cert_ch_len;
+ unsigned char *cert_ch;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
+ * the session if it does not have one */
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
+ SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
+ if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /* type=buf[0]; */
+ /* type eq x509 */
+ if (buf[1] != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ else
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
+ }
+
+ cert_ch = buf + 2;
+ cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+
+ /* If we get an error we need to
+ * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(error);
+ * We should then be retried when things are ok and we
+ * can get a cert or not */
+
+ i=0;
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
+ {
+ i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
+ if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+ {
+ i=0;
+ }
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ i=0;
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ /* We have no client certificate to respond with
+ * so send the correct error message back */
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B;
+ p=buf;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
+ s2n(SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE,p);
+ s->init_off=0;
+ s->init_num=3;
+ /* Write is done at the end */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B)
+ {
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+
+ /* ok, now we calculate the checksum
+ * do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
+ p=buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
+ s->s2->key_material_length);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
+ i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
+ /* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
+ if(i > 0)
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
+
+ p=buf;
+ d=p+6;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
+ n=i2d_X509(s->cert->key->x509,&d);
+ s2n(n,p);
+
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx,d,&n,s->cert->key->privatekey))
+ {
+ /* this is not good. If things have failed it
+ * means there so something wrong with the key.
+ * We will continue with a 0 length signature
+ */
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ s2n(n,p);
+ d+=n;
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D;
+ s->init_num=d-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ /* if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D) */
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, n, len;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
+ if (i < (1-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+
+ s->state= SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
+ if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY)
+ {
+ if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ /* try to read the error message */
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+ return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+ }
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ len = 1 + s->s2->challenge_length;
+ n = len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+ if (i < n)
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
+ p += 1;
+
+ if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int get_server_finished(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, n, len;
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=buf;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
+ if (i < (1-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+
+ if (*p == SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A;
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED)
+ {
+ if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ /* try to read the error message */
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+ return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+ }
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
+ }
+
+ len = 1 + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ n = len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]), n);
+ if (i < n) /* XXX could be shorter than SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, that's the maximum */
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-FINISHED */
+
+ if (!s->hit) /* new session */
+ {
+ /* new session-id */
+ /* Make sure we were not trying to re-use an old SSL_SESSION
+ * or bad things can happen */
+ /* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
+ s->session->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id,p+1,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG))
+ {
+ if ((s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ || (0 != memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
+ (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length)))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+/* loads in the certificate from the server */
+int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc=NULL;
+ int i;
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ int ret=0;
+
+ x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&data,(long)len);
+ if (x509 == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk,x509))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /* server's cert for this session */
+ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=sc;
+
+ sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509=x509;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ x509=NULL;
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_set_peer_cert_type(sc,SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE))
+ goto err;
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ sk_X509_free(sk);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, int padding)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int i= -1;
+
+ if ((sc == NULL) || (sc->peer_key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_key->x509)) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* we have the public key */
+ i=RSA_public_encrypt(len,from,to,pkey->pkey.rsa,padding);
+ if (i < 0)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+end:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(i);
+ }
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff3395f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* ssl/s2_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
+ {
+ /* Max number of bytes needed */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *rs,*ws;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int num;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,md);
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,md);
+
+ if ((s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) &&
+ ((s->enc_read_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case the malloc for enc_write_ctx fails
+ * and we exit with an error */
+ rs= s->enc_read_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(rs);
+
+ if ((s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) &&
+ ((s->enc_write_ctx=(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ ws= s->enc_write_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ws);
+
+ num=c->key_len;
+ s->s2->key_material_length=num*2;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->s2->key_material_length <= sizeof s->s2->key_material);
+
+ if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
+ s->session->key_arg);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),
+ s->session->key_arg);
+ s->s2->read_key= &(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]);
+ s->s2->write_key= &(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]);
+ return(1);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+/* read/writes from s->s2->mac_data using length for encrypt and
+ * decrypt. It sets s->s2->padding and s->[rw]length
+ * if we are encrypting */
+void ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
+ l=s->s2->wlength;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
+ l=s->s2->rlength;
+ }
+
+ /* check for NULL cipher */
+ if (ds == NULL) return;
+
+
+ bs=ds->cipher->block_size;
+ /* This should be using (bs-1) and bs instead of 7 and 8, but
+ * what the hell. */
+ if (bs == 8)
+ l=(l+7)/8*8;
+
+ EVP_Cipher(ds,s->s2->mac_data,s->s2->mac_data,l);
+ }
+
+void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *md, int send)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX c;
+ unsigned char sequence[4],*p,*sec,*act;
+ unsigned long seq;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ seq=s->s2->write_sequence;
+ sec=s->s2->write_key;
+ len=s->s2->wact_data_length;
+ act=s->s2->wact_data;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ seq=s->s2->read_sequence;
+ sec=s->s2->read_key;
+ len=s->s2->ract_data_length;
+ act=s->s2->ract_data;
+ }
+
+ p= &(sequence[0]);
+ l2n(seq,p);
+
+ /* There has to be a MAC algorithm. */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&c, s->read_hash);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,sec,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(s->enc_read_ctx));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,act,len);
+ /* the above line also does the pad data */
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,sequence,4);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,md,NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ }
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..99146041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
+/* ssl/s2_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+const char ssl2_version_str[]="SSLv2" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#define SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl2_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
+
+/* list of available SSLv2 ciphers (sorted by id) */
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[]={
+#if 0
+/* NULL_WITH_MD5 v3 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_NULL_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* RC4_128_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ 0,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ 0,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ 0,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ 0,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ 0,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+#if 0
+/* RC4_64_WITH_MD5 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL2_TXT_RC4_64_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL2_CK_RC4_64_WITH_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC,
+ 64,
+ 64,
+ },
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+/* NULL SSLeay (testing) */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL2_TXT_NULL,
+ SSL2_CK_NULL,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* end of list :-) */
+ };
+
+long ssl2_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ return(300);
+ }
+
+int ssl2_num_ciphers(void)
+ {
+ return(SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS);
+ }
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+ {
+ if (u < SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS)
+ return(&(ssl2_ciphers[SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS-1-u]));
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return SSL_in_init(s) ? 0 : s->s2->ract_data_length;
+ }
+
+int ssl2_new(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSL2_STATE *s2;
+
+ if ((s2=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s2)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memset(s2,0,sizeof *s2);
+
+#if SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER + 3 > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER + 2
+# error "assertion failed"
+#endif
+
+ if ((s2->rbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2)) == NULL) goto err;
+ /* wbuf needs one byte more because when using two-byte headers,
+ * we leave the first byte unused in do_ssl_write (s2_pkt.c) */
+ if ((s2->wbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+3)) == NULL) goto err;
+ s->s2=s2;
+
+ ssl2_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+err:
+ if (s2 != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s2->wbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
+ if (s2->rbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(s2);
+ }
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+void ssl2_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSL2_STATE *s2;
+
+ if(s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ s2=s->s2;
+ if (s2->rbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->rbuf);
+ if (s2->wbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s2->wbuf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s2,sizeof *s2);
+ OPENSSL_free(s2);
+ s->s2=NULL;
+ }
+
+void ssl2_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSL2_STATE *s2;
+ unsigned char *rbuf,*wbuf;
+
+ s2=s->s2;
+
+ rbuf=s2->rbuf;
+ wbuf=s2->wbuf;
+
+ memset(s2,0,sizeof *s2);
+
+ s2->rbuf=rbuf;
+ s2->wbuf=wbuf;
+ s2->clear_text=1;
+ s->packet=s2->rbuf;
+ s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
+ s->packet_length=0;
+ }
+
+long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ {
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
+ * available */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ unsigned long id;
+
+ id=0x02000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<16L)|
+ ((unsigned long)p[1]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[2];
+ c.id=id;
+ cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl2_ciphers, SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS);
+ if ((cp == NULL) || (cp->valid == 0))
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return cp;
+ }
+
+int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+ }
+ return(3);
+ }
+
+int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char *km;
+ unsigned char c='0';
+ const EVP_MD *md5;
+ int md_size;
+
+ md5 = EVP_md5();
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ c = os_toascii['0']; /* Must be an ASCII '0', not EBCDIC '0',
+ see SSLv2 docu */
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ km=s->s2->key_material;
+
+ if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
+ s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ md_size = EVP_MD_size(md5);
+ if (md_size < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += md_size)
+ {
+ if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + md_size) >
+ (int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
+ {
+ /* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md5, NULL);
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
+ && s->session->master_key_length
+ < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
+ c++;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,km,NULL);
+ km += md_size;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int err)
+ {
+ if (!s->error)
+ {
+ s->error=3;
+ s->error_code=err;
+
+ ssl2_write_error(s);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[3];
+ int i,error;
+
+ buf[0]=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
+ buf[1]=(s->error_code>>8)&0xff;
+ buf[2]=(s->error_code)&0xff;
+
+/* state=s->rwstate;*/
+
+ error=s->error; /* number of bytes left to write */
+ s->error=0;
+ OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= (int)sizeof(buf));
+ i=ssl2_write(s,&(buf[3-error]),error);
+
+/* if (i == error) s->rwstate=state; */
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ s->error=error;
+ else
+ {
+ s->error=error-i;
+
+ if (s->error == 0)
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, 0, buf, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s)
+ {
+ s->shutdown=(SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ return(1);
+ }
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f0e8ca59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* ssl/s2_meth.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_method,
+ ssl2_accept,
+ ssl2_connect,
+ ssl2_get_method)
+
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ac963b2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,744 @@
+/* ssl/s2_pkt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+
+static int read_n(SSL *s,unsigned int n,unsigned int max,unsigned int extend);
+static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
+static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
+static int ssl_mt_error(int n);
+
+
+/* SSL 2.0 imlementation for SSL_read/SSL_peek -
+ * This routine will return 0 to len bytes, decrypted etc if required.
+ */
+static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
+ {
+ int n;
+ unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ int mac_size;
+
+ ssl2_read_again:
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ n=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (n < 0) return(n);
+ if (n == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ if (s->s2->ract_data_length != 0) /* read from buffer */
+ {
+ if (len > s->s2->ract_data_length)
+ n=s->s2->ract_data_length;
+ else
+ n=len;
+
+ memcpy(buf,s->s2->ract_data,(unsigned int)n);
+ if (!peek)
+ {
+ s->s2->ract_data_length-=n;
+ s->s2->ract_data+=n;
+ if (s->s2->ract_data_length == 0)
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ }
+
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+ /* s->s2->ract_data_length == 0
+ *
+ * Fill the buffer, then goto ssl2_read_again.
+ */
+
+ if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)
+ {
+ if (s->first_packet)
+ {
+ n=read_n(s,5,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->first_packet=0;
+ p=s->packet;
+ if (!((p[0] & 0x80) && (
+ (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+ (p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO))))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n=read_n(s,2,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ }
+ /* part read stuff */
+
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+ p=s->packet;
+ /* Do header */
+ /*s->s2->padding=0;*/
+ s->s2->escape=0;
+ s->s2->rlength=(((unsigned int)p[0])<<8)|((unsigned int)p[1]);
+ if ((p[0] & TWO_BYTE_BIT)) /* Two byte header? */
+ {
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
+ s->s2->rlength&=TWO_BYTE_MASK;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
+ s->s2->rlength&=THREE_BYTE_MASK;
+
+ /* security >s2->escape */
+ s->s2->escape=((p[0] & SEC_ESC_BIT))?1:0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ {
+ n=s->s2->rlength+2+s->s2->three_byte_header;
+ if (n > (int)s->packet_length)
+ {
+ n-=s->packet_length;
+ i=read_n(s,(unsigned int)n,(unsigned int)n,1);
+ if (i <= 0) return(i); /* ERROR */
+ }
+
+ p= &(s->packet[2]);
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ if (s->s2->three_byte_header)
+ s->s2->padding= *(p++);
+ else s->s2->padding=0;
+
+ /* Data portion */
+ if (s->s2->clear_text)
+ {
+ mac_size = 0;
+ s->s2->mac_data=p;
+ s->s2->ract_data=p;
+ if (s->s2->padding)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
+ s->s2->mac_data=p;
+ s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
+ if (s->s2->padding + mac_size > s->s2->rlength)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s2->ract_data_length=s->s2->rlength;
+ /* added a check for length > max_size in case
+ * encryption was not turned on yet due to an error */
+ if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
+ (s->s2->rlength >= (unsigned int)mac_size))
+ {
+ ssl2_enc(s,0);
+ s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
+ ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
+ s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
+ if ( (memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
+ (unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
+ (s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ INC32(s->s2->read_sequence); /* expect next number */
+ /* s->s2->ract_data is now available for processing */
+
+ /* Possibly the packet that we just read had 0 actual data bytes.
+ * (SSLeay/OpenSSL itself never sends such packets; see ssl2_write.)
+ * In this case, returning 0 would be interpreted by the caller
+ * as indicating EOF, so it's not a good idea. Instead, we just
+ * continue reading; thus ssl2_read_internal may have to process
+ * multiple packets before it can return.
+ *
+ * [Note that using select() for blocking sockets *never* guarantees
+ * that the next SSL_read will not block -- the available
+ * data may contain incomplete packets, and except for SSL 2,
+ * renegotiation can confuse things even more.] */
+
+ goto ssl2_read_again; /* This should really be
+ * "return ssl2_read(s,buf,len)",
+ * but that would allow for
+ * denial-of-service attacks if a
+ * C compiler is used that does not
+ * recognize end-recursion. */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_STATE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ return ssl2_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
+ }
+
+int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ return ssl2_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
+ }
+
+static int read_n(SSL *s, unsigned int n, unsigned int max,
+ unsigned int extend)
+ {
+ int i,off,newb;
+
+ /* if there is stuff still in the buffer from a previous read,
+ * and there is more than we want, take some. */
+ if (s->s2->rbuf_left >= (int)n)
+ {
+ if (extend)
+ s->packet_length+=n;
+ else
+ {
+ s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[s->s2->rbuf_offs]);
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ }
+ s->s2->rbuf_left-=n;
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs+=n;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+ if (!s->read_ahead) max=n;
+ if (max > (unsigned int)(SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2))
+ max=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2;
+
+
+ /* Else we want more than we have.
+ * First, if there is some left or we want to extend */
+ off=0;
+ if ((s->s2->rbuf_left != 0) || ((s->packet_length != 0) && extend))
+ {
+ newb=s->s2->rbuf_left;
+ if (extend)
+ {
+ off=s->packet_length;
+ if (s->packet != s->s2->rbuf)
+ memcpy(s->s2->rbuf,s->packet,
+ (unsigned int)newb+off);
+ }
+ else if (s->s2->rbuf_offs != 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->s2->rbuf,&(s->s2->rbuf[s->s2->rbuf_offs]),
+ (unsigned int)newb);
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
+ }
+ s->s2->rbuf_left=0;
+ }
+ else
+ newb=0;
+
+ /* off is the offset to start writing too.
+ * r->s2->rbuf_offs is the 'unread data', now 0.
+ * newb is the number of new bytes so far
+ */
+ s->packet=s->s2->rbuf;
+ while (newb < (int)n)
+ {
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ i=BIO_read(s->rbio,(char *)&(s->s2->rbuf[off+newb]),
+ max-newb);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i= -1;
+ }
+#ifdef PKT_DEBUG
+ if (s->debug & 0x01) sleep(1);
+#endif
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s2->rbuf_left+=newb;
+ return(i);
+ }
+ newb+=i;
+ }
+
+ /* record unread data */
+ if (newb > (int)n)
+ {
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs=n+off;
+ s->s2->rbuf_left=newb-n;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
+ s->s2->rbuf_left=0;
+ }
+ if (extend)
+ s->packet_length+=n;
+ else
+ s->packet_length=n;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *_buf, int len)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *buf=_buf;
+ unsigned int n,tot;
+ int i;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->error)
+ {
+ ssl2_write_error(s);
+ if (s->error)
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ tot=s->s2->wnum;
+ s->s2->wnum=0;
+
+ n=(len-tot);
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ i=n_do_ssl_write(s,&(buf[tot]),n);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s2->wnum=tot;
+ return(i);
+ }
+ if ((i == (int)n) ||
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))
+ {
+ return(tot+i);
+ }
+
+ n-=i;
+ tot+=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ /* s->s2->wpend_len != 0 MUST be true. */
+
+ /* check that they have given us the same buffer to
+ * write */
+ if ((s->s2->wpend_tot > (int)len) ||
+ ((s->s2->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+ !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->wbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
+ (char *)&(s->s2->write_ptr[s->s2->wpend_off]),
+ (unsigned int)s->s2->wpend_len);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i= -1;
+ }
+#ifdef PKT_DEBUG
+ if (s->debug & 0x01) sleep(1);
+#endif
+ if (i == s->s2->wpend_len)
+ {
+ s->s2->wpend_len=0;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(s->s2->wpend_ret);
+ }
+ else if (i <= 0)
+ return(i);
+ s->s2->wpend_off+=i;
+ s->s2->wpend_len-=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+ {
+ unsigned int j,k,olen,p,bs;
+ int mac_size;
+ register unsigned char *pp;
+
+ olen=len;
+
+ /* first check if there is data from an encryption waiting to
+ * be sent - it must be sent because the other end is waiting.
+ * This will happen with non-blocking IO. We print it and then
+ * return.
+ */
+ if (s->s2->wpend_len != 0) return(write_pending(s,buf,len));
+
+ /* set mac_size to mac size */
+ if (s->s2->clear_text)
+ mac_size=0;
+ else
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* lets set the pad p */
+ if (s->s2->clear_text)
+ {
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
+ len=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER;
+ p=0;
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
+ /* len=len; */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ bs=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ j=len+mac_size;
+ /* Two-byte headers allow for a larger record length than
+ * three-byte headers, but we can't use them if we need
+ * padding or if we have to set the escape bit. */
+ if ((j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER) &&
+ (!s->s2->escape))
+ {
+ if (j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER)
+ j=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER;
+ /* set k to the max number of bytes with 2
+ * byte header */
+ k=j-(j%bs);
+ /* how many data bytes? */
+ len=k-mac_size;
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
+ p=0;
+ }
+ else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape))
+ {
+ /* j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
+ * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER */
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
+ p=0;
+ }
+ else /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
+ {
+ /* If s->s2->escape is not set, then
+ * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
+ * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER. */
+ p=(j%bs);
+ p=(p == 0)?0:(bs-p);
+ if (s->s2->escape)
+ {
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
+ if (j > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ j=SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER;
+ }
+ else
+ s->s2->three_byte_header=(p == 0)?0:1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now
+ * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
+ * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
+ * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
+ */
+
+ /* mac_size is the number of MAC bytes
+ * len is the number of data bytes we are going to send
+ * p is the number of padding bytes
+ * (if it is a two-byte header, then p == 0) */
+
+ s->s2->wlength=len;
+ s->s2->padding=p;
+ s->s2->mac_data= &(s->s2->wbuf[3]);
+ s->s2->wact_data= &(s->s2->wbuf[3+mac_size]);
+ /* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */
+ memcpy(s->s2->wact_data,buf,len);
+ if (p)
+ memset(&(s->s2->wact_data[len]),0,p); /* arbitrary padding */
+
+ if (!s->s2->clear_text)
+ {
+ s->s2->wact_data_length=len+p;
+ ssl2_mac(s,s->s2->mac_data,1);
+ s->s2->wlength+=p+mac_size;
+ ssl2_enc(s,1);
+ }
+
+ /* package up the header */
+ s->s2->wpend_len=s->s2->wlength;
+ if (s->s2->three_byte_header) /* 3 byte header */
+ {
+ pp=s->s2->mac_data;
+ pp-=3;
+ pp[0]=(s->s2->wlength>>8)&(THREE_BYTE_MASK>>8);
+ if (s->s2->escape) pp[0]|=SEC_ESC_BIT;
+ pp[1]=s->s2->wlength&0xff;
+ pp[2]=s->s2->padding;
+ s->s2->wpend_len+=3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pp=s->s2->mac_data;
+ pp-=2;
+ pp[0]=((s->s2->wlength>>8)&(TWO_BYTE_MASK>>8))|TWO_BYTE_BIT;
+ pp[1]=s->s2->wlength&0xff;
+ s->s2->wpend_len+=2;
+ }
+ s->s2->write_ptr=pp;
+
+ INC32(s->s2->write_sequence); /* expect next number */
+
+ /* lets try to actually write the data */
+ s->s2->wpend_tot=olen;
+ s->s2->wpend_buf=buf;
+
+ s->s2->wpend_ret=len;
+
+ s->s2->wpend_off=0;
+ return(write_pending(s,buf,olen));
+ }
+
+int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int j;
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ /* ssl2_return_error(s); */
+ /* for non-blocking io,
+ * this is not necessarily fatal */
+ return(i);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->init_num+=i;
+
+ /* Check for error. While there are recoverable errors,
+ * this function is not called when those must be expected;
+ * any error detected here is fatal. */
+ if (s->init_num >= 3)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ j=(p[1]<<8)|p[2];
+ SSLerr((int)f,ssl_mt_error(j));
+ s->init_num -= 3;
+ if (s->init_num > 0)
+ memmove(p, p+3, s->init_num);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If it's not an error message, we have some error anyway --
+ * the message was shorter than expected. This too is treated
+ * as fatal (at least if SSL_get_error is asked for its opinion). */
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret=ssl2_write(s,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],s->init_num);
+ if (ret == s->init_num)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return(-1);
+ s->init_off+=ret;
+ s->init_num-=ret;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_mt_error(int n)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (n)
+ {
+ case SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER:
+ ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER;
+ break;
+ case SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE:
+ ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE;
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bc885e8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1142 @@
+/* ssl/s2_srvr.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver);
+static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s);
+static int get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int server_hello(SSL *s);
+static int get_client_finished(SSL *s);
+static int server_verify(SSL *s);
+static int server_finish(SSL *s);
+static int request_certificate(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to,int padding);
+#define BREAK break
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv2_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_server_method,
+ ssl2_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl2_get_server_method)
+
+int ssl2_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ long num1;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int new_state,state;
+
+ RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server=1;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
+ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+ if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ s->handshake_func=ssl2_accept;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C:
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B:
+ ret=server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
+ BREAK;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
+ BREAK;
+ }
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
+ ret=get_client_master_key(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION:
+ /* Ok we how have sent all the stuff needed to
+ * start encrypting, the next packet back will
+ * be encrypted. */
+ if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,0))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ s->s2->clear_text=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
+ ret=server_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ /* If we are in here, we have been
+ * buffering the output, so we need to
+ * flush it and remove buffering from
+ * future traffic */
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C;
+ BREAK;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C:
+ /* get the number of bytes to write */
+ num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
+ if (num1 > 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+
+ /* flushed and now remove buffering */
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=get_client_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A;
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D:
+ /* don't do a 'request certificate' if we
+ * don't want to, or we already have one, and
+ * we only want to do it once. */
+ if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ret=request_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ BREAK;
+
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=server_finish(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* ERR_clear_error();*/
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ ret=1;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* BREAK; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* BREAK; */
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int is_export,i,n,keya,ek;
+ unsigned long len;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),10-s->init_num);
+
+ if (i < (10-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i));
+ s->init_num = 10;
+
+ if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY)
+ {
+ if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->session->cipher= cp;
+
+ p+=3;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clear=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.enc=i;
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if(i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->session->key_arg_length=i;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->init_buf->length < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ keya=s->session->key_arg_length;
+ len = 10 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clear + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.enc + (unsigned long)keya;
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ n = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+ if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,i));
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-MASTER-KEY */
+ p += 10;
+
+ memcpy(s->session->key_arg,&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear+s->s2->tmp.enc]),
+ (unsigned int)keya);
+
+ if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
+ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
+ {
+ is_export=1;
+ ek=8;
+ }
+ else
+ ek=5;
+
+ /* bad decrypt */
+#if 1
+ /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
+ * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
+ if ((i < 0) ||
+ ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
+ (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (is_export)
+ i=ek;
+ else
+ i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ error=1;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ }
+ /* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */
+ else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))
+ {
+ error=1;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS);
+ }
+ if (error)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
+
+ if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length=i;
+ memcpy(s->session->master_key,p,(unsigned int)i);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,n;
+ unsigned long len;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
+ int z;
+
+ /* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet
+ * type the first time round. */
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ s->first_packet=1;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),9-s->init_num);
+ if (i < (9-s->init_num))
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i));
+ s->init_num = 9;
+
+ if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ {
+ if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.session_id_length=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->challenge_length=i;
+ if ( (i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
+ (i > SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ len = 9 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->challenge_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ n = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+ if (i != n) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,i));
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
+ p += 9;
+
+ /* get session-id before cipher stuff so we can get out session
+ * structure if it is cached */
+ /* session-id */
+ if ((s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != 0) &&
+ (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length != SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s2->tmp.session_id_length == 0)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,&(p[s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length]),
+ s->s2->tmp.session_id_length, NULL);
+ if (i == 1)
+ { /* previous session */
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else if (i == -1)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ cs=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length,
+ &s->session->ciphers);
+ if (cs == NULL) goto mem_err;
+
+ cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ prio=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
+ if (prio == NULL) goto mem_err;
+ allow = cs;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ prio = cs;
+ allow = cl;
+ }
+ for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++)
+ {
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0)
+ {
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z);
+ z--;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->session->ciphers = prio;
+ }
+ /* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of
+ * ciphers that are on both the client and server.
+ * This list is ordered by the order the client sent
+ * the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
+ * if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
+ */
+ }
+ p+=s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
+ /* done cipher selection */
+
+ /* session id extracted already */
+ p+=s->s2->tmp.session_id_length;
+
+ /* challenge */
+ if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->s2->challenge,p,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
+ return(1);
+mem_err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+static int server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int n,hit;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ d=p+11;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO; /* type */
+ hit=s->hit;
+ *(p++)=(unsigned char)hit;
+#if 1
+ if (!hit)
+ {
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ /* This can't really happen because get_client_hello
+ * has called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set
+ * sess_cert. */
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL,
+ * depending on whether it survived in the internal cache
+ * or was retrieved from an external cache.
+ * If it is NULL, we cannot put any useful data in it anyway,
+ * so we don't touch it.
+ */
+
+#else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st and sess_cert_st were
+ * the same. */
+ if (!hit)
+ { /* else add cert to session */
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;
+ }
+ else /* We have a session id-cache hit, if the
+ * session-id has no certificate listed against
+ * the 'cert' structure, grab the 'old' one
+ * listed against the SSL connection */
+ {
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (hit)
+ {
+ *(p++)=0; /* no certificate type */
+ s2n(s->version,p); /* version */
+ s2n(0,p); /* cert len */
+ s2n(0,p); /* ciphers len */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* EAY EAY */
+ /* put certificate type */
+ *(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
+ s2n(s->version,p); /* version */
+ n=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
+ s2n(n,p); /* certificate length */
+ i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&d);
+ n=0;
+
+ /* lets send out the ciphers we like in the
+ * prefered order */
+ n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,s->session->ciphers,d,0);
+ d+=n;
+ s2n(n,p); /* add cipher length */
+ }
+
+ /* make and send conn_id */
+ s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH,p); /* add conn_id length */
+ s->s2->conn_id_length=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id,(int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(d,s->s2->conn_id,SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
+ d+=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B;
+ s->init_num=d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ /* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */
+ /* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2
+ * writes without a read between them. This occurs when
+ * Session-id reuse is used, so I will put in a buffering module
+ */
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) return(-1);
+ }
+
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+static int get_client_finished(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i, n;
+ unsigned long len;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
+ if (i < 1-s->init_num)
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+
+ if (*p != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ if (*p != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ /* try to read the error message */
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+ return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+ }
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B */
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = 1 + (unsigned long)s->s2->conn_id_length;
+ n = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+ if (i < n)
+ {
+ return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,i));
+ }
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-FINISHED */
+ p += 1;
+ if (memcmp(p,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length) != 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED,SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int server_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY;
+ if (s->s2->challenge_length > sizeof s->s2->challenge)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->s2->challenge,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length);
+ /* p+=s->s2->challenge_length; */
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
+ s->init_num=s->s2->challenge_length+1;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+static int server_finish(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id, (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length);
+ /* p+=s->session->session_id_length; */
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
+ s->init_num=s->session->session_id_length+1;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B */
+ return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+ }
+
+/* send the request and check the response */
+static int request_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *cp;
+ unsigned char *p,*p2,*buf2;
+ unsigned char *ccd;
+ int i,j,ctype,ret= -1;
+ unsigned long len;
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+
+ ccd=s->s2->tmp.ccl;
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
+ *(p++)=SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(p,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B;
+ s->init_num=SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B)
+ {
+ i=ssl2_do_write(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ ret=i;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),6-s->init_num); /* try to read 6 octets ... */
+ if (i < 3-s->init_num) /* ... but don't call ssl2_part_read now if we got at least 3
+ * (probably NO-CERTIFICATE-ERROR) */
+ {
+ ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num += i;
+
+ if ((s->init_num >= 3) && (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR))
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (i != SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ /* not the error message we expected -- let ssl2_part_read handle it */
+ s->init_num -= 3;
+ ret = ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, 3);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, 3, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* ERROR */
+
+ /* this is the one place where we can recover from an SSL 2.0 error */
+
+ if (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((*(p++) != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) || (s->init_num < 6))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_SHORT_READ);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (s->init_num != 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* ok we have a response */
+ /* certificate type, there is only one right now. */
+ ctype= *(p++);
+ if (ctype != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.clen=i;
+ n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.rlen=i;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ len = 6 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.clen + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.rlen;
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ j = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),j);
+ if (i < j)
+ {
+ ret=ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,i);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-CERTIFICATE */
+ p += 6;
+
+ cp = p;
+ x509=(X509 *)d2i_X509(NULL,&cp,(long)s->s2->tmp.clen);
+ if (x509 == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto msg_end;
+ }
+
+ if (((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(sk,x509)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto msg_end;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+
+ if (i > 0) /* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
+ s->s2->key_material_length);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+
+ i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
+ buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
+ if (buf2 == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto msg_end;
+ }
+ p2=buf2;
+ i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf2);
+
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ if (pkey == NULL) goto end;
+ i=EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,cp,s->s2->tmp.rlen,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x509->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+ ret=1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM);
+ goto msg_end;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+msg_end:
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ }
+end:
+ sk_X509_free(sk);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(CERT *c, int len, unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, int padding)
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((c == NULL) || (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ rsa=c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey->pkey.rsa;
+
+ /* we have the public key */
+ i=RSA_private_decrypt(len,from,to,rsa,padding);
+ if (i < 0)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return(i);
+ }
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..508e3902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+/* ssl/s3_both.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ s->init_num);
+ if (ret < 0) return(-1);
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ s->init_off+=ret;
+ s->init_num-=ret;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ p+=i;
+ l=i;
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+ renegotiation checks */
+ if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
+ * I do this.
