Back to the standard "app" module.

This return to "app" instead of "bitmask_android" is due to this reading: https://developer.android.com/sdk/installing/studio-build.html#projectStructure
I'll have to tweak the final apk name in build.gradle.

1 files changed, 1542 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/app/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..57766717
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1542 @@
+/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
+/* 
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.  
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#endif
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
+	{
+	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		return(DTLSv1_client_method());
+	else
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
+			ssl_undefined_function,
+			dtls1_connect,
+			dtls1_get_client_method)
+
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
+	{
+	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
+	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+	int ret= -1;
+	int new_state,state,skip=0;;
+
+	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	clear_sys_error();
+
+	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->info_callback;
+	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+	
+	s->in_handshake++;
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		state=s->state;
+
+		switch(s->state)
+			{
+		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+			s->new_session=1;
+			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+			/* break */
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+			s->server=0;
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
+
+			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
+			    (s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+				
+			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
+				{
+				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+					{
+					ret= -1;
+					goto end;
+					}
+				s->init_buf=buf;
+				buf=NULL;
+				}
+
+			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+			/* setup buffing BIO */
+			if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
+
+			/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			/* mark client_random uninitialized */
+			memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+			s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+			s->hit = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+			s->shutdown=0;
+
+			/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_client_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+			if ( s->d1->send_cookie)
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+				}
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+			if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+				s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
+
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			else
+				{
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+				if (s->hit)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+				else
+					s->state=DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+				}
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+		case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+			ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
+			if ( ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+			if ( s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+			else
+				s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+			s->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				s->hit = 1;
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+				s->init_num=0;
+				break;
+				}
+#endif
+			/* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
+			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
+				{
+				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+				else
+					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				skip = 1;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+				}
+#else
+				}
+			else
+				skip=1;
+
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			/* at this point we check that we have the
+			 * required stuff from the server */
+			if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
+			 * sent back */
+			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
+			 * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+				}
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+			dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+			if (!s->hit)
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+
+			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+			s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
+			if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+				s->session->compress_meth=0;
+			else
+				s->session->compress_meth=
+					s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+
+			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			
+			dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+			if (!s->hit)
+				dtls1_start_timer(s);
+			ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
+				SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+			/* clear flags */
+			s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+			if (s->hit)
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
+				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
+					{
+					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
+					}
+				}
+			else
+				{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+				/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
+				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+#endif
+				
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+				}
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+		break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->init_num=0;
+		break;
+#endif
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+			if (s->hit)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
+				{
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL_ST_OK:
+			/* clean a few things up */
+			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+				{
+				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+				s->init_buf=NULL;
+				}
+#endif
+
+			/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
+			 * remove the buffering now */
+			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+			s->init_num=0;
+			s->new_session=0;
+
+			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+			ret=1;
+			/* s->server=0; */
+			s->handshake_func=dtls1_connect;
+			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+
+			/* done with handshaking */
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq  = 0;
+			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+			
+		default:
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+			ret= -1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+			}
+
+		/* did we do anything */
+		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
+			{
+			if (s->debug)
+				{
+				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+					goto end;
+				}
+
+			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
+				{
+				new_state=s->state;
+				s->state=state;
+				cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
+				s->state=new_state;
+				}
+			}
+		skip=0;
+		}
+end:
+	s->in_handshake--;
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+	if (cb != NULL)
+		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	unsigned int i,j;
+	unsigned long Time,l;
+	SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+		{
+		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+		if ((s->session == NULL) ||
+			(s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			!sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+			(s->session->not_resumable))
+			{
+		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
+				goto err;
+			}
+		/* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+		p=s->s3->client_random;
+
+		/* if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+		 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */
+		for (i=0;p[i]=='\0' && i<sizeof(s->s3->client_random);i++) ;
+		if (i==sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
+			{
+			Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);	/* Time */
+			l2n(Time,p);
+			RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,sizeof(s->s3->client_random)-4);
+			}
+
+		/* Do the message type and length last */
+		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+		s->client_version=s->version;
+
+		/* Random stuff */
+		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+		/* Session ID */
+		if (s->new_session)
+			i=0;
+		else
+			i=s->session->session_id_length;
+		*(p++)=i;
+		if (i != 0)
+			{
+			if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
+			p+=i;
+			}
+		
+		/* cookie stuff */
+		if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+		memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+		p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+
+		/* Ciphers supported */
