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authorParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-04-08 11:38:09 +0200
committerParménides GV <parmegv@sdf.org>2014-04-08 11:43:27 +0200
commit5fc5d37330d3535a0f421632694d1e7918fc22d7 (patch)
tree1aad0c286e58962c8895854907e530b9bc9bce5a /app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
parentc206a91d320995f37f8abb33188bfd384249da3d (diff)
Compiles correctly: app/build-native + gradle.
Diffstat (limited to 'app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c')
-rw-r--r--app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c527
1 files changed, 527 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c b/app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c51c690b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/* crypto/asn1/x_crl.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED * const *b);
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r);
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer);
+
+static X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth =
+ {
+ 0,
+ 0,0,
+ def_crl_lookup,
+ def_crl_verify
+ };
+
+static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+
+/* The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation.
+ * Since we cache the original encoding the signature wont be affected by
+ * reordering of the revoked field.
+ */
+static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
+
+ if(!a || !a->revoked) return 1;
+ switch(operation) {
+ /* Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that
+ * would affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
+ */
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
+ ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+/* Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension.
+ * Check for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
+ */
+
+static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+
+ int i, j;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
+
+ revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+
+ gens = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++)
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev,
+ NID_certificate_issuer,
+ &j, NULL);
+ if (!gtmp && (j != -1))
+ {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (gtmp)
+ {
+ gens = gtmp;
+ if (!crl->issuers)
+ {
+ crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
+ if (!crl->issuers)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rev->issuer = gens;
+
+ reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason,
+ &j, NULL);
+ if (!reason && (j != -1))
+ {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (reason)
+ {
+ rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
+ }
+ else
+ rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
+
+ /* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */
+
+ exts = rev->extensions;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++)
+ {
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j);
+ if (ext->critical > 0)
+ {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) ==
+ NID_certificate_issuer)
+ continue;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ }
+
+/* The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
+ * and hash of the whole CRL.
+ */
+static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ int idx;
+
+ switch(operation)
+ {
+ case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ crl->idp = NULL;
+ crl->akid = NULL;
+ crl->flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ crl->meth = default_crl_method;
+ crl->meth_data = NULL;
+ crl->issuers = NULL;
+ crl->crl_number = NULL;
+ crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL);
+#endif
+ crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_issuing_distribution_point, NULL, NULL);
+ if (crl->idp)
+ setup_idp(crl, crl->idp);
+
+ crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+
+ crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL);
+
+ crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_delta_crl, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */
+ if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /* See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and
+ * indicate this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so
+ * anything else critical sets the flag.
+ *
+ * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly:
+ * applications shouldn't do this.
+ */
+
+ exts = crl->crl->extensions;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
+ {
+ int nid;
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object);
+ if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+ if (ext->critical > 0)
+ {
+ /* We handle IDP and deltas */
+ if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+ || (nid == NID_delta_crl))
+ break;;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if (!crl_set_issuers(crl))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init)
+ {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+ if (crl->meth->crl_free)
+ {
+ if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (crl->akid)
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+ if (crl->idp)
+ ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */
+
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
+ {
+ int idp_only = 0;
+ /* Set various flags according to IDP */
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
+ if (idp->onlyuser > 0)
+ {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyCA > 0)
+ {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyattr > 0)
+ {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
+ }
+
+ if (idp_only > 1)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
+
+ if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
+
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons)
+ {
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0)
+ crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1)
+ crl->idp_reasons |=
+ (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
+ crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ }
+
+ DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+ }
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
+
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED * const *b)
+ {
+ return(ASN1_STRING_cmp(
+ (ASN1_STRING *)(*a)->serialNumber,
+ (ASN1_STRING *)(*b)->serialNumber));
+ }
+
+int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+ X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
+ inf = crl->crl;
+ if(!inf->revoked)
+ inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ if(!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inf->enc.modified = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+ {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_verify)
+ return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+ {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x)
+ {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret,
+ X509_get_serialNumber(x),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+ {
+ return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+ crl->sig_alg, crl->signature,crl->crl,r));
+ }
+
+static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
+ X509_REVOKED *rev)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (!rev->issuer)
+ {
+ if (!nm)
+ return 1;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!nm)
+ nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer)
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
+ int idx;
+ rtmp.serialNumber = serial;
+ /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
+ * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
+ */
+ if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ }
+ idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
+ if(idx < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Need to look for matching name */
+ for(;idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++)
+ {
+ rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx);
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial))
+ return 0;
+ if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev))
+ {
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = rev;
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth)
+ {
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+ else
+ default_crl_method = meth;
+ }
+
+X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(
+ int (*crl_init)(X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_free)(X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_lookup)(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer),
+ int (*crl_verify)(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk))
+ {
+ X509_CRL_METHOD *m;
+ m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_CRL_METHOD));
+ if (!m)
+ return NULL;
+ m->crl_init = crl_init;
+ m->crl_free = crl_free;
+ m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup;
+ m->crl_verify = crl_verify;
+ m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
+ return m;
+ }
+
+void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m)
+ {
+ if (!(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC))
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ }
+
+void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat)
+ {
+ crl->meth_data = dat;
+ }
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ return crl->meth_data;
+ }
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_CRL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_CRL)