+ */
+ l&=0xffff;
+#endif
+
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
+ l2n3(l,d);
+ s->init_num=(int)l+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+ {
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+ {
+ int al,i,ok;
+ long n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* the mac has already been generated when we received the
+ * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
+ */
+#endif
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ a,
+ b,
+ SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+ 64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+ if (i != n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+ renegotiation checks */
+ if(s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+ */
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->init_num=1;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+ }
+
+static int ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n,p);
+ i2d_X509(x,&p);
+ *l+=n+3;
+
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l=7;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ int no_chain;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
+
+ cert_chain = SSL_get_certificate_chain(s, x);
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs || cert_chain)
+ no_chain = 1;
+ else
+ no_chain = 0;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (x != NULL)
+ {
+ if (no_chain)
+ {
+ if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Thawte special :-) */
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
+ {
+ x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
+ if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(cert_chain); i++)
+ if (ssl3_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, sk_X509_value(cert_chain,i)))
+ return(0);
+
+ l-=7;
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+ l2n3(l,p);
+ l+=3;
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
+ l2n3(l,p);
+ l+=4;
+ return(l);
+ }
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
+ * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+ */
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+ long n;
+ int i,al;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok=1;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
+ {
+ int skip_message;
+
+ do
+ {
+ while (s->init_num < 4)
+ {
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[s->init_num],4 - s->init_num, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->init_num+=i;
+ }
+
+ skip_message = 0;
+ if (!s->server)
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+ * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+ * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+ * 'Finished' MAC. */
+ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
+ {
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ skip_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+ while (skip_message);
+
+ /* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
+ (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
+ {
+ /* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
+ * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
+ * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
+ * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
+ * we have not completed the handshake. */
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
+
+ n2l3(p,l);
+ if (l > (unsigned long)max)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
+ s->state=stn;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* next state (stn) */
+ p = s->init_msg;
+ n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+ while (n > 0)
+ {
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->init_num += i;
+ n -= i;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+ * Finished verification. */
+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
+#endif
+
+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ *ok=1;
+ return s->init_num;
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ *ok=0;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ int ret= -1,i;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ else
+ pk=pkey;
+ if (pk == NULL) goto err;
+
+ i=pk->type;
+ if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ }
+ else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+ }
+ else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ }
+err:
+ if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+ {
+ int al;
+
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ return(al);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+/* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't just
+ * free() and malloc() buffers all the time, so we need to use freelists from
+ * unused buffers. Currently, each freelist holds memory chunks of only a
+ * given size (list->chunklen); other sized chunks are freed and malloced.
+ * This doesn't help much if you're using many different SSL option settings
+ * with a given context. (The options affecting buffer size are
+ * max_send_fragment, read buffer vs write buffer,
+ * SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_WRITE_BUFFER, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION, and
+ * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS.) Using a separate freelist for every
+ * possible size is not an option, since max_send_fragment can take on many
+ * different values.
+ *
+ * If you are on a platform with a slow malloc(), and you're using SSL
+ * connections with many different settings for these options, and you need to
+ * use the SSL_MOD_RELEASE_BUFFERS feature, you have a few options:
+ * - Link against a faster malloc implementation.
+ * - Use a separate SSL_CTX for each option set.
+ * - Improve this code.
+ */
+static void *
+freelist_extract(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, int sz)
+ {
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent = NULL;
+ void *result = NULL;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+ if (list != NULL && sz == (int)list->chunklen)
+ ent = list->head;
+ if (ent != NULL)
+ {
+ list->head = ent->next;
+ result = ent;
+ if (--list->len == 0)
+ list->chunklen = 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (!result)
+ result = OPENSSL_malloc(sz);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void
+freelist_insert(SSL_CTX *ctx, int for_read, size_t sz, void *mem)
+ {
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list;
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ list = for_read ? ctx->rbuf_freelist : ctx->wbuf_freelist;
+ if (list != NULL &&
+ (sz == list->chunklen || list->chunklen == 0) &&
+ list->len < ctx->freelist_max_len &&
+ sz >= sizeof(*ent))
+ {
+ list->chunklen = sz;
+ ent = mem;
+ ent->next = list->head;
+ list->head = ent;
+ ++list->len;
+ mem = NULL;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (mem)
+ OPENSSL_free(mem);
+ }
+#else
+#define freelist_extract(c,fr,sz) OPENSSL_malloc(sz)
+#define freelist_insert(c,fr,sz,m) OPENSSL_free(m)
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
+ {
+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+ + headerlen + align;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ {
+ s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+ if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 1, len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len,align=0,headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)
+ {
+ len = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ len = s->max_send_fragment;
+ }
+ len += 0
+ + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
+ + headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ len += headerlen + align
+ + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+ if ((p=freelist_extract(s->ctx, 0, len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
+ {
+ freelist_insert(s->ctx, 0, s->s3->wbuf.len, s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ {
+ freelist_insert(s->ctx, 1, s->s3->rbuf.len, s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..42bcd629
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3153 @@
+/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_connect,
+ ssl3_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+#if 0 /* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
+ * (only one site so far) closes the socket.
+ * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
+ * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
+ * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
+ {
+ /* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch(s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server=0;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
+ /* or PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* at this point we check that we have the
+ * required stuff from the server */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
+ * sent back */
+ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
+ * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
+ * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
+ * We need to skip the certificate verify
+ * message when client's ECDH public key is sent
+ * inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth=
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128
+ && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
+ )
+ {
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
+ s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+
+ /* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
+ * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
+ * remove the buffering now */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret=1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long Time,l;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (sess->not_resumable))
+ {
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p=s->s3->client_random;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[4]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+ s->client_version=s->version;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i=0;
+ else
+ i=s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++)=i;
+ if (i != 0)
+ {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
+ p+=i;
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=1;
+#else
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j=0;
+ else
+ j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++)=1+j;
+ for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+ *(p++)=comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,al,ok;
+ unsigned int j;
+ long n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
+ -1,
+ 20000, /* ?? */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else /* already sent a cookie */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
+ al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p+=2;
+
+ /* load the server hello data */
+ /* load the server random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j= *(p++);
+
+ if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+ {
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
+ {
+ if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
+ {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+ {
+ /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
+ * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
+ s->hit=0;
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->session->session_id_length=j;
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
+ }
+ p+=j;
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+
+ sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
+ cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
+ {
+/* Workaround is now obsolete */
+#if 0
+ if (!(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+#endif
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (*(p++) != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#else
+ j= *(p++);
+ if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (j == 0)
+ comp=NULL;
+ else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
+
+ if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (p != (d+n))
+ {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
+ unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *q,*p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p,llen);
+ if (llen+3 != n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+ {
+ n2l3(p,l);
+ if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q=p;
+ x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (q != (p+l))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x=NULL;
+ nc+=l+3;
+ p=q;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ {
+ al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+
+ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=sc;
+
+ sc->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
+ * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
+ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+ sk=NULL;
+ /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
+
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ ? 0 : 1;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
+ printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
+ printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
+ {
+ x=NULL;
+ al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
+ if (need_cert && i < 0)
+ {
+ x=NULL;
+ al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (need_cert)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /* Why would the following ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ sc->peer_key= NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ x=NULL;
+ ret=1;
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ }
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned char *param,*p;
+ int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
+ long n,alg_k,alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ int curve_nid = 0;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
+ * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
+ omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
+ session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
+ later.*/
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ }
+
+ param_len=0;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
+ * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
+ * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
+ * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
+ * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
+ * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
+ * NULL-terminated string. */
+ memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+
+ /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ rsa=NULL;
+ }
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
+ {
+ if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len+=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#else
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
+#endif
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
+ dh=NULL;
+ }
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
+ * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
+ * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+ * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+ */
+
+ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
+ * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ */
+ param_len=3;
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+ if (ngroup == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p+=3;
+
+ /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
+ ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
+ p+=1;
+ param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ n-=param_len;
+ p+=encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
+ * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
+ * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (0) ;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+#endif
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
+ ecdh=NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (alg_k)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+
+ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ n-=2;
+ j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
+ {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ int num;
+
+ j=0;
+ q=md_buf;
+ for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
+ q+=i;
+ j+=i;
+ }
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (n != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ if (ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,ret=0;
+ unsigned long n,nc,l;
+ unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
+ X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ ctype_num= *(p++);
+ if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
+ ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+ for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
+ p+=ctype_num;
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ n2s(p,llen);
+#if 0
+{
+FILE *out;
+out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
+fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
+fclose(out);
+}
+#endif
+
+ if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+ {
+ n2s(p,l);
+ if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
+ {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ q=p;
+
+ if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
+ {
+ /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
+ goto cont;
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (q != (p+l))
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p+=l;
+ nc+=l+2;
+ }
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+cont:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
+ ca_sk=NULL;
+
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
+ -1,
+ 16384,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (n < 6)
+ {
+ /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ n2s(p, ticklen);
+ /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+ if (ticklen + 6 != n)
+ {
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+ * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
+ * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
+ * client session ID matching to work and we know much
+ * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
+ *
+ * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
+ * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
+ * session resumption.
+ *
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
+ * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
+ * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
+ * ticket.
+ */
+ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+#else
+ EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#endif
+ ret=1;
+ return(ret);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok, al;
+ unsigned long resplen,n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
+ 16384,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ if (n < 4)
+ {
+ /* need at least status type + length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, resplen);
+ if (resplen + 4 != n)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok,ret=0;
+ long n;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
+ 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ if (n > 0)
+ {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+ (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q=p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p+=2;
+ n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
+#endif
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s2n(n,q);
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
+#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p+= enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length)
+ {
+ s2n(authp->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p+= authp->length;
+ n+= authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+ tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ ** kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
+ kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl,p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p+=outl;
+ n+=outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+ {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
+
+ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,p,n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p,0,n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n,p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
+ n+=2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+ /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+ * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Reuse key info from our certificate
+ * We only need our private key to perform
+ * the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+ -> generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
+ sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
+ (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ int keytype;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
+ EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+
+ /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
+ peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert)
+ peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
+ /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+
+ EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /* Generate session key */
+ RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
+ /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
+ /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
+ * would be used
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
+ * context data */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
+ 8,shared_ukm)<0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*Encapsulate it into sequence */
+ *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen=255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80)
+ {
+ *(p++)=0x81;
+ *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
+ n=msglen+3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
+ n=msglen+2;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ {
+ /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
+
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ n = strlen(identity);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, n);
+ n+=2;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned u=0;
+#endif
+ unsigned long n;
+ int j;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+ pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_md5,
+ &(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+ {
+ unsigned char signbuf[64];
+ int i;
+ size_t sigsize=64;
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94,
+ data);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
+ p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ s->init_num=(int)n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ X509 *x509=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
+ {
+ /* If we get an error, we need to
+ * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
+ * We then get retied later */
+ i=0;
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+ !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+ i=0;
+ }
+ else if (i == 1)
+ {
+ i=0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,idx;
+ long alg_k,alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+#endif
+
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ return(1);
+
+ sc=s->session->sess_cert;
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+#endif
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+ idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+ {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
+ { /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+
+ /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
+ !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
+ !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ if (rsa == NULL
+ || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ if (dh == NULL
+ || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+err:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
+ * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
+ * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
+ {
+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d[4] = len;
+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+ }
+# endif
+
+int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+ /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 1;
+ /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
+ * message, so permit appropriate message length */
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
+ return 2;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
+ {
+ i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+ SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+ px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
+ return i;
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b1459707
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,849 @@
+/* ssl/s3_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48]={
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,
+ 0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36,0x36 };
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48]={
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,
+ 0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c,0x5c };
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
+static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX m5;
+ EVP_MD_CTX s1;
+ unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char c='A';
+ unsigned int i,j,k;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
+#endif
+ k=0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
+ for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ {
+ k++;
+ if (k > sizeof buf)
+ {
+ /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (j=0; j<k; j++)
+ buf[j]=c;
+ c++;
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&s1,EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,buf,k);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&s1,smd,NULL);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&m5,EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
+ memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));
+ }
+ else
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,km,NULL);
+
+ km+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ int is_exp,n,i,j,k,cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_exp=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
+ OPENSSL_assert(m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ comp=NULL;
+ else
+ comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
+#endif
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ {
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
+
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->expand == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+ ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->compress == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err2;
+ cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j=is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ {
+ ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
+ er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n=i;
+ ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
+ er1= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ er2= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
+ memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+ if (is_exp)
+ {
+ /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
+ * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md,EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,key,j);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er1,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er2,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md,&(exp_key[0]),NULL);
+ key= &(exp_key[0]);
+
+ if (k > 0)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md,EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er1,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,er2,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md,&(exp_iv[0]),NULL);
+ iv= &(exp_iv[0]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length=0;
+
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]),sizeof(exp_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]),sizeof(exp_iv));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
+ return(1);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return(1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,NULL,NULL,&comp))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+#endif
+
+ num=EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ if (num < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+num+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num*=2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block=p;
+
+ ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s,p,num);
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ {
+ /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+ * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block,
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block=NULL;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs,i;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
+ (enc == NULL))
+ {
+ memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
+ rec->input=rec->data;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ l=rec->length;
+ bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ /* COMPRESS */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ {
+ i=bs-((int)l%bs);
+
+ /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+ l+=i;
+ /* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
+ * with the padding length. */
+ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+ rec->length+=i;
+ rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!send)
+ {
+ if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+ }
+
+ EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ {
+ i=rec->data[l-1]+1;
+ /* SSL 3.0 bounds the number of padding bytes by the block size;
+ * padding bytes (except the last one) are arbitrary */
+ if (i > bs)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
+ * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
+ * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* now i <= bs <= rec->length */
+ rec->length-=i;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer,BIO_CLOSE);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst) return;
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst=NULL;
+ }
+
+
+
+void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ {
+ BIO_write (s->s3->handshake_buffer,(void *)buf,len);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0;i< SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]!= NULL)
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],buf,len);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+ long mask;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ long hdatalen;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ /* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst = OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst,0,SSL_MAX_DIGEST *sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,&hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
+ for (i=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(i,&mask,&md); i++)
+ {
+ if ((mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2) && md)
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],md,NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],hdata,hdatalen);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]=NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ return(ssl3_handshake_mac(s,md_nid,NULL,0,p));
+ }
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
+ p+=ret;
+ ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ unsigned int ret;
+ int npad,n;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx,*d=NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst
+ * array*/
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
+ {
+ d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ npad=(48/n)*n;
+ if (sender != NULL)
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,sender,len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,md_buf,&i);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,md_buf,i);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,p,&ret);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return((int)ret);
+ }
+
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ unsigned char *p,rec_char;
+ unsigned int md_size;
+ int npad;
+ int t;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->write_hash;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return -1;
+ md_size=t;
+ npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
+
+ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
+ rec_char=rec->type;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
+ p=md;
+ s2n(rec->length,p);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+ return(md_size);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+ {
+ static const unsigned char *salt[3]={
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ (const unsigned char *)"A",
+ (const unsigned char *)"BB",
+ (const unsigned char *)"CCC",
+#else
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x41",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
+#endif
+ };
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ int i,ret=0;
+ unsigned int n;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ for (i=0; i<3; i++)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,salt[i],strlen((const char *)salt[i]));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,p,len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,buf,&n);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->md5, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,p,len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,buf,n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&n);
+ out+=n;
+ ret+=n;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+ {
+ switch (code)
+ {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..28ee4746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3357 @@
+/* ssl/s3_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#include "../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h"
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+const char ssl3_version_str[]="SSLv3" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl3_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
+
+/* list of available SSLv3 ciphers (sorted by id) */
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
+
+/* The RSA ciphers */
+/* Cipher 01 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 02 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 03 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 04 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 05 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 06 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 07 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* Cipher 08 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 09 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* The DH ciphers */
+/* Cipher 0B */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0C */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0D */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0E */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0F */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 10 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
+/* Cipher 11 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 12 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 13 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 14 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 15 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 16 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 17 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 18 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 19 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Fortezza ciphersuite from SSL 3.0 spec */
+#if 0
+/* Cipher 1C */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1D */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_eFZA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1E */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
+/* Cipher 1E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 20 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 21 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 22 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 23 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 24 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 25 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 26 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 27 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 28 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 29 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 2A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 2B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+/* New AES ciphersuites */
+/* Cipher 2F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 30 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 31 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 32 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 33 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 34 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 35 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+/* Cipher 36 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 37 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 38 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 39 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */
+
+ /* Cipher 41 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 42 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 43 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 44 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 45 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 46 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
+
+#if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES
+ /* New TLS Export CipherSuites from expired ID */
+#if 0
+ /* Cipher 60 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 61 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+ /* Cipher 62 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 63 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 64 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 65 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT|SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 66 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST94-GOST89-GOST89",
+ 0x3000080,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST94,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89",
+ 0x3000081,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST01,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST94-NULL-GOST94",
+ 0x3000082,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST94,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
+ 0,
+ 0
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94",
+ 0x3000083,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST01,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94|TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
+ 0,
+ 0
+ },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (256-bit portion) */
+
+ /* Cipher 84 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+ /* Cipher 85 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 86 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 87 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 88 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 89 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* Cipher 8A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+ /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+
+ /* Cipher 96 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 97 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 98 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 99 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ /* Cipher C001 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C002 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C003 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C004 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C005 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C006 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C007 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C008 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C009 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C010 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C011 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C012 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C013 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C014 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C015 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C016 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C017 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 168,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C018 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C019 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
+/* Cipher FF00 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-MD5",
+ 0x0300ff00,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST94",
+ 0x0300ff01,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST89MAC",
+ 0x0300ff02,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST89STREAM",
+ 0x0300ff03,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF|TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* end of list */
+ };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={
+ ssl3_enc,
+ n_ssl3_mac,
+ ssl3_setup_key_block,
+ ssl3_generate_master_secret,
+ ssl3_change_cipher_state,
+ ssl3_final_finish_mac,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_cert_verify_mac,
+ SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST,4,
+ SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST,4,
+ ssl3_alert_code,
+ };
+
+long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec
+ * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
+ return(60*60*2);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
+ {
+ return(SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+ }
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+ {
+ if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
+ return(&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS-1-u]));
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ return 0;
+
+ return (s->s3->rrec.type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSL3_STATE *s3;
+
+ if ((s3=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memset(s3,0,sizeof *s3);
+ memset(s3->rrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
+ memset(s3->wrec.seq_num,0,sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
+
+ s->s3=s3;
+
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+err:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if(s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+#endif
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3,sizeof *s->s3);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
+ s->s3=NULL;
+ }
+
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *rp,*wp;
+ size_t rlen, wlen;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
+
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
+ s->s3->rrec.comp=NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
+ wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
+ rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
+ wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) {
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ }
+ memset(s->s3,0,sizeof *s->s3);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->packet_length=0;
+ s->s3->renegotiate=0;
+ s->s3->total_renegotiations=0;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ if (
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA ||
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH ||
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
+#endif
+ 0)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret=s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret=s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret=s->s3->total_renegotiations;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
+ ret=(int)(s->s3->flags);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
+ ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512/8))))
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
+ s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+ {
+ DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))
+ {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh))
+ {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
+ s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+ {
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+
+ if (parg == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_up_ref((EC_KEY *)parg))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ ecdh = (EC_KEY *)parg;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(s->cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ s->cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
+ if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (parg == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG:
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg=parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT:
+ if (larg > 12288) /* actual internal limit is 2^16 for the complete hello message
+ * (including the cert chain and everything) */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+ if ((size_t)larg == 0)
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+ s->tlsext_status_type=larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+ *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+ *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+ *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+ return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ if (
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
+#endif
+ 0)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB:
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb=(void (*)(SSL *,int ,int,
+ unsigned char *, int, void *))fp;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+ {
+ CERT *cert;
+
+ cert=ctx->cert;
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
+ if ( (cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
+ ((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) > (512/8)))
+ )
+ return(1);
+ else
+ return(0);
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int i;
+
+ rsa=(RSA *)parg;
+ i=1;
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ i=0;
+ else
+ {
+ if ((rsa=RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
+ i=0;
+ }
+ if (!i)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp);
+ cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ return(1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+ {
+ DH *new=NULL,*dh;
+
+ dh=(DH *)parg;
+ if ((new=DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))
+ {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(new))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(new);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
+ cert->dh_tmp=new;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+ {
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+
+ if (parg == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_dup((EC_KEY *)parg);
+ if (ecdh == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ }
+ cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_arg=parg;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+ {
+ unsigned char *keys = parg;
+ if (!keys)
+ return 48;
+ if (larg != 48)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS)
+ {
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16);
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16);
+ memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_status_arg=parg;
+ return 1;
+ break;
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ /* A Thawte special :-) */
+ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT:
+ if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((ctx->extra_certs=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ return(0);
+ }
+ sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs,(X509 *)parg);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ CERT *cert;
+
+ cert=ctx->cert;
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_callback=(int (*)(SSL *,int *,void *))fp;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback = (int (*)(SSL *,void *, size_t, void *))fp;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_status_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,void *))fp;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb=(int (*)(SSL *,unsigned char *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+ HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+/* This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
+ * available */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ unsigned long id;
+
+ id=0x03000000L|((unsigned long)p[0]<<8L)|(unsigned long)p[1];
+ c.id=id;
+ cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+ if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return cp;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+ }
+ return(2);
+ }
+
+SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c,*ret=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
+ int i,ii,ok;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+ unsigned int j;
+ int ec_ok, ec_nid;
+ unsigned char ec_search1 = 0, ec_search2 = 0;
+#endif
+ CERT *cert;
+ unsigned long alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
+
+ /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */
+ cert=s->cert;
+
+#if 0
+ /* Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a
+ * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering.
+ * We may pay a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(),
+ * but would have to pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup().
+ */
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr);
+ for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr) ; ++i)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr,i);
+ printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+ }
+ printf("Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt);
+ for(i=0 ; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) ; ++i)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt,i);
+ printf("%p:%s\n",(void *)c,c->name);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ prio = srvr;
+ allow = clnt;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ prio = clnt;
+ allow = srvr;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
+
+ ssl_set_cert_masks(cert,c);
+ mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+/* printf("ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n", i,c->algorithms);*/
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ alg_k=c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a=c->algorithm_auth;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ if ( !kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx) )
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be server callback set */
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
+ {
+ ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,emask_k,emask_a,
+ (void *)c,c->name);
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n",ok,alg_k,alg_a,mask_k,mask_a,(void *)c,
+ c->name);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (
+ /* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
+ (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
+ /* and we have an ECC certificate */
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
+ /* and the client specified a Supported Point Formats extension */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL))
+ /* and our certificate's point is compressed */
+ && (
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data != NULL)
+ && (
+ (*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+ || (*(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED + 1)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ /* if our certificate's curve is over a field type that the client does not support
+ * then do not allow this cipher suite to be negotiated */
+ if (
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL)
+ && (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ )
+ {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++)
+ {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime)
+ {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; j++)
+ {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2)
+ {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+ if (
+ /* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
+ (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
+ /* and we have an ECC certificate */
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
+ /* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
+ )
+ {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ if (
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group != NULL)
+ )
+ {
+ ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group);
+ if ((ec_nid == 0)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth != NULL)
+ )
+ {
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x01;
+ }
+ else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x02;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0x00;
+ ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
+ }
+ if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0))
+ {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++)
+ {
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j+1] == ec_search2))
+ {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+ if (
+ /* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
+ (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ /* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
+ && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ /* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
+ )
+ {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL)
+ {
+ ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group);
+ if ((ec_nid == 0)
+ && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL)
+ )
+ {
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x01;
+ }
+ else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x02;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ec_search1 = 0x00;
+ ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
+ }
+ if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0))
+ {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++)
+ {
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j+1] == ec_search2))
+ {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ if (!ok) continue;
+ ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
+ if (ii >= 0)
+ {
+ ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN;
+ p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kEDH))
+ {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+# endif
+ }
+ if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kDHr)))
+ {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+ p[ret++]=TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
+ p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ /* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well
+ * so we don't need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+ }
+#endif
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or
+ * we don't want to send messages :-) */
+ if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE))
+ {
+ s->shutdown=(SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
+ {
+ s->shutdown|=SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
+#if 1
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+#endif
+ /* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs
+ * to be written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ return(-1); /* return WANT_WRITE */
+ }
+ else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ {
+ /* resend it if not sent */
+#if 1
+ ret=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if(ret == -1)
+ {
+ /* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth
+ * invocation, we must have already signalled
+ * return 0 upon a previous invoation,
+ * return WANT_WRITE */
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
+ {
+ /* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */
+ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,0,NULL,0,0);
+ if(!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
+ {
+ return(-1); /* return WANT_READ */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
+ !s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ return(1);
+ else
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int ret,n;
+
+#if 0
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(0);
+ }
+#endif
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+ /* This is an experimental flag that sends the
+ * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
+ * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
+ * session-id reuse */
+ /* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
+ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
+ {
+ /* First time through, we write into the buffer */
+ if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+ buf,len);
+ if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
+
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=ret;
+ }
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+
+ ret=s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ret=s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+ buf,len);
+ if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
+ }
+
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
+ {
+ int n,ret;
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
+ {
+ /* Deal with an application that calls SSL_read() when handshake data
+ * is yet to be written.
+ */
+ if (BIO_wpending(s->wbio) > 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=1;
+ ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
+ if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2))
+ {
+ /* ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which
+ * called ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data.
+ * However, ssl3_read_bytes actually found application data
+ * and thinks that application data makes sense here; so disable
+ * handshake processing and try to read application data again. */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ }
+ else
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
+
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+ {
+ return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+ return(1);
+
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
+ return(0);
+
+ s->s3->renegotiate=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate)
+ {
+ if ( (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) &&
+ (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) &&
+ !SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+/*
+if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' message, we
+need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
+*/
+ /* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
+ s->state=SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
+ s->s3->renegotiate=0;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
+ s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+ ret=1;
+ }
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cdddb17b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* ssl/s3_meth.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl3_connect,
+ ssl3_get_method)
+
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0d3874ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1502 @@
+/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
+ {
+ /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+ * packet by another n bytes.
+ * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
+ * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
+ * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
+ * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+ */
+ int i,len,left;
+ long align=0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n <= 0) return n;
+
+ rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+ if (!extend)
+ {
+ /* start with empty packet ... */
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* check if next packet length is large
+ * enough to justify payload alignment... */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
+ {
+ /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
+ * and its length field is insane, we can
+ * only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not.
+ * Header values has no effect on memmove
+ * arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered. */
+ memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
+ }
+ s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+ }
+
+ /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
+ * because the read operation returns the whole packet
+ * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+ if (left >= n)
+ {
+ s->packet_length+=n;
+ rb->left=left-n;
+ rb->offset+=n;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+ /* else we need to read more data */
+
+ len = s->packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf+align;
+ /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
+ * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
+ * 'left' extra ones at the end */
+ if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
+ {
+ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
+ s->packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
+
+ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->read_ahead)
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else
+ {
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+ }
+
+ while (left < n)
+ {
+ /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
+ * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
+ * len+max if possible) */
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (len+left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ return(i);
+ }
+ left+=i;
+ /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
+ * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
+ * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ s->packet_length += n;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+/* Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
+ int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ short version;
+ int mac_size;
+ int clear=0;
+ size_t extra;
+ int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD;
+#else
+ long align=0;
+#endif
+
+ rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ sess=s->session;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ else
+ extra=0;
+ if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) &&
+ extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+ {
+ /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p=s->packet;
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr->type= *(p++);
+ ssl_major= *(p++);
+ ssl_minor= *(p++);
+ version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
+ n2s(p,rr->length);
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet)
+ {
+ if (version != s->version)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+ /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
+ * allocate some memory for it.