+		i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		s2n(i,p);
+		p+=i;
+
+		/* COMPRESSION */
+		if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+			j=0;
+		else
+			j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+		*(p++)=1+j;
+		for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+			{
+			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
+			*(p++)=comp->id;
+			}
+		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+#endif		
+
+		l=(p-d);
+		d=buf;
+
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=p-buf;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int n, al, ok = 0;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	unsigned int cookie_len;
+
+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
+		DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
+		-1,
+		s->max_cert_list,
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+		{
+		s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
+		return(1);
+		}
+
+	data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	if ((data[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (data[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+		s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|data[1];
+		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+	data+=2;
+
+	cookie_len = *(data++);
+	if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
+	s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+	s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
+	return 1;
+
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	int n;
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	unsigned char *q;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+	const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+	BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
+		{
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+		
+		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+                /* Fool emacs indentation */
+                if (0) {}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+			{
+			RSA *rsa;
+			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+			else
+				{
+				pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+				if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+					(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+					(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
+				EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+				}
+				
+			tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
+			tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
+			if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
+					goto err;
+
+			s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+			q=p;
+			/* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+				p+=2;
+			n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+				tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
+			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
+#endif
+			if (n <= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+				{
+				s2n(n,q);
+				n+=2;
+				}
+
+			s->session->master_key_length=
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key,
+					tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+			}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+		else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+                        {
+                        krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
+                        KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+                        /*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
+                        krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
+                        krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
+			const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
+						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+                        printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+                                alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+			authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
+#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+                        krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+				&kssl_err);
+			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+                        if (enc == NULL)
+                            goto err;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+                        {
+                        printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+                        if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+                        }
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+                        if (krb5rc)
+                                {
+                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+						kssl_err.reason);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+
+			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+			**
+                        **  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+                        **  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+                        **  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+                        **  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
+                        **    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+                        **
+			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+			**  Example:
+			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
+			**  optional authenticator omitted.
+			*/
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
+			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+			p+= enc_ticket->length;
+			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
+			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
+				{
+				s2n(authp->length,p);
+				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+				p+= authp->length;
+				n+= authp->length + 2;
+				
+				free(authp->data);
+				authp->data = NULL;
+				authp->length = 0;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
+				n+=2;
+				}
+ 
+			if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
+			    goto err;
+
+			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+			**				kssl_ctx->length);
+			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+			*/
+
+			memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);  /* per RFC 1510 */
+			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
+				kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+				sizeof tmp_buf);
+			EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+			outl += padl;
+			if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
+			s2n(outl,p);
+			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+			p+=outl;
+			n+=outl + 2;
+
+                        s->session->master_key_length=
+                                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key,
+					tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+                        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+			{
+			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
+			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+			else
+				{
+				/* we get them from the cert */
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			
+			/* generate a new random key */
+			if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
+			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
+
+			n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
+
+			if (n <= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* generate master key from the result */
+			s->session->master_key_length=
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key,p,n);
+			/* clean up */
+			memset(p,0,n);
+
+			/* send off the data */
+			n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+			s2n(n,p);
+			BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
+			n+=2;
+
+			DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+			/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
+			}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 
+		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+			{
+			const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+			EC_KEY *tkey;
+			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+			int field_size = 0;
+
+			/* Did we send out the client's
+			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
+			 * computation as part of client certificate?
+			 * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+			 */
+			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) 
+				{
+				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+				 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+				 * To add such support, one needs to add
+				 * code that checks for appropriate 
+				 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+				 * For example, the cert have an ECC
+				 * key on the same curve as the server's
+				 * and the key should be authorized for
+				 * key agreement.
+				 *
+				 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+				 * to skip sending the certificate verify
+				 * message.
+				 *
+				 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+				 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+				 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+				 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+				 */
+				}
+
+			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+				{
+				tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+				srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
+				    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+				if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
+				    (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
+				    (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					goto err;
+					}
+
+				tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+				}
+
+			srvr_group   = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+			srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+			if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
+				{ 
+				/* Reuse key info from our certificate
+				 * We only need our private key to perform
+				 * the ECDH computation.
+				 */
+				const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+				tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+				priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+				if (priv_key == NULL)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			else 
+				{
+				/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+				if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+					goto err;
+					}
+				}
+
+			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+			 */
+
+			field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+			if (field_size <= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
+				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+			if (n <= 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
+				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			/* generate master key from the result */
+			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+			    -> generate_master_secret(s, 
+				s->session->master_key,
+				p, n);
+
+			memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
+				{
+				/* Send empty client key exch message */
+				n = 0;
+				}
+			else 
+				{
+				/* First check the size of encoding and
+				 * allocate memory accordingly.
+				 */
+				encoded_pt_len = 
+				    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
+					EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
+					POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+					NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+				encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
+				    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * 
+					sizeof(unsigned char)); 
+				bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+				if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || 
+				    (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+					goto err;
+					}
+
+				/* Encode the public key */
+				n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
+				    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
+				    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
+				    encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+				*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+				/* Encoded point will be copied here */
+				p += 1; 
+				/* copy the point */
+				memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+				/* increment n to account for length field */
+				n += 1; 
+				}
+
+			/* Free allocated memory */
+			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+			if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+			if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
+				 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+			}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+			{
+			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+			unsigned char *t = NULL;
+			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+			int psk_err = 1;
+
+			n = 0;
+			if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
+			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+			else if (psk_len == 0)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+			memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+			s2n(psk_len, t);
+			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+			t+=psk_len;
+			s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+				s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto psk_err;
+				}
+
+			s->session->master_key_length =
+				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+					s->session->master_key,
+					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
+			n = strlen(identity);
+			s2n(n, p);
+			memcpy(p, identity, n);
+			n+=2;
+			psk_err = 0;
+		psk_err:
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+			if (psk_err != 0)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
+		else
+			{
+			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+		SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+		/*
+		 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+		 l2n3(n,d);
+		 l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+		 s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+		*/
+		
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+		/* number of bytes to write */
+		s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+	
+	/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+	if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
+		EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*d;
+	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	unsigned u=0;
+#endif
+	unsigned long n;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+	int j;
+#endif
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
+		{
+		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+		pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+		s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+		NID_sha1,
+			&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+			{
+			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+				NID_md5,
+				&(data[0]));
+			if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+					 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			s2n(u,p);
+			n=u+2;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+			{
+			if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			s2n(j,p);
+			n=j+2;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+			{
+			if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+				    ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			s2n(j,p);
+			n=j+2;
+			}
+		else
+#endif
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+			SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n) ;
+
+		s->init_num=(int)n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+		}
+
+	/* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+err:
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+	{
+	X509 *x509=NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	int i;
+	unsigned long l;
+
+	if (s->state ==	SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
+		{
+		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+		else
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+		}
+
+	/* We need to get a client cert */
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
+		{
+		/* If we get an error, we need to
+		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
+		 * We then get retied later */
+		i=0;
+		i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+		if (i < 0)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
+			{
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
+				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
+				i=0;
+			}
+		else if (i == 1)
+			{
+			i=0;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+			}
+
+		if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
+		if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+				return(1);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
+				}
+			}
+
+		/* Ok, we have a cert */
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+		}
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
+		{
+		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+		l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
+			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
+		s->init_num=(int)l;
+		s->init_off=0;
+
+		/* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
+
+		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+		}
+	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+	}
+
+