Rename app->bitmask_android

This way, gradle commands generate apks correctly named.

1 files changed, 1563 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a6a4c87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmask_android/openssl/ssl/d1_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1563 @@
+/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
+/* 
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+	{
+	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+		return(DTLSv1_server_method());
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
+			dtls1_accept,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			dtls1_get_server_method)
+
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+	{
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+	int ret= -1;
+	int new_state,state,skip=0;
+	int listen;
+
+	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	clear_sys_error();
+
+	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->info_callback;
+	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+	
+	listen = s->d1->listen;
+
+	/* init things to blank */
+	s->in_handshake++;
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+	s->d1->listen = listen;
+
+	if (s->cert == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		state=s->state;
+
+		switch (s->state)
+			{
+		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+			s->new_session=1;
+			/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+			s->server=1;
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+			if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_buf=buf;
+				}
+
+			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+				{
+				/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
+				 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+				 */
+				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+				 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+				}
+
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+			s->shutdown=0;
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+			s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+			s->shutdown=0;
+			ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+			if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+				s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+			else
+				s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			/* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
+			if (listen)
+				{
+				memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+				}
+
+			/* If we're just listening, stop here */
+			if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+				{
+				ret = 2;
+				s->d1->listen = 0;
+				/* Set expected sequence numbers
+				 * to continue the handshake.
+				 */
+				s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
+				s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
+				s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			
+			break;
+			
+		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+		case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+			ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
+			if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+			/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+			if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+			break;
+			
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+			s->new_session = 2;
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			if (s->hit)
+				{
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+				}
+#else
+			if (s->hit)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+			/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+				&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+				{
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
+				ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				skip = 1;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+#else
+				}
+			else
+				skip=1;
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+			/* clear this, it may get reset by
+			 * send_server_key_exchange */
+			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+				&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+				)
+				/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
+				 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
+				 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
+				 * be able to handle this) */
+				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+			else
+				s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
+			/* only send if a DH key exchange or
+			 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+			if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+			/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+			 * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+			    || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+			    || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+			    || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+				&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+				    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+					&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+					)
+				    )
+				)
+			    )
+				{
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
+				ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				}
+			else
+				skip=1;
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+			if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+				!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+				/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+				 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+				((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+				 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+				/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+				 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+				 * and in RFC 2246): */
+				((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+				 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+				  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+				 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+				 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+				(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+				/* With normal PSK Certificates and
+				 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+				|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+				{
+				/* no cert request */
+				skip=1;
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
+				ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+				s->init_num=0;
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+		
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+			/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+			if (ret == 2)
+				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+			else {
+				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
+				 * have not asked for it :-) */
+				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+				s->init_num=0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+				 * message is not sent.
+				 */
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+				s->init_num = 0;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
+
+				/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+				 * a client cert, it can be verified */ 
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+					NID_md5,
+					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+					NID_sha1,
+					&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
+			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+			if (s->hit)
+				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+			ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#endif
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+				{ ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+				SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+
+			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+			ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+				SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			if (s->hit)
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			else
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL_ST_OK:
+			/* clean a few things up */
+			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+			BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+			s->init_buf=NULL;
+#endif
+
+			/* remove buffering on output */
+			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+				{
+				/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+				 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+				
+				s->new_session=0;
+				
+				ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+				
+				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+				/* s->server=1; */
+				s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
+
+				if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+				}
+			
+			ret = 1;
+
+			/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+			/* next message is server hello */
+			s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+
+		default:
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+			ret= -1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+			}
+		
+		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+			{
+			if (s->debug)
+				{
+				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+					goto end;
+				}
+
+
+			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+				{
+				new_state=s->state;
+				s->state=state;
+				cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
+				s->state=new_state;
+				}
+			}
+		skip=0;
+		}
+end:
+	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+	s->in_handshake--;
+	if (cb != NULL)
+		cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit 
+		 * requests for it */
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned int msg_len;
+	unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
+
+	if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
+		{
+		buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+		msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+		*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+		*(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
+
+		if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+		     s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+			 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return 0;
+			}
+
+		*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
+		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+		p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+		msg_len = p - msg;
+
+		dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
+			DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+		s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=p-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i;
+	unsigned int sl;
+	unsigned long l,Time;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+		{
+		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p=s->s3->server_random;
+		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
+		l2n(Time,p);
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+		/* Do the message type and length last */
+		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+		/* Random stuff */
+		memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+		/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
+		 * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the
+		 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
+		 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
+		 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
+		 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
+		 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+		 */
+		if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+			s->session->session_id_length=0;
+
+		sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+		if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		*(p++)=sl;
+		memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
+		p+=sl;
+
+		/* put the cipher */
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
+		p+=i;
+
+		/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+		*(p++)=0;
+#else
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+			*(p++)=0;
+		else
+			*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+#endif
+
+		/* do the header */
+		l=(p-d);
+		d=buf;
+
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=p-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+		/* do the header */
+		p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	unsigned char *q;
+	int j,num;
+	RSA *rsa;
+	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+	int encodedlen = 0;
+	int curve_id = 0;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
+#endif
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int al,i;
+	unsigned long type;
+	int n;
+	CERT *cert;
+	BIGNUM *r[4];
+	int nr[4],kn;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+		{
+		type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+		cert=s->cert;
+
+		buf=s->init_buf;
+
+		r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
+		n=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		if (type & SSL_kRSA)
+			{
+			rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
+			if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				{
+				rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+				if(rsa == NULL)
+				{
+					al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+					goto f_err;
+				}
+				RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+				cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
+				}
+			if (rsa == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			r[0]=rsa->n;
+			r[1]=rsa->e;
+			s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+			if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+			{
+			dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
+			if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+			if (dhp == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+				{
+				DH_free(dh);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
+			if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+			     dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+			     (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
+				{
+				if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
+				    {
+				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					   ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				    goto err;
+				    }
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+				dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+				if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
+					(dh->priv_key == NULL))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			r[0]=dh->p;
+			r[1]=dh->g;
+			r[2]=dh->pub_key;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+			if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
+			{
+			const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+			if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+				{
+				ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+				      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+				      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+				}
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+				{
+				EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+			if (ecdhp == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+			if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+			    (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+				{
+				if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+				    {
+				    SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				    goto err;
+				    }
+				}
+
+			if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
+			    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+			    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+			 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
+			 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+			 */
+			if ((curve_id = 
+			    tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+			    == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Encode the public key.
+			 * First check the size of encoding and
+			 * allocate memory accordingly.
+			 */
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+			encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
+			    OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
+			bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+			if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+
+			encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
+			    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
+			    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+			    encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+			if (encodedlen == 0) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
+			 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+			 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+			 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+			 * structure. 
+			 */
+			n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+			/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+			 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+			 */
+			r[0]=NULL;
+			r[1]=NULL;
+			r[2]=NULL;
+			r[3]=NULL;
+			}
+		else 
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+			if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+				{
+				/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+				n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+				}
+			else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+			{
+			nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+			n+=2+nr[i];
+			}
+
+		if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+			&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+			{
+			if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+				== NULL)
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			pkey=NULL;
+			kn=0;
+			}
+
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+		for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+			{
+			s2n(nr[i],p);
+			BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
+			p+=nr[i];
+			}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+		if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 
+			{
+			/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+			 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+			 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+			 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+			 * the actual encoded point itself
+			 */
+			*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = 0;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = curve_id;
+			p += 1;
+			*p = encodedlen;
+			p += 1;
+			memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
+			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
+			    encodedlen);
+			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+			p += encodedlen;
+			}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+			{
+			/* copy PSK identity hint */
+			s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 
+			strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+			p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+			}
+#endif
+
+		/* not anonymous */
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			/* n is the length of the params, they start at
+			 * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space
+			 * at the end. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+				{
+				q=md_buf;
+				j=0;
+				for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
+					{
+					EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+						?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
+						(unsigned int *)&i);
+					q+=i;
+					j+=i;
+					}
+				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(u,p);
+				n+=u+2;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+				{
+				/* lets do DSS */
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n);
+				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(i,p);
+				n+=i+2;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+				if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+				{
+				/* let's do ECDSA */
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+					(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				s2n(i,p);
+				n+=i+2;
+				}
+			else
+#endif
+				{
+				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
+				al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+			SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+
+		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+		 * it off */
+		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i,j,nl,off,n;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
+	X509_NAME *name;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	unsigned int msg_len;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
+		{
+		buf=s->init_buf;
+
+		d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+		p++;
+		n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
+		d[0]=n;
+		p+=n;
+		n++;
+
+		off=n;
+		p+=2;
+		n+=2;
+
+		sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+		nl=0;
+		if (sk != NULL)
+			{
+			for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+				{
+				name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+				j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n+j+2))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]);
+				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+					{
+					s2n(j,p);
+					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+					n+=2+j;
+					nl+=2+j;
+					}
+				else
+					{
+					d=p;
+					i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
+					j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
+					n+=j;
+					nl+=j;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		/* else no CA names */
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]);
+		s2n(nl,p);
+
+		d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+		l2n3(n,d);
+		s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+		s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+
+		/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
+		 * it off */
+
+		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+/* XXX: what to do about this? */
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+		/* do the header */
+		*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		*(p++)=0;
+		s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
+		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+			SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+		s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long l;
+	X509 *x;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
+		{
+		x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+		if (x == NULL)
+			{
+			/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+			if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
+			    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return(0);
+				}
+			}
+
+		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+		s->init_num=(int)l;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+		{
+		unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+		int len, slen;
+		unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+		HMAC_CTX hctx;
+		SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+		unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+		unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+		/* get session encoding length */
+		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+		/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ 		 * too long
+ 		 */
+		if (slen > 0xFF00)
+			return -1;
+		/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) +
+ 		 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+			EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+			return -1;
+		senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+		if (!senc)
+			return -1;
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+		/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+		 * from parent ctx.
+		 */
+		if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+			{
+			if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+							 &hctx, 1) < 0)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_free(senc);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+					tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+			memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+			}
+		l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+		/* Skip ticket length for now */
+		p += 2;
+		/* Output key name */
+		macstart = p;
+		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+		p += 16;
+		/* output IV */
+		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+		/* Encrypt session data */
+		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+		p += hlen;
+		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+		/* Total length */
+		len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
+		/* Ticket length */
+		p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
+		s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
+
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num= len;
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+		/* XDTLS:  set message header ? */
+		msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+			SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+#endif