+ */
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align)
+ {
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align;
+ s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i=rr->length;
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /* now n == rr->length,
+ * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
+ }
+
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
+ * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
+ * need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression
+ * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
+ * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
+
+ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+ * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data=rr->input;
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+ if (enc_err <= 0)
+ {
+ if (enc_err == 0)
+ /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
+ * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
+ * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
+ * the MAC computation anyway. */
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
+{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
+ clear=1;
+
+ if (!clear)
+ {
+ /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+ {
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
+ if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+ {
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+ rr->length = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ {
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+ {
+ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off=0;
+ /* So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length=0;
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+ return(1);
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+ rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ rr->length=i;
+ rr->data=rr->comp;
+#endif
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+ wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+ wr->input,(int)wr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ wr->length=i;
+
+ wr->input=wr->data;
+#endif
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
+ * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
+ unsigned int tot,n,nw;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int max_plain_length;
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ tot=s->s3->wnum;
+ s->s3->wnum=0;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ n=(len-tot);
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS))
+ max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ else
+ max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment;
+
+ if (n > max_plain_length)
+ nw = max_plain_length;
+ else
+ nw=n;
+
+ i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->wnum=tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if ((i == (int)n) ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
+ {
+ /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+ * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+ return tot+i;
+ }
+
+ n-=i;
+ tot+=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*plen;
+ int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+ int prefix_len=0;
+ long align=0;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+ if (wb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
+ if (wb->left != 0)
+ return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ {
+ i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return(i);
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
+ wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ sess=s->session;
+
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+ clear=1;
+
+ if (clear)
+ mac_size=0;
+ else
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
+ {
+ /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
+ * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
+ * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
+ * together with the actual payload) */
+ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (prefix_len >
+ (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */
+ if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len)
+ {
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ wb->buf = p;
+ wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
+ }
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
+ * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
+ * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
+ * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
+ align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+ else if (prefix_len)
+ {
+ p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+
+ /* write the header */
+
+ *(p++)=type&0xff;
+ wr->type=type;
+
+ *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet length */
+ plen=p;
+ p+=2;
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+ wr->data=p;
+ wr->length=(int)len;
+ wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
+
+ /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
+ * wr->data */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
+ wr->input=wr->data;
+ }
+
+ /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
+ * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
+ * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
+
+ if (mac_size != 0)
+ {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ wr->length+=mac_size;
+ wr->input=p;
+ wr->data=p;
+ }
+
+ /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+
+ /* record length after mac and block padding */
+ s2n(wr->length,plen);
+
+ /* we should now have
+ * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+ * wr->length long */
+ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+ wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ /* we are in a recursive call;
+ * just return the length, don't write out anything here
+ */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+
+ /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
+ s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
+ s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
+ s->s3->wpend_type=type;
+ s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
+err:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len)
+ {
+ int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+
+/* XXXX */
+ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
+ || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+ !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+ || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->wbio != NULL)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
+ (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+ (unsigned int)wb->left);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i= -1;
+ }
+ if (i == wb->left)
+ {
+ wb->left=0;
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
+ }
+ else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+ point in using a datagram service */
+ wb->left = 0;
+ }
+ return(i);
+ }
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ wb->left-=i;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
+ {
+ int al,i,j,ret;
+ unsigned int n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return(-1);
+
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
+ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+ {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+start:
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
+ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+ * (even in 'peek' mode) */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ rr->length=0;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+ if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+ {
+ /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+ * are doing a handshake for the first time */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
+ if (!peek)
+ {
+ rr->length-=n;
+ rr->off+=n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
+ }
+ return(n);
+ }
+
+
+ /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
+ * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
+ * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+ }
+ else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0)
+ {
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (rr->length < n)
+ n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ while (n-- > 0)
+ {
+ dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ rr->length--;
+ }
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ {
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ !s->s3->renegotiate)
+ {
+ ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
+ {
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
+ * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+ goto start;
+ }
+ /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+ * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ */
+ if (s->server &&
+ SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+ !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+
+ {
+ /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
+ {
+ int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
+
+ s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
+ {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+ {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
+ * a fatal alert because if application tried to
+ * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+ * expects it to succeed.
+ *
+ * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
+ * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
+ {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
+ s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ rr->length=0;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+ * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+ if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
+ (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+ {
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+ * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+ * protocol violations): */
+ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
+ ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
+ :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
+ i=s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0) return(i);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+ {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (rr->type)
+ {
+ default:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+ /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+#endif
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
+ * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
+ * should not happen when type != rr->type */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
+ * but have application data. If the library was
+ * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
+ * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+ * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
+ * we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ ((
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ ) || (
+ (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ )
+ ))
+ {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* not reached */
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+ else
+ i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
+ return(0);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* we have to record the message digest at
+ * this point so we can get it before we read
+ * the finished message */
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+#endif
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+ {
+ /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+ desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+ desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+ if (desc < 0) return -1;
+ /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+ s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
+ s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
+ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
+ * some time in the future */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,j;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
+ * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
+ * we will not worry too much. */
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ {
+ j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
+ }
+ }
+ return(i);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60591622
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3314 @@
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return(SSLv3_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
+
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+ int ret= -1;
+ int new_state,state,skip=0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ state=s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->new_session=1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server=1;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+ if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf=buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+ {
+ /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+ * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ }
+ else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+ * client that doesn't support secure
+ * renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+ * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ s->new_session = 2;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ )
+ /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+ * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+ * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+ * be able to handle this) */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
+
+ /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
+ * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
+ *
+ * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
+ *
+ * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
+ * message only if the cipher suite is either
+ * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
+ * server certificate contains the server's
+ * public key for key exchange.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ skip=1;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip=1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+ ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+
+ /* This code originally checked to see if
+ * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+ * and then flushed. This caused problems
+ * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+ * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+ * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+ * still exist. So instead we just flush
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+ * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+ * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+ * message is not sent.
+ * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+ * the client uses its key from the certificate
+ * for key exchange.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int offset=0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+ * a client cert, it can be verified
+ * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
+ * should be generalized. But it is next step
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
+ {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+ dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0)
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset+=dgst_size;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+ ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit)
+ {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num=0;
+
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+ {
+ if (s->debug)
+ {
+ if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+ {
+ new_state=s->state;
+ s->state=state;
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+ s->state=new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip=0;
+ }
+end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+
+ /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+ * so permit appropriate message length */
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ {
+ /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long id;
+ unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
+
+ /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
+ * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
+ * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
+ * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
+ * TLSv1.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ s->first_packet=1;
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->first_packet=0;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
+ * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
+ p+=2;
+
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
+ * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+ * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+ {
+ unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+ if (cookie_length == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* load the client random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j= *(p++);
+
+ s->hit=0;
+ /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
+ * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
+ * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
+ * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
+ * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
+ * an earlier library version)
+ */
+ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+ {
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+ if (i == 1)
+ { /* previous session */
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else /* i == 0 */
+ {
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p+=j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+ {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ cookie_len > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+ {
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 2;
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
+ {
+ /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
+ {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
+ == NULL))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
+ {
+ j=0;
+ id=s->session->cipher->id;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
+ if (c->id == id)
+ {
+ j=1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
+ {
+ /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+ * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+ * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+ * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+ * enabled, though. */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
+ {
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (j == 0)
+ {
+ /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+ * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compression */
+ i= *(p++);
+ if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+ {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q=p;
+ for (j=0; j<i; j++)
+ {
+ if (p[j] == 0) break;
+ }
+
+ p+=i;
+ if (j >= i)
+ {
+ /* no compress */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+ * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+ * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+ * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+ {
+ unsigned long Time;
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ pos=s->s3->server_random;
+ l2n(Time,pos);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+ ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+ {
+ s->hit=1;
+ s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+ s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+ ciphers=NULL;
+
+ /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+ pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+ if (s->cipher_list)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+ /* Can't disable compression */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed compression method */
+ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+ if (comp_id == comp->id)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+ for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
+ {
+ if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (m >= i)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (s->hit)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ { /* See if we have a match */
+ int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
+
+ nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+ v=comp->id;
+ for (o=0; o<i; o++)
+ {
+ if (v == q[o])
+ {
+ done=1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (done) break;
+ }
+ if (done)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ else
+ comp=NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
+ * pick a cipher */
+
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+ s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
+ if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+ if (ciphers == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ciphers=NULL;
+ c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Session-id reuse */
+#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
+ SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ {
+ sk=s->session->ciphers;
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
+ nc=c;
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
+ ec=c;
+ }
+ if (nc != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
+ else if (ec != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ /* we now have the following setup.
+ * client_random
+ * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+ * compression - basically ignored right now
+ * ssl version is set - sslv3
+ * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
+ * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
+ */
+
+ if (ret < 0) ret=1;
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ }
+err:
+ if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,sl;
+ unsigned long l;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ unsigned long Time;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ {
+ buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ p=s->s3->server_random;
+ /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ l2n(Time,p);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+#endif
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d=p= &(buf[4]);
+
+ *(p++)=s->version>>8;
+ *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
+ * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
+ * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
+ * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
+ * session-id if we want it to be single use.
+ * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
+ * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ *
+ * We also have an additional case where stateless session
+ * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
+ * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
+ * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
+ * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
+ * is unaffected.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
+ s->session->session_id_length=0;
+
+ sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++)=sl;
+ memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
+ p+=sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
+ p+=i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++)=0;
+ else
+ *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* do the header */
+ l=(p-d);
+ d=buf;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l,d);
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=p-buf;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num=4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j,num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int al,i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4],kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+ {
+ type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert=s->cert;
+
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
+ n=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if(rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0]=rsa->n;
+ r[1]=rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+ {
+ dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
+ {
+ if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+ (dh->priv_key == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0]=dh->p;
+ r[1]=dh->g;
+ r[2]=dh->pub_key;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+ * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
+ * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key.
+ * First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
+ * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+ * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+ * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0]=NULL;
+ r[1]=NULL;
+ r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ n+=2+nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+ {
+ if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=NULL;
+ kn=0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[4]);
+
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ s2n(nr[i],p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
+ p+=nr[i];
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+ * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
+ encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
+ * and p points to the space at the end. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ q=md_buf;
+ j=0;
+ for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+ {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
+ (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q+=i;
+ j+=i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u,p);
+ n+=u+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+ s->init_num=n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i,j,nl,off,n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
+ {
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
+ d[0]=n;
+ p+=n;
+ n++;
+
+ off=n;
+ p+=2;
+ n+=2;
+
+ sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl=0;
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+ j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ {
+ s2n(j,p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ n+=2+j;
+ nl+=2+j;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ d=p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+ j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
+ n+=j;
+ nl+=j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
+ s2n(nl,p);
+
+ d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+
+ /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+ * it off */
+
+ s->init_num=n+4;
+ s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,al,ok;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ unsigned char *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa=NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
+ DH *dh_srvr;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ 2048, /* ??? */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ {
+ /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
+ {
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
+ rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
+ /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
+ * be sent already */
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
+ goto f_err;
+
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+ if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+ (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ p-=2;
+ }
+ else
+ n=i;
+ }
+
+ i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+ al = -1;
+
+ if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ }
+
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
+ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ p,i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p-=2;
+ i=(int)n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+ }
+
+ pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
+ if (pub == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
+
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
+
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ pub=NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,p,i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+ /* Note that the length is checked again below,
+ ** after decryption
+ */
+ if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+ ** but will return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+ * the protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
+ {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ ** but it caused problems for apache.
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+ {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
+ * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L)
+ {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) ||
+ (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates
+ * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+ * never executed. When that support is
+ * added, we ought to ensure the key
+ * received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement.
+ * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+ * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+ * group.
+ */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get client's public key from encoded point
+ * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (n != 1 + i)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
+ clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+ * currently, so set it to the start
+ */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+ char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
+ * string for the callback */
+ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+ psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
+
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+ size_t outlen=32, inlen;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key*/
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+ * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
+ * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
+ * a client certificate for authorization only. */
+ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (client_pub_pkey)
+ {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /* Decrypt session key */
+ if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ if (p[1] == 0x81)
+ {
+ start = p+3;
+ inlen = p[2];
+ }
+ else if (p[1] < 0x80)
+ {
+ start = p+2;
+ inlen = p[1];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
+
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ ret = 2;
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ gerr:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int al,ok,ret=0;
+ long n;
+ int type=0,i,j;
+ X509 *peer;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+ -1,
+ 514, /* 514? */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ {
+ peer=s->session->peer;
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ peer=NULL;
+ pkey=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (peer == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
+ * signature without length field */
+ if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+ pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
+ {
+ i=64;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ n-=2;
+ if (i > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ {
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ {
+ j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+ { unsigned char signature[64];
+ int idx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+ if (i!=64) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
+ }
+ for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
+ signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
+ }
+ j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (j<=0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+
+ ret=1;
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ }
+end:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1,
+ s->max_cert_list,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+ {
+ if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p,llen);
+ if (llen+3 != n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
+ {
+ n2l3(p,l);
+ if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q=p;
+ x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (p != (q+l))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x=NULL;
+ nc+=l+3;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
+ {
+ /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
+ * when we arrive here. */
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
+ * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
+
+ sk=NULL;
+
+ ret=1;
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ }
+err:
+ if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
+ {
+ x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num=(int)l;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+ * extension in their ClientHello */
+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ 514, /* See the payload format below */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return((int)n);
+
+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n < 2)
+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /* The payload looks like:
+ * uint8 proto_len;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
+ * uint8 padding_len;
+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
+ */
+ proto_len = p[0];
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+ return 0;
+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+ return 0;
+
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9cb2bf93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2382 @@
+/* ssl/ssl.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_H
+#define HEADER_SSL_H
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include <openssl/kssl.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
+/* Version 0 - initial version
+ * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
+ */
+#define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
+
+/* text strings for the ciphers */
+#define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA
+
+/* VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
+ */
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5
+
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5
+
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
+#define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256
+
+#define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+#define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32
+
+#define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8)
+#define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8
+#define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48
+
+
+/* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */
+
+#define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40"
+#define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56"
+#define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW"
+#define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM"
+#define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH"
+#define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA" /* unused! */
+#define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA" /* unused! */
+#define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA" /* unused! */
+#define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA" /* unused! */
+
+#define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL"
+#define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL"
+#define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA"
+#define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5"
+#define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr"
+#define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe"
+#define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK"
+#define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA"
+#define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS"
+#define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH" /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5"
+#define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA"
+#define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK"
+#define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94"
+#define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
+#define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS"
+#define SSL_TXT_DH "DH"
+#define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH" /* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */
+#define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH"
+#define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA"
+#define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH" /* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */
+#define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH"
+#define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA"
+#define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5"
+#define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_DES "DES"
+#define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES"
+#define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4"
+#define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2"
+#define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA"
+#define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED"
+#define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128"
+#define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256"
+#define SSL_TXT_AES "AES"
+#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128"
+#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256"
+#define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5"
+#define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1"
+#define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA" /* same as "SHA1" */
+#define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94"
+#define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2"
+#define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3"
+#define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP"
+#define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT"
+
+#define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL"
+
+/*
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select)
+ * ciphers normally not being used.
+ * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers
+ * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due
+ * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+ * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection.
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments
+ * to the default cipher setup will also be included here.
+ *
+ * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that
+ * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed
+ * for DEFAULT.
+ */
+#define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL"
+#define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+
+/* The following cipher list is used by default.
+ * It also is substituted when an application-defined cipher list string
+ * starts with 'DEFAULT'. */
+#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
+/* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
+ * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
+ * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites!
+ * (The latter are not actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable
+ * some of them.)
+ */
+
+/* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
+#define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1
+#define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM
+
+/* This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the
+ * 'struct ssl_st *' function parameters used to prototype callbacks
+ * in SSL_CTX. */
+typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
+typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
+
+/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
+typedef struct ssl_cipher_st
+ {
+ int valid;
+ const char *name; /* text name */
+ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
+
+ /* changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value 'algorithms' */
+ unsigned long algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */
+ unsigned long algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */
+ unsigned long algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */
+ unsigned long algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */
+ unsigned long algorithm_ssl; /* (major) protocol version */
+
+ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */
+ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */
+ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */
+ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */
+ } SSL_CIPHER;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+
+typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn)(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
+typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
+
+/* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */
+typedef struct ssl_method_st
+ {
+ int version;
+ int (*ssl_new)(SSL *s);
+ void (*ssl_clear)(SSL *s);
+ void (*ssl_free)(SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_accept)(SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_connect)(SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_read)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len);
+ int (*ssl_peek)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len);
+ int (*ssl_write)(SSL *s,const void *buf,int len);
+ int (*ssl_shutdown)(SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_renegotiate)(SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_renegotiate_check)(SSL *s);
+ long (*ssl_get_message)(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long
+ max, int *ok);
+ int (*ssl_read_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len,
+ int peek);
+ int (*ssl_write_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len);
+ int (*ssl_dispatch_alert)(SSL *s);
+ long (*ssl_ctrl)(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg);
+ long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char)(const unsigned char *ptr);
+ int (*put_cipher_by_char)(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,unsigned char *ptr);
+ int (*ssl_pending)(const SSL *s);
+ int (*num_ciphers)(void);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher)(unsigned ncipher);
+ const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method)(int version);
+ long (*get_timeout)(void);
+ struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
+ int (*ssl_version)(void);
+ long (*ssl_callback_ctrl)(SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
+ long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void));
+ } SSL_METHOD;
+
+/* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
+ * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER, -- structure version number
+ * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number
+ * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID
+ * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID
+ * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key
+ * KRB5_principal OCTET STRING -- optional Kerberos principal
+ * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument
+ * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time
+ * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds
+ * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate
+ * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context
+ * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
+ * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension
+ * ECPointFormatList [ 7 ] OCTET STRING, -- optional EC point format list from TLS extension
+ * PSK_identity_hint [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
+ * PSK_identity [ 9 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional PSK identity
+ * }
+ * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
+ * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
+ */
+typedef struct ssl_session_st
+ {
+ int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is
+ * being kept in here? */
+
+ /* only really used in SSLv2 */
+ unsigned int key_arg_length;
+ unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH];
+ int master_key_length;
+ unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ /* session_id - valid? */
+ unsigned int session_id_length;
+ unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
+ /* this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in
+ * the appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this,
+ * via SSL_new */
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
+ unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char *psk_identity_hint;
+ char *psk_identity;
+#endif
+ int not_resumable;
+
+ /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
+ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert;
+
+ /* This is the cert for the other end.
+ * On clients, it will be the same as sess_cert->peer_key->x509
+ * (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is not retained
+ * in the external representation of sessions, see ssl_asn1.c). */
+ X509 *peer;
+ /* when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's certificate
+ * is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */
+ long verify_result; /* only for servers */
+
+ int references;
+ long timeout;
+ long time;
+
+ unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */
+
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this
+ * needs to be used to load
+ * the 'cipher' structure */
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
+
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
+
+ /* These are used to make removal of session-ids more
+ * efficient and to implement a maximum cache size. */
+ struct ssl_session_st *prev,*next;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ char *tlsext_hostname;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */
+ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ /* RFC4507 info */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */
+ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
+ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
+#endif
+ } SSL_SESSION;
+
+
+#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L
+/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
+#define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L
+#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
+#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L
+#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
+#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
+#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
+#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L
+
+/* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
+ * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol)
+ * the workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
+ * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include
+ * it in SSL_OP_ALL. */
+#define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L /* added in 0.9.6e */
+
+/* SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless.
+ * This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */
+#define SSL_OP_ALL 0x80000FFFL
+
+/* DTLS options */
+#define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L
+/* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */
+#define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L
+/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
+#define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L
+/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */
+#define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L
+
+/* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
+#define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L
+/* Don't use compression even if supported */
+#define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000L
+/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
+#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
+#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
+/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+#define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
+/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations,
+ * even when this violates protocol specs */
+#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x00200000L
+/* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's
+ * preferences */
+#define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L
+/* If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number
+ * as latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0
+ * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is
+ * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */
+#define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L
+
+#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L
+
+/* The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check
+ * for the PKCS#1 attack */
+#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x08000000L
+#define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x10000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L
+/* Make server add server-hello extension from early version of
+ * cryptopro draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated.
+ * Required for interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
+ */
+#define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000L
+
+/* Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
+ * when just a single record has been written): */
+#define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L
+/* Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location
+ * (buffer contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid
+ * the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like
+ * non-blocking write(): */
+#define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L
+/* Never bother the application with retries if the transport
+ * is blocking: */
+#define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L
+/* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
+#define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L
+/* Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
+ * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
+#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
+/* Use small read and write buffers: (a) lazy allocate read buffers for
+ * large incoming records, and (b) limit the size of outgoing records. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS 0x00000020L
+/* When set, clients may send application data before receipt of CCS
+ * and Finished. This mode enables full-handshakes to 'complete' in
+ * one RTT. */
+#define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH 0x00000040L
+
+/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
+ * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_get_options(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+#define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+
+#define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+#define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+#define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+
+
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */
+#else
+#define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */
+#endif
+
+#define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20)
+
+/* This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that set
+ * them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in a
+ * server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. Also,
+ * callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique otherwise
+ * the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do this using the
+ * 'ssl' value they're passed by;
+ * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len)
+ * The length value passed in is set at the maximum size the session ID can be.
+ * In SSLv2 this is 16 bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback
+ * can alter this length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are
+ * supposed to be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback
+ * returns in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to
+ * zero. */
+typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len);
+
+typedef struct ssl_comp_st
+ {
+ int id;
+ const char *name;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *method;
+#else
+ char *method;
+#endif
+ } SSL_COMP;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
+
+struct ssl_ctx_st
+ {
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+ /* same as above but sorted for lookup */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+
+ struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
+ /* Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
+ * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */
+ unsigned long session_cache_size;
+ struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
+ struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
+
+ /* This can have one of 2 values, ored together,
+ * SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
+ * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER,
+ * Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which means only
+ * SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */
+ int session_cache_mode;
+
+ /* If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set
+ * when SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make
+ * life easier to set things up */
+ long session_timeout;
+
+ /* If this callback is not null, it will be called each
+ * time a session id is added to the cache. If this function
+ * returns 1, it means that the callback will do a
+ * SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. Otherwise,
+ * on 0, it means the callback has finished with it.
+ * If remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when
+ * a session-id is removed from the cache. After the call,
+ * OpenSSL will SSL_SESSION_free() it. */
+ int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy);
+
+ struct
+ {
+ int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */
+ int sess_connect_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */
+ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
+ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */
+ int sess_accept_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */
+ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
+ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */
+ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
+ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */
+ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */
+ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not
+ * in the cache was
+ * passed back via the callback. This
+ * indicates that the application is
+ * supplying session-id's from other
+ * processes - spooky :-) */
+ } stats;
+
+ int references;
+
+ /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
+ int (*app_verify_callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
+ void *app_verify_arg;
+ /* before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
+ * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */
+
+ /* Default password callback. */
+ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
+
+ /* Default password callback user data. */
+ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+ /* get client cert callback */
+ int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
+ /* cookie generate callback */
+ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len);
+
+ /* verify cookie callback */
+ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len);
+
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+ const EVP_MD *rsa_md5;/* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */
+ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
+ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+
+
+ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
+
+ void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
+
+ /* what we put in client cert requests */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+
+
+ /* Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by SSL_new) */
+
+ unsigned long options;
+ unsigned long mode;
+ long max_cert_list;
+
+ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+ int read_ahead;
+
+ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+ void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *msg_callback_arg;
+
+ int verify_mode;
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+ int (*default_verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
+
+ /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+#if 0
+ int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
+ int trust; /* Trust setting */
+#endif
+
+ int quiet_shutdown;
+
+ /* Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment.
+ * actual record size can be more than this due to
+ * padding and MAC overheads.
+ */
+ unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ENGINE
+ /* Engine to pass requests for client certs to
+ */
+ ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions servername callback */
+ int (*tlsext_servername_callback)(SSL*, int *, void *);
+ void *tlsext_servername_arg;
+ /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16];
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16];
+ /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
+ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx,
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
+
+ /* certificate status request info */
+ /* Callback for status request */
+ int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_status_arg;
+
+ /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
+ int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
+
+ /* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
+ * advertised protocols can be provided. */
+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
+ /* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
+ * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
+ int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg);
+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char *psk_identity_hint;
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+#define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
+ unsigned int freelist_max_len;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
+#endif
+ };
+
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080
+/* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200
+#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \
+ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess));
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess));
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy));
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy);
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val));
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
+#endif
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg);
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg),
+ void *arg);
+
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned *len);
+
+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
+ * resulting identity/psk */
+#define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128
+#define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len));
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint);
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+#define SSL_NOTHING 1
+#define SSL_WRITING 2
+#define SSL_READING 3
+#define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4
+
+/* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
+#define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING)
+#define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
+#define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
+#define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+
+#define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
+#define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
+
+struct ssl_st
+ {
+ /* protocol version
+ * (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, DTLS1_VERSION)
+ */
+ int version;
+ int type; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
+
+ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* SSLv3 */
+
+ /* There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the
+ * same. This is so data can be read and written to different
+ * handlers */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */
+ BIO *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */
+ BIO *bbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate
+ * messages */
+#else
+ char *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */
+ char *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */
+ char *bbio;
+#endif
+ /* This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing
+ * when a 0 or -1 is returned. This is needed for
+ * non-blocking IO so we know what request needs re-doing when
+ * in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */
+ int rwstate;
+
+ /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
+ int in_handshake;
+ int (*handshake_func)(SSL *);
+
+ /* Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is
+ * switched as soon as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state
+ * is called for the first time, so that "state" and
+ * "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as
+ * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this
+ * test instead of an "init" member.
+ */
+
+ int server; /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear*/
+
+ int new_session;/* 1 if we are to use a new session.
+ * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
+ * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
+ * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
+ * cached session or even the previous session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+ int quiet_shutdown;/* don't send shutdown packets */
+ int shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02
+ * for received */
+ int state; /* where we are */
+ int rstate; /* where we are when reading */
+
+ BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */
+ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by ssl3_get_message() */
+ int init_num; /* amount read/written */
+ int init_off; /* amount read/written */
+
+ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
+ unsigned char *packet;
+ unsigned int packet_length;
+
+ struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */
+ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
+ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
+
+ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible
+ * (for non-blocking reads) */
+
+ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+ void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *msg_callback_arg;
+
+ int hit; /* reusing a previous session */
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+#if 0
+ int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
+ int trust; /* Trust setting */
+#endif
+
+ /* crypto */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+
+ /* These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are
+ * the ones to be 'copied' into these ones */
+ int mac_flags;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */
+#else
+ char *expand;
+#endif
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
+#else
+ char *compress;
+#endif
+
+ /* session info */
+
+ /* client cert? */
+ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
+ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+
+ /* the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused
+ * in the appropriate context */
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+
+ /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+
+ /* This can be disabled to prevent the use of uncached sessions */
+ int session_creation_enabled;
+
+ /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+
+ /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */
+ int verify_mode; /* 0 don't care about verify failure.
+ * 1 fail if verify fails */
+ int (*verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* fail if callback returns 0 */
+
+ void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* optional informational callback */
+
+ int error; /* error bytes to be written */
+ int error_code; /* actual code */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; /* Kerberos 5 context */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ /* set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read()
+ * and SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */
+ int debug;
+
+ /* extra application data */
+ long verify_result;
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+ /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+
+ int references;
+ unsigned long options; /* protocol behaviour */
+ unsigned long mode; /* API behaviour */
+ long max_cert_list;
+ int first_packet;
+ int client_version; /* what was passed, used for
+ * SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
+ unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extension debug callback */
+ void (*tlsext_debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+ unsigned char *data, int len,
+ void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_debug_arg;
+ char *tlsext_hostname;
+ int servername_done; /* no further mod of servername
+ 0 : call the servername extension callback.
+ 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
+ 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
+ */
+ /* certificate status request info */
+ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */
+ int tlsext_status_type;
+ /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
+ int tlsext_status_expected;
+ /* OCSP status request only */
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+ X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+ /* OCSP response received or to be sent */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+ int tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+
+ /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
+ int tlsext_ticket_expected;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* our list */
+ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* our list */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for handshakes */
+ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
+ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket;
+
+ /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
+ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb;
+ void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg;
+
+ /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
+ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb;
+ void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
+
+ SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
+ * extensions.
+ *
+ * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
+ * before the Finished message. */
+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
+#endif
+
+#define session_ctx initial_ctx
+#else
+#define session_ctx ctx
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ };
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl2.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h> /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
+#include <openssl/dtls1.h> /* Datagram TLS */
+#include <openssl/ssl23.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* compatibility */
+#define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg))
+#define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0))
+#define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a))
+#define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0))
+#define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0))
+#define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg))
+
+/* The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are
+ * used to indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment.
+ * The macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use
+ * and even then, only when using non-blocking IO.
+ * It can also be useful to work out where you were when the connection
+ * failed */
+
+#define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000
+#define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000
+#define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF
+#define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000
+#define SSL_ST_OK 0x03
+#define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
+
+#define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01
+#define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02
+#define SSL_CB_READ 0x04
+#define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08
+#define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000 /* used in callback */
+#define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
+#define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
+#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+#define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+#define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10
+#define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20
+
+/* Is the SSL_connection established? */
+#define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a)
+#define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
+#define SSL_in_init(a) ((SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) && \
+ !SSL_cutthrough_complete(a))
+#define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
+#define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s);
+
+/* The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail,
+ * you should not need these */
+#define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0
+#define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1
+#define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2
+
+/* Obtain latest Finished message
+ * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
+ * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
+ * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+
+/* use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options
+ * are 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */
+#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00
+#define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01
+#define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02
+#define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04
+
+#define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
+#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
+
+/* this is for backward compatibility */
+#if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */
+#define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c)
+#define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n)
+#define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b))
+#define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b))
+#define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b))
+#endif
+/* More backward compatibility */
+#define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+#define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
+#define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+#define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+#define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a)
+#define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b))
+#define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a)
+#define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b))
+
+#define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+#define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+
+#define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000 /* offset to get SSL_R_... value from SSL_AD_... */
+
+/* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
+#define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
+#define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
+#define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
+#define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE/* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE/* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE /* Not for TLS */
+#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
+#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
+#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
+#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
+#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
+#define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
+#define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION/* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY/* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED
+#define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+#define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
+#define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
+#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
+
+#define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+#define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4
+#define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5 /* look at error stack/return value/errno */
+#define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10
+#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13
+#define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16
+
+/* only applies to datagram connections */
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17
+/* Stats */
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30
+#define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31
+#define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32
+#define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52
+
+/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72
+#endif
+
+#define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73
+#define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74
+#define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75
+
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76
+#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77
+#define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78
+
+#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+#define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL)
+#define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer)
+
+#define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+
+#define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
+#define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+#define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client);
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to,BIO *from);
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio);
+
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *,const char *str);
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx,long t);
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *,X509_STORE *);
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s);
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx,long tm);
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits);
+char * SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+const char * SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+const char * SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
+const char * SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n);
+char * SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL * s);
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
+const char * SSL_authentication_method(const SSL *c);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio);
+BIO * SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
+BIO * SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
+#endif
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk);
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *);
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+ int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx));
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain);
+STACK_OF(X509) * SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); /* PEM type */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+ const char *file);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+ const char *dir);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+void SSL_load_error_strings(void );
+const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const SSL *from);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ unsigned int *len);
+const char * SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+#endif
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp);
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled(SSL *, int);
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c);
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int id_len);
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a,const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length);
+
+#ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+X509 * SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *);
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,
+ int (*callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
+
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+SSL * SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose);
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose);
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_read(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num);
+int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num);
+int SSL_write(SSL *ssl,const void *buf,int num);
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void));
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void));
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int ret_code);
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
+
+/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+#endif
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s);
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x);
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x);
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s);
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_library_init(void );
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *,char *buf,int size);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk);
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl);
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
+/* EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode);
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode);
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode);
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+ const char *CApath);
+#define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session /* just peek at pointer */
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx);
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val));
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl);
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long v);
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl,int idx,void *data);
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl,int idx);
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx,void *data);
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx);
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx,void *data);
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx);
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void );
+
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+#define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+#define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+
+ /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp);
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,COMP_METHOD *cm);
+#else
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp);
+void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,void *cm);
+#endif
+
+/* TLS extensions functions */
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len);
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+ void *arg);
+
+/* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+#define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100
+#define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167
+#define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101
+#define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102
+#define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103
+#define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245
+#define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 295
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268
+#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105
+#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106
+#define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107
+#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108
+#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109
+#define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110
+#define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111
+#define SSL_F_READ_N 112
+#define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113
+#define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239
+#define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114
+#define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120
+#define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126
+#define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 296
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 304
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC 285
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 287
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299
+#define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278
+#define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160
+#define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164
+#define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178
+#define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179
+#define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182
+#define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183
+#define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184
+#define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185
+#define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281
+#define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282
+#define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
+#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187
+#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224
+#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243
+#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197
+#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN 2000
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205
+#define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206
+#define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207
+#define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC 286
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284
+#define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211
+#define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+#define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100
+#define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272
+#define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101
+#define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102
+#define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103
+#define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111
+#define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112
+#define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304
+#define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305
+#define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306
+#define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332
+#define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105
+#define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271
+#define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113
+#define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH 333
+#define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114
+#define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115
+#define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116
+#define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH 316
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121
+#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125
+#define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126
+#define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127
+#define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128
+#define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129
+#define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130
+#define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131
+#define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132
+#define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133
+#define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134
+#define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135
+#define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136
+#define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137
+#define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138
+#define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139
+#define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226
+#define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140
+#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343
+#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141
+#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307
+#define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142
+#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143
+#define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144
+#define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308
+#define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145
+#define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
+#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
+#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
+#define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
+#define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
+#define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
+#define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309
+#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT 317
+#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318
+#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322
+#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323
+#define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310
+#define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150
+#define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282
+#define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151
+#define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
+#define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
+#define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 346
+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 347
+#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
+#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279
+#define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284
+#define SSL_R_KRB5 285
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295
+#define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
+#define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
+#define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
+#define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161
+#define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173
+#define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174
+#define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175
+#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176
+#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177
+#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178
+#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179
+#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180
+#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181
+#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182
+#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183
+#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184
+#define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185
+#define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331
+#define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186
+#define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187
+#define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330
+#define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188
+#define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189
+#define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190
+#define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191
+#define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192
+#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339
+#define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324
+#define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193
+#define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194
+#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195
+#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
+#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197
+#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
+#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297
+#define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327
+#define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198
+#define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227
+#define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270
+#define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199
+#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200
+#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201
+#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202
+#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203
+#define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204
+#define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205
+#define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206
+#define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207
+#define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223
+#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224
+#define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225
+#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208
+#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209
+#define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210
+#define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211
+#define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312
+#define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212
+#define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213
+#define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214
+#define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298
+#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335
+#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336
+#define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337
+#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215
+#define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342
+#define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216
+#define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217
+#define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218
+#define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345
+#define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
+#define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
+#define SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED 2000
+#define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
+#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
+#define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221
+#define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299
+#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321
+#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319
+#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320
+#define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300
+#define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
+#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043
+#define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228
+#define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229
+#define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230
+#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301
+#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302
+#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273
+#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303
+#define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
+#define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232
+#define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157
+#define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
+#define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234
+#define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242
+#define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243
+#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244
+#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245
+#define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254
+#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255
+#define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE 326
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329
+#define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266
+#define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267
+#define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268
+#define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..99a52ea0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/* ssl/ssl2.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL2_H
+#define HEADER_SSL2_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Protocol Version Codes */
+#define SSL2_VERSION 0x0002
+#define SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00
+#define SSL2_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+/* #define SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION 0x0002 */
+/* #define SSL2_SERVER_VERSION 0x0002 */
+
+/* Protocol Message Codes */
+#define SSL2_MT_ERROR 0
+#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 2
+#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED 3
+#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO 4
+#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY 5
+#define SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED 6
+#define SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 7
+#define SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 8
+
+/* Error Message Codes */
+#define SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR 0x0000
+#define SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER 0x0001
+#define SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE 0x0002
+#define SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x0004
+#define SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x0006
+
+/* Cipher Kind Values */
+#define SSL2_CK_NULL_WITH_MD5 0x02000000 /* v3 */
+#define SSL2_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 0x02010080
+#define SSL2_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0x02020080
+#define SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x02030080
+#define SSL2_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0x02040080
+#define SSL2_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x02050080
+#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x02060040
+#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA 0x02060140 /* v3 */
+#define SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x020700c0
+#define SSL2_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA 0x020701c0 /* v3 */
+#define SSL2_CK_RC4_64_WITH_MD5 0x02080080 /* MS hack */
+
+#define SSL2_CK_DES_64_CFB64_WITH_MD5_1 0x02ff0800 /* SSLeay */
+#define SSL2_CK_NULL 0x02ff0810 /* SSLeay */
+
+#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CFB64_WITH_MD5_1 "DES-CFB-M1"
+#define SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 "NULL-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 "RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 "RC2-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 "IDEA-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 "DES-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 "DES-CBC3-MD5"
+#define SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define SSL2_TXT_RC4_64_WITH_MD5 "RC4-64-MD5"
+
+#define SSL2_TXT_NULL "NULL"
+
+/* Flags for the SSL_CIPHER.algorithm2 field */
+#define SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC 0x01
+#define SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC 0x02
+
+/* Certificate Type Codes */
+#define SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE 0x01
+
+/* Authentication Type Code */
+#define SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION 0x01
+
+#define SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+
+/* Upper/Lower Bounds */
+#define SSL2_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH_IN_BITS 256
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MPE
+#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER 29998u
+#else
+#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER 32767u /* 2^15-1 */
+#endif
+#define SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER 16383 /* 2^14-1 */
+
+#define SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 16
+/*#define SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 32 */
+#define SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 16
+#define SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 32
+#define SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH 16
+#define SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH 16
+#define SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 16
+#define SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 32
+#define SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 16
+#define SSL2_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH 24
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+#define CERT char
+#endif
+
+typedef struct ssl2_state_st
+ {
+ int three_byte_header;
+ int clear_text; /* clear text */
+ int escape; /* not used in SSLv2 */
+ int ssl2_rollback; /* used if SSLv23 rolled back to SSLv2 */
+
+ /* non-blocking io info, used to make sure the same
+ * args were passwd */
+ unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */
+ int wpend_tot;
+ const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
+
+ int wpend_off; /* offset to data to write */
+ int wpend_len; /* number of bytes passwd to write */
+ int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes to return to caller */
+
+ /* buffer raw data */
+ int rbuf_left;
+ int rbuf_offs;
+ unsigned char *rbuf;
+ unsigned char *wbuf;
+
+ unsigned char *write_ptr;/* used to point to the start due to
+ * 2/3 byte header. */
+
+ unsigned int padding;
+ unsigned int rlength; /* passed to ssl2_enc */
+ int ract_data_length; /* Set when things are encrypted. */
+ unsigned int wlength; /* passed to ssl2_enc */
+ int wact_data_length; /* Set when things are decrypted. */
+ unsigned char *ract_data;
+ unsigned char *wact_data;
+ unsigned char *mac_data;
+
+ unsigned char *read_key;
+ unsigned char *write_key;
+
+ /* Stuff specifically to do with this SSL session */
+ unsigned int challenge_length;
+ unsigned char challenge[SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int conn_id_length;
+ unsigned char conn_id[SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int key_material_length;
+ unsigned char key_material[SSL2_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH*2];
+
+ unsigned long read_sequence;
+ unsigned long write_sequence;
+
+ struct {
+ unsigned int conn_id_length;
+ unsigned int cert_type;
+ unsigned int cert_length;
+ unsigned int csl;
+ unsigned int clear;
+ unsigned int enc;
+ unsigned char ccl[SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int cipher_spec_length;
+ unsigned int session_id_length;
+ unsigned int clen;
+ unsigned int rlen;
+ } tmp;
+ } SSL2_STATE;
+
+/* SSLv2 */
+/* client */
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A (0x10|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B (0x11|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A (0x20|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B (0x21|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A (0x30|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B (0x31|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A (0x40|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B (0x41|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A (0x50|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B (0x51|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C (0x52|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D (0x53|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A (0x60|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B (0x61|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A (0x70|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B (0x71|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION (0x80|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE (0x90|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* server */
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A (0x10|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B (0x11|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C (0x12|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A (0x20|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B (0x21|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A (0x30|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B (0x31|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A (0x40|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B (0x41|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C (0x42|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A (0x50|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B (0x51|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A (0x60|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B (0x61|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A (0x70|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B (0x71|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C (0x72|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D (0x73|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION (0x80|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE (0x90|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d3228983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl23.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* ssl/ssl23.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL23_H
+#define HEADER_SSL23_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*client */
+/* write to server */
+#define SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* read from server */
+#define SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x220|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x221|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+
+/* server */
+/* read from client */
+#define SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9268c57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,664 @@
+/* ssl/ssl3.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H
+#define HEADER_SSL3_H
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
+#define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009
+#define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A
+
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F
+#define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010
+
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015
+#define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016
+
+#define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017
+#define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018
+#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019
+#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A
+#define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B
+
+#if 0
+ #define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA 0x0300001C
+ #define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA 0x0300001D
+ #if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe
+ to remove according to David Hopwood <david.hopwood@zetnet.co.uk>
+ of the ietf-tls list */
+ #define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA 0x0300001E
+ #endif
+#endif
+
+/* VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
+ */
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001E
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300001F
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000020
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000021
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 0x03000022
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 0x03000023
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000024
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 0x03000025
+
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000026
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000027
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA 0x03000028
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 0x03000029
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 0x0300002A
+#define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 0x0300002B
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+#if 0
+ #define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA "FZA-NULL-SHA"
+ #define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA "FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA"
+ #define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA "FZA-RC4-SHA"
+#endif
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA "KRB5-RC4-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 "KRB5-RC4-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5"
+
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+#define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5"
+
+#define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+#define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+
+#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48
+#define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32
+#define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32
+#define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5
+
+#ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+ /* Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's
+ * not actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least
+ * 64-bit aligned pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes
+ * 3 bytes in either case. Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these
+ * wasted bytes from the end of allocated region to its front,
+ * but makes data payload aligned, which improves performance:-) */
+# define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD 8
+#else
+# if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0
+# error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD"
+# undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library.
+ * Currently maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for
+ * future extension for 512-bit hashes.
+ */
+
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE 64
+
+/* Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES.
+ */
+
+#define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384)
+
+/* Default buffer length used for writen records. Thus a generated record
+ * will contain plaintext no larger than this value. */
+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH 2048
+/* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384
+/* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD 1024
+
+/* The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes.
+ * In practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum
+ * number of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size.
+ */
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/* OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so
+ * the send overhead is smaller.
+ */
+
+#define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+#else
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
+#endif
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
+#define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+
+/* Extra space for empty fragment, headers, MAC, and padding. */
+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD 256
+#define SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE 4096 - SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD
+#if SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE
+#error "Insufficient space allocated for write buffers."
+#endif
+
+#define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
+#define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52"
+
+#define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300
+#define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00
+
+#define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
+#define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21
+#define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22
+#define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23
+
+#define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1
+#define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2
+
+#define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0
+#define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* fatal */
+#define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* fatal */
+#define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* fatal */
+#define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* fatal */
+#define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41
+#define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42
+#define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43
+#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44
+#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45
+#define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46
+#define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* fatal */
+
+typedef struct ssl3_record_st
+ {
+/*r */ int type; /* type of record */
+/*rw*/ unsigned int length; /* How many bytes available */
+/*r */ unsigned int off; /* read/write offset into 'buf' */
+/*rw*/ unsigned char *data; /* pointer to the record data */
+/*rw*/ unsigned char *input; /* where the decode bytes are */
+/*r */ unsigned char *comp; /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
+/*r */ unsigned long epoch; /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
+/*r */ unsigned char seq_num[8]; /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
+ } SSL3_RECORD;
+
+typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf; /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes,
+ * see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
+ size_t len; /* buffer size */
+ int offset; /* where to 'copy from' */
+ int left; /* how many bytes left */
+ } SSL3_BUFFER;
+
+#define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
+#define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
+#define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
+#define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
+#define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5
+#define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6
+#define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20
+/* SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large
+ * enough to contain all of the cert types defined either for
+ * SSLv3 and TLSv1.
+ */
+#define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 9
+
+
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004
+#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
+#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
+
+typedef struct ssl3_state_st
+ {
+ long flags;
+ int delay_buf_pop_ret;
+
+ unsigned char read_sequence[8];
+ int read_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char write_sequence[8];
+ int write_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+
+ /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
+ int need_empty_fragments;
+ int empty_fragment_done;
+
+ /* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
+ int init_extra;
+
+ SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */
+ SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */
+
+ SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */
+ SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */
+
+ /* storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not
+ * yet processed by ssl3_read_bytes: */
+ unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
+ unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
+ unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
+ unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
+
+ /* partial write - check the numbers match */
+ unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */
+ int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */
+ int wpend_type;
+ int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */
+ const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
+
+ /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
+ BIO *handshake_buffer;
+ /* When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed
+ * and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
+ * this array */
+ EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
+ /* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
+ * come in when we are not looking for one */
+ int change_cipher_spec;
+
+ int warn_alert;
+ int fatal_alert;
+ /* we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding,
+ * send close alert via the warning alert */
+ int alert_dispatch;
+ unsigned char send_alert[2];
+
+ /* This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when
+ * there is no more data in the read or write buffers */
+ int renegotiate;
+ int total_renegotiations;
+ int num_renegotiations;
+
+ int in_read_app_data;
+
+ /* Opaque PRF input as used for the current handshake.
+ * These fields are used only if TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input is defined
+ * (otherwise, they are merely present to improve binary compatibility) */
+ void *client_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ void *server_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
+ our peer. */
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
+
+ struct {
+ /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
+ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+
+ /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
+ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+ int finish_md_len;
+ unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
+ int peer_finish_md_len;
+
+ unsigned long message_size;
+ int message_type;
+
+ /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */
+#endif
+
+ /* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */
+ int next_state;
+
+ int reuse_message;
+
+ /* used for certificate requests */
+ int cert_req;
+ int ctype_num;
+ char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
+
+ int use_rsa_tmp;
+
+ int key_block_length;
+ unsigned char *key_block;
+
+ const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_MD *new_hash;
+ int new_mac_pkey_type;
+ int new_mac_secret_size;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
+#else
+ char *new_compression;
+#endif
+ int cert_request;
+ } tmp;
+
+ /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
+ int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+ } SSL3_STATE;
+
+
+/* SSLv3 */
+/*client */
+/* extra state */
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE (0x101|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* write to server */
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* read from server */
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A (0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B (0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A (0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B (0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A (0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B (0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* write to server */
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A (0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B (0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C (0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D (0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A (0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#endif
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* read from server */
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+
+/* server */
+/* extra state */
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* read from client */
+/* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* write to client */
+#define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A (0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B (0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C (0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A (0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B (0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A (0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B (0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A (0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B (0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* read from client */
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A (0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B (0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#endif
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* write to client */
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+
+#define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+#define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2
+#define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4
+#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11
+#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
+#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
+#define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14
+#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
+#define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
+#define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
+#define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
+#endif
+#define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
+
+
+#define SSL3_MT_CCS 1
+
+/* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */
+#define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01
+#define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02
+#define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10
+#define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20
+#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ)
+#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ)
+#define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0967b2df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_algs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_algs.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int SSL_library_init(void)
+ {
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
+ /* Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work
+ * if an application only calls SSL_library_init().
+ */
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+ EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl3-md5");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1,"ssl3-sha1");
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption,SN_sha1WithRSA);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss1()); /* DSA with sha1 */
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,SN_dsaWithSHA1_2);
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"DSS1");
+ EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"dss1");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_ecdsa());
+#endif
+ /* If you want support for phased out ciphers, add the following */
+#if 0
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha());
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms.
+ The value returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can
+ be discarded safely */
+ (void)SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+#endif
+ /* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
+ ssl_load_ciphers();
+ return(1);
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d7f4c608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,592 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_asn1.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st
+ {
+ ASN1_INTEGER version;
+ ASN1_INTEGER ssl_version;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING key_arg;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ ASN1_INTEGER time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
+ ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname;
+ ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ } SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
+ {
+#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
+ int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0,v7=0,v8=0;
+ unsigned char buf[4],ibuf1[LSIZE2],ibuf2[LSIZE2];
+ unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2],ibuf4[LSIZE2],ibuf5[LSIZE2];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ int v6=0,v9=0,v10=0;
+ unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ unsigned char cbuf;
+ int v11=0;
+#endif
+ long l;
+ SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
+ M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
+
+ if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
+ return(0);
+
+ /* Note that I cheat in the following 2 assignments. I know
+ * that if the ASN1_INTEGER passed to ASN1_INTEGER_set
+ * is > sizeof(long)+1, the buffer will not be re-OPENSSL_malloc()ed.
+ * This is a bit evil but makes things simple, no dynamic allocation
+ * to clean up :-) */
+ a.version.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.version.data=ibuf1;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.version),SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION);
+
+ a.ssl_version.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.ssl_version.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.ssl_version.data=ibuf2;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.ssl_version),in->ssl_version);
+
+ a.cipher.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.cipher.data=buf;
+
+ if (in->cipher == NULL)
+ l=in->cipher_id;
+ else
+ l=in->cipher->id;
+ if (in->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ a.cipher.length=3;
+ buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xff;
+ buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xff;
+ buf[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xff;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ a.cipher.length=2;
+ buf[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>8L))&0xff;
+ buf[1]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xff;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth)
+ {
+ cbuf = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
+ a.comp_id.length = 1;
+ a.comp_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.comp_id.data = &cbuf;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ a.master_key.length=in->master_key_length;
+ a.master_key.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.master_key.data=in->master_key;
+
+ a.session_id.length=in->session_id_length;
+ a.session_id.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.session_id.data=in->session_id;
+
+ a.session_id_context.length=in->sid_ctx_length;
+ a.session_id_context.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.session_id_context.data=in->sid_ctx;
+
+ a.key_arg.length=in->key_arg_length;
+ a.key_arg.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.key_arg.data=in->key_arg;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
+ {
+ a.krb5_princ.length=in->krb5_client_princ_len;
+ a.krb5_princ.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.krb5_princ.data=in->krb5_client_princ;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ if (in->time != 0L)
+ {
+ a.time.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.time.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.time.data=ibuf3;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.time),in->time);
+ }
+
+ if (in->timeout != 0L)
+ {
+ a.timeout.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.timeout.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.timeout.data=ibuf4;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.timeout),in->timeout);
+ }
+
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ a.verify_result.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.verify_result.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.verify_result.data=ibuf5;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result,in->verify_result);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ a.tlsext_hostname.length=strlen(in->tlsext_hostname);
+ a.tlsext_hostname.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.tlsext_hostname.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname;
+ }
+ if (in->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ a.tlsext_tick.length= in->tlsext_ticklen;
+ a.tlsext_tick.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.tlsext_tick.data=(unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick;
+ }
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+ {
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length=LSIZE2;
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data=ibuf6;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint)
+ {
+ a.psk_identity_hint.length=strlen(in->psk_identity_hint);
+ a.psk_identity_hint.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.psk_identity_hint.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ if (in->psk_identity)
+ {
+ a.psk_identity.length=strlen(in->psk_identity);
+ a.psk_identity.type=V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.psk_identity.data=(unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (in->time != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
+ if (in->timeout != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
+ if (in->peer != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,v4);
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
+ if (in->tlsext_tick)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11,v11);
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
+ if (in->psk_identity)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0);
+ if (in->time != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,1,v1);
+ if (in->timeout != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout),i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,2,v2);
+ if (in->peer != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(in->peer,i2d_X509,3,v3);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context,i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4,
+ v4);
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result,i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,5,v5);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6,v6);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7,v7);
+ if (in->psk_identity)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,8,v8);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER,9,v9);
+ if (in->tlsext_tick)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10,v10);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11,v11);
+#endif
+ M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
+ }
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length)
+ {
+ int ssl_version=0,i;
+ long id;
+ ASN1_INTEGER ai,*aip;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING os,*osp;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,SSL_SESSION *,SSL_SESSION_new);
+
+ aip= &ai;
+ osp= &os;
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
+ M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
+
+ ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
+
+ /* we don't care about the version right now :-) */
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER,aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ ssl_version=(int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ ret->ssl_version=ssl_version;
+ if (ai.data != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0; }
+
+ os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (os.length != 3)
+ {
+ c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ id=0x02000000L|
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<16L)|
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[1]<< 8L)|
+ (unsigned long)os.data[2];
+ }
+ else if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ if (os.length != 2)
+ {
+ c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ id=0x03000000L|
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[0]<<8L)|
+ (unsigned long)os.data[1];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ c.error=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->cipher=NULL;
+ ret->cipher_id=id;
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if ((ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ i=SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+ i=SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+
+ if (os.length > i)
+ os.length = i;
+ if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
+ os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
+
+ ret->session_id_length=os.length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
+ memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ ret->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ret->master_key_length=os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->master_key,os.data,ret->master_key_length);
+
+ os.length=0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ os.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.data)
+ {
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len=0;
+ else
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len=os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ,os.data,ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len=0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,0,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+ ret->key_arg_length=SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ret->key_arg_length=os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->key_arg,os.data,ret->key_arg_length);
+ if (os.data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+
+ ai.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,1);
+ if (ai.data != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->time=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+
+ ai.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,2);
+ if (ai.data != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->timeout=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->timeout=3;
+
+ if (ret->peer != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_free(ret->peer);
+ ret->peer=NULL;
+ }
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(ret->peer,d2i_X509,3);
+
+ os.length=0;
+ os.data=NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,4);
+
+ if(os.data != NULL)
+ {
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+ {
+ c.error=SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ret->sid_ctx_length=os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->sid_ctx,os.data,os.length);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data); os.data=NULL; os.length=0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
+
+ ai.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,5);
+ if (ai.data != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->verify_result=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ os.length=0;
+ os.data=NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,6);
+ if (os.data)
+ {
+ ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->tlsext_hostname=NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ os.length=0;
+ os.data=NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,7);
+ if (os.data)
+ {
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ai.length=0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER,9);
+ if (ai.data != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data); ai.data=NULL; ai.length=0;
+ }
+ else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length)
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1;
+ else
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint=0;
+ os.length=0;
+ os.data=NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,10);
+ if (os.data)
+ {
+ ret->tlsext_tick = os.data;
+ ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->tlsext_tick=NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ os.length=0;
+ os.data=NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,11);
+ if (os.data)
+ {
+ ret->compress_meth = os.data[0];
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..27256eea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,834 @@
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+ {
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+ }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+ {
+ CERT *ret;
+
+ ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references=1;
+
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+ {
+ CERT *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+ /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+ * if you find that more readable */
+
+ ret->valid = cert->valid;
+ ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+ ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ }
+ ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+ if (!b)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+ if (!b)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+ switch(i)
+ {
+ /* If there was anything special to do for
+ * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+ * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+ /* We have an RSA key. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ /* We have a DSA key. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+ /* We have a DH key. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+ /* We have an ECC key */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Can't happen. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+ * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
+
+ ret->references=1;
+
+ return(ret);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if(c == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#if 0
+ if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+#endif
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(c);
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+ {
+ /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+ * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+ * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+ * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+ * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+ * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+ * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+ * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+ */
+
+ if (o == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (*o == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+ {
+ SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
+ ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
+ * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+ * data structure. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(sc);
+ }
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+ {
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return(0);
+
+ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+ if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+#if 0
+ if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
+
+ /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+ * or vice versa.
+ */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
+ s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
+ * ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+ if (s->verify_callback)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+#else
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
+ else
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+ i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+ i=0;
+ ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ s->verify_result=ctx.error;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return(i);
+ }
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+ {
+ if (*ca_list != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+
+ *ca_list=name_list;
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+ {
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
+ if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
+ {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+ {
+ set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+ {
+ set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return(ctx->client_CA);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ { /* we are in the client */
+ if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+ (s->s3 != NULL))
+ return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ return(s->client_CA);
+ else
+ return(s->ctx->client_CA);
+ }
+ }
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
+ {
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ if (x == NULL) return(0);
+ if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return(0);
+
+ if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+ return(0);
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
+ {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
+ {
+ return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
+ {
+ return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
+ }
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+ {
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
+
+ sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+ /* check for duplicates */
+ xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ {
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+err:
+ if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+ ret=NULL;
+ }
+ if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *file)
+ {
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+ int ret=1;
+ int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
+
+ oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+ xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+err:
+ ret=0;
+ }
+ if(in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if(x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *dir)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
+ /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+
+ while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
+ {
+ char buf[1024];
+ int r;
+
+ if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
+#else
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+ goto err;
+ if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (errno)
+ {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e523a8f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1792 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0
+#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1
+#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2
+#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3
+#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4
+#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9
+#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10
+#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11
+#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 12
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]={
+ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,
+ };
+
+#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0
+#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1
+#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods=NULL;
+
+#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0
+#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1
+#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
+#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
+/*Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be
+ * defined in the
+ * ssl_locl.h */
+#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST
+static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL
+ };
+/* PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because
+ * implementation is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if
+ * corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is found
+ */
+static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,EVP_PKEY_HMAC,NID_undef
+ };
+
+static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+ 0,0,0,0
+ };
+
+static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]={
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5,SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94,0
+ };
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ int active;
+ int dead;
+ struct cipher_order_st *next,*prev;
+ } CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
+ /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_ALL,0, 0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_CMPALL,0, 0,0,SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in ALL!) */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_CMPDEF,0, SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* key exchange aliases
+ * (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+ * multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs,
+ * e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kRSA,0, SSL_kRSA, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kDHr,0, SSL_kDHr, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kDHd,0, SSL_kDHd, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kDH,0, SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kEDH,0, SSL_kEDH, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_DH,0, SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kKRB5,0, SSL_kKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kECDHr,0, SSL_kECDHr,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kECDHe,0, SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kECDH,0, SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kEECDH,0, SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_ECDH,0, SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kEECDH,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kPSK,0, SSL_kPSK, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_kGOST,0, SSL_kGOST,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* server authentication aliases */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aRSA,0, 0,SSL_aRSA, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aDSS,0, 0,SSL_aDSS, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_DSS,0, 0,SSL_aDSS, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aKRB5,0, 0,SSL_aKRB5, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aNULL,0, 0,SSL_aNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aDH,0, 0,SSL_aDH, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0}, /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aECDH,0, 0,SSL_aECDH, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aECDSA,0, 0,SSL_aECDSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_ECDSA,0, 0,SSL_aECDSA, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aPSK,0, 0,SSL_aPSK, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0, SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EECDH,0, SSL_kEECDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_NULL,0, 0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_KRB5,0, SSL_kKRB5,SSL_aKRB5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_RSA,0, SSL_kRSA,SSL_aRSA,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_ADH,0, SSL_kEDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_AECDH,0, SSL_kEECDH,SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_PSK,0, SSL_kPSK,SSL_aPSK,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+
+ /* symmetric encryption aliases */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_DES,0, 0,0,SSL_DES, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_3DES,0, 0,0,SSL_3DES, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_RC4,0, 0,0,SSL_RC4, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_RC2,0, 0,0,SSL_RC2, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_IDEA,0, 0,0,SSL_IDEA, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_SEED,0, 0,0,SSL_SEED, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_eNULL,0, 0,0,SSL_eNULL, 0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_AES128,0, 0,0,SSL_AES128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_AES256,0, 0,0,SSL_AES256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_AES,0, 0,0,SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA ,0,0,0,SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* MAC aliases */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_MD5,0, 0,0,0,SSL_MD5, 0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_SHA1,0, 0,0,0,SSL_SHA1, 0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_SHA,0, 0,0,0,SSL_SHA1, 0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_GOST94,0, 0,0,0,SSL_GOST94, 0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC,0, 0,0,0,SSL_GOST89MAC, 0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* protocol version aliases */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_SSLV2,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV2, 0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_SSLV3,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_SSLV3, 0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_TLSV1,0, 0,0,0,0,SSL_TLSV1, 0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* export flag */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EXP,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EXPORT,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXPORT,0,0,0},
+
+ /* strength classes */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EXP40,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP40, 0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EXP56,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_EXP56, 0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_LOW,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_LOW, 0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_MEDIUM,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_MEDIUM,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_HIGH,0, 0,0,0,0,0,SSL_HIGH, 0,0,0},
+ /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_FIPS,0, 0,0,~SSL_eNULL,0,0,SSL_FIPS, 0,0,0},
+ };
+/* Search for public key algorithm with given name and
+ * return its pkey_id if it is available. Otherwise return 0
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+ {
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ int pkey_id=0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL,pkey_name,-1);
+ if (ameth)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
+ }
+ return pkey_id;
+ }
+
+#else
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+ {
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+ int pkey_id=0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng,pkey_name,-1);
+ if (ameth)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,ameth);
+ }
+ if (tmpeng) ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+ return pkey_id;
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
+ {
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc);
+#else
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX]= NULL;
+#endif
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
+
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
+ if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX])
+ {
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
+ }
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
+ ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
+ if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=32;
+ }
+
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+
+static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP * const *a,
+ const SSL_COMP * const *b)
+ {
+ return((*a)->id-(*b)->id);
+ }
+
+static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
+ {
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+
+ MemCheck_off();
+ ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
+ if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
+ {
+ comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ comp->method=COMP_zlib();
+ if (comp->method
+ && comp->method->type == NID_undef)
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ else
+ {
+ comp->id=SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
+ comp->name=comp->method->name;
+ sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ MemCheck_on();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+ const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size,SSL_COMP **comp)
+ {
+ int i;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ c=s->cipher;
+ if (c == NULL) return(0);
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP ctmp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+#endif
+
+ *comp=NULL;
+ ctmp.id=s->compress_meth;
+ if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
+ {
+ i=sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,&ctmp);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ *comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods,i);
+ else
+ *comp=NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) return(0);
+
+ switch (c->algorithm_enc)
+ {
+ case SSL_DES:
+ i=SSL_ENC_DES_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ i=SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC4:
+ i=SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC2:
+ i=SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_IDEA:
+ i=SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ i=SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ i=SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ i=SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+ i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+ i=SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+ i=SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SEED:
+ i=SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
+ break;
+ default:
+ i= -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+ *enc=NULL;
+ else
+ {
+ if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
+ *enc=EVP_enc_null();
+ else
+ *enc=ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+ }
+
+ switch (c->algorithm_mac)
+ {
+ case SSL_MD5:
+ i=SSL_MD_MD5_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ i=SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST94:
+ i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+ i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX;
+ break;
+ default:
+ i= -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MD_NUM_IDX))
+ {
+ *md=NULL;
+ if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+ if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0;
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *md=ssl_digest_methods[i];
+ if (mac_pkey_type!=NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
+ if (mac_secret_size!=NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
+ }
+
+ if ((*enc != NULL) && (*md != NULL) && (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
+ return(1);
+ else
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ if (idx <0||idx>=SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx]==0) return 0;
+ *mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
+ *md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+ (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+ {
+ if (curr == *tail) return;
+ if (curr == *head)
+ *head=curr->next;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next=curr->next;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
+ (*tail)->next=curr;
+ curr->prev= *tail;
+ curr->next=NULL;
+ *tail=curr;
+ }
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+ {
+ if (curr == *head) return;
+ if (curr == *tail)
+ *tail=curr->prev;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev=curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next=curr->next;
+ (*head)->prev=curr;
+ curr->next= *head;
+ curr->prev=NULL;
+ *head=curr;
+ }
+
+static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth, unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac, unsigned long *ssl)
+ {
+ *mkey = 0;
+ *auth = 0;
+ *enc = 0;
+ *mac = 0;
+ *ssl = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ *mkey |= SSL_kRSA;
+ *auth |= SSL_aRSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ *auth |= SSL_aDSS;
+#endif
+ *mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd; /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ *auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ *mkey |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH;
+ *auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ *mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ *auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ *auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ *mkey |= SSL_kECDHe|SSL_kECDHr;
+ *auth |= SSL_aECDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ *mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
+ *auth |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+ /* Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they
+ * do not present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
+ *auth |= SSL_aGOST94;
+ }
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) {
+ *auth |= SSL_aGOST01;
+ }
+ /* Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */
+ if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01)) {
+ *mkey |= SSL_kGOST;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
+ *enc |= SSL_eNULL;
+#endif
+
+
+
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_DES :0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 :0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 :0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED:0;
+
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX ] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 :0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1:0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94:0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]==NID_undef)? SSL_GOST89MAC:0;
+
+ }
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ int num_of_ciphers,
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
+ unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
+ unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+ {
+ int i, co_list_num;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ /*
+ * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
+ * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
+ * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
+ * entries.
+ */
+
+ /* Get the initial list of ciphers */
+ co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++)
+ {
+ c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
+ /* drop those that use any of that is not available */
+ if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
+ !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl))
+ {
+ co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
+ co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+ co_list_num++;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n",i,c->name,c->id,c->algorithm_mkey,c->algorithm_auth);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ /*
+ if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
+ */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare linked list from list entries
+ */
+ if (co_list_num > 0)
+ {
+ co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+ if (co_list_num > 1)
+ {
+ co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+ for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++)
+ {
+ co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+ co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+ *head_p = &co_list[0];
+ *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+ }
+ }
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
+ int num_of_group_aliases,
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey, unsigned long disabled_auth,
+ unsigned long disabled_enc, unsigned long disabled_mac,
+ unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head)
+ {
+ CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
+ unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
+ unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
+ unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
+ unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl;
+
+ /*
+ * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
+ */
+ ciph_curr = head;
+ ca_curr = ca_list;
+ while (ciph_curr != NULL)
+ {
+ *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
+ ca_curr++;
+ ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
+ * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
+ * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
+ * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++)
+ {
+ unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
+ unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
+ unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
+ unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl;
+
+ if (algorithm_mkey)
+ if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_auth)
+ if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_enc)
+ if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_mac)
+ if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_ssl)
+ if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
+ ca_curr++;
+ }
+
+ *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */
+ }
+
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
+ unsigned long alg_mkey, unsigned long alg_auth,
+ unsigned long alg_enc, unsigned long alg_mac,
+ unsigned long alg_ssl,
+ unsigned long algo_strength,
+ int rule, int strength_bits,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+ {
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *curr2, *last;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ int reverse = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+ rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength, strength_bits);
+#endif
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
+ reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */
+
+ head = *head_p;
+ tail = *tail_p;
+
+ if (reverse)
+ {
+ curr = tail;
+ last = head;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ curr = head;
+ last = tail;
+ }
+
+ curr2 = curr;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if ((curr == NULL) || (curr == last)) break;
+ curr = curr2;
+ curr2 = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+
+ cp = curr->cipher;
+
+ /*
+ * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
+ * or the algorithms used.
+ */
+ if (strength_bits >= 0)
+ {
+ if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl, cp->algo_strength);
+#endif
+
+ if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("Action = %d\n", rule);
+#endif
+
+ /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD)
+ {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (!curr->active)
+ {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Move the added cipher to this location */
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD)
+ {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (curr->active)
+ {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
+ {
+ /* reverse == 1 */
+ if (curr->active)
+ {
+ /* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+ * for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+ * works in reverse to maintain the order) */
+ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL)
+ {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (head == curr)
+ head = curr->next;
+ else
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ if (tail == curr)
+ tail = curr->prev;
+ curr->active = 0;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *head_p = head;
+ *tail_p = tail;
+ }
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+ {
+ int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+ /*
+ * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
+ * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
+ * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
+ */
+ max_strength_bits = 0;
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL)
+ {
+ if (curr->active &&
+ (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
+ max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+ if (!number_uses)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+ /*
+ * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
+ */
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL)
+ {
+ if (curr->active)
+ number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
+ * order.
+ */
+ for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (number_uses[i] > 0)
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, tail_p);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list)
+ {
+ unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength;
+ const char *l, *buf;
+ int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+ unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
+ char ch;
+
+ retval = 1;
+ l = rule_str;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ ch = *l;
+
+ if (ch == '\0')
+ break; /* done */
+ if (ch == '-')
+ { rule = CIPHER_DEL; l++; }
+ else if (ch == '+')
+ { rule = CIPHER_ORD; l++; }
+ else if (ch == '!')
+ { rule = CIPHER_KILL; l++; }
+ else if (ch == '@')
+ { rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; l++; }
+ else
+ { rule = CIPHER_ADD; }
+
+ if (ITEM_SEP(ch))
+ {
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ alg_mkey = 0;
+ alg_auth = 0;
+ alg_enc = 0;
+ alg_mac = 0;
+ alg_ssl = 0;
+ algo_strength = 0;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ ch = *l;
+ buf = l;
+ buflen = 0;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ while ( ((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
+ ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+ ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
+ (ch == '-'))
+#else
+ while ( isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-'))
+#endif
+ {
+ ch = *(++l);
+ buflen++;
+ }
+
+ if (buflen == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * We hit something we cannot deal with,
+ * it is no command or separator nor
+ * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ retval = found = 0;
+ l++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
+ {
+ found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
+ break; /* special treatment */
+ }
+
+ /* check for multi-part specification */
+ if (ch == '+')
+ {
+ multi=1;
+ l++;
+ }
+ else
+ multi=0;
+
+ /*
+ * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
+ * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
+ * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
+ * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
+ * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
+ * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
+ * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
+ * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
+ * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
+ */
+ j = found = 0;
+ cipher_id = 0;
+ while (ca_list[j])
+ {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
+ (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0'))
+ {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ break; /* ignore this entry */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey)
+ {
+ if (alg_mkey)
+ {
+ alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ if (!alg_mkey) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth)
+ {
+ if (alg_auth)
+ {
+ alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ if (!alg_auth) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc)
+ {
+ if (alg_enc)
+ {
+ alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ if (!alg_enc) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac)
+ {
+ if (alg_mac)
+ {
+ alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ if (!alg_mac) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
+ {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
+ {
+ algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) | ~SSL_EXP_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+ {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+ {
+ algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->valid)
+ {
+ /* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version
+ * does not become part of the search pattern!*/
+
+ cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
+ * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl)
+ {
+ if (alg_ssl)
+ {
+ alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+ if (!alg_ssl) { found = 0; break; }
+ }
+ else
+ alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!multi) break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
+ */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL)
+ { /* special command */
+ ok = 0;
+ if ((buflen == 8) &&
+ !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8))
+ ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ if (ok == 0)
+ retval = 0;
+ /*
+ * We do not support any "multi" options
+ * together with "@", so throw away the
+ * rest of the command, if any left, until
+ * end or ':' is found.
+ */
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ }
+ else if (found)
+ {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
+ alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength,
+ rule, -1, head_p, tail_p);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ }
+ if (*l == '\0') break; /* done */
+ }
+
+ return(retval);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
+ const char *rule_str)
+ {
+ int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
+ const char *rule_p;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return with error if nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+ * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc, &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl);
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
+ * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
+ * it is used for allocation.
+ */
+ num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n", num_of_ciphers);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
+ if (co_list == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL); /* Failure */
+ }
+
+ ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl,
+ co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+
+ /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */
+
+ /* Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key exchange mechanisms */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Low priority for MD5 */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain disabled.
+ * (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but we prefer
+ * authenticated ciphers.) */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+ /* ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0,0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains
+ * in force within each class */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail))
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+
+ /*
+ * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
+ * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
+ * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
+ * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
+ * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
+ * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
+ */
+ num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
+ num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
+ ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
+ if (ca_list == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL); /* Failure */
+ }
+ ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+ disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head);
+
+ /*
+ * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
+ * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+ */
+ ok = 1;
+ rule_p = rule_str;
+ if (strncmp(rule_str,"DEFAULT",7) == 0)
+ {
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+ &head, &tail, ca_list);
+ rule_p += 7;
+ if (*rule_p == ':')
+ rule_p++;
+ }
+
+ if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
+
+ OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */
+
+ if (!ok)
+ { /* Rule processing failure */
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+ * if we cannot get one.
+ */
+ if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+ * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+ */
+ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next)
+ {
+ if (curr->active)
+ {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("<%s>\n",curr->cipher->name);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
+
+ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+ {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (*cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+ *cipher_list = cipherstack;
+ if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
+ *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
+ return(cipherstack);
+ }
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
+ {
+ int is_export,pkl,kl;
+ const char *ver,*exp_str;
+ const char *kx,*au,*enc,*mac;
+ unsigned long alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl,alg2;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
+#else
+ static const char *format="%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+ alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
+
+ alg2=cipher->algorithm2;
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
+ pkl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+ kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
+ exp_str=is_export?" export":"";
+
+ if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
+ ver="SSLv2";
+ else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
+ ver="SSLv3";
+ else
+ ver="unknown";
+
+ switch (alg_mkey)
+ {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)"):"RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHr:
+ kx="DH/RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHd:
+ kx="DH/DSS";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kKRB5:
+ kx="KRB5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kEDH:
+ kx=is_export?(pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)"):"DH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHr:
+ kx="ECDH/RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHe:
+ kx="ECDH/ECDSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kEECDH:
+ kx="ECDH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ kx="PSK";
+ break;
+ default:
+ kx="unknown";
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_auth)
+ {
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ au="RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aDSS:
+ au="DSS";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aDH:
+ au="DH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aKRB5:
+ au="KRB5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aECDH:
+ au="ECDH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aNULL:
+ au="None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ au="ECDSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ au="PSK";
+ break;
+ default:
+ au="unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_enc)
+ {
+ case SSL_DES:
+ enc=(is_export && kl == 5)?"DES(40)":"DES(56)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ enc="3DES(168)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC4:
+ enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
+ :((alg2&SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)?"RC4(64)":"RC4(128)");
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC2:
+ enc=is_export?(kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)"):"RC2(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_IDEA:
+ enc="IDEA(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ enc="None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ enc="AES(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ enc="AES(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+ enc="Camellia(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+ enc="Camellia(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SEED:
+ enc="SEED(128)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ enc="unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_mac)
+ {
+ case SSL_MD5:
+ mac="MD5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ mac="SHA1";
+ break;
+ default:
+ mac="unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ {
+ len=128;
+ buf=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (buf == NULL) return("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
+ }
+ else if (len < 128)
+ return("Buffer too small");
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str,alg_mkey,alg_auth,alg_enc,alg_mac,alg_ssl);
+#else
+ BIO_snprintf(buf,len,format,cipher->name,ver,kx,au,enc,mac,exp_str);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return(buf);
+ }
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (c == NULL) return("(NONE)");
+ i=(int)(c->id>>24L);
+ if (i == 3)
+ return("TLSv1/SSLv3");
+ else if (i == 2)
+ return("SSLv2");
+ else
+ return("unknown");
+ }
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+ {
+ if (c != NULL)
+ return(c->name);
+ return("(NONE)");
+ }
+
+/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+
+ if (c != NULL)
+ {
+ if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
+ ret = c->strength_bits;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+/* return string version of key exchange algorithm */
+const char* SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(const SSL_CIPHER* cipher)
+ {
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey)
+ {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL_kDHr:
+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL_kDHd:
+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
+ case SSL_kEDH:
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
+ {
+ case SSL_aDSS:
+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_DSS;
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL_aNULL:
+ return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ case SSL_kKRB5:
+ return SSL_TXT_KRB5;
+ case SSL_kECDHr:
+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL_kECDHe:
+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
+ case SSL_kEECDH:
+ switch (cipher->algorithm_auth)
+ {
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL_aNULL:
+ return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon";
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ }
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP *ctmp;
+ int i,nn;
+
+ if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) return(NULL);
+ nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
+ for (i=0; i<nn; i++)
+ {
+ ctmp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk,i);
+ if (ctmp->id == n)
+ return(ctmp);
+ }
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm)
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+ {
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+ return(ssl_comp_methods);
+ }
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+ compression number ranges should be the following:
+
+ 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
+ 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
+ 193 to 255: reserved for private use */
+ if (id < 193 || id > 255)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MemCheck_off();
+ comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+ comp->id=id;
+ comp->method=cm;
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+ if (ssl_comp_methods
+ && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods,comp) >= 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ MemCheck_on();
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+ || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp))
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ MemCheck_on();
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MemCheck_on();
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
+ {
+ if (comp)
+ return comp->name;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8bff5905
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0)
+#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
+ {
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED), "CLIENT_FINISHED"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO), "CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "DO_DTLS1_WRITE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "DO_SSL3_WRITE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT), "DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO), "DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT), "DTLS1_CONNECT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC), "DTLS1_ENC"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY), "DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT), "DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED), "DTLS1_READ_FAILED"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST), "DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE), "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES), "DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED), "GET_CLIENT_FINISHED"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE), "REQUEST_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH), "SERVER_FINISH"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO), "SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY), "SERVER_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT), "SSL23_ACCEPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT), "SSL23_CONNECT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK), "SSL23_PEEK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_READ), "SSL23_READ"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE), "SSL23_WRITE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT), "SSL2_ACCEPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT), "SSL2_CONNECT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT), "SSL2_ENC_INIT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL), "SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK), "SSL2_PEEK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ), "SSL2_READ"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL), "SSL2_READ_INTERNAL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE), "SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE), "SSL2_WRITE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT), "SSL3_ACCEPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL), "SSL3_CTX_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS), "SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY), "SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED), "SSL3_GET_FINISHED"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC), "ssl3_handshake_mac"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK), "SSL3_PEEK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N), "SSL3_READ_N"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST), "SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE), "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK), "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "SSL_BAD_METHOD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "SSL_CERT_DUP"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST), "SSL_CERT_INST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE), "SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "SSL_CERT_NEW"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG), "SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR), "SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD), "SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL), "SSL_ctrl"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW), "SSL_CTX_new"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE), "SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_CTX_set_purpose"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION), "SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST), "SSL_CTX_set_trust"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT), "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW), "SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT), "SSL_SET_CERT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_set_cipher_list"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD), "SSL_set_fd"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY), "SSL_SET_PKEY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_set_purpose"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD), "SSL_set_rfd"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION), "SSL_set_session"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_set_session_id_context"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT), "SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST), "SSL_set_trust"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD), "SSL_set_wfd"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN), "SSL_shutdown"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION), "SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION), "SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION), "SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_use_certificate"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_use_certificate_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_PrivateKey"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE), "SSL_write"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC), "tls1_cert_verify_mac"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC), "TLS1_ENC"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF), "tls1_prf"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING), "WRITE_PENDING"},
+{0,NULL}
+ };
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
+ {
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE) ,"app data in handshake"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),"attempt to reuse session in different context"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD) ,"bad alert record"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE),"bad authentication type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),"bad change cipher spec"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM) ,"bad checksum"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),"bad data returned by callback"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION) ,"bad decompression"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH) ,"bad dh g length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH) ,"bad dh pub key length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH) ,"bad dh p length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ,"bad digest length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE) ,"bad dsa signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT) ,"bad ecc cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE) ,"bad ecdsa signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT) ,"bad ecpoint"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH) ,"bad handshake length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST) ,"bad hello request"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH) ,"bad length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE) ,"bad mac decode"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH) ,"bad mac length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE) ,"bad message type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH) ,"bad packet length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),"bad protocol version number"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH),"bad psk identity hint length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT) ,"bad response argument"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT) ,"bad rsa decrypt"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT) ,"bad rsa encrypt"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH) ,"bad rsa e length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH),"bad rsa modulus length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE) ,"bad rsa signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE) ,"bad signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE) ,"bad ssl filetype"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),"bad ssl session id length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_STATE) ,"bad state"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY) ,"bad write retry"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET) ,"bio not set"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),"block cipher pad is wrong"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB) ,"bn lib"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"ca dn length mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG) ,"ca dn too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY) ,"ccs received early"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),"certificate verify failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"cert length mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT),"challenge is different"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),"cipher code wrong length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),"cipher or hash unavailable"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"clienthello tlsext"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"compressed length too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED) ,"compression disabled"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE) ,"compression failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),"compression id not within private range"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),"compression library error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"connection id is different"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET),"connection type not set"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH) ,"cookie mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),"data between ccs and finished"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG) ,"data length too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED) ,"decryption failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED) ,"digest check failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG) ,"dtls message too big"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID),"duplicate compression id"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT),"ecc cert not for key agreement"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING),"ecc cert not for signing"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have rsa signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE),"ecc cert should have sha1 signature"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),"ecgroup too large for cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"encrypted length too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),"error generating tmp rsa key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),"error in received cipher list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"invalid compression algorithm"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE) ,"invalid purpose"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),"invalid ticket keys length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST) ,"invalid trust"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG) ,"key arg too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5) ,"krb5"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC) ,"krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED) ,"krb5 client get cred"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT) ,"krb5 client init"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ) ,"krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET) ,"krb5 server bad ticket"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT) ,"krb5 server init"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ) ,"krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED) ,"krb5 server tkt expired"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV) ,"krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW) ,"krb5 server tkt skew"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"length mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT) ,"length too short"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG) ,"library bug"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),"library has no ciphers"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG) ,"message too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT) ,"missing dh dsa cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY) ,"missing dh key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT) ,"missing dh rsa cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing dsa signing cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY),"missing export tmp dh key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY),"missing export tmp rsa key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE),"missing rsa certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),"missing rsa encrypting cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing rsa signing cert"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY) ,"missing tmp dh key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY) ,"missing tmp ecdh key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY) ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY) ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED),"no certificate returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET) ,"no certificate set"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED),"no certificate specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE) ,"no ciphers available"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED) ,"no ciphers passed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED) ,"no ciphers specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST) ,"no cipher list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH) ,"no cipher match"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD) ,"no client cert method"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED),"no client cert received"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED),"no compression specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED) ,"no method specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY) ,"no privatekey"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY) ,"no publickey"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION) ,"no renegotiation"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST) ,"digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER) ,"no shared cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK) ,"no verify callback"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX) ,"null ssl ctx"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT) ,"parse tlsext"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG) ,"path too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),"peer did not return a certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR) ,"peer error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE),"peer error certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE),"peer error no certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER) ,"peer error no cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"peer error unsupported certificate type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"pre mac length too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS),"problems mapping cipher functions"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN) ,"protocol is shutdown"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND),"psk identity not found"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB) ,"psk no client cb"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB) ,"psk no server cb"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR),"public key encrypt error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA) ,"public key is not rsa"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA) ,"public key not rsa"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET) ,"read bio not set"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED) ,"read timeout expired"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE),"read wrong packet type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),"record length mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE) ,"record too large"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL) ,"record too small"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG),"renegotiate ext too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),"renegotiation encoding err"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH),"renegotiation mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING),"required cipher missing"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),"required compresssion algorithm missing"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert length not zero"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cert type not zero"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),"reuse cipher list not zero"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),"scsv received when renegotiating"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT) ,"serverhello tlsext"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),"session id context uninitialized"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED),"session may not be created"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ) ,"short read"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),"signature for non signing certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),"ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl2 connection id too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT),"ssl3 ext invalid ecpointformat"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),"ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),"ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG),"ssl3 session id too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT),"ssl3 session id too short"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),"sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),"sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),"sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),"sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),"sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),"sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert no certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),"sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),"sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),"ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) ,"ssl handshake failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),"ssl library has no ciphers"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),"ssl session id callback failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT),"ssl session id conflict"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),"ssl session id context too long"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),"ssl session id has bad length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"ssl session id is different"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),"tlsv1 alert access denied"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decode error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),"tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),"tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA),"tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),"tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),"tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),"tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),"tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),"tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),"tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),"tls peer did not respond with certificate list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),"tried to use unsupported cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS),"unable to decode dh certs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS),"unable to decode ecdh certs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY),"unable to extract public key"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS),"unable to find dh parameters"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),"unable to find ecdh parameters"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),"unable to find public key parameters"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD),"unable to find ssl method"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl2 md5 routines"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),"unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) ,"unexpected message"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) ,"unexpected record"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED) ,"uninitialized"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE) ,"unknown alert type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"unknown certificate type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED),"unknown cipher returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE) ,"unknown cipher type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),"unknown key exchange type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE) ,"unknown pkey type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL) ,"unknown protocol"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),"unknown remote error type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION) ,"unknown ssl version"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE) ,"unknown state"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),"unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported compression algorithm"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE),"unsupported digest type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),"unsupported elliptic curve"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL) ,"unsupported protocol"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION),"unsupported ssl version"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),"unsupported status type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET) ,"write bio not set"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED) ,"wrong cipher returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE) ,"wrong message type"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS),"wrong number of key bits"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE) ,"wrong signature size"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION) ,"wrong ssl version"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER) ,"wrong version number"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB) ,"x509 lib"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),"x509 verification setup problems"},
+{0,NULL}
+ };
+
+#endif
+
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL)
+ {
+ ERR_load_strings(0,SSL_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0,SSL_str_reasons);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ea95a5f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_err2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_err2.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+void SSL_load_error_strings(void)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_load_SSL_strings();
+#endif
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b169ba93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3242 @@
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
+ * \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
+ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
+ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+ 0, /* finish_mac_length */
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+ NULL, /* client_finished_label */
+ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
+ NULL, /* server_finished_label */
+ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
+ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
+ };
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+
+ if (s->method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->error=0;
+ s->hit=0;
+ s->shutdown=0;
+
+#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+ * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
+ /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+ * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
+ if (s->new_session) return(1);
+#else
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->type=0;
+
+ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+
+ s->version=s->method->version;
+ s->client_version=s->version;
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
+ s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf=NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+ s->first_packet=0;
+
+#if 1
+ /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
+ * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
+ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
+ {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method=s->ctx->method;
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ return(0);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ ctx->method=meth;
+
+ sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
+ &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+ meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ SSL *s;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+ if (s == NULL) goto err;
+ memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ s->options=ctx->options;
+ s->mode=ctx->mode;
+ s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
+ * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
+ * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
+ * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
+ * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
+ * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+ * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
+ * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
+ * duplicated it once. */
+
+ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
+ s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+ s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
+ s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+ s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+ s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+ s->session_creation_enabled=1;
+ s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+ s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!s->param)
+ goto err;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
+ s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+ s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+ s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+ s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->ctx=ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+ s->method=ctx->method;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ s->references=1;
+ s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
+
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
+ s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+ return(s);
+err:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+ if (s->ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+ {
+ if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+ {
+ if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int id_len)
+ {
+ /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+ * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+ * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+ * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
+ * use by this SSL. */
+ SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+ if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+ r.session_id_length = id_len;
+ memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+ /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+ * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+ * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+ * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
+ if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+ (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+ {
+ memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
+ SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+ r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (p != NULL);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+ }
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if(s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+ if (s->bbio != NULL)
+ {
+ /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+ {
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio=NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+ /* add extra stuff */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ /* Make the next call work :-) */
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ {
+ ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+ /* Free up if allocated */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+
+ if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+ if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+ kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
+ {
+ /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+ */
+ if (s->bbio != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
+ {
+ s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
+ s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+ s->rbio=rbio;
+ s->wbio=wbio;
+ }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+ { return(s->rbio); }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+ { return(s->wbio); }
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret= -1;
+ BIO *b,*r;
+
+ b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret= -1;
+ BIO *b,*r;
+
+ b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+ bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+ if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
+ {
+ bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
+ }
+ else
+ SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+ if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
+ {
+ bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ }
+ else
+ SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->verify_mode);
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+ }
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+ {
+ return(s->verify_callback);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return(ctx->verify_mode);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+ }
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+ {
+ return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
+ int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+ {
+ s->verify_mode=mode;
+ if (callback != NULL)
+ s->verify_callback=callback;
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
+ {
+ s->read_ahead=yes;
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->read_ahead);
+ }
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+ * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
+ * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
+ * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
+ * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
+ * so we'd better not return -1.)
+ */
+ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+ }
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ X509 *r;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+ r=NULL;
+ else
+ r=s->session->peer;
+
+ if (r == NULL) return(r);
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+ r=NULL;
+ else
+ r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+ /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
+ * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
+
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
+ {
+ CERT *tmp;
+
+ /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+ SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
+
+ /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
+ * vice-versa */
+ if (t->method != f->method)
+ {
+ t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
+ t->method=f->method; /* change method */
+ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
+ }
+
+ tmp=t->cert;
+ if (f->cert != NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ t->cert=f->cert;
+ }
+ else
+ t->cert=NULL;
+ if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
+ }
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
+ (ctx->cert == NULL) ||
+ (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+ }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ if (ssl == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+ ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+ }
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+
+ return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+ }
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+
+ return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+ }
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->method->get_timeout());
+ }
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
+ }
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
+ }
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
+ }
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+ * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
+ * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
+ * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
+ */
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
+ return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
+ else
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->new_session == 0)
+ {
+ s->new_session=1;
+ }
+ return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+ }
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+ {
+ /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
+ * false again once a handshake has finished */
+ return (s->new_session != 0);
+ }
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return(s->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l=s->read_ahead;
+ s->read_ahead=larg;
+ return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return(s->options|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return(s->options&=~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return(s->mode|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return(s->mode &=~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(s->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=s->max_cert_list;
+ s->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu = larg;
+ return larg;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+ if (s->s3)
+ return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+ else return 0;
+ default:
+ return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
+ }
+ }
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
+ }
+ }
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->sessions;
+ }
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ switch (cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return(ctx->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l=ctx->read_ahead;
+ ctx->read_ahead=larg;
+ return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return(ctx->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l=ctx->max_cert_list;
+ ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
+ return(l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ l=ctx->session_cache_size;
+ ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
+ return(l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ return(ctx->session_cache_size);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
+ return(l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+ return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+ return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return(ctx->options|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return(ctx->options&=~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return(ctx->mode|=larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
+ }
+ }
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+ {
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ l=a->id-b->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+ }
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
+ {
+ long l;
+
+ l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return(0);
+ else
+ return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+ }
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ {
+ return(s->cipher_list);
+ }
+ else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
+ {
+ return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
+ }
+ }
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ {
+ return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
+ else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
+ {
+ return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
+ }
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
+ sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+ return(NULL);
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
+ if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
+ return(c->name);
+ }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
+ &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+ /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
+ * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
+ * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
+ * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+ * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
+ * updated. */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
+ &s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+ /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
+ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+ s->cipher_list = sk;
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
+ {
+ char *p;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
+ (len < 2))
+ return(NULL);
+
+ p=buf;
+ sk=s->session->ciphers;
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ int n;
+
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+ n=strlen(c->name);
+ if (n+1 > len)
+ {
+ if (p != buf)
+ --p;
+ *p='\0';
+ return buf;
+ }
+ strcpy(p,c->name);
+ p+=n;
+ *(p++)=':';
+ len-=n+1;
+ }
+ p[-1]='\0';
+ return(buf);
+ }
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
+ {
+ int i,j=0;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *q;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+ q=p;
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
+ nokrb5)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
+ s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+ /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+ * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+ */
+ if (p != q && !s->new_session)
+ {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+ p+=j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return(p-q);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i,n;
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+ if ((num%n) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+ else
+ {
+ sk= *skp;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+ {
+ /* Check for SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+ {
+ /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ p+=n;
+ if (c != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ *skp=sk;
+ return(sk);
+err:
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+ {
+ if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname :
+ s->tlsext_hostname;
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+ return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
+ *
+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
+ *
+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
+ *
+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
+ * or have a default application level protocol.
+ *
+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
+ *
+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
+ * a client should use.
+ *
+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
+ *
+ * It returns either
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *result;
+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
+ for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
+ {
+ for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
+ {
+ if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+ memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
+ {
+ /* We found a match */
+ result = &server[i];
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ goto found;
+ }
+ j += client[j];
+ j++;
+ }
+ i += server[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+ result = client;
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+ found:
+ *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
+ *outlen = result[0];
+ return status;
+ }
+
+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
+ *
+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
+ {
+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+ if (!*data) {
+ *len = 0;
+ } else {
+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ }
+}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
+ * it.
+ *
+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+ {
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+ }
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
+ *
+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+ {
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+ }
+
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+ {
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ l=(unsigned long)
+ ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )|
+ ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
+ return(l);
+ }
+
+/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+ * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+ * with a matching session ID. */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
+ {
+ if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+ return(1);
+ if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+ return(1);
+ return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
+ }
+
+/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
+ * ssl.h. */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
+
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+ ret->method=meth;
+
+ ret->cert_store=NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+ ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+ ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+
+ /* We take the system default */
+ ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
+
+ ret->new_session_cb=0;
+ ret->remove_session_cb=0;
+ ret->get_session_cb=0;
+ ret->generate_session_id=0;
+
+ memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
+
+ ret->references=1;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
+
+/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+ ret->master_key=NULL;
+ ret->key_arg=NULL;
+ ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+
+ ret->info_callback=NULL;
+
+ ret->app_verify_callback=0;
+ ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+
+ ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+ ret->read_ahead=0;
+ ret->msg_callback=0;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
+ ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
+ ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+ ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
+ ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
+ if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
+ ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
+ ret->client_cert_cb=0;
+ ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
+ ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
+
+ ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
+ ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
+ if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
+
+ ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+ &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+ meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
+ || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!ret->param)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+ ret->extra_certs=NULL;
+ ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+ ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+ /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+ if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+ ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+ ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
+ ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+ ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+ goto err;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+#define eng_strx(x) #x
+#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
+ /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+ {
+ ENGINE *eng;
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ if (!eng)
+ {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ }
+ if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+ /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+ * deployed might change this.
+ */
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+ return(ret);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+ if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+#if 0
+static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
+ { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void
+ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+ {
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+ for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
+ {
+ next = ent->next;
+ OPENSSL_free(ent);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(list);
+ }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (a == NULL) return;
+
+ i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (a->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+ /*
+ * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+ * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+ * after the sessions were flushed.
+ * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+ * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+ * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+ * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+ */
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+ if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+ if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+ if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+ if (a->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+ if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+ if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
+ if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
+#else
+ a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (a->client_cert_engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+ if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+ if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+ {
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
+ {
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
+ {
+ ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
+ ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+ {
+ ctx->verify_mode=mode;
+ ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+ }
+
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
+ int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
+ int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
+ unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
+ int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ int have_ecdh_tmp;
+#endif
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+ int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+
+ if (c == NULL) return;
+
+ kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+ rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+ dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+#endif
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+ rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+ dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+ dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
+ dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+ cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+ have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ mask_k=0;
+ mask_a=0;
+ emask_k=0;
+ emask_a=0;
+
+
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+ rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
+ rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
+#endif
+
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+ }
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+ mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+ if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+ emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+
+#if 0
+ /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+ if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
+ (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+ if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+ (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+#endif
+
+ if (dh_tmp_export)
+ emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+ if (dh_tmp)
+ mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+ if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+ if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+
+ if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+ if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+
+ if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
+ {
+ mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+ }
+
+ if (dsa_sign)
+ {
+ mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+ }
+
+ mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+ mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+ emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+
+ /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
+ * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
+ */
+ if (have_ecc_cert)
+ {
+ /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+ x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+ ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+ ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+ {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ecdh_ok)
+ {
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
+ {
+ mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+ mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+ {
+ emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+ {
+ mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+ mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+ {
+ emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (ecdsa_ok)
+ {
+ mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+ emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (have_ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+ emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+ c->mask_k=mask_k;
+ c->mask_a=mask_a;
+ c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
+ c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
+ c->valid=1;
+ }
+
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+ {
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int keysize = 0;
+ int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+
+ alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
+ {
+ /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
+ keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (keysize > 163) return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+ {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+ {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
+ {
+ /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+ if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+ {
+ /* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+ if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* all checks are ok */
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
+ CERT *c;
+ int i;
+
+ c=s->cert;
+ ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+ {
+ /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
+ * since no certificate is needed for
+ * anon ECDH and for authenticated
+ * EECDH, the check for the auth
+ * algorithm will set i correctly
+ * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
+ * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
+ * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
+ * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
+ * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
+ */
+ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ {
+ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ {
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ else
+ i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ }
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
+ {
+ /* VRS something else here? */
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
+
+ return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ }
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+ {
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ CERT *c;
+
+ alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ c=s->cert;
+
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+ return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ {
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+ return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+ else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+ return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+ return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+ else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
+ * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
+
+ i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+ && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+ || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
+ && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
+ ((i & mode) == mode))
+ {
+ if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+ ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+ :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->method);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+ {
+ int conn= -1;
+ int ret=1;
+
+ if (s->method != meth)
+ {
+ if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+ conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+ if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+ s->method=meth;
+ else
+ {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method=meth;
+ ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
+ }
+
+ if (conn == 1)
+ s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
+ else if (conn == 0)
+ s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
+ {
+ int reason;
+ unsigned long l;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+ /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
+ * etc, where we do encode the error */
+ if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
+ {
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ else
+ return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
+ {
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
+ * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
+ * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
+ * should wait for.
+ * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
+ * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
+ * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
+ * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
+ * to keep it. */
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+ {
+ reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
+ {
+ bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+ {
+ reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
+ {
+ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+ return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+ return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ }
+ }
+ return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ }
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=1;
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ {
+ ret=s->handshake_func(s);
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
+ * one of these calls will reset it */
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+ {
+ s->server=1;
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+ {
+ s->server=0;
+ s->shutdown=0;
+ s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+ }
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
+ {
+ if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return("TLSv1");
+ else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return("SSLv3");
+ else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return("SSLv2");
+ else
+ return("unknown");
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return ssl_get_version(s->version);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+ {
+ return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
+ }
+
+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
+ {
+ if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
+ switch (ssl->version)
+ {
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ case DTLS1_VERSION:
+ return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ default:
+ return "UNKNOWN";
+ }
+ }
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ SSL *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+
+ ret->version = s->version;
+ ret->type = s->type;
+ ret->method = s->method;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ {
+ /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+ SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
+ * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
+ * they should not both point to the same object,
+ * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
+
+ ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+ ret->method = s->method;
+ ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ {
+ if (ret->cert != NULL)
+ {
+ ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+ }
+ ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+ if (ret->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
+ s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ }
+
+ ret->options=s->options;
+ ret->mode=s->mode;
+ SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+ SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+ ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+ SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
+ SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+ SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+ SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+
+ ret->debug=s->debug;
+
+ /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->wbio != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
+ }
+ ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+ ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+ ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+ ret->server = s->server;
+ ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
+ ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
+ ret->rstate=s->rstate;
+ ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
+ ret->hit=s->hit;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+ /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Dup the client_CA list */
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
+ ret->client_CA=sk;
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
+ {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+err:
+ if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
+ ret=NULL;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand=NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress=NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return(s->cert->key->x509);
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ return(s->session->cipher);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ return(s->compress->meth);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ return(s->expand->meth);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
+ {
+ BIO *bbio;
+
+ if (s->bbio == NULL)
+ {
+ bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
+ s->bbio=bbio;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ bbio=s->bbio;
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (push)
+ {
+ if (s->wbio != bbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->wbio == bbio)
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
+
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+ {
+ /* remove buffering */
+ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+ assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio=NULL;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
+ {
+ ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+ {
+ s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->quiet_shutdown);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+ {
+ s->shutdown=mode;
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->shutdown);
+ }
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->version);
+ }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ return(ssl->ctx);
+ }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
+ {
+ if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+ return ssl->ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+ if (ssl->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+ ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+ ssl->ctx = ctx;
+ return(ssl->ctx);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+ const char *CApath)
+ {
+ return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
+ }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
+ {
+ ssl->info_callback=cb;
+ }
+
+/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
+ function pointer. */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
+ {
+ return ssl->info_callback;
+ }
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ return(ssl->state);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
+ {
+ ssl->verify_result=arg;
+ }
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ return(ssl->verify_result);
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+ {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+ }
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+ {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+ }
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+ }
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return(ctx->cert_store);
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
+ {
+ if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+ ctx->cert_store=store;
+ }
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return(s->rwstate);
+ }
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param cb the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DOXYGEN
+/*!
+ * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
+ * \param ssl the SSL session.
+ * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
+ * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
+ * of the required key in bits.
+ * \return the temporary RSA key.
+ * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
+ */
+
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
+ {}
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+ {
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL)
+ {
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL)
+ {
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return(s->session->psk_identity);
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+ unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len))
+ {
+ s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len))
+ {
+ ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+ unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+ {
+ s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+ {
+ ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+ }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+ }
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+ {
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+ }
+
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
+ !s->hit && /* full-handshake */
+ s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
+ (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */
+ SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 && /* strong cipher choosen */
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */
+ (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/
+ s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
+ }
+
+/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
+ * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
+ * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+ *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
+ return *hash;
+}
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
+{
+
+ if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+ *hash=NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+ ssl_cipher_id);
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..25f8e16c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1085 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_locl.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+#define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
+# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+# define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+#endif
+
+#define PKCS1_CHECK
+
+#define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+#define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+ c+=n; \
+ l1=l2=0; \
+ switch (n) { \
+ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
+ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+#define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
+
+#define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+#define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+#define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+#define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++))))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+#define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+ c+=n; \
+ switch (n) { \
+ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \
+ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+#define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \
+ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2)
+#define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2)
+
+#define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \
+ (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \
+ (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3)
+
+#define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3)
+
+/* LOCAL STUFF */
+
+#define SSL_DECRYPT 0
+#define SSL_ENCRYPT 1
+
+#define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80
+#define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40
+#define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff
+#define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff
+
+#define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL)
+#define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL)
+#define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */
+
+/*
+ * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
+ * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
+ * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
+ * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
+ * can be publicly accessed.
+ * Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
+ *
+ * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
+ * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
+ * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
+ */
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
+#define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L /* RSA key exchange */
+#define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L /* DH cert, RSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L /* DH cert, DSA CA cert */ /* no such ciphersuite supported! */
+#define SSL_kEDH 0x00000008L /* tmp DH key no DH cert */
+#define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000010L /* Kerberos5 key exchange */
+#define SSL_kECDHr 0x00000020L /* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */
+#define SSL_kECDHe 0x00000040L /* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */
+#define SSL_kEECDH 0x00000080L /* ephemeral ECDH */
+#define SSL_kPSK 0x00000100L /* PSK */
+#define SSL_kGOST 0x00000200L /* GOST key exchange */
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
+#define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001L /* RSA auth */
+#define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002L /* DSS auth */
+#define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004L /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
+#define SSL_aDH 0x00000008L /* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+#define SSL_aECDH 0x00000010L /* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */
+#define SSL_aKRB5 0x00000020L /* KRB5 auth */
+#define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000040L /* ECDSA auth*/
+#define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
+#define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
+#define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
+#define SSL_DES 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_3DES 0x00000002L
+#define SSL_RC4 0x00000004L
+#define SSL_RC2 0x00000008L
+#define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010L
+#define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_AES128 0x00000040L
+#define SSL_AES256 0x00000080L
+#define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100L
+#define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200L
+#define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400L
+#define SSL_SEED 0x00000800L
+
+#define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256)
+#define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
+
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
+#define SSL_MD5 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002L
+#define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004L
+#define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008L
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
+#define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002L
+#define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3 /* for now */
+
+
+/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
+
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA)
+
+/* When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX
+ * make sure to update this constant too */
+#define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 4
+
+#define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8
+#define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+#define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+#define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+#define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1)
+
+/* Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft
+ * (currently this also goes into algorithm2) */
+#define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide
+ * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change
+ * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue.
+ *
+ * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes.
+ * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now
+ * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change
+ * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more,
+ * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW.
+ * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the
+ * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed
+ * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would
+ * be possible.
+ */
+#define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L
+#define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000001fcL
+
+#define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L
+#define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L
+
+#define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L
+#define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L
+#define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40)
+#define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L
+#define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56)
+#define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L
+#define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L
+#define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L
+#define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L
+
+/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
+
+/*
+ * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.
+ * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names,
+ * their meaning is different:
+ * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status.
+ * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength
+ * is given.
+ * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct
+ * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no
+ * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their
+ * direct usage is discouraged.
+ * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead.
+ */
+#define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT)
+#define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56)
+#define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40)
+#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength)
+#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength)
+#define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength)
+
+#define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \
+ (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7)
+#define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024)
+#define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \
+ (c)->algo_strength)
+#define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength)
+
+
+
+
+/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
+#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0
+#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1
+#define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2
+#define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3
+#define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4
+#define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5
+#define SSL_PKEY_GOST94 6
+#define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 7
+#define SSL_PKEY_NUM 8
+
+/* SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) |
+ * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN)
+ * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
+ * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
+ */
+
+/*
+#define CERT_INVALID 0
+#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
+*/
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in
+ * ECParameters
+ */
+#define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1
+#define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2
+#define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+typedef struct cert_pkey_st
+ {
+ X509 *x509;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
+ EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
+ } CERT_PKEY;
+
+typedef struct cert_st
+ {
+ /* Current active set */
+ CERT_PKEY *key; /* ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
+ * Probably it would make more sense to store
+ * an index, not a pointer. */
+
+ /* The following masks are for the key and auth
+ * algorithms that are supported by the certs below */
+ int valid;
+ unsigned long mask_k;
+ unsigned long mask_a;
+ unsigned long export_mask_k;
+ unsigned long export_mask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa_tmp;
+ RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh_tmp;
+ DH *(*dh_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp;
+ /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keysize);
+#endif
+
+ CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+
+ int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
+ } CERT;
+
+
+typedef struct sess_cert_st
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */
+
+ /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */
+ int peer_cert_type;
+
+ CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never NULL!) */
+ CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+ /* Obviously we don't have the private keys of these,
+ * so maybe we shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here. */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp;
+#endif
+
+ int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */
+ } SESS_CERT;
+
+
+/*#define MAC_DEBUG */
+
+/*#define ERR_DEBUG */
+/*#define ABORT_DEBUG */
+/*#define PKT_DEBUG 1 */
+/*#define DES_DEBUG */
+/*#define DES_OFB_DEBUG */
+/*#define SSL_DEBUG */
+/*#define RSA_DEBUG */
+/*#define IDEA_DEBUG */
+
+#define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
+#define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \
+ ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr)))
+#define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \
+ ((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr))
+
+/* This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff
+ * It is a bit of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as
+ * an opaque structure :-) */
+typedef struct ssl3_enc_method
+ {
+ int (*enc)(SSL *, int);
+ int (*mac)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int);
+ int (*setup_key_block)(SSL *);
+ int (*generate_master_secret)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int);
+ int (*change_cipher_state)(SSL *, int);
+ int (*final_finish_mac)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *);
+ int finish_mac_length;
+ int (*cert_verify_mac)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *);
+ const char *client_finished_label;
+ int client_finished_label_len;
+ const char *server_finished_label;
+ int server_finished_label_len;
+ int (*alert_value)(int);
+ } SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
+typedef struct ssl3_comp_st
+ {
+ int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression type */
+ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */
+ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */
+ } SSL3_COMP;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st
+ {
+ size_t chunklen;
+ unsigned int len;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head;
+ } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST;
+
+typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st
+ {
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next;
+ } SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY;
+#endif
+
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
+OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[];
+OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[];
+
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
+
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ TLS1_VERSION, \
+ tls1_new, \
+ tls1_clear, \
+ tls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ ssl3_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ tls1_default_timeout, \
+ &TLSv1_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ SSL3_VERSION, \
+ ssl3_new, \
+ ssl3_clear, \
+ ssl3_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ ssl3_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl3_default_timeout, \
+ &SSLv3_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ TLS1_VERSION, \
+ tls1_new, \
+ tls1_clear, \
+ tls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl23_read, \
+ ssl23_peek, \
+ ssl23_write, \
+ ssl_undefined_function, \
+ ssl_undefined_function, \
+ ssl_ok, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl_undefined_const_function, \
+ ssl23_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl23_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl23_default_timeout, \
+ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ SSL2_VERSION, \
+ ssl2_new, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_clear, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_free, /* local */ \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl2_read, \
+ ssl2_peek, \
+ ssl2_write, \
+ ssl2_shutdown, \
+ ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \
+ ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \
+ ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl2_pending, \
+ ssl2_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl2_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl2_default_timeout, \
+ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+#define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ DTLS1_VERSION, \
+ dtls1_new, \
+ dtls1_clear, \
+ dtls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ ssl3_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ dtls1_get_message, \
+ dtls1_read_bytes, \
+ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
+ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
+ dtls1_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ dtls1_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ dtls1_default_timeout, \
+ &DTLSv1_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o);
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void);
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+ ssl_cipher_id);
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp);
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp);
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *));
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
+ const char *rule_str);
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+ const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
+int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i,long *mask,const EVP_MD **md);
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *);
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *,const SSL_CIPHER *);
+int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+
+int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
+int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
+void ssl2_enc(SSL *s,int send_data);
+void ssl2_mac(SSL *s,unsigned char *mac,int send_data);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
+int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i);
+int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data);
+void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s,int reason);
+void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_num_ciphers(void);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl2_new(SSL *s);
+void ssl2_free(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s);
+void ssl2_clear(SSL *s);
+long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
+long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
+int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s);
+long ssl2_default_timeout(void );
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c,unsigned char *p);
+void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b);
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s,int state_a,int state_b);
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s,int which);
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s,int type);
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s,int level, int desc);
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, int len);
+int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s,unsigned char *p);
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender,int slen);
+int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,unsigned char *p);
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
+void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
+SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_new(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
+long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
+long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
+int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
+long ssl3_default_timeout(void );
+
+int ssl23_num_ciphers(void );
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+long ssl23_default_timeout(void );
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void);
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s,int type);
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend);
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len);
+unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len);
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
+ unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
+int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
+void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
+void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
+long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
+struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft);
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
+const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+
+/* some client-only functions */
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
+
+/* some server-only functions */
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s);
+
+
+
+int ssl23_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl23_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n);
+int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s);
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s);
+void tls1_free(SSL *s);
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, void (*fp)(void));
+
+int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push);
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, int len);
+int tls1_alert_code(int code);
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs);
+#endif
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit);
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1
+#else
+#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256
+#endif
+int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret);
+#endif
+EVP_MD_CTX* ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) ;
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
+int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c43f3e2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_rsa.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert,x));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j;
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret=0;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ x=d2i_X509_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ x=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_use_certificate(ssl,x);
+end:
+ if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
+ {
+ X509 *x;
+ int ret;
+
+ x=d2i_X509(NULL,&d,(long)len);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_use_certificate(ssl,x);
+ X509_free(x);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if ((pkey=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa);
+
+ ret=ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ i=ssl_cert_type(NULL,pkey);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /* Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly
+ * for smart cards. */
+ if ((pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
+ (RSA_flags(pkey->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
+ ;
+ else
+#endif
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509,pkey))
+ {
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ c->pkeys[i].privatekey=pkey;
+ c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
+
+ c->valid=0;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j,ret=0;
+ BIO *in;
+ RSA *rsa=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ rsa=PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in,NULL,
+ ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret=SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl,rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+end:
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ p=d;
+ if ((rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl,rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ ret=ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert,pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j,ret=0;
+ BIO *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,
+ ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret=SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+end:
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ p=d;
+ if ((pkey=d2i_PrivateKey(type,NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+ {
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x));
+ }
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int i;
+
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT,SSL_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /* Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly
+ * for smart cards. */
+ if ((c->pkeys[i].privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
+ (RSA_flags(c->pkeys[i].privatekey->pkey.rsa) &
+ RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
+ ;
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(x,c->pkeys[i].privatekey))
+ {
+ /* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free
+ * current private key (when switching to a different
+ * cert & key, first this function should be used,
+ * then ssl_set_pkey */
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ c->pkeys[i].privatekey=NULL;
+ /* clear error queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ c->pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ c->key= &(c->pkeys[i]);
+
+ c->valid=0;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j;
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret=0;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ x=d2i_X509_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ x=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+end:
+ if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d)
+ {
+ X509 *x;
+ int ret;
+
+ x=d2i_X509(NULL,&d,(long)len);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+ X509_free(x);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if ((pkey=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey,rsa);
+
+ ret=ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j,ret=0;
+ BIO *in;
+ RSA *rsa=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ rsa=PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in,NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx,rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+end:
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ p=d;
+ if ((rsa=d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx,rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ return(ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert,pkey));
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+ {
+ int j,ret=0;
+ BIO *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
+ {
+ j=ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ }
+ else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in,NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE,j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+end:
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
+ long len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ p=d;
+ if ((pkey=d2i_PrivateKey(type,NULL,&p,(long)len)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain)
+ {
+ if (ssl == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ ssl->cert->key->cert_chain = cert_chain;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_certificate_chain(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (ssl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ if (ssl->cert->pkeys[i].x509 == x)
+ return ssl->cert->pkeys[i].cert_chain;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format,
+ * possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be
+ * sent to the peer in the Certificate message.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+ {
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret=0;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret=SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,x);
+ if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
+ ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply ret==0 ... */
+ if (ret)
+ {
+ /* If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to
+ * the CA certificates.
+ */
+ X509 *ca;
+ int r;
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
+ ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,ctx->default_passwd_callback,ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
+ != NULL)
+ {
+ r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
+ if (!r)
+ {
+ X509_free(ca);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Note that we must not free r if it was successfully
+ * added to the chain (while we must free the main
+ * certificate, since its reference count is increased
+ * by SSL_CTX_use_certificate). */
+ }
+ /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
+ err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ else
+ ret = 0; /* some real error */
+ }
+
+end:
+ if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..93954e48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1102 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+ {
+ return(ssl->session);
+ }
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+ * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
+ * non-null and when we up the reference count. */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ sess = ssl->session;
+ if(sess)
+ sess->references++;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ return(sess);
+ }
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+ {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ }
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+ }
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
+ {
+ return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+ }
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+ ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ if (ss == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+ ss->references=1;
+ ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+ ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ ss->prev=NULL;
+ ss->next=NULL;
+ ss->compress_meth=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ss->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+ ss->psk_identity=NULL;
+#endif
+ return(ss);
+ }
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ {
+ if(len)
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ return s->session_id;
+ }
+
+/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
+ * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
+ * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
+ * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
+ * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
+ * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
+ * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
+ * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+ if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 1;
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
+ * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
+ * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
+ * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
+ * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
+ * and make a reservation for it if it does not
+ * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_session_creation_enabled (SSL *s, int creation_enabled)
+ {
+ s->session_creation_enabled = creation_enabled;
+ }
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
+ {
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ unsigned int tmp;
+ SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+ /* caller should check this if they can do better error handling */
+ if (!s->session_creation_enabled) return(0);
+ if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
+
+ /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+ ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+ else
+ ss->timeout=s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (session)
+ {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ {
+ ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+ ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ goto sess_id_done;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if(s->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ else if(s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
+ {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+ * nor set it higher than it was. */
+ if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
+ {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+ if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+ else
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+ ss->session_id_length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return(0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ sess_id_done:
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ss->session_id_length=0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
+ ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
+ s->session=ss;
+ ss->ssl_version=s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+ SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL;
+ int fatal = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ int r;
+#endif
+
+ if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+ goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
+ if (r == -1)
+ {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else if (r == 0 || (!ret && !len))
+ goto err;
+ else if (!ret && !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
+#else
+ if (len == 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
+#endif
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version=s->version;
+ data.session_id_length=len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ret=lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions,&data);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ int copy=1;
+
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+ ret=NULL;
+ if (s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
+ && (ret=s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy))
+ != NULL)
+ {
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+ /* Increment reference count now if the session callback
+ * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
+ * returned by the callback are shared between threads,
+ * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
+ * or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ if (copy)
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /* Add the externally cached session to the internal
+ * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
+ if(!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
+ * things are very strange */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
+ }
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
+ {
+ /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
+ * want to use it in this context. */
+
+#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
+ * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+#endif
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+
+ if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
+ * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
+ * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
+ *
+ * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
+ * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
+ * applications to effectively disable the session cache by
+ * accident without anyone noticing).
