Compiles correctly: app/build-native + gradle.

1 files changed, 2219 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5a0b0249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2219 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL	0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE		0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME		0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME	0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT	0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH	0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID		0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA	0x002
+
+static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+			unsigned int *preasons,
+			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
+			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+				unsigned int *preasons);
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
+	{
+	return ok;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
+	{
+	return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
+	}
+#endif
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+	X509_NAME *xn;
+	int bad_chain = 0;
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+	int depth,i,ok=0;
+	int num;
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
+	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
+	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
+	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
+		{
+		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
+			{
+			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto end;
+			}
+		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+		}
+
+	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
+	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+	    && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+	depth=param->depth;
+
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		/* If we have enough, we break */
+		if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+		                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+		                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
+		                         * code later.
+		                         */
+
+		/* If we are self signed, we break */
+		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
+
+		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+		if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
+			{
+			xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
+			if (xtmp != NULL)
+				{
+				if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
+					{
+					X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+					goto end;
+					}
+				CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+				(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
+				ctx->last_untrusted++;
+				x=xtmp;
+				num++;
+				/* reparse the full chain for
+				 * the next one */
+				continue;
+				}
+			}
+		break;
+		}
+
+	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
+	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
+	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+
+	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
+ 	 * is self signed.
+ 	 */
+
+	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
+	xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+		{
+		/* we have a self signed certificate */
+		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+			{
+			/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
+			 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
+			 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
+			 */
+			ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+			if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
+				{
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+				ctx->current_cert=x;
+				ctx->error_depth=i-1;
+				if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
+				bad_chain = 1;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			else 
+				{
+				/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
+				 * so we get any trust settings.
+				 */
+				X509_free(x);
+				x = xtmp;
+				(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+				ctx->last_untrusted=0;
+				}
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
+			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+			ctx->last_untrusted--;
+			num--;
+			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		/* If we have enough, we break */
+		if (depth < num) break;
+
+		/* If we are self signed, we break */
+		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
+
+		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+		if (ok < 0) return ok;
+		if (ok == 0) break;
+
+		x = xtmp;
+		if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
+			{
+			X509_free(xtmp);
+			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		num++;
+		}
+
+	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+	xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
+		{
+		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
+			{
+			if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+			else
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+			ctx->current_cert=x;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+
+			sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
+			num++;
+			ctx->last_untrusted=num;
+			ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+			chain_ss=NULL;
+			}
+
+		ctx->error_depth=num-1;
+		bad_chain = 1;
+		ok=cb(0,ctx);
+		if (!ok) goto end;
+		}
+
+	/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
+	ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
+
+	if (!ok) goto end;
+
+	/* Check name constraints */
+
+	ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
+	
+	if (!ok) goto end;
+
+	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
+
+	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+
+	if (!ok) goto end;
+
+	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+
+	/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
+	 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+	 */
+
+	ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+	if(!ok) goto end;
+
+	/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
+	if (ctx->verify != NULL)
+		ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
+	else
+		ok=internal_verify(ctx);
+	if(!ok) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+	/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+	ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+	if (!ok) goto end;
+	ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+	if (!ok) goto end;
+#endif
+
+	/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+	if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+		ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+	if(!ok) goto end;
+	if (0)
+		{
+end:
+		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+		}
+	if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+	if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
+	return ok;
+	}
+
+
+/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ */
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+	int i;
+	X509 *issuer;
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+		{
+		issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+			return issuer;
+		}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+	if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+		return 1;
+	/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx->error = ret;
+	ctx->current_cert = x;
+	ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+	return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+	*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+	if (*issuer)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+	
+
+/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
+ * with the supplied purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+	return 1;
+#else
+	int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+	X509 *x;
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+	int proxy_path_length = 0;
+	int purpose;
+	int allow_proxy_certs;
+	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+	   -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+	       use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+	   0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+	       used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+	   1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+	       all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+	*/
+	must_be_ca = -1;
+
+	/* CRL path validation */
+	if (ctx->parent)
+		{
+		allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+		purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		allow_proxy_certs =
+			!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+		/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
+		   software happy */
+		if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+			allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+		purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+		}
+
+	/* Check all untrusted certificates */
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
+		{
+		int ret;
+		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+		if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+			&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+			ctx->error_depth = i;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto end;
+			}
+		if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+			ctx->error_depth = i;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto end;
+			}
+		ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+		switch(must_be_ca)
+			{
+		case -1:
+			if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+				&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (ret != 0)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+				}
+			else
+				ret = 1;
+			break;
+			}
+		if (ret == 0)
+			{
+			ctx->error_depth = i;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto end;
+			}
+		if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
+			{
+			ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
+			if ((ret == 0)
+				|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+					&& (ret != 1)))
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+				ctx->error_depth = i;
+				ctx->current_cert = x;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+		if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+			   && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+			   && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+			ctx->error_depth = i;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto end;
+			}
+		/* Increment path length if not self issued */
+		if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+			plen++;
+		/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
+		   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
+		   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
+		   CA certificate.  */
+		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+			{
+			if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
+				{
+				ctx->error =
+					X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+				ctx->error_depth = i;
+				ctx->current_cert = x;
+				ok=cb(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			proxy_path_length++;
+			must_be_ca = 0;
+			}
+		else
+			must_be_ca = 1;
+		}
+	ok = 1;
+ end:
+	return ok;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	X509 *x;
+	int i, j, rv;
+	/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+	for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+		/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+		if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+			continue;
+		/* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
+		 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
+		 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
+		 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
+		 */
+		for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
+			{
+			NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+			if (nc)
+				{
+				rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+				if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+					{
+					ctx->error = rv;
+					ctx->error_depth = i;
+					ctx->current_cert = x;
+					if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
+						return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+	return 1;
+#else
+	int i, ok;
+	X509 *x;
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
+	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+	ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+	if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+		return 1;
+	ctx->error_depth = i;
+	ctx->current_cert = x;
+	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+	else
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+	ok = cb(0, ctx);
+	return ok;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	int i, last, ok;
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+		return 1;
+	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+		last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	else
+		{
+		/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+		if (ctx->parent)
+			return 1;
+		last = 0;
+		}
+	for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
+		{
+		ctx->error_depth = i;
+		ok = check_cert(ctx);
+		if (!ok) return ok;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+	X509 *x;
+	int ok, cnum;
+	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+	ctx->current_cert = x;
+	ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+	ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+	ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+	while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
+		{
+		/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+		if (ctx->get_crl)
+			ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+		else
+			ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+		/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
+		 * notify callback
+		 */
+		if(!ok)
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ctx->current_crl = crl;
+		ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+		if (!ok)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (dcrl)
+			{
+			ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+			if (!ok)
+				goto err;
+			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+			if (!ok)
+				goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			ok = 1;
+
+		/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+		if (ok != 2)
+			{
+			ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+			if (!ok)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+		X509_CRL_free(crl);
+		X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+		crl = NULL;
+		dcrl = NULL;
+		}
+	err:
+	X509_CRL_free(crl);
+	X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+	ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+	return ok;
+
+	}
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+	{
+	time_t *ptime;
+	int i;
+	if (notify)
+		ctx->current_crl = crl;
+	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+	else
+		ptime = NULL;
+
+	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		if (!notify)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (i > 0)
+		{
+		if (!notify)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
+		{
+		i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			if (!notify)
+				return 0;
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+				return 0;
+			}
+		/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+		if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
+			{
+			if (!notify)
+				return 0;
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+			if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (notify)
+		ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+			X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+			STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+	{
+	int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+	unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+	X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+	X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+		{
+		crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+		reasons = *preasons;
+		crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+
+		if (crl_score > best_score)
+			{
+			best_crl = crl;
+			best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+			best_score = crl_score;
+			best_reasons = reasons;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (best_crl)
+		{
+		if (*pcrl)
+			X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+		*pcrl = best_crl;
+		*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+		*pscore = best_score;
+		*preasons = best_reasons;
+		CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+		if (*pdcrl)
+			{
+			X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+			*pdcrl = NULL;
+			}
+		get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+		}
+
+	if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+	{
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+	int i;
+	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
+	if (i >= 0)
+		{
+		/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+			return 0;
+		exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+		}
+	else
+		exta = NULL;
+
+	i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+
+	if (i >= 0)
+		{
+
+		if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+			return 0;
+		extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+		}
+	else
+		extb = NULL;
+
+	if (!exta && !extb)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!exta || !extb)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+	{
+	/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+	if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+			return 0;
+	/* Base must have a CRL number */
+	if (!base->crl_number)
+			return 0;
+	/* Issuer names must match */
+	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+				X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+		return 0;
+	/* AKID and IDP must match */
+	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+			return 0;
+	if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+			return 0;
+	/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+			return 0;
+	/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+	if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
+ * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+			X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+	{
+	X509_CRL *delta;
+	int i;
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+		return;
+	if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+		{
+		delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+		if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
+			{
+			if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+				*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+			CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+			*dcrl = delta;
+			return;
+			}
+		}
+	*dcrl = NULL;
+	}
+
+/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
+ * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
+ * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
+ * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
+ * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+			unsigned int *preasons,
+			X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+	{
+
+	int crl_score = 0;
+	unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+	/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+	/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+		return 0;
+	/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+		{
+		if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
+		{
+		/* If no new reasons reject */
+		if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+			return 0;
+		}
+	/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+	else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+		return 0;
+	/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+		{
+		if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+	if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+	/* Check expiry */
+	if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+	/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+	crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+	/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+	if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+	if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
+		{
+		/* If no new reasons reject */
+		if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+			return 0;
+		tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+		crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+		}
+
+	*preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+	return crl_score;
+
+	}
+
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+				X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+	{
+	X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+	X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+	int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+	int i;
+
+	if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+		cidx++;
+
+	crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+	if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
+		{
+		if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
+			{
+			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
+			return;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
+		{
+		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+			continue;
+		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
+			{
+			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
+			return;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+	if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+		return;
+
+	/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
+	 * set of untrusted certificates.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
+		{
+		crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+			continue;
+		if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
+			{
+			*pissuer = crl_issuer;
+			*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+			return;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
+ * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
+ * practice.
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+	{
+	X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+	int ret;
+	/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+	if (ctx->parent)
+		return 0;
+	if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+		return -1;
+
+	crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+	/* Copy verify params across */
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+	crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+	crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	/* Verify CRL issuer */
+	ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+	if (ret <= 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+	ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+	err:
+	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+	return ret;
+	}
+
+/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
+ * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
+ * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
+ * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
+ * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
+ * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+			STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+			STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+	{
+	X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+	cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+	crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+	if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
+ * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+	{
+	X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+	GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+	GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+	int i, j;
+	if (!a || !b)
+		return 1;
+	if (a->type == 1)
+		{
+		if (!a->dpname)
+			return 0;
+		/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+		if (b->type == 1)
+			{
+			if (!b->dpname)
+				return 0;
+			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+				return 1;
+			else
+				return 0;
+			}
+		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+		nm = a->dpname;
+		gens = b->name.fullname;
+		}
+	else if (b->type == 1)
+		{
+		if (!b->dpname)
+			return 0;
+		/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+		gens = a->name.fullname;
+		nm = b->dpname;
+		}
+
+	/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+	if (nm)
+		{
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
+			{
+			gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);	
+			if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+				continue;
+			if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+				return 1;
+			}
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
+		{
+		gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+		for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
+			{
+			genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+			if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+
+	}
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+	{
+	int i;
+	X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+	/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+	if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+		return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
+		{
+		GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+		if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+			continue;
+		if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+			return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+				unsigned int *preasons)
+	{
+	int i;
+	if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+		return 0;
+	if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+		{
+		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+		{
+		DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+		if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
+			{
+			if (!crl->idp ||
+			     idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
+				{
+				*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+				return 1;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
+ * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
+ */
+	
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+				X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int ok;
+	X509 *issuer = NULL;
+	int crl_score = 0;
+	unsigned int reasons;
+	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+	STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+	X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+	reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+	ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
+				&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
+	if (ok)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+	skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+	/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+	if (!skcrl && crl)
+		goto done;
+
+	get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+	done:
+
+	/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+	if (crl)
+		{
+		ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+		ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+		ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+		*pcrl = crl;
+		*pdcrl = dcrl;
+		return 1;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+	{
+	X509 *issuer = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+	int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+	chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+	/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+	if (ctx->current_issuer)
+		issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
+	/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
+	 * is next certificate in chain.
+	 */
+	else if (cnum < chnum)
+		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+	else
+		{
+		issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+		/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+		if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if(!ok) goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if(issuer)
+		{
+		/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
+		 * been done
+		 */
+		if (!crl->base_crl_number)
+			{
+			/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+			if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+				!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+				if(!ok) goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+				if(!ok) goto err;
+				}
+
+			if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
+				{
+				if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
+					{
+					ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+					ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+					if(!ok) goto err;
+					}
+				}
+
+			if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+				{
+				ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+				if(!ok) goto err;
+				}
+
+
+			}
+
+		if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
+			{
+			ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+			if (!ok)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+		/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+		ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+		if(!ikey)
+			{
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			if (!ok) goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* Verify CRL signature */
+			if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
+				{
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+				ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+	ok = 1;
+
+	err:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+	return ok;
+	}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int ok;
+	X509_REVOKED *rev;
+	/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
+	 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
+	 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
+	 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
+	 */
+	if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+		{
+		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+			return 1;
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		if(!ok)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+	 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
+	 */
+	if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
+		{
+		if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+			return 2;
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		if (!ok)
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	int ret;
+	if (ctx->parent)
+		return 1;
+	ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+				ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+	if (ret == 0)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+	if (ret == -1)
+		{
+		/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
+		 * callback.
+		 */
+		X509 *x;
+		int i;
+		for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
+			{
+			x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+			if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+				continue;
+			ctx->current_cert = x;
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+			if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+				return 0;
+			}
+		return 1;
+		}
+	if (ret == -2)
+		{
+		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+		return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		}
+
+	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
+		{
+		ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+		ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+	{
+	time_t *ptime;
+	int i;
+
+	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+		ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+	else
+		ptime = NULL;
+
+	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+		ctx->current_cert=x;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (i > 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+		ctx->current_cert=x;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+	if (i == 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+		ctx->current_cert=x;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (i < 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+		ctx->current_cert=x;
+		if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	int ok=0,n;
+	X509 *xs,*xi;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+	n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+	ctx->error_depth=n-1;
+	n--;
+	xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
+
+	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+		xs=xi;
+	else
+		{
+		if (n <= 0)
+			{
+			ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+			ctx->current_cert=xi;
+			ok=cb(0,ctx);
+			goto end;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			n--;
+			ctx->error_depth=n;
+			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
+			}
+		}
+
+/*	ctx->error=0;  not needed */
+	while (n >= 0)
+		{
+		ctx->error_depth=n;
+
+		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+		 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
+		 * just wastes time.
+		 */
+		if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
+			{
+			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+				{
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+				ctx->current_cert=xi;
+				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok) goto end;
+				}
+			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+				{
+				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+				ctx->current_cert=xs;
+				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+				if (!ok)
+					{
+					EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+					goto end;
+					}
+				}
+			EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+			pkey=NULL;
+			}
+
+		xs->valid = 1;
+
+		ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+		if (!ok)
+			goto end;
+
+		/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+		ctx->current_issuer=xi;
+		ctx->current_cert=xs;
+		ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
+		if (!ok) goto end;
+
+		n--;
+		if (n >= 0)
+			{
+			xi=xs;
+			xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
+			}
+		}
+	ok=1;
+end:
+	return ok;
+	}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+	return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+	{
+	char *str;
+	ASN1_TIME atm;
+	long offset;
+	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+	int i,j;
+
+	p=buff1;
+	i=ctm->length;
+	str=(char *)ctm->data;
+	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+		{
+		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
+		memcpy(p,str,10);
+		p+=10;
+		str+=10;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (i < 13) return 0;
+		memcpy(p,str,12);
+		p+=12;
+		str+=12;
+		}
+
+	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+	else
+		{ 
+		*(p++)= *(str++);
+		*(p++)= *(str++);
+		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+		if (*str == '.')
+			{
+			str++;
+			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
+			}
+		
+		}
+	*(p++)='Z';
+	*(p++)='\0';
+
+	if (*str == 'Z')
+		offset=0;
+	else
+		{
+		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+			return 0;
+		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+		if (*str == '-')
+			offset= -offset;
+		}
+	atm.type=ctm->type;
+	atm.flags = 0;
+	atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
+	atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+	if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+		{
+		i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
+		if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+		j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
+		if (j < 50) j+=100;
+
+		if (i < j) return -1;
+		if (i > j) return 1;
+		}
+	i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
+	if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+		return -1;
+	else
+		return i;
+	}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
+{
+	return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+	{
+	return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+	}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+				int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+	{
+	time_t t;
+
+	if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
+	else time(&t);
+
+	if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
+		{
+		if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+			return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+		if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+			return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
+								offset_sec);
+		}
+	return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+	}
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
+	int i,j;
+
+	if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
+
+	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+		{
+		ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
+		if (ktmp == NULL)
+			{
+			X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+			break;
+		else
+			{
+			EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+			ktmp=NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	if (ktmp == NULL)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* first, populate the other certs */
+	for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
+		{
+		ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
+		EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
+		}
+	
+	if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+	     CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+	{
+	/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
+	 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
+	return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
+			new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+	{
+	return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
+	}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+	{
+	return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->error;
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+	{
+	ctx->error=err;
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->error_depth;
+	}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->current_cert;
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->chain;
+	}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	int i;
+	X509 *x;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+	if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+		{
+		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		}
+	return chain;
+	}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->current_issuer;
+	}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->current_crl;
+	}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->parent;
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+	{
+	ctx->cert=x;
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+	{
+	ctx->untrusted=sk;
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+	{
+	ctx->crls=sk;
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+	{
+	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+	{
+	return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+	}
+
+/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
+ * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
+ * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
+ * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
+ * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
+ * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
+ * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
+ * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+				int purpose, int trust)
+{
+	int idx;
+	/* If purpose not set use default */
+	if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
+	/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+	if (purpose)
+		{
+		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+		idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+		if (idx == -1)
+			{
+			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+		if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+			{
+			idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+			if (idx == -1)
+				{
+				X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+						X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+				return 0;
+				}
+			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+			}
+		/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+		if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
+		}
+	if (trust)
+		{
+		idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+		if (idx == -1)
+			{
+			X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+						X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+	if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+	ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+	if (!ctx)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+	     STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	ctx->ctx=store;
+	ctx->current_method=0;
+	ctx->cert=x509;
+	ctx->untrusted=chain;
+	ctx->crls = NULL;
+	ctx->last_untrusted=0;
+	ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
+	ctx->valid=0;
+	ctx->chain=NULL;
+	ctx->error=0;
+	ctx->explicit_policy=0;
+	ctx->error_depth=0;
+	ctx->current_cert=NULL;
+	ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
+	ctx->current_crl=NULL;
+	ctx->current_crl_score=0;
+	ctx->current_reasons=0;
+	ctx->tree = NULL;
+	ctx->parent = NULL;
+
+	ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+
+	if (!ctx->param)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
+	 * use defaults.
+	 */
+
+
+	if (store)
+		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+	else
+		ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+	if (store)
+		{
+		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+		ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+		}
+	else
+		ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+	if (ret)
+		ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+					X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		{
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (store && store->check_issued)
+		ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+	else
+		ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+	if (store && store->get_issuer)
+		ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+	else
+		ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+	if (store && store->verify_cb)
+		ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+	else
+		ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+	if (store && store->verify)
+		ctx->verify = store->verify;
+	else
+		ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+	if (store && store->check_revocation)
+		ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+	else
+		ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+	if (store && store->get_crl)
+		ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+	if (store && store->check_crl)
+		ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+	if (store && store->cert_crl)
+		ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+	else
+		ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+	if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+		ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+	else
+		ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+	if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+		ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+	else
+		ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+	ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+
+	/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
+	 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
+	 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
+	/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
+	if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+				&(ctx->ex_data)))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
+ * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+	ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+	ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+	if (ctx->param != NULL)
+		{
+		if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+			X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+		ctx->param=NULL;
+		}
+	if (ctx->tree != NULL)
+		{
+		X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+		ctx->tree=NULL;
+		}
+	if (ctx->chain != NULL)
+		{
+		sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
+		ctx->chain=NULL;
+		}
+	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+	memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
+	{
+	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+				  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+	{
+	ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
+	}
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->tree;
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->explicit_policy;
+	}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+	{
+	const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+	param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+	if (!param)
+		return 0;
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+	}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	return ctx->param;
+	}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+	{
+	if (ctx->param)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+	ctx->param = param;
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)