Correctly connects to millipede.

Location keyword on android.cfg isn't supported, EIP corresponding code
has been commented out. I think we should support it in ics-openvpn, so
that we can show the location instead of the server name.

I've updated all opensssl, openvpn, etc. subprojects from rev 813 of
ics-openvpn, and jni too.

1 files changed, 202 insertions, 138 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/app/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 91562f35..5b84e97c 100644
--- a/app/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/app/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
 	unsigned char *priority);
 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			  unsigned int len);
 
 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
 static int
@@ -232,6 +233,14 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
 
 	item->data = rdata;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+	    (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
+		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
 	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
 		{
@@ -369,14 +378,12 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
 	int i,al;
-	int clear=0;
 	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
-
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess = s->session;
 
@@ -407,14 +414,15 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
-		if (enc_err < 0)
-			{
-			rr->length = 0;
-			s->packet_length = 0;
-			}
+		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
 		goto err;
 		}
 
@@ -425,46 +433,67 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(s->read_hash == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		int t;
-		t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-		mac_size=t;
-
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
-			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			goto err;
-#endif			
-			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length < mac_size)
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			goto err;
-#endif
 			}
-		rr->length-=mac_size;
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
-			goto err;
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		}
+
+	if (enc_err < 0)
+		{
+		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
 		}
 
 	/* r->length is now just compressed */
@@ -604,24 +633,6 @@ again:
 			goto again;
 			}
 
-		/* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-		 * allocate some memory for it.
-		 */
-		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			unsigned char *pp;
-			unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-			s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp;
-			s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen;
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			}
-
 		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 		}
 
@@ -656,20 +667,28 @@ again:
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
-	 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
-	 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
-	 * since they arrive from different connections and
-	 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
-	 */
-	if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-		*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-		!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
-		{
-		rr->length = 0;
-		s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
-		goto again;     /* get another record */
-		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+	if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+  		{
+#endif
+		/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
+		 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
+		 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
+		 * since they arrive from different connections and
+		 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
+		 */
+		if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+		    *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		    !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
+			{
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
+			goto again;     /* get another record */
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+  		}
+#endif
 
 	/* just read a 0 length packet */
 	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
@@ -697,7 +716,6 @@ again:
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	dtls1_clear_timeouts(s);  /* done waiting */
 	return(1);
 
 	}
@@ -755,7 +773,17 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 
 	/* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+	/* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
+	 * app data with SCTP.
+	 */
+	if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
+	    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+	     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
+	     s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
+#else
 	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+#endif
 		{
 		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
@@ -786,6 +814,15 @@ start:
 		item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 		if (item)
 			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+				{
+				DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+				BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+				}
+#endif
+
 			dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
 
 			OPENSSL_free(item->data);
@@ -812,6 +849,12 @@ start:
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		{
+		rr->length = 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 
 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@@ -868,6 +911,31 @@ start:
 				rr->off=0;
 				}
 			}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+			/* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
+			 * belated application data first, so retry.
+			 */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+			    rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+			    (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
+				{
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+				}
+
+			/* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
+			 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
+			 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
+			 */
+			if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+			    s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+				{
+				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+				return(0);
+				}
+#endif			
 		return(n);
 		}
 
@@ -895,6 +963,19 @@ start:
 			dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
 			dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
+			{
+			dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#endif
 		/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
 		else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
 			{
@@ -978,6 +1059,8 @@ start:
 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
 			{
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+			s->new_session = 1;
 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
 				{
@@ -1039,6 +1122,21 @@ start:
 			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
 			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
 				{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+				/* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
+				 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
+				 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
+				 */
+				if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+					BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+					{
+					s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
+					s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+					BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+					return -1;
+					}
+#endif
 				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
 				return(0);
 				}
@@ -1145,6 +1243,15 @@ start:
 		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		/* Remember that a CCS has been received,
+		 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
+		 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
+		 * if no SCTP is used
+		 */
+		BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
+#endif
+
 		goto start;
 		}
 
@@ -1167,6 +1274,9 @@ start:
 		 */
 		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
 			{
+			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+				return -1;
+
 			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
 			rr->length = 0;
 			goto start;
@@ -1184,6 +1294,7 @@ start:
 #else
 			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
 #endif
+			s->renegotiate=1;
 			s->new_session=1;
 			}
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
@@ -1280,7 +1391,16 @@ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 	{
 	int i;
 
-	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+		/* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
+		 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
+		 */
+		if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
+		    (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+		     (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
+#else
+		if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+#endif
 		{
 		i=s->handshake_func(s);
 		if (i < 0) return(i);
@@ -1345,11 +1465,12 @@ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
 
 	OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
+	i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
 	return i;
 	}
 
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			  unsigned int len)
 	{
 	unsigned char *p,*pseq;
 	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
@@ -1358,7 +1479,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	int bs;
-	unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
 
 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
@@ -1368,16 +1488,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 		}
 
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead)
-		{
-		if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-		s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead;
-		}
-
 	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 		{
@@ -1387,7 +1497,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 		}
 
-	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+	if (len == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
@@ -1408,37 +1518,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 			goto err;
 		}
 
-	/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
-#if 0
-	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
-	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
-	    && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
-		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-		 */
-
-		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
-			{
-			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
-			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
-			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
-			 * together with the actual payload) */
-			prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
-			if (prefix_len <= 0)
-				goto err;
-
-			if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
-				{
-				/* insufficient space */
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-				goto err;
-				}
-			}
-		
-		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
-		}
-#endif
 	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
 
 	/* write the header */
@@ -1544,14 +1623,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 
 	ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
 
-	if (create_empty_fragment)
-		{
-		/* we are in a recursive call;
-		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
-		 */
-		return wr->length;
-		}
-
 	/* now let's set up wb */
 	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
 	wb->offset = 0;
@@ -1648,7 +1719,7 @@ int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
 		}
 #endif
 
-	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
+	i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
 	if (i <= 0)
 		{
 		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
@@ -1791,10 +1862,3 @@ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
 
 	memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
 	}
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
-	{
-	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
-	}