+ */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ unsigned char buf[5],*p;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ p=buf;
+ l=ret->cipher_id;
+ l2n(l,p);
+ if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
+ else
+ ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
+
+ /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
+ * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
+ * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
+ * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#endif
+
+ if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */
+ {
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+ /* remove it from the cache */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx,ret);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
+ /* again, just leave the session
+ * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
+ * then decremented the reference count :-) */
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ return(1);
+
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+ if (fatal)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+ /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
+ * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
+ * doubly linked list and an lhash */
+ CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s=lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
+
+ /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
+ * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c)
+ {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
+ * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
+ * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
+ * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
+ * cache) */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ if (s == NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
+
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+ ret=0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
+
+ ret=1;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
+ {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
+ {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
+ ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
+ else
+ ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *r;
+ int ret=0;
+
+ if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
+ {
+ if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
+ {
+ ret=1;
+ r=lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
+ }
+
+ if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ret)
+ {
+ r->not_resumable=1;
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ ret=0;
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if(ss == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
+ if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
+ if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
+ if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
+ OPENSSL_free(ss);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
+ {
+ int ret=0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+
+ if (session != NULL)
+ {
+ meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (meth != s->method)
+ {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
+ return(0);
+ if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+ session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+ else
+ session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
+ {
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+ memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
+ CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=session;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
+ ret=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session=NULL;
+ }
+
+ meth=s->ctx->method;
+ if (meth != s->method)
+ {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
+ return(0);
+ }
+ ret=1;
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ s->timeout=t;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ return(s->timeout);
+ }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ return(s->time);
+ }
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ s->time=t;
+ return(t);
+ }
+
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+ {
+ long l;
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ l=s->session_timeout;
+ s->session_timeout=t;
+ return(l);
+ }
+
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ return(s->session_timeout);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+ void *arg)
+ {
+ if (s == NULL) return(0);
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
+ {
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+ if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ext_data)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st
+ {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ long time;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+ } TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
+ {
+ if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
+ {
+ /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
+ * save on locking overhead */
+ (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache,s);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
+ s->not_resumable=1;
+ if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ }
+ }
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+ tp.ctx=s;
+ tp.cache=s->sessions;
+ if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
+ tp.time=t;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ i=CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=0;
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load=i;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if ( (s->session != NULL) &&
+ !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ else
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+ {
+ if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
+
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
+ { /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
+ { /* only one element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
+ s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
+ { /* first element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
+ s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ }
+ else
+ { /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev=s->prev;
+ s->prev->next=s->next;
+ }
+ }
+ s->prev=s->next=NULL;
+ }
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+ {
+ if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
+
+ if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
+ {
+ ctx->session_cache_head=s;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
+ s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
+ s->next->prev=s;
+ s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ ctx->session_cache_head=s;
+ }
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess))
+ {
+ ctx->new_session_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+ {
+ return ctx->new_session_cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess))
+ {
+ ctx->remove_session_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX * ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess)
+ {
+ return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy))
+ {
+ ctx->get_session_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+SSL_SESSION * (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy)
+ {
+ return ctx->get_session_cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
+ {
+ ctx->info_callback=cb;
+ }
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)
+ {
+ return ctx->info_callback;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+ {
+ ctx->client_cert_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+ {
+ return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+ {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(e))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len))
+ {
+ ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len))
+ {
+ ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb=cb;
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..144b81e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_stat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_stat.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+case SSL_ST_BEFORE: str="before SSL initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="before accept initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="before connect initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_OK: str="SSL negotiation finished successfully"; break;
+case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: str="SSL renegotiate ciphers"; break;
+case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="before/connect initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="ok/connect SSL initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="before/accept initialization"; break;
+case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="ok/accept SSL initialization"; break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION: str="SSLv2 client start encryption"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION: str="SSLv2 server start encryption"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 write client hello A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 write client hello B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 read server hello A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 read server hello B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="SSLv2 write client master key A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="SSLv2 write client master key B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 write client finished A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 write client finished B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A: str="SSLv2 write client certificate A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B: str="SSLv2 write client certificate B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C: str="SSLv2 write client certificate C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D: str="SSLv2 write client certificate D"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="SSLv2 read server verify A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="SSLv2 read server verify B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 read server finished A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 read server finished B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 read client hello A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 read client hello B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C: str="SSLv2 read client hello C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2 write server hello A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2 write server hello B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="SSLv2 read client master key A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="SSLv2 read client master key B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="SSLv2 write server verify A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="SSLv2 write server verify B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C: str="SSLv2 write server verify C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 read client finished A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 read client finished B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv2 write server finished A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv2 write server finished B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A: str="SSLv2 write request certificate A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B: str="SSLv2 write request certificate B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C: str="SSLv2 write request certificate C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D: str="SSLv2 write request certificate D"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: str="SSLv2 X509 read server certificate"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: str="SSLv2 X509 read client certificate"; break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+/* SSLv3 additions */
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv3 write client hello A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv3 write client hello B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="SSLv3 read server hello A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="SSLv3 read server hello B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: str="SSLv3 read server certificate A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: str="SSLv3 read server certificate B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: str="SSLv3 read server key exchange A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: str="SSLv3 read server key exchange B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: str="SSLv3 read server certificate request A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: str="SSLv3 read server certificate request B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: str="SSLv3 read server session ticket A";break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: str="SSLv3 read server session ticket B";break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: str="SSLv3 read server done A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: str="SSLv3 read server done B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: str="SSLv3 write client certificate A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: str="SSLv3 write client certificate B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: str="SSLv3 write client certificate C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: str="SSLv3 write client certificate D"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: str="SSLv3 write client key exchange A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: str="SSLv3 write client key exchange B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: str="SSLv3 write certificate verify A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: str="SSLv3 write certificate verify B"; break;
+
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: str="SSLv3 write change cipher spec A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: str="SSLv3 write change cipher spec B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv3 write finished A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv3 write finished B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A:
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A: str="SSLv3 read change cipher spec A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B:
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B: str="SSLv3 read change cipher spec B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: str="SSLv3 read finished A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: str="SSLv3 read finished B"; break;
+
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: str="SSLv3 flush data"; break;
+
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv3 read client hello A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv3 read client hello B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: str="SSLv3 read client hello C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: str="SSLv3 write hello request A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: str="SSLv3 write hello request B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: str="SSLv3 write hello request C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="SSLv3 write server hello A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="SSLv3 write server hello B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: str="SSLv3 write certificate A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: str="SSLv3 write certificate B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: str="SSLv3 write key exchange A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: str="SSLv3 write key exchange B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: str="SSLv3 write certificate request A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: str="SSLv3 write certificate request B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: str="SSLv3 write session ticket A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: str="SSLv3 write session ticket B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: str="SSLv3 write server done A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: str="SSLv3 write server done B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: str="SSLv3 read client certificate A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: str="SSLv3 read client certificate B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: str="SSLv3 read client key exchange A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: str="SSLv3 read client key exchange B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: str="SSLv3 read certificate verify A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: str="SSLv3 read certificate verify B"; break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
+/* client */
+case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello A"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 write client hello B"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello A"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 read server hello B"; break;
+/* server */
+case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello A"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="SSLv2/v3 read client hello B"; break;
+#endif
+
+/* DTLS */
+case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request A"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 read hello verify request B"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request A"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DTLS1 write hello verify request B"; break;
+
+default: str="unknown state"; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (s->rstate)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: str="read header"; break;
+ case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: str="read body"; break;
+ case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: str="read done"; break;
+ default: str="unknown"; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (s->state)
+ {
+case SSL_ST_BEFORE: str="PINIT "; break;
+case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: str="AINIT "; break;
+case SSL_ST_CONNECT: str="CINIT "; break;
+case SSL_ST_OK: str="SSLOK "; break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION: str="2CSENC"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SERVER_START_ENCRYPTION: str="2SSENC"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="2SCH_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="2SCH_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="2GSH_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="2GSH_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="2SCMKA"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="2SCMKB"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="2SCF_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="2SCF_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A: str="2SCC_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B: str="2SCC_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C: str="2SCC_C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D: str="2SCC_D"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="2GSV_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="2GSV_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="2GSF_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="2GSF_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A: str="2GCH_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_B: str="2GCH_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_C: str="2GCH_C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_A: str="2SSH_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B: str="2SSH_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A: str="2GCMKA"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B: str="2GCMKA"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_A: str="2SSV_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_B: str="2SSV_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_VERIFY_C: str="2SSV_C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_A: str="2GCF_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED_B: str="2GCF_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_A: str="2SSF_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_FINISHED_B: str="2SSF_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_A: str="2SRC_A"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B: str="2SRC_B"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_C: str="2SRC_C"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_D: str="2SRC_D"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: str="2X9GSC"; break;
+case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: str="2X9GCC"; break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+/* SSLv3 additions */
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: str="3FLUSH"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="3WCH_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="3WCH_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="3RSH_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="3RSH_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: str="3RSC_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: str="3RSC_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: str="3RSKEA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: str="3RSKEB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: str="3RCR_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: str="3RCR_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: str="3RSD_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: str="3RSD_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: str="3WCC_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: str="3WCC_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: str="3WCC_C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: str="3WCC_D"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: str="3WCKEA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: str="3WCKEB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: str="3WCV_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: str="3WCV_B"; break;
+
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: str="3WCCSA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: str="3WCCSB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: str="3WFINA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: str="3WFINB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A: str="3RCCSA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
+case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B: str="3RCCSB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: str="3RFINA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: str="3RFINB"; break;
+
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: str="3WHR_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: str="3WHR_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: str="3WHR_C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="3RCH_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="3RCH_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: str="3RCH_C"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="3WSH_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="3WSH_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: str="3WSC_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: str="3WSC_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: str="3WSKEA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: str="3WSKEB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: str="3WCR_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: str="3WCR_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: str="3WSD_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: str="3WSD_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: str="3RCC_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: str="3RCC_B"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: str="3RCKEA"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: str="3RCKEB"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: str="3RCV_A"; break;
+case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: str="3RCV_B"; break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+/* SSLv2/v3 compatibility states */
+/* client */
+case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="23WCHA"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="23WCHB"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: str="23RSHA"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: str="23RSHA"; break;
+/* server */
+case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: str="23RCHA"; break;
+case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: str="23RCHB"; break;
+#endif
+/* DTLS */
+case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DRCHVA"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DRCHVB"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: str="DWCHVA"; break;
+case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: str="DWCHVB"; break;
+
+default: str="UNKWN "; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value)
+ {
+ value>>=8;
+ if (value == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ return("warning");
+ else if (value == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+ return("fatal");
+ else
+ return("unknown");
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value)
+ {
+ value>>=8;
+ if (value == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ return("W");
+ else if (value == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+ return("F");
+ else
+ return("U");
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (value & 0xff)
+ {
+ case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: str="CN"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: str="UM"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: str="BM"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: str="DF"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: str="HF"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: str="NC"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: str="BC"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: str="UC"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: str="CR"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: str="CE"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: str="CU"; break;
+ case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: str="IP"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: str="DC"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: str="RO"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: str="CA"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: str="AD"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR: str="DE"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: str="CY"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: str="ER"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: str="PV"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: str="IS"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: str="IE"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED: str="US"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: str="NR"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: str="UE"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: str="CO"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: str="UN"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: str="BR"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: str="BH"; break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: str="UP"; break;
+ default: str="UK"; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (value & 0xff)
+ {
+ case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ str="close notify";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ str="unexpected_message";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ str="bad record mac";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ str="decompression failure";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ str="handshake failure";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ str="no certificate";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ str="bad certificate";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ str="unsupported certificate";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ str="certificate revoked";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ str="certificate expired";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ str="certificate unknown";
+ break;
+ case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ str="illegal parameter";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ str="decryption failed";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ str="record overflow";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ str="unknown CA";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ str="access denied";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ str="decode error";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ str="decrypt error";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ str="export restriction";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ str="protocol version";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ str="insufficient security";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ str="internal error";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ str="user canceled";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ str="no renegotiation";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ str="unsupported extension";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ str="certificate unobtainable";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ str="unrecognized name";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ str="bad certificate status response";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ str="bad certificate hash value";
+ break;
+ case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ str="unknown PSK identity";
+ break;
+ default: str="unknown"; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
+
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ const char *str;
+
+ switch (s->rstate)
+ {
+ case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:str="RH"; break;
+ case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: str="RB"; break;
+ case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: str="RD"; break;
+ default: str="unknown"; break;
+ }
+ return(str);
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3122440e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssl_txt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_txt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
+ {
+ BIO *b;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((b=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal())) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b,fp,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret=SSL_SESSION_print(b,x);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ const char *s;
+
+ if (x == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"SSL-Session:\n") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (x->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ s="SSLv2";
+ else if (x->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ s="SSLv3";
+ else if (x->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ s="TLSv1";
+ else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ s="DTLSv1";
+ else if (x->ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ s="DTLSv1-bad";
+ else
+ s="unknown";
+ if (BIO_printf(bp," Protocol : %s\n",s) <= 0) goto err;
+
+ if (x->cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ if (((x->cipher_id) & 0xff000000) == 0x02000000)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp," Cipher : %06lX\n",x->cipher_id&0xffffff) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp," Cipher : %04lX\n",x->cipher_id&0xffff) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp," Cipher : %s\n",((x->cipher == NULL)?"unknown":x->cipher->name)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp," Session-ID: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ for (i=0; i<x->session_id_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->session_id[i]) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n Session-ID-ctx: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ for (i=0; i<x->sid_ctx_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->sid_ctx[i]) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n Master-Key: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ for (i=0; i<(unsigned int)x->master_key_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->master_key[i]) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n Key-Arg : ") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (x->key_arg_length == 0)
+ {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"None") <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ for (i=0; i<x->key_arg_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->key_arg[i]) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n Krb5 Principal: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (x->krb5_client_princ_len == 0)
+ {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"None") <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ for (i=0; i<x->krb5_client_princ_len; i++)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"%02X",x->krb5_client_princ[i]) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n PSK identity: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity ? x->psk_identity : "None") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n PSK identity hint: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s", x->psk_identity_hint ? x->psk_identity_hint : "None") <= 0) goto err;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,
+ "\n TLS session ticket lifetime hint: %ld (seconds)",
+ x->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) <=0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (x->tlsext_tick)
+ {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (x->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+
+ ssl_cipher_get_evp(x,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,&comp);
+ if (comp == NULL)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"\n Compression: %d",x->compress_meth) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,"\n Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id,comp->method->name) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (x->time != 0L)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Start Time: %ld",x->time) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ if (x->timeout != 0L)
+ {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Timeout : %ld (sec)",x->timeout) <= 0) goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp,"\n") <= 0) goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " Verify return code: ") <= 0) goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%ld (%s)\n", x->verify_result,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(x->verify_result)) <= 0) goto err;
+
+ return(1);
+err:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6a2c79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2503 @@
+/* ssl/ssltest.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#define _BSD_SOURCE 1 /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly
+ on Linux and GNU platforms. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500 /* Or isascii won't be declared properly on
+ VMS (at least with DECompHP C). */
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1 /* Or gethostname won't be declared properly
+ on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C).
+ Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes
+ get screwed...
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+#include <winsock.h>
+#else
+#include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]SERVER.PEM"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]CLIENT.PEM"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\client.pem"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\client.pem"
+#else
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../apps/server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../apps/client.pem"
+#endif
+
+/* There is really no standard for this, so let's assign some tentative
+ numbers. In any case, these numbers are only for this test */
+#define COMP_RLE 255
+#define COMP_ZLIB 1
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export,int keylength);
+static void free_tmp_rsa(void);
+#endif
+static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+#define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument"
+struct app_verify_arg
+ {
+ char *string;
+ int app_verify;
+ int allow_proxy_certs;
+ char *proxy_auth;
+ char *proxy_cond;
+ };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_dh512(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void);
+#endif
+
+
+static char *psk_key=NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+static BIO *bio_err=NULL;
+static BIO *bio_stdout=NULL;
+
+static char *cipher=NULL;
+static int verbose=0;
+static int debug=0;
+#if 0
+/* Not used yet. */
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+static int s_nbio=0;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl,SSL *c_ssl,long bytes,clock_t *s_time,clock_t *c_time);
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl,SSL *c_ssl,long bytes);
+static int do_test_cipherlist(void);
+static void sv_usage(void)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -server_auth - check server certificate\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -client_auth - do client authentication\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -proxy - allow proxy certificates\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -proxy_auth <val> - set proxy policy rights\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -proxy_cond <val> - experssion to test proxy policy rights\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -v - more output\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -d - debug output\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -reuse - use session-id reuse\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -num <val> - number of connections to perform\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -bytes <val> - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ fprintf(stderr," -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -no_dhe - disable DHE\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ fprintf(stderr," -no_ecdhe - disable ECDHE\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ fprintf(stderr," -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ fprintf(stderr," -ssl2 - use SSLv2\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ fprintf(stderr," -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ fprintf(stderr," -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr," -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -cert arg - Server certificate file\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -key arg - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -c_cert arg - Client certificate file\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -c_key arg - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -cipher arg - The cipher list\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -bio_pair - Use BIO pairs\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -f - Test even cases that can't work\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -time - measure processor time used by client and server\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -zlib - use zlib compression\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -rle - use rle compression\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ fprintf(stderr," -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n" \
+ " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n" \
+ " (default is sect163r2).\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr," -test_cipherlist - verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -c_small_records - enable client side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -s_small_records - enable server side use of small SSL record buffers\n");
+ fprintf(stderr," -cutthrough - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
+ }
+
+static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ciph;
+ X509 *cert;
+
+ ciph=SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl);
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout,"%s%s, cipher %s %s",
+ prefix,
+ SSL_get_version(c_ssl),
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph),
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph));
+ cert=SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl);
+ if (cert != NULL)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ {
+ if (0)
+ ;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL
+ && pkey->pkey.rsa->n != NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit RSA",
+ BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL
+ && pkey->pkey.dsa->p != NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit DSA",
+ BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p));
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ X509_free(cert);
+ }
+ /* The SSL API does not allow us to look at temporary RSA/DH keys,
+ * otherwise we should print their lengths too */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout,"\n");
+ }
+
+static void lock_dbg_cb(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+ {
+ static int modes[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; /* = {0, 0, ... } */
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+ int rw;
+
+ rw = mode & (CRYPTO_READ|CRYPTO_WRITE);
+ if (!((rw == CRYPTO_READ) || (rw == CRYPTO_WRITE)))
+ {
+ errstr = "invalid mode";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS)
+ {
+ errstr = "type out of bounds";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
+ {
+ if (modes[type])
+ {
+ errstr = "already locked";
+ /* must not happen in a single-threaded program
+ * (would deadlock) */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ modes[type] = rw;
+ }
+ else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK)
+ {
+ if (!modes[type])
+ {
+ errstr = "not locked";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (modes[type] != rw)
+ {
+ errstr = (rw == CRYPTO_READ) ?
+ "CRYPTO_r_unlock on write lock" :
+ "CRYPTO_w_unlock on read lock";
+ }
+
+ modes[type] = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ errstr = "invalid mode";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (errstr)
+ {
+ /* we cannot use bio_err here */
+ fprintf(stderr, "openssl (lock_dbg_cb): %s (mode=%d, type=%d) at %s:%d\n",
+ errstr, mode, type, file, line);
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+struct cb_info_st { void *input; size_t len; int ret; };
+struct cb_info_st co1 = { "C", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st co2 = { "C", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st so1 = { "S", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st so2 = { "S", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
+
+int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
+ {
+ struct cb_info_st *arg = arg_;
+
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, arg->input, arg->len))
+ return 0;
+ return arg->ret;
+ }
+#endif
+ int ssl_mode = 0;
+ int c_small_records=0;
+ int s_small_records=0;
+ int cutthrough = 0;
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
+ int badop=0;
+ int bio_pair=0;
+ int force=0;
+ int tls1=0,ssl2=0,ssl3=0,ret=1;
+ int client_auth=0;
+ int server_auth=0,i;
+ struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
+ { APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0, 0, NULL, NULL };
+ char *server_cert=TEST_SERVER_CERT;
+ char *server_key=NULL;
+ char *client_cert=TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
+ char *client_key=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ char *named_curve = NULL;
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX *s_ctx=NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *c_ctx=NULL;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth=NULL;
+ SSL *c_ssl,*s_ssl;
+ int number=1,reuse=0;
+ long bytes=256L;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+ int dhe1024 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+#endif
+ int no_dhe = 0;
+ int no_ecdhe = 0;
+ int no_psk = 0;
+ int print_time = 0;
+ clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0;
+ int comp = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
+#endif
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+ int test_cipherlist = 0;
+
+ verbose = 0;
+ debug = 0;
+ cipher = 0;
+
+ bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE|BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(lock_dbg_cb);
+
+ /* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
+ if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off"))))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+
+ bio_stdout=BIO_new_fp(stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE|BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+
+ while (argc >= 1)
+ {
+ if (strcmp(*argv,"-server_auth") == 0)
+ server_auth=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-client_auth") == 0)
+ client_auth=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-proxy_auth") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ app_verify_arg.proxy_auth= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-proxy_cond") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ app_verify_arg.proxy_cond= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-v") == 0)
+ verbose=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
+ debug=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-reuse") == 0)
+ reuse=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dhe1024") == 0)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dhe1024=1;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dhe1024dsa") == 0)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dhe1024dsa=1;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -dhe1024, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_dhe") == 0)
+ no_dhe=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ecdhe") == 0)
+ no_ecdhe=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-psk") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ psk_key=*(++argv);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+#else
+ no_psk=1;
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
+ ssl2=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-tls1") == 0)
+ tls1=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl3") == 0)
+ ssl3=1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv,"-num",4) == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ number= atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (number == 0) number=1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bytes") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ bytes= atol(*(++argv));
+ if (bytes == 0L) bytes=1L;
+ i=strlen(argv[0]);
+ if (argv[0][i-1] == 'k') bytes*=1024L;
+ if (argv[0][i-1] == 'm') bytes*=1024L*1024L;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cert") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ server_cert= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-s_cert") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ server_cert= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-key") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ server_key= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-s_key") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ server_key= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-c_cert") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ client_cert= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-c_key") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ client_key= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ cipher= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CApath") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ CApath= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CAfile") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+ CAfile= *(++argv);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bio_pair") == 0)
+ {
+ bio_pair = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-f") == 0)
+ {
+ force = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-time") == 0)
+ {
+ print_time = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-zlib") == 0)
+ {
+ comp = COMP_ZLIB;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-rle") == 0)
+ {
+ comp = COMP_RLE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-named_curve") == 0)
+ {
+ if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ named_curve = *(++argv);
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,"ignoring -named_curve, since I'm compiled without ECDH\n");
+ ++argv;
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-app_verify") == 0)
+ {
+ app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-proxy") == 0)
+ {
+ app_verify_arg.allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-test_cipherlist") == 0)
+ {
+ test_cipherlist = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_small_records") == 0)
+ {
+ c_small_records = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_small_records") == 0)
+ {
+ s_small_records = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cutthrough") == 0)
+ {
+ cutthrough = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
+ badop=1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ if (badop)
+ {
+bad:
+ sv_usage();
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (test_cipherlist == 1)
+ {
+ /* ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit */
+ if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
+ EXIT(1);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
+ "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
+ "or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
+ "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+
+ if (print_time)
+ {
+ if (!bio_pair)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n");
+ bio_pair = 1;
+ }
+ if (number < 50 && !force)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n");
+ }
+
+/* if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (comp == COMP_ZLIB) cm = COMP_zlib();
+ if (comp == COMP_RLE) cm = COMP_rle();
+ if (cm != NULL)
+ {
+ if (cm->type != NID_undef)
+ {
+ if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to add compression method\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Warning: %s compression not supported\n",
+ (comp == COMP_RLE ? "rle" :
+ (comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" :
+ "unknown")));
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ fprintf(stderr, "Available compression methods:\n");
+ {
+ int j, n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, " NONE\n");
+ else
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+ {
+ SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j);
+ fprintf(stderr, " %d: %s\n", c->id, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ if (ssl2)
+ meth=SSLv2_method();
+ else
+ if (tls1)
+ meth=TLSv1_method();
+ else
+ if (ssl3)
+ meth=SSLv3_method();
+ else
+ meth=SSLv23_method();
+#else
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ meth=SSLv3_method();
+#else
+ meth=SSLv2_method();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ c_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ s_ctx=SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx,cipher);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx,cipher);
+ }
+
+ ssl_mode = 0;
+ if (c_small_records)
+ {
+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
+ }
+ ssl_mode = 0;
+ if (s_small_records)
+ {
+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(s_ctx);
+ ssl_mode |= SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS;
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(s_ctx, ssl_mode);
+ }
+ ssl_mode = 0;
+ if (cutthrough)
+ {
+ ssl_mode = SSL_CTX_get_mode(c_ctx);
+ ssl_mode = SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH;
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(c_ctx, ssl_mode);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (!no_dhe)
+ {
+ if (dhe1024dsa)
+ {
+ /* use SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE to avoid small subgroup attacks */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ dh=get_dh1024dsa();
+ }
+ else if (dhe1024)
+ dh=get_dh1024();
+ else
+ dh=get_dh512();
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx,dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+#else
+ (void)no_dhe;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (!no_ecdhe)
+ {
+ int nid;
+
+ if (named_curve != NULL)
+ {
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
+ if (nid == 0)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ nid = NID_sect163r2;
+
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ecdh == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx, ecdh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ }
+#else
+ (void)no_ecdhe;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx,tmp_rsa_cb);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(c_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(c_ctx, &co1); /* or &co2 or NULL */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx, &so1); /* or &so2 or NULL */
+#endif
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx,server_cert,SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ else if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(s_ctx,
+ (server_key?server_key:server_cert), SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx,client_cert,
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c_ctx,
+ (client_key?client_key:client_cert),
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ }
+
+ if ( (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx)))
+ {
+ /* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ /* goto end; */
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"client authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg);
+ }
+ if (server_auth)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"server authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx,SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+ verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback, &app_verify_arg);
+ }
+
+ {
+ int session_id_context = 0;
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context, sizeof session_id_context);
+ }
+
+ /* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
+ if (psk_key != NULL)
+ {
+ /* no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool */
+ if (no_psk)
+ {
+ /* if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is
+ * given, do nothing and exit successfully */
+ ret=0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
+ if (debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint"))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ c_ssl=SSL_new(c_ctx);
+ s_ssl=SSL_new(s_ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx)
+ {
+ char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN+2];
+
+ if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost-1) == 0)
+ {
+ localhost[sizeof localhost-1]='\0';
+ if(strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost-1)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"localhost name too long\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER,
+ localhost);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ for (i=0; i<number; i++)
+ {
+ if (!reuse) SSL_set_session(c_ssl,NULL);
+ if (bio_pair)
+ ret=doit_biopair(s_ssl,c_ssl,bytes,&s_time,&c_time);
+ else
+ ret=doit(s_ssl,c_ssl,bytes);
+ }
+
+ if (!verbose)
+ {
+ print_details(c_ssl, "");
+ }
+ if ((number > 1) || (bytes > 1L))
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%d handshakes of %ld bytes done\n",number,bytes);
+ if (print_time)
+ {
+#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
+ /* "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned
+ * by the clock function should be divided by the value
+ * of the macro CLOCKS_PER_SEC."
+ * -- ISO/IEC 9899 */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n"
+ "Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n",
+ (double)s_time/CLOCKS_PER_SEC,
+ (double)c_time/CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+#else
+ /* "`CLOCKS_PER_SEC' undeclared (first use this function)"
+ * -- cc on NeXTstep/OpenStep */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
+ "Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n"
+ "Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n",
+ (double)s_time,
+ (double)c_time);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(s_ssl);
+ SSL_free(c_ssl);
+
+end:
+ if (s_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
+ if (c_ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
+
+ if (bio_stdout != NULL) BIO_free(bio_stdout);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ free_tmp_rsa();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
+ if (bio_err != NULL) BIO_free(bio_err);
+ EXIT(ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
+ clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
+ {
+ long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+ BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
+ BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ size_t bufsiz = 256; /* small buffer for testing */
+
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz))
+ goto err;
+
+ s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if (!s_ssl_bio)
+ goto err;
+
+ c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if (!c_ssl_bio)
+ goto err;
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
+ (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
+ (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ do
+ {
+ /* c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
+ *
+ * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+ *
+ * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
+ * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
+ * test program, we're the server, too:
+ *
+ * server_io: server's SSL communication
+ *
+ * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+ *
+ * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
+ *
+ * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
+ * client + client_io, server + server_io.
+ * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
+ * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
+ * be handled by the same thread).
+ * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
+ * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
+ * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
+ *
+ * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
+ *
+ * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
+ * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
+ * other side's read attempt
+ * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
+ *
+ * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
+ * it depends on the application which one you should use.
+ */
+
+ /* We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
+ * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so
+ * we don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE
+ * -- we just try everything in each iteration
+ */
+
+ {
+ /* CLIENT */
+
+ MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024*8];
+ int i, r;
+ clock_t c_clock = clock();
+
+ memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+
+ if (debug)
+ if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+ printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+
+ if (cw_num > 0)
+ {
+ /* Write to server. */
+
+ if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf)
+ i = sizeof cbuf;
+ else
+ i = (int)cw_num;
+ r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here.
+ * The library expects us to call BIO_write with
+ * the same arguments again, and that's what we will
+ * do in the next iteration. */
+ }
+ else if (r == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
+ cw_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cr_num > 0)
+ {
+ /* Read from server. */
+
+ r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored. */
+ }
+ else if (r == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client read %d\n", r);
+ cr_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
+ * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals),
+ * but sampling over a large number of connections should
+ * result in fairly accurate figures. We cannot guarantee
+ * a lot, however -- if each connection lasts for exactly
+ * one clock tick, it will be counted only for the client
+ * or only for the server or even not at all.
+ */
+ *c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* SERVER */
+
+ MS_STATIC char sbuf[1024*8];
+ int i, r;
+ clock_t s_clock = clock();
+
+ memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+ if (debug)
+ if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+ printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+
+ if (sw_num > 0)
+ {
+ /* Write to client. */
+
+ if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf)
+ i = sizeof sbuf;
+ else
+ i = (int)sw_num;
+ r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
+ }
+ else if (r == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
+ sw_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sr_num > 0)
+ {
+ /* Read from client. */
+
+ r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* blah, blah */
+ }
+ else if (r == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server read %d\n", r);
+ sr_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */
+
+ size_t r1, r2;
+ BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io;
+ /* we use the non-copying interface for io1
+ * and the standard BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2
+ */
+
+ static int prev_progress = 1;
+ int progress = 0;
+
+ /* io1 to io2 */
+ do
+ {
+ size_t num;
+ int r;
+
+ r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1);
+ r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2);
+
+ num = r1;
+ if (r2 < num)
+ num = r2;
+ if (num)
+ {
+ char *dataptr;
+
+ if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */
+ num = INT_MAX;
+
+ r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ assert(r <= (int)num);
+ /* possibly r < num (non-contiguous data) */
+ num = r;
+ r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write "
+ "BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ progress = 1;
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf((io1 == client_io) ?
+ "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+ "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n",
+ (int)num);
+ }
+ }
+ while (r1 && r2);
+
+ /* io2 to io1 */
+ {
+ size_t num;
+ int r;
+
+ r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2);
+ r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1);
+ /* here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of
+ * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter
+ * we test restartability of the SSL implementation
+ * more thoroughly */
+ num = r1;
+ if (r2 < num)
+ num = r2;
+ if (num)
+ {
+ char *dataptr;
+
+ if (INT_MAX < num)
+ num = INT_MAX;
+
+ if (num > 1)
+ --num; /* test restartability even more thoroughly */
+
+ r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ if (r < (int)num)
+ num = r;
+ r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read "
+ "BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ progress = 1;
+ r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) /* can't happen */
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept "
+ "BIO_nwrite0() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf((io2 == client_io) ?
+ "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+ "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n",
+ (int)num);
+ }
+ } /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now returns 0 anyway */
+
+ if (!progress && !prev_progress)
+ if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n");
+ if (strcmp("SSLv2", SSL_get_version(c_ssl)) == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This can happen for SSL2 because "
+ "CLIENT-FINISHED and SERVER-VERIFY are written \n"
+ "concurrently ...");
+ if (strncmp("2SCF", SSL_state_string(c_ssl), 4) == 0
+ && strncmp("2SSV", SSL_state_string(s_ssl), 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, " ok.\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ prev_progress = progress;
+ }
+ }
+ while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
+
+ if (verbose)
+ print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: ");
+end:
+ ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+
+ if (server)
+ BIO_free(server);
+ if (server_io)
+ BIO_free(server_io);
+ if (client)
+ BIO_free(client);
+ if (client_io)
+ BIO_free(client_io);
+ if (s_ssl_bio)
+ BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
+ if (c_ssl_bio)
+ BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+
+#define W_READ 1
+#define W_WRITE 2
+#define C_DONE 1
+#define S_DONE 2
+
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
+ {
+ MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024*8],sbuf[1024*8];
+ long cw_num=count,cr_num=count;
+ long sw_num=count,sr_num=count;
+ int ret=1;
+ BIO *c_to_s=NULL;
+ BIO *s_to_c=NULL;
+ BIO *c_bio=NULL;
+ BIO *s_bio=NULL;
+ int c_r,c_w,s_r,s_w;
+ int i,j;
+ int done=0;
+ int c_write,s_write;
+ int do_server=0,do_client=0;
+
+ memset(cbuf,0,sizeof(cbuf));
+ memset(sbuf,0,sizeof(sbuf));
+
+ c_to_s=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ s_to_c=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ c_bio=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ s_bio=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL))
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(c_ssl,s_to_c,c_to_s);
+ BIO_set_ssl(c_bio,c_ssl,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(s_ssl,c_to_s,s_to_c);
+ BIO_set_ssl(s_bio,s_ssl,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ c_r=0; s_r=1;
+ c_w=1; s_w=0;
+ c_write=1,s_write=0;
+
+ /* We can always do writes */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ do_server=0;
+ do_client=0;
+
+ i=(int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
+ if ((i && s_r) || s_w) do_server=1;
+
+ i=(int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
+ if ((i && c_r) || c_w) do_client=1;
+
+ if (do_server && debug)
+ {
+ if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+ printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+/* else if (s_write)
+ printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
+ }
+
+ if (do_client && debug)
+ {
+ if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+ printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+/* else if (c_write)
+ printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
+ }
+
+ if (!do_client && !do_server)
+ {
+ fprintf(stdout,"ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE))
+ {
+ if (c_write)
+ {
+ j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
+ i=BIO_write(c_bio,cbuf,j);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ c_r=0;
+ c_w=0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio))
+ {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r=1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (i == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client wrote %d\n",i);
+ /* ok */
+ s_r=1;
+ c_write=0;
+ cw_num-=i;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ i=BIO_read(c_bio,cbuf,sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ c_r=0;
+ c_w=0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio))
+ {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r=1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (i == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client read %d\n",i);
+ cr_num-=i;
+ if (sw_num > 0)
+ {
+ s_write=1;
+ s_w=1;
+ }
+ if (cr_num <= 0)
+ {
+ s_write=1;
+ s_w=1;
+ done=S_DONE|C_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE))
+ {
+ if (!s_write)
+ {
+ i=BIO_read(s_bio,sbuf,sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s_r=0;
+ s_w=0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio))
+ {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r=1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server read %d\n",i);
+ sr_num-=i;
+ if (cw_num > 0)
+ {
+ c_write=1;
+ c_w=1;
+ }
+ if (sr_num <= 0)
+ {
+ s_write=1;
+ s_w=1;
+ c_write=0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
+ i=BIO_write(s_bio,sbuf,j);
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ s_r=0;
+ s_w=0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio))
+ {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r=1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ fprintf(stderr,"SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server wrote %d\n",i);
+ sw_num-=i;
+ s_write=0;
+ c_r=1;
+ if (sw_num <= 0)
+ done|=S_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE)) break;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: ");
+ ret=0;
+err:
+ /* We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be
+ * OPENSSL_free()ed twice. Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and
+ * again when c_ssl is SSL_free()ed.
+ * This is a hack required because s_ssl and c_ssl are sharing the same
+ * BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and SSL_free() automatically
+ * BIO_free non NULL entries.
+ * You should not normally do this or be required to do this */
+ if (s_ssl != NULL)
+ {
+ s_ssl->rbio=NULL;
+ s_ssl->wbio=NULL;
+ }
+ if (c_ssl != NULL)
+ {
+ c_ssl->rbio=NULL;
+ c_ssl->wbio=NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (c_to_s != NULL) BIO_free(c_to_s);
+ if (s_to_c != NULL) BIO_free(s_to_c);
+ if (c_bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(c_bio);
+ if (s_bio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s_bio);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int idx = -1;
+ if (idx < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ {
+ idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSLtest for verify callback", NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+ return idx;
+ }
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ char *s,buf[256];
+
+ s=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,
+ sizeof buf);
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ if (ok)
+ fprintf(stderr,"depth=%d %s\n",
+ ctx->error_depth,buf);
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
+ ctx->error_depth,ctx->error,buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ok == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"Error string: %s\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
+ switch (ctx->error)
+ {
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ fprintf(stderr," ... ignored.\n");
+ ok=1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ok == 1)
+ {
+ X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert;
+#if 0
+ X509 *xi = ctx->current_issuer;
+#endif
+
+ if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ {
+ unsigned int *letters =
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+ get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx());
+
+ if (letters)
+ {
+ int found_any = 0;
+ int i;
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo,
+ NULL, NULL);
+
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage))
+ {
+ case NID_Independent:
+ /* Completely meaningless in this
+ program, as there's no way to
+ grant explicit rights to a
+ specific PrC. Basically, using
+ id-ppl-Independent is the perfect
+ way to grant no rights at all. */
+ fprintf(stderr, " Independent proxy certificate");
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
+ /* This is basically a NOP, we
+ simply let the current rights
+ stand as they are. */
+ fprintf(stderr, " Proxy certificate inherits all");
+ break;
+ default:
+ s = (char *)
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data;
+ i = pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length;
+
+ /* The algorithm works as follows:
+ it is assumed that previous
+ iterations or the initial granted
+ rights has already set some elements
+ of `letters'. What we need to do is
+ to clear those that weren't granted
+ by the current PrC as well. The
+ easiest way to do this is to add 1
+ to all the elements whose letters
+ are given with the current policy.
+ That way, all elements that are set
+ by the current policy and were
+ already set by earlier policies and
+ through the original grant of rights
+ will get the value 2 or higher.
+ The last thing to do is to sweep
+ through `letters' and keep the
+ elements having the value 2 as set,
+ and clear all the others. */
+
+ fprintf(stderr, " Certificate proxy rights = %*.*s", i, i, s);
+ while(i-- > 0)
+ {
+ int c = *s++;
+ if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
+ {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ letters[c - 'A']++;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i] < 2)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ else
+ letters[i] = 1;
+ }
+
+ found_any = 0;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ ", resulting proxy rights = ");
+ for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i])
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
+ found_any = 1;
+ }
+ if (!found_any)
+ fprintf(stderr, "none");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+static void process_proxy_debug(int indent, const char *format, ...)
+ {
+ static const char indentation[] =
+ ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"
+ ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"; /* That's 80 > */
+ char my_format[256];
+ va_list args;
+
+ BIO_snprintf(my_format, sizeof(my_format), "%*.*s %s",
+ indent, indent, indentation, format);
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ vfprintf(stderr, my_format, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ }
+/* Priority levels:
+ 0 [!]var, ()
+ 1 & ^
+ 2 |
+*/
+static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent);
+static int process_proxy_cond_val(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
+ {
+ int c;
+ int ok = 1;
+ int negate = 0;
+
+ while(isspace((int)*cond))
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ while(c == '!')
+ {
+ negate = !negate;
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ while(isspace((int)*cond))
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+ }
+
+ if (c == '(')
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
+ indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ while(isspace((int)*cond))
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+ if (c != ')')
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Weird condition character in position %d: "
+ "%c\n", *pos, c);
+ ok = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ else if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
+ {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ ok = letters[c - 'A'];
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Weird condition character in position %d: "
+ "%c\n", *pos, c);
+ ok = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ end:
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ if (ok >= 0 && negate)
+ ok = !ok;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ return ok;
+ }
+static int process_proxy_cond_multipliers(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ char c;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters, cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ while(ok >= 0)
+ {
+ while(isspace((int)*cond))
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ switch(c)
+ {
+ case '&':
+ case '^':
+ {
+ int save_ok = ok;
+
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters,
+ cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ break;
+
+ switch(c)
+ {
+ case '&':
+ ok &= save_ok;
+ break;
+ case '^':
+ ok ^= save_ok;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
+ " STOPPING\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ return ok;
+ }
+static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ char c;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
+ indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ while(ok >= 0)
+ {
+ while(isspace((int)*cond))
+ {
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ switch(c)
+ {
+ case '|':
+ {
+ int save_ok = ok;
+
+ cond++; (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters,
+ cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ break;
+
+ switch(c)
+ {
+ case '|':
+ ok |= save_ok;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
+ " STOPPING\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+static int process_proxy_cond(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end)
+ {
+ int pos = 1;
+ return process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, &pos, 1);
+ }
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+ {
+ int ok=1;
+ struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg;
+ unsigned int letters[26]; /* only used with proxy_auth */
+
+ if (cb_arg->app_verify)
+ {
+ char *s = NULL,buf[256];
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. ");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n",
+ (void *)ctx, (void *)ctx->cert);
+ if (ctx->cert)
+ s=X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert),buf,256);
+ if (s != NULL)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"cert depth=%d %s\n",ctx->error_depth,buf);
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+ if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
+ {
+ int found_any = 0, i;
+ char *sp;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ for(sp = cb_arg->proxy_auth; *sp; sp++)
+ {
+ int c = *sp;
+ if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c))
+ {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ letters[c - 'A'] = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " Initial proxy rights = ");
+ for(i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i])
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
+ found_any = 1;
+ }
+ if (!found_any)
+ fprintf(stderr, "none");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
+ get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(),letters);
+ }
+ if (cb_arg->allow_proxy_certs)
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ FIPS_allow_md5(1);
+# endif
+ ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if(s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ FIPS_allow_md5(0);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
+ {
+ if (ok > 0)
+ {
+ const char *cond_end = NULL;
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond(letters,
+ cb_arg->proxy_cond, &cond_end);
+
+ if (ok < 0)
+ EXIT(3);
+ if (*cond_end)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Stopped processing condition before it's end.\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ok)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved invalid\n",
+ cb_arg->proxy_cond);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved valid\n",
+ cb_arg->proxy_cond);
+ }
+ }
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA *rsa_tmp=NULL;
+
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ if (rsa_tmp == NULL)
+ {
+ bn = BN_new();
+ rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
+ if(!bn || !rsa_tmp || !BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory error...");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...",keylength);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ if(!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp,keylength,bn,NULL))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error generating key.");
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+end:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ }
+ if(bn) BN_free(bn);
+ return(rsa_tmp);
+ }
+
+static void free_tmp_rsa(void)
+ {
+ if (rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* These DH parameters have been generated as follows:
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024
+ * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.)
+ */
+static DH *get_dh512()
+ {
+ static unsigned char dh512_p[]={
+ 0xCB,0xC8,0xE1,0x86,0xD0,0x1F,0x94,0x17,0xA6,0x99,0xF0,0xC6,
+ 0x1F,0x0D,0xAC,0xB6,0x25,0x3E,0x06,0x39,0xCA,0x72,0x04,0xB0,
+ 0x6E,0xDA,0xC0,0x61,0xE6,0x7A,0x77,0x25,0xE8,0x3B,0xB9,0x5F,
+ 0x9A,0xB6,0xB5,0xFE,0x99,0x0B,0xA1,0x93,0x4E,0x35,0x33,0xB8,
+ 0xE1,0xF1,0x13,0x4F,0x59,0x1A,0xD2,0x57,0xC0,0x26,0x21,0x33,
+ 0x02,0xC5,0xAE,0x23,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh512_g[]={
+ 0x02,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh512_p,sizeof(dh512_p),NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh512_g,sizeof(dh512_g),NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ { DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
+ return(dh);
+ }
+
+static DH *get_dh1024()
+ {
+ static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
+ 0xF8,0x81,0x89,0x7D,0x14,0x24,0xC5,0xD1,0xE6,0xF7,0xBF,0x3A,
+ 0xE4,0x90,0xF4,0xFC,0x73,0xFB,0x34,0xB5,0xFA,0x4C,0x56,0xA2,
+ 0xEA,0xA7,0xE9,0xC0,0xC0,0xCE,0x89,0xE1,0xFA,0x63,0x3F,0xB0,
+ 0x6B,0x32,0x66,0xF1,0xD1,0x7B,0xB0,0x00,0x8F,0xCA,0x87,0xC2,
+ 0xAE,0x98,0x89,0x26,0x17,0xC2,0x05,0xD2,0xEC,0x08,0xD0,0x8C,
+ 0xFF,0x17,0x52,0x8C,0xC5,0x07,0x93,0x03,0xB1,0xF6,0x2F,0xB8,
+ 0x1C,0x52,0x47,0x27,0x1B,0xDB,0xD1,0x8D,0x9D,0x69,0x1D,0x52,
+ 0x4B,0x32,0x81,0xAA,0x7F,0x00,0xC8,0xDC,0xE6,0xD9,0xCC,0xC1,
+ 0x11,0x2D,0x37,0x34,0x6C,0xEA,0x02,0x97,0x4B,0x0E,0xBB,0xB1,
+ 0x71,0x33,0x09,0x15,0xFD,0xDD,0x23,0x87,0x07,0x5E,0x89,0xAB,
+ 0x6B,0x7C,0x5F,0xEC,0xA6,0x24,0xDC,0x53,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={
+ 0x02,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p,sizeof(dh1024_p),NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g,sizeof(dh1024_g),NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ { DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
+ return(dh);
+ }
+
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa()
+ {
+ static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
+ 0xC8,0x00,0xF7,0x08,0x07,0x89,0x4D,0x90,0x53,0xF3,0xD5,0x00,
+ 0x21,0x1B,0xF7,0x31,0xA6,0xA2,0xDA,0x23,0x9A,0xC7,0x87,0x19,
+ 0x3B,0x47,0xB6,0x8C,0x04,0x6F,0xFF,0xC6,0x9B,0xB8,0x65,0xD2,
+ 0xC2,0x5F,0x31,0x83,0x4A,0xA7,0x5F,0x2F,0x88,0x38,0xB6,0x55,
+ 0xCF,0xD9,0x87,0x6D,0x6F,0x9F,0xDA,0xAC,0xA6,0x48,0xAF,0xFC,
+ 0x33,0x84,0x37,0x5B,0x82,0x4A,0x31,0x5D,0xE7,0xBD,0x52,0x97,
+ 0xA1,0x77,0xBF,0x10,0x9E,0x37,0xEA,0x64,0xFA,0xCA,0x28,0x8D,
+ 0x9D,0x3B,0xD2,0x6E,0x09,0x5C,0x68,0xC7,0x45,0x90,0xFD,0xBB,
+ 0x70,0xC9,0x3A,0xBB,0xDF,0xD4,0x21,0x0F,0xC4,0x6A,0x3C,0xF6,
+ 0x61,0xCF,0x3F,0xD6,0x13,0xF1,0x5F,0xBC,0xCF,0xBC,0x26,0x9E,
+ 0xBC,0x0B,0xBD,0xAB,0x5D,0xC9,0x54,0x39,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh1024_g[]={
+ 0x3B,0x40,0x86,0xE7,0xF3,0x6C,0xDE,0x67,0x1C,0xCC,0x80,0x05,
+ 0x5A,0xDF,0xFE,0xBD,0x20,0x27,0x74,0x6C,0x24,0xC9,0x03,0xF3,
+ 0xE1,0x8D,0xC3,0x7D,0x98,0x27,0x40,0x08,0xB8,0x8C,0x6A,0xE9,
+ 0xBB,0x1A,0x3A,0xD6,0x86,0x83,0x5E,0x72,0x41,0xCE,0x85,0x3C,
+ 0xD2,0xB3,0xFC,0x13,0xCE,0x37,0x81,0x9E,0x4C,0x1C,0x7B,0x65,
+ 0xD3,0xE6,0xA6,0x00,0xF5,0x5A,0x95,0x43,0x5E,0x81,0xCF,0x60,
+ 0xA2,0x23,0xFC,0x36,0xA7,0x5D,0x7A,0x4C,0x06,0x91,0x6E,0xF6,
+ 0x57,0xEE,0x36,0xCB,0x06,0xEA,0xF5,0x3D,0x95,0x49,0xCB,0xA7,
+ 0xDD,0x81,0xDF,0x80,0x09,0x4A,0x97,0x4D,0xA8,0x22,0x72,0xA1,
+ 0x7F,0xC4,0x70,0x56,0x70,0xE8,0x20,0x10,0x18,0x8F,0x2E,0x60,
+ 0x07,0xE7,0x68,0x1A,0x82,0x5D,0x32,0xA2,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p,sizeof(dh1024_p),NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g,sizeof(dh1024_g),NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ { DH_free(dh); return(NULL); }
+ dh->length = 160;
+ return(dh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */
+static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+ ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
+ if (!ret)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n", pskkey);
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
+ max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+
+ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity");
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_err;
+ if (debug)
+ fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret);
+ ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_err;
+ psk_len = ret;
+out_err:
+ return psk_len;
+ }
+
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)
+ {
+ unsigned int psk_len=0;
+
+ if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ psk_len=psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+ return psk_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+static int do_test_cipherlist(void)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ci, *tci = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv2 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = SSLv2_method();
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
+ {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv3 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = SSLv3_method();
+ tci = NULL;
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
+ {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing TLSv1 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = TLSv1_method();
+ tci = NULL;
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL)
+ {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c87af177
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* ssl/t1_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_client_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_connect,
+ tls1_get_client_method)
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..793ea43e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@
+/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+ int sec_len,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+ {
+ int chunk;
+ unsigned int j;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (olen > chunk)
+ {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+ goto err;
+ out+=j;
+ olen-=j;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else /* last one */
+ {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(out,A1,olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out1,
+ unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+ {
+ int len,i,idx,count;
+ const unsigned char *S1;
+ long m;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
+ count=0;
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
+ }
+ len=slen/count;
+ S1=sec;
+ memset(out1,0,olen);
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+ if (!md) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
+ seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
+ out2,olen))
+ goto err;
+ S1+=len;
+ for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
+ {
+ out1[i]^=out2[i];
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+ unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ km,tmp,num);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n"); }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ {
+ static const unsigned char empty[]="";
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *exp_label;
+ unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
+ unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
+ int client_write;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ int mac_type;
+ int *mac_secret_size;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+ printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
+ comp);
+ printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
+ printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+ c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
+ printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
+ printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
+ mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->expand == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress=NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL)
+ {
+ s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->compress == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
+ mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+ cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
+ {
+ ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
+ exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write=1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n=i;
+ ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
+ key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
+ iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
+ exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write=0;
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+ mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+ if (is_export)
+ {
+ /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
+ * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ exp_label,exp_label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ goto err2;
+ key=tmp1;
+
+ if (k > 0)
+ {
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
+ goto err2;
+ if (client_write)
+ iv=iv1;
+ else
+ iv= &(iv1[k]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length=0;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i;
+ printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\niv=");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
+ return(1);
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+ int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
+ int ret=0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return(1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num*=2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
+
+ if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("client random\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("server random\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("pre-master\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
+ goto err;
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("\nkey block\n");
+{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+#endif
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ {
+ /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
+ * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ if (p2)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ }
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc=NULL;
+ else
+ enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
+ (enc == NULL))
+ {
+ memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
+ rec->input=rec->data;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ l=rec->length;
+ bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send)
+ {
+ i=bs-((int)l%bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j=i-1;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
+ rec->input[k]=j;
+ l+=i;
+ rec->length+=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long ui;
+ printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ printf("\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ printf("\n");
+ printf("\trec->input=");
+ for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!send)
+ {
+ if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ {
+ ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
+ i++;
+ /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
+ * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
+ * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
+ * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
+ * now or no buggy implementation supports compression
+ * [steve]
+ */
+ if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
+ && !s->expand)
+ {
+ /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+ if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
+ s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ i--;
+ }
+ /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
+ * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
+ if (i > (int)rec->length)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
+ * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
+ * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
+ {
+ if (rec->data[j] != ii)
+ {
+ /* Incorrect padding */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ rec->length-=i;
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
+ {
+ unsigned int ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
+ {
+ d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return((int)ret);
+ }
+
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
+ int idx;
+ long mask;
+ int err=0;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ q=buf;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
+ {
+ if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+ {
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ {
+ /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
+ if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+ err = 1;
+ q+=i;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
+ err = 1;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return sizeof buf2;
+ }
+
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+ {
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ size_t md_size;
+ int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[5];
+ int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
+
+ if (send)
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->write_hash;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash=ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size=t;
+
+ buf[0]=rec->type;
+ buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+ buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
+ buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
+
+ /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+ if (stream_mac)
+ {
+ mac_ctx = hash;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
+ mac_ctx = &hmac;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
+
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+ }
+ else
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+
+ if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("sec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("seq=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("buf=");
+{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+printf("rec=");
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
+ {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+ return(md_size);
+ }
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+ {
+ unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
+ int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
+ col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
+ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ co, col,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ so, sol,
+ p,len,
+ s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+ }
+
+int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ {
+ switch (code)
+ {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bbab4675
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1859 @@
+/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess);
+#endif
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ };
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+ {
+ /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
+ * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
+ return(60*60*2);
+ }
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+void tls1_free(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ ssl3_free(s);
+ }
+
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
+ {
+ ssl3_clear(s);
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int nid_list[] =
+ {
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ };
+
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+ {
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
+ sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+ return 0;
+ return nid_list[curve_id-1];
+ }
+
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
+ {
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
+ switch (nid)
+ {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ int extdatalen=0;
+ unsigned char *ret = p;
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return p;
+
+ ret+=2;
+
+ if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ unsigned long size_str;
+ long lenmax;
+
+ /* check for enough space.
+ 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ 2 for servernamelist length
+ 1 for the hostname type
+ 2 for hostname length
+ + hostname length
+ */
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
+ || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* extension type and length */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
+ s2n(size_str+5,ret);
+
+ /* length of servername list */
+ s2n(size_str+3,ret);
+
+ /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ s2n(size_str,ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+ ret+=size_str;
+ }
+
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
+
+ /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
+ * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
+ * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
+ * resolves this to two bytes.
+ */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+ {
+ int ticklen;
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
+ {
+ ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
+ ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ }
+ else
+ ticklen = 0;
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ goto skip_ext;
+ /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
+ * rest for ticket
+ */
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
+ s2n(ticklen,ret);
+ if (ticklen)
+ {
+ memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+ ret += ticklen;
+ }
+ }
+ skip_ext:
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
+ return NULL;
+ if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(col + 2, ret);
+ s2n(col, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
+ ret += col;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ int i;
+ long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+ idlen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+ {
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (itmp <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ idlen += itmp + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ {
+ extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+ if (extlen < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ extlen = 0;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+ *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+ s2n(idlen, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+ {
+ /* save position of id len */
+ unsigned char *q = ret;
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ /* skip over id len */
+ ret += 2;
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+ /* write id len */
+ s2n(itmp, q);
+ }
+ s2n(extlen, ret);
+ if (extlen > 0)
+ i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+ {
+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
+ * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
+ return p;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+ {
+ int extdatalen=0;
+ unsigned char *ret = p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return p;
+
+ ret+=2;
+ if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+ if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+
+ }
+ /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
+ && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
+ s2n(0,ret);
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(sol + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sol, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
+ ret += sol;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
+ { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
+ 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
+ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
+ if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
+ memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
+ ret+=36;
+
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *npa;
+ unsigned int npalen;
+ int r;
+
+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+ {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
+ s2n(npalen,ret);
+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
+ ret += npalen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
+ return p;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+ {
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned short len;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ goto ri_check;
+ n2s(data,len);
+
+ if (data > (d+n-len))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ while (data <= (d+n-4))
+ {
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (data+size > (d+n))
+ goto ri_check;
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
+#endif
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+
+ - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ the value of the Host: field.
+ - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
+ i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
+ - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+
+*/
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata;
+ int servname_type;
+ int dsize;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size )
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sdata = data;
+ while (dsize > 3)
+ {
+ servname_type = *(sdata++);
+ n2s(sdata,len);
+ dsize -= 3;
+
+ if (len > dsize)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->servername_done == 0)
+ switch (servname_type)
+ {
+ case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
+ if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->servername_done = 1;
+
+ }
+ else
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dsize -= len;
+ }
+ if (dsize != 0)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
+ ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
+
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+ if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ {
+ if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+
+ if (size < 5)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
+ size--;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *sdata;
+ int dsize;
+ /* Read in responder_id_list */
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size )
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (dsize > 0)
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+ if (dsize < 4)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data, idsize);
+ dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
+ if (dsize < 0)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ data += idsize;
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
+ &sdata, idsize);
+ if (!id)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (data != sdata)
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+ && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
+ {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sdata = data;
+ if (dsize > 0)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
+ &sdata, dsize);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
+ || (data + dsize != sdata))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* We don't know what to do with any other type
+ * so ignore it.
+ */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+ {
+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+ * renegotiation.
+ *
+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+ * anything like that, but this might change).
+
+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+ data+=size;
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
+ * the length of the block. */
+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+ {
+ unsigned int off = 0;
+
+ while (off < len)
+ {
+ if (d[off] == 0)
+ return 0;
+ off += d[off];
+ off++;
+ }
+
+ return off == len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+ {
+ unsigned short length;
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int tlsext_servername = 0;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data,length);
+ if (data+length != d+n)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while(data <= (d+n-4))
+ {
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (data+size > (d+n))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tlsext_servername = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr,"\n");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ || (size > 0))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
+ * a status request message.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+ {
+ unsigned char *selected;
+ unsigned char selected_len;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The data must be valid */
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ {
+ if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+ data+=size;
+ }
+
+ if (data != d+n)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ {
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+ * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+ * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+ * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+ * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+ * absence on initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
+ * and elliptic curves we support.
+ */
+ int using_ecc = 0;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *j;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+ {
+ using_ecc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
+ if (using_ecc)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+
+ /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
+ sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
+ s2n(i,j);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
+ {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2)
+ /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
+ * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
+ * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
+ */
+
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+
+ if (using_ecc)
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+ /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+#endif
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+ /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ * the certificate has changed.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r)
+ {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
+ * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
+ * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
+ {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
+ * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
+ * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
+ * abort the handshake.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+#endif
+ err:
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done=0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
+ * it must contain uncompressed.
+ */
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
+ (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
+ ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+ {
+ /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *list;
+ int found_uncompressed = 0;
+ list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ {
+ if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
+ {
+ found_uncompressed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found_uncompressed)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
+ {
+ /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
+ * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
+ * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
+ * tell the callback
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
+ * there is no response.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (r == 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done=0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
+ * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
+ * session ticket extension at the same time.
+ */
+
+int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+ {
+ /* Point after session ID in client hello */
+ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
+ unsigned short i;
+
+ /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
+ * to permit stateful resumption.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 1;
+
+ if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
+ return 1;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ i = *(p++);
+ p+= i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+ p+= i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p > limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+ if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(p, i);
+ while ((p + 4) <= limit)
+ {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+ if (p + size > limit)
+ return 1;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ {
+ /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
+ * trigger a full handshake
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 1;
+ /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
+ * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
+ */
+ if (size == 0)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 0; /* Cache miss */
+ }
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
+ * generating the session from ticket now,
+ * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
+ * external mechanism to calculate the master
+ * secret later. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
+ ret);
+ }
+ p += size;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess)
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *sdec;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+ if (eticklen < 48)
+ goto tickerr;
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ goto tickerr;
+ if (rv == 2)
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+ goto tickerr;
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ }
+ /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
+ * integrity checks on ticket.
+ */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ goto tickerr;
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (!sdec)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+ goto tickerr;
+ slen += mlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess)
+ {
+ /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
+ * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+ * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+ * as required by standard.
+ */
+ if (sesslen)
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ *psess = sess;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
+ * send a new ticket
+ */
+ tickerr:
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6ce7c0bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_meth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* ssl/t1_meth.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl3_connect,
+ tls1_get_method)
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9c2cc3c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_reneg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+/* ssl/t1_reneg.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* Add the client's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen)
+ {
+ if(p)
+ {
+ if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len+1) > maxlen)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Length byte */
+ *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+ p++;
+
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n",
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+ }
+
+ *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
+
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
+ right */
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al)
+ {
+ int ilen;
+
+ /* Parse the length byte */
+ if(len < 1)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ilen = *d;
+ d++;
+
+ /* Consistency check */
+ if((ilen+1) != len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the extension matches */
+ if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n",
+ ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen)
+ {
+ if(p)
+ {
+ if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Length byte */
+ *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+ p++;
+
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+ p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n",
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+ }
+
+ *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
+ right */
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al)
+ {
+ int expected_len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+ + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+ int ilen;
+
+ /* Check for logic errors */
+ OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+ OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+
+ /* Parse the length byte */
+ if(len < 1)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ilen = *d;
+ d++;
+
+ /* Consistency check */
+ if(ilen+1 != len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the extension matches */
+ if(ilen != expected_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+ if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n",
+ ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..42525e9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/t1_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* ssl/t1_srvr.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *tls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+ {
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(TLSv1_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ tls1_get_server_method)
+
diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/tls1.h b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..76f368ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H
+#define HEADER_TLS1_H
+
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
+#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+#define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21
+#define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22
+#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR 51
+#define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+#define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+#define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110
+#define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111
+#define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112
+#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113
+#define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
+#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* fatal */
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length 1
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url 2
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys 3
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac 4
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves 10
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
+/* ExtensionType value from draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt */
+#if 0 /* will have to be provided externally for now ,
+ * i.e. build with -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=38183
+ * using whatever extension number you'd like to try */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input ?? */
+#endif
+
+/* Temporary extension type */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
+#endif
+
+/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
+#define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
+/* status request value from RFC 3546 */
+#define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
+
+/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
+#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0
+#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0
+#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1
+#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2
+#define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+#define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) ;
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) ;
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
+SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL)
+
+#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2
+#define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+#define SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(s, src, len) \
+SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT, len, src)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB, (void (*)(void))cb)
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG, 0, arg)
+
+#define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+#endif
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
+#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300008A
+#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300008B
+#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300008C
+#define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300008D
+
+/* Additional TLS ciphersuites from expired Internet Draft
+ * draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt
+ * (available if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES is defined, see
+ * s3_lib.c). We actually treat them like SSL 3.0 ciphers, which we probably
+ * shouldn't. Note that the first two are actually not in the IDs. */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 0x03000060 /* not in ID */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 0x03000061 /* not in ID */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000062
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000063
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000064
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000065
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000032
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000033
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000034
+
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000035
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000036
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000037
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000038
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000039
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x0300003A
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000041
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000042
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000043
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000044
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000045
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000046
+
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000084
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000085
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000086
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000087
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000088
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000089
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+#define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000096
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000097
+#define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000098
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000099
+#define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009A
+#define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009B
+
+/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with changes soon to be in draft 13 */
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C001
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C002
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C003
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C004
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C005
+
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C006
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C007
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C008
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C009
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00A
+
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C00B
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C00C
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C00D
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00E
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00F
+
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C010
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C011
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C012
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C013
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C014
+
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C015
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C016
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C017
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C018
+#define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C019
+
+/* XXX
+ * Inconsistency alert:
+ * The OpenSSL names of ciphers with ephemeral DH here include the string
+ * "DHE", while elsewhere it has always been "EDH".
+ * (The alias for the list of all such ciphers also is "EDH".)
+ * The specifications speak of "EDH"; maybe we should allow both forms
+ * for everything. */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC4-MD5"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA "ADH-AES128-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "AES256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA "AECDH-NULL-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "AECDH-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "PSK-RC4-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+#define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "SEED-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+#define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+
+#define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
+#define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
+#define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
+#define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
+#define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN 64
+#define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH 65
+#define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH 66
+#define TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN 21
+#define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN 22
+/* when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see
+ * comment there) */
+#define TLS_CT_NUMBER 9
+
+#define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH 12
+
+#define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE 20
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "client finished"
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "server finished"
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "key expansion"
+#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE 13
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "client write key"
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "IV block"
+#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE 8
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "master secret"
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64" /*client finished*/
+#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64" /*server finished*/
+#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" /*server write key*/
+#undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e" /*key expansion*/
+#undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" /*client write key*/
+#undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79" /*server write key*/
+#undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b" /*IV block*/
+#undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74" /*master secret*/
+#endif
+
+/* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */
+struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st
+ {
+ unsigned short length;
+ void *data;
+ };
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif