ics-openvpn as a submodule! beautiful

ics-openvpn is now officially on GitHub, and they track openssl and
openvpn as submodules, so it's easier to update everything. Just a git
submodule update --recursive.

I've also set up soft links to native modules from ics-openvpn in app,
so that we don't copy files in Gradle (which was causing problems with
the submodules .git* files, not being copied). That makes the repo
cleaner.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 261 deletions

diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c3633319..00000000
--- a/app/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */
-/* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
-   basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
-
-/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
-
-/* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000,
- * <URL: http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z>
- * for problems with the security proof for the
- * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on.
- * 
- * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto,
- * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!",
- * Dec. 2000, <URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>.
- * The new proof has stronger requirements for the
- * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead
- * of one-wayness.  For the RSA function, this is
- * an equivalent notion.
- */
-
-#include "constant_time_locl.h"
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-	const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-	const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-	const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-	{
-	int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
-	unsigned char *db, *seed;
-	unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-	if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
-		   RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	to[0] = 0;
-	seed = to + 1;
-	db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
-
-	if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
-		return 0;
-	memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
-		emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
-	db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
-	memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
-	if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
-		return 0;
-#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
-	memcpy(seed,
-	   "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
-	   20);
-#endif
-
-	dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	if (dbmask == NULL)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
-		return 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-		db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
-
-	if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
-		return 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-		seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
-
-	OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-	const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
-	const unsigned char *param, int plen)
-	{
-	int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
-	unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
-	const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
-	/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes:
-	 * em = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */
-	unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
-		phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
-        if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	/*
-	 * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
-	 * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
-	 * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-	 * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus
-	 * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
-	 * This does not leak any side-channel information.
-	 */
-	if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2)
-		goto decoding_err;
-
-	dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1;
-	db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
-	em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-	if (db == NULL || em == NULL)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto cleanup;
-		}
-
-	/*
-	 * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
-	 * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
-	 * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
-	 * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
-	 *
-	 * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
-	 */
-	memset(em, 0, num);
-	memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
-
-	/*
-	 * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
-	 * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
-	 * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
-	 */
-	good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
-
-	maskedseed = em + 1;
-	maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-	if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
-		goto cleanup;
-	for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
-		seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
-
-	if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
-		goto cleanup;
-	for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
-		db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
-
-	if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
-		goto cleanup;
-
-	good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
-
-	found_one_byte = 0;
-	for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
-		{
-		/* Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */
-		unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
-		unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]);
-		one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1,
-			i, one_index);
-		found_one_byte |= equals1;
-		good &= (found_one_byte | equals0);
-		}
-
-	good &= found_one_byte;
-
-	/*
-	 * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid,
-	 * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
-	 * concern.
-	 */
-	if (!good)
-		goto decoding_err;
-
-	msg_index = one_index + 1;
-	mlen = dblen - msg_index;
-
-	if (tlen < mlen)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-		mlen = -1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
-		goto cleanup;
-		}
-
-decoding_err:
-	/* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
-	 * which kind of decoding error happened. */
-	RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
-cleanup:
-	if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
-	if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em);
-	return mlen;
-	}
-
-int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-	const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
-	{
-	long i, outlen = 0;
-	unsigned char cnt[4];
-	EVP_MD_CTX c;
-	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	int mdlen;
-	int rv = -1;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
-	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
-	if (mdlen < 0)
-		goto err;
-	for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
-		{
-		cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
-		cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
-		cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
-		cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
-		if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL)
-			|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
-			|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
-			goto err;
-		if (outlen + mdlen <= len)
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
-				goto err;
-			outlen += mdlen;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
-				goto err;
-			memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
-			outlen = len;
-			}
-		}
-	rv = 0;
-	err:
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
-	return rv;
-	}
-
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
-		 long seedlen)
-	{
-	return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
-	}
-#endif