Compiles correctly: app/build-native + gradle.

1 files changed, 1125 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/app/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..00ac158f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1125 @@
+/* ssl/s2_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int get_server_finished(SSL *s);
+static int get_server_verify(SSL *s);
+static int get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+static int client_hello(SSL *s); 
+static int client_master_key(SSL *s);
+static int client_finished(SSL *s);
+static int client_certificate(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to,int padding);
+#define BREAK	break
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
+	{
+	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+		return(SSLv2_client_method());
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_client_method,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			ssl2_connect,
+			ssl2_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl2_connect(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+	int ret= -1;
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+	int new_state,state;
+
+	RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	clear_sys_error();
+
+	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->info_callback;
+	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+	/* init things to blank */
+	s->in_handshake++;
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		state=s->state;
+
+		switch (s->state)
+			{
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+			s->server=0;
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+			s->version=SSL2_VERSION;
+			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+			buf=s->init_buf;
+			if ((buf == NULL) && ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
+				SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
+				{
+				if (buf == s->init_buf)
+					buf=NULL;
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			s->init_buf=buf;
+			buf=NULL;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
+			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+			s->handshake_func=ssl2_connect;
+			BREAK;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B:
+			s->shutdown=0;
+			ret=client_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
+			BREAK;
+		
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B:
+			ret=get_server_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			if (!s->hit) /* new session */
+				{
+				s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A;
+				BREAK; 
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
+				break;
+				}
+	
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B:
+			ret=client_master_key(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_CLIENT_START_ENCRYPTION:
+			/* Ok, we now have all the stuff needed to
+			 * start encrypting, so lets fire it up :-) */
+			if (!ssl2_enc_init(s,1))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			s->s2->clear_text=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B:
+			ret=client_finished(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B:
+			ret=get_server_verify(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B:
+			ret=get_server_finished(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C:
+		case SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D:
+		case SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+			ret=client_certificate(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL_ST_OK:
+			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+				{
+				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+				s->init_buf=NULL;
+				}
+			s->init_num=0;
+		/*	ERR_clear_error();*/
+
+			/* If we want to cache session-ids in the client
+			 * and we successfully add the session-id to the
+			 * cache, and there is a callback, then pass it out.
+			 * 26/11/96 - eay - only add if not a re-used session.
+			 */
+
+			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+			ret=1;
+			/* s->server=0; */
+			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+		default:
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+			return(-1);
+			/* break; */
+			}
+
+		if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+			{
+			new_state=s->state;
+			s->state=state;
+			cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+			s->state=new_state;
+			}
+		}
+end:
+	s->in_handshake--;
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+	if (cb != NULL) 
+		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int i,j;
+	unsigned long len;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	p=buf;
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A)
+		{
+		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),11-s->init_num);
+		if (i < (11-s->init_num)) 
+			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+		s->init_num = 11;
+
+		if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+			{
+			if (p[-1] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+				}
+			else
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
+		/* The Rhapsody 5.5 (a.k.a. MacOS X) compiler bug
+		 * workaround. <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
+		s->hit=(i=*(p++))?1:0;
+#else
+		s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
+#endif
+		s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
+		n2s(p,i);
+		if (i < s->version) s->version=i;
+		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.cert_length=i;
+		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.csl=i;
+		n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length=i;
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B */
+	len = 11 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cert_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.csl + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+	if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+		return -1;
+		}
+	j = (int)len - s->init_num;
+	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
+	if (i != j) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-HELLO */
+
+	/* things are looking good */
+
+	p = buf + 11;
+	if (s->hit)
+		{
+		if (s->s2->tmp.cert_length != 0) 
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		if (s->s2->tmp.cert_type != 0)
+			{
+			if (!(s->options &
+				SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+		if (s->s2->tmp.csl != 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+#ifdef undef
+		/* very bad */
+		memset(s->session->session_id,0,
+			SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES);
+		s->session->session_id_length=0;
+		*/
+#endif
+
+		/* we need to do this in case we were trying to reuse a 
+		 * client session but others are already reusing it.
+		 * If this was a new 'blank' session ID, the session-id
+		 * length will still be 0 */
+		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+			{
+			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (ssl2_set_certificate(s,s->s2->tmp.cert_type,
+			s->s2->tmp.cert_length,p) <= 0)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		p+=s->s2->tmp.cert_length;
+
+		if (s->s2->tmp.csl == 0)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		/* We have just received a list of ciphers back from the
+		 * server.  We need to get the ones that match, then select
+		 * the one we want the most :-). */
+
+		/* load the ciphers */
+		sk=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,s->s2->tmp.csl,
+					    &s->session->ciphers);
+		p+=s->s2->tmp.csl;
+		if (sk == NULL)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+		/* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
+		cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+		(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+		/*
+		 * If server preference flag set, choose the first
+		 * (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
+		 * client preference has priority.
+		 */
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+		    {
+		    prio = sk;
+		    allow = cl;
+		    }
+		else
+		    {
+		    prio = cl;
+		    allow = sk;
+		    }
+		/* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
+		 * don't want to use but that does not matter since we
+		 * will check against the list we originally sent and
+		 * for performance reasons we should not bother to match
+		 * the two lists up just to check. */
+		for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
+			{
+			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
+					     sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
+				break;
+			}
+
+		if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
+
+
+		if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
+		/* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
+		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		}
+
+	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL 
+      || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
+		/* can't happen */
+		{
+		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+		
+	s->s2->conn_id_length=s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+	if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+		{
+		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+		return -1;
+		}
+	memcpy(s->s2->conn_id,p,s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length);
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+static int client_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+/*	CIPHER **cipher;*/
+	int i,n,j;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A)
+		{
+		if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+			(s->session->ssl_version != s->version))
+			{
+			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+		p=buf;					/* header */
+		d=p+9;					/* data section */
+		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;		/* type */
+		s2n(SSL2_VERSION,p);			/* version */
+		n=j=0;
+
+		n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d,0);
+		d+=n;
+
+		if (n == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		s2n(n,p);			/* cipher spec num bytes */
+
+		if ((s->session->session_id_length > 0) &&
+			(s->session->session_id_length <=
+			SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+			{
+			i=s->session->session_id_length;
+			s2n(i,p);		/* session id length */
+			memcpy(d,s->session->session_id,(unsigned int)i);
+			d+=i;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			s2n(0,p);
+			}
+
+		s->s2->challenge_length=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+		s2n(SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH,p);		/* challenge length */
+		/*challenge id data*/
+		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+			return -1;
+		memcpy(d,s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+		d+=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B;
+		s->init_num=d-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_B */
+	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+	}
+
+static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int clear,enc,karg,i;
+	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
+		{
+
+		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		sess=s->session;
+		p=buf;
+		d=p+10;
+		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY;/* type */
+
+		i=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,sess->cipher,p);
+		p+=i;
+
+		/* make key_arg data */
+		i=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+		sess->key_arg_length=i;
+		if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		if (i > 0)
+			if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg,i) <= 0)
+				return -1;
+
+		/* make a master key */
+		i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+		sess->master_key_length=i;
+		if (i > 0)
+			{
+			if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				return -1;
+				}
+			if (RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i) <= 0)
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (sess->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
+			enc=8;
+		else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(sess->cipher))
+			enc=5;
+		else
+			enc=i;
+
+		if ((int)i < enc)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		clear=i-enc;
+		s2n(clear,p);
+		memcpy(d,sess->master_key,(unsigned int)clear);
+		d+=clear;
+
+		enc=ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(sess->sess_cert,enc,
+			&(sess->master_key[clear]),d,
+			(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+		if (enc <= 0)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) d[1]++;
+		if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+			sess->master_key[clear]++;
+#endif
+		s2n(enc,p);
+		d+=enc;
+		karg=sess->key_arg_length;	
+		s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
+		if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		memcpy(d,sess->key_arg,(unsigned int)karg);
+		d+=karg;
+
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B;
+		s->init_num=d-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+
+	/* SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_B */
+	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+	}
+
+static int client_finished(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_A)
+		{
+		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+		if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		memcpy(p,s->s2->conn_id,(unsigned int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
+
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
+		s->init_num=s->s2->conn_id_length+1;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+	}
+
+/* read the data and then respond */
+static int client_certificate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int i;
+	unsigned int n;
+	int cert_ch_len;
+	unsigned char *cert_ch;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+	/* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
+	 * the session if it does not have one */
+
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
+		{
+		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
+			SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
+		if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
+			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
+		s->init_num += i;
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
+
+		/* type=buf[0]; */
+		/* type eq x509 */
+		if (buf[1] != SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+			{
+			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+			{
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+			}
+		else
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
+		}
+
+	cert_ch = buf + 2;
+	cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
+		{
+		X509 *x509=NULL;
+		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+
+		/* If we get an error we need to
+		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+		 * return(error);
+		 * We should then be retried when things are ok and we
+		 * can get a cert or not */
+
+		i=0;
+		if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
+			{
+			i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
+			}
+
+		if (i < 0)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+			{
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
+			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || 
+				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+				{
+				i=0;
+				}
+			X509_free(x509);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+			}
+		else if (i == 1)
+			{
+			if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+			if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+			i=0;
+			}
+
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			/* We have no client certificate to respond with
+			 * so send the correct error message back */
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B;
+			p=buf;
+			*(p++)=SSL2_MT_ERROR;
+			s2n(SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE,p);
+			s->init_off=0;
+			s->init_num=3;
+			/* Write is done at the end */
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_B)
+		{
+		return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+		}
+
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C)
+		{
+		EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+
+		/* ok, now we calculate the checksum
+		 * do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
+		p=buf;
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+		EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
+		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
+			       s->s2->key_material_length);
+		EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
+		i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
+		/* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
+		if(i > 0)
+			EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
+
+		p=buf;
+		d=p+6;
+		*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+		*(p++)=SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
+		n=i2d_X509(s->cert->key->x509,&d);
+		s2n(n,p);
+
+		if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx,d,&n,s->cert->key->privatekey))
+			{
+			/* this is not good.  If things have failed it
+			 * means there so something wrong with the key.
+			 * We will continue with a 0 length signature
+			 */
+			}
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+		s2n(n,p);
+		d+=n;
+
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D;
+		s->init_num=d-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+		}
+	/* if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_D) */
+	return(ssl2_do_write(s));
+	}
+
+static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int i, n, len;
+
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
+		{
+		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
+		if (i < (1-s->init_num)) 
+			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
+		s->init_num += i;
+
+		s->state= SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
+		if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY)
+			{
+			if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,
+					SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+				/* try to read the error message */
+				i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+				return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+				}
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		}
+	
+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	len = 1 + s->s2->challenge_length;
+	n =  len - s->init_num;
+	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+	if (i < n)
+		return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
+	p += 1;
+
+	if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+		{
+		ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+static int get_server_finished(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int i, n, len;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	p=buf;
+	if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_A)
+		{
+		i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
+		if (i < (1-s->init_num))
+			return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
+		s->init_num += i;
+
+		if (*p == SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE)
+			{
+			s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A;
+			return(1);
+			}
+		else if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED)
+			{
+			if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+				/* try to read the error message */
+				i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+				return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+				}
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
+		}
+
+	len = 1 + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+	n = len - s->init_num;
+	i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]), n);
+	if (i < n) /* XXX could be shorter than SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, that's the maximum */
+		return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
+	s->init_num += i;
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-FINISHED */
+
+	if (!s->hit) /* new session */
+		{
+		/* new session-id */
+		/* Make sure we were not trying to re-use an old SSL_SESSION
+		 * or bad things can happen */
+		/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
+		s->session->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+		memcpy(s->session->session_id,p+1,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG))
+			{
+			if ((s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+			    || (0 != memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
+			                    (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length)))
+				{
+				ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+/* loads in the certificate from the server */
+int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	SESS_CERT *sc=NULL;
+	int i;
+	X509 *x509=NULL;
+	int ret=0;
+	
+	x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&data,(long)len);
+	if (x509 == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk,x509))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
+		
+	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+	/* server's cert for this session */
+	sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
+	if (sc == NULL)
+		{
+		ret= -1;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+	s->session->sess_cert=sc;
+
+	sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509=x509;
+	sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+
+	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+	x509=NULL;
+	if (pkey == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!ssl_set_peer_cert_type(sc,SSL2_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE))
+		goto err;
+	ret=1;
+err:
+	sk_X509_free(sk);
+	X509_free(x509);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+static int ssl_rsa_public_encrypt(SESS_CERT *sc, int len, unsigned char *from,
+	     unsigned char *to, int padding)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	int i= -1;
+
+	if ((sc == NULL) || (sc->peer_key->x509 == NULL) ||
+		((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_key->x509)) == NULL))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA);
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	/* we have the public key */
+	i=RSA_public_encrypt(len,from,to,pkey->pkey.rsa,padding);
+	if (i < 0)
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+end:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	return(i);
+	}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif